Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

II

Introduction

From the above analysis, we can deduce two different stages in the evolution ofIbn Rushd's view of the intellect. The first, which may be referred to as theIbn Bajja -Alexandrian phase, can be traced back to the two original versions of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis , i.e., those versions containing no amendments or additions; the second is that embodied in Al-sharh , and may be called theRushdi stage. Given that these two stages involve radically different and contradictory conceptions, our study may now proceed in one of two directions. One alternative would be to trace the evolution inIbn Rushd's writings; this would involve an examination of all three texts, and our analysis would proceed on the assumption that there are two discernible stages, and that the amendments in Al-Talkhis represent the middle ground between them. The other would be to attempt an analysis ofIbn Rushd's psychological system, or, more specifically, of his conception of the problem of the intellect. In this case we would no longer need to examine Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis or, indeed, refer to them.

Since the differences between the texts are clearly the result of a developing process, an examination focusing on all three texts would be awkward and misguided. We are, in effect, postulating the existence of two possible approaches towards the problem of the intellect, stemming from what is not merely an evolution but an enormous change inIbn Rushd's position, with two distinct stages being divided by a weak intermediate link (this link will be more fully considered later). Let us therefore now examine these stages more closely, confining ourselves, in our review, to those elements involving the material and theoretical intellect.

11.1. TheIbn Bajja -Alexandrian stage or theIbn Bajja -AlexandrianIbn Rushd

This stage, as noted above, combines two phases, contained in Al-Mukbtasar and Al-Talkhis . The rationale for combining these into one single stage springs from important perceived similarities between the two texts in question; nonetheless, there are also differences between them, particularly, as mentioned earlier, with respect to the respective strategies employed. The significant similarities stem from the fact thatIbn Rushd compiled both these texts in the light of others' viewpoints; he was, at this stage, much more dependent on the opinions and analyses of previous commentators, effectively seeing and hearing Aristotle through the eyes and ears of others rather than cultivating his own independent perceptions. At the beginning he was primarily influenced byIbn Bajja , then, later, by Alexander, and he only freed himself of these influences, finally, when he composed Al-Sharh al-kabir ; it is in this text that we are offered a new image ofIbn Ru hd , which best captures the independence and uniqueness of his thought. Al-Sharh's originality gives a sense of personal satisfaction, making all our arduous and painstaking efforts appear worthwhile in the end. As we followIbn Rushd's argument, we are struck by the insightful way hecriticises the positions of earlier writers, positions which he himself had earlier upheld in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis ; and, as such, his arguments might be interpreted as a form of self-criticism and self-revision. This is why I have combinedAlMukk tasar and Al-Talk-1 is as representing a single stage, with the second stage represented by Al-Sharh . Let us begin by examining the two phases of the first stage as articulated in the original texts.

For all the difficulties associated with reading Al-Mukhtasar , its analysis can reasonably be seen ascentring around the theoretical intellect or theoreticalintelligibles . He regards theseintelligibles as the most important structural element in his theory of the intellect, other elements having importance only in so far as they elucidate the nature of theintelligibles themselves-this applying, also, to the material and active intellect, which he considers to constitute the matter and form of theintelligibles (there will be an opportunity to examine this structure in more detail later in the paper). It is this conception ofintelligibles which distinguishes Al-Mukhtasar from Al-Talkhis . Yet despite these differences-which become still more marked when we compare Al-Talkhis with Al-Sharh -the two works do in fact share a common approach.

In the first stage of his analysisIbn Rushd concludes thatintelligibles are subject to alteration. They therefore necessarily possess matter and have in the first place a potential existence and in the second place an actual existence. They are contingent, corruptible and plural with regard to the plurality of objects and they are numerous in the range of their numbers. This is significant when it is considered that their conjunction with imaginative forms is spontaneous. The analysis showsIbn Rushd followingIbn Bajja's conclusions as set out inRisalat al-ittisnl , although he never in fact mentionsIbn Bajja by name.27 It must beemphasised that this position is very different from the one adopted in Al-Shtarh , where he asserts that the theoretical intellect is eternal with respect to its substance and a corruptible entity with respect to its action-intelligibles being, in other words, linked with two objects: the material intellect which is eternal and imaginative forms which are a corruptible entity.28 This analysis is equally relevant for understanding the positions found in Al-Mukbtasar , particularly his concept of the material intellect or the matter ofintelligibles . WhenIbn Rushd distinguishes between the form and the matter ofintelligibles he states quite clearly that their form, which is the active intellect, remains unchanged, being neither generating nor corrupting. When considering the matter ofintelligibles , however, he shows awareness of disagreements between the earlier commentators, and, by adopting the stand ofIbn Bajja , he rejects the other positions, particularly the view that the material intellect is an eternal substance; this rejection stemming from the contradiction inherent in the proposition that the intellect is eternal while theintelligibles found in it are contingent. Contingency,Ibn Rushd says, is incompatible with an eternal substance; and ifintelligibles were in fact contingent, then the material intellect would also have to be contingent, because the material intellect is merely the capacity giving rise to the formation ofintelligibles . This capacity is irreducible, and it is thus necessarily a special object, which is neither body nor intellect, but rather a soul. The conception of the soul is seen as being the object ofintelligibles and is represented by imaginative forms-hence, the capacity found in imaginative forms capable of acceptingintelligibles is the material intellect. The habituated or theoretical intellect can best be explained as theactualisation ofintelligibles which had previously existed inpotentia .Ibn Rushd buttresses his interpretation by citing examples used by Aristotle, especially when attempting to define the passivity of the intellect by comparing it to the passivity of the tablet which is merely disposed to writing. He states that the capacity of the imaginative faculty to acceptintelligibles is similar to the corresponding relationship between the tablet and writing; the soul, subject to this capacity, being in the position of the tablet. Yet this capacity is not an actual thing in and of itself; thus the concept of passivity cannot really be applied to it. This analysis is no more than an interpretation ofIbn Bajja's propositions.29 By the admission ofIbn Rushd himself,Ibn Bajja was the first commentator to state that the material intellect is merely a capacity found in imaginative forms; a capacity able to acceptintelligibles . This interpretationendeavours to surmount some of the absurdities put forth by Alexander. The conclusion in Al-sharh is that the material intellect is neither an actual thing nor an explicitly eternal thing or separate substance. It is evident that a considerable interval separated the two stages as reflected in the two positions in question. Some of the reasons which ledIbn Rind, subsequently, to revise and amend Al-Mukhtasar have already been pointed out.

Such, then, is the basic nature of the first phase of this stage. The important points to bear in mind include the wayIbn Rushd deals with the problem of conjunction as set out inIbn Bajja's famous treatise on the subject and the way he adoptsIbn Bajja's interpretation of the problem of the intellect, and his arguments should also be examined in the light of the selected themes and subsequent amendments in Al-Mukhtasar . Let us now examine the second phase of this stage, as represented in the text of Al-Talkhis .

Whereas the argument of Al-Mukhtasar revolved around the theoretical intellect orintelligibles , the analytical thrust of Al-Talkhis is primarily directed towards the material intellect and its role in the process of intellection.30 This thematic difference between the two texts is both marked and significant.31

The change reflects the evolving position ofIbn Rushd on the problem of the intellect and, in particular, on the question of the material intellect, and it can, as mentioned earlier, be generally explained in terms ofIbn Rushd's transition from an echoing ofIbn Bajja's stand to his subsequent inclination towards the views of Alexander (though the two commentators do, we should remember, share the view that the material intellect is only a capacity and not a separate substance). Let us therefore consider further the full significance of the differences between Al-TaWhis and Al-Mukhtasar , and let us focus on the amendments incorporated in Al-Talk) is, especially those relating to the nature of the material intellect, which mark a revolution inIbn Rushd's view of the subject and, indeed, on the entire question of the intellect-a revolution which later becomes fully articulated in Al-Sharh .

Ibn Rushd begins, in accordance with the text of Aristotle, by stating that the faculty capable of acceptingintelligibles is neither passive nor subject to change. If there is indeed any question of passivity, this is merely confined to the acceptance of theintelligibles and does not imply mixing with any of the material forms. By this,Ibn Rus_hd means that the material intellect is the accepting faculty, accepting and comprehending all forms and all things. However, if it were to accept any forms, we would have to uphold one of the two following explanations: either it does not comprehend the other forms, only the form with which it is mixed; or it would be a mixed form which would change what it comprehends through the intellect, and it would thus be unable to comprehend fully the essence of things as they really are.

The material intellect is unable to mix with anything and is hence only a capacity; this implying, too, that the potential intellect is merely a capacity, containing nothing. However, although it is an object ultimately incapable of mixing, it is not to be classified as a subject of the potential intellect. On the whole the intellect carries a sense of passivity which is not confined to the process of acceptance only, and the subject of this acceptance is not a thing but a capacity able to acceptintelligibles ; there can be no notion of an independently existing capacity. This, as is well known, represents a summary of Alexander's position on the material intellect, and it is this position which is incorporated within A1-Talkhis, or at least in the passage from Al-Talkhis noted above.

Among the many features of Al-Talkkis which help to clarifyIbn Rushd's concept of the material intellect, the most prominent is the passage in which he compares the capacity in the intellect with the potentiality in the tablet to accept writing. Heemphasises that, just as the capacity found on the surface of the tablet does not mix with the tablet itself, so this is the case, also, with the intellect and theintelligibles . The acceptance of the tablet does not signify passivity, and, analogously, the acceptance of the intellect is neither passive nor active. This interpretation differs from the one given in Al-Mukhtasar , where the capacity is represented by the ability of imaginative forms to acceptintelligibles -a capacity, that is, whose object is embodied in the imaginary processes of the soul. However, in this case the capacity is not conceived as being similar to the blank tablet, and this is because the intellect as such is perceived as being a capacity and not an actual thing. As for the written tablet it resembles the perfected intellect while the actualintelligibles represent another type of intellect.

The analogy of the tablet helps us to understand the evolution inIbn Rushd's position on the material intellect, not only in connection with the transition from Al-Muk_htasar to Al-Talkh -is but also with respect to its final version as found in Al-Sharh al-kabir . In this final versionIbn Rus_hd traces the different positions back to their original authors,32 and it is in this context that he severelycriticises Alexander's comparison of the intellect with the potentiality found in the tablet. His other criticisms will be examined later.

Other themes connected withIbn Rushd's discussion of the active intellect should also be briefly noted: the first of these concerns the ontological nature of the active intellect, and the second its role in the process of intellection and cognition (ma'rifa ).

He begins his first discussion in Al-Talkhis by citing an Aristotelian proposition that establishes a correspondence between the intellect and material things. Aristotle asserts that there exist, in all categories of natural matter, two things in opposition: that which has the capacity to receive and that which is the agent; the receptive capacity is potential in all things that exist, while the agent acts in everything within these categories.Ibn Ruhd applies this notion of Aristotelian opposition to his concept of the intellect, thereby postulating the existence of an active and passive intellect;33 and, despite the difference between this and what he later concludes in Al-Sharh , he continues to maintain that the active intellect is a transcendent substance, not a corruptible entity, comprehending its own essence when it is separated from humanity and comprehending the material affairs of the world when it is linked to humanity. As such, the intellect andintelligibles , contrary toIbn Rushd's later conception of the material intellect, are one and the same.

The second discussion in Al-Talkhis focuses on the process of intellection, with analysiscentring on the active intellect to the exclusion of others. Like Aristotle,Ibn Rushd compares the role of this intellect with light; more precisely, it is a light which translatescolours from potentiality to actuality, thus enabling the eye to see and experience them. Similarly, the active intellect provides the material intellect with the capacity for acceptingintelligibles , and this capacity further changes the imaginary representations of theintelligibles until they are no longer potential butactualised . Though this description is very similar to what is contained in Al-Sharh , the passage still leaves us with some difficulties and questions.

The preceding discussion touches upon the most important points contained in Al-Talk is. There is, however, another dimension to this text which in effect makes it an intermediate link between the first and second stages ofIbn Rushd's thought. It is possible to examine this text from two different angles: on the one hand, it can be viewed, along with Al-Mukhrasar , as constituting the first stage in the evolution ofIbn Rushd's psychological system; on the other, it can be seen as representing a bridge by means of which he was able to construct another version or form of the problem of the intellect. This dual viewpoint is made possible by the very nature of the amendments in Al-Talkhis ; for these not only help us to distinguish the differences between Al-Talkis and Al-Mukhtasar , but also allow us to evaluate Al-Talkhis vis -ـ -vis Al-Sharh . The amendment to the analogy of the tablet marks the first transition from the former position, with the material intellect, regardless of the arguments put forth byIbn Bajja or the Alexandrian school, now viewed simply as a capacity. As noted earlier, this change does not completelycrystallise into a new position, but rather foreshadows the new developments that eventually took place in Al-Sharh . Let us now, as an introduction to the changes occurring in the second stage ofIbn Ruhd's thought, examine the context from which the amendment emerged, confining our examination, for the moment, to a discussion of the nature of the material intellect and leaving till later a more general consideration of the intellect as a whole.

It is immediately apparent that the amendment reflectsIbn Rushd's struggle with the difficulties and absurdities inherent in Alexander's position (which, it will be recalled, he had earlier upheld, together with corresponding positions attributed toThemistius and other ancient commentators); he is attempting to formulate a conciliatory viewpoint through which to establish an appropriate interpretation of the viewpoints of the Alexandrian school.

He maintains, as Alexander had also done, that the material intellect is a capacity independent of material forms, but claims that it is also a transcendent substance invested with this capacity. In other words, this capacity is found in Man, and yet it is solely an object connected to a transcendent substance. It is not, as claimed by earlier commentators, a capacity existing, as it were, by the very nature of this transcendent substance; nor is it, as Alexander had claimed, a mere capacity.

The material intellect is a product of the conjunction between a transcendent substance and the capacity existing in Man. It can also be viewed as a compound of the capacity and its connection with the intellect. We must, therefore, seek to understand the nature of this compound and of the capacity inherent in it, and, also, to understand the link between the transcendent substance and its corresponding capacity. As for the transcendent substance, what is meant by it here is clearly the active intellect, the implication being that this intellect becomes a potential intellect in the state of conjunction. The substance of the active intellect is transformed when it is invested with a certain type of capacity, the character of which is best understood as the continuous movement from potentiality to actuality. In this movement the action of the intellect is transformed from one state to another; in other words the active intellect is eventually transformed into a material intellect, while the material intellect is, in its turn, eventually transformed into an active intellect.Ibn Rushd's rationale for this analysis is that he views the intellect as being one thing which yet contains two functions with respect to the soul: the first being the action ofintelligibles , and the second that of acceptingintelligibles .

While the identity and meaning of the separate substance has now been clarified, the notion of "capacity found in Man" remains somewhat obscure: we do not, for example, know whether this capacity is an intellect or a soul, or, moreover, whether it is capable of mixing with any of the faculties in the body. This obscurity can be attributed to the fact thatIbn Rushd did not himself define the nature of this capacity and its contents-which means that we also do not know the meaning of his statement that the material intellect is a compound of the capacity and that the intellect is linked with this capacity. A possible explanation can be found if we assume that the material intellect is not in itself a separate substance. Such an assertion would, however, run contrary toIbn Rushd's later conclusion in Al-Sharh , where he makes a clear distinction between the active and the material intellect, considering them both to be transcendent substances, neither generating nor corrupting. We do not, though, know whether this amendment in Al-Talk/is refers to the material or the active intellect34

Ibn Rushd is advancing, through this amendment, a new interpretation which he believes accurately reflects the original view of Aristotle, and he refers to this interpretation as the "school of synthesis", implying, by the latter term, a middle road between the views of Alexander and those of other commentators on the nature of the material intellect. According toIbn Rushd , the synthesis enables him to go beyond the absurdities inherent in these, the avowed aim being to free himself from the necessity to debase a transcendent thing in whose substance some capacity exists, merely because this transcendent thing happens to exist in conjunction with Man rather than by virtue of its own nature. He further notes that the synthesis frees him from the necessity of limiting the potential intellect to being solely a capacity, merely on the basis that there is, somehow, a separate thing to which this capacity accidentally clings.

For all his claims,Ibn Rushd ultimately fails to construct a genuine synthesis; its falsity and incoherence soon, indeed, become clear to him, leading him to embark on a revision of his views in Al-Sharh al-kabir , where he does not refer to the doctrine of synthesis, but laboriously examines, one by one, the views of the schools ofIbn Bajja , Alexander andThemistius , thencriticises them by comparison with the original Aristotelian text. And from the springboard which this critical strategy provides he simultaneously articulates and justifies his own new interpretation.Ibn Rushd's influence on the development of philosophy among theLatins , from the middle of the 13th century onwards, can be traced back to the legacy of this critical method.

Such, then, are the main characteristics ofIbn Rind's new position-a position which, as noted earlier, represents both the end of the first stage of his thought and a link or bridge, with respect to postulations about the material intellect, to the subsequent stage. It now remains to demonstrate how the analytical strands of this new position culminated in the creation of a new, second stage in his writings.

11.2. TheRushdi stage; or theRushdi Ibn Rushd

This final stage was the fruit of more than thirty years of study and ceaseless probing. In retrospect, his writings can best be interpreted as a quest for both an original and an authentic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical system-a quest sustained, as it were, both through a persistent dialogue with Aristotle's writings and through a concurrent critical engagement with major thinkers within the Aristotelian heritage.

Ibn Rushd's commentary on De Anima is, as I have noted in an earlier work,35 the most important text among his psychological writings. Let us now examine it in detail, in order toanalyse the evolution of his thought, and, more importantly, to assess the originality of his philosophical contribution.

The preceding analysis of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tabs revealed the gradual processes wherebyIbn Rushd critically rejected the views of Alexander and, subsequently, those ofIbn Bajja , thereby exorcising theAlexandrianIbn Bajja influences in his own earlier writings. A similar transition had also in fact occurred with respect to Abu Nasr al-Farabi : his earlier writings on logic had been deeply influenced by al-Farabi's views, but in a later commentary on theAnalytica Posteriora (Al-Burhdn ) he severelycriticised al-Farabi on account of views which he himself had specifically upheld earlier inMukhtasar al-Burhan (Epitome ofAnalytica Posteriora )36 Ibn Rushd's revisionist inclinations aptly demonstrate the degree ofrigour and seriousness with which he pursued his philosophical vocation; and there is no better example of thisrigour than Al-sharh al-kabir , which formulates a completely different psychological system and a completely different approach to the problem of the intellect, whose force almost annuls much of what he had previously written in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis .

The analysis of Al-Sharh will be conducted somewhat differently from those made of Al-Mukbtasar and Al-Talkhis , the reason being that the original Arabic text of the work is lost; the earliest authoritative version is in fact preserved in a Latin translation. For the purposes of this paper I shall be basing myself on sections of the text which have been translated into French from the Latin version37 and on portions of the text which have been recorded in the margins of the manuscript copies of A1-Talkhis found in the Modena library. Let us begin by briefly reviewing the central strands of this text, which sufficiently indicate the complete transformation inIbn Rushd's thought.

The transformation appears not only in the new views advanced but in the very style in which Al-Sharh is written. There is a conscious attempt, onIbn Rushd's part, to articulate processes of thought which have now led him to confront hitherto unexplored questions and unexamined obscurities. The conclusions reached in the work are advanced in a manner which implicitly suggests a new set of perspectives.

Ibn Rushd immediately makes it clear that the material intellect38 constitutes the central theme of this text,39 but he also clearly indicates, thereafter, that the examination of the material intellect in isolation from the other faculties would be impractical and misguided. As such, the scope of changes in Al-Sarh affects not only the conception of the material intellect, as previously articulated in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis , but his entire psychological structure, involving all the major elements from the intellect, theoreticalintelligibles and the active intellect to imaginary representations. The implications of these structural changes are examined from the perspective both of epistemological states and of the different ontological states in question; his discussion of the material intellect is thus constantly linked up with all the other aspects of the intellect. With regard to the relationship between the material intellect and the senses,Ibn Rusted states that, while the material intellect is not affected by a passivity similar to that of the senses, and does not experience change analogous to what the senses undergo, there does nonetheless exist within it a concept of passivity whose meaning is subsumed within its function of acceptance. The material intellect is regarded as belonging among the genus of passive faculties, and is thus rightfully distinguished from the active intellect, yet it is neither a body nor a faculty within a body; it is, in effect, a substance which accepts all forms without itself being one of the forms it accepts. This is because the material forms are not separate, whereas the material intellect is simple and separate. The material intellect is devoid of a specific nature, except in so far as it exists inpotentia . It contains, potentially, all universal materialintelligibles , but in actuality it is not a thing prior to its being endowed with the faculty of reason.40 Hence it differs from the irrational prime matter which accepts particular forms, and, similarly, differs from the form, the matter and the compound of both. It is a part of a particular mode of existence. To assert that the material intellect exists inpotentia does not mean that it is not a definite thing or a substance; what is implied is that, whatever the substrate bears, it cannot exist in actuality and thus cannot be taken in an absolute sense, but should rather be approached in a qualified manner. However, the substrate need not be a definite thing in actuality; rather, what the substrate bears should not be found in it in actuality.

The first obstacle to understanding the nature of this intellect is the question of how it can be from the genus of the passive faculties, while at the same time being simple, separate and not mixed in with the body. If we say that it is separate and simple, does this mean that the intellect and theintelligibles within it are one, as is the case with the active and separate intellects? This is a second difficulty.

The solution to the first difficulty lies in defining the concept of passivity in the context of the material intellect; for passivity, here, has aspecialised meaning, implying a form of changeless potentiality, analogous to the disposition in the tablet to receive writing without being affected by passivity or change. Just as the tablet does not bear any writing either in actuality or inpotentia approaching actuality, so the material intellect does not embrace any of the intelligible forms which it accepts, either in actuality or inpotentia approaching actuality. It would be wrong to say, with Alexander, that the material intellect is similar to the disposition that exists in the tablet, rather than to the tablet itself inasmuch as it is disposed41 This is because we must first know the nature of the thing that is disposed before we can completely know the nature of the disposition-this because the material intellect is not only a disposition. Here, clearly,Ibn Rushd is not onlycriticising the views of Alexander, but also laying aside his own positions in Al-Talkis and Al-Mukasar . Heemphasises for the first tune that the capacity within the intellect is different from all other capacities, since it does not bear anyintelligibles , either in actuality or inpotentia , and is neither a body nor a faculty within a body. Nor is it a capacity existing within imaginative forms; for, among the many other absurdities enumerated,42 this would make it a faculty within a body and therefore accepting the intellect itself.

As for the second difficulty, he asserts that the material intellect is closer to the other faculties of intellection than to separate intellects. There is, however, an important distinction, namely that it is, in its essence, an intellect existing in actuality, while the other intellects exist inpotentia . He further states, however, that the material intellect ranks lowest among the separate intellects, in that the action of the material intellect is less powerful than that of the separate intellects. Furthermore, the material intellect is marked more by passivity than by activity, and in this respect it differs from the active intellect43

In Al-Sharh the material intellect is not simply discussed for the elementary purposes of formulating a new definition, but is alsoanalysed for its philosophical significance.Ibn Rushd daringly asserts that the material intellect is eternal and unitary with respect to mankind, and it is this which underlines the radical transformation in his thought and the revolt against his own earlier positions and those of his predecessors. It is not possible, here, toanalyse the significance of this assertion in detail; this paper will rather content itself with a brief review of the changes arising out of the new position. To this end, we mustanalyse the text with reference to general approach, content of the dialogue, criticism and the final conclusions embodied in the text, as against those reached in his earlier writings.

Ibn Rushd has finally broken away from Alexander's position on the material intellect, which he himself had earlier upheld, and, just as he had attackedIbn Bajja's writings, so hecriticises the school ofThemistius and others for their views on the theoretical intellect and the active intellect.44 The main criticism is directed againstThemistius ' view that the theoretical intellect springs from the conjunction of the active and material intellect within us, and is therefore external. Since the first two intellects are external,Ibn Rushd asserts thatThemistius ' viewpoint has departed from that of Aristotle and is in opposition to truth itself.Ibn Rushd had alreadycriticised this position earlier, in Al-Mukhtasar , but there his criticism reflects his adoption of theIbn Bajja or Alexandrian school, whereas now it springs from a new position and a new conception of the system of relations required by the process of intellection. The criticism is equally determined by the ontological position of the material and active intellect, together with the role played by imaginary representations. All this is in contrast to the viewpoint of earlier schools, which had concluded the theoretical intellect to be eternal. It is this belief, inIbn Rushd's view, that will eventually lead to absurdities undermining the process of intellection and the intellect itself.

The intellect is indeed the offspring of the material and active intellect, yet different from both. The compound of two things which are eternal, as the material and active intellect are, must itself necessarily be eternal and one. There is, however, another important element neglected byThemistius and his followers, namely the decisive role played by imaginative forms in the process of intellection. In this respect, the connection of the theoretical intellect to its activity regarding imaginary representations in particular is

corrupting and multiple, due to the corruption and multiplicity of the imaginary representations themselves. This necessary connection is similar to the connection existing between the senses andsensibles . Just as the senses do not perceive anything without the presence ofsensibles , so, similarly, the rational faculty does notconceptualise without imagination. Hence the intellect andintelligibles are not to be seen as contingent, generating and corrupting.

Yet it cannot be conceived thatintelligibles are contingent while the intellect is eternal; for this would not correspond with the proposition that the material intellect is eternal and one. In other words, if the material intellect is the first perfection of Man and the theoretical intellect is the second perfection, then both these categories should be functioning under the same conditions. For example, if Man is generating and corrupting, this would apply equally to the first and second perfection within Man-a viewpoint which contradicts earlier conclusions and leads to absurdities and ambiguities concerning the material intellect. The assertion, for example, that the material intellect is a body or a faculty within a body could not possibly be upheld, since it has already been postulated that the intellect is not generating or corrupting. When we say that the first perfection is one and not multiple in relation to the human race, then inescapable ambiguities emerge, which can only be resolved if we assert that the first perfection is an individual concept embedded in matter, which is corruptible and multiple in relation to. the multiplicity of individuals. We are then left with several questions: can we resolve this problem, and what exactly is the nature of the theoretical intellect and theoreticalintelligibles if we are to assume that the material intellect is one and eternal?

Alexander resolves the problem by stating that the material intellect is generating and corrupting, and is at the same time a faculty. ThisIbn Rushd rejects, just as he rejectedIbn Bajja's position, which, in his view, did not satisfactorily resolve Alexander's inconsistencies. All earlier views are in fact judged inadequate, the only way out being through the assertion that theoreticalintelligibles have two elements, the first contingent and the second eternal. The first element makes them contingent and the second element makes them one of the existents. Imaginative forms are the first element and the material intellect is the second element. Imaginary representations or forms set the intellect into motion, this motion arising out of the process whereby the active intellect has transformed imaginary representations from potentialintelligibles into activeintelligibles .

I conclude, withIbn Rushd , that there are two separate aspects tointelligibles : with respect to the subject which makes them contingent they are generating and corrupting, while with respect to the material intellect which makes them one of the existents of the world they are eternal; from this perspective they can be viewed as simultaneously generating, corrupting and eternal. The theoretical intellect is, in other words, eternal with respect to its activity. This solution bypasses the difficulties and absurdities found in the previous schools of commentators, andIbn Rushd takes evident pride in his significant discovery, which enables him to uphold and further fortify his central thesis about the intellect and its eternity45

Conclusion

These, then, are some of the major points it has been possible to derive fromIbn Rushd's key psychological texts. It has not been the aim of this study toanalyse the points in full critical detail, but rather to explore the transformation in approaches to the problem of the intellect up to the writing of Al-Sharh . If the paper has shed some light on this area, then any oversights apparent in the analysis may perhaps be excused.

There are, I am convinced, two distinct phases in the evolution ofIbn Rushd's psychological system-this is indeed the claim from which the study begins-and the recognition of an evolution in his thought provides further encouragement for taking a more chronologically systematic approach to theRushdi corpus. The discovery of amendments, as in the case of Al-Mulchtasar and Al-Talkhis , will inevitably lead us to labelIbn Rushd's earlier writings as obsolete, yet such an approach will, nevertheless, ultimately provide us with deeper and richer insights. It would in any case be mere obstinacy to ignore such established differences between texts as occur in the various versions of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tallliis .46

What must now be investigated is the nature and philosophical significance of the evolution inIbn Rushd's thought. Was it, for example, an evolution born of successive and laborious interpretations of the Aristotelian text, or did it rather reflect a philosophical curiosity in search of new horizons beyond the limits of the original text? In either case what is the scope and depth of this evolution? Is it possible to speak of an evolution or a change within the context of an interpretative philosophy? These and other such questions represent a whole new and vital area of study. For the moment I shall rest content merely with raising them, in the hope of tackling them in a future study.