Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

• Tadākhul al-Asbāb (Intervention of Causes)

In the discussion of mafhūm of the condition [q.v.] a problem is raised concerning some case where there are two (or more) conditional sentences in which conditions are multiple but consequents are one. In such case, manţūq of each sentence opposes mafhūm of the other. The case in question may be of two kinds the second of which being where the consequent is religiously repeatable, as in: “If you had sexual intercourse, make major ablution,” and “If you touched a dead body, make major ablution.” This kind is, in turn, of two kinds:

1. Itis proved that each condition is part of the cause. Doubtless, the consequent is one andwill be actualized when both conditions are realized.

2. Itis proved , either by another proof or by the appearance of the same proof, that each condition is an independent cause. Here, whether or not the conditional sentence has mafhūm, it is disputed whether the rule to which one is supposed to refer to in such cases necessitates intervention of causes so that they may have one consequence, or necessitates non-intervention of causes so that the consequence should be repeated by repetition of conditions.

Doubtless, as we have frequently stressed, the specific proof should be followed in this respect should there be one, as in the case with intervention of causes of ablution such as urine, sleep, and the like and non-intervention of causes of obligation of prayers such as coming of the time of daily prayers, eclipse of the sun or moon, and so forth. The dispute is over the problem where no specific proof exists and one wonders what one is principally supposed to do - a problem known as the problem of “intervention of causes.”

The justifiable opinion concerning this problem is non-intervention of causes. The reason is that every conditional sentence has two appearances: appearance of the condition in independence in the causality, and appearance of the consequence in that the object of the judgment is the sheer being. As for the former, the appearance necessitates that the consequence should be multiple in the conditional sentences; hence, causes do not intervene. As for the latter, since the sheer being of something cannot be object of two judgments, itis necessitated that all causes should have one consequence and judgment when their conjunction is assumed; hence, the causes intervene. Thus, those two appearances contradict one another. If the first appearance is preferred, we should believe in non-intervention, and if the second, in intervention. Now, which one is more justifiable to be preferred?

The justifiable idea is to give the appearance of condition priority over that of consequence. Since the consequence is dependent upon thecondition it is subject to the latter both in realization and demonstration: if the latter is one it is one, and if the latter is multiple it is multiple. Now that the antecedent is multiple, because of appearance of two conditional sentences, the consequent, which is subject to it, is not apparent in the unity of the desired. Thus, there would be no contradiction between the two appearances; rather, the appearance in the multiplicity removes the appearance in the unity, since the latter cannot exist unless when itis assumed that the appearance in the multiplicity is removed or that there is no such appearance, while there is such appearance here. The principle in such case, therefore, is non-intervention.

• Tadākhul al-Musabbabāt (Intervention of the Caused)

Should one believe that causes intervene (→tadākhul al-asbāb), one would not be in need of discussing whether or not the caused intervene. That discussion, however, is necessary for those who hold the contrary opinion, for they should find out whether or not is it acceptable to content oneself with one obedience where the caused are common in the designation and reality, such as major ablutions. In other words, they should find outwhether or not the caused intervene.

The principle here is also non-intervention. The reason is that obedience of multiple mandatory acts by one act, even though where all of themare intended , needs a specific proof; otherwise, every obligation necessitates a specific obedience incapable of substitution by any other obedience - even in cases where mandatory acts share the same designation and reality.

•al-Takhaş şuş (Non-Inclusion)

Takhaşşuş means non-inclusion of some instances in the object of ‘āmm judgment [q.v.]. In order to clarify this, let us take an example. Suppose that Joshua is not a teacher in the school. Now, should the principal order his deputy to pay salaries of all teachers, Joshua would not be paid. This non-payment is not because of Joshuabeing excluded from the judgment, i.e., paying salaries, but rather because of not being an instant of the object, i.e., teacher.

•al-Takhşīş (Restriction)

Takhşīş (→al-khāşş) means to expel some instances of ‘āmm [q.v.] frombeing covered by the judgment. In order to clarify this, let us take an example. Suppose that John is a teacher in the school. Now, should the principal order his deputy to pay salaries of all teachers except John’s, John would not be paid. This non-payment is not because of John not being an instant of the object, i.e., teacher, since he is a teacher, but rather because of Johnbeing excluded from the ‘āmm judgment, i.e., paying salaries.

•al-Takhyīr al-Badwī → Aşāla al-Takhyīr

•al-Takhyīr al-Istimrārī → Aşāla al-Takhyīr

•al-Takrār → al-Marra; also: al-Dawām

•al-Taqrīr (Acknowledgment)

By taqrīr is meant a case where someone performs an act in the presence of the infallible-innocent personality and the latter remains silent while he is aware of what the former is doing and is in the state of capability of informing the former if he is wrong in what he is doing. The state of capability occurs when the time is enough for depiction and when there is no obstacle for that, such as fear, dissimulation, despairing of influence of advising, and the like. Such silence of the infallible-innocent personality and taking no action with regard to what someone has doneis called taqrīr.

Doubtless such an acknowledgment, accompanied by those conditions, is apparent in that such an act is permissible where its prohibition is probable and is lawful and acceptable where it is an act of worship or transaction.For should it be unlawful in the actuality or suffer from deficiency it was upon the infallible-innocent personality to prohibit the doer if he is knowledgeable of what he is doing, because of obligation of commanding to good and prohibiting from bad, and to expound the precept as well as mode of the act if the doer is ignorant of the precept, because of obligation of teaching the ignorant.

The case is the same where someone explains a precept or quality of an act of worship or transaction in the presence of the infallible-innocent personality while he is capable of depiction but he remains silent, since this is acknowledgement of what he has said.

•al-Tarākhī → al-Fawr

•al-Ţarīq (Path)

There is a dispute whether amāra [q.v.] is path or cause. By amāra being a path is meant that it is merely made to take duty-bounds to the actuality and to reveal the latter; if it is a success, the actuality will become incontrovertible, and if it is a failure, it will merely be an excuser for the duty-bound in opposing the actuality. Byamāra being a cause is meant that it is a cause in generating a good in its outcome which is equivalent to causing elimination of the actuality in case of failure of amāra.

The justifiable opinion is the first. To believe in the latter is dependent upon not believing in the former; for to believe in the latter is caused by inability to justify the former - which is the principle in this connection. However, since we are able to justify the former, there will remain no room for the belief in the latter. The former being the principle in this connection means that amāra, per se, must be a sheer path to its outcome; for it is to recount, express, and reveal the actuality. Furthermore, the wisetake it into consideration because it reveals the actuality - and the conduct of the wise (→ binā’ al-‘uqalā‘) is the primary base in the authority of amāra. Amārabeing treated by the wise as a cause is nonsensical.

•al-Tazāĥum (Interference)

In case of disagreement of two religious proofs where they do not repudiate one another in the position of lawgiving (→ al-ta‘āruđ) but rather it is the duty-bound who cannot take both of them in the position of obedience, such as the case where someone is going to be drowned and the only way to save him is an expropriated land, tazāĥum occurs. There is only one preferrer in the case of tazum, and it is “significance;” i.e., between the two cases, the one which is more important must be given priority. (See also: al-muradjdjiĥāt)

U

•al-‘Umūm → al-‘Āmm

•al-‘Umūm al-Badalī (Substitutional Generality)

In the substitutional generality (→al-mm), such as “respect any scholar you wish,” the judgmentis directed to one instance in a substitutional way. Hence, only one instance, in a substitutional way, is the object of the judgment andshould one instance be obeyed the burden would absolutely be treated as being obeyed.

Should it strike you that this kind cannot be treated as generality, since to be substitutional, in which the object isnot but one, contradicts generality, we would remind you that the meaning of generality in this kind is generality in the substitution, i.e., capability of every instance to be an object. Of course,should the generality in this kind be understood because of absoluteness (→al-iţlāq), it would be included in the absolute and not the general.

Generally speaking, generality of the object of the judgment with regard to its states and instances, if it is an object of a mandatory or a recommended command, is mostly of the kind of substitutional generality.

•al-‘Umūm al-Istighrāqī (Encompassing Generality)

In the encompassing generality (→al-‘āmm), such as “respect every scholar,” the judgment covers every single instance in such a way that every instance is singly an object of the judgment and every judgment of every instance has its own specific obedience or disobedience. Thus, in this kind there will be as many obedience and disobedience as number of objects of the judgment.

•al-‘Umūm al-Madjmū‘ī (Total Generality)

In the total generality (→al-āmm), such as “believe in the holy Imāms,” the judgment is for the total as such and the totalis treated as one object. Hence, the obedience in the examplewill not be actualized unless one believes in the all twelve Imāms and not even in the eleven. Thus, in thiskind there would only be a single obedience, i.e., obedience of the total, and disobedience even in one instance will be considered an absolute disobedience.

•al-Uşūl al-‘Amaliyya (Practical Principles)

Doubtless every follower of the religion knows, in summary fashion, that there are some divine obligatory precepts, whether compulsory or unlawful, that all duty-bounds, whether knowledgeable or ignorant, must observe. Such knowledge in summary fashion makes actual, obligatory duties incontrovertible; and since the intellect necessitates clarification of one’s obligation it becomes obligatory for duty-bounds to struggle for seeking knowledge of such duties through a reliable waywhose following should make them certain of clearance from liability. That is why we believe in the obligation ofknowledge-seeking in the one hand and of the quest for proofs of such duties on the other.

However, knowledge-seeking does not lead to precept finding in all probable cases; that is why the duty-bound may sometimes doubt what his duty is and wonder what to do. The divine lawgiver hastaken such cases into consideration and made some practical duties for him in order to refer to them when necessary and act in accordance with them to become certain that he will not be punished in the hereafter because of negligence in performing his duties. Such principles, whichare authorized merely for rescuing from perplexity without any consideration of the actuality, are called al-uşūl (sing.Aşl) al-‘amaliyya.

Uşūlīs have realized that such duties, which are general and not peculiar to certain parts of jurisprudence, are of four kinds: the principle of clearance from liability (aşāla al-barā’a), the principle of precaution or liability (aşāla al-iĥtiyāţ or ishtighāl), the principle of option (aşāla al-takhyīr), and the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb) [qq.v.].

Generally speaking, two points should be borne in mind as to the practical principles:

1. By doubtis meant both real doubt, i.e., a case wherein both sides are equal, and the invalid conjecture; for the latter is treated as the former. In fact, the latter is really a kind of the former, for perplexity of the duty-bound will not be removed by following it and he remains doubtfulwhether or not he has cleared his obligation.

2. To refer to practical principles is allowed only when the jurist has quested for the authorized conjectural proof of theprecept which is the matter of dubiety and despaired of finding it.Thus, there would be no room for exercising practical proofs where the quest is possible and existence of an authorized conjectural proof is probable. The quest and despair in this connection is a matter of must for jurists, for knowing and learning precepts are obligatory. That is why the jurist would not be excused should he oppose an actual duty by exercising a practical principle, especially that of clearance.

• Uşūl al-Fiqh

The science in which such rules whose resultsare placed in ways of deduction of juristic precepts are discussed is uşūl al-fiqh. For instance, performing the prayers (şalāt) is mandatory in Islam, and this Qur’ānic verse proves that obligation: “And that perform the prayers” (6: 72). However, denotation of the verse is dependent upon the imperative, like “perform” in that verse, being apparent in the obligation on the onehand and Qur’ānic apparent meanings being authoritative on the other. Those two issuesare dealt with in the science of uşūl al-fiqh. Now, when the jurist learns through this science that the imperative is apparent in the obligation and that the Qur’ānic apparent meanings are authoritative proofs, he can infer from the said verse that theprayers is mandatory.

In the same way, deduction of every juristic precept inferred from any juristic or intellectual proof must be dependent upon one or more issues of this science.

It should be noted, however, that the science of uşūl al-fiqh is developed by Shiite scholars in two recent centuries into an unparalleled intellectual, logical system of thought and a comprehensive branch of knowledge which not only serves as the logic of jurisprudence but as an independent science dealing with some hermeneutical problems.

•al-Uşūl al-Lafżiyya (Literal Principles)

When a doubt occurs concerning aterm it can be of two kinds: a doubt concerning convention whether that term is specified for a certain meaning, and a doubt concerning intention of a speaker whether he has meant the literal or figurative meaning. Al-Tabādur and ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb [qq.v.] are two signs of recognition of the literal meaning. However, that is not enough for the removal of the second doubt, for those signs cannot determine speaker's intention. What can we do, then? Uşūlīs have presented some principles in this connection, called “literal principles,” their most important ones being aşāla al-ĥaqīqa, aşāla al-‘umūm, aşāla al-iţlāq, aşāla al-żuhūr [qq.v.].

As for the authority of such principles, they are all based on “the conduct of the wise (binā’ al-‘uqalā’ [q.v.])” according to which the wise practically consider the apparent, general, absolute, etc. meaning of terms in their communications and ignore other inconsiderable probable meanings - as they ignore the probability of heedlessness, fault, jest, ambiguousness, and the like - and since the divine lawgiver has not prohibited us from that conduct and has not declared another specific way in His communications, we lawfully conclude that He has indorsed and confirmed that conduct having treated apparent meanings as authoritative - as the wise do.

W

•al-Wađ ‘ (Convention)

A smoke essentially denotes a fire; but the case is not the same with denotation of words - whatever the language may be - for in that case all people throughout the world should have been speaking the same language. Thus, denotation of words is just through convention. Convention of a word, therefore, means to make that word for a meaning and to designate it to that meaning. That conventioncan be made in two ways: convention by determination (→al-waal-taayyun), and convention by specification (→al-wa al-tayn).

•al-Wađ ‘ ‘Āmm wa’l Mawđū‘ lah ‘Āmm (Convention General and Object of Convention General)

In this variety, the conceived meaning is general and the object of convention is the very general, i.e., the object of convention is a general meaning conceived by itself and not by a general facet.

There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that this variety is possible, and has occurred as well, its example being common nouns such as water, heaven, star, and the like. See also: al-wađ‘ wa’l mawđū‘ lah.

•al-Wađ ‘ ‘Āmm wa’l Mawđū‘ lah Khāşş (Convention General and Object of Convention Particular)

In this variety, the conceived meaning is general and the object of convention is an instance of that general and not itself, i.e., the object of convention is a particular meaning conceived not by itself but by its general facet. There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that this variety is possible, but they dispute whether it has occurred - though according to the justifiable opinion it has definitely occurred, and its example are prepositions, demonstrative pronouns, pronouns, and the like. See also: al-wađ‘ wa’l mawđū‘ lah.

•al-Wađ Khāşş wa’l Mawđū‘ lah ‘Āmm (Convention Particular and Object of Convention General)

In this variety, the conceived meaning is particular and the object of convention is a general facet of that particular, i.e., the object of convention is a general meaning conceived not by itself but by its particular facet. Uşūlīs have disputed over possibility of this variety, and the justifiable opinion is that it is impossible. For the particular cannot be a facet of the general; rather, it is the general that is a facet and aspect of the particular. See also: al-wađ‘ wa’l mawđū‘ lah.

•al-Wađ ‘ Khāşş wa’l Mawđū‘ lah Khāşş (Convention Particular and Object of Convention Particular)

In this variety, the conceived meaning is particular and the object of convention is the very particular, i.e., the object of convention is a particular meaning conceived by itself and not by its general facet.There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that this variety is possible, and has occurred as well, its example being proper nouns. See also: al-wađ‘ wa’l mawđū‘ lah.

•al-Wađ ‘ al-Ta‘ayyunī (Convention by Determination)

Words sometimes denote their meanings by being specified to the latter through repetition in theusage which makes minds familiar with it in such a way that as soon as one hears the word one refers to the meaning. This kind of conventionis called “convention by determination. Seealso: al-wađ‘.

•al-Wađ ‘ al-Ta‘yīnī (Convention by Specification)

Words normally denote their meanings by making (al-dja‘l) and specification. This kind of conventionis called “convention by specification. Seealso: al-wađ‘.

•al-Wađ ‘ wa’l Mawđū‘ lah (Convention and Object of Convention)

In the convention, the term and the meaning must necessarily be conceived; for convention is a judgment on the meaning and the term, and making judgment about something is not acceptable unless it is conceived and known - even though in an undifferentiated mode, for any given thing can be conceived either by itself (bi-nafsih), or by its general facet (bi-wadjhih).For instance, when you see a white object from a distance you can judge that it is white while you do not know what exactly it is; this judgment is acceptable because you have somehow conceived it - as a thing, an animal, or the like - and that is not like an absolutely unknown object which in no way can be judged.

Now, since the meaning must be conceived on the one side, its conception is of two kinds on the second, and it is particular or general on the third, the convention can be divided into four varieties of al-wađ‘ khāşş wa’l mawđū‘ lah khāşş, al-wađ‘ ‘āmm wa’l mawđū‘ lah ‘āmm, al-wađ‘ ‘āmm wa’l mawđū‘ lah khāşş, al-wađ khāşş wa’l mawđū‘ lah ‘āmm [qq.v.].

•al-Wādjib al-‘Aynī (Individual Mandatory Act)

The “individual mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-kifā’ī [q.v.]) is the one which is obligatory for every duty-bound and cannot be substituted by obedience on the part of others, such as the prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and so forth.

•al-Wādjib al-Kifā’ī (Collective Mandatory Act)

The “collective mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-‘aynī [q.v.]) is the one in which what is desired is merely actualization of the act, no matter who has done it, such as burying a dead person, purifying the mosque, and the like. Hence, that affair is obligatory for all, but shouldit be done by some it is considered done and others will be exempted. However, if itis eschewed by all and left undone all will be punished, but in the case of being done by some only those who have participated will be rewarded.

•al-Wādjib al-Mashrūţ (Conditional Mandatory Act)

When a mandatory act is compared with something external, if its obligation is dependent upon that thing and that thing is considered in the obligation of the mandatory act as a condition, such as pilgrimage to Mecca (al-ĥadjdj) with regard to financial capability (al-istiţā‘a), it is called “conditional mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-muţlaq [q.v.]), since its obligation is conditional upon actualization of that external thing; and that is why the pilgrimage will not become mandatory unless financial capability is actualized.

Itshould be noted that all mandatory acts are conditional with regard to general conditions of burden, i.e., puberty, power, and intellect. Hence, the minor, impotent, and insane have no burden in the actuality. Itshould also be known that the absolute and conditional are relative, since one mandatory act is absolute with regard to one thing and conditional with regard to another - as the pilgrimage is absolute with regard to travelling to Mecca while it is conditional with regard to financial capability.

•al-Wādjib al-Mu‘allaq (Suspended Mandatory Act)

Doubtless when condition of the conditional mandatory act is realized its obligation becomes actual, like the absolute mandatory act, and the burden is actually directed to the duty-bound. Now, if actuality of the obligation is prior to that of the mandatory act and therefore the time of mandatory act is later than that of obligation, it is called “suspended” (opp. al-wādjib al-munadjdjaz [q.v.]), since the act and not its obligation is suspended until a time not realized yet. An example of this is the pilgrimage, since when the financial capabilityis actualized the obligation of the pilgrimage becomes actual - as it is said - while the mandatory act is suspended until coming of the time of the ritual. Here, when the financial capabilityis actualized the pilgrimage becomes mandatory, and that is why it is mandatory for the duty-bound to provide all preliminaries to become able to perform it in its specific, limited time.

It should be noted, however, that there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether al-wādjib al-mu‘allaq is possible. Some believe in its possibility, while the majority of Uşūlīs hold that it is impossible.

•al-Wādjib al-Muđayyaq (Constricted Mandatory Act)

Considering the time, the mandatory actis divided into of specified time (al-muwaqqat) and of unspecified time (ghayr al-muwaqqat). The one of specified time, in turn, is divided into extended and constricted; and the one of unspecified time into urgent (fawrī) and non-urgent (ghayr fawrī).

The mandatory act of specified time is the one in which a specific time is considered juristically, such as the prayers, the pilgrimage, fasting, and the like. If we consider the relation between this kind and its specified time, where both of those times are equal the mandatory act is called “constricted” (opp. al-wādjib al-muwassa‘ [ q.v.]), such as fasting whose specified time precisely covers its time of performance.

•al-Wādjib al-Munadjdjaz (Definite Mandatory Act)

Doubtless when condition of the conditional mandatory act is realized its obligation becomes actual, like the absolute mandatory act, and the burden is actually directed to the duty-bound.Now, if actuality of the obligation and the mandatory act is simultaneous, in the sense that the time of mandatory act is the very time of the obligation, the mandatory act is called “definite” (opp. al-wādjib al-mu‘allaq [q.v.]); such as the prayers when its time comes, since its obligation is actual and the mandatory act, i.e., the prayers, is also actual.

•al-Wādjib al-Muţlaq (Absolute Mandatory Act)

When a mandatory act is compared with something external, if its obligation is not dependent upon actualization of that thing, such as the pilgrimage with regard to travelling to Mecca - even though its actualization is dependent upon the latter - it is called “absolute mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-mashrūţ [q.v.]), since its obligation is unconditional upon that external thing.

Itshould be known that the absolute and conditional are relative, since one mandatory act is absolute with regard to one thing and conditional with regard to another - as the pilgrimage is absolute with regard to travelling to Mecca while it is conditional with regard to financial capability.

•al-Wādjib al-Muwassa‘ (Extended Mandatory Act)

Considering the time, the mandatory actis divided into of specified time (al-muwaqqat) and of unspecified time (ghayr al-muwaqqat). The one of specified time, in turn, is divided into extended and constricted; and the one of unspecified time into urgent (fawrī) and non-urgent (ghayr fawrī).

The mandatory act of specified time is the one in which a specific time is considered juristically, such as the prayers, the pilgrimage, fasting, and the like.If we consider the relation between this kind and its specified time, where its performing takes less time than its specified time the mandatory act is called “extended” (opp. al-wādjib al-muđayyaq [q.v.]), since the duty-bound is free to perform it in the first, middle, or the last part of the time; such as daily prayers which cannot be left undone in the whole time but must be done once in its specified time.

•al-Wādjib al-Ta‘abbudī (Religiously Mandatory Act)

In the Islamic holy Sharī‘a, there are obligations that are not considered sound and their commands are not obeyed unless they are performed with the intention of proximity to God, such as the prayers, fasting, and the like. Such mandatory actsare called “religiously” (opp. al-wādjib al- tawaşşulī [q.v.]).

•al-Wādjib al-Ta‘yīnī (Determinate Mandatory Act)

The “determinate mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-takhyīrī [q.v.]) is the one which is determinately wished and has no horizontal parallel in the position of obedience, such as prayers and fasting in Ramađān. To Add “horizontal” is necessary because there are some determinate mandatory acts that have some vertical parallels, such as ablution which has the vertical parallel, i.e., dry ablution (al-tayammum), since the latter is lawful only when the former is not possible.

•al-Wādjib al-Takhyīrī (Optional Mandatory Act)

The “optional mandatory act” (opp. al-wādjib al-ta‘yīnī [q.v.]) is the one which is not determinately wished and has a horizontal parallel. In other words, what is wished is whether this one or another, in such a way that the duty-bound is free to choose each of them. An example of this kind is the penance when one does not observe fasting in Ramađān deliberately, sine he must either fast sixty days, or feed sixty needy people, or free a slave.

•al-Wādjib al-Tawaşşulī (Instrumental Mandatory Act)

In the Islamic holy Sharī‘a, there are some obligations whose commands are obeyed merely by being performed without having any divine intention, such as saving a drowning person, burying a dead person, purifying cloths and body for prayers, and the like. Such mandatory acts are called “instrumental” (opp. al-wādjib al-ta‘abbudī [q.v.]).

•al-Wurūd (Entry)

Entry is used for a case where something is not included in something else - in a real manner, but through depiction of the divine lawgiver and not existentially - like the relation between authoritative conjectural proof (→ al-amāra) and such intellectual practical principles as clearance and option. The object of intellectual principle of clearance (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is “lack of depiction,” while the proof which makes the conjectural proof authoritative treats it as depiction - through declaration of the divine lawgiver - and thereby the object of intellectual principle of clearance is removed by such divine declaration.Also , the object of practical principle of option (→ aşāla al-takhyīr) is perplexity, while the authoritative conjectural proof, because of the proof which has made it authoritative, makes one part preferable and thereby removes perplexity. See also: al-taru

Z

•al-Żāhir (Apparent)

When a term is used in a meaning not in such an explicit way that no other meaning is probable - assome other meaning is probable, but that probability is not considerable since the wise ignore it - it is called żāhir (apparent). See also: naşş.

•al-Żann al-Khāşş (Particular Conjecture)

Byal-żann al-khāşş is meant the conjecture whose authority and validity is proved by a definitive, certain proof and not “the major closure proof (dalīl al-insidād al-kabīr).” It, therefore, means amāra [q.v.]which is an absolutely authoritative proof even when the door of knowledge is open. Itis also called the knowledge-rooted (‘ilmī) path, since its authority is proved via knowledge and certainty.

•al-Żann al-Mu‘tabar → al-Amāra

•al-Żann al-Muţlaq (Absolute Conjecture)

By al-żann al-muţlaq is meant every conjecture whose authority and validity is proved by “the major closure proof (→dalīl al-insidād).” It, therefore, means amāra which is an authoritative proof only when the door of knowledge and knowledge-rooted (‘ilmī → al-żann al-khāşş) is closed, i.e., closure of the door to both the very knowledge of precepts and knowledge-rooted paths leading to them.

•al-Żann al-Naw‘ī → al-Amāra

Table of Technical Terms

1. English-Arabic

A

1- Abolishment: al- Naskh

2- Absolute Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Muţlaq

3- Absolute: al-Muţlāq

4- Absoluteness of the Position: Iţlāq al-Maqām / al-Iţlāq al-Maqāmī

5- Absoluteness: al-Iţlāq

6- Accordant: al-Muwāfiq

7- Acknowledgment: al-Taqrīr

8- Act of Worship: al-‘Ibādī

9- Actual Precept: al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī

10- Ambiguous: al-Mudjmal

11- Analogy (Juristic): al-Qiyās

12- Apparent Precept: al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī

13- Apparent: al-Żāhir

14- Appearance: al- Żuhūr

15- Authoritative Proof: al-Ĥudjdja

16- Authority: al-Ĥudjdjiyya

17- Authorized Conjectural Proof: al-Amāra

B

18- Book: al-Kitāb

C

19- Cause: al-Sabab (pl. al-Asbāb)

20- Celebrity: al-Shuhra

21- Certainty: al-Yaqīn

22- Certitude: al-Qaţ‘

23- Clear: al-Mubayyan

24- Clearance: al-Barā’a

25- Closure Proof: Dalīl al-Insidād

26- Collective Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Kifā’ī

27- Command: al-Amr (pl. al-Awāmir)

28- Condition: al-Sharţ

29- Conditional Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Mashrūţ

30- Conduct of the Wise: Binā’ al-‘Uqalā’

31- Conjecture: al-Żann

32- Conjunction: al-Idjtimā‘

33- Consensus: al-Idjmā‘

34- Constricted Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Muđayyaq

35- Contextual Denotation: al-Dalāla al-Siyāqiyya

36- Continence: Kaff al-Nafs

37- Continuity of the Previous State: al-Istişĥāb

38- Continuous: al-Istimrārī

39- Contradiction: al-Ta‘āruđ

40- Convention by Determination: al-Wađ‘ al-Ta‘ayyunī

41- Convention by Specification: al-Wađ‘ al-Ta‘yīnī

42- Convention: al-Wađ‘

43- Correctness: al-Şiĥĥat

44- Custom: al-Sīra

45- Customary: al-‘Urfī

D

46- Definite Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Munadjdjaz

47- Definite Obedience: al-Muwāfaqa al-Qaţ‘iyya

48- Definite Opposition: al-Mukhālafa al-Qaţ‘iyya

49- Denotation: al-Dalāla

50- Denotation of Hint: Dalāla al-Tanbīh

51- Denotation of Implicit Conveyance: Dalāla al-Ishāra

52- Denotation of Necessitation: Dalāla al-Iqtiđā’

53- Dependent Intellectual Proofs: Ghayr al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya

54- Depiction: al-Bayān

55- Derived: al-Mushtaqq

56- Designation: al-Laqab

57- Detailed: al-Tafşīlī

58- Determinate Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Ta‘yīnī

59- Disaccording: al-Mukhālif

60- Divesting: al-Salb

61- Dubiety: al- Shubha

62- Dubiety as to Obligation: al-Shubha al-Wudjūbiyya

63- Dubiety as to Unlawfulness: al-Shubha al-Taĥrīmiyya

64- Dubiety concerning the Concept: al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

65- Dubiety concerning the Instance: al-Shubha al-Mişdāqiyya

66- Dubiety concerning the Object: al-Shubha al-Mawđū‘iyya

67- Dubiety concerning the Precept: al-Shubha al-Ĥukmiyya

68- Duty-bound: al-Mukallaf

E

69- Encompassing: al-Istighrāqī

70- Entry: al-Wurūd

71- Equilibrium: al-Ta‘ādul

72- Extended Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Muwassa‘

G

73- Gathering: al-Djam‘

74- General: al-‘Āmm

75- Generality: al-‘Umūm

I

76- Implication: al-Mulāzama

77- Implicature: al-Mafhūm (pl. al-Mafāhīm)

78- Inclusive: al-Shumūlī

79- Incorrectness: ‘Adam Şiĥĥat

80- Independent Intellectual Proofs: al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya

81- Independing: al-Istiqlālī

82- Individual Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-‘Aynī

83- Instrumental Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Tawaşşulī

84- Intellect: al-‘Aql

85- Intellectual Implications: al-Mulāzamāt al-‘Aqliyya

86- Intellectual: al-‘Aqlī / al- ‘Aqliyya

87- Interference: al-Tazāĥum

88- Intervention: al-Tadākhul

J

89- Joint: al-Muttaşil

90- Juristic-Literal Meaning: al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya

K

91- Knowledge: al-‘Ilm

L

92- Large-Scale: Ghair al-Maĥşūra

93- Least: al-Aqall

94- Liability: al-Ishtighāl

95- Literal: al-Lafżī

M

96- Massive Report: al-Khabar al-Mutawātir

97- Most: al-Akthar

98- Muslims' Literal Meaning: al-Ĥaqīqa al-Mutasharri‘iyya

N

99- Non-Inclusion: al-Takhaşşuş

100- Number: al-‘Adad

O

101- Object of Convention: al-Mawđū‘ lah

102- Once: al-Marra

103- Opposite: al-Đidd

104- Option: al-Takhyīr

105- Optional Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Takhyīrī

106- Optional: al-Takhyīrī

P

107- Particular: al-Khāşş

108- Path: al-Ţarīq

109- People of the Religion: al-Mutasharri‘a

110- Permanence: al-Dawām

111- Practical: al-‘Amalī

112- Precaution: al-Iĥtiyāţ

113- Preceding: al-Tabādur

114- Precept: al-Ĥukm

115- Preferrer: al-Muradjdjiĥ (pl. al-Muradjdjiĥāt)

116- Preliminary: al-Muqaddima

117- Premises of Wisdom: Muqaddimāt al-Ĥikma

118- Primary: al-Badwī

119- Principality: al-Aşāla

120- Principle: al-Aşl (pl. al-Uşūl)

121- Problem: al-Mas’ala

122- Prohibition: al-Nahy (pl. al-Nawāhī)

123- Promptitude: al-Fawr

124- Proof: al-Dalīl

125- Punishment: al- ‘Iqāb

Q

126- Qualified: al-Muqayyad

127- Qualifier: al-Waşf

R

128- Reduction: al- Inĥilāl

129- Relational: al-Irtibāţī

130- Religiously Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Ta‘abbudī

131- Removal: al-Raf‘

132- Repetition: al-Takrār

133- Replacement: al-Idjzā’

134- Reprehensibility: al-Qubĥ

135- Restriction: al-Takhşīş

136- Restrictor: al-Mukhaşşis

137- Rule: al-Qā‘ida

S

138- Separate: al-Munfaşil

139- Single Report: Khabar al-Wāĥid

140- Small-Scale: al- Maĥşūra

141- Sound: al-Şaĥīĥ

142- Sovereignty: al-Ĥukūma

143- Substitutional: al-Badalī

144- Summary-fashioned: al-Idjmālī

145- Suspended Mandatory Act: al-Wādjib al-Mu‘allaq

T

146- Term: al-Lafż (pl. al-Alfāż)

147- Termination: al-Ghāya

148- The Caused: al-Musabbabāt

U

149- Universal: al- Kullī

150- Uttered: al- Manţūq

W

151- Way out: al-Mandūĥa