Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter III: Mapping Religion onto Life: Religion as Sagacious Ordering of Life

Introduction

When ‘Ali Naqvi arrived at the intellectual scene of India, his community was faced with criticisms of Islam from both within (Muslims influenced by western thought) and without (Christian and Hindu missionaries, Imperial rulers, and Orientalists). These criticisms had led to burgeoning skepticism toward what used to be religion’s preeminent status and role within Indian society. Consequently, it had become increasingly uncertain what relevance religion could potentially have for the welfare of a human community. Many had come to see religion and its teachings as passé, to be dispensed with altogether, especially when it came to issues concerning the ordering of communal life. This persistent questioning of the worth of religion for human civilization had increasingly put religious communities (in Naqvi’s case, his Shi’i audience) on the defense, often leading to loss of conviction in religious beliefs and practices. We have already noted in Chapter 1 the various factors that led to this religious crisis. There, we also noted that these criticisms against religion’s relevance had invariably constructed an inherent and insurmountable opposition between the dictates of religion and those of the intellect. Chapter 2 was a reflection on ways in which ‘Ali Naqvi tried to overcome this perceived dichotomy.According to ‘Ali Naqvi the intellect is the mark of human excellence which plays a crucial role in humankind’s self-willed advancement in knowledge, the ultimate aim of human life. No other creature, even the angels, shares in this distinction reserved exclusively for humans. Since for ‘Ali Naqvi, religion’s decisive aim is human islah, both individual and collective, a central faculty like the intellect could not be indifferent to it; instead, in accomplishing this task, it is called upon to be religion’s foremost ally.

Yet, for his aim of preserving and reviving religion, overcoming the religion/intellect divide, although necessary, was far from being sufficient. Given the distinctiveness of the critique leveled against religion in his milieu (details of which have already been laid out in chapter 1), for ‘Ali Naqvi’s rejoinder to be really effective and satisfying for his interlocutors, something more fundamental remained to be accomplished: he needed to demonstrate to them (and to his Shi’i audience) how religion is indispensable for the ultimate interests of individual human beings as well as human communities. While querying the religion/intellect binary (noted in chapter 2), the early 1930s also saw ‘Ali Naqvi beginning to carefully address the problematic: why and how is religion indispensable for human societies? His various writings during this period return to this theme often and address it at length. Furthermore, this problematic was critical in shaping the direction that his restructuring of Islamic theology and praxis would take from this point forward.

If on the one hand, ‘Ali Naqvi’s religion is not man-made and is validated and endorsed by sound intellectual judgment, it is also inherently reforming (islahi) for a human collectivity. In fact, the task of reform is necessary and pivotal to the reality of a true religion. He presented religion’s immense ability to positively transform a society as one of the key features of a true1 religion:

True religion is the aggregate of firm realities upon whose truths the intellect has provided witness…[and] appears necessary for the islah of the world’s civilization….Without doubt, a true religion contains principles of society-formation (mu‘asharat), cultural axioms, decrees for enjoining good and forbidding wrong. [It also has] the power of force (jabaruti taqat): reward and punishment, [Divine] wrath and anger, and mercy and forgiveness are realities to whose importance the intellect bows down….[T]rue religion is one that is a flag-bearer of peace and serenity in the world, the best guide for the formation of society, an honest advisor of culture, a good teacher of civilization, a nourishment of [human] self, the prevention of evil and what is forbidden, a protection from sedition, a preserver of peace and tranquility, a hindrance to crimes, and the best islah of [human] nature.2

By the same token a false religion in essence will be destructive for society. It would demand blind adherence to the way of the forefathers, instigate sedition and corruption, and instead of calling intellect to confirm its veracity, will misguide and hinder its activity. If true religion sides with knowledge and intellect, false religions side with ignorance and human emotions and passions. That is why although false religions also make claim to civilization (tamaddun), “they are culture’s (tahzib) worst enemy”.3

It is evident from the quote that for ‘Ali Naqvi, religion is indispensable for the islah of human society. Yet this ‘indispensable religion’ is not one that opposes the intellect but instead sees the intellect as its key collaborator in formulating principles that are beneficial to human societies. In positing the religion-intellect companionship in forming a healthy society, ‘Ali Naqvi has clearly laid out a criterion for true religion.

Thus, for him to convince people of the truth of Islam - the preservation and revival of religion rests on this - he has to demonstrate to his audience how Islam is really the religion that meets this criterion completely. ‘Ali Naqvi’s many writings during this period attempt to prove precisely that. In these early years, ‘Ali Naqvi is witnessed assertively claiming that no religion other than Islam meets this criteria fully. One such pronouncement is found in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi:

The legal code and religion that has paved the way for human flourishing in knowledge and deeds and has guided him to this path is the one that could truly be the guide of human life; and religion that bars this flourishing in knowledge and deeds needs to realize that its legal code is worthless. Put Islam to this criterion in comparison with all other religions and see [for yourself] how Islam has taught lessons of knowledge and practical deeds and cleared the way and how other religions have chained the human being and blocked his flourishing.

On this criterion it will have to be admitted that Islam alone is the complete code of life (mukammal zabit̤a-yi hayat).4

In brief, his reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis was sensitive to the religionintellect divide on the one hand, and to the question of the significance of religion for human flourishing on the other. The former has already been addressed in the preceding chapter. What remains to be shown is how ‘Ali Naqvi applied his solution to the religion-intellect divide to concrete theological problems. In the present chapter, therefore, we will look at how ‘Ali Naqvi renovates Islamic theology and praxis in view of this perceived divide between religion and intellect, while ultimately attempting to demonstrate to his audience the absolute indispensability of religion for human civilization. In the process we will also examine how ‘Ali Naqvi develops his arguments to show that through Islam’s rich and sagacious teachings, human beings flourish at both individual and communal levels.

PART I: Overcoming Dichotomies: ‘Ali Naqvi’s Islah of the Concept of Religion

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored in detail the centrality of the intellect in ‘Ali Naqvi’s religio-intellectual project and provided his generally employed definition of ‘religion’.

We noted that ‘Ali Naqvi divides religion into two parts: the principles and the branches. Whereas we extensively discussed how intellect relates to this two-fold religious division, our discussion of his concept of religion by virtue of necessity and relevance remained cursory. An examination of his attempts to prove the ‘indispensability of religion for human civilization’, however, calls for a more comprehensive account of his concept of religion. This is all the more important because a critical strand of his reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis was precisely to rectify widespread confusions about the phenomenon of religion. As he saw it, during his own time, the prevalent conception of religion had become progressively more simplistic and too reductive to do full justice to its proper definition and scope, and to what it truly entails for human life and civilization. It is in light of his islah of the concept of religion on the one hand, and that of intellect on the other (together which form the foundation of his religio-theological project) that a comprehensive understanding can emerge of the way he proves to his interlocutors and audience the necessity of religion for human flourishing and civilization. In the first place then, let me turn to his concept of religion.

What Religion is not? Prevailing Misunderstandings about the Reality of Religion

In laying out a detailed account of his rejoinder to ‘what is religion?’ it seems appropriate to examine ‘Ali Naqvi’s allusions to opinions he cites as erroneous or reductive. The religious crisis witnessed by him was a result of these widespread confusions about the conception of religion. In discussing “what is religion?”, ‘Ali Naqvi was responding to a multitude of positions on the nature, meaning, and purposes of religion. His early writings make extensive references to the misunderstandings and confusions that had become widespread in his milieu. Already in 1933, in one of his earliest writings, Tijarat aur Islam (Commerce and Islam), he seems baffled by the extent to which his community had dichotomized the concerns of the present life and that of the hereafter, a distinction usually characterized as din/dunya (life of the world/afterlife). In the section “Mindset of the Individuals of the Community and the Fruits of Wrong Beliefs”, he noted two major errors regarding people’s understanding of the Islamic point of view: First, some presumed that between religion (din) and the world (dunya), Islam has chosen religion and has taught abandonment of the world (dunya). In these people’s view, religion and the world could not coexist and one has to give up worldly life for the sake of religion. In support of this view, ‘Ali Naqvi observed, these people cite the famous saying of the first Shi’i Imam, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abi Talib, in which he divorced the world three times.5 ‘Ali Naqvi noted how emphasis of certain “old-style educated [people]” (purana maktab)6 on religion at the expense of the world only draws more criticism of religion for its backwardness and hindrance in the cause of human progress from the “new-style educated” (naya maktab).7

The whole treatise is then ‘Ali Naqvi’s attempt to remedy this and many other erroneous views that brought about this religion/world (din/dunya) divide. For ‘Ali Naqvi, many of the problems faced by his community, including the economic concerns, were precisely due to this dichotomous view. In this work, it is the application of this divide in the economic realm that concerned him the most.8

Although the text discusses various dimensions of the problem, especially as they relate to economic activity, his anxiety over this matter was far from being resolved with this text alone. Written two years later in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, ‘Ali Naqvi returned to this subject again, addressing it this time in more comprehensive terms. Here he tackles the religion/world divide not from the economic point of view alone; instead this time he draws the dichotomy’s full intellectual, social, economic, and most importantly for us, religious ramifications. Although the fundamental problem is still the same (dissevering of world and religion by his contemporaries of various intellectual and religious orientations), the religion/world divide now appears in the guise of the world/hereafter (dunya/akhirat) dichotomy. In simpler terms, whereas the world represents this worldly life, religion was now identified exclusively with the other-worldly (akhirat) concerns.

According to ‘Ali Naqvi, this dichotomization had forced people to posit varying prescriptions for the ideal human lifestyle,9 two of which had dominated during his time: either seeing this life as the be-all and end-all of human life, or denouncing the life in the world for the sake of the afterlife. Whereas the former viewed human life restricted to the life of this world with nothing to follow, thus the emphasis on enjoying its blessings and gifts, the people of the latter view chose ascetic and monastic lifestyles, renouncing all pleasures of this world, from the point of view of spiritual success in the hereafter, deeming these pleasures with utmost suspicions. ‘Ali Naqvi saw both solutions erroneous: “In the story of this world, these people actually saw only one side. They only saw the afterlife and only took that into account. [Consequently,] they deemed the present life quite unreal and worthless, as if this life created by God was absolutely in vain.”10

For ‘Ali Naqvi, despite these dichotomous views, the Muslim community also suffered from other misperceptions about the nature of the religious worldview and commitments, and their pertinence for human life. An example of this was noted in Chapter 1 where ‘Ali Naqvi expresses his disapproval toward the construal of religion in a manner that severs the organic relationship between religious doctrine and practice.

He notes that during his time, the opinion that human salvation and wellbeing is dependent solely on performance or non-performance of good deeds: it is correct action that saves and makes a human being good or bad. Prescriptively, good deeds would imply things such as being honest and trustworthy, favoring justice and detesting oppression, and being peace-loving. Beyond these righteous deeds, no religious creed is necessary. Religious beliefs (‘aqa’id) such as the Oneness of God, the prophecy of Prophet Muhammad and the Judgment Day are entirely superfluous.11 That ‘Ali Naqvi in pointing out this erroneous view had fellow Muslims in mind becomes clear from the ensuing passage: “If this opinion were posited by those who do not uphold the Qur’an or hadith, then discussion on this subject would have been [presented] in different terms.

But because this opinion is found within religious circles, in deciding on this matter, it is appropriate to first refer to the Qur’an.”12

Besides overemphasizing faith over works (or vice versa), for many, religious doctrines were absolutely useless and theology no more than futile intellectual acrobatics. From the point of view of the welfare of human society, it really had no real relevance. ‘Ali Naqvi explicitly refers to this position in a text published in 1938.13 In a section titled “Khuda ki ma‘rafat ki zarurat aur insan ki ‘amali zindagi par us ka asar (The Necessity of the Knowledge of God and its Effects on the Practical Life of a Human Being)” he cites the various arguments posited by people who question the utility of the belief and knowledge of God:

1. To attempt to know God is akin to the digging of a mountain that results in nothing more than a tuft of grass. An onerous task indeed, the benefit of exerting so much intellectual energy on this complicated matter is quite unclear. One learns that He exists but so what? What is the gain of this knowledge? What harm follows from the absence of this knowledge?

2. Our belief or unbelief in God has no bearing on the reality of God. If he exists belief in Him would not make him non-existent. Yet, human life in the world pertains to human character and deeds; beliefs have nothing to do with it.

3. God is not like human beings, where he is affected by whether people recognize and praise Him or not. He does not desire praise, nor is He vain like human beings. Therefore, He remains indifferent to the belief in Him and does not avenge those who do not believe in Him.

4. Finally, the life of this world is all there is and whatever betterment there could be, it is to be pursued here. It is the life of this world that needs to be ordered for which certain restrictions on certain acts seems quite reasonable. Beliefs, however, hardly impact the cause of islah. Therefore, emphasis on right belief is hardly justifiable.

In sum, according to this burgeoning view, the one saved will be the one with good deeds regardless of whether he is a believer or unbeliever.

Similarly, in another essay ‘Ali Naqvi notes the prevalent reductionism about the reality of religion, but this time in much more comprehensive terms, and in a particularly Shi’i fashion. Here he compares the dire situation of Islamic religion to that of a dream that has been over-interpreted (kasrat-i ta‘bir): Some reduced Islam to the pillars (arkan), prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, etc., with no reference made to morality. In this interpretation, a Muslim becomes a person who performs these rituals but could possibly have the most horrendous evil character. Others reacted to this other-worldly simplicity of interpretation, and came to identify Islam with power and political dominion; it turned a military system into Islam or vice versa: “If [this conception] is deemed correct, then famous oppressive monarchs who had a deep desire for lordship will be reckoned as true Muslims and the term “Muslim” will become lacking [in meaning]. Napoleon, Tamerlane, Nadir [Shah], and these days Hitler and Mussolini will be the greatest Muslims. But can Islam’s purity (pakdamani) and peace-making [disposition] bear out this explanation?Absolutely not!” Yet Muslims may well dwell in the markets, participate in battles, study in the mosques, performing a whole variety of activities of routine daily life: “The truth is that all these [various groups of] people [that I have mentioned] took one part from a broad and comprehensive meaning of Islam and by making it all-encompassing have taken it [i.e., the meaning of Islam] beyond its limits.”14

Cumulatively, these prevailing misapprehensions about religion were responsible in limiting its scope, either by excluding or downplaying certain essential aspects. This worried ‘Ali Naqvi and invited from him an islah of these misconceptions. Yet, in ‘Ali Naqvi’s diagnosis, the problematic “what is religion?” is far from being merely a scholastic puzzle. For him, beliefs carry serious practical consequences in all human domains - religious, moral, social, economic, and political. Therefore, for him much more was at stake in this debate than simply amending an intellectual error. As early as 1935, he clearly expresses what he saw as an organic relationship between belief and action, or intellectual and practical life: human behavior is subordinate to the human mindset. Weakness in action owes not only to lack of will, but to erroneous ideas that come to dwell within the mind and heart of an individual, or among the members of a community. For ‘Ali Naqvi, like the sickness of mind that paralyzes human body, erroneous ideas that emerge out of someone’s pen or tongue come to paralyze a human community. To cure the illness of laxity in practical life, these ideas need to be diagnosed and treated.15

So what, according to ‘Ali Naqvi, were these ideas that were causing lethargy in action? A passage from Islam ki hakimanah zindagi lays out his diagnosis quite clearly.

Here ‘Ali Naqvi notes that individuals of human communities have made varying criteria of distinction and nobility from their own points of view. For materialists, what bestows honor and nobility are wealth and power. Then there are those who see filial association as the mark of nobility. Others see race as the criterion of excellence.

Depending upon the perspective, human beings are led to pursue these “goods”: wealth and power, orracial, or filial affiliation. The case of lineage is particularly curious: here nobility is earned without effort; no military campaigns or effort is needed. ‘Ali Naqvi rejects each ofthese principle because all of these downplay the significance of human virtue. None of these entice a human being into embellishing their souls with positive qualities and habits. They encourage spiritual apathy. The cause of human excellence in character and virtue is further hampered by erroneous Christian beliefs such as the idea of atonement and a misconstrued meaning of worship, that is, to worship means to live in solitude and away from the life of this world. For ‘Ali Naqvi the Christian belief in a Messiah who died for the sins of all human beings obstructs human will from taking full responsibility of its actions. Finally, he notes the example of the Jewish community which reckons itself as a special nation and relies on this charisma over and above right action. Together, for ‘Ali Naqvi “all these ideas were bringing down the quality of people, making them apathetic in action.”16

Applied to the problematic of religion, for ‘Ali Naqvi, misconceptions about religion had barred an effective application of religious principles to practical life. To rectify these misconceptions, the concept of religion itself needed to be clarified. If these were the sorts of confusions prevailing among his audience, what then, according to him, was the correct view of religion, the normal relationship between faith and works, and between the life of this world and the hereafter? The ensuing section takes up these questions.

The All-Encompassing Ambit of Religion:

For ‘Ali Naqvi, religion is not a department of human life; its ambit is all-encompassing, providing guidelines for all aspects of human existence. He calls it “the code of [human] life” (zabit̤a-yi hayat).17 The most questionable facet of the religion/world binary (analogous to which was the pitting of the world against the hereafter) for him is that it leads to the compartmentalization of human life. If it is acceded to, ineluctably one will wind up stressing one dimension over the other: religion over the world, or vice versa.

Eventually, for those who have internalized this partitioning of human existence, the binary would compel mundane choices. Given the high stakes, his first step in rectifying the definition of religion was to address this matter. Quite early in his intellectual career he tackled it in depth in Tijarat aur Islam (Commerce and Islam) and Islam ki hakimanah zindagi. In contrast to the prevalent dichotomous view, ‘Ali Naqvi argued for what he took to be essentially a complementary relationship between the aims of these two lives. ‘Ali Naqvi questions those who belittled the life of the world on the grounds that if it did not mean much and was insignificant, why did God create it in the first place? If death is what God wanted then why did He create life anyway?According to ‘Ali Naqvi, a Purposeful God’s intention of creating life could not be to destroy it, but to maintain it. That is why any teaching or perspective that runs counter to this basic intention witnessed in the world of nature is running counter to the purposes and order of creation, and thus to be rejected on these grounds. One can be certain of this because a Wise God would hardly create something without any purpose: “A successful teaching is only that which fulfills the purposes of nature. The only teaching that can be correct is the one that protects the human [race] from extinction.” Therefore, Christian monasticism is erroneous in its point of view. If universalized, it will lead the human race to extinction. That is why it is unnatural and unacceptable.

‘Ali Naqvi objects to the false dichotomy between the life of this world and that of the hereafter. People deem one of the two real whereas, “true teachings could only be those which protect human existence on the one hand, and also keep an eye on the hereafter”. It is in contrast to these extreme views that ‘Ali Naqvi posits the Islamic point of view as consistent with the call of nature, balanced and accommodative of both this life and that to come. It is precisely the equilibrium contained within Islamic teachings that it can be universalized for all:

It is to the pride of Muslims that their teachings are so comprehensive and compatible with the requirements of nature that if they are presented to the world, then every person can claim that “I can act on these”. This division was created [by people] between this world and the other world. Some saw this world as everything, ignoring the other world. Others deemed the other world everything and this world nothing. Islam came to present [a position of]equilibrium . [God says] that if we have established the present life for you, then [we have] not made forbidden drawing benefits from it. Thus, [Islam] sanctified the existing life. It made the present life full of dignity, so much so that if the human being under the sway of temporary emotions tries to take life away, then Islam bars him [from doing that].18

What constitutes this equilibrium between the life of this world, and the life of the hereafter, and how are they related in ‘Ali Naqvi’s resolution of this dichotomy? His solution rests on a careful distinction drawn between the life of the world (hayat addunya) and a worldly life (al-hayat ad-dunya). In ‘Ali Naqvi’s perspective the life of the world needs to be viewed as a station on the human journey to the hereafter. It needs to be “respected and spent in anticipation of the life to come.” He notes how criticisms of the world found within the Shi’i hadith-literature is often construed to be an outright rejection of the life of this world. ‘Ali Naqvi rejects this interpretation; it is the worldly life, not life of the world that was censured by the Holy Imams: “Remember, this critique is of the ‘worldly life’ (al-hayat ad-dunya). ‘Worldly life’, its meaning is ‘a life that carries a lowly rank.’ ‘Life of the World’ (hayat ad-dunya), [however], is an izafahconstruction, its meaning is ‘the life of the progress of the world’ (insha’-yi dunya ki zindagi). [From the Imams,] there is absolutely no criticism of it. This life instead carries a lofty status.”19 It is when the life of the world is cut off from its larger context - as a step in the journey -that it becomes a worldly life, without any purpose or direction. So long as this life is lived with the vision of the life to come and is used to work towards it, is it noble, praiseworthy, and of a lofty status. In fact, states ‘Ali Naqvi, “the Islamic teaching is that you spend the life of this world in such a manner that it no longer remains ‘al-hayat ad-dunya’ (the worldly life); [instead], the world should itself becomereligion .” 20 That is the reason why when funerals pass by Muslims are called to pray “Thank God who has not put me within the group that is dead”. For ‘Ali Naqvi, the fact that even prophets and Imams had to bear this life is evidence as to its centrality. Not only does it need to be taken seriously, it is also a “fountain of all blessings and goodness.” Naqvi’s rejection of the religion/world divide served a two-fold purpose: to argue with those who had come to make success in the worldly life as the solitary aim for human communities, and with those who, in seeking success in the afterlife, had forsaken the present life. The former group was constituted of materialists (maddah parast) and the irreligious (la din) for whom this life was the only life, with nothing to follow. For him, the latter group included not only Christians and Hindus, but also a huge number of members from his own community. Misconstruing the relationship between this life and the afterlife, these communities had given up on seeking the goods of this life, viewing these as materialist and worldly pursuits. Especially concerned with the plight of his community and given the political and economic crises it confronted, ‘Ali Naqvi saw this other-worldly disposition of Muslims as a hindrance to their success in this world. Whereas he would remind his community of the indivisibility of religious life - by virtue of which seeking the goods of this world becomes a religious duty - with those prone to rejecting any conception of an afterlife (i.e., materialists and the irreligious), he would argue for the intellectual legitimacy of the life to come. Mazhab aur ‘aql, written to explain basic religious doctrines to such an audience (including Shi’i Muslims who are affected by these perspectives), provides one such example.

In the section titled “Reward, Punishment,the Judgment Day” he begins his argument by noting that all human thoughts and actions carry good or bad consequences. Goodness invites rewards and evil punishments. The Judgment Day then is “the occasion upon which one faces the final reward or punishment for his acts.” When the human heart is filled with desires, it is the intellect that comes to teach it the good from the bad. Yet, this voice of the intellect is only heard when one’s conscience is alive and functioning. Habitual criminals whose conscience is dead will not pay heed to the call of the intellect. They in fact reckon their sins as skills. Therefore, no feeling of sorrow or guilt issues forth within them and thus they are devoid of the suffering for their sins: “[Fast] beating of the heart, anxiety of the conscience, the terror of punishment: if these are punishments for the crime, then the result is that a novice criminal sinner’s punishment is severe and that of habitual criminals less so - [and with passing of time] comes to be absent.”21

Which system of justice would uphold the principle that the more the crimes are committed, the lesser the punishment, ‘Ali Naqvi inquires. In other words, if sins result in anxieties, fears of punishment, and the fast beating of hearts, then a professional criminal has long since buried these concerns. ‘Ali Naqvi further points to the immense injustices that are found within this world, where the powerful continue to rob, oppress and exploit the weak and governments prove helpless or even supportive of these acts.

Since in these systems justice is hardly ever implemented, these robbers and exploiters get away with everything. So neither these robbers suffer from any commensurate punishment, nor do they bear the burden of guilt within their consciences. Even bad reputation hardly stops them from carrying out mischievous acts. In fact, criminals often take pride in their destructive activities. Accordingly, anyone who believes in true justice and fairness has to look elsewhere than the existing systems of justice for a proper resolution of the just consequence of one’s actions, the Judgment Day:

If a decisive dividing line between good and evil is necessary in the courtroom of justice and equity, then beyond these temporary consequences you will have to admit a permanent and final reward and punishment. That is the Judgment Day.

Those who truly believe in it cannot dare to sin. Those who are free from belief in returning [i.e., eschatology], [simply] protecting [the rule] of law by keeping them at bay from committing crimes cannot be enough. This is because they do not abhor crimes; instead, they always desire safety for themselves.22

Akin to the religious belief in the Judgment Day, ‘Ali Naqvi illustrates to his audience a sagacious and intellectual basis for other religious doctrines. In these illustrations, intellectual arguments are given centrality through demonstrating the superiority of the religious creed over other perspectives.

Overcoming the Faith-Works Dichotomy

Similar to his objection to the religion/world divide, he also rejects the faith/works (‘aqidah/‘amal) dichotomy. For him, religion is neither simply doctrines, nor actions that occur in isolation from proper understanding. It is instead an indivisible unity comprised of both faith and works that encompasses concerns, both of this world and the hereafter. At times he argues with those who deem faith sufficient for religious purposes;23 at others, with those who had overlooked the doctrinal dimension. His islah of the concept of religion would therefore be through a clarification of the organic relationship between faith and works. Let us look closely at his response to the faithworks divide.

Argument I: Principles and Branches of Religion (Usul-furu‘) and the Complementarity of Faith and Works (‘aqida wa ‘amal)

In countering the faith/works divide, ‘Ali Naqvi resorts to two major arguments. In his first argument he addresses the issue upfront. In chapter 2 we presented ‘Ali Naqvi’s classification of religion under principles (usul) and branches (furu‘) of religion.24 In his first rejoinder to the prevalent misunderstandings, he amply uses this traditional principles-braches distinction and maps it onto the faith/works divide.25 He begins his discussion by providing a textual proof from the Qur’an for a mutually harmonizing and necessary relationship between faith and works. Textual proof was needed because according to ‘Ali Naqvi, this opinion had become widespread among Muslims themselves. He draws the attention of his audience to the frequent juxtaposition of faith and righteous action (iman va ‘amal-i salih), arguing that this concurrence is evidence to necessity of both for salvation (nijat) and blessings in the afterlife. Furthermore, he presents the Qur’anic verse 2:17726 as conclusive proof that piety is not limited to action alone; it also demands religious beliefs in the Oneness of God, angels, the prophets, and so on. In the Qur’anic verse it is in fact presented as prerequisite for activity: it is only after the beliefs are listed that the verse turns to things that are within the domain of action. He specifically notes the absence of the conjunction “or” between faith-related and action-related items in the verse: the verse does not present an option for human beings to choose either faith or action. It instead demands both: “Here they are all [listed] with ‘and’, ‘and’….It means a collection of attributes (ijtima‘-i ausaf)….It means that all these attributes have a part to play in making a human pious.

If some [attributes] are present yet others are lacking, then piety cannot be attributed [to such a person].”27

So much for the textual (naqli) proof against the faith-works divide. As with his other arguments and in full awareness of the needs of his audience for whom intellectual justification had more force than textual citation, ‘Ali Naqvi now turned to a discussion of this issue on intellectual grounds, spending the rest of this short treatise articulating a persuasive intellectual proof. His argument rests on the distinction between actions that are performed habitually (‘adat) and those that are performed with understanding (fahm). Finally, he compares and contrasts the impact of each on the human soul (nafs) and its character-formation (kirdar). Whereas habitual acts according to ‘Ali Naqvi bestow limited results, actions performed with understanding are much wider in scope and quite effective in transforming the human soul. Let us look at this argument carefully.28

‘Ali Naqvi begins by positing the absolute indispensability of cooperation between belief and action. This cooperation owes to the organic relationship between human body, intellect, and will. Since beliefs belong to the domain of the human mind, and action to the human body, it is conceivable that occasionally mind and body may remain severed from each other, and the body would act independently of the mind. This independent action of the body could occur especially when the act is performed out of a habitual behavior, unconscious and routine.

The case of non-habitual, conscious, and deliberate willful act is completely different however. In an act based on conscious intention and willful choice, the mind and the body bond with one another, the mind governing the body during the process. In other words, it is human volition that combines the human mind to the human body:

“Human merit is contained within the substance of [his ability to make a] choice.

Choice is connected to his soul whose activity occurs through the mind and the brain.” ‘Ali Naqvi extends his analysis further: acts that are based on habit and habit alone, their fruitful results at best could only be partial, never complete. He cites the example of a child who is taught by his parents to pray on time and since that habit was instilled in him over a long period of time, the child would feel restless if and when he breaks it. Once the call to prayer has been made, he will not be at peace until he would pray. Such is the power of habit on human soul. Yet, since the domain of the child’s habit is limited to prayer alone, it would never branch out to encompass other spheres of life. He would not feel the same kind of restlessness if he steals, lies, or does not pay his debts. The case of worship is quite similar: “…[ I]f this worship is simply a habit, then its effect will be confined to prayer alone. It will not influence his character beyond this act.” Furthermore, by itself, a habit-based act does not guarantee complete success even in its own domain: a tongue that is trained to be truthful - a laudable act indeed - cannot by virtue of its truthfulness ensure that it does not cause the most destructive rows among people. Backbiting could well be based on truthfulness yet in certain scenarios can lead to the complete breakdown of human relationships. In sum, the results of habit-based activity are quite inadequate.

What is the alternative to this habit-based human behavior and action?Having noted the limitations of habitual practices, ‘Ali Naqvi now presents an alternative and more effective way of accomplishing more wholesome results. He argues that the central abode of all human activity is the human soul. The human soul rules over the body and all the acts gather at that place: “It is the eyes that see but the person who says ‘I saw’;

what heard something were the ears, but the person states ‘I heard’.” Since the human dominates all parts of the body, anything that will influence it will also influence all these body parts. If that is the case, observes ‘Ali Naqvi, then there will be no need to separately train each part of the body. This is where the role of correct mindset and intention becomes so crucial.

For ‘Ali Naqvi there is an inherent wisdom in the emphasis that Islam puts on proper intentionality. Because people do not pay attention to the intention of worship which is usually pronounced in the Islamic rituals - to the extent even that sometimes that pronouncement itself becomes a habit - the effects of their prayer does not extend out to other domains of life that demand righteousness and piety. Just as the tongue which has been trained to not lie can easily backbite or instigate a feud, a person whose prayer life emerges simply out of a routine, one could not expect it to transform acts that lie outside of it. By itself, the act of prayer and the habit of praying is good, but its impact quite limited.

What is needed therefore is mindfulness and right intention. For ‘Ali Naqvi the necessity of a proper mindset and intentionality demonstrates to us the need for proper doctrinal understanding, thus the necessity of the religious principles or creed. Those desiring to go beyond the limited results offered by a habit-based human life to arrive at a “holistic and total” transformation of human life and societies would find religious doctrines, therefore, indispensable.

Having demonstrated the necessity of religious creed and understanding for proper action, ‘Ali Naqvi now turns to the process by way of which religious faith affects the human soul and concomitantly actions: “Faith and beliefs are such things that leave a deep impression (sikkah jamana) directly on the human soul. When faith conquers the soul, a mould for the character is created. In accordance with adherence to the order and discipline and preservation of higher [human] aims, all [human] actions are fashioned into this mold. In Qur’anic terminology this mold is known as “godfearing” (taqvaá)29 . Without faith, it cannot come into existence.” In the process, he also clarifies how beliefs and actions naturally correspond to the principles-branches (usul-furu‘) distinction made by religious scholars. Faith characterized by the principles of religion sets the background, “the mold”, within which religious activity takes place. ‘Ali Naqvi uses the analogy of a tree to elaborate this point. Akin to the roots of a tree30 that remain invisible but hold the whole tree together, religious faith provides the foundation upon which human action grows. If the branches of religion (which in this analogy correspond to human actions) do not appear on the tree, it reveals that the roots of the tree are weak. Furthermore, if the branches exist but become dry one must not start sprinkling water on the leaves. The proper way to breathe life into the tree then will be watering the roots. In the same manner, when human actions fail to show fruits, one should cultivate and strengthen intellectual understanding of the principles of religion. In conclusion then, Fruits can only be [obtained] from those branches that are connected to the root (asl ). The mutual relationship between doctrines and actions replicates the same situation. If there are no actions, then either there is no faith, or it is so weak that it cannot lead to any revolution in life. And if actions are without correct beliefs, then they are temporal, have no durability, and one cannot reap [the fruit of] salvation from them. They are either due to habit or are ostentatious for a particular strategic reason. Hence, deriving righteous actions from these will not succeed.

If on some occasions, ‘Ali Naqvi argues for the necessity of the principles of religion (usul) for the branches of religion (furu‘), at others he illustrates how the latter in turn preserves the former, thus the inseparability and consonance between the two. ‘Ali Naqvi uses the example of canonical prayer (salat/namaz) and other pillars of religion.

Here again his analysis rests on a crucial distinction between the conception (tasavvur) of the object of worship (markaz-i ‘ibadat) and the manner of worship (tariq-i ‘ibadat) and brings to fore the centrality of human intention in acts. Whereas the manner of worship relates to the bodily acts, the Object of worship (which is God) concerns the human mind and intentionality. Insofar as the litanies (azkar), recitation of the Qur’anic verses, and bodily movements such as bowing and prostrations are concerned, they involve human body parts such lips, tongue, limbs, and so on. These acts relate to the branches of religion. The conception of the Object of worship relates, however, to the principles of religion. Like other human habits, if acts of worship were to be performed out of habit alone, the mind would remain detached to these acts and will hardly be affected by these actions. That is why according to Naqvi the sagacious teachings of the Shari’a has made proclamation of intention mandatory: “But when intention was made prerequisite for worship, its consequence was [the prescription] that every act be performed with this conception [of the Object of worship], that is [to reflect on questions such as]: what is the foundation of this act and for whom is it performed?

Therefore, worship is the name of an act which involves this conception. Fasting is a thing associated with this conception; otherwise, it is simply abstention from eating.” Therefore, through the intention the manner of worship is tied to the Object of Worship and the purpose of worship preserved in the act of worship. That is how, for ‘Ali Naqvi, principles of religion are preserved through the branches of religion. A further consequence of this underlying wisdom of Shari’a rulings is that if intention remains unknown or uncomprehended - as has been the case with many rituals of other religions such as Diwali or Holi - that with the passage of time the community would completely forget the basis for that ritual. By invoking the intention in every Islamic ritual, a Muslim is always reminded of the ultimate purpose behind these acts. It ensures that these acts are not performed out of custom - following the ways of the forefathers - but with purposefulness and clarity of vision.31

Despite reciprocity and complementarity between the principles and branches of religion as noted above, for ‘Ali Naqvi, the principles do have a priority over the branches, and thus, understanding over action. For him, correct understanding is the prerequisite for proper action. Human action is a result of the human mindset and intellectual errors will inevitably result in improper behavior. In a section titled “Islami ‘aqa’id ka asar-iaf‘al va a‘mal par” (Effects of Islamic doctrines on [human] deeds and actions), he writes: “Human actions and deeds are subordinate to the human mindset, and formation of that mindset occurs through beliefs and views. All the beliefs taught by Islam are such that they elevate human horizons and are the reason for ennoblement and propriety in one’s actions and deeds.”32

It goes without saying that in mapping intellectual and practical dimensions of human life onto the scholastic principles-branches distinction, ‘Ali Naqvi also attempted to illustrate to his audience the efficacy of these scholastic categories, their inherent reasonability, and commonsensical nature.

Argument II: Widening the Meaning of Worship

The distinction of matters of worship (‘ibadat) and socio-economic transactions of everyday life (mu‘amalat) has become standard in Islamic Law.33 The former include the well-known five pillars of Islam (arkan al-Islam), and the latter human transactions that range from socioeconomic contracts to matters pertaining to family law. ‘Ali Naqvi’s alternative argument was to widen this standard view of worship (‘ibadat). For ‘Ali Naqvi, the Muslim community had increasingly confined the meaning of worship to basic religious rituals such as the five prayers, fasting, alms tax, and pilgrimage to Mecca and had often identified religion as such with these pillars of religion. From the legal point of view, for ‘Ali Naqvi, this way of defining worship is not entirely inaccurate, yet to limit the concept of worship to this definition alone is quite problematic. Therefore, he attends to the islah of the concept of worship, construing it as a “deep sense of responsibility/duty (farz shanasi)” that pervades and steers all human affairs. ‘Ali Naqvi’s description of this sense of duty would encompass the classical categories of the rights of God (huquq Allah) and the rights of people (huquq an-nas). In expanding the concept of worship from religious rituals to this “strong sense of duty” encompassing human affairs related both to God and other human beings, ‘Ali Naqvi attempted the integration of all aspects of human life into the ambit of religion. A brief allusion to his intention of correcting the misconception and his islah appears as early as in 1935: “There is a misunderstanding about the Islamic injunction to worship. For some people, there is a misconception that worship is simply prayer and alms-tax. But the truth is that this is not the correct meaning of worship. The meaning of worship is to perform duties. Its meaning is to achieve God’s pleasure through one’s actions and includes all those facets of life that human beings need to work on.”34

In his early career, ‘Ali Naqvi frequently makes similar statements, succinctly but without making a clear intellectual case for them. These statements occur within a broader context of his attempts to articulate correct principles for the Islamic way of life, or the Islamic sagacious ordering of life.35 In these writings, ‘Ali Naqvi clearly highlights the prevalent confusion about worship and its meaning, while also summarily stating his position on this issue. However, the full version of this argument appears much later in his writings. In dealing with the proper definition, nature, scope, and purpose of worship, Ibadat aur tariq-i ‘ibadat [Worship and the [Proper] Manner of Worship]36 is a short but important treatise of ‘Ali Naqvi’s liturgical theology. Here, he accords human intention a central focal point in religious life relating it to the previously noted idea of worship as a sense of duty. In expanding the meaning of worship from prayer and fasting to a deep sense of responsibility, ‘Ali Naqvi is also aware of a seeming contradiction: if worship in legal classification37 pertains to basic religious rituals, then how could it have such a wide-ranging meaning? Does that not mean that worship is everything, thus making the distinction itself inane? ‘Ali Naqvi accepts that the common meaning of worship is the pillars of Islam, recitation of the Qur’an, supererogatory prayers such as visitation prayers (ziyarat). Yet in Islam, notes ‘Ali Naqvi, the meaning of worship is quite broad and in fact includes fulfilling of the responsibilities of every sphere of life. This is so because Islam is a complete religion that oversees all aspects of life. That is why Islamic Shari’a encompasses all aspects of the human individual and communal lives andlegislates issues as trivial as how to sit, stand, or sleep properly. It does not leave out affairs that would otherwise be seen related to a human being’s animal desires such as procreation and sex.38 In brief, in this second meaning everything is part of worshipping God.But how so? For ‘Ali Naqvi every human act that is performed in seeking divine pleasure turns into an act of worship: “From the point of view of a particular conception (mafhum-i khass), worship is the name of a combination of actions put together in a particular arrangement and is created for the sole reason of exhibiting spiritual poverty (nayaz mandi)39 towards God.

For this purpose, an action is not an action unless it contains striving to be nearer [to God] (qasd-i taqarrub) or carries an intention seeking Divine pleasure.”40

Understood this way, observes ‘Ali Naqvi, even the most basic human arrangements to stay alive, drinking water, eating food, protecting oneself from danger (so long all of these things are done with the intention of pleasing God), are acts of worship. It is so because God desires for us to live until the time when He decides to take this life away from us.Every act that is in accordance with this will of God and for his sake then fulfils the duty prescribed by His will expressed through the Islamic Shari’a. On the other hand, if a person regularly does all that it takes to protect his life, but for any reason other than obeying or pleasing God, although Divine will for that human person to stay alive will be accomplished, these acts will not be reckoned as acts of worship.41

The key idea for this argument is God’s intention for human beings to stay alive:

If staying alive is what is expected by God, then everything that is necessary for the continuation of this life would logically become religiously mandatory, and every act carried out for its preservation will transform into an act of worship. One is immediately reminded of ‘Ali Naqvi’s arguments against the religion/world divide where ‘Ali Naqvi emphasizes how Islam, in asserting a holistic perspective on this matter, celebrates this life and considers it a gift of God. It refuses to take it for granted or ignore it for otherworldly concerns. Instead, the Islamic ideal is to integrate it fully within the higher purposes of human life. By relating every human action to the ultimate Divine intention, ‘Ali Naqvi brings the whole of human life under the umbrella of religion.

Akin to the first argument, if understood correctly, no human domain can escape the ambit of religion.

Concluding Remarks: Toward a Renewed Understanding of Religion

During ‘Ali Naqvi’s time, the prevalent reductionist view of religion had extricated certain crucial spheres of human life (such as economics and politics) from religion’s ambit. The concept of ‘privatized Islam’ that emerged due to this view meant that for many, Islam dealt only with religious rituals and basic beliefs, with no significant import for day-to-day human affairs and decisions. The overall impact of this concurrent compartmentalization of life into many spheres on the one hand, and then allotment of a particular territory to religion (via its privatization) meant that the Islamic religion, in this new scheme, had only a limited relevance for the society. Similarly, a good Muslim became someone who believed in certain abstract ideas, and performed certain acts such as prayers, paying alms-tax, and fasting, among others. None of these, however, translated into a comprehensive worldview or a way of life. Nor was this religious life supposed to weigh upon society in any serious way.

By overcoming the religion/world and faith/works dichotomies, ‘Ali Naqvi asserted what he saw as the all-encompassing scope of religion - one that guides every human action, no matter how trivial it may seem. In ‘Ali Naqvi’s alternative, every human action performed with a sense of duty and with the intention of seeking Divine pleasure became a religious act. The cumulative effect of various rectifications offered by ‘Ali Naqvi brought about a renewed understanding of the nature and reality of religion, in which religion could no more be reduced simply to certain religious rituals, or privatized to a department or aspect of life; nor could life be neatly compartmentalized into two isolated sectors of this world and the hereafter. Whatever concerns a human being, individually or collectively, concerns religion as well: Since the human life is an organic unity, created for ordering it sagaciously, religion’s mark could not but be total, touching its every aspect. In other words, for the human collectivity, religion became life itself, and a complete code. Hence, the totality of life corresponded to - especially in the case of Islam - a totality of religious prescriptions which were contained in its constitutive elements of proper belief and action.

In view of everything that has been noted thus far, it is not surprising that ‘Ali Naqvi would summarize and express his definition of religion (and Islam in specific) in the following terms:

The “Reality of Islam” is a lofty and complete objective in which are included the proclamation [of the testimony of faith], prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and alms-giving; protecting the higher aims, bravery and sacrifice are also its constituents; the military system is also needed for protection of these aims; and obedience to the ruler under rules that are protective of the realities of Islam are also made essential. And there are many other domains which are not related to these aforementioned limits.

Islam is an aggregate of beliefs and actions: beliefs that stir up the consciousness to act and such actions that help refine beliefs; beliefs that will result in self-confidence and dignity over all other creatures, and actions that will bring together the world; beliefs that enhance the collective order [of human society] and call [humans] toward islah, and actions that will complete the purpose of islah. If we look for one comprehensive word to describe the reality of Islam then it will be “sense of responsibility/duty” (farz shanasi). If you extend this term, then the whole world of beliefs and actions will appear [before us] (emphasis added).42

According to ‘Ali Naqvi, for the human intellect religious doctrines provide a framework that awakens and sustains the fervor for a strong sense of duty. Through its prescriptions for the practical life, these religious convictions are then enacted and put in practice. These practical duties are constituted by both individual and collective responsibilities, towards God and towards fellow human beings, and together carrying out of these responsibilities reforms an individual and strengthens the public order. An important conclusion to be derived from this analysis is that Islam is neither simply thought, nor just action. It is not to be reduced to a military system or to empire building. It is simultaneously prayer, alms-giving, and recitations of the holy scripture on the one hand, and honesty, justice, and protection of one’s life and honor. Viewed from the comprehensive definition of Islam as principles and branches of religion, it includes content for the mind, for the body, and for the heart. No aspect of human personality is left out of it.43

‘Ali Naqvi goes on to argue how everything that he has listed above is religiously intended and an integral part of the vision of Islam. That “there are many other domains which are not related to these aforementioned limits” shows that he kept the list deliberately open to further possibilities. Since the possibilities in life are infinite, the list of what the religion of Islam comprises need not be made exhaustive either; new situations may always arise. The important point, however, is simple:

Nothing in existence is or can be outside the scope of religion.

Once religion’s ambit is extended to include all human domains, individual and communal, it is easier, then, for ‘Ali Naqvi to delve in matters that would usually be (under the influence of misunderstandings, according to him) considered worldly such as earning income, doing business, running governments, and so on: “In both individual and collective life, concerning the rights of God (huquq Allah) and that of humans (huquq an-nas), in everything fulfilling whatever duty a human has is part of worship.

Those things which are considered separate from worship, for example, attaining income and wealth, if sought in a [legally] permissible way, is not separate from religion (din)”.44

The purpose of ‘Ali Naqvi’s many writings on sociopolitical and economic matters can only be appreciated when situated within this larger project of rehabilitation and islah of the concept of religion. We have already noted in chapter one how ‘Ali Naqvi exhorted his community to take full part in economic activities and see economic effort as part of their religious duty. In the same vein, in 1941, he is found at pains again to encourage his followers to pursue their economic interests.45 While we will return to these writings in the following chapter, the most significant aspect about these writings for us is that no aspect of human life remained divorced from religion: the irreducibility of religion to this or that sphere of life prevented this religion-secular dichotomization.

Religion in this transformed understanding was comprehensive and guided everything:

the human body, mind, and spirit; and for a human society from family relations to economic and political matters and everything in between.46 In sum, the fundamental premises of the Islamic revelation - the organic relationship between worldly life and the hereafter, binding correlation between faith and works, and the balance between human individuality and community - provides an excellent prescription that could embrace and tackle the inherent complexity of human life with perfect care and profundity.

The reader may remember that the litmus test of the success or failure of ‘Ali Naqvi’s response to the religious crisis was illustrating the indispensability of religion for human society to his interlocutors. One may grant ‘Ali Naqvi the argument of the inseparability of religion from every aspect of human life; by itself, however, this was far from admitting that religion is indispensable for human societies. At a time when religion’s necessity or benefit for human communities was under intense scrutiny and doubt, something more was still to be accomplished. He had to prove to his community that not only is religion concerned with all aspects of human life, but it improves them immensely. Furthermore, he also needed to show that such a religion is unmistakably ‘Islam’. In this regard, ‘Ali Naqvi appears very confident when he proclaims:

The life of people living in a house, within a city, within a country, and then that of people of the whole world, Islam has not left any aspect of life yearning for teachings. In every department of life, religion has established its own theoretical and practical imprint (‘ilmi va ‘amali nuqush), acting upon which is truly necessary47 for success. What can one say about the comprehensiveness of Islamic Law in the realms of household management (tadbir-i manzil) and citypolitics!

[They are so comprehensive] that scholars of the science of ethics are compelled to say, “What can we do, the Islamic Shari’a has fulfilled all needs.” A book of Islamic jurisprudence that is comprehensive on Islamic rulings is also comprehensive in the science of virtue. All the spheres of life are completely contained within the Islamic Shari’a.48

Now that a comprehensive picture of the religious crisis, his conception and islah of the concept of religion, and the relationship between religion and ‘aql has been presented, we are in a position to examine how ‘Ali Naqvi would defend this view and convince his interlocutors that the Islamic religion is the greatest source of islah for human societies.

PART II: Indispensability of Religion for Human Civilization: Religion as Sagacious Ordering of Life

The previous section brought to the fore ‘Ali Naqvi’s insistence on Islam as an allencompassing religion. The question still remains: in what ways is this claim true? How do Islamic teachings encompass and address all the needs of human societies? An interrelated second question is about the shifting nature of human cultures and societies.

How does a religion like Islam stay relevant and keep up with these shifts which are sometimes of unprecedented intellectual and cultural scale? This latter question was even more pressing within the context in which ‘Ali Naqvi lived. As ‘Ali Naqvi himself noted,49 during these years India was passing through a cultural, political, and intellectual revolution. How could Islam be seen as relevant and its teachings sufficient in addressing the needs and conditions of these colossal transformations?

‘Ali Naqvi addresses both questions at length, at times in conjunction with one another. This subject was a prominent theme in his early writings, especially in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, Nizam-i zindagi, Mazhab aur ‘aql, Hayat-i qaumi, and his various essays on the Islamic doctrine of God.50 Given the nature and magnitude of the religious crisis, ‘Ali Naqvi was never content with simply laying out the correct religious creed or practice. He was always demonstrating to his audience ways in which these prescriptions contain wisdom and become necessary for the islah of the society. I will return to this point later. For the moment, let us examine his answers to these two pressing questions.

PART I: Religion and the Order of Life: Mapping Religion onto Life

Although the seeds of ‘Ali Naqvi’s arguments are already found in his earliest writings, with Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, he begins to respond to these questions in a more systematic manner. His first step was to point to the absolute necessity of orderliness for human life. This necessity is a logical corollary of the patterns of order and harmony witnessed in the natural world which is also proof of a Wise Creator: “In the order of existence (nizam-i hasti) there is wisdom which is perceived by the eye, understood by the reason, and assented to by the heart….In the created things (sana‘iyun), there is a manifestation of power through which a powerful artisan is known.”51 In a later text and along the lines similar to those of Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, he returns to discuss this harmony and order of the whole world of existence, this time, however, making this assertion of orderliness explicit. Akin to his arguments about the life and death of a human being in which the interconnectedness of the world of creation was assumed, here again the ideas provide the basis for his analysis: “The human being is part of the chain of creation. That is why he is not exempt from the laws of life and death that are operative in everything else [in creation]. Acts of nature are a school for education and training for the human, from where he could draw many useful lessons for his life (emphasis added).”52

It is worth noting for ‘Ali Naqvi, the harmony in the world of nature is replete with definite lessons which carry momentous consequences for human life. This is because human beings reside very much within this cosmic order. We have already seen this line of argument from him: In chapter two where we discussed ‘Ali Naqvi’s discussion of the “meaning of human life” vis-à-vis the life and death of inanimate bodies, plants, animals, and angels.53 Here again, after having shown the meaning and significance of this orderliness and the interconnectedness of the world of creation (that includes human life as well), he turns to various lessons that humans need to learn from this order. ‘Ali Naqvi notes that in the order of inanimate bodies, there are forces of attraction and repulsion that keep things together. If one attempts to break a piece of iron, or press it, he would feel repulsion, something within the iron piece resisting that external force. This is because of the attraction of its parts towards the center. A cotton piece of a much bigger size would not present any comparable level of resistance. This is because its parts do not possess the same level of attraction towards its center. The same iron piece after having rusted loses these forces of attraction towards the center, and can be pressed and broken easily into pieces. Thus, observations of inanimate bodies teach human beings the importance of attraction towards the center.

In the case of plants one learns that the plants that grow are the plants that remain attached to their roots. No leaf or branch can survive once it is uprooted from its source.Thus the importance of the roots. In the animal kingdom, the intellect witnesses another phenomenon, absent from the domains of inanimate and plant kingdoms: here, simple connection of a part to the whole - like that of a branch to the tree and its roots - would not keep the part alive. An animal’s hand or eyes that are never put to use or are sick due to illness would be useless for the rest of the body and result in defectiveness of the whole. Here the key lesson is that a part needs to keep unity with the whole and should be functioning. In brief, from the domain of the world of matter human beings should learn to remain centered, from the plant kingdom learn to be rooted, and from the animal world learn to be actively engaged and connected to the whole.

Having drawn these lessons from the various levels of the created order, ‘Ali Naqvi now applies these lessons to human life: “Now consider human life in light of these examples. The only difference is that whereas inanimate bodies, plants, and animals have individual status, human life is connected to society. Its center will be a communal center, its connection a spiritual connection, and the life gained will be communal (qaumi)54 life.”55

What could then be that thing which could provide the essential needs of centredness and rootedness for a human collectivity? ‘Ali Naqvi notes that various points of view have posited race, color, lineage, or country as that fundamental basis. He points out that none of these frameworks are able to create a universal family; instead they have always caused divisions and created rifts within human societies. That is why, ‘Ali Naqvi argues, “Islam established a foundation for global community greater than all of these. This [foundation] originates through relationship with one God in which there is neither difference in race, color, or country.” Whether certain groups of peoples accept or reject this intellectual basis would hardly affect the principle.56

The rest of the essay draws numerous lessons pertinent for the life of a community, which are not central to my argument here. An earlier four-volume text Nizam-i zindagi (The Order of Life) takes the argument to yet another level. Here, the harmonious order of the natural world no longer remains simply an educator of human beings, but points to the vital necessity of orderliness and harmony for human societies as well. ‘Ali Naqvi argues that it is this natural order and harmony that makes possible sciences such as zoology, botany, and physics, upon which in turnrest the various crafts and practices such as medicine. In discerning and discovering the underlying order these sciences rely on universal principles (kulliyat). Accidents (ittafaqat), since they are without criterion, hardly play any significant role in these sciences. The crucial point is that the order that is witnessed in the cosmic order and vouched by these sciences point to a Wise Creator (hakim khaliq)Who has placed laws and regulations for the natural world. If so much is affirmed by the human intellect, ‘Ali Naqvi argues, then it would be inconceivable that the same Wise Creator would leave His chief creation (i.e., human beings) without any guidance for ordering their day to day life and managing their affairs: “It is wrong for a human being to think that he will be left alone in this world - just as he is, without any order (nazm), guidance (qa‘idah), or law (qanun/a’in). This would only have been possible if his Creator were lacking in understanding, was without consciousness (shu‘ur ), or incapable of bringing about order and law for action.”57

But there is a slight difference: Whereas, to the natural order, the Creator’s guidance has come in the form of laws that constitute its very existential makeup (takvini), for human beings it has come in the form of a divine law (tashri‘). Humanbeings, since endowed with choice and freewill, can then choose either to accept or reject this guidance. The status of this law is therefore the same as that of other natural science in which universal principles (not accidents!) play a crucial part: “Now when everything is principled and part of an order, then whyshould a human being be without order, without principles,” he argues.

It is at this point that we can see ‘Ali Naqvi’s resolution to the problem: “how does religion guide?”According to ‘Ali Naqvi, religious guidance comes in the form of a Shari’a, a Divine law. Akin to the whole created order, the guidance for human existence and flourishing is also comprehensive and contained within this Law. In other words, the essential needs of humanity are all addressed in the Islamic Shari’a, which is formulated by the Creator and revealed to human beings through the channel of prophecy. Yet, unlike the rest of creation, human beings can choose to accept or refuse it. In a nutshell then, ‘Ali Naqvi’s argument is as follows: the necessity of order in human life is self-evident, but since human life occurs within a larger whole that includes all of creation, there is an organic bond between humans and this larger whole.

That is why, in many ways, the laws that govern these other planes of existence also rule human life. It is therefore mandatory for humans to pay heed to the underlying tidiness and harmony witnessed in these other modes of existence by pondering over them as ‘signs’ (ayat). However, notwithstanding humanity’s existence within the broader harmonious universe - to which it must not stay indifferent - its own unique stature, nature, and mission also deserve guidance that corresponds uniquely to these. A complete account of this specificity of human nature - taken to be “willful progress in knowledge and deeds” - was discussed at length in chapter two.58 For the accomplishment of this ultimate calling of human life, religion provides direction and guidelines. And it is in this process that the divinely gifted faculty of the intellect comes to play such a crucial role. It is through the intellect that the patterns in nature are observed and their lessons are drawn. Yet for affairs that are beyond the capacities of the human intellect, religion functions as the intellect’s foremost ally.59 For ‘Ali Naqvi, religious guidance - especially in its Islamic formulation - is contained within the prescriptions of the Shari’a and covers in its scope all human actions, whether related to the human-God relationship (‘ibadat) or human-human relationships (mu‘amalat).

Furthermore - and this is crucial to ‘Ali Naqvi’s argument - the raison d’être of this Law is precisely to guarantee harmony and order for human life. Religion exists for the reforming human societies, countering corruption, and bringing peace and tranquility to the human order. Almost all of ‘Ali Naqvi’s writings - whether on theological or praxis-related questions - stress this point: religion is the source of reform (islah) and peace within human societies and society’s wellbeing is religion’s highest calling: “There is no doubt that [it is] for the islah of people that the founders of religion preached the realities of [Divine] Unity and the Returning (ma‘ad).”(emphasis added)60

In the same vein, notice how he relates belief in One God to peace and tranquility in human life: “To live a peaceful and tranquil lifespan, accepting and understanding an infinite power greater than the human being, and conforming to certain principles, is religion. To submit to God, the Sender of themessage, is called Islam....Practical teachings for islah of people kept changing according to the program [intended].” (emphasis added)61

‘Ali Naqvi’s insistence that religion is the source of social peace and tranquility is not a coincidence. The circumstances of the time demanded it. As was noted in the introduction, many of his interlocutors and the growing waves of Westernization and secularization had put a huge question mark on the relevance of religion for human society. For ‘Ali Naqvi to be successful in persuading his audience that “religion is still relevant”, it was not enough to show that it was reasonable, and that it can be upheld on intellectual grounds. He had to prove to them that not only it is not at odds with reason, but in actuality is very beneficial to the well-being of human communities.

Let us look at one of his representative texts in this regard, one that captures in a nutshell ‘Ali Naqvi’s religio-intellectual project and its already discussed various strands, especially reflecting the discussion about religion’s role in the human order of life. If Mazhab aur ‘aql (1942) was his clearest statement of his hermeneutics - his assertion of the inherent compatibility of religion and reason, and the former’s reasonability - the four-volume Nizam-i zindagi [The Order of Life] written around the same time (between 1940 and 1942) completes his reformulation of Islamic theology and praxis. That it is a practical manual for his followers for the ordering of their lives is only obvious from the content of this work. Besides this overt aim of teaching his community the proper religious attitude towards life, in many ways this work goes beyond proving Islam’s inherent reasonability: it is ‘Ali Naqvi’s attempts to “illustrate” to his audience that not only is Islam quite reasonable, but more importantly, its sagacious teachings are absolutely indispensable for human societies. In what could be construed as the culmination of his religio-intellectual project, this is the task he lays out for himself.

To persuade his audience of this assertion, ‘Ali Naqvi takes upon himself to show how religion encompasses all spheres and stages of human life. Nizam-i zindagi [The Order of Life] is his most comprehensive attempt in this regard where, to demonstrate the sagacious teachings of Islam for ordering human life, ‘Ali Naqvi would systematically “map” Islamic religion (comprised of the faith-works division) onto human life. He walks his reader through the complete lifespan of a human being - beginning from even before he was born - illustrating along the way how in every Islamic prescription made for the various stages of human life, there is immense wisdom that is both beneficial for the progress of humans and guarantor of peace and stability in their lives. An implicit argument in this schematization is about the comprehensiveness of Islamic faith and the Shari’a: in dealing with human life, nothing whatsoever has been left out. Nizam-i zindagi also deals with many of the issues discussed thus far - the relationship between intellect and religion, beliefs and praxis, and the centrality of knowledge - all again in the context of broader interests of the purpose of human life.

Furthermore - and this is a crucial point in understanding the significance of this text - by demonstrating the underlying wisdom of the Islamic faith and practices, he is attempting to highlight how Islam is still very relevant for Indian society.

If it is deliberated further, it appears that ‘Ali Naqvi was not content with simply proving that religion is a great source for reform. He asserts instead that, if understood properly, religion would prove to be the greatest source of reform. That is why in discussing theological matters, he always returns to the “so what” question, the issue of the advantages of believing in God, prophecy, the Imamate, the afterlife, and other such central religious doctrines, and shows that there is no source other than religion that could bring about a comprehensive peace for human societies. Nizam-i zindagi [The Order of Life] is not unique in this regard: almost every text - even those that are intended toward his committed and believing followers - would include some claims along these lines, in pointing toward the wisdom and practical efficacy of these beliefs and rituals.62 All these points and ‘Ali Naqvi’s intention are clearly summed up in the preface:

Without doubt, under the rulings of Shari’a, arrangements have been made to adorn the practical life of such a human being in every way. From birth [onwards], every era of human life has been addressed so that human being could truly follow a principled orderliness and law. For him, through Shari’a directives, God has provided a complete “Document of [Sagacious] Ordering of Life” (Nizam namah-yi zindagi) or “Charter for Practical Life” (Dastur al-‘amal-i hayat), in following which fully is contained our reform and success.63

In content, Nizam-i zindagi seems intended as a follow-up commentary and concrete illustration of the various claims he had already put forth a few years ago in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi. The reader may recall that Islam ki hakimanah zindagi was a statement that Islam - more than any other religion - is in unison with the demands of the intellect and provides excellent guidance for human advancement and peace within human communities.64 But in that work, he mostly discussed the broader principles that underlie the Islamic point of view. With Nizam-i zindagi, he builds and expands on those arguments and takes his analysis to a more concrete illustrative level. Since it is impossible to present all of ‘Ali Naqvi’s step-by-step reflections on all the different phases of human life, we will restrict ourselves to presenting the general outline of the work and a few examples.

I have already presented how in the “Introduction”, he ties the need for order and guidance in human life to the cosmic natural order.65 The opening section of the first volume is entitled “Laying down the Initial Foundations of The [Sagacious] Ordering of Life” (Nizam-i zindagi ki ibtada’i dagh bayl). Here, ‘Ali Naqvi claims that, if followed properly, Islam’s sagacious teachings ensure that all the necessary material and spiritual provisions needed to welcome a human being into the world are in place, thereby creating a solid foundation for his flourishing.

When did these arrangements made for the human life commence? ‘Ali Naqvi refers to the Qur’anic covenant of Alast66 in the “world of pre-eternity” (‘alam al-dhar) where human spirits before joined to their bodies were taught certain lessons and oaths.

He accepts that many may not remember that covenant but one should not be surprised to find a soul strong enough that it would still recall that covenant. That possibility should not be discounted.67 Yet those who do not believe in the existence of the spiritual world would reject this. For them one has to begin with this life, and examine how “the rulings of the Shari’a have drawn attention toward islah of his future practical life” even before an individual is born into the world.68

In the ensuing section ‘Ali Naqvi begins with Shari’ite prescriptions for proper marriage, which, on the one hand, is the origin of a child’s life, but on the other, is responsible for an enduring impact on the child’s character. He goes on to discuss issues such as “Consideration of the [child’s] future in the marital relationship”, “The choice of mother for the child” (6), “Establishment of the proper human mindset in the etiquette of marriage” (11), “Rulings for the time of birth” (14), “Arrangement for the [child’s] suckling” (15) and the early years in which the child does not need any training (18).

Throughout these sections ‘Ali Naqvi is at pains to demonstrate to his readers that at every step of the reception of a child into this life, Islamic Shari’a has laid out careful teachings to ensure that the child has all that he needs for his physical, psychological, and spiritual nourishment.

‘Ali Naqvi then turns to what he calls the “Age of the [child’s] moral training” (Tarbiyat ka zamana, 19): at the age of 6 or 7, his education and moral training begins during which Shari’a teaches that a child’s moral character and activities are reformed, he is taught his religious obligations (fara’iz) and also made familiar with the Shari’ite rulings. This is because the time when the child will be under legal obligations (hukm-i taklif) is not that far, and he needs to prepared for it.69

Yet in the remarks that follow, ‘Ali Naqvi claims that the sagacious ordering of the Islamic Shari’a has as its aim human success in this life as well: “At the same time, the Shari’a has not neglected the necessities of this world. [There is] a saying of the Prophet: “Teach your children swimming and archery.” ‘Ali Naqvi spends some time further emphasizing the significance of moral training for children while also highlighting the negative consequences that would follow from its absence.

Hierarchy of Knowledge and Primacy of Religion

These reflections on moral training are followed immediately by a discussion of the meaning and significance of knowledge (al-‘ilm). This topic is of immense significance, not only because it acts as a transition to turn to more central issues and sets the tone and agenda for the rest of the treatise, but also because it sheds light on ‘Ali Naqvi’s general assessment of the role of religion in human life. It is through a clarification of the proper concept of knowledge that ‘Ali Naqvi paves the way for a discussion of religious beliefs, and later, of religious praxis.

‘Ali Naqvi begins by noting the immense emphasis put by Islam on seeking knowledge. He cites the hadith report, “Seeking Knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim [man],70 ,” and the Qur’anic verses, “Say: Are they equal - those who know and those who know not?”71 to demonstrate this point. ‘Ali Naqvi observes that people have taken this call for education as absolute and unconditional - assuming that all forms of knowing are at an equal pedestal - with no thought ever rendered to discover the nature of this prescription within Islamic sources and Shari’a law. He argues that although absolute, the emphasis on knowledge is limited to specific fields of knowledge.

Knowledge is deserving of merit (fazilat) but that could not mean all forms of knowledge. Given that every human being has specific knowledge in his own field of life (shobah-yi zindagi) - for example, a farmer knows things about agriculture that a blacksmith would not, and vice versa - this point of view collapses all distinctions among the various forms of knowing. After all, everyone knows something that another person would not be aware of. Even a beggar living in a forest knows more about trees and plants than a philosopher or a physicist. In brief, this erroneous views turns everyone into a scholar (‘alim) after which the Qur’anic distinction between a knower and an ignorant person becomes pointless. It follows from the argument that the Shari’a intends some specific form of knowledge for all Muslims. The intellect also confirms that it has to be some type of useful knowledge (kar amad ‘ilm).

Yet what is useful differs from perspective to perspective, what a physician deems useful knowledge for himself is seen useless by a musician, and vice versa.

Therefore, notes ‘Ali Naqvi, it is important to attend to the point of view of the Lawgiver (Shar‘). He reminds his reader that the Law-giver is interested “in the perfection of the doctrinal (a‘taqadi) and practical (‘amali) life of humans.” In this quest for perfection there are multiple levels, some lower and some higher. Like other religious acts prescribed in Shari’a, various forms of knowledge draw various kinds of Shari‘ite rulings, mandatory, recommended, neutral, reprehensible, and forbidden. In the same way, there is a level of knowledge that is obligatory for all. There are forms of knowledge that are recommended and praiseworthy, and then there are those that are neutral, reprehensible, or forbidden.72

At the most basic level everyone is obliged to have faith with some general proof (ajmali dalil), and knowledge of the obligations (vajabat) and prohibitions (muharramat) in the realm of deeds and actions. After one reaches the age of adulthood and rational understanding gathering knowledge at this basic level will be an individual’s responsibility. Thencomes the level of recommended knowledge where in-depth familiarity (tafsili vaqafiyat) with the principles of faith is situated. Here, one masters matters of religion with deep insight and extensive proofs. Not every individual is called upon to master that level. Since different people provide for different necessities of life, not everyone can be expected to attain this level. It is necessary, however, that within a community, certain people exist who attain that level so that those at the basic level may consult them for their religious needs. ‘Ali Naqvi calls this level, the level of independent reasoning (ijtihad), and deems ensuring that such people exist within a community, a collective responsibility.73 In the same vein, presence of physicians is necessary within every community so that bodily illnesses could be cured and Law- giver’s intention of preserving human life be fulfilled. In brief, knowledge associated with things that preserve human life at the spiritual and material level are at the level of obligations.

‘Ali Naqvi then turns to recommended forms of knowledge: providing food, dress, and housing, etc. - since these are not necessities of life - the status of knowledge that makes those possible is that of recommended. Because these things assist the order of life intended by the Law-giver, they may still be pursued and when in consciousness of this intention, they also carry reward. Turning to the neutral forms of knowledge, he classifies there fields of knowledge that are neither necessary, not recommended, yet contain information which is also not harmful. Factual information such as the distance between two countries, population of a country, its economic situation and system of governance or historical information about kings and their conquests or empires, etc. is information that one may gather in one’s spare time, but is neither useful nor harmful.74

Finally, expertise associated with magic and playing music is characterized by him under forbidden forms of knowledge from which one should stay aloof.75

The spectrum and hierarchy of knowledge that encompasses poles of “useful” and “harmful” (and everything in between) allows ‘Ali Naqvi to assert the primacy of religion for human life.According to ‘Ali Naqvi, beginning with adulthood and lasting till one’s death, religious knowledge in both its theoretical and practical dimensions is an absolute necessity. At the most fundamental level, it is this knowledge that is indispensable. There are other important forms of knowledge but nothing is quite like religious knowledge, which he defines in concrete terms of faith (a‘taqad) and works (‘amal). Notice also that in the whole discussion ‘Ali Naqvi barely uses transmitted proofs; even the verse or hadith-report cited is commented upon and explained on purely intellectual grounds. Nevertheless, once the hierarchy of knowledge has been established, ‘Ali Naqvi could turn - after having discussed other relevant issues regarding the early years of human life - to the age of adulthood and its responsibilities, where he clearly makes use of this worked-out hierarchy: “After reaching the boundaries of adulthood, there are many responsibilities for a human being, which can be divided as principles of beliefs (usul-i ‘aqa’id) and practical obligations (‘amali fara’iz). In the latter, there are further two divisions: One, the rights of God, that is, the individual obligations of a human being, and two, the rights of people, that is, collective obligations. We now turn to a detailed exposition of these.”76

At this juncture, one notices how by carving these distinctions within religious obligations, ‘Ali Naqvi has begun to relate religion to life, and map Islam onto the human order of life. Although this framework would be crucial in setting the tone and direction for the ensuing pages (all four volumes), he prefaces it with an important discussion: his interlocutors’ deep concern about the relevance and benefits of religion for the human order of life. He addresses it in a section entitled “Importance of Religion in the Order of Life” (Nizam-i zindagi main mazhab ki ahammiyat).

‘Ali Naqvi begins by noting how every human being desires supremacy and eminence so that he could fulfill his wishes. It is also true for human beings that they are never content with what they have, and continue to seek more and more. Even when the whole of world is thrown at their feet, they would desire yet another. Yet, the world is limited and one person cannot have it all. If the resources of the world are to be divided amongst the human collectivity, uninhibited human desires would only result in limitless clashes and conflicts. The powerful will decimate the weak. But even that does not settle the matter once and for all: “But worldly power, force, and weakness keep fluctuating like passing seasons. A person who is powerful at one time becomes weak at another and vice versa,” which ensures perpetual and endless conflict in the human order. The powerful continue to dominate while the weak wait for their turn to retaliate.

Given this human dynamic is well illustrated in history, there is no way that every human being could receive one’s rights. What then is the solution?

‘Ali Naqvi argues that either everything is given to one person and all others imprisoned which is hardly possible; or one may seek some authority that is over and above the shortsighted selfishness of human individuals, an authority that does not base its justice upon nepotism or favoritism (janabdari) preferring one’s own over all others.

Such an authority and power in ‘Ali Naqvi’swords is the traditional concept of God:

“Therefore, it is needed that there be a being that is uniformly related to all humans.

Only the laws that are established by Him could be trustworthy for all. Such a law that allots freedom for everyone is called religion and its patron God….” Such is the benefit of religion: “In ignoring religion, we do not have a right to demand from a powerful [person] that he should not benefit from his power. This is because everything in the world is for gaining benefit.” Why should a powerful person withhold his power? Why not pursue one’s desires? Without the force of religion which speaks to and molds the human heart and conscience which in turn dominates the human mind and actions, the task of defeating human arrogance and passion for power could hardly be accomplished. That is why it is religion that provides breathing space for the weak, ensures proper boundaries, and rights among different groups; it is religion alone which is responsible for “keeping peace, tranquility, and communal order in the world.” ‘Ali Naqvi reminds his audience that one should not be misled by false imitations of a true religion, nor blame religion itself for mischief carried out under its banner. A discerning and reflecting intellect will be able to separate the true from the false forms of religiosity.77

The rest of the first volume is a systematic presentation of the standard usuli- Shi’i creed of belief in God (tauhid, with emphasis on Divine Justice), prophecy (nubuwwah), Imamate (Imamah), and the Returning (ma‘ad), with many interrelated topics discussed along the way under each heading. What is characteristically different about this presentation of Islamic faith is the emphasis on the wisdom of each belief which he strives to make attractive to thinking minds and to the human intellect. He executes it by highlighting the various benefits of religious commitments for human beings, both at the individual and collective levels. Notice, for example, how he commences his argument for the doctrine of Divine Unity: “The first gift that religion has presented to the world of humanity is the affirmation of One God. Due to that, all human individuals come to be molded into the same mold and dwell in the same state (kayfiyat).”78 He goes on to show that without belief in God, equity and social justice cannot be achieved. The language of “religion as a gift for the world” only confirms that proving the relevance and significance of religion to his interlocutors is a central concern of this text.

It should be clear that if volume one was his mapping of Islamic theology (usul ad-din, the principles of religion or faith) by way of illustrating its indispensability for human flourishing, volumes two through four attempt to map Islamic praxis onto life by systematically moving through the basic rituals, the pillars of Islam (arkan ad-din) and other associated practices. In the opening pages of volume two, ‘Ali Naqvi sets up this discussion under the title “A human’s practical obligations” (Insan kay ‘amali fara’iz) in the following words:

The evident result of the strengthening of beliefs is a sense of duty in deeds and actions. With adulthood, this responsibility becomes serious for a human being.

From the point of view of the Shari’a, he was free until this time but has nowbecame bound (muqayyad). Now, every [act of] movement or the absence of it, the movement of lips and the turning of the gaze is tied to accountability. Legal obligations (taklif) now apply and there is a strong supervision over deeds and actions.79

The inherent dependency of actions upon faith is unmistakable. The volume goes on to discuss all the Shari’ite rulings associated with the proper performance of prayer.

Volume three continues the discussion of prayer and the benefits of the various Shari’ite rulings in ordering human life. Finally, volume four is dedicated to fasting and its rulings. It is relevant to note that ‘Ali Naqvi did not include a section on religious pilgrimage (Hajj). It is perhaps that this journey is undertaken once in a lifetime and is not part of a Muslim’s ordinary day-to-day activities and normal order of life. It is prayer and fasting that punctuate a human’s normal order of life. Akin to his discussion in the first volume, he continues to reflect and illustrate how in each ruling associated with these rituals is a wisdom that can be unearthed if one employs one’s intellectual resources in a proper manner.

Returning to the first question80 , the following concluding remarks need to be made. Although Nizam-i zindagi, by itself, is not comprehensive in dealing with all the aspects of human life, leaving out important domains such as economic and political activities, it lays out an overall framework with which ‘Ali Naqvi approaches these subjects in his later writings. And in his treatment of these other issues, the ideas laid out in this text regarding religion’s relationship with life - its mapping onto the latter through the usul-furu‘ distinction on the one hand, and the rights of people and the rights of God on the other - provided him with a scheme through which to discuss these issues. His definition, scope, and the overall scheme mentioned above remain quite standard for his later works, as we shall see in the following chapter. What is most important in all of this is the all-encompassing nature of religion’s relationship with the order of life. Neither economic activity nor politics are outside the domain of religion;

in fact, no aspect of life is. When broached in view of this underlying framework, it becomes clear that his writings on other subjects are a part and parcel of the same religio-intellectual project and display remarkable consistency of ideas and method. The significance of this text is precisely due to its representative nature in explicating his theological and hermeneutical schemes. In it, the two strands are clearly intertwined and the underlying intent of preserving, reviving, and teaching religion unmistakable.

Secondly, notwithstanding the centrality of this text in understanding ‘Ali Naqvi’s broader religio-intellectual project, one should not lose sight of the obvious: at the most fundamental level, the text is intended as a practical manual for Shi’i Muslims to enrich their religious lives and to strengthen their religious convictions and practice.

Needless to say, the two dimensions are not mutually exclusive but instead clearly reflective of his overall aim of religious preservation and revival.

Finally, it needs to be admitted that it was indeed impossible to illustrate fully the myriad ways in which ‘Ali Naqvi went about drawing out the underlying wisdom of the prescriptions of Islam. It is hoped that our discussion of the structure of the text and some of the arguments - both from this text and those discussed previously - does provide some insight into how he carries out this task.

Part II: Question of Change

Having discussed the first question about religion’s significance for human life and the ways in which it interacts with it, it is timely now to turn to the second question, one that pertains to the changing nature of life. In other words, how does Islam as a religion cater to the changing circumstances of human life and the flux that is inherent to it?

The foregoing discussion makes it clear that according to ‘Ali Naqvi, Islamic revelation and its resultant Islamic theology and praxis (expressed through thisusulfuru‘ distinction , the latter embodied in the Shari’a) is a complete code for human life (mukammal zabayta-i hayat). ‘Ali Naqvi acknowledges that change is inevitable for human societies. Speaking to his audience in 193581 he stated that the claim “Islamic Shari’a is complete” should not be construed to mean that after the Prophet of Islam declared his prophecy, the world that was incessantly undergoing transformations and modifications stopped changing anymore. It does not mean that with the coming of Islam, the ever-changing life of human beings became somehow static and eternal. This would be a wrong interpretation of the meaning of completeness of the Shari’ite Law.

The opinion “the world is changing” (al-‘alam mutaghayyur) continues to be true after the Prophet’s prophecy exactly the same way; it is always changing.82

Yet ‘Ali Naqvi rejects the opinion that the comprehensiveness of Shari’a is at odds with the flux of human life and civilization. In his view, the reason that some had come to pit “changing times” with the “unchanging static Shari’a” was due to misperceptions about how the Shari’a deals with change in the first place.83 Since change is part and parcel of human life, ‘Ali Naqvi asks his audience, how could the Shari‘a - which was intended by the Law-giver to be all-encompassing - be so naïve in neglecting this self-evident reality.

So how exactly does Shari‘a deal with change? According to him, the proper understanding of the way Shari‘a responds to “the needs of the times” is through an unending process of ijtihad, which is the deliberation of knowledgeable people in applying religion to emerging questions of life by way of the fresh application of unchanging principles. Though these principles do not change, their application does.

That is why the process occurs not despite the Shari‘a, but within its very confines.

According to ‘Ali Naqvi, it deals with it through principles that are of such a wide scope that they enable those astute in the understanding of theShari‘a in dealing with all sorts of changes and revolutions at the intellectual, practical, or cultural levels. The key is existence of qualified people who are able to draw correct conclusions from these principles and also have deep insight into the changing circumstances and needs of human beings: “Situations and places change but these changes, differences, and alterations all occur within a vast space that the Shari‘a contains within its limits. It is as if the Islamic Shari‘a is a great enclosure (ahatah) within which thousands of changes can take place, but the enclosure does not change. Surely, it is needed that a human being could draw inferences and deduce rulings from the principles [of Shari‘a]”.

‘Ali Naqvi notes that the case of Islamic Shari‘a is not any different from its predecessors: even previousShari‘a laws such as Judaic or Hindu laws have lasted hundreds of years. Did the world not undergo massive transformations during these times? Did these previous Laws not deal with these overwhelming changes, he asks. Furthermore, that a new law was promulgated by the Law-giver demonstrates that the previous law was intended for a specific and limited period of time, some 100 years, some 300, and so on. Since Islamic Shari‘a is promulgated till the end of times, it means it is absolutely complete in its scope. It follows from this that precisely because it is complete that it is impossible to modify (tarmim) or alter (tabdil) it.

From this angle, if there is a Shari‘a whose vast and comprehensive principles dominate all possible changes till the end of time, then why should it not remain established as permanent, and why should there be a need for another prophet for its supersession?

…[ T]his [Shari‘a] is the Islamic Shari‘a. There is no change in it: “you will not find God’s Sunnah changing, and you will not find God’s Sunnah modifying”.84 But our conditions and needs change and in accordance with it, rulings as well, though in every case these are within the limits of Shari‘a.85

Based on the premise that Islamic Shari‘a is the onlyShari‘a that is complete, ‘Ali Naqvi calls it as the Seal of the Shari‘as (Khatim-i Shara’i‘). At this point, ‘Ali Naqvi illustrates his point with an example regarding how, although Shari‘ite rulings may seemingly differ from case to case, they still fall within the ambit of the Shari‘a. he presents the case of a person who has never traveled out of his village and has therefore prayed the five daily prayers always in their full and complete form, and has fasted during the month of Ramadan. Now one day at the age of say 50, he was confronted by circumstances that forced him to journey to another city or country and based on his habit continued to pray and fast like before. Accidently a person who understands Shari‘a was traveling with him and begins to question this person’s prayers and fasting.

The person’s reply will be, “How do I pray two units? Has the Shari‘a changed? TheShari‘a always stays the same. How come there are two Shari‘as now?” It would have to be proved to him that it is not that the Shari‘a has changed, but since the circumstances had changed, different Shari‘ite rulings were applicable: while at home, the person belonged to a specific category; as soon as he began his journey, he fell into an entirely different one. The ruling did change, but Shari‘a did not.86 It is entirely another matter that from the parochial perspective of that person it may appear that it isShari‘a that has changed.

Based on this example, ‘Ali Naqvi goes on to present his conclusions on the topic:

…[S]ometimes rulings originate out of particulars and at others, from universals.If a universal qua universal is anything [in its logical force], then particular rulings originating from this universal cannot really be outside the bounds of the Shari‘a. It is so because a universal is always dependent on the existence of particulars; if we ignore particulars, then universals will be absolutely useless.

The result of a universal becomes clear only when it is applied to an issue to which it belongs. If we had not considered a particular referent (misdaq) of a universal, or we did not need [to apply it], and then the necessity arose and we came to discover a particular ruling [from this universal], then although this [ruling] will be a new thing, but because it is subordinate to the Shari‘ite ruling, in fact, it will not be new.87

This process of deriving particular rulings from Shari‘ite universals as and when “new particular situations arise” becomes the way in which the Islamic Shari‘a addresses the needs of changing times, addresses fresh challenges, and remains complete for all time and space. In other words, so long a particular Shari‘ite ruling could be seen asa application of a universal Shari‘ite ruling - and could be traced back to it - it is completely within the ambit of the existing Shari‘a law and nothing new. On another occasion, ‘Ali Naqvi calls this ongoing process of fresh applications of unchanging universal principles of Shari‘a law to changing particular circumstances - Shari‘a’s way of dealing with the flux of life - ijtihad. Moreover, indispensability of continuous ijtihad also proves a persistent necessity of qualified jurists who could carry it out.88

Prima facie, the transition in ‘Ali Naqvi’s thought from Islam as a ‘complete code of life’ (discussed in the previous section), to Shari‘a Law as a ‘complete code’ may prove confusing. In this regard, one must again contextualize these seemingly contradictory statements within his broader theology on the one hand and his historical context on the other. First, in ‘Ali Naqvi’s scheme of religion as principles-branches, notwithstanding that correct faith and understanding precede action, in the realm of day to day life, it is through action that this understanding is best expressed. Although prefaced by true faith, the human order is an order of activity which is in turn guided by the Islamic Shari‘a. Faith remains invisible and unexamined - thus the significance of the works. In practical life, therefore, Islam is best expressed through actions legislated by Shari‘a, and Islamic code best illustrated by its rulings.

Second, statements such as “[The view] that the Islamic Shari‘a is complete does not mean that the way our needs proceed should not change” reflects the historical Indian intellectual and social context within which the nature and role of Shari‘a and ijtihad and its scope and purpose were persistently contested.89 In dealing with the question of change, ‘Ali Naqvi was responding to these debates and what he took to be prevalent misunderstandings about the way Shari‘a and ijtihad address fresh challenges.

Combining ‘Ali Naqvi’s conclusions on how religion maps onto life, and how it deals with the ever-changing needs of human societies, one may state the following:

Islam is a comprehensive sagacious code for ordering human life. This sagacious code guides the human mind, body, and heart at the individual plane and on the social plane, family matters, economic transactions, political structures, and everything in between.

The degree of guidance may differ from one domain to another, or sometimes may not even be obvious (or obvious in every case) but it is always present, embedded in the revelation, contained in the insights of ‘true’ religious scholars, and those generally well-trained in the Shari‘a law. If it is not to be found, it needs to be deduced from the principles. Circumstances may change but never to a degree where they could circumvent Islam’s all-encompassing sagacious ambit.

Concluding Remarks

In the last two chapters, we have seen that faced with the deep crisis of religion, ‘Ali Naqvi undertakes a comprehensive religio-intellectual project that could circumvent abandonment and dissolution of religion from Indian Muslim society. Aware of the intellectual problems that underlie this crisis, such as the pitting of revelation against reason, din against dunya, and the relegation of religion to an obscure and private space with little relevance for human society’s progress, he addresses all these issues both separately and relationally to mitigate their overall impact on his followers. The overarching aim of this project was to restore religion to its central and privileged status of being the primary determinant of the principles and prescriptions by which human societies could live, in justice and in peace. Toward that end, he attempted to illustrate to his audience (as well as to skeptical interlocutors) the underlying sagaciousness of the Islamic faith and teachings and therefore, Islam’s indispensability for Indian society. In this process, he had to overcome numerous dichotomies, especially the misunderstood relationships between reason and revelation and between the purposes of this life and the hereafter. Most importantly, ‘Ali Naqvi had to resist the ‘privatization of religion’, which was reducing religion to a compartment among the many compartments of life, depriving it of its all-encompassing scope of application.

Thus, during the period 1930 to 1945, his writings and speeches carry out a comprehensive islah of the concept of religion, responding to all these challenges. It has been our contention that by 1945, he had largely completed his formulation of the response to the crisis of religion. His later intellectual career displays a consistency of application of this overall framework and associated categories that he had worked out during these years. Although he continued to be quite prolific during these later years, there is hardly any noticeable shift in his thought. In fact, the writings of his early years would leave a strong mark on these later scholarly endeavors while also being elaborated in depth and scope during this time.

Before examining these later writings, it is timely to consider from his earlier phase of intellectual life yet another recurring strand within his writings: his ongoing reflections on the theme of Karbala and martyrdom of Husayn. Even during the early years of his intellectual life - and while carrying out a comprehensive reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis - ‘Ali Naqvi had frequently returned to this motif. In fact, these writings constitute a major portion of his corpus. The ensuing chapter is an indepth examination of these writings and the place they hold within his religiointellectual project.