Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

• al-Idjzā’ (Replacement)

Idjzā’ is infinitive, meaning that something has replaced something else in doing its job. Hence, “replacement” necessitates that the act doneshould not be repeated .

Doubtless when the duty-bound performs what the Lord has commanded him in its desired way, i.e., he performs the desired in accordance with what he is commanded observing all juristic and intellectual conditions, that act is considered obedience to that command no matter the command is voluntary-actual (ikhtiyārī), compelling (iđţirārī), or apparent (żāhirī). This neither is nor can be a matter of dispute.

There is also neither doubt nor dispute over that such an obedience of such characteristic is considered enough and need not be replaced by any other obedience - for it is assumed that the duty-bound has performed his duty in the desired manner, and that is enough. In this case, the command directed to the duty-boundwill be removed , for that which was urged by the command has been actualized and its time has terminated. It is impossible for the command to remain after its purpose has been actualized - unless if one holds that the impossible, i.e., actualization of the effect without the cause, is possible.

The only case which can be disputed is where two commands exist: one primary, actual which is not obeyed by the duty-bound either because it has become impossible for him or because of his ignorance of it, and one secondary which is “compelling” in case of impossibility of the first or “apparent” in case of ignorance of the first.Now, should the duty-bound obey that secondary compelling or apparent command and then the compulsion or ignorance should be removed, it would be plausible to dispute whether or not what was performed in obedience to the second command is enough and replaces the first without any need for the first command to be repeated within the time or performed belatedly out of the time. This discussion is, in fact, to inquire whether there exists an intellectual implication between performing the commanded act by a compelling or apparent command and contenting oneself with it without obeying the primary, voluntary, actual command.

•al-‘Ilm → al-Qaţ‘

•al-‘Ilm al-Idjmālī (Summary-fashioned Knowledge)

The object of knowledge in this kind is more than one (→al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī). For instance, one definitely knows that one bowl of water among two or more bowlsis religiously polluted , but one does not know which one is so. Objects of knowledge in this kindare called aţrāf al-‘ilm al-idjmālī.

The summary-fashioned knowledge makes its object incontrovertible, precisely as the detailed knowledge does. For there is no difference between those two kinds of knowledge but being in detail and in summary fashion, and that makes no variety as to their function. The criterion for the intellect’s judgment as to the liability and obligation of obedience is merely recognizing nature of the Lord’s command, without considering any other property.

And that incontrovertible-making is like “causality” as to both the definite opposition (→al-mukhālafa al-qaţ‘iyya) and the definite obedience (→ al-muwāfaqa al-qaţ‘iyya), and not like a “prerequisite” so that its effectiveness may be prevented even as to the definite opposition and duty-negating principles may be exercised as to all parts of summary-fashioned knowledge. It does not allow occurrence of even a single opposition to “the known in summary fashion,” for such allowing necessitates contradiction: on the onehand the intellect judges that it is mandatory to avoid all parts as a preliminary to avoiding the unlawful existing among doubtful affairs, and on the other hand it allows committing some parts - an obvious contradiction. Furthermore, itis treated by the intellect as the Lord’s permission to disobey Him, and this is obviously impossible.

•al-‘Ilm al-Tafşīlī (Detailed Knowledge)

The object of knowledge in this kind is one. For instance, one definitely knows that a particular bowl of wateris religiously polluted . The detailed knowledge makes its object definitely incontrovertible. See also: al-‘ilm al-idjmālī.

•al-Inĥilāl al-Ĥaqīqī (Actual Reduction)

Al-Inĥilāl al-ĥaqīqī occurs where the knowledge changes from summary fashion (→ al-‘ilm al-idjmālī) into detailed, such as the case where the duty-bound knows in summary fashion that one of the two bowls is religiously impure and then realizes that one certain bowl is so. Here, the other bowlwould be treated as pure, since the dubiety concerning it has changed into a primary one.

•al-Inĥilāl al-Ĥukmī (Quasi-Reduction)

Al-Inĥilāl al-ĥukmī occurs where the summary-fashioned knowledge (→ al-‘ilm al-idjmālī) is subsistent, but it is no longer effective; such as the case where one of the two bowls which are parts of a summary-fashioned knowledge of religious impurity becomes part of another summary-fashioned knowledge of religious impurity with another bowl. The second summary-fashioned knowledge cannot affect the part in question whose obligation of avoiding had become incontrovertible by the first summary-fashioned knowledge, since it would be a kind of acquiring whatis already acquired .

•al-Istişĥāb al-Kullī (Continuity of the Previous State of the Universal)

Byistişĥāb al-kullī is meant istişĥāb [q.v.] of the universal where one is certain of its existence within one of its instants but later on doubts subsistence of the very universal. This doubt over subsistent of the universal within its instancescan be considered in three ways - called varieties of istişĥāb al-kullī:

1. The doubt is over subsistence of the universal because of doubting subsistence of the very instance one was certainof .

2. The doubt is over subsistence of the universal because of the doubt over determination of the instance one was certain of, in the sense that the instance is either definitely subsistent or is definitely removed.In this case, one is summarily certain of existence of an instant of the universal instants and thereby is certain of existence of the universal within that, but one is doubtful whether that actual instant has a long lifespan and therefore is definitely subsistent in the second time or has a short lifespan and therefore is definitely removed in that time - that is why one is doubtful about subsistence of the universal.

3. The doubt is over subsistence of the universal because of the doubt over existence of another instant instead of the one whose generation or removing is definitely known, i.e., the doubt is caused by the probability of existence of another instant. In this case, should the second instant actually be existent, the universal would be subsistent through it; otherwise, the universal would become non-existent due to the annihilation of the first instant.

This variety is of two kinds:

3.1. It is probable that the second instant is originated in the vessel of existence of the first one, and

3.2. Probable origination of the second instant is simultaneous with the removal of the first, which, in turn,may be actualized through changing the first into the second or mere accidental simultaneity of removal of the first and origination of the second.

•al-Iţlāq (Absoluteness)

By absoluteness is meant encompassment and extensiveness of the term with regard to its meaning and states without the term being used in encompassment in the way understood from an indefinite noun in a negative context - since in that case the term would be considered general and notabsolute. Such a termis called muţlaq, like “slave” in “free a slave” which is not qualified by “believer,” i.e., it is not said “free a believer slave” and the duty-bound is allowed to free either a believer or an unbeliever slave.

As an absolute termis not made for the absolute meaning but rather for the meaning per se, absoluteness is to be discovered through premises of wisdom (→ muqaddimāt al-ĥikma).

•al-Iţlāq al-Badalī (Substitutional Absoluteness)

Absoluteness in this kind of iţlāq [q.v.] covers instances, but in substitutional way, as in “free a slave” and “do not free an unbeliever slave.”

• Iţlāq al-Maqām (Absoluteness of the Position)

Since the contrariety of absolute and qualified is that of possession and privation, for absoluteness is lack of qualification in that which can be qualified, absoluteness follows qualification in the possibility, in the sense that if qualification is possible in the speech or proof the absoluteness is possible and if it isimpossible the absoluteness is impossible. Hence, in a case where qualification is not possible, one cannot discover absoluteness from the speech of speaker; that speech is neither absolute nor qualified - though infact one of them is necessarily intended by the speaker. In such cases, however, one can discover absoluteness from absoluteness of the position (iţlāq al-maqām or al-iţlāq al-maqāmī) and not from that of speech. By absoluteness of the positionis meant that although the speaker cannot qualify his words in one sentence, he can qualify it by adding another sentence after finishing his first sentence and utter the condition he intends.

•al-Iţlāq al-Maqāmī → Iţlāq al-Maqām

•al-Iţlāq al-Shumūlī (Inclusive Absoluteness)

Absoluteness in this kind of iţlāq [q.v.] covers all instances, as in “in the sheep there is zakāt” and “in the fed sheep there is not zakāt.”

K

• Kaff al-Nafs (Continence)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs specifically in the discussion of the prohibition over this issue whether the desired in the prohibition is merely not to do (nafsan lā taf‘al) or continence (kaff al-nafs). The difference between the two is that the former is a sheer non-existential affair while the latter is an existential one inasmuch as continence is a psychic act.

The justifiable opinion is the first. What caused some to believe in the second is that they thought that “to eschew,” whose meaning is to keep non-existence of the prohibited act as it is, is not possible for the duty-bound, since it is pre-eternal, out of reach of power, and cannot become an object of wish. However, it is quite plausible that the continence, which is a psychic act, would become an object of wish in the prohibition. The answer to this illusion is that impossibility of non-existence in the pre-eternity does not contradict its possibility in the continuity, for the power for existence implicates the power for non-existence.One can even say that the power for non-existence is based on the nature of the power for existence; otherwise, should non-existence be impossible in the continuity the existence would not be possible at all, since the free, powerful agent is the one who performs the act if he wishes and does not perform the act if he does not wish.

However, the truth is that such discussionis basically nonsense, for “wish” is not the meaning of prohibition so that it may be discussed whether the desired is eschewal or continence. The wish for eschewing is an implication of the prohibition; the meaning of prohibition is forbidding and dissuading - yea, to forbid an act implicates logically the wish for its eschewing. Thus, the prohibitionis basically directed to the act itself and there is no room for doubting whether the wish in the prohibition is for eschewal or continence.

•al-Khabar al-Mutawātir (Massive Report)

Al-Khabar al-mutawātir is a report which causes confidence in one’s soul in such a way that all doubtsare removed and definite certainty occurs because of report of massive transmitters whose collusion in lying is impossible. What should be emphasized with regard to the massive report is that in areport which has several mediators, like reports of old events, all conditions of massive report must be actualized in each generation; otherwise the report is not to be treated as massive, for the conclusion is pursuant to the inferior preliminaries. The reason is clear: a report with several mediators is in fact made of several reports, for each generation reports the report of its previous one. Therefore, report of the last generation must be a massive report of a massive report of a massive report, and so forth, up to a massive report of the very incident or words; and it is clear thatshould conditions of massive report not be actualized in any generation the report would not be massive, but rather single.

• Khabar al-Wāĥid (Single Report)

Khabar al-wāĥid, in its uşūlī sense, means that which is not massive (→al-khabar al-mutawātir) even though reporters may be more than one. This kind of report may sometimes provoke knowledge even though the reporter may be one - and that is where the reportis overwhelmed by evidence provoking knowledge of truthfulness of the report. Such a report is doubtlessly an authoritative proof, for acquisition of knowledge is the utmost end, as there is no authority beyond knowledge and authority of every authoritative proof affair rests upon it.

However, wherethe single report is not overwhelmed by such evidence , even though it may be overwhelmed by some evidence provoking confidence but not knowledge, there is a major disagreement among Uşūlīs as to its authority as well as conditions of its authority. The disagreement, especially among Shiite scholars, refers, in fact, to the existence or otherwise of definite proof supporting authority of the single report; for it is a matter of consensus among them that the single report as it provokes personal or typical conjecture is not considerable - as conjecture per se is definitely not authoritative proof in their opinion. Thus, those who deny authority of single report merely deny existence of such a definite proof, while others believe that it does exist.

As for opinions in this connection, some have denied authority of single report in an absolute way, such as al-Sayyid al-Murtađā, Ibn Barrādj, Ibn Zuhra, and Ibn Idrīs who claimed that there is a consensus among Shī‘a scholars that the single report is absolutely not an authoritative proof. However, that opinion has found no support from others who came after Ibn Idrīs. Some Akhbārīs have said that all ĥadīths collected in Shiite well-known books, especially al-Kutub al-Arba‘a (the Four-fold Books, i. e., al-Kāfī by Kulaini, Man Lā-Yaĥđuruh al-Faqīh by al-Shaikh al-Şadūq, and Tahdhīb al-Aĥkām and al-Istibşār fī-mā Ikhtalaf min al-Akhbār both by al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī) are definitely truthful.Others, who believe in the authority of single report but not in an absolute way hold different views as to the criterion for its authority maintaining that it is its being considered by Shī‘a jurists, righteousness of the transmitter or only his being trustworthy, the sheer conjecture of being uttered by authorities without taking into consideration qualities of the transmitter, and so forth.

•al-Khāşş (Particular)

Particular is among clear,self evident concepts which need no definition but lexical explanation for the sake of bringing the meaning closer to the mind. By particularis meant a term, or a judgment, which covers only some instances of its object, object of burden, or duty-bound. See also: al-‘āmm.

•al-Kitāb (The Book)

The Holy Qur’ān, the Muslims' sacred book, is the everlasting miracle of the Holy Prophet Muĥammad, and is doubtlessly a divine mercy and guidance which “could not have been forged apart from God” (10: 37). Thus, it is the primary, definite authoritative source of the Islamic law, as its verses contain divine laws. As for other sources of the Islamic law, such as Sunna and consensus, they refer to the Qur’ān andare nourished by it.

However, it should be noted that the Qur‘ān, whose authority with regard to the issuance is definitely established inasmuch it is transmitted massively from a generation to another, is not totally so with regard to its denotation; for it contains unambiguous (muĥkam) and ambiguous (mutashābih), the former being, in turn, divided into explicit-definite (naşş) whose denotation is definite, and apparent (żāhir) whose denotation is dependent upon the belief in the authority of appearances. It also containsabolisher and abolished, general and particular, absolute and qualified, and ambiguous and clear which altogether make its denotation indefinite in a good number of its verses. That is why some discussionsare presented in this connection in books of uşūl al-fiqh.

M

• Mabāĥith al-Alfāż (Discussions of Terms)

Mabāĥith al-alfāż is that part of the science of uşūl al-fiqh in which denotations and appearances of terms are discussed from a general aspect, such as appearance of the imperative in the obligation, that of the prohibition in the unlawfulness, and the like.

• Mabāĥith al-Ĥudjdja (Discussions of the Authority)

Mabāĥith al-ĥudjdja is that part of the science of uşūl al-fiqh in which it is investigated whether some specific thing is juristically treated as a proof; for instance, whether report of a single transmitter, appearances,appearances of the Quran, Sunna, consensus, intellect, and the like are authoritative proofs.

• Mabāĥith al-Mulāzamāt al-‘Aqliyya (Discussions of Intellectual Implications)

Mabāĥith al-mulāzamāt al-‘aqliyya is that part of the science of uşūl al-

fiqh in which implications of precepts are surveyed even though such precepts may not be inferred from terms, such as discussing truthfulness of mutual implication of intellectual judgments and juristic precepts, of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminaries (known as “the problem of preliminary of the mandatory act”), of obligation of something necessitating unlawfulness of its opposite (known as “the problem of the opposite”), of possibility of conjunction of the command and the prohibition, and so on.

•al-Mafāhīm → al-Mafhūm

•al-Mafhūm

The Arabic term mafhūm (pl. mafāhīm) is used for three different expressions the third of which being meant in the science of uşūl al-fiqh. The firstis used to denote “meaning,” and the second to denote “concept” as the opposite of instance (mişdāq). The third, however,is used in uşūl al-fiqh only to convey a specific meaning equivalent to implicature of a sentence. This meaningis used in opposition to manţūq (the uttered) which means what is denoted by the sentence per se in such a way that the uttered sentence is bearing that meaning and is a frame for it. By mafhūm, therefore,is meant what the sentence is not bearing and does not denote comprehensively; rather, it is an “obvious implicature in the most particular sense” of the sentence. (An implicating conceiving of whose implicated implicates conceiving of itself is called “obvious implicating in the most particular sense,” as in “two being twice as one” in which the very conceiving of two implicates immediate conceiving of its being twice as one.) Hence, mafhūmis specifically used for the implicative denotation (al-dalāla al-iltizāmiyya).

Let us take an example in order to give a clear insight of manţūq and mafhūm at the beginning of our discussion. Suppose that the jurist has said, “If the water is pure, one can make ablution with it.” In this sentence, manţūq is the content of the sentence, i.e., lawfulness of making ablution with pure water, and mafhūm, should such a sentence have mafhūm, is unlawfulness of making ablution with impure water.

Hence, manţūq can be defined as “a precept denoted by the word where it is uttered,” and mafhūm as “a precept denoted by the word where it is not uttered.” Here, by the preceptis meant precept in the most general meaning and not one of the five-fold burdensome precepts. Sometimes the phrase “non-existence where non-existence” (al-intifā’ ‘ind al-intifā’) is used for mafhūm, meaning non-existence of the judgment where the condition, qualifier, and the like become non-existent.

• Mafhūm al-‘Adad (Number)

Limitation of an object to a specific number will doubtlessly not denote negation of the judgment from others. Thus, this command: “Fast three days of every lunar month” does not mean that fasting other than the three days is not recommended; hence, it does not contradict anotherproof which commands fasting some other days of every month.

Of course, should the precept be obligation, for instance, and limitation by the maximum numberbe for determination of the highest level- such as the proof that makes fasting thirty days of Ramađān obligatory - it would doubtlessly denote that the more is not mandatory. However, this is not due to the limitation by number having mafhūm, but rather because of peculiarities of the case. Thus, limitation by number has no mafhūm.

• Mafhūm al-Ghāya (Termination)

Concerning sentences in which a termination occurs, such as the Qur’ānic verse: “Then complete the Fast unto the night,” (2: 187) and the ĥadīth: “Everything is lawful until you know that it, itself, is unlawful,” it is disputed whether or not qualification by termination denotes negation of type of the judgment from other than termination as well as from termination itself should it not be included in the terminated.

The criterion for mafhūm of the termination is the very criterion for that of condition and qualifier [qq.v.]. Should the termination be condition for the judgment it would have mafhūm and would denote negation of the judgment from other things, and should it be condition for the object or the predicate only it would not denote mafhūm. Now, the question is that which of those two probabilities can be justified.

What seems to be more justifiable is to hold that the termination is apparent in referring to the judgment and to be a termination for its preceding relation; it is its reference to the object itself or the predicate itself is theone which is in need of depiction and evidence. Hence, the termination has mafhūm.

• Mafhūm al-Ĥaşr (Exclusivity)

It is obviously clear that whatsoever denotes exclusivity definitely denotes mafhūm, since such structure is merely made to convey non-existence where non-existence, otherwise there would be no need to use such structure with such terms and one could simply convey one's desire by using simple words in simple sentences.

• Mafhūm al-Laqab (Designation)

By al-laqabis meant any noun used as an object of the judgment, such as the thief in this Qur’ānic verse: “And the thief, male and female, cut off the hands of both.” (5: 38) Mafhūm of the designation means that the judgment does not cover whatis not covered by the noun in general.

Since we did not accept that the qualifier [q.v.] denotes mafhūm, it is more plausible to hold that the designation does not have such denotation, for the very object of the judgment does not even allude to the judgment being dependent upon the designation, let alone any appearance in the exclusiveness. The ultimate thing understood from the designation is that the person of the judgment does not cover whatis not generally covered by the noun, but this is far from negation of the type of the judgment from another object. Itis even said that should the designation have mafhūm, it would be the weakest one.

•al-Mafhūm al-Mukhālif / Mafhūm al-Mukhālafa (Disaccording Mafhūm)

Disaccording is the mafhūm in which the type of precept disaccords with the precept in the manţūq, i.e., if the precept in the manţūq is obligation it is unlawfulness in the mafhūm, if it is unlawfulness in the former it is obligation in the latter, and so forth. There are six instances of this kind, and they are as follows: mafhūm of the condition (al-sharţ), that of the qualifier (al-waşf), that of the termination (al-ghāya), that of the exclusivity (al-ĥaşr), that of the number (al-‘adad), and that of the designation (al-laqab) [qq.v.].

•al-Mafhūm al-Muwāfiq / Mafhūm al-Muwāfaqa (Accordant Mafhūm)

Accordant is the mafhūm in which the type of precept accords with the precept in the manţūq, i.e., if the precept in the manţūq is obligation it is obligation in the mafhūm, if it is unlawfulness in the former it is unlawfulness in the latter, and so forth - as in the Qur’ānic verse: “Do not say to them (your parents) Fie,” (17: 23) that denotes prohibition of assault and battery which are more insulting and painful than to say “Fie” which is explicitly declared unlawful in the verse.

There is no dispute over authority of accordant mafhūm, in the sense that the precept transmits to that which has priority in terms of motive of the precept.

• Mafhūm al-Sharţ (Condition)

Doubtless manţūq of the conditional sentence conventionally denotes that the consequent is dependent upon the antecedent. However, conditional sentences are of two kinds:

1. That which is made todepict the object of judgment. In this kind, the antecedent is the very object of the judgment; the judgment in the consequent is dependent upon the condition in the antecedent in such a way that consideration of the judgment without condition is implausible. For instance, in this Qur’ānic verse: “And do not constrain your slave-girls to prostitution if they desire to live in chastity,” (23: 33) supposition of constraining to prostitution is implausible unless when the desire of slave-girls to live in chastityis assumed .

All Uşūlīsare in agreement that such conditional sentences have no mafhūm, since non-existence of the condition means non-

existence of the judgment; hence, to judge that the consequent does not exist is nonsensical except in the way of “negative by non-existence of the object”: it is not to judge that consequent does not exist, it is non-existence of the judgment. Thus, there is no mafhūm for the verse in question and itcannot be said that if your slave-girls did not desire to live in chastity you should constrain them to prostitution.

2. That which is not made todepict the object of the judgment. In this kind, the antecedent is not the very object of the judgment and the judgment in the consequent is dependent upon the condition in the antecedent in such a way that its consideration without condition is plausible. For instance, when one says, “If your friend did you a favor, do him a favor,” to do one’s friend a favor is not logically dependent upon one’s friend’s doing one a favor, since one can do one’s friend a favor whether the latter does the former a favor or not.

It is this kind of conditional sentence that is a matter of dispute in this discussion. It refers to the dispute whether or not the conditional sentence denotes non-existence of the judgment where the condition becomes non-existent, in the sense that whether or not itis understood from the nature of making the judgment conditional upon the condition that the type of precept, obligation for instance, would become non-existent should the condition become non-existent.

In order to have mafhūm, conditional sentence needs to denote three subsequent affairs, whether conventionally or by absoluteness, as follows:

1. To denote that there is a relation and implication between the antecedent (al-muqaddam) and the consequent (al-tālī).

2. To denote that, in addition to relation and implication, the consequent is dependent upon, subsequent to, and subject to the antecedent; hence, the antecedent is a cause for the consequent.

3. To denote that, in addition to those two, the antecedent is the exclusive cause, in the sensethat there is no parallel cause upon which the consequent can be dependent .

That the mafhūm of the conditional sentence is dependent upon those three affairs is obviously clear; for should the sentence be occasional, or the consequent not be dependent upon the antecedent, or be dependent butnot in an exclusive way, the consequent would not become non-existent where the antecedent does not exist. The only thing tobe proved is that the sentence is apparent in those three-fold affairs, whether conventionally or by absoluteness, so that it can have mafhūm.

The truth is that the conditional sentence is apparent in those affairs, conventionally in some and by absoluteness in others:

1. As for the relation and existence of necessary connection between the two, it appears that it is conventional - because of tabādur [q.v.]. Itshould be noted , however, that it is not because of articles of condition being specified to that so that one may deny it; it is necessitated by the compound disposition of the conditional sentence as a whole.

2. As for the consequent being dependent upon the antecedent, no matter what kind of dependence it might be, it is also conventional; but not in the sense that the sentence is specified twice - one for the implication and another for the dependence - but rather in the sense that it is specified once for the specific relation which is dependence of the consequent upon the antecedent. Again, the reason is tabādur of dependence of the consequent upon its antecedent, as the conditional sentence denotes that the antecedent is situated in the position of supposition and in case of its actualization the consequent will be actualized secondarily, i.e., consequent follows the antecedent in the actualization. In other words, what immediately comes to the mind from the conditional sentence is that its consequentwould necessarily be actualized should its condition be actualized. This is obviously clear and cannot be denied, except by someone who is obstinate or negligent, for it is the meaning ofdependent-making of something - which is the content of conditional sentence. The conditional sentence has no content other than that; that is why its first clauseis called subordinate clause and antecedent and its second clause principle clause and consequence.

3. As for exclusiveness of the condition, it is by absoluteness; for had there been another condition to substitute that one or to be added to it so that they may both make one compound condition, there would have necessarily been an additional depiction either by “or” in the first state or “and” in the second. Now, wheredependent-making of the consequent upon the condition is left absolute, it reveals that the condition is independent and inclusive; it has neither a partner nor a substitute or parallel. Otherwise, the wise speaker was mandatorily supposed to depict that where he was in the position of depiction.

In short, there is no doubt that the conditional sentence is apparent in having mafhūm, except in cases where itis made to depict the object of the judgment or there is contradictory contextual evidence. This can clearly been proved by the following ĥadīth of the sixth Imām:

Abū Başīr asked, “A lamb is slaughtered and blood came out, but no part of its body moved.”

Imām replied, “Do not eat. Ali said, ‘If the leg jerked or the eye blinked, eat.’”

It is clear that Imām’s appeal to Imām Ali’s words cannot be justified except when the conditional sentence has mafhūm, i.e., “If the leg did not jerk or the eye did not blink, do not eat.”

• Mafhūm al-Waşf (Qualifier)

By waşf in mafāhīm discussionsis meant whatsoever can be a condition, in its broadest sense, for the object of burden.

The qualifier here should have an object of qualification, for a case where the qualifier itself is the object of judgment - like this verse: “And the thief, male and female, cut off the hands of both” (5: 38) -is called designation (laqab) and should be discussed in the mafhūm of designation. The reason is that there must be a constant object of thejudgment which can be both qualified and not qualified by the qualifier so that the negation of judgment can be assumed.

The qualifier here should also be more particular than the qualified either absolutely or in some aspect, since should it be equal or absolute general, it would make no constriction in the qualified so that one can assume negation of the judgment from the qualified where the qualifier is negated. However, the more particular in some respectis considered only with respect to the separation of the qualified from the qualifier and not to that of the qualifier from the qualified, for the object, i.e., the qualifier, should be preserved in the mafhūm; a given object neither proves nor negates any other object. Thus, mafhūm of “there is zakāt in the pastured sheep” - should there be mafhūm for such sentence - would be “there is not zakāt in the fed sheep,” and not “there is not zakāt in other than the pastured sheep” nor “there is not zakāt in other than the pastured, such as camel.”

Anyhow, the dispute in this discussion is that whether the sheer qualification by the qualifier, without there being any contextual evidence, denotes mafhūm, i.e., denotes non-existence of the judgment of the qualified where the qualifier does not exist. There are two opinions in this connection, the prominent one being that such sentence has no mafhūm.The problem is that whether the qualification understood from the qualifier is the qualification of the judgment which means that the judgment is made dependent upon the qualifier, or it is the qualification of the object of the judgment - or the object of the object (muta‘allaq al-mawđu‘), due to difference of cases - the object or the object of the object being the combination of the qualified and the qualifier altogether. If the first, the qualification by the qualifier is apparent in non-existence of the judgment where the qualifier does not exist; because of absoluteness, for absoluteness necessitates that when dependence of the judgment upon the qualifier is assumed the qualifier should be exclusive - as explained in the qualification by the condition. If the second, however, the qualification by the qualifier is not apparent in non-existence of the judgment when the qualifier does not exist, for this case is included in mafhūm of designation. Here, the qualifier and the qualifiedare merely uttered to limit the object of judgment; the case is not that the object is the essence of the qualified and the qualifier being a condition for judging it. For instance, if the teacher says, “Draw a quadrilateral, perpendicular, equilateral shape,” it is clearly understood that what he desires is a square and he has expressed his wish by using those terms to allude to that. In this case, the object is the total meaning denoted by the statement, which is a compound of the qualified and the qualifier, i.e., “a quadrilateral, perpendicular, equilateral shape” in theexample which is in place of square. Thus, as the sentence “draw a square” does not denote non-existence where non-existence, what is in its place does not denote either, for it is in fact like aqualifier which is not dependent upon a qualified.

Now, what is the justifiable opinion? The appearance of the qualifier per se and without any contextual evidence is the second, i.e., it is a condition for the object and not the judgment. Thus, the judgment is absolute with regard to it; hence, there is no mafhūm for the qualifier.

•al-Mandūĥa →Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

•al- Manţūq →al-Mafhūm

•al-Marra (Once)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes once or repetition, and the justifiable opinion is that neither of themis denoted by the imperative per se, for the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation (→al-amr) and nothing else. Of course, obedience to the command necessitates bringing about at least one instance of the nature of the act, for not doing that is equivalent to disobedience. However, the absoluteness of the mode necessitates that performing the mandatory act once is enough; for the Lord's desire can only be considered as one of the three following probabilities:

1. The desired is sheer existence of the thing without any proviso or condition, in the sense that He wishes that His desired should not remain non-existent but rather come out from darkness of non-existence into the light of existence - even though through one single instance. In such case, the desired would necessarily be actualized and obeyed by the first existent and doing the mandatory act more would merely be a vain performance; its example being daily prayers.

2. The desired is one existence with the proviso of unity, i.e., it is conditional upon not being more than the first existence. In such case, should the duty-bound perform it twice, he hasabsolutely not obeyed the command; its example being the inaugural takbīr (saying “God is the greatest”) of daily prayers, since the second nullifies the first and becomes null itself.

3. The desired is the repeated existence; either conditional upon repetition, i.e., the desired being the whole as a whole and hence obedience not being actualized by doing the mandatory act once such as rak‘as of one prayers, or unconditioned with regard to its repetition, i.e., the desired being each of existences, such as fasting in days of Ramađān inasmuch as each day has its specific obedience.

Doubtless the two later facets are in need of more depiction. Thus, should the Lord, who is in the position of depiction, command in an absolute way and do not qualify His command to any of those two facets, itwould be discovered that He has wished the first facet. Hence, the obedience, as was said earlier,would be actualized by the first existence and the second one would be considered neither disobedience nor obedience.

• Mas’ala al-Đidd (Problem of the Opposite)

Uşūlīs have disputedwhether or not to command something necessitates prohibiting its opposite. By the opposite in this discussion is meant that which is incompatible, in its broadest sense, with something else; hence, it covers both the “opposite” and the “contradictory” in their philosophical senses - the former being an existential while the latter being a non-existential affair. That is why Uşūlīs have divided the opposite into “the general opposite (al-đidd al-‘āmm)”, i.e., eschewal and not doing which is non-existential, and “the particular opposite (al-đidd al-khāşş)”, i.e., the existential, incompatible affair, such as eating with regard to prayers.

The dispute is, then,whether or not something commanded by the Lord would necessitate, intellectually or literally, that He, as He is the Lord, has prohibited its general or particular opposite. If positive, there is another dispute over how thiscan be proved .

•al-Mubayyan → al-Mudjmal

•al-Mudjmal (Ambiguous)

By “ambiguous”is meant what whose denotation is not clear. In other words, ambiguous is the word or act by which it is not clear what the speaker or doer has meant. Thus, ambiguous is the word oract which has no appearance, contrary to the “clear” which has an appearance denoting what is meant by the speaker or doer in the way of conjecture or certitude. Hence, clear covers both the apparent (żāhir) and the explicit-definite (naşş).

As for the ambiguous act, its mode of occurrence is not understood; for instance, when the holy Imam performs ablution in circumstances of possibility of dissimulation in which it is not understood whether he had dissimulated (so that it would not denote lawfulness of such performing) or he had performed it in the manner of actual ablution (so that it would denote its lawfulness), or when the holy Imam performs an act in his prayers and it is not understood whether it is done as a mandatory or a recommended act and hence it becomes ambiguous in this respect - though it is clear with respect to its denotation that such an act is lawful and not forbidden.

As for the ambiguous word,there are so many things that cause ambiguity in words. For example, where the word is homonymous but used without evidence, where the wordis used in a figurative manner but without evidence, where it is not clear to what the pronoun refers, where the sentence suffers from incorrect arrangement, where the speaker is in the position of ambiguity and negligence, and so forth.

Ambiguity and clarity are not absolute, since something may be ambiguous for someone but clear for someone else, and a clear affair may be so by itself and may become so by anotheraffair which clarifies it.

•al-Mukhālafa al-Qaţ‘iyya (Definite Opposition)

Al-Mukhālafa al-qaţ‘iyya is to ignore the summary-fashioned knowledge (→al-‘ilm al-idjmālī) and commit all doubtful things, e.g., to drink all four bowls of water one of which is definitely polluted. Here, the duty-bound has definitely opposed the Lord’s command to avoid drinking religiously polluted water - and that is why it is called definite opposition.

•al-Mukhaşşis (Restrictor)

In case of restriction (→al-takhşīş), what expels something from being covered by the ‘āmm [q.v.] judgment is calledmukhaşşis. For instance, should it be said “respect all scholars except evil-doer ones,” “except evildoer ones” is mukhaşşis.

•al-Mukhaşşis al-Munfaşil (Separate Restrictor)

Should the restrictor (→al-mukhaşşis) not be depicted in the same single utterance delivered by the speaker but rather in an independent utterance before or after that, such as “perform your prayers completely,” and “do not perform your prayers completely when travelling,” it is called separate and like the joint restrictor (→al-mukhaşşis al-muttaşil) denotes that by general is meant other than the particular; with a difference, that is, in the joint restrictor the appearance is not formed but in peculiarity while in the separate restrictor the appearance is initially formed in generality but since the appearance of the particular is stronger it is given precedence over the general - and this is due to the principle of giving the more apparent (al-ażhar) or the explicit, definite (al-naşş) precedence over the apparent.

•al-Mukhaşşis al-Muttaşil (Joint Restrictor)

Should the restrictor (→al-mukhaşşis) be depicted in the same single utterance delivered by the speaker, such as “perform your prayers completely except when travelling,” it is called joint and denotes that by general is meant other than the particular. The case is the same with the circumstantial evidence denoting peculiarity in such a way that the speaker can count on it in depicting his will.