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CHAPTER 8: REPLACEMENT (AL-IDJZĀ’)

Idjzā’ is infinitive, meaning that something has replaced something else in doing its job. Hence, “replacement” necessitates that the act done should not be repeated.

Doubtless when the duty-bound performs what the Lord has commanded him in its desired way, i.e., he performs the desired in accordance with what he is commanded observing all juristic and intellectual conditions, that act is considered obedience to that command no matter the command is voluntaryactual (ikhtiyārī), compelling (iđţirārī), or apparent (żāhirī). This neither is nor can be a matter of dispute.

There is also neither doubt nor dispute over that such an obedience of such characteristic is considered enough and need not be replaced by any other obedience - for it is assumed that the duty-bound has performed his duty in the desired manner, and that is enough. In this case, the command directed to the duty-bound will be removed, for that which was urged by the command has been actualized and its time has terminated. It is impossible for the command to remain after its purpose has been actualized - unless if one holds that the impossible, i.e., actualization of the effect without the cause, is possible.

The only case which can be disputed is where two commands exist: one primary, actual which is not obeyed by the duty-bound either because it has become impossible for him or because of his ignorance of it, and one secondary which is “compelling” in case of impossibility of the first or “apparent” in case of ignorance of the first. Now, should the duty-bound obey that secondary compelling or apparent command and then the compulsion or ignorance should be removed, it would be plausible to dispute whether or not what was performed in obedience to the second command is enough and replaces the first without any need for the first command to be repeated within the time or performed belatedly out of the time. This discussion is, in fact, to inquire whether there exists an intellectual implication between performing the commanded act by a compelling or apparent command and contenting oneself with it without obeying the primary, voluntary, actual command.

Since the type of discussion differs with regard to the compelling and apparent commands, we have to discuss them separately.

1. The Compelling Command

There are numerous commands in the Islamic law which are peculiar to the state of compulsion, i.e., impossibility or difficulty of obeying primary commands, such as dry ablution, minor or major ablution on the bandage, prayers of the one who is not able to stand, that of a drawing person, and so on. Doubtless compulsion removes the actuality of the duty, for the Almighty charges no soul save to its capacity (2:286), and the holy prophet has said in a very well-known authoritative ĥadīth, “Nine things are removed from my followers: …..what they are compelled to do… .” Such compelling, secondary commands are actual endowed with obligatory good - like primary commands.

However, one may ask if such compelling, secondary state was removed and the duty-bound returned to his normal situation in which he is able to perform the command in its usual manner, could what he has done in the state of compulsion be considered enough and replace the command in the state of volition, or should he repeat it within the time - if the compulsion is removed before ending the time on the one hand and hastening to perform the command in such case is allowed on the other - or perform it belatedly out of the time? This question is plausible because what has been performed in the state of compulsion is incomplete in comparison with the commanded act in the state of volition, and there would be no rational problem should the dutybound be commanded to perform it again in order to acquire the complete good. Nevertheless, it is quite well-known that jurists give verdict that such performing in the state of compulsion is absolutely enough, and there is no need for repetition neither within nor out of the time.

Thus, there should be a secret in giving such a verdict. The secret can be one, or all, of the following points:

1. It is clear that precepts for the state of compulsion are legalized for the sake of alleviation and convenience of duty-bounds (“God desires ease for you, and does not desire hardship for you.” Qur., 2: 185), and this would be contradicted should God command them to perform the duty again within or out of the time - even though the incomplete cannot replace the complete in acquiring its whole obligatory good.

2. Most of proofs as to compelling duties are absolute - such as: “… and you can find no water,then have recourse to pure soil,”(Qur4:43) - and their absolute appearances necessitate that one can content oneself with the second duty for the state of compulsion, that the duty is restricted to that one, and that there is no other duty. Hence, had repetition within or out of the time been mandatory it should have explicitly been depicted. Now that the Almighty has not made such a depiction, it becomes clear that the incomplete does replace the complete both within and out of the time -

especially when we find that in a ĥadīth the holy Imām has said, “Soil will be sufficient for you even for ten years.”

3. Repetition out of the time will become obligatory only when missing holds true, while it can be said that in this case it does not hold true; for repetition out of the time can be assumed only when the compulsion continues in the whole time, and in that case there would be no command to the complete in the time. When there is no command, no missing of the mandatory act will hold true, for there is no mandatory act at all.

As for the repetition within the time, it can be assumed only when hastening is allowed, and in such case the duty-bound has hastened to perform the incomplete in early parts of the time while the compulsion is removed before the end of the time. The very permission for hastening, should it be proved, alludes to forbearance of the divine lawgiver with regard to acquiring the complete when one can acquire it, otherwise he would have made it obligatory for the duty-bound to wait and not to hasten in order to acquire the complete.

4. When we doubt whether repetition within or out of the time is mandatory while it is assumed that we have not negated their obligation by absoluteness or the like, we doubt the very existence of the duty; and the principle in such cases is that of clearance from obligation which declares non-obligation.

2. The Apparent Command

As mentioned in the preliminary discussions, the apparent precept has two meanings; one is used for practical principles, and the other for those precepts which are proved apparently when the actual precept with God is unknown. The second expression is more inclusive and covers precepts proved by authorized conjectural proofs (al-amārāt, sing. al-amāra) and practical principles both. In this discussion, by apparent command is meant the second expression.

Doubtless the actual command is not incontrovertibly directed to the dutybound in cases of practical principles and authorized conjectural proofs both, i.e., there would be no punishment should practical principles or authorized conjectural proofs oppose the actual precept; for it is clearly evident that any duty which has not reached the duty-bound, after he has quested for and has become desperate to find it, is not incontrovertible. It is self-evident that the duty becomes incontrovertible (munadjdjaz) only when it reaches the dutybound, even though in the form of knowledge in summary fashion (al-‘ilm al-idjmālī). All those are definitely accepted, and they will be discussed in detail in the third part.

The only point to be discussed here is that if error of practical principle or authorized conjectural proof is revealed later while the duty-bound has opposed the actual precept by following the errant authorized conjectural proof or practical principle, is it obligatory for the duty-bound to obey the actual precept by repeating it within or out of the time or is it not so and he can content himself with what he has done in accordance with the practical principle or the authorized conjectural proof ? It is well-known among Shī‘a scholars that there is no replacement, neither in precepts nor in objects. In order to deal with the problem, however, we have to consider some different states, for acting in opposition to the actuality is sometimes because of authorized conjectural proof and sometimes because of practical principle on the one hand and the error is either revealed with certainty or by an authoritative proof on the other.

2.1. The Replacement with respect to the Authorized Conjectural Proof When the Error Is Revealed with Certainty

The authorized conjectural proof concerns either precepts, such as an authorized conjectural proof denoting obligation of djumu‘a prayers on Friday instead of żuhr in The Occultation Time (the time when the twelfth Imām is in occultation), or objects, such as evidence denoting juristic purity of a cloth in which one has performed his prayers while it is revealed later that it has not been so.

2.1.1. In the Precepts

There is no replacement in precepts because of consensus of Shiites on takhţi’a, i.e., the belief that the jurist may or may not attain the actuality (opp. taşwīb, i.e., to hold that the jurist always attains the actuality). For Shiites, there are constant precepts with God in respect of which both scholar and ignorant are common. In other words, such precepts are directed to the ignorant people as they are directed to scholars. However, they are not incontrovertible with respect to the incapable ignorant (al-djāhil al-qāşir) while he is ignorant, i.e., he would be excused should he oppose the actual precept because of following the authorized conjectural proof. For according to Shī‘a, the authorized conjectural proof is a sheer way to acquire the actuality playing no other role. Thus, in case of error revelation there will remain no excuse, but rather the actuality will become incontrovertible without the duty-bound having done anything which can replace it.

There is only one way to the belief in the replacement: if one holds that the authorized conjectural proof of obligation of something creates an obligatory good in that thing in such a way that such good attains the good of the actuality and compensates for the good of the actual mandatory act. According to this, the authorized conjectural proof is considered as something principal by itself and not a way to acquire the precept. This means taşwīb as attributed to Mu‘tazila, i.e., to hold that although there are actual precepts with God, His precepts are subject to opinions of jurists and any opinion declared by a jurist He has already made a precept in accordance with it. This idea is nullified by Shiite scholars, though its detailed discussion is beyond the level of an introductory work.

2.1.2. In the Objects

For Shiites, the authorized conjectural proof is taken as sheer way with regard to objects too. Hence, should the authorized conjectural proof not attain the actuality, the actuality would still be there without occurring any good to compensate for the good of actuality. The only point here is that the dutybound will be excused in case of error - as was the case with the authorized conjectural proof. The reason why the authorized conjectural proof is taken as sheer way with regard to objects is not the problem of taşwīb, since no taşwīb occurs here, but rather is that the very proof which authorizes the authorized conjectural proof in precepts authorizes it in objects, without any difference in depiction.

2.2. The Replacement with respect to the Practical Principles When the Error Is Revealed with Certainty

Doubtless to act in accordance with the practical principle is allowed only where no persuasive proof of the precept is found by the duty-bound, and he has to refer to it as a duty considered for an ignorant person in order to escape from perplexity. Thus, as will be explained in the fourth chapter, the practical principle is in fact a duty in the position of action for an ignorant, doubtful person in order to remove his perplexity.

Generally speaking, practical principles are of two kinds: intellectual, and juristic. Intellectual principles are those which are judged by the intellect without inclusion of any apparent juristic precept, such as the principle of precaution (iĥtiyāţ), that of option (takhyīr), and that of intellectual clearance (al-barā’a al-‘aqliyya). Juristic principles are those which are made by the divine lawgiver for the state of doubt and perplexity, such as the principle of continuity of the previous state (istişĥāb) and that of juristic clearance (al-barā’a al-shar‘iyya).

As for the principle of precaution, whether intellectual or juristic, discussion of replacement is nonsense, for it is assumed in this principle that the dutybound has acted in a way that the actual precept, whatever it may be, is acquired.

The case is the same with other intellectual principles, for it is assumed that they do not include any apparent precept so that one may inquire whether or not they replace the actual precept. Theme of such principles is merely removal of the punishment and excusing duty-bounds.

The dispute, therefore, can be assumed only over juristic principles other than precaution, such as the principle of clearance (barā’a), that of continuity of the previous state (istişĥāb), that of lawfulness (ĥilliyya), and that of purity (ţahāra). When no replacement can be assumed with regard to authorized conjectural proofs, it becomes clear that no replacement will be plausible with regard to those principles; since they are merely temporal, practical duties for the ignorant, doubtful duty-bound in order to remove his perplexity - they bear no relation to the actuality. Thus, the actual precept is still there; and when that precept becomes known through the error revelation, it becomes incontrovertible. To follow the practical principle has no good but that of removal of the perplexity; hence, it has no good to compensate for the good of the actuality so that it can replace it.

2.3. The Replacement with respect to Both Authorized Conjectural Proof and Practical Principle When the Error Is Revealed by an Authoritative Proof

This is the major problem in this discussion, since many times jurists change their opinions according to which the previous acts become apparently nullified, and laymen encounter the same problem because of following them.

Also, laymen sometimes change their minds and refer to another jurist whose opinions sometimes oppose those of the first jurist, and the problem again occurs.

Before discussing the problem, we should bear in mind that there are three kinds of acts in this connection: coming acts with no relation to the past, passed acts with no effect in the future, and coming acts related to the past. Doubtless both jurist and layman should follow the newly established authoritative proof in the first case. As for the second case, there is no doubt that acts done in the past are over without any need to be repeated. The problem is concerning the third case; for instance, the error is revealed within the time of a mandatory act or out of the time but repetition of the act is obligatory, such as the prayers, or one has married without pronouncing the respective formula in Arabic and now the newly established authoritative proof necessitates that while his wife is still with him.

Now, let us deal with the problem:

In the objects, it is quite well-known that there is no replacement and what has been done previously should be repeated in accordance with the new proof.

As for the precepts, it is claimed that there is a consensus on the replacement, especially with regard to juristic duties such as the prayers. This alleged consensus, however, is not in accordance with the principle in such cases, since what is principally necessitated is non-replacement.

The only argument supporting the replacement is that although it is true that the duty-bound should follow the newly established authoritative proof in the future, his previous acts have been done in accordance with some authoritative proof in that time and hence they should not be repeated.

That argument is not sound, however, for the change occurred is either a change in the actual precept or in what has been an authoritative proof of the duty-bound and nothing else. Annulment of the first state is absolutely clear, since it clearly necessitates taşwīb. As for the second, if by that is meant that the first authoritative proof has been authoritative with regard to previous acts in their own time it has nothing to do with the coming acts as well as effects of previous ones; and if it is meant that the first authoritative proof is absolutely authoritative even with regard to the coming acts as well as effects of previous ones it is absolutely null and void, for in the change of opinion of a jurist it is revealed that the previous proof has not absolutely been authoritative even with regard to the coming acts, or that the jurist thought it was authoritative proof while it was not so, and not that the first proof has absolutely been authoritative and the second one is another authoritative proof. The case is the same with the layman’s following another jurist, for what is necessitated by following the second jurist is revelation of annulment of acts done in accordance with opinions of the first. Since on the one hand the previous authoritative proof, i.e., the first following, is not authoritative with regard to the coming effects, though it has been authoritative in its time, and on the other hand it is assumed that the actual precept is not changed, it becomes mandatory for the layman to act in accordance with the actual authoritative proof and what it necessitates.

Thus, should there really be a consensus on the replacement it would definitely be followed; otherwise, there is principally no room for the replacement in the precepts.

Change in the Certitude

Should the duty-bound become certain of something and act in accordance with it and should the error of his certitude become certainly revealed later, doubtless there would be no replacement. For, he has done nothing, in no way, to attain the good of actuality in his first certitude; so, how can the actual precept be removed? In fact, there has been no command directed to the dutybound; he has just been thinking so. Thus, he should obey the actuality within or out of the time.

CHAPTER 9: THE PRELIMINARY OF THE MANDATORY ACT (MUQADDIMA AL-WĀDJIB)

It is absolutely clear for every wise man that if something is mandatory while its actualization is dependent upon some preliminaries it is necessary for him to acquire those preliminaries in order to actualize that act through them. This is for certain. The only thing which is a matter of doubt and dispute among Uşūlīs is that whether or not this intellectual necessity reveals a juristic necessity as well, i.e., whether juristic obligation of something necessitates intellectually the juristic obligation of its preliminaries. In other words, the intellect doubtlessly judges that preliminaries of a mandatory act are mandatory. Now, does it judge that they are mandatory with the divine lawgiver as well? Thus, the intellectual implication between intellectual judgment and juristic obligation is the matter of dispute here.

The outcome of this discussion is deduction of juristic obligation of preliminaries in addition to their intellectual obligation, and this is enough as an outcome of a problem in uşūl al-fiqh. However, this is not a practical outcome, for when preliminaries are intellectually mandatory the duty-bound has no way to leave them undone, and in such case to believe in their obligation or nonobligation is of no use. Nevertheless, there are a lot of scholarly outcomes for this discussion on the one hand and it is related to a good number of practical, juristic problems on the other - something that Uşūlīs cannot ignore. That is why this discussion mostly deals with such problems as varieties of conditions and preliminaries, their possibility or otherwise, and the like; and discussing the very implication seems somehow a marginal issue. However, since such subtle, complicated discussions are higher than the level of an introductory work, we ignore them.

As for the opinions with regard to juristic obligation of the preliminary of the mandatory act, various differentiations are made by Uşūlīs. The justifiable opinion, however, is that it is absolutely not mandatory. For, as proved in discussions of independent intellectual proofs, in cases where judgment of intellect for necessity of something exists in such a way that it calls the dutybound to do that thing there will remain no room for the Lord’s command as He is the Lord. The discussion in question is among such things with respect to the cause, for if the command to that which has preliminary calls the dutybound to do the commanded act, that call will necessarily, due to the judgment of intellect, make him actualize whatever the commanded act is dependent upon in order to acquire that act. And with the assumption of existence of that motive in the duty-bound’s soul there will remain no need for another motive from the Lord while He, as was assumed, knows that such motive exists; for the Lord as He is the Lord commands only for the sake of motivating the dutybound to do the commanded act and establishing motive in his soul where there is no motivation. Furthermore, to establish a second motive from the Lord in such case is impossible, for it is acquiring what is already acquired -

something impossible.

In other words, if the command to that which has preliminary is not enough to call the duty-bound to do the preliminary, no command to the preliminary will be enough to call to the preliminary as it is preliminary; and if the command to that which has preliminary is enough to call and motive to the preliminary, no need will remain for the command from the Lord - rather it is in vain, or impossible, since it is acquiring what is already acquired. That is why commands to some preliminaries should be predicated upon being guides to consideration of such preliminaries as conditions for the mandatory act - as is the case with all commands where there exists an intellectual judgment.

CHAPTER 10: THE PROBLEM OF THE OPPOSITE (MAS’ALA AL-ĐIDD)

Uşūlīs have disputed whether or not to command something necessitates prohibiting its opposite. By the opposite in this discussion is meant that which is incompatible, in its broadest sense, with something else; hence, it covers both the “opposite” and the “contradictory” in their philosophical senses - the former being an existential while the latter being a non-existential affair. That is why Uşūlīs have divided the opposite into “the general opposite”, i.e., eschewal which is non-existential, and “the particular opposite”, i.e., the existential, incompatible affair - and we will deal with those two separately since opinions differ with regard to either of them.

The dispute is, then, whether or not something commanded by the Lord would necessitate, intellectually or literally, that He, as He is the Lord, has prohibited its general or particular opposite. If positive, there is another dispute over how this can be proved.

1. The General Opposite (al-Đidd al-‘Āmm)

The dispute over the general opposite is not over the necessity in principle, for Uşūlīs apparently agree about the necessity; they disagree only on its nature.

They have declared various opinions in this connection. Some have said that the necessity is the sameness, i.e., to command something is the same with prohibiting its opposite. Some have said that since the command is composed of wish of something and prohibition of its eschewal, the prohibition of eschewal is analytical part of meaning of obligation. Some have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most particular sense; hence, the denotation is literal, but implicative. Others have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most general sense or an unclear necessitation; hence, the denotation is merely intellectual.

The justifiable opinion, however, is that there exists no necessity of any kind, i.e., there is no religious prohibition of eschewal necessitated by the very command in such a way that there exists a juristic prohibition beyond the very command to the act. The reason is that the obligation, whether it is denotation of the imperative or its intellectual implication - the latter being true - is not a composite concept; but rather it is a simple, single one which is necessity of the act. A requisite of obligation of something, of course, is prohibition of its eschewal. However, that prohibition is not a juristic prohibition made by the Lord as He is the Lord, but rather is an intellectual secondary prohibition without there being a prohibition from the divine lawgiver beyond the very obligation. The reason is obvious: the very command to do something in an obligatory mode is sufficient to prohibit its eschewal; so, there is no need for the divine lawgiver to prohibit eschewal of something in addition to commanding it.

2. The Particular Opposite (al-Đidd al-Khāşş)

To hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitation the prohibition of its general opposite; and since, as proved, there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is no juristic prohibition of the particular opposite either. Thus, to command something necessitates prohibiting neither its general nor its particular opposite.

The question, however, is that how to hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitating the prohibition of its general opposite. The answer is that those who believe in the prohibition of the particular opposite have only two ways in this connection both of which being dependent upon and secondary to that:

2.1. The Way of Implication

According to this way, unlawfulness of one of two implicative affairs needs and necessitates unlawfulness of the other. Since it is assumed that doing the particular opposite, such as eating, implicates eschewal of the commanded act (which is the general opposite), such as the prayers, on the one hand and the general opposite, i.e., eschewal of the prayers, is unlawful on the other, the particular opposite, i.e., eating, should also be unlawful. It is clearly seen that prohibition of the particular opposite is dependent upon prohibition of the general opposite according to this way.

However, since we held that there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is nothing to make us hold that the particular opposite is juristically prohibited because of such alleged implication; for, according to what we proved, the other implicative affair is not prohibited.

Furthermore, this way is incorrect per se : its major premise, i.e.,unlawfulness of one of two implicative affairs necessitating unlawfulness of the other, is not acceptable. For it is not necessary that two implicative affairs should have the same precept, whether obligation, unlawfulness, or any other one, while the criterion of the precept of one of them does not exist in the other. Of course, they should not disagree in the obligation and unlawfulness in such a way that one of them is mandatory and the other is prohibited, since it becomes impossible for the duty-bound to obey both of them in such case and it thereby becomes impossible for the Lord to command both of them. In such case, either one of them is prohibited, or the other is mandatory.

2.2. The Way of Being Preliminary

According to this way, eschewal of the particular opposite is a preliminary (muqaddima) of doing the commanded act. The syllogism is like this, for example:

eschewal of eating is a preliminary of performing the prayers, preliminary of the mandatory act is mandatory, therefore eschew of the particular opposite is mandatory. If eschewal of eating is mandatory, its eschewal, i.e., eschewal of eschewal of eating, is prohibited; for to command something necessitates prohibiting its general opposite. And if eschewal of eschewal of eating is prohibited, its doing is prohibited; for negation of negation is affirmation.

Thus, the particular opposite is prohibited. It is clearly seen that prohibition of the particular opposite is dependent upon prohibition of the general opposite according to this way.

However, since we held that there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, eschewal of eschewal of the particular opposite will not be juristically prohibited, i.e., doing the particular opposite will not be prohibited.

Furthermore, this way is incorrect from two other aspects:

1. This way, as it is clearly seen, is dependent upon obligation of the preliminary of the mandatory act, while we proved that it is not juristically mandatory; therefore, eschewal of the particular opposite is not juristically mandatory so that its doing should be prohibited.

2. We do not accept that eschewal of the particular opposite is a preliminary of doing the commanded act. This that eschewal of the particular opposite is a preliminary of doing the commanded act has always been a matter of lengthy, complicated discussion among later Uşūlīs. Nevertheless, since its annulment is clear according to what we said, there is no need for us to deal with it. In order to eradicate that fallacy, however, we have to explain it briefly here:

The claim of one who holds that eschewal of the opposite is a preliminary of its opposite is dependent upon this that lack of opposite is an example of lack of impediment with regard to the other opposite - because of reciprocal prevention of two opposite affairs, i.e., impossibility of their conjunction - and doubtless lack of impediment is among preliminaries; for it is among supplements to the cause, since it is well-known that the complete cause consists of the origin (al-muqtađī) and lack of impediment (almāni‘). Thus, the minor premise here is “lack of the opposite is an example of lack of impediment to its opposite” (because of reciprocal prevention of two opposite affairs), and the major premise is “lack of impediment is among preliminaries,” which concludes that “lack of opposite is among preliminaries of the other opposite.”

The fallacy is caused by consideration of the term “impediment” in an absolute manner treating it as having the same meaning in both premises, while the truth is that it has two different meanings in each premise and the middle term is not repeated in order to form a correct syllogism. By reciprocal prevention is sometimes meant reciprocal prevention in the existence, i.e., impossibility of conjunction and incompatibility of two things; and this is the meaning intended in the minor premise, since two opposite things can have no conjunction in the existence and are incompatible with one another. Reciprocal prevention, however, is sometimes used in the sense of prevention in the influence even though there may exist no contradiction in the existence. This meaning exists in two origins of two effects which are incompatible with one another, for the object is capable of allowing only influence of one origin; hence, the two origins encounter reciprocal prevention, since each of them can influence only on the condition of lack of the other. This is the meaning intended in the major premise, for the impediment whose lack is a condition for the influence of the origin is the other origin which opposes the influence of the first. That lack of impediment is either because the origin does not exist at all, or because it exists but has not reached the level of overcoming the other in the influence.

Thus, we agree that lack of the opposite is an example of lack of impediment, but this is lack of impediment in the existence while that which is among preliminaries is lack of impediment in the influence. Hence, the middle term is not repeated, and that syllogism does not conclude that lack of the opposite is among preliminaries.

The Outcome of This Discussion

Outcomes of this discussion mentioned by Uşūlīs are peculiar to the particular opposite the most important of which being veraciousness of that opposite which is an act of worship according to the opinion that to command something does not necessitate prohibiting its opposite and its annulment according to the contrary opinion.

Should there be a mandatory act (no matter it is an act of worship or not) whose opposite is an act of worship (which is, in turn, commanded) and the mandatory act is preferable to that opposite, the actual, incontrovertible command would be the former and not the latter; for objects of commands are opposite, this causing interference of commands, while the first is preferable in the divine lawgiver’s view. Now, if we hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite, the opposite which is an act of worship will be prohibited, and prohibiting an act of worship necessitates its annulment; and if we believe that to command something does not necessitate prohibiting its particular opposite, the opposite which is an act of worship will not be prohibited and hence will not be annulled.

Preference of the mandatory act to its opposite which is an act of worship occurs in four cases:

1. Where the opposite which is an act of worship is recommended (and it is doubtlessly clear that the mandatory takes precedence over the recommended), such as conjunction of a mandatory and a recommended prayers. According to the opinion that to command something necessitates prohibiting its opposite, one cannot perform the recommended prayers if the time for the mandatory prayers has just begun, and should one do so one’s recommended prayers would be annulled. According to this opinion, therefore, one who has not performed some of one’s daily prayers is absolutely not allowed to perform recommended prayers and must first perform belatedly one’s missed mandatory prayers. According to the contrary opinion, however, unlawfulness of performing recommended prayers in such case is in need of specific proof.

2. Where the opposite which is an act of worship is mandatory but it is less important than the first, such as conjunction of saving a life and performing the mandatory prayers.

3. Where the opposite which is an act of worship is mandatory but it is extended while the first is restricted (and it is doubtlessly clear that the restricted takes precedence over the extended even though the extended may be more important), such as conjunction of purifying the mosque and performing mandatory prayers when its time is extended.

4. Where the opposite which is an act of worship is mandatory but it is optional while the first is determinate (and it is doubtlessly clear that the determinate takes precedence over the optional even though the optional may be more important, since the optional has a substitute), such as conjunction of a travel which has become mandatory through a vow and fasting as a penance; for should the duty-bound not travel and fast instead, his fast would be prohibited and annulled according to the opinion that to command something necessitates prohibiting its opposite.

It should be added that such occurrences are not sufficient for the outcomes to appear, and we are in need of two more points in this connection:

a) To hold that prohibition of a mandatory act of worship necessitates its annulment; for it is clear that should it not be so, the opposite which is an act of worship would be veracious whether one holds that to command something necessitates prohibiting its opposite or not.

The truth is that prohibition of a mandatory act of worship necessitates its annulment, and this will be discussed in detail in chapter 12.

b) To hold that veraciousness of an act of worship and its capability to take the duty-bound closer to God is not dependent upon its being actually commanded, but rather its essential desirability for the Lord is sufficient for that purpose - even though there may not be an actual command, because of some impediment. It is clear that should we hold the contrary opinion, that outcome would never occur; for in that case the opposite which is an act of worship is not actually commanded, because of interference of two commands, and where there is no command the act of worship will not be veracious even though we hold that to command something does not necessitate prohibiting its opposite.

The justifiable opinion is the first, for it is sufficient for capability of an act to take the duty-bound closer to God to be related to the Lord and to be done by the duty-bound with the intention of getting closer to Him, while there exists no impediment to that such as its being prohibited or to do it being law-making.