Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

3 Wahhabism in a British context

3.1 Biographical analysis of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab

In order to understand the generally accepted definition of Wahhabism, the endeavours of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab need to be put into context. Even if Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were to be regarded as the source of all Islamist activities, there is enough in his biography to disregard his influence on Muslims around the world.

Wahhabism is widely reported to have originated in eighteenth century Saudi Arabia as a purist Islamic movement which eventually dominated the various tribes and minority groups in the Najd area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in the town of Uyainah in 1702 or 1703 (Allen, 2007:42), was its founder. His early years were characterised by being a devoted student of religion (Allen, 2007:48) who at the age of ten could recite the whole Qur’an from memory. His father was a judge who followed the Hanbali School of jurisprudence and was descended from a long line of respected jurists who were also Hanbalis. One of the key influences on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would appear to have been Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim ibn Sayf (d. unknown), an admirer of Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) theology. Ibn Sayf introduced him to a teacher ofhadith called Muhammad Hayat of Sindh (d. unknown) who was a follower of the Shafi’i School of jurisprudence and a Naqshbandi Sufi.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was already showing hard-line and intolerant tendencies in his twenties, apparently as a reaction to Sufism and there was an uncomfortable encounter with his father and his uncle who was also a religious teacher. He believed that Sufism’s teaching of tolerance towards people in general had weakened the militant streak in Arabs of the Najd region and this allowed colonialist powers to gain a foothold. He also came up against the scholars of the day with his puritanical approach to Islam. The scholars of his then dwelling place, Uyainah, denounced him as a schismatic, branded him a heretic and ordered him to leave the town. He went to live with his father who had moved to Huraymila but his views were not accepted there either. He thereafter kept his views to himself until his father’s death in 1740. After that he took over as judge and began to ‘act and pronounce judgement in accordance with his new teachings.’ (Allen, 2007:51). The populace turned on him and he fled Huraymila and sought refuge back in Uyainah.

Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263−1328) influence on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was through his teacher Ibn Sayf. The former’s purist movement was as a result of the Mongol invasion in which thousands of Muslims were slaughtered at the hands of Hulaku Khan (d. 1265). Ibn Taymiyya’s desire to purify Islam was intended to pull the Muslim world out of its despair by returning it to the original teachings of Islam. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, although apparently one in a line of Islamist revivers, regarded Muslims whom he saw as apostates as the enemy of the religion.

Following his initial rejection by contemporary scholars, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab made a comeback through marriage ties to the ancestors of the current Saudi regime and it is this tactic throughout his remaining life that enabled him to stay at the centre of the political scene and establish his power in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Saud of the Aal Saud (Family of Saud) established close ties with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744 and declared himself as Amir with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as Imam. This Imam-Amir coalition was to form the basis of the ruling administration in the Kingdom today. It was an approach which was successful in oppressing minority groups such as Shiites and Sufis. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab successfully merged Islam and politics in the form of a holyjihad . In return for allegiance he promised Paradise.

Both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab allowedjihad against one’s (unjust) rulers even though both belonged to the Hanbali School offiqh and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) prohibited this.

The intolerance of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is shown in the attacks on the graves of prominent personalities of Islam’s history in 1802. Imam Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud’s eldest son, Saud ibn Saud, attacked the sacred shrine of the Shiites in which Husayn, grandson of the Prophet and son of Imam Ali is buried. Allen quotes Lieutenant Francis Warden as saying that they ‘pillaged…and plundered the Tomb of Hossein…slaying in the course of the day, with…cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants.’ (Allen, 2007:63). The Turkish government could take criticism as having failed to protect the tombs and the people that visited them, however, the trend of militancy shown by the followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was clear. Therefore Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’sjihad is a unique phenomenon in Islamic history and should be treated as such.

The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad in which the lesser jihad is compared and contrasted with the greater jihad highlights the inherent risk of jihadis turning off in periods of peace. [12] The Prophet explained how the jihad al-nafs (combat with the self) is superior to the jihad against a foe because the inner enemy is unseen, unexpected and requires self-appraisal which is harder on the ego ( nafs ) than appraising other people. Furthermore, the diversion of the Companions’ attention to themselves is a way of shutting down the frame of mind in which one is mentally prepared to kill or be killed. The original Wahhabi movement fell foul of this flaw and it is seen how the warring tendency within the Najdi tribe has not changed until this day. This tendency to wage war appears to have continued to this day with Arabs often being accused of promoting a ‘culture of violence’ [13] even in today’s society in which humanity prides itself in its civilised manners. This to an extent explains why the Taliban have continued in their quest for jihad after being supported by the United States against Russia during the 1980s.

Despite the Saudi administration’s bloody beginnings, it has endured as an ally to the West, supplying it with oil for the best part of a century along with opportunities for a growing number of expatriates.[14] Despite this, a cost cannot be put on the calamitous effect that the apparent oppression has had on the now minority groups within the Kingdom. In more recent years, it is reported that there is somewhat of a tolerance-through-ignorance policy in operation where the Kingdom chooses to turn a blind eye towards minority groups because it struggles to embrace them openly[15]

The current state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia belies Delong-Bas’ (2004:17) portrayal of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a pacifist: how is it possible that Saudi Arabia, where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings are venerated, is accused of oppression towards women and other minority Muslims in the name of Islam? Muslim women were not allowed until recent times to drive cars on their own under the ruling ofsad al-dharai . [16]

Some of the issues in the state of Arab society in the Najd area today with regard to women’s rights and the rights of minority Muslims may well be as a result of scholars selectively following the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. If it is possible for this to occur with the original sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) then it is also possible for it to occur with the works of someone such as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Though so-called radical groups within Britain display a desire to purify Islam and for military and political dominance, any link with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is untenable. Though, given that he is regarded highly, he must accept some culpability.

Allen’s (2007) depiction of a link between purist movements in the Najd area, the Indian sub-continent, Ikhwan reformers of Egypt and Afghan tribes is based on the relationship that Shah Waliullah (d. 1762), a key influential figure of purist movements within the Indian sub-continent, had with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: they both studied with the same teachers in Madina and possibly even attended the same lectures together and discussed the same topics. He further claims a link between so-called Wahhabi groups and Deobandi[17] and Ahl-i-Hadith[18] preachers in the Indian sub-continent stretching back to the eighteenth century. This is also untenable because his writing contradicts itself when he goes on to say how the Ahl-i-Hadith of India refuted this link when they petitioned the Government of India to stop using the term ‘Wahhabi’ in relation to them and the group also denied any links with Wahhabism.

The circumstances regarding each instance of radical behaviour are different, whether it was in the case of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or Britons. In order to understand who the Wahhabis of Britain could be, an understanding of the main Islamist groups is needed.

3.2 Islamist groups of Britain

Anti-Wahhabists attempt and often fail to demonstrate clearly that there is a political link between acts of violence in the name of Islam and the influence of the Saudi administration. The Saudi government being Arab and the apparent 9/11 suicide bombers coming from Saudi Arabia is a very convenient correlation. The 7/7 attacks in London, however, began to challenge the Wahhabi-Saudi link. Modern literature has begun now to focus on what influences people of Britain. The difficulty in literature on this subject is in being able to identify clearly who in Britain are the candidates for the label of ‘Wahhabi’.

3.2.1 The Salafiyyah

The Salafiyyah could be regarded as similar to Ahl-i-hadith in their Islamic outlook. The Salafiyyah movement is often deemed to be closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab due to the obvious reverence that they afford him by studying his famousKitab al-Tawhid , commentated on many times over by various Saudi shaykhs and selling on Salafi websites and in their bookshops. However, alongside Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s books one can at times also find Natana Delong-Bas’ book entitledWahhabi Islam [19] which portrays Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a positive manner and as someone who did not actively promote any form of violence.

Geaves (2000: 54) writes how the origins of what is labelled as the Salafiyyah movement in the UK are based on the teachings of Egyptian reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). Strangely, Abduh was in favour of legal reform within the Muslim world and used rationality in the application ofmaslaha [20] to reform law. Three examples of controversial decrees of his are allowing Muslims to accept interest and dividends, to eat meat prepared by non-Muslims in foreign lands and to allow Muslims to wear non-traditional dress.[21] These views are liberal as compared to the likes of Rashid Rida. Though the Salafiyyah may be regarded as purist Muslims, in Britain their focus is on the teachings of Islam and they are not reliably known to be involved in Islamic political activism.

Geaves (2000:57) explains that according to Joffe (1998) the Salafi movement’s activities in attempting to purify Islam ‘coincided with socio-political and economic developments in the Middle East which paralleled the reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the Transformation of Egypt in the 1920s.’ Modern Salafis greatly identify themselves with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; however, their identity is complicated because their scholars are also known to denounce terrorism,[22] although terrorists would also identify with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Terrorism or ‘extremist’ Islam therefore does not have a clear-cut face within the Salafi community. Geaves (2000:57) points out that ’[t]he main thrust of the attack was not directed at the West, but at the need to purify Islam from the teachings and practices of the Sufi tariqas’ − implying that although some of the initiatives of the Salafis may have been identical to the Wahhabis, that religious militancy has not necessarily translated into extremism or violence.

The writings of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) are often deemed to be an influence on the modern terrorist;[23] however, similarly to Ibn Taymiyyah, the context of Qutb’s writing was his reaction to colonialism within Egypt whereas within Britain, the immigrants from South Asia and the first and second generation Muslims are here by choice. Therefore, the link between Middle Eastern reformers and British Muslims is not reliable. Furthermore, Qutb’s intellectual ancestor was Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and as described above he espoused a more accommodating view of Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims. Abduh had been in favour oftalfīq . [24] Abduh himself was not averse to Sufism, having been involved in it during his life. He had always retained a respect for it.[25] The two approaches of Abduh and Qutb at times are in some ways different: Abduh’s desire to evolve Islamic law in a constantly changing world was not seen in the same way within the writing of Qutb who espoused a move away from thejahiliyyah (ignorance) of western societies and a return to original Islamic principles. Qutb’s writings should therefore be taken with some caution.

The mix of ideologies that were evolving in the Middle East during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have also appeared within Britain and often manifest themselves in fiery speeches delivered by impassioned imams at Friday prayers and other Muslim festivities such as the two Eid prayers and the twenty-seventh night of Ramadan and arguably also in the above mentioned suicide attack.[26]

3.2.2 Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahl-i-hadith

These groups originated in the Indian sub-continent. None of them accepts the label of ‘Wahhabi’ which they regard as a term that describes a zealot or excessively purist Muslim. The relationship between Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-i-hadith[27] is rarely amicable.

Barelvis[28] usually label the Deobandis, Ahl-i-hadith, Salafi and others who generally do not carry out themawlid or birthday celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad,urs (anniversary of death) of a dead Shaykh as Wahhabi. [29] Deobandis and Barelvis send blessings on the Prophet Muhammad regularly and Geaves’s (2000:54) statement that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab banned such practises distances both these groups from Wahhabism.

This also challenges the impression that Geaves gives about the Deobandis being ‘Wahhabi-lites’.Deobandis use the term ‘Wahhabi’ to refer to the Ahl-i-hadith or Salafis whom they consider to be purists to a greater degree than themselves. The clearest manifestation of potential Wahhabi or radical tendencies among the Deobandis (and in some mosques populated by Arabs) is at the time for Jumuah prayer when the imams often decide to curse and even pray for destruction of the enemies of the Muslims. Such rhetoric is quite common within the mosques of Britain and is often the result of issues inherited from the Indian sub-continent. These issues are often, in a Qutbian way, ones which themawlawi s [30] display out of their zeal for freedom. From field research conducted as part of this dissertation, it is apparent that the most striking part of these sermons is that they are often in Arabic and the congregation being of Urdu, Hindi or Punjabi speaking backgrounds have little or no idea of what the imam is saying.

Barelvis are greatly influenced by Sufism and some purist Deobandi groups are also deeply influenced by it: the Husseini group of Lahore is one example and Shaykh al-Hadith Sufi Sarwar preachestasawwuf to other scholars and students from the University of al-Jamiah al-Ashrafiyyah. [31] This is indicative of the osmosis of Sufi thought into a number of other ‘purist’ Muslim groups and its appeal to a wide audience. This also challenges Geaves’ (2000:56) notion that ‘the reformed Sufi influence in the (Deobandi) movement does seem to have gone into decline after the advent of Muhammad Wahhab’s movement in Arabia with its strong anti-Sufi rhetoric’.

In terms oftaqlid , Barelvis and Deobandis are ardentmuqallid s (followers) of the Hanafi School which is rejected by the Salafis who regard Abu Hanifah as a misguided Imam of theahl al-ray . [32]

From a Salafi perspective, Deobandis and Barelvis are innovators in theD in (religion) and regard them as having close links with Sufis; for that reason, they could not be Wahhabis. Deobandi and Barelvi practises such as raising the hands for supplication in congregation after each prayer are reminiscent of the Sufis; Salafis consider thesebidah s (innovations) along with others such as the use ofmisbaha rosary beads fordhikr (divine remembrance) which often resemble the practices of Sufis as well as different religions.

The Salafis could be regarded superficially as the British equivalent of the Ahl-i-hadith, however, they dissociate themselves from the term ‘Wahhabi’, but this is not because they reject being called a follower of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab but at the incorrect use of al-Wahhab, one of Allah’s ninety names and of the incorrect use of the name of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

There would appear to be great influence in the Deobandi theology of Mawdudi and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) but a general lack of understanding as to who Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was.

In today’s UK, there is little difference apparent between the Sufism-oriented Barelvis and Deobandis, apart from when one enters the mosque in which the former have more influence, one sees ‘Ya Muhammad’ (O Muhammad) on the wall and usually at the entrance. This is indicative of the teachings of Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) who espoused that the Prophet Muhammad was alwayshazir (present) andnazir (watching). This is indicative of the theological difference between Barelvis and others who would regard this notion asshirk [33] .

The internal strife and competition between Deobandis and Barelvis can be said to have preoccupied these communities in Britain for the latter part of the twentieth century in their efforts to establish their own mosques within Muslim communities; the mosques of one group are not known to invite openly the worshippers of another group. The Salafis are especially looked upon suspiciously because they do not want to hold either study circles in any of the other two main groups’ mosques nor enthusiastically attend prayers there. When they do, they often sit in an isolated position and on discussion with some of them it has become apparent that they would only be willing to take over the running of the mosques completely but not be willing to engage or integrate into their communities.

3.2.3 Al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir

The Deobandis, Barelvis and Salafis do not openly admit any type of political agenda. Al-Muhajiroun, deemed to be in support of radical Islamic thought and also militant, do have a political agenda. Omar Bakri Mohammed, who was the founder and worldwide leader of this group, openly declared the suicide bombers in the Israeli Café of Mike’s Bar as ‘heroes’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005:6). He displays a sense of pan-Islamism and supports the founding of an Islamic caliphate in Muslim lands. This group does not appear to have perpetrated violence in Britain as yet, though this may simply be intentional in order to maintain a presence in Britain by keeping it out of bounds.

Geaves identifies Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) which is known for its desire to establish an Islamic state (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) even in Britain as having the potential to ignite the fire of extremism or jihadist sentiments. Bakri joined this group in 1977. This group had been banned and severely suppressed in Saudi Arabia (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) where Bakri had difficulty in recruiting people, hence, making it difficult to associate this group with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or the Saudi administration. After being cast out of HT, Bakri continued work under the banner of al-Muhajiroun and over time it emerged as a group in its own right.

This desire to establish an Islamic caliphate for the implementation of Sharia is not extreme or jihadist nor does it pose a threat to British society or the British public. The comments from the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2008 that Sharia was inevitable in the UK[34] coupled with the emergence of Sharia law courts in Britain which are under the control of Dr. Shoaib Hasan,[35] who has no links with these groups, show that there is an untenable link made between the requirement to establish an Islamic way of life and the political activities of HT and al-Muhajiroun.

3.3 Summary

Given the cultural (and to a great extent, ideological and religious) gap between immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and the second generation Muslims, it can be said that British Muslims have not necessarily inherited the issues that their parents brought with them from the sub-continent. Contrary to common belief, the first-generation Muslims are not greatly influenced by Wahhabism, nor are they clearly linked to extremist or terrorist activities. This leaves a question hanging over the militant activities of groups such as al-Muhajiroun, HT, and others which supportjihadi or militant activities. Scholarly literature and media reports accuse militant groups of extremist activities but fail to pin-point how they influence the youth or analyse the factors that are contributing to underlying issues faced by Muslim youth in Britain.

The objective of establishing the success or failure of Wahhabism as an ideology is not possible because of the difficulties surrounding the definition of Wahhabism, as well as the erroneous link between the desire to live Islamically with the political agenda of some fringe groups that are labelled as Wahhabi by both writers on this topic as well as the media. Nevertheless, Britain is faced with a rise of extremist behaviour and in order to deal with it, a solution is required. Sufism is often discussed within the media and within political circles as being the cure and given that the British government recently supported the establishment of the Muslim Sufi Council of Britain. Given the sparse material on this topic, it needs to be discussed in some detail.

4 Sufism: an alternative perspective for British Muslims

4.1 The Wahhabi–Sufi rivalry

The second objective of this dissertation is to establish how Sufism as an alternative paradigm addresses the issues of Britain’s youth. There are underlying issues within Islamic theology whose contention goes back to the formative period within the early centuries of Islam. Geaves (2000:56) alludes to this point wherein questions about the nature of Allah, his non-corporeality, his anthropomorphism, his attributes and an understanding of what he desires, often become a bone of contention. This has been at the heart of the Sufi−non-Sufi divide: how far is Islam willing to accommodate hermeneutical interpretations of Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions? What exactly constitutesshirk ? How much freedom is allowed within religion to express one’s love for Allah? How literal is literal: does every verse within the Quran have an inner meaning and outer meaning or is there such thing as an outer meaning at all? Throughout these debates and attacks, Sufism has remained the one approach that has clearly stood the test of time and survived everywhere in the Muslim world working with all kinds of cultures. Ibn Arabi, a past Sufi master, even addressed the issue of equality between the sexes where traditional scholars often struggled to clear Islam’s name.[36] Sufism is greatly responsible for the spread of Islam in the Indian sub-continent and saw the flow of Sufism from the Khwajagan of Afghanistan[37] to India and back again in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has survived purist movements and political turmoil in Arab countries and even the theological turmoil of the early centuries of Islam. The scholars of Islamicfiqh and Sufism claim that it goes back to the Adam himself (Geaves, 2000).

The focus on the oppression of Sufism by Muslim purists has recently come to the fore, accelerated by the search of the British Government for a solution to the rise in Islamic extremism in Britain recently manifesting in suicide bomb attacks. This has also brought to the public eye the tireless efforts of the Haqqani Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani who campaigned in the pre−9/11 days to raise awareness of the pending attacks. This has provided the backdrop to allow the Shaykh to bring out the Sufi voice and ‘officially’ enter Sufism into mainstream Islam in Britain. His celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in number 10 Downing Street has done a great deal to raise the profile of Sufism within Britain. His flourishing relationship with royalty[38] seen in his hosting of a Sufi event in Manchester on 4th February 2010 is another indication of harmonious relationships that Sufism can bring to the table. Despite the seeming division in the Muslim community caused by the polarisation into either non-Sufi and Sufi, there appears to be a benefit in that the moderate Muslim has a potential representative in the form of Sufism. This is also indicated by Geaves (2000:59) who has written about the potential of Sufism to counter the extremist tendencies as he analyses the writings of Sufi Shaykhs such as Kabbani (1998).

The immanent danger that needs addressing is the possibility of hard-line or extremist rhetoric that has already infiltrated Britain’s mosques remaining there. The Friday sermons of anger aimed at perceived enemies of Islam are indications that there are some remnants of the reaction to the colonialism of Muslim lands imported into Britain. This voice is increasingly becoming dated as British Muslims struggle to form an identity for themselves.

Geaves (interview conducted by this author, 2010) explains that there has been a fair amount of opportunism exhibited by Sufi groups in the wake of the issues of recent years especially after the 9/11 and 7/7 incidents. Sufis capitalised on the opportunity saying that Sufism would never support the violent actions of such radical groups. Furthermore, given that Sufis have also historically been involved in military conflicts, it cannot be simply said that Sufism is an apolitical, non-militant group of mystics.

4.2 Sufism: conclusion

The question as to whether or not Sufism is an alternative paradigm is a complex one on many levels. There is a plethora of writings on Sufism stretching back centuries: the scholarly writings on this subject have, as previously mentioned, traversed centuries, cultures, peoples, eras, languages and an array of other variable factors in society. The extant writings of the likes of Idries Shah (d. 1996) have been a companion to the British people from the mid-twentieth century until today. Book stores proliferate with both original writings in Arabic and Persian as well as interpretations in English by Orientalists, Westerners, Sufis and non-Sufis. Many writers such as Annemarie Schimmel (d. 2003) have given the best parts of their lives to the study of Sufism, taking up residency in centres of Sufi culture[39] and Islamic scholars to this day search to define the inner kernel of Islam through the Sufi way. Sufism’s roots are seen by some to emerge from the Hadith of Jibril narrated in theForty Ahadith [40] of Abu Zakaria Muhi al-Din Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (d. 1278) in which Jibril (the Angel Gabriel) comes to the Prophet Muhammad and asks him an array of questions, one of which is aboutIhsan to which the Prophet replies that it is to worship Allah as though one sees him and if one cannot see him then one should realise that Allah sees him. The clear message of this hadith is that Sufism is greatly experiential and it aims to bring one closer to Allah.

This section of the dissertation could not possibly hope to cover the vast amount of books on Sufism or the wide range of its topics. Given the lack of in-depth literature available on the possibility of Sufism being the alternative paradigm to extremism, it leads one to the following conclusions.

Some prominent Sufis in Britain such as Shaykh al-Kabbani have a good relationship with the British ruling administration and this will be viewed by politically-oriented Islamists as a political tool which politicians can use according to their whims and non-Islamic objectives if required. This will always be a point of contention and sticking point for supporting Sufism as an alternative perspective given that some such groups are receiving funding from the British government.[41]

Sufism promotes certain non-Orthodox activities such as the veneration of saints, which even non-extremist groups such as Deobandis can critically argue against using Islamic sources. Sufism would need to be able to accommodate such differences of opinion otherwise Sufis will fail to engage with other Islamic elements within British society.

Many Sufi Muslims uphold the British monarchy as divinely ordained rulers whereas there are anti-royalists even in Britain, given the monarchy’s German descent. This notion had its origin in the Banu Umayyad caliphate where the oppressive rulers espoused the view that Allah had supported their rule through predestination. This again is a contentious point which goes back to the heart of Islamic theology and the days of the Qadarite-Jabbarite debates.[42] The issue is where one draws the line between accepting a ruling establishment on the grounds that they are divinely ordained and opposing them on their oppressive policies. It has further ramifications for British citizens because of the pledge to the British monarchy and the British state which is expected from each citizen.[43] Despite the passing of centuries this point is still contentious and not likely to be resolved by simply promoting Sufi values.

Sufism is not necessarily averse to political involvement even by military means. Even a Sufi could interpret a political situation to justify the taking up of arms and possibly fighting for a bad cause. The Janissary Turkish troops were closely linked to Haji Bektashi Veli (d. 1270) and often called ‘Sons of Haji Bektash’[44] a well-known Sufi of the thirteenth century who came to Anatolia from Khorasan settling in the small village of Suluca Karahoyuk (Nasr, 1997:359). The Bektashi way became central to the Janissary corps because every man who joined them had to take an oath of loyalty to Haji Bektash Wali, thus this would in effect make them hismurid (follower).

Othman Dan Fodio (d. 1817) of the Qadiriyyah Order in West Africa launched ajihad to reform his followers and formed the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria[45] . Thisjihad was also instrumental in inspiring later Sufi leaders to form new states in Fouta Jallon in 1725, Fouta Toro in 1776 and Masina in 1810.

Is the relationship between prominent Sufis like Shaykh al-Kabbani and the ruling administration reciprocated in the same way by his counterparts? The whole-hearted backing by the British government of Sufis in the early twenty-first century does not appear to be as forthcoming now with some reports that the government is not considering Sufism as the only strand of the Muslim community with which it is willing to engage. This gives the impression that Sufis of Britain have not managed to maintain their once flourishing ties with the British ruling establishment. Furthermore, the recent function arranged by Shaykh al-Kabbani to which he invited Prince Charles has only been noted as a musical festival on his ‘official website’ as opposed to being promoted as an effort to spread Islam through love.[46] It would be too late for a personality such as Haqqani to preach an apolitical perspective because of the support he has already given to the likes of Prince Charles and solidarity shown to the British Government. To a typically non-Sufi group such as the Salafis Haqqani probably is regarded as a sell-out. Furthermore, even within Sufis, there are some such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who have espoused a general divide between rulers andwalis .[47] The implication is that there are some Sufis who would not regard Haqqani’s affiliation with royalty and ruling powers as legitimate and this could result in realignment with more extreme groups.

Sufism cannot therefore necessarily be deemed as an apolitical strand of Islam. Nasr (1997:163) writes that one of the prominent characteristics of the Naqshbanditariqa was the way in which it never hesitated in being critical of or confrontational towards political powers. He goes on to quote Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi as saying that ‘[t]he King is the soul and the people the body. If the King goes astray, the people will follow suit.’ Given that this strand of Sufism is traced back to either Abu Bakr or to Imam Ali, it is inevitable that there are political ties with the Naqshbandis and that they would even be willing to engage in combat for the right cause. The other Sufitariqas on the other hand may have had a slightly different approach in that their policy was ‘As you are, so shall be your rulers.’ (Nasr, 1997:163) which implies a focus on oneself rather than others, nevertheless, armed conflict cannot be ruled out of the Sufi theology.

The inference is that whereas a so-called Wahhabist Muslim was willing to fight against the British Government and its citizens in favour of the Afghan Taliban, the Naqshbandi Sufi might be willing to take the side of the British Government against the Afghan Taliban and this is a problematic situation for any Muslim if they were required to fight against a fellow Muslim even if given approval by their government. The well-known Prophetichadith is often quoted in this regard which states that if two Muslims fight amongst each other both of them are destined to hell-fire (Sunan Abi Dawud).[48]

Given the Naqshbandiyya principle of opposing one’s rulers if need be, there is no guarantee that even British Sufis can be stopped from joining forces with militant andjihadi groups in Afghanistan and other such places. The result is that militancy could possibly begin to occur even within the Sufi community of Britain. The Muslim world may well see the formation of ‘pro-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis and ‘anti-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis splitting the Muslim community even further.

It can be seen that the answer to the increase in radical Islam within Britain is therefore not necessarily Sufism; on the contrary, the over-promotion of Sufism to British Muslims could result in a total split within the Muslim community on more levels than simply a religious one: there would now be a theological and a political split.

The answer must therefore be sought from identifying the underlying reasons why the British youth are finding that they need to express themselves in such devastating ways. This is achieved in the next section through case studies and field research.