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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL (AL-‘ĀMM) AND PARTICULAR (AL-KHĀŞŞ)

General and particular are among clear, self evident concepts which need no definition but lexical explanation for the sake of bringing the meaning closer to the mind. By general is meant a term whose concept covers whatsoever capable of being conformable to its designation in realization of the judgment.

A judgment, too, is sometimes called general due to its covering all instances of the object, the object of burden, or duty-bound. On the contrary, by particular is meant a term, or a judgment, which covers only some instances of its object, object of burden, or duty-bound.

In the discussion of general and particular, there are two frequently used expressions whose definition seems necessary: al-takhşīş (restriction), and altakhaşşuş (non-inclusion). The former means to expel some instances from being covered by the judgment, and the latter means not being included from the very beginning in the object. In order to clarify that, let us take an example. Suppose that John is a teacher in the school while Joshua is not. Now, the principal orders his deputy to pay salaries of all teachers except John’s. Should there not be such exclusion in the principal’s order, John should be paid too, since he was a teacher; but the case is not the same with Joshua, since he is not a teacher at all. In the first case it is exclusion, while in the second it is non-inclusion; and that is the difference between takhşīş and takhaşşuş.

Varieties of Generality

With regard to direction of a judgment to a general, generality is divided into three kinds:

1. The encompassing generality (al-‘umūm al-istighrāqī), such as “respect every scholar.” In this kind, the judgment covers every single instance in such a way that every instance is singly an object of the judgment and every judgment of every instance has its own specific obedience or disobedience.

2. The total generality (al-‘umūm al-madjmū‘ī), such as “believe in the holy Imāms.” In this kind, the judgment is for the total as such and the total is treated as one object. Hence, the obedience in the example will not be actualized unless one believes in the all twelve Imāms and not even in the eleven. Thus, in this kind there would only be a single obedience, i.e., obedience of the total, and disobedience even in one instance will be considered an absolute disobedience.

3. The substitutional generality (al-‘umūm al-badalī), such as “respect any scholar you wish.” In this kind, the judgment is directed to one instance in a substitutional way. Hence, only one instance, in a substitutional way, is the object of the judgment and should one instance be obeyed the burden would absolutely be treated as being obeyed.

Should it strike you that this third kind cannot be treated as generality, since to be substitutional, in which the object is not but one, contradicts generality, we would remind you that the meaning of generality in this kind is generality in the substitution, i.e., capability of every instance to be an object. Of course, should the generality in this kind be understood because of absoluteness, it would be included in the absolute and not the general.

Generally speaking, generality of the object of the judgment with regard to its states and instances, if it is an object of a mandatory or a recommended command, is mostly of the kind of substitutional generality.

Terms of Generality

Doubtless there are some terms specifically used for generality either by convention, or by absoluteness through Premises of Wisdom (Muqaddimāt alĤikma,) something to be explained in detail in the sixth chapter). Such terms are either single words like “every,” “all,” “any,” “ever,” and so forth, or lexical dispositions like occurrence of an indefinite noun in a negative or prohibitive context. There are some discussions in this connection with regard to some terms in the Arabic language, as the language of Kitāb (the holy Qur’ān) and Sunna, but as they make no sense in the English language we refer readers to Arabic texts on uşūl al-fiqh for further, detailed studies.

The Joint Restrictor (al-Mukhaşşiş al-Muttaşil) and the Separate Restrictor (al-Mukhaşşiş al-Munfaşil)

Qualification of a general can be made in two ways:

1. The restrictor is depicted in the same single utterance delivered by the speaker, such as “perform your prayers completely except when travelling.”

This restrictor is called joint and denotes that by general is meant other than the particular. The case is the same with the circumstantial evidence denoting peculiarity in such a way that the speaker can count on it in depicting his will.

2. The restrictor is not uttered in the same speech, but rather in an independent utterance before or after that. This restrictor is called separate and like the first denotes that by general is meant other than the particular.

These two types have no differences with regard to being evidence for the real intent of the speaker. The difference appears with regard to formation of the appearance in generality; as in the joint restrictor the appearance is not formed but in peculiarity while in the separate restrictor the appearance is initially formed in generality but since the appearance of the particular is stronger it is given precedence over the general - and this is due to the principle of giving the more apparent (al-ażhar) or the explicit-definite (al-naşş) precedence over the apparent.

The reason is that no appearance for any kind of speech, general or otherwise, would be formed unless when that speech is customarily ended and terminated in such a way that there would customarily remain no room for addition of any supplement as an evidence of changing the speech's primary, initial appearance.

Hence, the appearance of the speech is suspended while the speech is customarily not terminated. Should the speech be ended without addition of any contrary evidence, its primary appearance would become established and the appearance of the speech would be formed upon that. However, should contrary evidence be added the primary appearance of the speech would change into another, on the basis of denotation of the evidence, and the appearance of speech would be formed upon that evidence. That is why if the evidence is ambiguous or there exists something that can probably be evidence the primary appearance is not formed; and since there is no other appearance the speech as a whole becomes ambiguous.

Now, since the restrictor is contrary evidence: if it is separate, it will not harm the primary appearance of the speech, as the appearance had been formed before it intervened; and if it is joint, it will change the primary appearance of the general and will form its appearance in accordance with the joint restrictor.

However, where a separate restrictor occurs, it intervenes in the appearance of the general, and as it is evidence revealing the real intent of the speaker it should be given precedence over the general.

Usage of the General in the Restricted (al-Mukhaşşaş)

As was said, both kinds of restrictors reveal that by the general is meant other than the particular; hence, what is meant by the general is some of the objects covered by its appearance. However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether such usage is literal or figurative. Opinions in this connection are various the most notable of which being as follows: (1) it is absolutely figurative, (2) it is absolutely literal, and (3) the case differs with regard to the joint and separate restrictors.

Investigate of the reason presented by those who believe in the first reveals the truth and proves that the justifiable opinion is the second, i.e., such usage is absolutely literal. Holders of the first opinion argue that since the particle of generality is conventionally made to denote extensiveness of its posterior term as well as its inclusiveness with regard to all of its instances, it would have been used in other than what it is specified for had by that be meant some and not all instances - and this is a figurative usage.

This is an illusion, however, and would be removed by simple deliberation.

Since the explanation will be somehow different with regard to the joint and the separate restrictors, we will deal with them separately:

1. In the restriction by a joint restrictor, such as “perform all your prayers completely except when travelling,” the particle of generality, i.e., all, is not used but in its meaning, i.e., inclusion of all instances of its posterior term.

However, the meaning of restriction is that the term next to does not cover whatsoever the term prayers holds true for, but rather the home-performed prayers in particular. As for the term “all,” it still has its signification of generality and inclusion; for it denotes inclusion of every home-performed prayers. That is why changing it with “some” and saying “Perform some of your prayers completely except when travelling” is not correct and makes no sense. It also makes no sense if one says, “Perform completely some of the home-performed prayers,” since it does not denote limitation of the object as in the case where both “all” and “exception” exist.

2. The case would be the same with the restriction by a separate restrictor, for the meaning of restriction by a separate restrictor is to make the particular a separate evidence for allocation of the term next to “all” to other than the particular. Thus, neither in the particle of the generality nor in its posterior term has a change been made; in the process of restriction, the particular reveals what the speaker has really meant by the general.

Authority or Otherwise of the Restricted General in the Remaining (al-Bāqī)

In case where it is doubted whether some remaining instances of a restricted general are included in that general or not, it is disputed whether or not the general is an authoritative proof in that portion so that one can or cannot appeal to the appearance of the generality in order to include it in the judgment of the general. For instance, if the Lord says, “Every water is pure,” and then excepts from that general, whether by a joint or a separate proof, the water polluted by a juristically impure object, and at the same time it is probable that the scant water (al-mā’ al-qalīl) touched by a juristically impure object without being polluted is excepted. Now, should we hold that the restricted general is an authoritative proof in the remaining, we would reject that probability by the appearance of the generality of the general in the whole remaining, judging thereby that the touched, unpolluted water is juristically pure. However, if we believe in the contrary view, that probability remains suspended without there being any proof from the very general as to it. Hence, we should look for another proof to prove its juristic purity or impurity.

Opinions in this connection are multiple some of which differentiating between the joint and the separate restrictors. To find the justifiable opinion, however, is not that difficult; for this problem is secondary to the previous one, and since we held there that the restricted general is literally, and not figuratively, applied to the remaining, we should hold here that it is absolutely an authoritative proof, no matter of what kind the restrictor is. The reason is that, as we said, the particle of the generality still holds its meaning of encompassing all instances of its posterior term. Now, when some of its instances are excepted by restriction, no matter of which kind the restrictor is, its indication of the generality still remains established and it is only the scope of its posterior term that has become limited by the restriction. Thus, there is no difference between the restricted and the unrestricted general in being apparent in encompassing whatsoever may possibly be included in them.

As for those who believe that the restricted general is figuratively applied to the remaining, they encounter a problem concerning the appearance of the general and its authority in the whole remaining. For it is assumed that usage of the general in the whole remaining is one figurative application and its usage in some of the remaining is another; hence, it is disputed whether the first figurative application is closer to the literalness making the general become apparent in it or both of applications are equal in this connection and the general has no appearance in neither of them. If the first, the general is an authoritative proof in the whole remaining, and if the second, it is not an authoritative proof. Thus, it is not true that those who believe in the figurative application believe absolutely in non-authority of the restricted general.

Penetration or Otherwise of Ambiguity of the Restrictor to the General

The previous discussion was based on the presumption that the particular was clear without having any ambiguity. The matter doubted there was whether something, other than the particular, which was clearly known that it was not included in the particular, is restricted or not. The present discussion, however, deals with the authority of the general in the case of ambiguity of the particular.

First of all, we should bear in mind that the ambiguity in question is of two types:

1. The dubiety concerning the concept (al-shubha al-mafhūmiyya). Here, the doubt is about the concept of the particular per se, i.e., the particular is ambiguous; such as this ĥadīth: “Every water is juristically pure except what its taste, color, or smell is polluted [by a juristically impure object],”

in which it is doubted whether by pollution is meant the sheer sensory pollution or it includes the assumed pollution as well. Or this order, for instance, by the commander: “Trust soldiers of the squadron except John,”

in which it is doubted whether John refers to John Smith or John Cooper.

2. The dubiety concerning the instance (al-shubha al-mişdāqiyya). Here, the doubt is about the inclusion of an instance of the general in the particular while the concept of the particular is clear without any ambiguity. For instance, we doubt whether specific water has been polluted by something juristically impure and has been included in the precept of the particular or not and still holds its purity.

Another thing to be mentioned before dealing with the problem in detail is the meaning of penetration of ambiguity of the restrictor into the general.

Whenever it is said that the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general it means that one cannot refer to the principality of generality in order to include the doubtful instance in the precept of the general.

1. The Dubiety concerning the Concept

The dubiety in this type is sometimes over the least (al-aqall) and the most (alakthar), like the first example in which it was doubted whether the sheer sensory pollution is excepted or the restriction includes the assumed change as well (the least being the sensory pollution, and the most being what incorporates the assumed as well), and sometimes over two divergent things (al-mutabāyinayn), such as the second example in which the restriction is doubted whether it addresses John Smith or John Cooper. On the other hand, the restrictor can be joint or separate - something influential in the case in question. For the sake of comprehensiveness, therefore, we will discuss the problem in the following separate states:

1 & 2. Where the restrictor is joint, whether the dubiety is over the least and the most or over two divergent things. Here, the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general. For, as was said earlier, the joint restrictor is of kind of joint evidence of the speech; hence, no appearance takes form for the general except in other than the particular. Therefore, should the particular be ambiguous, its ambiguity would penetrate into the general; since other than the particular is unknown, and it is clear that no appearance will take form for the general in something whose exclusion of the designation of the particular is not known.

3. Where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over two divergent things. In this state, too, the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general. For it is known in summary fashion that the restriction has actually occurred, though between two things in a doubtful manner, and this will cause non-authority of the general in either of them.

The difference between this and the previous state is that in the latter the very appearance of the speech in the generality is eliminated while in the former the authority of appearance is eliminated - though the primary appearance is still remaining - and one cannot refer to the principality of generality in either of the two doubtful things.

4. Where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over the least and the most. Contrary to all previous states, the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general in this state. For in a general restricted by a separate restrictor, the appearance takes form in the generality, as was said earlier in the second chapter, and the particular is given precedence over the general only because it is stronger. Thus, should the restrictor be ambiguous with regard to the additional to the definite amount, it would not be an authoritative proof in that additional; for it is assumed that the restrictor is ambiguous having no appearance in that additional and is an authoritative proof exclusively in the definite amount, which is the least. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the general whose appearance in encompassing all of its instances, among which being the definite amount of the particular as well as the additional to the definite amount whose inclusion in the particular is doubtful, has been established. Now, should the definite amount be excluded by an authoritative proof stronger than the general, the additional to the definite amount would remain included without interference of anything with the appearance as well as authority of the general in it.

2. The Dubiety concerning the Instance

Although it is sometimes said that the prominent opinion among the earliest jurists has been that the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general in the dubiety concerning the instance and one can refer to the principality of generality in order to include the doubtful instance in the precept of the general, the justifiable opinion is contrary to that with regard to both joint and separate restrictors. The reason is that since the particular is a stronger authoritative proof than the general, it causes allocation of the precept of the general to its remaining instances and removes the authority of the general from some of its objects of denotation. In the case in question, it is doubted whether the doubtful instance is included in or excluded from what the general is an authoritative proof in, while the general does not denote its inclusion in what it is an authoritative proof in. Therefore, the general is not an authoritative proof in the doubtful instance without encountering any interference - as argued by those who believe in the contrary opinion.

In other words, there are two known, authoritative affairs here: the general which is an authoritative proof in other than the particular, and the restrictor which is an authoritative proof in its object of denotation; the doubtful instance is doubted whether it is included in this authoritative affair or that one.

What we said clarifies the difference between “the dubiety concerning the instance,” and “the dubiety concerning the concept where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over the least and the most” in which the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general. For in the latter the particular is not an authoritative proof except in the least, and it is not the doubtful additional which is doubted to be included in what the particular is clearly an authoritative proof in; rather, it is the particular which is doubted whether it is made an authoritative proof as to the doubtful additional or not - and, as will be proved in the third part, something whose authority in something else is doubtful is definitely not an authoritative proof in that thing.

The general, however, is authoritative proof except in what the particular is authoritative proof in. Thus, the most is not doubted whether to be included in this or that authoritative proof, as was the case with the doubtful instance; on the contrary, it is known that the particular is not an authoritative proof in the most - because of the doubt - and therefore the particular does not interfere with the authority of the general in it.

Unlawfulness of Implication of the General before the Quest for the Restrictor

Doubtless a good number of general precepts in the Qur’ān and Sunna are restricted by separate restrictors which describe what is meant by them, and this is so clearly known from the conduct of the holy Prophet and holy Imāms that a sentence has constantly been prevalent: “there is no general except it is restricted.” This fact necessitates that the jurist should not hasten to implicate the general before a thorough quest for the restrictor, since that general may be among those which are restricted by a separate restrictor existing in the Book or Sunna not known by the one who received the general. The reason is simple: when we know that the Divine Lawgiver’s conduct is to count on separate evidence in expounding His objectives, there will remain no confidence in the appearance of the general in its generality - as it is a primary appearance. That is why the Divine Lawgiver (al-Shāri‘) has the right to punish the duty-bound if he shirks his duty of questing for the restrictor. However, should the dutybound do his level best and make a thorough quest for the restrictor where it is supposed to exist in such a way that he becomes confident that there exists no restrictor, he would have the right to take the appearance of the general and implement it. Thus, should there actually exist a restrictor but in such a way that the duty-bound could not attain it through his quest, he would be excused for implementation of the general.

What we said concerning divine laws applies to all other kinds of appearances too, for one is not allowed to take them except after one has made a quest for the separate evidence. This is summed up in a rule: “the principality of appearance will not be an authoritative proof except after one has made a thorough quest for the evidence and one has despaired of finding it.”

A General Preceding a Pronoun Which Refers to Some Instances of the General

In the verse 228 of sūra 2: “Divorced women will wait by themselves for three periods…in such time their mates have better right to restore them…”“divorced women” is general covering both revocable and irrevocable divorcées while by pronoun in “their mates” is merely meant revocable divorcées. In such cases, one has to oppose either the appearance of the general in generality restricting it to those to which the pronoun refers, or that of reference of the pronoun to what has preceded it referring it to some of them (something called istikhdām in Arabic rhetoric) which leaves no room for the generality.

There are different views in this connection the justifiable one being that there is no problem with reference to the principality of generality. The reason is that the reference of pronoun to some instances of the general makes no changes in the appearance of the general, for determination of some instances because of reference of the pronoun due to some evidence does not necessitate that some instances are determined by the general’s precept per se; as the precept in the sentence containing pronoun is different from the precept in the sentence containing general and there is no connection between the two sentences. Thus, reference of the pronoun to some instances of the general is not such evidence capable of necessitating change in general’s appearance in the generality.

An Exception Preceded by Multiple Sentences

In verses 4-5 of sūra 24: “And those who cast it up on women in wedlock and then do not bring four witnesses, scourge them with eighty stripes, do not accept any testimony of theirs ever, and they are the ungodly; save such as repent thereafter and make amends…,” there are three general precepts followed by an exception in the end. In such cases, one doubts whether the exception is made to the last sentence or to all sentences.

There are four opinions in this connection:

1. The speech is apparent in reference of the exception to the last sentence.

Although its reference to other than the last is possible, it needs evidence.

2. The speech is apparent in its reference to all sentences, and it is its reference to the last sentence that needs proof.

3. The speech is apparent in neither of them - though its reference to the last sentence is something for sure. As for other sentences, they remain ambiguous, because of existence of some potential evidence; hence, no appearance in generality takes form for them and one cannot refer to the principle of generality in this connection.

4. Differentiation should be made between the case where the object of sentences is repeated in every sentence, like the verse mentioned, and the case where the object of sentences is one and is just mentioned in the first sentence, like: “do people good, respect them, and satisfy their needs, except evildoers.” In the latter, the object, i.e., people, is mentioned only in the first sentence and is not repeated in others - what is repeated is a pronoun referring to it - while in the verse in question the object of all precepts is a pronoun which refers to a word mentioned in the beginning without being accompanied by a judgment.

According to this opinion, in cases where the object of sentences is not repeated, the exception is apparent in referring to all sentences. For the exception is to be made from the object with the consideration of the judgment, and the object is only mentioned in the beginning; hence, it refers to all. However, in cases where the object of sentences is repeated, the exception is apparent in referring to the last sentence. For the object is mentioned in the last sentence independently and the exception has found its reference. Restriction of previous sentences is in need of another proof which, as was assumed, is missing; that is why one may refer to their principality of generality with regard to them.

The fourth opinion can bring all opinions together, since one may make any of them conformable to a case mentioned in this view.

Restriction of the General by Mafhūm

As explained earlier in chapter 4, implicatures of sentences (mafāhīm) are divided into accordant and disaccording. There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that a general can be restricted by an accordant mafhūm. For instance, according to the general ruling of the verse 40 of sūra 42 “the recompense of evil is evil the like of it,” if one is beaten by another one is allowed to beat him. On the other hand, the verse 23 of the sūra 17 declares that: “Your Lord has decreed you … to be good to parents … and do not say to them Fie,” according to whose accordant mafhūm one is not allowed to beat one’s parents. The general ruling of that verse is restricted by accordant mafhūm of this verse, then.

As for disaccording mafhūm, it is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. For instance, according to the general ruling of the verse 36 of sūra 10 “indeed conjecture is no substitute for the truth,” no conjecture may be treated as an authoritative proof even though it is caused by report of a righteous-trustworthy transmitter, while according to the disaccording mafhūm of the verse 6 of sūra 49 “O believers, if an evildoer bring you some news you should verify it,” it is allowed to treat a report by a righteous-trustworthy person as valid without verifying it. Since the appearance of the disaccording mafhūm is not as strong as the appearance of Manţūq or that of the accordant mafhūm, it is disputed whether it is stronger than the appearance of the general and should be given precedence over it, the general is stronger and it is the general that should be given precedence, they are equal in the appearance and none of them should be given precedence, or the case differs in various states.

Since it is assumed that mafhūm is more particular than the general, the former is conventionally treated as evidence for what is intended by the latter; and it is the rule that evidence should principally be given precedence over that which has evidence, no matter its appearance is stronger or not. Of course, if the general is explicit-definite, it is the general that should be considered as evidence for what is intended by the sentence containing mafhūm, and in this case the sentence will not have mafhūm.

Restriction of the Book by Single Tradition

Since issuance of the holy Qur’ān is for certain while that of single tradition (khabar al-wāĥid) is doubtful, to restrict the Qur’ān by single tradition seems problematic. However, there has always been consensus that the latter should be given precedence over the former. The reason is that definite proofs have proved that single tradition, where it is valid because of certain evidence, is an authoritative proof though its issuance is not for certain. Now, should theme of a single tradition be more particular than a general Qur’ānic verse, one should either reject the tradition and treat its transmitter as a liar, or make some change in the appearance of the Qur’ān; for one can neither change the theme of a tradition, as it is explicit-definite (naşş) or more apparent (ażhar), nor reject the transmission of the Qur’ān since it is for certain. In other words, one should oppose either the conjecture for the truth of tradition or the conjecture for the generality of the Qur’ānic verse.

Doubtless the tradition can be evidence for changing the appearance of the Book, for it is assumed that it has an eye for the appearance of the Book and comments on it. On the contrary, the appearance of the Book is not capable of rejecting the proof of authority of the tradition, for it is assumed that it has no relation with the latter in this respect so that it can have an eye for it or comment on it. The language of the tradition is that of commenting on the Book; hence, it should be given precedence over the latter. The appearance of the Book, however, does not intend to comment on the proof of authority of the tradition so that it may be given precedence over it. In other words, it is assumed that the tradition is evidence for the Book and the principle as to the evidence, i.e., the principle of truthfulness of the transmitter, should be given precedence over the principle as to that which has evidence, which is the principle of generality.

CHAPTER 6: ABSOLUTE (AL-MUŢLAQ) AND QUALIFIED (ALMUQAYYAD)

By absoluteness is meant encompassment and extensiveness of a term with regard to its meaning and states without the term being used in encompassment in the way understood from an indefinite noun in a negative context - since in that case the term would be considered general and not absolute.

As was said earlier, the contrariety of absolute and qualified is that of possession and privation, for absoluteness is lack of qualification in that which can be qualified. Thus, absoluteness follows qualification in the possibility, in the sense that if qualification is possible in the speech or proof the absoluteness is possible and if it is impossible the absoluteness is impossible. Hence, in a case where qualification is not possible, one cannot discover absoluteness from the speech of speaker; that speech is neither absolute nor qualified - though in fact one of them is necessarily intended by the speaker. In such cases, however, one can discover absoluteness from absoluteness of the position (iţlāq al-maqām or al-iţlāq al-maqāmī) and not from that of speech. By absoluteness of the position is meant that although the speaker cannot qualify his words in one sentence, he can qualify it by adding another sentence after finishing his first sentence and utter the condition he intends.

Is Absoluteness by Convention?

Doubtless absoluteness of proper nouns with regard to their states as well as that of sentences is not by convention, but rather by premises of wisdom (muqaddimāt al-ĥikma). However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether absoluteness of generic nouns (asmā’ al-adjnās) and the like is by convention or by premises of wisdom. In other words, are generic nouns (such as star, mountain, water, etc.) designated by convention for their meanings as they are extensive and encompassing in such a way that encompassment, i.e., absoluteness, is taken into consideration in the meaning of the term, or are they designated for their very meanings per se and absoluteness is understood from another indicator, i.e., the very term’s voidance of the condition where premises of wisdom exist?

The justifiable opinion is the second one. Its explanation, however, is beyond the boundaries of an introductory work and should be found in detailed works.

Premises of Wisdom (Muqaddimāt al-Ĥikma)

Now that terms are designated for the essence of meanings and not for the meanings as they are absolute, there must be particular or general evidence which make the speech per se apparent in the absoluteness in order to prove that by the term is intended the absolute and to make the judgment penetrate into all instances. Such general evidence will exist only if the three following premises exist:

1. Possibility of absoluteness and qualification. This exists where the object of judgment is capable of division before being judged, since if it is capable of division only after being judged the qualification will be impossible - as was explained earlier in chapter 2 where secondary divisions were explained.

2. Lack of any evidence, neither joint nor separate. The joint evidence forms the appearance of the speech only in the qualified. As for the separate evidence, although an appearance in the absoluteness takes form for the speech, that appearance is not an authoritative proof - because of existence of the evidence, which should be given precedence. That appearance, therefore, is a primary one leaving no room for the principality of absoluteness.

3. The speaker being in the position of depiction. Should the speaker not be in the position of depiction, but in the position of law-making only or in that of depicting another precept, no appearance in the absoluteness would take form for the speech. For instance, in the verse 4 of sūra 5: “and such hunting dogs as you teach…eat what they catch for you,” the Almighty is in the position of depiction of lawfulness of what hunting dogs catch and not in that of purity of parts bitten by dogs so that one can refer to the absoluteness of the speech and judge that such parts are juristically pure and they need not to be purified by water.

What should one do if one doubts whether or not the speaker is in the position of depiction? The principle in such cases is that the speaker is in the position of depiction, for as the wise treat the speaker as being attentive not unconscious and serious not joking when they doubt that, they treat him as being in the position of depiction and explanation not in that of negligence and ambiguousness.

The conclusion is that any speech capable of being qualified but not being qualified by a speaker who is wise, attentive, serious, and in the position of depiction is apparent and an authoritative proof in the absoluteness, in such a way that both the speaker and the listener can refer to its absoluteness in the position of argumentation.

Contradictory Absolute and Qualified

By contradiction between absolute and qualified is meant that one cannot take the duty in the absolute and that in the qualified altogether if one wishes to keep appearances of both; i.e., they contradict one another in their appearances.

Contradiction appears only where both causes and judgments are the same.

Hence, there would be no contradiction where (a) causes are different, for instance: “If you break your fasting deliberately, then free a slave,” and “If you commit injurious assimilation, then free a slave,” (b) judgments are different, for instance: “If you break your fasting deliberately, then free a slave,” and “If you break your fasting deliberately, then fast sixty days,” (c) judgment in the absolute is mandatory while it is recommended in the qualified, and (d) it is understood from the duty in the qualified that it is another duty to be performed.

Now, should one find contradictory absolute and qualified in a juristic statement, one would have no choice but to either change the appearance of the absolute and predicate it upon the qualified or to change the qualified in such a way that it does not contradict the absolute leaving it to keep its absoluteness.

Which of those change-makings is preferable, then? Since absolute and qualified agree or disagree in affirmation or negation on the one hand and absoluteness is either substitutional (when the noun is indefinite) or inclusive (when the noun is definite) on the other, we have to discuss the problem in some different states.

Before dealing with the problem, however, it should be noted that whenever it is said that the absolute is predicated upon the qualified it means that one should take the qualified, and not the absolute, into consideration; since it is the qualified that is the real, serious intent of the speaker.

1 & 2. Absolute and qualified disagree in affirmation or negation, no matter the absoluteness is substitutional (badalī, such as “Free a slave,” and “Do not free an unbeliever slave”) or inclusive (shumūlī, such as “In the sheep there is zakāt” and “In the fed sheep there is not zakāt”). Doubtless the absolute should be predicated upon the qualified in such case, for the qualified is evidence for what is intended by the absolute. Thus, the conclusion in the former is “free a believer slave” and in the latter is “in the pastured sheep there is zakāt.”

3. Absolute and qualified agree in affirmation or negation, and the absoluteness is substitutional. For instance, the two following commands by the divine lawgiver: “Free a slave,” and “Free a believer slave.” Here, though to predicate the qualified upon the absolute is possible, the appearance of the qualified in the determinate obligation should be given precedence over that of the absolute in the absoluteness, for the qualified can be evidence for the absolute and it is quite possible that the speaker has taken this into consideration.

4. Absolute and qualified agree in affirmation or negation, and the absoluteness is inclusive. For instance, the two following statements by the divine lawgiver: “In the sheep, there is zakāt” and “In the pastured sheep, there is zakāt.” This case is the only one in which the absolute should not be predicated upon the qualified, as there is no contradiction between those statements except if one believes that the qualifier denotes mafhūm - and we proved that the qualifier has no such denotation.

CHAPTER 7: AMBIGUOUS (AL-MUDJMAL) AND CLEAR(AL-MUBAYYAN)

By “ambiguous” is meant what whose denotation is not clear. In other words, ambiguous is the word or act by which it is not clear what the speaker or doer has meant. Thus, ambiguous is the word or act which has no appearance, contrary to the “clear” which has an appearance denoting what is meant by the speaker or doer in the way of conjecture or certitude. Hence, clear covers both the apparent (żāhir) and the explicit-definite (naşş).

As for the ambiguous act, its mode of occurrence is not understood; for instance, when the holy Imām performs ablution in circumstances of possibility of dissimulation in which it is not understood whether he had dissimulated (so that it would not denote lawfulness of such performing) or he had performed it in the manner of actual ablution (so that it would denote its lawfulness), or when the holy Imām performs an act in his prayers and it is not understood whether it is done as a mandatory or a recommended act and hence it becomes ambiguous in this respect - though it is clear with respect to its denotation that such an act is lawful and not forbidden.

As for the ambiguous word, there are so many things that cause ambiguity in words.

For example, where the word is homonymous but used without evidence, where the word is used in a figurative manner but without evidence, where it is not clear to what the pronoun refers, where the sentence suffers from incorrect arrangement, where the speaker is in the position of ambiguity and negligence, and so forth.

Ambiguity and clarity are not absolute, since something may be ambiguous for someone but clear for someone else, and a clear affair may be so by itself and may become so by another affair which clarifies it.

Numerous examples of ambiguous and clear can be found in the Qur’ān and Sunna. On the other hand, there are some examples doubted whether they are ambiguous or clear some of which being discussed by Uşūlīs for the sake of training beginners. However, since they are mostly based on Arabic grammatical rules, we do not deal with them in this book.

Part II: Intellectual Implications

Among the four-fold sources of juristic precepts in Shiite uşūl al-fiqh is intellect - the other three being the Book, Sunna, and consensus. The authority of these, including intellect, will be discussed in the third part. However, we need to discuss some minor premises of the authority of the intellect in this part in order to find out whether or not the intellect can discover from something being essentially good or evil that it is so with the divine lawgiver as well.

Generally speaking, intellectual proof is divided into independent and dependent. Independent intellectual proofs (al-mustaqillāt al-‘aqliyya) are those whose both minor and major premises are intellectual, such as “justice is intellectually good,” and “whatsoever is intellectually good is juristically good,”

which results that “justice is juristically good.” This kind is usually discussed in the science of theology (kalām) and not uşūl al-fiqh, as it is the major dispute between Ashā‘ira and ‘Adliyya (including both Mu‘tazila and Shī‘a).

Dependent intellectual proofs (ghayr al-mustaqillāt al-‘aqliyya) are those whose major premises are intellectual while their minor premises are juristic, such as “this act is juristically mandatory,” and “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its preliminary should juristically be mandatory,” or “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its opposite should juristically be forbidden,” and so forth.

As clearly seen, minor premises of such syllogisms are proved in the science of fiqh, so they are juristic, while their major premises are intellectual, i.e., it is the intellect’s judgment that there exists an intellectual implication between the precept in the first premise and another juristic precept. The consequence of such minor and major premises becomes a minor premise of a syllogism whose major premise is authority of intellect - something to be discussed in the discussions of authority.

In this part, we will deal with independent intellectual proofs in 5 chapters.

Introductory Discussions

Definition of the Science of Uşūl al-Fiqh

The science of uşūl al-fiqh is a science in which such rules whose results are placed in ways of deduction of juristic precepts are discussed. For instance, performing the prayers (şalāt) is mandatory in Islam, and this Qur’ānic verse proves that obligation: “And that perform the prayers.” (6:72) However, denotation of the verse is dependent upon the imperative, like “perform” in that verse, being apparent in the obligation on the one hand and Qur’ānic apparent meanings being authoritative proofs on the other. Those two issues are dealt with in the science of uşūl al-fiqh. Now, when the jurist learns through this science that the imperative is apparent in the obligation and that the Qur’ānic apparent meanings are authoritative proofs, he can infer from the said verse that the prayers is mandatory.

In the same way, deduction of every juristic precept inferred from any juristic or intellectual proof must be dependent upon one or more issues of this science.

It should be known that precepts are of two kinds:

1. The precept is directed to something per se as it is an act; such as the prayers, since the obligation is directed to the prayers as it is prayers and an act per se without consideration of anything else. Such precept is called “the actual precept” (al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī) and the proof proving it “the persuasive proof” (al-dalīl al-idjtihādī).

2. The precept is directed to something as its actual precept is unknown; such as the dispute among jurists whether or not smoking is unlawful. Here, where there is no proof to support any of the existing opinions, the jurist doubts the primary, actual precept of the disputed matter, and since he is not supposed to remain perplexed practically there must exist another precept, though intellectual, for him, such as obligation of precaution, clearance from obligation, or ignoring the doubt. Such a secondary precept is called “the apparent precept” (al-ĥukm al-żāhirī) and the proof proving it “the juristic proof” (al-dalīl al-faqāhatī) or “the practical principle” (al-aşl al-‘amalī).

Discussions of the science of uşūl al-fiqh cover both of such precepts.

Subject-Matter of the Science of Uşūl al-Fiqh

Different things are said by various Uşūlīs to be the subject matter of this science. However, there is no need to treat them as true and, as later Uşūlīs have said, this science has no specific subject-matter. It discusses various subjects which are all common in its purpose, which is inferring juristic precepts. Detailed discussions on this topic can be found in detailed works of uşūl al-fiqh.

Benefit of the Science of Uşūl al-Fiqh

Since it is clearly known that any human voluntarily act has a precept in Islam, whether obligation, unlawfulness, or any of the five-fold burdensome precepts, on the one side, it is known that not all those precepts are known to everyone by self-evident knowledge but most of them are in need of survey and proof, i.e., they are deductive on the second, and uşūl al-fiqh is the only science formulated for proving juristic precepts on the third, the benefit of this science would be seeking assistance for deducing precepts from their proofs.

Parts of the Science of Uşūl al-Fiqh

Discussions of this science are presented in various parts in the works of uşūl al-fiqh. However, the best division is presented by al-Muĥaqqiq al-Işfahānī(d.1940) in his last course of teaching (as narrated by his great student Muĥammad Riđā al-Mużaffar in his Uşūl al-Fiqh, p. 11) according to which all uşūlī topics are discussed in the four following parts: Discussions of “terms” (mabāĥith al-alfāż), those of “intellectual implications” (mabāĥith al-mulāzamāt al-‘aqliyya), those of “the authority” (mabāĥith al-ĥudjdja), and those of “practical principles” (mabāĥith al-uşūl al-‘amaliyya).

Discussions of terms deal with denotations and appearances of terms from a general aspect, such as appearance of the imperative in the obligation, that of the prohibition in the unlawfulness, and the like.

Discussions of intellectual implications survey implications of precepts even though such precepts may not be inferred from terms, such as discussing truthfulness of mutual implication of intellectual judgments and juristic precepts, of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminaries (known as “the problem of preliminary of the mandatory act”), of obligation of something necessitating unlawfulness of its opposite (known as “the problem of the opposite”), of possibility of conjunction of the command and the prohibition, and so on.

Discussions of the authority investigate whether some specific thing is juristically treated as a proof; for instance, whether report of a single transmitter, appearances, appearances of the Qur’ān, Sunna, consensus, intellect, and the like are authoritative proofs.

Discussions of practical principles deal with what the jurist refers to when he cannot find a persuasive proof, such as the principle of clearance from obligation, that of precaution, and so forth.

Convention (al-Wađ‘)

A smoke essentially denotes a fire; but the case is not the same with denotation of words - whatever the language may be - for in that case all people throughout the world should have been speaking the same language. Thus, denotation of words is just through convention. That convention, however, is not made by a specific person, otherwise that person should have been named in the history of every language; rather, it is the human nature that invents a specific word when man wishes to denote a specific meaning and communicate others. Others, in turn, do the same; and with the passage of time the structure of a language takes shape, and then its vocabulary and grammar gradually develop. Convention of a word, therefore, means to make that word for a meaning and to designate it to that meaning.

Words normally denote their meanings by making (al-dja‘l) and specification, and this kind of convention is called “convention by specification (al-wađ‘ alta‘yīnī).” However, that denotation is sometimes caused by specification of a word to a meaning by repetition in the usage which makes minds familiar with it in such a way that as soon as one hears the word one refers to the meaning. This kind of convention is called “convention by determination (al-wađ‘ alta‘ayyunī).”

Varieties of Convention

In the convention, the term and the meaning must necessarily be conceived; for convention is a judgment on the meaning and the term, and making judgment on something is not acceptable unless it is conceived and known - even though in an undifferentiated mode, for any given thing can be conceived either by itself (bi-nafsih), or by its general facet (bi-wadjhih). For instance, when you see a white object from a distance you can judge that it is white while you do not know what exactly it is; this judgment is acceptable because you have somehow conceived it - as a thing, an animal, or the like - and that is not like an absolutely unknown object which in no way can be judged.

Now, since the meaning must be conceived on the one side, its conception is of two kinds on the second, and it is particular or general on the third, the convention can be divided into the four following varieties:

1. The conceived meaning is particular and the object of convention is the very particular, i.e., the object of convention is a particular meaning conceived by itself and not by its general facet. This kind is called “the convention particular and the object of convention particular (al-wađ‘ khāşş wa’l mawđū‘ lah khāşş).”

2. The conceived meaning is general and the object of convention is the very general, i.e., the object of convention is a general meaning conceived by itself and not by a general facet. This kind is called “the convention general and the object of convention general (al-wađ‘ ‘āmm wa’l mawđū‘ lah ‘āmm).”

3. The conceived meaning is general and the object of convention is an instance of that general and not itself, i.e., the object of convention is a particular meaning conceived not by itself but by its general facet. This kind is called “the convention general and the object of convention particular (al-wađ‘ ‘āmm wa’l mawđū‘ lah khāşş).”

4. The conceived meaning is particular and the object of convention is a general facet of that particular. This kind is called “the convention particular and the object of convention general (al-wađ khāşş wa’l mawđū‘ lah ‘āmm).”

There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that the first three varieties are possible, and the first two varieties have occurred - the first like proper nouns, and the second like common nouns such as water, heaven, star, and the like. Dispute is over the possibility of the fourth as well as the occurrence of the third. Referring the reader to detailed works on the Shiite uşūl al-fiqh, here we just mention that the fourth is impossible - for the particular cannot be a facet of the general; rather, the case is vice versa, i.e., the general is a facet and aspect of the particular - and the third has occurred and its instances are prepositions, demonstrative pronouns, pronouns, and the like.

What we discussed was concerning the meaning. That discussion can somehow be pursued with regard to the term as well. If the term is specified for the meaning while it is conceived by itself, as is the normal procedure, the convention is called personal (al-shakhşī), and if it is conceived by its general facet it is called typical (al-naw‘ī) like dispositions in typical phrases and sentences, as the disposition in conditional clauses to denote that the consequence is dependent upon the antecedent.

Signs of Literal and Figurative Meanings

Usage of a term in its designated meaning is literally correct, in another meaning with which it has some pertinence along with some contextual evidence is figuratively correct, and in another meaning without any pertinence is wrong. Therefore, usage of a term literally and figuratively is correct and “the usage” cannot specify whether a term is designated for a meaning or it is used figuratively.

Now, should one know, through assertion of philologists, that a term is designated for a meaning it would obviously be clear that such word is to be used literally in that meaning and figuratively in other pertinent meanings.

However, the case is not that clear sometimes and one may wonder how to treat the usage. What can one do in that case in order to find out whether such a usage is literally correct or it is figuratively so and hence one should use it with some contextual evidence?

Uşūlīs have mentioned some signs of recognition of the literal meaning the most important of which being preceding (al-tabādur) and incorrectness of divesting(‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb). By tabādur is meant that when one thinks of a term, a specific meaning comes to one’s mind first - from the very term without there being any contextual evidence - and precedes other meanings. This clearly proves that the term indicates its meaning merely because of convention and nothing else. By ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb is meant that divesting a term of a meaning is not correct. To exercise both of these signs, let us consider the example of the term “lion.” We know that this term is used for a specific animal literally and for a brave man figuratively. Now, when you hear the term “lion” it is the meaning of that animal which comes to your mind first and not a brave man, and this is tabādur. Also, you cannot divest “lion” of that animal while you can do that of a brave man, and this is ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb. Thus, tabādur and ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb are two signs which indicate the literal meaning of a term.

Literal Principles

When a doubt occurs concerning a term it can be of two kinds: a doubt concerning convention whether that term is specified for a certain meaning, and a doubt concerning intention of a speaker whether he has meant the literal or figurative meaning. Presenting two signs of recognition of the literal meaning, the pervious discussion dealt with the first kind of doubt. However, that is not enough for the removal of the second doubt, for those signs cannot determine speaker’s intention. What can we do, then? Uşūlīs have presented some principles in this connection, called “literal principles (al-uşūl al-lafżiyya),”

their most important ones being the following:

1. The Principle of Literalness (Aşāla al-Ĥaqīqa). This principle is used when one doubts whether a certain speaker has intended the literal or the figurative meaning, where there is no contextual evidence while its existence is probable. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the literalness,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its literal and not figurative meaning, for to use a word figuratively needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

2. The Principle of Generality(Aşāla al-‘Umūm). This principle is used when a speaker has used a general term and one doubts whether it is still general or it has been restricted. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the generality,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its general meaning without being restricted.

3. The Principle of Absoluteness(Aşāla al-Iţlāq). This principle is used when a speaker has used an absolute term which has some states and conditions and one doubts whether its absolute meaning is intended by the speaker or he may have intended some of those states or conditions. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the absoluteness,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its absolute meaning without being limited to some states or conditions.

4. The Principle of Appearance(Aşāla al-Żuhūr). When a term is explicitly used in a meaning in such a way that no other meaning is probable it is called naşş, and when it is used in a meaning not in such an explicit way, i.e., some other meaning is also probable though that probability is not considerable and people usually ignore it, it is called żāhir (apparent). Now, when a speaker uses a term in the second way and one doubts whether some other meaning is meant, it is said that “the principle is the appearance,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its main meaning and not the less probable one.

In fact, all literal principles refer to this one; for the term is apparent in its literal, general, absolute (when it is general or absolute) meaning and not vice versa.

As for the authority of such principles, they are all based on “the conduct of the wise (binā’ al-‘uqalā’)”‫ which is to be discussed in the third part in detail. According to that conduct, we see that the wise practically consider the apparent meaning of terms in their communications and ignore other inconsiderable probable meanings - as they ignore the probability of heedlessness, fault, jest, ambiguousness, and the like - and since the divine lawgiver has not prohibited us from that conduct and has not declared another specific way in His communications, we lawfully conclude that He has indorsed and confirmed that conduct having treated apparent meanings as authoritative proofs -

precisely as the wise do.

Usage of One Term in More than One Meaning

Doubtless usage of a homonym in one of its meanings along with contextual evidence is allowed, and in case no such evidence is provided the term will become ambiguous having no indication. Also, there is no doubt that such term can be used in all of its meanings as such - although figuratively and in need of contextual evidence inasmuch as it is an unconventional usage. The dispute is over veraciousness of using a homonym and intending more than one meaning in the same usage in such a way that every meaning is separately meant by the term as if it is uttered to denote it alone. Ignoring details and different opinions, we should say that such usage is incorrect and not allowed; for using a term to denote a meaning means creation of that meaning by that term - although not by its real but rather its conventional, secondary existence (since there is only one existence which is attributed to the term in a primary, essential and to the meaning in a secondary, accidental manner, existence of the term is secondarily existence of the meaning). Hence, when a speaker utters a term in order to use it in a meaning he indeed utters the very meaning and not the term, and delivers the meaning to the hearer. In this way, the term is considered by the speaker, and even for the hearer, secondarily and as an instrument for and a way to the meaning. The term is annihilated in the meaning. Thus, what is considered primarily and independently is the meaning and not the term. The case is like an image in the mirror; the image exists by the existence of the mirror. The real, essential existence belongs to the mirror and that very existence is secondarily and accidentally attributed to the image. When one looks at the image in the mirror one is in fact looking at it through the mirror in one look. That one look is primarily and independently at the image and secondarily and dependently at the mirror. Consideration of the mirror, therefore, is secondarily with regard to that of image - as was the case with the term.

That is why one term cannot be used except in one meaning. For if it is used in two meanings independently in such a way that both of them are meant by the term, as in the case where any of them is used alone, it necessitates that every one of them should be considered primarily, which, in turn, necessitates that the term should be used secondarily twice at once. This is obviously impossible, for one thing can have only one existence in the soul at any given moment.

What we said is not true only as to two, or more, literal meanings. It is true even where one uses a literal and a figurative meaning at once, for the problem is the same: attachment of two considerations to one object at one moment.

The Juristic-Literal Meaning (al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm(fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Now, the question is that whether such transfer has happened in the holy Prophet’s time so that we may have the juristic-literal meaning or it has occurred after him and therefore what we have in hand is Muslims’ literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa almutasharri‘iyya).

The answer to that question would make a difference in the process of inferring juristic precepts from the Qur’ān and Sunna. Should there exist the juristic-literal meaning, any such term without contextual evidence would be predicated to its juristic meaning, while it must be interpreted as its usual meaning if such a juristic-literal meaning does not exist.

It is obviously clear that those new meanings were not made through convention by specification, for in that case it should have been narrated to us in one way or another. As for the convention by determination, it must be said that it had doubtlessly happened in Imām Ali's time, for by that time all Muslims have been using such terms in their new juristic meanings for a long time. Hence, since in Shiite jurisprudence only such prophetic ĥadīths that are narrated by holy Imāms are treated as valuable, all such terms in their words should be predicated to their new juristic meanings where they are void of any contextual evidence. As for the holy Qur’ān, there is no room for such a dispute, since almost all such words are used in it along with contextual evidence and convey their new juristic meanings.

The Sound (al-Şaĥīĥ) and What Incorporates Both (al- A‘amm)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether terms of acts of worship and transactions are designations specified for sound meanings (i.e., perfect in terms of parts and conditions) or for what incorporates imperfect (al-fāsid) ones as well. In other words, when such term is used, should it be predicated only to perfect instances or could it be predicated to imperfect ones too (the latter being termed “what incorporates both” in this discussion)?

The outcome of this discussion is that when it is doubted whether or not a condition is considered in a specific act of worship or transaction, one who believes in the latter (who is called al-a‘ammī) can refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate consideration of that condition while one who believes in the former (who is called al-şaĥīĥī) cannot.

To explain this, let us take an example. When the Lord commands us to actualize something and we are doubtful whether that thing would be realized by bringing about a specific external instance, such case can have two states:

1. It is known that designation of the commanded holds true for that instance, but it is probable that an additional condition is taken into consideration in the Lord's purpose which does not exist in that instance. For example, when the Lord commands to free a slave, it is known that “slave” does hold true for an unbelieving one, but we are doubtful whether or not the condition of “faith” is considered in the purpose of the Lord and therefore it becomes probable that being faithful is a condition of the commanded. In such case, one is principally supposed to refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate consideration of the probable condition. Hence, acquiring that condition would not be mandatory and one can content oneself in the position of obedience with actualizing the doubtful instance (i.e., freeing an unbeliever slave in the given example).

2. It is doubted whether designation of the commanded holds true for that external instance. For example, the Lord has commanded to perform dry ablution with al-şa‘īd in case of lack of water and we wonder whether şa‘īd means soil alone or it includes stone and whatsoever lies on the ground as well. Here, the doubt is over şa‘īd holding true for other than soil. In such case, one cannot refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to enter the doubtful instance in the designation of the commanded so that one can content oneself with it in the position of obedience. Rather, one should refer to such practical principles as precaution or clearance in accordance with the situation.

Now, when the Lord commands us to perform şalāt (the prayers) and we doubt whether sūra, for example, is part of şalāt, the case would be an example of the first state should we hold that şalāt is designation of what incorporates both, and would be an example of the second one should we hold that it is designation of the sound. The reason for the former is that we know that designation of şalāt holds true for the one which lacks sūra and we only doubt whether or not an additional condition is taken into consideration. In that case one may refer to the absoluteness of the Lord’s speech, negate consideration of the additional condition, and content oneself in the position of obedience with performing şalāt without sūra. The reason for the latter is that when consideration of sūra is doubted, it is in fact doubted whether or not designation of şalāt holds true for the one which lacks sūra. For, designation of the commanded is the sound and the sound is designation of the commanded; therefore, what is not sound is not şalāt. Thus, what lacks the doubtful part is both doubted whether it is veracious and whether designation of the commanded holds true for it. In this case, it is not allowed to refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate consideration of sūra as part of şalāt so that one can content oneself in the position of obedience with the instance lacking sūra. Rather, one should refer to either the principle of precaution or that of clearance - on the basis of what will be explained in the fourth part.

What is the justifiable opinion, then? It is the second one, i.e., terms being specified for what incorporates both, since it is the denotation of preceding (altabādur) and incorrectness of divesting (‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb) which are two signs of literalness - as explained earlier. When we think of a term, what incorporates both comes to the mind first and precedes the sound, and also it is not veracious to divest the term of the imperfect instance.

Part I: Discussions of Terms

The purpose of this part is to recognize appearance of terms from a general view, whether by convention or by absoluteness of the speech, to result in universal rules which clarify minor premises of “the Principle of Appearance” - a general principle to be discussed in detail in the third part. Such discussions are concerned with doubted, disputed dispositions of speech, either dispositions of terms such as command and prohibition or those of sentences such as implicatures of sentences (al-mafāhīm) and the like. As for specific terms and their convention as well as appearances, since there can be no general rule in this connection, they are not to be discussed in this science and it is dictionaries and the like that are supposed to deal with such issues.

CHAPTER 1: THE DERIVED (AL-MUSHTAQQ)

Since there is no precise word in English to convey the meaning of al-mushtaqq in its uşūlī usage, we have no choice but to use the closest term to it and just rely on its explanation in our discussion. For the purpose of clarification of this complicatedly presented discussion, let us take an example. Suppose that Ali has finished the high school, he is now studying law at a university, and he will definitely become a judge when he is graduated.

A. If we say, “Ali was a student,” “Ali is a university student,” and “Ali will be a judge” we are literally correct. In those examples we are using exactly the time when “student,” “university student,” and “judge” are attributed to Ali. That time is called “the time of possession (ĥāl al-talabbus).” Thus, when we attribute something to somebody or something else in the time when the former possesses the latter, we are literally correct and there is no dispute over this among Uşūlīs.

B. If we say, “Ali is a judge” we are attributing something to Ali when he has not possessed it yet, i.e., the time of attribution (ĥāl al-isnād) is different from that of possession (ĥāl al-talabbus) which will be in the future. In this case, we are figuratively correct, since Ali will be a judge in the future; and this point is also not a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs.

C. Now, suppose that Ali finished the university course, was appointed as a judge, finished his thirty years of duty, and became retired having no position in the juristic system. In this case, if we say, “Ali was a judge” we are literally correct, since we used the time of possession, and there is no dispute over this. But how would be the case if we would say, “Ali is a judge”? Is this usage correct literally or figuratively? Such case, i.e., when something is attributed to somebody or something else because he, or it, has possessed it in the past, is the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs: some consider it as being literally and others as being figuratively correct.

The justifiable opinion is that it is used figuratively in such case, for it does not precede other meanings in coming to our mind on the one hand and it is correct to divest it of someone who is no longer in that position on the other.

In other words, signs of literalness do not exist; hence, such usage is figurative.

So far the problem is clarified in a simple way. However, we need to explain some specific terms used in this discussion by Uşūlīs to become able to present this discussion in its normal scholarly way.

In this discussion, somebody or something that may or may not possess a quality while in both cases he or it permanently exists is addressed as al-dhāt (like Ali in the example),that quality as al-mabda’ (like being a judge),to possess that quality as al-talabbus (like actually being a judge), to lose that quality as inqiđā’ al-talabbus (like being retired and no longer being an actual judge), and what is abstracted and derived from the quality as al-mushtaqq (like the “judge”).

To sum up what was explained in a simple way in its specific scholarly way, note the following:

1. To use al-mushtaqq with regard to ĥāl al-talabbus is absolutely a literal usage, whether the time used is past, present, or future (as explained in A) -

without there being any dispute among Uşūlīs.

2. To attribute al-mushtaqq to the dhāt presently, i.e., with regard to ĥāl alisnād before the time of al-talabbus because the dhāt will possess it later on (as explained in B), is a figurative usage - without there being any dispute among Uşūlīs.

3. To attribute al-mushtaqq to the dhāt presently, i.e., with regard to ĥāl alisnād when it no longer possesses the mabda’ merely because it has had it in the past (as in the second example in (3)), is the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs whether it is a literal or a figurative usage.

This dispute manifests its result in some juristic precepts. For instance, according to some ĥadīths performing minor ablution with some water warmed by the sun is disapproved. “The water warmed by the sun” is a mushtaqq.

Suppose that such water has now become cold. A jurist who holds that calling that water “warmed by the sun” is literally correct gives verdict that performing minor ablution with that water is still disapproved, while the one who maintains that such calling is a figurative usage does not treat such an ablution as being disapproved.