Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

5. Field Research

5.1 Introduction

The challenges in obtaining first-hand information on Muslim extremists have already been discussed in the Introduction. The research conducted for this section is predominantly second-hand with some first hand information where interviews could successfully be conducted with British Muslims. Priority was given to case study material published and stocked by university libraries; where news reports were used, the stories that were available on well known websites such as the BBC were referenced.

From Quintan Wiktorowicz’s research included inRadical Islam Rising: Extremism in the West [49] it became increasingly apparent that the issues within Britain were being caused by similar underlying factors which were often socio-cultural and common to British Muslims. This is most apparent in the second-generation Muslims originating from the Indian sub-continent which is the ethnic origin of three of the 7/7 bombers with the remaining one being a convert to Islam of Jamaican origin.

5.2 Cognitive openings and the process of change

Wiktorowicz (2005:85) uses a term ‘cognitive opening’ to describe the process of a Muslim becoming more receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews. It is somewhat of a shaking up of deep-rooted beliefs, almost like a paradigm shift in which a person’s worldview changes. The reasons for such a shift can be several; however, simply listening to anti-West rhetoric is not always enough to bring about this change as seen during a control survey conducted by Wiktorowicz: most Muslims usually turn off or even ‘ignore da’wa stalls’ set out by activist groups and ‘keep walking’ (Wiktrorowicz, 2005:92).

Anjem Choudary, the leader of the UK branch of al-Muhajiroun, expressed in an interview (Wiktorowicz, 2005:90) that British Muslims were questioning their own identity especially after going to university and being encouraged by the education process to aspire towards professional careers. They would often ask whether they want to continue to live in British society and want their children to be brought up here or whether it is more appropriate to move elsewhere. An unsatisfactory answer could result in a cognitive opening and causing one to rethink one’s ideology and identity. Such an opening is all that a radical such as Choudary needs in order to recruit.

Activist recruiters also use a technique of stimulating the person’s mind so that in the words of Omar Bakri a newcomer ‘himself determines the problem’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005:97). A person is on the road to becoming a full-fledged member once that stimulation has started.

A recruiter who is open to a person’s slow progress has a greater level of appeal than one who is more militant often scolding a new member for not attending lessons. Al-Muhajiroun are of the former ilk whereas HT are of the latter.

To Choudary and Bakri, such cognitive openings would be indicative of the failing of British society.

5.2.1 Racial and religious discrimination

A survey conducted in 2002 showed that sixty-nine percent of Muslims felt that the broader society did not consider them an integral part of life in Britain (Wiktorowicz, 2005:88) with many experiencing personal abuse because of their religion. In a control survey conducted by Wiktorowicz (2005: 102–103) it was felt for racial discrimination in the UK the mean score (from 1 to 10, where 1 was not at all a problem and 10 was a problem in every aspect of British society) was 6.19. Twenty-three percent indicated racial discrimination at their place of work.

Forty percent of all Britons believe Britain to be a racist society Wiktorowicz (2005:90); forty-five percent say that they know someone who is prejudiced; sixty percent of blacks and Asians say that they have experienced verbal racism; twenty percent complain of physical racial abuse.

This is brought home when, despite sacrificing one’s culture, religion and ethics for a Western life style a person might still be labelled a ‘Paki’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005:91). Activist Islamists regard Britain the most racist society in the world (Wiktorowicz, 2005:103).

Incidents such as the Bradford riots in July 2001 resulted in forty-six rioters receiving sentences which on average came to 5.5 years (Wiktorowicz, 2005:88); these are longer than the sentence handed down to a rioter in Belfast. Muslims also feel that the terror laws are specifically targeting them above all others.

There is a growing sense that laws do not adequately protect Muslims as they do other ethnic minorities. It would appear that the religious identities of Sikhs, Jews and Gypsies (Wiktorowicz, 2005:88) have been bundled within their ethnic identities and laws against discrimination on grounds of ethnicity as well as religion doubly protect these communities. Discrimination on the grounds of religion is not always prevented adequately for Muslims, as seen in the case of two Muslims who prayed during their breaks and were consequently fired by their employer who was from the same North African group as them on the grounds that discrimination could not be proven. Because of this, Muslims feel that they are exposed.

5.2.2 Alienation and segregation

Discrimination, as well as 7/7 and 9/11 incidents, have resulted in a change in perception of some non-Muslims causing Muslims to feel excluded on a greater scale. In a survey conducted by Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 it was found that within Britain forty-two percent (vs. thirty-four in 2005) felt very concerned about the rise of ‘Islamic extremism’.[50] A survey by YouGov in 2006 found that fifty-five three percent of non-Muslims felt British Muslims had grown more apart from the rest of British society[51] . This, however needs to be contrasted with a survey conducted by the Gallup World Poll in which seventy- four percent of Muslims living in London felt Muslims are loyal to the countries they live in.[52] The effect on Muslims is that there is unnecessary negative media attention on Muslims with public support for anti-Islamic rhetoric which can contribute to an increased sense of alienation. Eighty-four percent of non-Muslims have become more suspicious of Muslims since the attacks of 9/11 (Wiktorowicz 2005:88)

5.2.3 Identity crisis

The above factors often lead to an identity crisis amongst educated second-generation Muslims in Britain. Every professional Muslim interviewed by this author expressed the same concern. Ironically, although Muslims are struggling to find their identity and promoting unity among Muslims, there is often a general desire within the Muslim community to move away from areas densely populated by Muslims. One’s surroundings and upbringing inform one’s identity; a knock in one’s perception of their surroundings can cause a vacuum and if the knock were substantial enough, an identity crisis occurs. Activist groups often operate through networks of close associates and friends in which one associate attempts to attract another (Wiktorowicz, 2005:86).

The situation in which the British Muslim often finds himself is that he leads a double life as a traditional Pakistani at home and then as a British Muslim in public. This makes it more difficult to reconcile oneself to British culture.

5.2.4 International conflict involving Muslims

In the same YouGov survey aforementioned, fifty-eight percent of Muslims felt that Britain’s foreign policy is anti-Muslim.[53] Such political questions are not satisfactorily tackled by traditional imams from the Indian sub-continent or an Arab nation because a person originating from outside Britain may not have the political interests of Britain at heart until they regard Britain as their home. Jihadis or extreme groups such as HT or the al-Mouhajirun seek to tackle the political issues of the day head on and are vocal in their views.

Given the complexity of these situations, activists can coax the potential recruit into a knee-jerk reaction and adopt radical or violent actions, although the actions of an individual may not have any impact on an international conflict. Nevertheless, the fear that the War on Terror could turn into a war on Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005:109) is widely felt. This has been echoed by a number of Muslims professionals in Yorkshire interviewed by this author during July and August 2010. Although the likes of al-Muhajiroun do not profess to promote extreme activities, they certain can use media headlines to exploit a British Muslim.

5.2.5 Other factors

Factors such as unemployment can contribute to not only an identity crisis when Muslims feel they cannot get jobs because of their religion. Statistical data confirms that economic factors appear to be pitted against Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. Wiktorowicz (2005:89) explains how men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than a white man. 40 percent of young Bangladeshi men are unemployed as compared to 12 percent of whites of the same age group. Those employed earn less than whites and other minority groups per week (Wiktorowicz, 2005:89). This is an important factor because Muslims originating from Pakistan form forty-three percent of all Muslims in the UK (see Table 1).

Table 1: statistics of Muslims in the UK

[The total Muslim population was 1.59 million, 2.7 percent of the total UK population. The above Pakistanis are mostly from the Azad Kashmir region of northern Pakistan

Data is courtesy of Wiktorowicz (2005:89) referencing a UK Census taken in 2001].

Another major factor is the death in a family with 31.7 percent of people in the control group in surveyed by Wiktorowicz (2005:104) citing this as a reason as to why they decided to explore their religion more (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Reasons why a person decided to explore their religion more deeply

5.3 Case Studies: bombers in the making

The stories of three second-generation Muslim youths who committed suicide bombings are analysed in this section to understand what factors influenced their decision to carry out these acts. The names are:

Muhammad Sidique Khan (d. 2005)

Omar Khan Sharif (d. 2003)

Asim Mohammed Hanif (d. 2003)

The acts committed by them confused the British public. Their stories are discussed below.

5.3.1 Mohammad Sidique Khan (d. 7th July 2005)

In 2007, Shiv Malik published an article calledMy Brother the Bomber in which he reportedly spent months in the Leeds suburb of Beeston becoming acquainted with Gultasab Sidique Khan, the brother of Mohammad Sidique Khan.[54] Mohammad was described as a softly spoken youth worker, yet something in his life changed the Islamic perspective of this individual who was western in his youth and was even called Sid by his colleagues.

Khan had volunteered for community youth mentoring in 1997 whilst at Leeds Metropolitan University and his conversion to a form of jihadi Islam reportedly began in 1999. Khan had been working with Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif, the two other suicide bombers discussed in this section of the dissertation. The youth mentoring activities also included explaining to Mirpuri youth that if they wanted to lever themselves out of poverty, they needed to branch out from jobs such as being taxi drivers and restaurant workers.

Beeston is an isolated and undistinguished suburb of Leeds and, one of the poorest places in England, it has remained a ghetto until recent times and become a neighbourhood in which drug dealers now operate. Khan had become a mentor to fellow Muslim youth and had reacted to the situation by affiliating himself with a group of second-generation Pakistanis who called themselves the Mullah Boys. This was a group of fifteen to twenty members which was formed in the mid-1990s whose initial mission it was to deal with the drug issue which the previous generation did not know how to deal with. Khan and his colleagues would reportedly take drug addicts to a flat and forcibly cleanse them of their drug habits.

After the 9/11 incident the Mullah Boys became increasingly religious. They exhibited Salafi tendencies and began to marry girls of their own choice and outside of the Pakistani community and to this end conduct marriages from the premises of Iqra, an Islamic bookshop on Bude Road. Though this caused a stir in the community they defended the marriages saying that pure Islam was not averse to such a practise.

Khan was initially affected by social problems he was surrounded with although it is not clear how he developed into a would-be suicide bomber. It is known that his activities became increasingly jihadi as he began to make excursions to Pakistan. He had links to Abdullah al-Faisal, a radical preacher jailed in 2003 for inciting racial hatred. Malik explains how little was known about Khan’s intentions up until the 7/7 incident. Khan’s friends were increasingly joining more fundamentalist groups thus possibly influencing his path also.

Additionally, Khan’s brother Gultasab said that his local mosque could not connect with the second generation of Muslims because they could not speak English whereas more fundamentalist groups delivered sermons and printed publications in English.

5.3.2 Omar Sharif (d. 2003)

Omar Sharif, a British Muslim from Derby attempted to detonate himself at a bar in Tel Aviv, Israel but the bomb failed to go off. Sharif escaped from the scene but his body was found some twelve days later washed up on the beach and badly decayed.

In an article by Shiv Malik,[55] Sharif’s friend Zaheer Khan explainshow there was a gradual development in Sharif’s radicalisation. Sharif had allegedly established links with Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and in particular, Omar Bakri, whilst studying Maths at King’s College London in 1995. Khan explained how Sharif was like ‘an empty bowl’ and how he ‘didn't know much about the culture of his own family, his background’ and he ‘didn’t have a clue about Islam’.

It would initially appear that the reasons for the radicalisation of Sharif were down to his affiliation with HT whose then leader, Bakri, had called for the assassination of John Major in 1991. Sharif’s future wife had also been a student at King’s College and they had both become more traditional in their dress and perspective on Islam since joining HT.

Even Bakri apparently had no prior knowledge of Sharif’s intentions and to this day has denied any involvement in it.

The case of Sharif does nothing to provide a clear reason for the actions especially when HT vehemently denies any desire for their members to become suicide bombers. Nevertheless, the answer would appear to come from Bakri’s explanation as to what the ‘obligation of the time’ is. In his view the obligation of the time is now jihad: the obligation of the Muslim ummah before the occupation of Muslim land was the establishment of a caliphate ‘but when the non-Muslims gather together to fight against Muslims and occupy Muslim land, the mother of all obligations is to liberate, the fight back’.

The suggestion from the above is that rather than an intolerant form of Islam being the driving force behind Sharif’s actions, it was the situation in Israel with the humanitarian crisis of the people of Palestine.

5.3.3 Asim Mohammad Hanif (d. 2003)

Asim Hanif was born in Hounslow, Middlesex in 1992. He is reported to have been a religious person from an early age. He had been a member of a Sufi group called Light Study based in Hounslow mosque and lead by a Syrian Shaykh called Muhammad al-Yaqoubi whose views are supposedly against violent jihad and al-Qaeda.[56] Despite his leaning towards Sufism Hanif is reported to have been seen in the offices of al-Muhajiroun several times.[57]

In late 2002 Hanif is reported to have travelled to Damascus Syria for studies in Arabic and Islam. He is said to have met with Omar Sharif Khan there. From there he apparently established links with radical Islamic groups and was drawn into the operations of Hamas.

Both he and Sharif travelled around Palestine for a number of weeks as peace activists before occupying a flat for one night during which they filmed their farewell speech in which they denounced the state of Israel and called Israelis the ‘real terrorists’ and ‘sickos’ along with Tony Blair and George Bush. Hanif justified his intentions to carry out the bombings by blaming the treatment of Muslims at the hands of Blair and Bush. The evidence points in the direction of British and American foreign policy being the catalyst in this episode.

5.4 Emerging Trends and Observations

In the above case studies it can be seen that the cognitive opening as discussed by Wiktorowicz appears to have occurred, providing an opening for radical elements. Each person’s case was different and there is a degree of complexity surrounding the thought processes that lead a suicide bomber to their eventual conclusion.

Diagram 1 portrays the above process of radicalisation and compares it with that portrayed within alternative process which reflects the writings of the majority literature in this field and the British media.

Given that suicide bombers often cite conflicts around the world as being the reasons why they decided to take drastic action, it is impossible to ignore the factors discussed in section 5.2. Dotted lined boxes and shapes indicate the possibility but not conclusive involvement of an actor or a part of the process.

Empirical evidence is inconclusive in placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of activists Islamists because at face value they have not always been aware of the intentions of suicide bombers. Nevertheless, they need to take some culpability given that they can often provide the channels for would-be bombers to mobilise around the world. Furthermore, given that most al-Muhajiroun activists were irreligious prior to them joining the movement describing themselves as secular and typically British (Wiktorowicz, 2005:102), there is some mileage in the notion that the militancy of such groups can have bring pressure to bear on an individual.

There is an emerging trend within the Muslim community of educated Muslims searching for answers to questions that living in a Western society raises. The questions are being asked and therefore the answers will also need to be provided otherwise there is the risk of another generation gap occurring where Muslims who were to some extent in-between cultures never managed to decide which one they belonged to and what that meant for their religion.

The new generation could potentially be so far removed from the first two generations that neither of them will be able to relate to it, thus losing all sense of ethnic identity; this could be seen as advantageous to theological discussions because it provides the context to revisit many of Islam’s central notions, on the other hand, it could also create more crises for activist groups to operate and more confusion within a troubled community.

6. Conclusions and closing remarks

Sufism’s inherent pluralism and humility contributes towards a harmonious society; but its eagerness to focus on these and other key aspects such as love can at times overpower its ability to self-appraise. This inability to self-critique is also seen in other Islamic groups. Wahhabism, Sufism’s perceived antithesis, is a misnomer because purism is part and parcel of all strands of Islam and does not necessarily lead to extreme acts of violence. This opens up the discussion on the use of terms such as ‘extremism’ or ‘Islamic extremist’ which are widely used to denote literalist and purist approaches to Islam without due attention or analysis carried out on the Muslim groups in question. An extremity is a relative notion; if a purist and literalist approach to Islam can be called ‘extreme’, why can a completely liberal approach not also be called ‘extreme’ since both approaches, potentially being opposites, are equidistant from a middle way?

The issues that face the British Muslim community are complex. If not addressed, socio-economic issues in the more deprived areas of Britain and increasing ghettoisation will cause a growing sense of despair. The economic downturn affects all citizens of Britain, and from empirical evidence it could be argued that Asian Muslims are more affected than others. Given the pressure from radical Islamist (or terror-supporting) groups, modernists, the media, traditional scholars, and the first generation Muslims the community is in danger of being sidelined as opposed to being integrated into British society. Despite the above pressures, the Muslim community is expected to reform and to contribute to British society; the community needs time to reflect and weigh up its options.

The importance of engagement with British Muslims cannot be under-estimated especially given that many issues which face the wider Muslim world cannot be ignored or simply be passed off as Islamist issues especially when some of the political issues have a legitimate existence and impact on the minds of British Muslims. Most Muslims have opinions on current issues like the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the threat of a hijab ban, detaining of ‘terror suspects’ for long periods of time without trial, stop and search policies of the Police and the detention of Britons in the Guantanamo Bay prison. It is the responsibility of prominent Muslims and leaders within the community to engage with the community and represent it. Freedom of speech entitles British Muslims to have their views heard on all socio-political issues. Table 3 below suggests a depiction of the various stages of a Muslim’s perspective.

Table 3 depicts the various perspectives that a Muslim may find they have adopted or are adopting: it plots political involvement against religious attitudes. It also suggests how change may be brought about and gives a goal to focus upon.

Grey cells (A and I) suggest an impossible combination; red cells (D, G and H) are unfavourable places to be in that they pose threats to society; yellow cells (B and C) are cells which are neutral or optional; green cells (E and F) are desirable for the British community. Both yellow and green cells will reap most benefits for Britain. Examples of D could be argued to be politically active Islamist groups which use bully tactics to oppress other Islamist groups. An example of G is a suicide bomber, like the ones studied in the Case Study section; H shows a person whose main aim is not to incite terror but live in a modern world and is happy to use violent means to achieve their aims, such as domestic violence. It should be impossible for a moderate and violent Muslim to exist.

It can be seen that political involvement from the Muslim community in no way suggests that it will harm society; if anything, it should bring benefits to society with Islam’s values of justice, equality, mercy etc. The task of transitioning from one cell to another is made easier by the teachings that are espoused by a particular strand of Islam. It may be that Muslim groups have a mix of elements within them, however, any assessment of an institution should be undertaken with care. Socio-economic issues make the task of progressing through the table more challenging.

Some Islamic institutions promise much yet appear to under-deliver, often losing credibility in their early stages. The Sufi Council of Britain, accused of being set up by US Neo-cons, does not appear to have made many headlines of late[58] .

Government-backed think tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation promote theological reform but its current policy of naming, Islamism-grading[59] and shaming respected Muslim groups and an inability to win support from the mainstream Muslim community could exacerbate the sense of isolation that the community is feeling and further distance Quilliam and result in its plans to retrain Imams to fail. The Quilliam Foundation, in their state-of-the-art Central London offices, and alleged large salaries, portray an image quite distant from the humble, almost poor, image portrayed by the Prophet Muhammad and supported by Sufitariqa s which are greatly influential in Britain. The community may see the classical scholarly method of studying traditional texts under the tutelage of a pious, often Sufi inspired, mentor in danger of extinction. It must also overcome the accusations of commercialism, opportunism and ‘toeing the Government line’[60] levelled at it. This will not help in its efforts to try and win mainstream Muslim support especially when it often uncritically accepts Government policies and what it perceives to be British values.

The human state informs its theological outlook and as such the British Muslim is in a formative period. The socio-political context that surrounds the British Muslim community needs addressing at the same time as it finds its theology. Religious reinterpretation and reform should be natural processes of human evolution in mankind’s attempt to adapt to his socio-political surroundings. There is room for reinterpretation of many notions from their apparent traditional definitions: jihad, apostasy, kufr, shirk, dar ul-harb, civil weddings are only a few. The community clearly need pragmatism, reform, coaching, counselling and most important time to reflect; change on such a large scale is a slow process and cannot simply be quickened with Government backing. Modern Turkey is on its way to reconciling modernism with its Islamic heritage, however, the process has taken the best part of the twentieth century. Sometimes, the key guiding principles of Islam are most easily overlooked such as the constant Quranic reminder to mankind of reflection, patience and turning to Allah. Given that the Muslim community is a minority group, it also requires support from the majority non-Muslim community.

Sincerity is obvious to the observer and it breeds loyalty. Muslim leaders need to display a sense of commitment and inspire. Reformers need to be aware of their audience before they engage with them and be careful not to simply dismantle everything within Muslim communities and institutions in a reinvent-the-wheel method of reform and throw the baby out with the bathwater.

END

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69- http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_ibn_Abd-al-Wahhab accessed 17.08.10

70- http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com

71- http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/newsandgallery/gallery/trh_visit_manchester_608019307_397614779.html accessed 31.07.10

72- http://www.questia.com

73- http://www.salaf.com/

74- http://www.scribd.com/doc/19073545/British-and-the-Rise-of-Wahhabism

75- http://www.sufilive.net/Radios.html

76- http://www.sunnah.org/ibadaat/Rajab_commentary40hadith.htm accessed 01.08.10

77- http://www.sunnirazvi.org/topics/index.htm

78- http://www.yursil.com/blog/2007/09/sufi-salafi-unity/

79- www.abwoon.com/pdf/RehearingQuran.pdf

Glossary of Terms

Ahl-i-hadith

A group of Muslims understood to have been founded by Shah Wali Ullah Dehlavi (d. 1762) who follow the Islamic sources usually avoiding the imitation of any of the major fiqh imams such as Abu Hanifah. This group is commonly found in Pakistan and India.

Barelvi

A follower of Ahmad Raza Khan (d. 1921) who was a reformer in India during the colonial years. The Barelvis are usually influenced by Sufis, more so than Deobandis. Barelvis are known for celebrating the urs of dead saints and the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad each year.

Dar ul-Harb

This translates as House of War and was a notion that medieval Muslim scholars used to describe the non-Muslim lands; it was used in opposition to Dar ul-Islam (see below). The inference was that Muslims were not allowed to live in Dar ul-Harb.

Dar ul-Islam

Translates as House of Islam and was used by medieval Muslim scholars to describe the lands under Muslim rule.

Dar ul-Ulum Deoband

See Deobandi

Deobandi

A person affiliated with Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, a seat of learning based in India greatly influenced by Maulana Qasim Nanautawi (d. 1901) whose scholarly line traces back to Shah Waliullah al-Dehlavi (d. 1762).

Dhikr

Arabic word meaning remembrance of Allaah

Extremism

Usually denotes a literalist rendering of Islam which allows room for unjustified violence as opposed to mercy and compassion.

First generation Muslims

Muslim immigrants from countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Arab countries whose native language is not English.

Hadith (pl. ahadith)

Prophetic tradition reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad. Among Sunnis ahadith can also include sayings of the Prophet’s Companions and among Shiites they include the sayings of the ahl al-bayt.

Ihsan

The feeling that one is gazing upon Allaah whilst one is praying; manifested in an experiential feeling of Allaah’s presence during one’s salat.

Imam

Typically the leader of prayers for Sunnis; leader of community for Shiites.

Islamist

This term is typically used to refer to active organisations or individuals which have an Islamically oriented aims or mission statement. Islamists often espouse views on governmental policies and social life which involve implementing the Shariah principles or Islamic law.

Khanqah (Tekke in Turkish, Zawiya in Arabic)

A place where a Sufi may retreat to perform dhikr etc.

Kufr

Translates as disbelief. It is a term widely used to refer to people who have no religion; however, some Muslims even use this term to refer to what the Quran calls People of the Book (Jews and Christians).

Masjid

Another term for mosque: place of worship for Muslims.

Pir

A word for Sufis Shaykh used by people of Pakistani and Indian origin.

Salafi

A Muslim who follows the teachings of the ‘salaf salih ’ (pious predecessors). They preach a return to the original teachings of Islam as allegedly practised by the first three generations of Muslims. Salafis oppose taqlid and greatly admire the books of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Second generation Muslims

Children of first generation Muslims whose first language is English and have predominantly been born and brought up in the UK.

Shaykh

A respectable word used to refer to a Muslim scholar or somebody in position of religious authority.

Shirk

A word which denotes the ascription of a partner or an equal to Allah.

Sufi

A follower of Sufism

Sufism (or Tasawwuf)

Discipline within Islam in which the adherent aims to achieve spiritual excellence and purification through certain practises such as remembrance of Allaah and also betters one’s prayers so that they ultimately instil a sense of ihsan within themselves.

Tablighi Jamaat

A group of Muslim preachers originating in India under the auspices of Maulana Zakariyya (d. 1982). This group is influenced by the Deobandi cause but is also influenced greatly by Sufi teachings and has a great focus on prayer (salat) as well as dhikr. (See Malik, B (2007)The Six Points of Tabligh : http://ekhlas.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/the-six-points-of-tabligh.pdf accessed 28.08.10) and are:

Iman (faith)

Namaz ( Salat or Prayer)

Ilm (knowledge) anddhikr (remembrance of Allah)

Ikram-i-Muslim (treating fellow Muslims kindly)

Ikhlas-i-Niyyat (purity of intention)

Dawat (inviting) and tabligh (preaching)

Tariqa

Arabic word meaning path and used in Sufi parlance to refer to a Sufi chain orsilsilah .

Tasbih

Used to refer to an instrument like rosary beads used to carry out dhikr and is also used to refer to a set of oft-repeated words of dhikr.

Wahhabi

A term which is used by Deobandis and Barelvis mostly but seldom by Salafis or Ahl-i-hadith. The term is usually used to refer to a purist who follows the literal meaning of the Qur’aan and has a non accommodating view of Islam.