Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

• Muqaddimāt al-Ĥikma (Premises of Wisdom)

Since terms are designated for the essence of meanings and not for the meanings as they are absolute, there must be particular or general evidence which make the speech per se apparent in the absoluteness in order to prove that by the term is intended the absolute and to make the judgment penetrate to all instances. Such general evidence will exist only if the three following premises exist:

1. Possibility of absoluteness and qualification. This exists where the object of judgment is capable of division beforebeing judged , since if it is capable of division only after being judged the qualification will be impossible.

2. Lack of any evidence, neither joint (→ al-mukhaşşis al-muttaşil) nor separate (→al-mukhaşşis al-munfaşil). The joint evidence forms the appearance of the speech only in the qualified. As for the separate evidence, although an appearance in the absoluteness takes form for the speech, that appearance is not an authoritative proof - because of existence of the evidence, whichshould be given precedence. That appearance, therefore, is a primary one leaving no room for the principality of absoluteness.

3. The speaker being in the position of depiction. Should the speaker not be in the position of depiction, but in the position oflaw-making only or in that of depicting another precept, no appearance in the absoluteness would take form for the speech.For instance, in the verse 4 of sūra 5: “and such hunting dogs as you teach…eat what they catch for you,” the Almighty is in the position of depiction of lawfulness of what hunting dogs catch and not in that of purity of parts bitten by dogs so that one can refer to the absoluteness of the speech and judge that such parts are juristically pure and they need not to be purified by water.

What should one do if one doubtswhether or not the speaker is in the position of depiction? The principle in such cases is that the speaker is in the position of depiction, for as the wise treat the speaker as being attentive not unconscious and serious not joking when they doubt that, they treat him as being in the position of depiction and explanation not in that of negligence and ambiguousness.

The premises mentioned aboveare called premises of wisdom. The conclusion is that any speech capable of being qualified but not being qualified by a speaker who is wise, attentive, serious, and in the position of depiction is apparent and an authoritative proof in the absoluteness, in such a way that both the speaker and the listener can refer to its absoluteness in the position of argumentation.

• Muqaddima al-Wādjib (Preliminary of the Mandatory Act)

It isabsolutely clear for every wise man that if something is mandatory while its actualization is dependent upon some preliminaries it is necessary for him to acquire those preliminaries in order to actualize that act through them. Thisis for certain. The only thing which is a matter of doubt and dispute among Uşūlīs is that whether or not this intellectual necessity reveals a juristic necessity as well, i.e., whether juristic obligation of something necessitates intellectually the juristic obligation of its preliminaries. In other words, the intellect doubtlessly judges that preliminaries of a mandatory act are mandatory. Now, does it judge that they are mandatory with the divine lawgiver as well? Thus, the intellectual implication between intellectual judgment and juristic obligation is the matter of dispute here.

The outcome of this discussion is deduction of juristic obligation of preliminaries in addition to their intellectual obligation, and this is enough as an outcome of a problem in uşūl al-fiqh. However, this is not a practical outcome, for when preliminaries are intellectually mandatory the duty-bound has no way to leave them undone, and in such case to believe in their obligation or non-obligation is of no use. Nevertheless, there area lot of scholarly outcomes for this discussion on the one hand and it is related to a good number of practical, juristic problems on the other - something that Uşūlīs cannot ignore. That is why this discussion mostly deals with such problems as varieties of conditions and preliminaries, their possibility or otherwise, and the like; and discussing the very implication seems somehow a marginal issue.

As for the opinions with regard to juristic obligation of the preliminary of the mandatory act,various differentiations are made by Uşūlīs . The justifiable opinion, however, is that it isabsolutely not mandatory. For, as proved in discussions of independent intellectual proofs, in cases where judgment of intellect for necessity of something exists in such a way that it calls the duty-bound to do that thing there will remain no room for the Lord’scommand as He is the Lord. The discussion in question is among such things with respect to the cause, for if the command to that which has preliminary calls the duty-bound to do the commanded act, that call will necessarily, due to the judgment of intellect, make him actualize whatever the commanded act is dependent upon in order to acquire that act.And with the assumption of existence of that motive in the duty-bound’s soul there will remain no need for another motive from the Lord while He, as was assumed, knows that such motive exists; for the Lord as He is the Lord commands only for the sake of motivating the duty-bound to do the commanded act and establishing motive in his soul where there is no motivation. Furthermore, to establish a second motive from the Lord in such case is impossible, for it is acquiring what is already acquired - something impossible.

In other words, if the command to that which has preliminary is not enough to call the duty-bound to do the preliminary, no command to the preliminary will be enough to call to the preliminary as it is preliminary; and if the command to that which has preliminary is enough to call and motive to the preliminary, no need will remain for the command from the Lord - rather it is in vain, or impossible, since it is acquiring what is already acquired. That is why commands to some preliminariesshould be predicated upon being guides to consideration of such preliminaries as conditions for the mandatory act - as is the case with all commands where there exists an intellectual judgment.

•al-Muqayyad (Qualified)

A term which is not left absolute (→al-iţlāq) but is qualified by something is called muqayyad; such as “slave” in “free a believer slave,” which is qualified by “believer.” That is why to free an unbeliever would not be enough and the duty-bound should free a believer slave.

•al-Muradjdjiĥāt (Preferrers)

According to ĥadīths, if one of the two contradictory proofsis endowed with a preferrer, it should definitely be taken; but what the preferrers are is a matter of dispute. Such preferrers differ in cases of contradiction (→al-ta‘āruđ) and interference (→al-tsazāĥum). The former include such affairs as being in accordance with celebrity, conforming to the holy Qur’ān, notbeing uttered due to dissimulation, positive qualities of transmitters, and the like. As for the latter, preferrers refer to the importance of one of the two proofs in the view of divine lawgiver: what is more important in His view is theone which should be given priority.

•al-Mushtaqq (Derived)

As there is no precise word in English to convey the meaning of al- mushtaqq in its uşūlī sense on the one hand and there are some specific expressions in this discussion on the other, we have to take the example of somebody orsomething which possesses a quality and then looses it in order to clarify the topic. In the discussion of mushtaqq, somebody or something that may or may not possess a quality while in both cases he or it permanently exists is addressed as al-dhāt, the quality as al-mabda’, to possess the quality as al-talabbus, to lose the quality as inqiđā’ al-talabbus, and what is abstracted and derived from the quality as al-mushtaqq.

For the purpose of clarification of this complicatedly presented discussion, let us take an example. Suppose that Ali has finished the high school, he is now studying law at a university, and he will definitely become a judge when he is graduated.

A. If we say, “Ali was a student,” “Ali is a university student,” and “Ali will be a judge” we are literally correct. In those examples we are using exactly the time when “student,” “university student,” and “judge” are attributed to Ali. That timeis called “the time of possession (ĥāl al-talabbus).” Thus, when we attribute something to somebody or something else in the time when the former possesses the latter, we are literally correct and there is no dispute over this among Uşūlīs.

B. If we say, “Ali is a judge” we are attributing something to Ali when he has not possessed it yet, i.e., the time of attribution (ĥāl al-isnād) is different from that of possession (ĥāl al-talabbus) which will be in the future. In this case, we are figuratively correct, since Ali will be a judge in the future; and this pointis also not a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs.

C. Now, suppose that Ali finished the university course, was appointed as a judge, finished his thirty years of duty, and became retired having no position in the juristic system. In this case, if we say, “Ali was a judge” we are literally correct, since we used the time of possession, and there is no dispute over this.But how would be the case if we would say, “Ali is a judge”? Is this usage correct literally or figuratively? Such case, i.e., when somethingis attributed to somebody or something else because he, or it, has possessed it in the past, is the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs: some consider it as being literally and others as being figuratively correct.

The justifiable opinion is that it is used figuratively in such case, for it does not precede other meanings in coming to our mind on the one hand and it is correct to divest it of someone who is no longer in that position on the other. In other words, signs of literalness do not exist; hence, such usage is figurative.

Sofar the problem is clarified in a simple way. However, we need to explain some specific terms used in this discussion by Uşūlīs to become able to present this discussion in its normal scholarly way. To sum up whatwas explained in a simple way in its specific scholarly way, note the following:

1. To use al-mushtaqq with regard to ĥāl al-talabbus is absolutely a literal usage, whether the time used is past, present, or future (as explained in A) - without there being any dispute among Uşūlīs.

2. To attribute al-mushtaqq to the dhāt presently, i.e., with regard to ĥāl al-isnād before the time of al-talabbus because the dhāt will possess it later on (as explained in B), is a figurative usage - without there being any dispute among Uşūlīs.

3. To attribute al-mushtaqq to the dhāt presently, i.e., with regard to ĥāl al-isnād when it no longer possesses the mabda’ merely because it has had it in the past (as in the second example in C), is the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs whether it is a literal or a figurative usage.

This dispute manifests its result in some juristic precepts. For instance, according to some ĥadīths performing minor ablution with some water warmed by the sunis disapproved . “The water warmed by the sun” is a mushtaqq. Suppose that such water has now become cold. A jurist who holds that calling that water “warmed by the sun” is literally correct gives verdict that performing minor ablution with that wateris still disapproved , while the one who maintains that such calling is a figurative usage does not treat such an ablution as being disapproved.

•al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya (Independent Intellectual Proofs)

Independent intellectual proofs are thosewhose both minor and major premises are intellectual, such as “justice is intellectually good,” and “whatsoever is intellectually good is juristically good,” which results that “justice is juristically good.” This kind is usually discussed in the science of theology (kalām) and not uşūl al-fiqh, as it is the major dispute between Ashā‘ira and ‘Adliyya (including both Mu‘tazila and Shī‘a).

•al-Muţlaq → al-Iţlāq

•al-Muwāfaqa al-Qaţ‘iyya (Definite Obedience)

Al-Muwāfaqa al-qaţ‘iyya is to avoid all parts of the summary-fashioned knowledge (→al-‘ilm al-idjmālī) and not to commit even a single doubtful thing, e.g., not to drink even one bowl of water of four bowls one of which is definitely polluted. Here, the duty-bound has definitely obeyed the Lord’s command to avoid drinking religiously polluted water, no matter which of those bowlsis polluted - and that is why it is called definite obedience.

N

• Nafs an lā Taf‘al →Kaff al-Nafs

•al-Nahy (Prohibition)

By al-nahy (the prohibition; pl. al-nawāhī) is meant wish of the superior from the inferior to eschew and not to do an act, whether by such terms as “I prohibit you” or by any other mode; or, to be more precise, the superior's dissuading and forbidding the inferior from doing an act whose requisite being wish of eschewing and not doing that act.

The prohibition is like the command in denoting necessity and obligation intellectually and not conventionally (→al-amr). The only difference is that the purpose in the command is obligation of doing while in the prohibition is that of eschewing. Therefore, the prohibition is apparent in the unlawfulness as the command was apparent in the obligation.

Itshould be noted that by “act” in the definition of prohibition is meant what is conveyed by the infinitive, even though it may not be an existential affair. Thus, “Do not leave the prayers” is a prohibition while “Eschew drinking wine” is a command - though itmeans “Do not drink wine.”

•al-Naskh (Abolishment)

Terminologically, naskh (abolishment) denotes removal of whatis established in the religion, such as precepts and the like. By “establishment in the religion”is meant the real, actual establishment and not the apparent one because of literal appearance. That is why the removal of aprecept which is established by the appearance of generality or absoluteness through a restrictor or a qualifier proof is not called naskh, but rather restriction, qualification, and the like.In the latter, the second proof which is given precedence over the appearance of the first is contextual evidence revealing the real intent of the divine lawgiver; it does not remove that precept but apparently, without any real removal of the precepts - contrary to the abolishment - and this is the real difference between abolishment on the one hand and restriction and qualification on the other.

The phrase “precepts and the like” is added so that the definition may cover both burdensome and conventional precepts as well as whatsoever whose establishment and removal is entrusted to the divine lawgiver as He is the Lawgiver. Thus, abolishment does not include existentialthings which are made by the divine lawgiver as He is the Creator.

Although some have doubted possibility of abolishment in general and that of the holy Qur’ān in particular, their arguments areabsolutely inconsiderable .

Itshould be noted that it is a matter of consensus among all Muslim scholars of any sect that no Qur’ānic verse can be treated as abolished except where its abolishment is proved by a definite proof. It is also a matter of consensus that thereare abolisher and abolished verses in the holy Qur’ān. The only matter of dispute is recognition of cases of abolishment. Thus, cases whose abolishment is proved definitely, which are very few, are treated so in fiqh. However, if the abolisher is conjectural and not definite, it is not an authoritative proof andmust be ignored .

•al-Naşş (Explicit-Definite)

When a termis explicitly used in a meaning in such a way that no other meaning is probable, it is called naşş. See also: żāhir.

In another application, where the term is not concerned, naşşis used as an equivalent to proof in its general sense.

•al-Nawāhī → al-Nahy

Q

•Qā‘ida Qubĥ ‘Iqāb bilā Bayān (Principle of Reprehensibility of Punishment without Depiction)

The intellect undoubtedly judges that punishment without depiction is reprehensible. In other words, it judges independently, without any need to religiousjudgments, that it is reprehensible to reproach and punish someone without there being a depiction available to him - of course when he has made a thorough quest for probable existing proofs but has found nothing. This intellectual rule, which cannot be a matter of dispute, is calledqā‘ida qubĥ ‘iqāb bilā bayān (principle of reprehensibility of punishment without depiction).

•Qā‘ida al-Yaqīn (Rule of Certainty)

This rule, in which the doubtis called the penetrative doubt (al-shakk al-sārī), deals with the case where one doubts the very thing one was certain of. For instance, one is certain on Friday that one’s cloth is religiously pure, then onSaturday one doubts whether one’s cloth was religiously pure on Friday. In such case, the doubt penetrates to Friday and the certainty of Friday changes into doubt. Such case is not included in the proofs of authority of istişĥāb [q.v.], for it is not “to judge that what has previously been is subsistent,” as nothing has previously been certain. On the other hand, there is no other proof in favor of this rule; that is why itcannot be treated as an authoritative proof for religious precepts.

•al-Qaţ ‘ (Certitude, Knowledge)

Sinceqaţ‘ ( certitude, or knowledge, i.e., that which is one hundred percent for certain) is essentially a path to the factuality, its authority is essential, i.e., it is raised from the very nature of its essence and is not taken from something else. The certitude must necessarily be followed, that necessity being an intellectual one originated by the fact that certitude is per se a path to thefactuality and its reality is the very manifestation of the actuality. Thus, the essence of certitude is the very manifestation; it is notsomething which is endowed with manifestation. Since the certitude is essentially a path it is neither plausible to bemade a path by the divine lawgiver nor is it possible to be negated as a path; for both making and negating the essence and its requisites are impossible.Therefore, the certitude is an authoritative proof whatever its cause may be (contrary to Akhbārīs, who hold that certitude should not be followed when it is caused by intellectual preliminaries), for whomever it may be actualized (contrary to those who maintain that certitude is not valid if actualized for someone who becomes certain too much and too quickly (al-qaţţā‘)), and whatever its object of denotation may be. In all such cases, the certitude is essentially a path to the actuality, and that is why no affirmative or negative changecan be made in it. Yea, the only thing possible is to makethe one who is wrongly certain realize that there is something wrong in the preliminaries of one’s certitude . In that case, one’s certitudewill necessarily be changed into either possibility of or certitude in the contrary view - and there is nothing wrong with that.

•al-Qiyās (Juristic Analogy)

Qiyās, tobe defined precisely later, is a matter of major dispute among Muslim scholars of different sects. Following their infallible-innocent Imams, Shi‘a scholars have denied its authority; and among Sunni sects, followers of Dāwūd b. Khalaf, called al-Żāhiriyya, and Ĥanbalīs hold the same. The first one whotook the analogy into consideration and used it widely was Abū Ĥanīfa (in the second Hijri century). That method, however, was later on adopted by Shāfi‘īs and Mālikīs and used by some in such an extremist way that they preferred it to the consensus and rejected some ĥadīths by it.

Definition of Qiyās

Qiyās is defined variously the best of which being “establishment of a precept for something by a motive (‘illa) because of its establishment for something else by that motive.” The first thing is called “subordinate (far‘),” the second “principle (aşl),” and the common motive “encompassing (djāmi‘).” In fact, qiyās is a function performed by the arguer in order to infer a juristic precept for something whose preceptis not depicted by the divine lawgiver inasmuch as such a function provokes certainty or conjecture as to the precept of that thing.This function is the very predication of the subordinate upon the principle with regard to the proved precept of the principle through which the arguer grants the same precept to the subordinate - if obligation, obligation; if unlawfulness, unlawfulness; and so forth - in the sense that he argues that the subordinate should have the same precept with the principle because of commonness of the motive. Thus, that arguer’s function becomes a proof for religious precepts, since it provokes certainty or conjecture that the divine lawgiver has the same judgment.

Shiite Position on Qiyās

Following Ahl al-Bayt, Shī‘a scholars have absolutely denied authority of qiyās, for it provokes nothing but conjecture (which, according to the Quran (10: 36), avails naught against truth) on the one hand and no acceptable, definite proof is argued to support it on the other. One ĥadīth will suffice to present Shiite position on qiyās:

Abān b. Taghlib narrates that he asked Imām Dja‘far al-Sādiq (the sixth Imām), “What do you say on compensation of a woman’s finger cut by a man?”

Imām replied, “Ten camels.”

I asked, “Two fingers?”

Imām replied, “Twenty.”

I asked, “Three?”

Imām replied, “Thirty.”

I asked, “Four?”

Imām replied, “Twenty.”

Being astonished, I asked, “A man cuts three fingers of a woman and gives thirty camels but cuts four fingers and gives twenty?! We heard this when we were in Irāq and we used to say one who said this was Satan!”

Imām replied, “Calm down Abān! This is the holy Prophet’s judgment that woman equals man up to the third of compensation, but when it comes to the third hers becomes half. O Abān, you are arguing qiyās, while arguing qiyās against Sunna obliterates the latter.” (al-Kulanī , 7: 300)

S

•al-Sabab → al-Ţarīq

•al-Şaĥīĥ wa’l A‘amm (Sound and What Incorporates Both)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether terms of acts of worship and transactions are designations specified for sound meanings (i.e., perfect in terms of parts and conditions) or for what incorporates imperfect (al-fāsid) ones as well. In other words, when such termis used , should it be predicated only to perfect instances or could it be predicated to imperfect ones too? The justifiable opinion is the second, i.e., terms being specified for what incorporates both, since it is the denotation of preceding (al-tabādur) and incorrectness of divesting (‘dam şiĥĥat al-salb) [qq.v.] which are two signs of literalness. When we think of a term, what incorporates both comes to the mind first and precedes the sound,and also it is not veracious to divest the term of the imperfect instance.

•al-Shakk al-Sārī → Qā‘ida al-Yaqīn

•al-Shubha Ghair al-Maĥşūra (Large-Scale Dubiety)

This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-iĥtiyāţ [q.v.]. Contrary al-shubha al- maĥşūra [q.v.] whose definition is clear, several definitionsare presented for the large-scale dubiety some of which being as follows:

1. It is treated by people as being large-scale dubiety, such as one in one thousand .

2. The parts are abundant in such a way that counting them in a short time, or absolutely, is difficult.

3. The parts are abundant in such a way that the wise do not take the summary-fashioned knowledge existing among them into consideration and treat it as no knowledge.

4. Abundance of parts causes hardship and difficulty with the definite obedience, and itis clearly known in the Islamic jurisprudence that the hardship removes duties.

5. Abundance of parts is that much that weakens the probability in each of them. There is consensus among Sha scholars that precaution is not mandatory in this kind.

•al-Shubha al-Ĥukmiyya (Dubiety concerning the Precept)

When the doubtful is a universal precept, such as doubting whether smoking is unlawful or it nullifies fasting, the dubietyis called al-shubha al-ĥukmiyya. This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-barā’a [q.v.].

•al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya (Dubiety concerning the Concept)

In thediscussion entitled “penetration of ambiguity of the restrictor to the general” the authority of the general in the case of ambiguity of the particular is thoroughly discussed. Itis mentioned there that the said ambiguity is of two types, one being that of the concept - a problem called “the dubiety concerning the concept.”In this case, the doubt is about the concept of the particular per se, i.e., the particular is ambiguous; such as this ĥadīth: “Every water is juristically pure except what its taste, color, or smell is polluted [by a juristically impure object],” in which it is doubted whether by pollution is meant the sheer sensory pollution or it includes the assumed pollution as well. Or this order, for instance, by the commander: “Trust soldiers of the squadron except John,” in which it is doubted whether John refers to John Smith or John Cooper.

The dubiety in this type is, in turn, divided into “over the least and the most(dawarān bain al-aqall wa’l-akthar),” like the first example in which it was doubted whether the sheer sensory pollution is excepted or the restriction includes the assumed change as well (the least being the sensory pollution, and the most being what incorporates the assumed as well), and “over two divergent things (dawarān bain al-mutabāyinayn),” such as the second example in which the restriction is doubted whether it addresses John Smith or John Cooper. See also: al-mudjmal.

•al-Shubha al- Maĥşūra (Small-Scale Dubiety)

When the doubtful exists between two or more specified and limited things, the dubietyis called maĥşūra. For instance, one knows that the liquid existing in one of these two or more specified bowls is religiously impure andits drinking, therefore, is unlawful. This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-iĥtiyāţ [q.v.].

•al-Shubha al-Mawđū‘iyya (Dubiety concerning the Object)

When the duty-bound knows the precept but wonders whether certain thing is an instance of the object, the dubiety is called mawđū‘iyya. For instance, one definitely knows that drinking wineis forbidden but wonders whether this liquid in this glass is wine or not. This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-barā’a [q.v.].

•al-Shubha al-Mişdāqiyya (Dubiety concerning the Instance)

In thediscussion entitled “penetration of ambiguity of the restrictor to the general” the authority of the general in the case of ambiguity of the particular is thoroughly discussed. Itis mentioned there that the said ambiguity is of two types, one being that of the instant - a problem called “the dubiety concerning the instant.”

Here, the doubt is about the inclusion of an instance of the general in the particular while the concept of the particular is clear without any ambiguity. For instance, concerning this ĥadīth: “Every water is juristically pure except what its taste, color, or smell is polluted [by a juristically impure object],” we doubt whether specific water has been polluted by something juristically impure and has been included in the precept of the particular or not and still holds its purity. See also: al-mudjmal.

•al-Shubha al-Taĥrīmiyya (Dubiety as to Unlawfulness)

When the dubiety is over unlawfulness, e.g., whethercertain act is prohibited by the divine lawgiver , the dubiety is called al-shubha al-taĥrīmiyya. This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-barā’a [q.v.].

•al-Shubha al-Wudjūbiyya (Dubiety as to Obligation)

When the dubiety is over obligation, e.g., whether certainprayers in certain case is made mandatory by the divine lawgiver, the dubiety is called al-shubha al-wudjūbiyya. This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-barā’a [q.v.].

•al-Shuhra (Celebrity)

Literally, al-shuhra means obviousness and clarity of something.Terminologically, however, it is of two applications: one is in the science of ĥadīth where any ĥadīth whose transmitters are less than the level of massive report (mutawātir) is called mashhūr (i.e., celebrated) or sometimes mustafīđ), and the other is in the jurisprudence where any opinion of jurists on a juristic problem which is abundant but not at the level of consensus is called mashhūr (and sometimes the very jurists are called the same, as in “mashhūr says so,” or “mashhūr holds that…”).

Thus, shuhra is of two varieties:

1. Shuhra in the ĥadīth. In this kind, it is not necessary that jurists should havetaken that ĥadīth into consideration in a celebrated way as well; they may or may not do so. However, such celebrity provokes preference of the celebrated ĥadīth over others, and that is why the celebrated ĥadīth is an authoritative proof from this aspect.

2. Shuhra in the verdict, meaning celebrity of a verdict ofjurists which provokes the belief in its conformity to the factuality - though not at the level of certitude. This is, in turn, of two varieties:

2.1. Itis known that such shuhra is dependent upon a specific ĥadīth available to us. This kind is called “practical celebrity (al-shuhra al-‘amaliyya)” and it is discussed in the science of uşūl al-fiqh whether it compensates for the weakness in the chain of transmission and/or for the weakness in the denotation.

2.2. Itis not known on what that celebrity is dependent, whether there exists a ĥadīth in conformity with the celebrity but the celebrity did not consider it or it is not known whether the celebrity has considered it, or there is no ĥadīth at all. This kind is called “celebrity of verdict (al-shuhra al-fatwā’iyya).”

It is this celebrity of verdict that is the matter of dispute here, for some jurists have allegedly held that this kind of celebrity, as it is celebrity, is an authoritative proof over juristic precepts and, like single report, should be included in particular conjectures, while others hold that there is nothing that can confirm its authority.

•al-Sīra (Custom)

By the customis meant continuity of practical conduct of people to do or to leave something.By people, in turn, is meant either all people of every folk and creed, whether Muslim or non-Muslim - this custom being called “the custom of the wise (sīra al-‘uqalā’)” and by recent Uşūlīs “the conduct of the wise (binā’ al-‘uqalā’ [q.v.])” - or only Muslims as they are Muslims or a specific sect of Muslims such as Shī‘a - this custom being called “the custom of people of the religion (sīra al-mutasharri‘a [q.v.]),” or “the religious custom (al-sīra al-shar‘iyya),” or “the Islamic custom (al-sīra al-Islāmiyya).”

• Sīra al-Mutasharri‘a (Custom of People of the Religion)

The custom of people of religion, i.e., Muslims, to do or to eschew something (→ al-sīra) is in fact a kind of consensus. It is even thehighest level consensus, for it is an actual consensus of all Muslims while consensus on verdicts is a literal one and made only by scholars.

Such conduct is of two kinds, for it issometimes known that it has been prevalent in the time of infallible personalities in such a way that the infallible personality has exercised, or, at least, confirmed it, and sometimes that is not known or it is known that such custom has appeared after infallible personalities’ time.

If the former, that custom is undoubtedly a definite, authoritative proof for agreement of the divine lawgiver and is, per se, an indicator of religious precepts. It is this point that differentiates between custom of the people of religion and custom of the wise; for the latter is in need of another proof proving its confirmation by the divine lawgiver, even though through lack of establishment of His prohibition.

As for the latter, there is no way to rely on that for discovering agreement of infallible personalities in a certain manner, as was the case with consensus. The case is even worse and lower with this one, as will be explained.Consideration of the way customs take shape in human communities, including Muslims’, clarifies the influence of irreligious habits on human emotions: some influential person does something in order to satisfy his own desires or for some other reason such as imitating other cultures, then comes someone else who follows the first, and thereby the act continues and gradually becomes prevalent among people without there being someone who prohibits them from that wrong act because of neglectfulness, heedlessness, fear, and the like. That actis conveyed by the first generation to the second and other coming generations and becomes a custom of Muslims. In this case, should someone cast doubts upon that custom, which has become sacred with the passage of time, and blame Muslims because of their heedlessness, hewould definitely be treated as someone against the Islamic laws and customs.

That is why we cannot treat present Muslim customs as being present in early Islam; and when we doubt authority of something we have to treat it as unauthorized, for there is no authority but through knowledge and certainty.

As for the extent of an authorized custom of people of religion, it proves lawfulness of something if it is a custom of doing, and lawfulness of eschewing and lack of obligation if it is a custom of eschewal. There is no denotation of obligation or unlawfulness, even preference or disapproval, in any custom of doing or eschewing; for the act is, per se, ambiguous having no denotation more than lawfulness of doing or eschewing.

•al-Sunna

Among Sunni jurists, Sunna (lit. lifestyle) is “word, act, and acknowledgment (taqrīr→ [q.v.]) of the Prophet.” Thatexpression is originated by Muslim’s being commanded by the holy prophet to follow his Sunna. Then, wherever the word Sunnais used in an absolute manner without being attributed to anyone, it is interpreted specifically as what contains a precept declared by the holy prophet, whether by his word, act, or acknowledgment.

As for Shiite jurists, since it is proved for them that words of infallible-innocent Imāms of the Household of the Prophet are, like those of the Prophet, authoritative proofs, they expanded the expression Sunna so that it may include “word, act, and acknowledgment of the infallible-innocent personality.” The secret of that expansion is that holy Imāms are not like transmitters of words of the holy prophet so that their words should be authoritative proofs because they are trustworthy in transmission, but rather because theyare appointed by God via the holy prophet in order to deliver factual precepts.That is why they do not make any judgment but in accordance with factual precepts as they are with God, and that happens either through inspiration, as happens for the holy prophet through revelation, or through receiving from the previous infallible-innocent personality, as Imam Ali said, “The holy prophet taught me a thousand windows of knowledge through each one opens for me a thousand windows.” Therefore, their declaration of precepts is not of kind of transmission and narration of Sunna, nor of kind of idjtihād and inference from sources oflaw-making ; but rather, they are themselves a source for law-making. Thus, their words are Sunna and not transmission of Sunna. However, they sometimes narrate traditions from the holy prophet, for the sake of transferring his precious epigrams, for arguing against others who do not believe in them, or for some other reasons.

As for proving their leadership and that their words are to be considered as those of the holy prophet, it is discussed in ‘ilm al-kalām (Islamic theology).

T

•al-Ta‘ādul wa’l Tarādjīĥ (Equilibrium and Preferences)

This expressionis used in the discussion dealing with the question of contradiction of proofs. By equilibrium is meant that two proofs are equal in whatsoever necessitating preference of one to another, and by preferences is meant whatsoever necessitating preference of one to another where they are not equal - by infinitive being meant subject in the latter, i.e., preferrer.

•al-Ta‘āruđ (Contradiction)

Contradiction between two proofs occurs where either of them nullifies and repudiates the other. Such repudiation iseither in all denotations or some of them, in such a way that assumption of subsistence of authority of either of them along with that of the other is impossible and one cannot act in accordance with both of them.

Contradiction of proofs occurs only where the following conditions exist:

1. Neither of two proofs being definite; for should one of them be definite untruth of the otherwould be revealed , and it is obviously clear that untrue cannot contradict true. As for both of them being definite, it isabsolutely impossible .

2. Actual conjecture notbeing considered in the authority of both, since actualization of actual conjecture as to two contradictory proofs is also impossible. Of course, actual conjecturemay be taken into consideration particularly in one of them.

3. Denotations of two proofs contradicting one another, even though in parallel and in some aspects, so that mutual repudiation may occur. The criterion is that they would result in what cannot religiously be made and is impossible in the actuality, even though such impossibility being caused by something outside of their very denotations; as is the case with contradiction of proofs of obligation of Friday prayers and that of obligation of żuhr prayers on Friday, since there is no contradiction between those two proofs per se inasmuch as conjunction of obligation of two prayers in a specific time is not impossible, but as it is known through another proof that only one prayer is obligatory at a given time they repudiate one another.

4. Either of two proofs possessing conditions of authority, in the sense that either of them is an authoritative proof whose following is mandatory if there appears no contradictory proof - though one unspecified proof would become unauthorized as soon as contradiction occurs.

5. Relation of two proofs not being that of interference (→ al-tazāĥum).

6. Relation of two proofs not being that of sovereignty (→ al-ĥukūma).

7. Relation of two proofs not being that of entry (→ al-wurūd).

•al-Tabādur (Preceding)

Usage of a term in its designated meaning is literally correct, in another meaning with which it has some pertinence along with some contextual evidence is figuratively correct, and in another meaning without any pertinence is wrong. Therefore, usage of a term literally and figuratively is correct and “the usage” cannot specify whether a termis designated for a meaning or it is used figuratively.

Now, should one know, through assertion of philologists, that a term is designated for a meaning it would be obviously clear that such word is to be used literally in that meaning and figuratively in other pertinentmeanings. However, the case is not that clear sometimes and one may wonder how to treat the usage. What can one do in that case in order to find out whether such a usage is literally correct or it isfiguratively so and hence one should use it with some contextual evidence?

Uşūlīs have mentioned some signs of recognition of the literal meaning the most important of which being preceding (al-tabādur) and incorrectness of divesting (‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb [q.v.]). By tabādur is meant that when one thinks of a term, a specific meaning comes to one’s mind first - from the very term without there being any contextual evidence - and precedes other meanings. This clearly proves that the term indicates its meaning merely because of convention and nothing else. To exercise this sign, let us consider the example of the term “lion.” We know that this termis used for a specific animal literally and for a brave man figuratively. Now, when you hear the term “lion”it is the meaning of that animal which comes to your mind first and not a brave man, and this is tabādur. Hence, tabādur is asign which indicates the literal meaning of a term.