Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Role of MuhammadBaqir Al-Sadr inShi'a Political Activism in Iraq From 1958 to 1980

By T.M Aziz

www.victorynewsmagazine.com

www.alhassanain.org/english

Published on7th January, 2003 (4thZhul Qa'dah , 1423).This work was written by T.M Aziz and was contributed to Victory News Magazine byMr A.GKarim . Editing and design byZaynab El-Fatah. Technical work provided byS.Abidin

©All rights reserved 2008. VictoryNewsMagazine.com

Notice:

This workis published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english

The typingerrorsaren’t corrected.

Table of Contents

Dedication: 5

Chapter One: Sadr is Executed 6

Chapter Two: The Rise of Sadr 7

The Communist Party 7

Chapter Three: al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (Religious Academy) 8

Al-Hakim's Fatwa Identifying Communism With Atheism 8

Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959) and Iqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961) 8

Chapter Four: Back to Hawza 10

Mujtama’una (Our Society) 10

Planned Establishment of Western-style Universities 10

Usul al-Din College in Baghdad 11

Chapter Five: Golden Era For Modern Shi’a Politics 12

Chapter Six: Confrontation with the Ba’th Party 13

Ayatullah Khomeini Not Executed by Shah of Iran 15

Chapter Seven: Ashurra Commemorations Banned 16

Chapter Eight: Encounters with the Ba’th Party: The Final Episode 18

Sadr Issues Fatwa Against The Ba'th Party 19

Chapter Nine: Sadr Detained- Bint Al-Huda Gives Fiery Speech 20

Chapter Ten: Sadr Interrogated 21

Security Forces Come For them Both 22

Conclusion 23

Sadr Was Dragged into Public Opposition 23

References 25

Dedication:

This workis dedicated to the memory ofShahid MuhammadBaqir Al-Sadr and his Sister,Shahidah Amina bint al-Huda who were both executed in the name of God's religion.

Chapter One:Sadr isExecuted

On April 8, 1980, MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr was executed . His execution aroused no criticism from the West against the Iraqi regime, however, becauseSadr had openly supported theAyatullah Khomeini’s regime in Iran and because the Westwas distracted by the turbulence in Iran that followed the revolution. Governments both in the West and in the region were concerned that the Iranian revolution would be “exported,” and they set about eliminating that threat. WhenAyatullah Khomeini called upon Muslims in Iraq to follow the example of the Iranian people and rise up against the corrupt secularBa’thist socialist regime, they interpreted it as the first step in the spread of Islamic radicalism that would eventually lead to thedestabilisation of the whole region.

Sadr’s support of the Khomeini crusade against theBa’thists was considered a threat to the Iraqi regime and dealt with swiftly . Thousandswere arrested , and hundreds were executed without trial.Sadr as the head of a movement that had gained popular support from the success of the Iranian revolution, emerged as an anti-governmental leader and a catalyst for anti-Ba’thist activity, and was regarded by his followers as the “future Khomeini” of Iraq.(1) TheBa’thist regime decided that he had to be eliminated if the regime was to survive.Sadr’s execution, hence, was the act of an authoritarian regime fighting for its survival.

What made political Islam such a grave danger to the regimes in the area was not simply its popular appeal, but also the grassroots organizations that embraced its principles and political slogans.In almost all Middle East countries Islamic political groups had, since the turn of the century, been bent on achieving their principal goal of establishing a state based on the principles and teachings of Islam, and these very organizations had paved the way for the victory of the revolution in Iran,(2) Khomeini also found in them both the means and the political muscle to export Islamic revolutionary ideas to the rest of the Middle East.

Some of these organizations, including the IslamicDa’wa Party which Sadr founded, had existed in Iraq before the Islamic revolution in Iran and theBa’thist regime in Iraq.Sadr was also the mastermind behind a program that aimed to establish an Islamic state not only in Iraq,but throughout the Islamic world. The roleSadr played in theShi’a community in Iraq at large and his effort to counter the political acquiescence of the religious establishment and to confront the political oppression there made him theShi’a leader in that country. A detailed account of the events that led to the rise and fall ofSadr is therefore useful for placingSadr in the context of Iraqi politics in general and of the Islamic movement in particular.

Chapter Two: The Rise ofSadr

In 1958, a military coupd’etat began a period of great turmoil in Iraq that changed its political system and social fabric.The kingdom that had been engineered by British occupation forces in 1921, was replaced by a “republic” under the rule of a military junta ; the royal family and the ruling class were executed. The head of the military junta, GeneralQasim , who had led the revolt gained popular support unprecedented in modern Iraqi history, in part because of his policy of dissociating Iraq from Britain, which included withdrawing from the CENTO alliance known as the “Baghdad Pact” and closing British military bases in the country.(3)

The Communist Party

With the coup in place, a variety of political groups sought a place in the new regime, and in the process created anarchy. Some, of which the Communist Party was the best organized, were given a voice in the new regime. To increase his power base in the country,Qasim used the Communists to eliminate his colleagues in the ruling junta who were loyal to the Arab nationalist movements. In the bloody street fighting that followed, especially in the northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk where the nationalist officers attempted a military coup againstQasim , the Communists emerged as the major political force.(4)

TheShi’ia religious establishment, acquiescent since its last revolt against the British in 1920, found itself challenged by atheist political forces who, if left unchecked, might wipe Islam from the lives of the people,(5) for the nation seemed to be welcoming the secularism and antireligious sentiments of the new regime and to accept Communist propaganda, which denounced the religious establishment as reactionary and religion as an obstacle to modernization and the progress of the people. The Communist forces then began to penetrate the religious establishment itself in the holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, andKadhimiyah , even recruiting members of religious families, but the religious leadership (marja’iyya ) under the GrandMujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim took steps to overcome these challenges.

Chapter Three: al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (Religious Academy)

TheShi’a religious establishment in the al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (religious academy)was divided between traditional scholars who advocated indifference or aloofness from politics and activists who advocated involvement. The latter organized themselves into theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ in Najaf(6) to counter antireligious trends in society.MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr was at that time a young scholar and was not considered an official member of theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ which was made up mainly of elders and well-knownmujtahids .(7) He was able, however, to exert influence on the group through his father-in-lawShaykh Murtaza AlYasiyn , who was acting president of the group, and through his older brother, Ismail al-Sadr , amujtahid who held a senior position in theJama’at . (8)

According toTalib al-Rifa’i , theJama’at al-‘Ulama ’ had as its immediate objective countering the Communistchallenge to Islam. In theirmanoeuvring , they were realistic enough to appease the popularQasim ; in their public leaflets and announcements, they supported him while attacking the Communists. As a reward, theQasim regime gave them access to the government-controlled radio. The weekly public statements of theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ were written bySadr and delivered byHadi al-Hakim.(9)

Al-Hakim's Fatwa Identifying CommunismWith Atheism

This appeasement did not last long. Conflict between the religious leadership andQasim erupted whenAyatullah Muhsin al-Hakim issued a fatwa that identified Communism with atheism and forbade Muslims from joining the Communist Party or helping its cause. The fatwa embarrassed theQasim government and forced GeneralQasim to abandon the Iraqi Communist Party.Qasim made several requests to visitAyatullah Hakim, but the latter refused to meet with him until he had abrogated the civil-liberties’ law, which violated the Islamic codes of inheritance.( 10)

For two years during the appeasement period theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ had been given permission to publish a monthly journal al-Awa’ (the Lights), whose objective was to counter the intense secular and antireligious propaganda that had followed the 1958 revolution.According toTalib al-Rifa’i ,Muhsin al-Hakim had suggested it, but since it was not acceptable for amarja ’ to sponsor a political publication, theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ was asked to assume the task.(11) Sadr wrote its editorials, which he used to outline the basic political program of the Islamic movement,(12) and in the process discovered that he had a talent for writing persuasively.

Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959) andIqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961)

During the same period,Sadr published his first philosophical study,Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959),(13) a critique of communism, the materialist school of thought, and dialectic materialism, in whichSadr argued, that communism had too many flaws and shortcomings to be considered the final truth for mankind. It could not be the answer to society’s problems because its basic assumptions were false,Sadr contended. His second work,Iqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961), criticized the economic theories of communism and capitalism and introduced an Islamic theory of political economy in an effort to counter the argument by secularists and communists that Islam lacked solutions to the problems of man in modern time.Sadr’s major task inIqtisaduna was to show that Islam was concerned with man’s economic welfare. Infact his major intellectual achievement was his formulation of an Islamic economic doctrine based on Islamic law; he was the first to do so.

Sadr and his colleagues also confronted the secular forces on a third front through the establishment of theDa’wa Party. According toTalib al-Rifa’i , itwas founded byMahdi al-Hakim, al-Rifa’i and another, unknown, person. Al-Rifa’i later introducedSadr to the party leadership, andSadr eventually became its head,( 14) playing an important role in setting party structure and doctrine,(15) and later its supremejurisconsult (faqih al-hizb ). Even the name of the party,Da’wa (“Call”), was said to beSadr’s idea.( 16) The aim of theDa’wa was to organize dedicated Muslim believers with the goal of seizing power and establishing an Islamic state. To achieve that goal it would indoctrinate revolutionaries, fight the corrupt regime, and establish an Islamic state; then it would go on to implement Islamic laws and export the Islamic revolution to the rest of the world.( 17) This grand plan was said to beSadr’s idea. The first stage had to be clandestine to secure the party against a crackdown, so the partywas organized in a hierarchical multi-branch cell structure. Its activities were not to be limited to Iraq only, but were to go on in otherShi’a communities around the world. To that end, branches were secretly formed in the Gulfstates and in Lebanon; attempts to form them in Iran were unsuccessful.

Chapter Four: Back toHawza

By 1960,Sadr was one of the leadingmujtahids in the religious school of Najaf with a distinguished reputation in jurisprudence (fiqh andusul al-fiqh ).His seniors in theHawza therefore advised him to give up his political role in theDa’wa party and on the Awa’, which were detrimental to his leadership in theHawza and prepare himself for becoming the future grandmarja ’ of theShi’i (thehawza would not accept an activemujtahid for the position of grandmarja ’ , at least not a member of a political party).(18) Themarja ’ is usually selected from among the leadingmujtahid in thefiqh andusul al-fiqh , and the candidate has to prove his capacity in these areas by using the Socratic method in his teaching and by publishing his legal opinions. Since being appointed depended on the approval of the teachers andmujtahids in theHawza , the prospect ofSadr’s becoming the grandmarja ’ of allShi’as was in jeopardy so long as he continued to be politically active. Although pressure onSadr to give up his political activities seemed to come mainly from the formermarja ’Muhsin al-Hakim, many factions in theHawza were critical ofSadr’s activism. Led by Hussein al-Safi,( 19) a public campaign was launched againstSadr depicting his activities as harmful to the survival of theHawza .(20) A group in theJama’at , influenced by the propaganda againstSadr , began to show their dissatisfaction with him as well.(21) Sadr’s editorials in al-Awa’ also raised a disturbing question: they were subtitledRisalatuna (Our Message), but the enemies ofSadr questioned whether they represented the views of theJama’at at all. Finally, in 1961Muhsin al-Hakim, through his sonMahdi , persuadedSadr to give up his post asfaqih of theDa’wa party and as editor of Awa’.(22)

Mujtama’una (Our Society)

After his resignationSadr confined himself to the traditional way of life of theHawza , avoiding activities that might jeopardize hismarja ’ status . He even delayed the publication of his long awaited book,Mujtama’una (Our Society) because, according to some sources, the time was not ripe for it.(23) According to members of theDa’wa party, however,Sadr kept in touch with the party through one of his pupils.(24) As for the Awa’,Fadlullah notes thatSadr encouraged him to write its editorials.(25)

Planned Establishment of Western-style Universities

Sadr’s passion for reformwas now directed toward thehawza itself.First it was necessary to modernize its curriculum: for the past century and a half, Najaf’shawza had emphasized onlyfiqh andusul al-fiqh because that was what Najaf was noted for; other Islamic studies were considered minor or unimportant, and thehawza’s teachers paid little attention to them.Sadr was also uneasy over the irregular attendance of the students and their neglect of their studies. He felt that students must complete their courses with distinction before they could claim to be religious scholars (‘alim )(26) and proposed a new textbookon the grounds that the old ones were not written for students. A textbook, according toSadr , must take into consideration the student’s ability to comprehend the subject only gradually from its basic concepts to its most recent development.Sadr’s plan embraced not only the use of textbooks of the sort used in modern academic institutions, but the establishment of Western-style universities that would hold the student responsible for completing certain courses and passing regular examinations.

Usul al-Din College in Baghdad

To implement his reforms,Sadr helped establish theUsul al-Din College in Baghdad in 1964 and set up its curriculum.(27) He later wrote three textbooks on the Qur’an, theusul al-fiqh , and Islamic economics for first and second year college students.(28) However, his efforts to carry out his reforms in theHawza itself faced stubborn resistance from both students and its antiquated establishment.

Chapter Five: Golden EraFor ModernShi’a Politics

The years 1964-1968 were a “golden era” for modernShi’i politics, first because theBa’thist-Arif regime felt indebted to theShi’a religious establishment for its help in discrediting and oustingQasim’s regime and second because the new regime gained legitimacy from theShi’a leaders who supported their crackdown on Communist forces in the country (ironically, most of those prosecuted were alsoShi’as ). The relative freedom theShi’a enjoyed during that period resulted from the continuous struggle between theBa’thists andArif , between the Arab nationalists and the Communists, and among theBa’thists themselves. The regime was so preoccupied withthis internal fighting that it turned a blind eye toShi’a political activities, though later, it oustedShi’as from the few governmental posts they had gained underQasim .

Free from government interference, theDa’wa party increased its membership in the universities and among the intelligentsia. According toDa’wa sources, more than 1,500 copies of theDa’wa official, but underground, journal, theawt al-Da’wa ,were distributed to members and supporters in the University of Baghdad alone. Students showed their commitment in a march known as themawakb al-talaba (students’ procession) in Karbala at the annual commemoration of the martyrdom of the ImamHusayn . Al-Hakim expanded his influence by increasing enrolment in theHawza in Najaf and by developing plans to establish a Western-styleShica academy inKufa , where a college education would become available toShi’a youths who would someday be influential in political affairs.He also established new religiouscentres and libraries in several Iraqi cities directed by missionaries known aswukala ’ (representatives). The religious scholars of Baghdad andKadhimiyah organized an association, similar to theJama’at al-Ulama ’ in Najaf, known as theHay’at Jama’at al-Ulama ’fi Baghdadwa al-Kadhimiyah .(29)

Chapter Six: Confrontation with theBa’th Party

TheBa’th Party’s rise to power on July 17, 1968, started a new phase in the conflict betweenShi’a leaders,Muhsin al-Hakim and MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr , and the central government in Baghdad. The regime faced two leaders, whoboth had charisma and political clout, al-Hakim through his symbolic leadership of theShi’a worldwide, andSadr through his influence over theDa’wa . The stability of the new regime depended on withstanding them.Its first step toward limiting theShi’a’s power was to curtail their religious activities, which included the closing of theJawadayn elementary and high schools and theUsul al-Din college in Baghdad, confiscating the land and funds set aside for buildingKufa University, shutting down theRisalat al-Islam, the only religious journal the government allowed to be published at that time, prohibiting themawakb al-talaba in Karbala, expelling hundreds of non-Iraqi students from thehawza in Najaf, and issuing a law requiring Iraqis attending thehawza to join the armed forces.

TheShi’a leaders appeared tobe disorganized and theBa’th regime to catch them by surprise. Unaware of theBa’thist’s plan to eliminate the political structure of theShi’a community, its leaders met to figure out some peaceful means for dealing with the government and decided on a public protest. TheHay’at al-Ulama ’ suggested thatMuhsin al-Hakim visit Baghdad to mobilizeShi’a support against the government.(30) Al-Hakim took up residence inKadhimiyah to receive supporters;Sadr went to Lebanon to organize protest from abroad and use the office of theShi’a supreme council headed by his cousin Musa al-Sadr to campaign against the Iraqi government. Telegramswere sent by Musa al-Sadr to the heads of the Islamic states and Islamic groups calling attention to theBa’thist’s government harassment of the religious leadership in Najaf. The result of these efforts was disappointing. Only Nasser of Egypt, Faisal of Saudi Arabia,Iriyani of North Yemen, and theJama’at-i Islami of Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in Pakistan gave any moralsupport, and no one acted.

On his return to Iraq,Sadr , with the cooperation of theJama’at of Najaf and theHay’at of Baghdad andKadhimiyah , held a public meeting at the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf to support al-Hakim and condemn theBa’thist government action.The statement, which was delivered to the audience byMahdi al-Hakim, had been drafted bySadr .(31) The next step tobe taken against the government, according toMurtada al-Askari , was to organize a mass demonstration in Baghdad in support of al-Hakim.(32) However, before the plan was carried out theBa’thist government announced thatMahdi al-Hakim was plotting to overthrow the government in a military coup with the help of some generals andShi’a businessmen who had links to Iran and the West (by which they meant the United States and Israel).(33) This accusation put theShi’a leaders on the defensive and diluted their support. Mahdi al-Hakim was smuggled out of the country; al-Askari went to Lebanon; andMuhsin al-Hakim retreated to Najaf where he died a few months later. His successorAyatullah Khoei , the mentor ofSadr , refrained from taking any action against theBa’thist government.( 34)

AfterMuhsin al-Hakim died, theBa’th government intensified its efforts to reduce the influence of theHawza in Najaf by expelling its non-Iraqi students (the majority of students were foreigners) and monitoring the Iraqi students there. That threw the wholeHawza into chaos. To keep non-Iraqi students in the country so they could help resist the government,Sadr convincedAyatullah Khoei to issue an order (hukm ) to students to stay in Najaf and continue their studies.(35) Unwilling to antagonize the newShi’a marja ’ ,Ayatullah Khoei , who was considered to be above politics, theBa’th government postponed implementing its deportation policy. TheBa’thist regime then started to crack down on theDa’wa party. Many suspected members of the partywere rounded up in 1972 and sentenced to one to five years in prison .(36) SahibDakhiyl , known as Abu ‘Isam , died under torture in 1973.He was the organizer of the student procession held in Karbala(37) and was also believed to have been the head of theDa’wa party’s Baghdad branch.(38) A year later, about seventy-fiveDa’wa party members, some of them religious scholars, were detained by the security forces, and five, all of whom were believed to be leaders of theDa’wa party, were sentenced to death by the revolutionary court.(39) Sentencing these people, three of themulama ’, brought a public outcry and condemnation from the religious establishment, includingKhoei , Khomeini, andSadr .(40) In order to avoid a precedent for executing religious scholars of theHawza ,Sadr issued a fatwa forbidding students or scholars of theHawza to join any political party. Later that year,Sadr himself was detained by security forces and taken from Najaf to Baghdad for interrogation, but was soon released.(41)

In the post-Hakim era,Sadr was recognized in theHawza as amarja ’ and the heir-apparent of Grandmarja ’Ayatullah Khoei .(42) However, he was aware that themarja’iyya , theShi’as ’ only true source of political leadership, lacked adequate institutional underpinning, even though it was a thousand years old. In particular, it lacked the means of enforcing decisions on therank and file of ‘ulama ’. Additionally, themarja ’ traditionally made policies and arrived at decisions using an inner circle of close associates and family members to gather information, issue statements, and distribute religious funds. There was no formal procedure for making decisions or planning long-term strategy, and that often resulted in confusion that weakened the relationship between themarja’iyya and the people.

To enhance the power of themarja’iyya ,Sadr sought, as he put it, to transform what he called the “subjectivemarja’iyya ” into an “objectivemarja’iyya .” Themarja ’ , according toSadr , must conduct his affairs and guide his people using an organized structure. To conduct the affairs of theummah , themarja ’ should set up committees to manage educational affairs in thehawza , to support Islamic studies, research, and writing on essential subjects, to look after the affairs of the ‘ulama ’ who represent themarja ’ in other cities, to support the Islamic movement, and, finally, to administer financial affairs.

However, at that timeSadr was not ready to form the institutional structure of the “objectivemarja’iyya ” because he was not the suprememarja ’ , the symbolic authority for allShi’as , a position that would give him the financial and the religious power to carry out changes. The publication of his al-Fatawa al-Wadiha , a book on religious laws, was intended in a way to announce hismarja’iyya , and prepare himself and contenders in Najaf and Qum in the traditional manner to succeedAyatullah Khoei , the grandmarja ’Sadr also had a political motive behind his early indirect announcement of interest in themarja’iyya . He thought it would protect him from government prosecution.

Ayatullah Khomeini Not Executed by Shah of Iran

Once he was amarja ’,Sadr believed, the government would spare his life regardless of his political stand, because regimes in Iraq and Iran did not execute leading jurists. A case in point was the Shah’s decision not to executeAyatullah Khomeini after themaraji ’ in Qum issued a statement proclaiming that Khomeini as one of them.Instead the Shah expelled Khomeini from Iran.

In announcing hismarja’iyya ,Sadr somehow thought he was gaining political immunity. At the publication ofSadr’s al-Fatawa al-Wadiha , members ofDa’wa party andSadr’s admirers, mostly students and intellectuals, started referring to him as theirmarja ’ and leader.

Chapter Seven:Ashurra Commemorations Banned

In early 1977, theBa’th regime took the boldest step yet to curb theShi’a when it banned the annual ceremonies commemorating ImamHusayn’s martyrdom. The regime had tried but failed to prohibit them since 1970, especially in Najaf and in Karbala. That year, theBa’th leadership was determined to use any means necessary to stop the traditional procession from Najaf to Karbala, an event that generates considerable religiousfervour . Tens of thousands ofShi’a from all over Iraq participate in the pilgrimage, which usually takes four days to cover about fifty miles. The processionwas seen by the regime as hindering their policy of secularism and as providing the religious authorities with popular support.

Banning the procession in 1977 provoked riots in Najaf. Organizers distributed leaflets that called on people to participate in defiance of the authorities to protect their religious rights.(43) The public hearings organized by theBa’th Party and the governor of Najaf did not ease the tension but rather precipitated chaos.(44) An estimated thirty thousand people began their procession holding banners printed with verses from the Qur’an, such as “The power of God is above theirs” and “Victory shall come from God.”(45)

Faced with this defiance, the regime first met with the leaders of theprocession( 46) and sought the help of MuhammadBaqir al-Hakim, who informed theShi’a that the regime was willing to lift the ban on the procession if the rioters would stop chanting anti-government slogans. However, anti-Ba’thist sentiments ran so high by then that compromise was impossible. The government on its part mobilized a military brigade with tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets to block the way to the city of Karbala.(47) Hundreds of demonstrators were able to get into the city, however, because many officers and soldiers were sympathetic to the cause and were unwilling to obey the government orders to fire on people chanting religious slogans.(48) The government then mobilized theBa’th Party security and police to suppress the procession in the streets of Karbala and to detain as many people as they could. Hundredswere imprisoned , and many were injured.

The government then formed a special revolutionary court (makamat al-thawra ) headed by three high-rankingBa’th Party leaders to try the defendants.(49) Seven peoplewere sentenced to death and fifteen, including MuhammadBaqir al-Hakim, to life imprisonment. The incident also caused a split within theBa’th leadership itself. Some high-ranking members of the party judged the action unduly harsh and seemed hesitant to take strong action. An extremist group led by theBakr -Saddam factions won by expelling the moderate group, including the members of the Special Revolutionary Court, from their government and party positions.

The regime suspectedSadr of having had a part in the demonstration. Ithad been well organized , which suggested that theDa’wa Party was behind it. Al-Hakim, the head of the group who negotiated on behalf of the regime with the rioters, was a disciple and personal representative ofSadr . His failure to gain concessions from the rioters whose links were with theDa’wa , the mainSadr organization, was one of the signs that made the regime suspect thatSadr led a behind-the-scenes conspiracy. The regime’s security forces detainedSadr and sent him to Baghdad for questioning, but released him when the people demanded it in order not to instigate another riot by theHawza .

The meaning and concept of Occultation (ghaibah)

One of the discussions highly misunderstood and in which most people falter on account of ignorance is the meaning and concept of occultation.

In the traditions, the concept of Hazrat Mahdi’s (a.t.f.s.) occultation is likened to that of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.). Now let us analyze the mode of the latter’s occultation. The brothers of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) took him and threw him in a well. As you know, Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) finally landed up at Egypt. His father Hazrat Yaqub (a.s.) knew that Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) is alive but was unaware of his whereabouts. Importantly, the brothers of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) came to him, conversed with him but failed to recognize him while he recognized them. Narrating this situation, the Holy Quran states,

« و جاء إخوهْ يوسف فدخلوا عليهِ فَعرفهْم ‎ْ و هم لَهْ منكرون ».

“And the brothers of Yusuf (a.s.) came to him. He recognized them but they failed to recognize him. [34] ”

Traditions of the infallible declare the occultation of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) to be like that of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) i.e. Allah has put a veil between him and the people in a way that « يرونهْ و لا يعرِفوْنهْ ».

“…they see him but do not recognize him.[35] ”

In other words, just as the brothers of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) could not recognize him, Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) lives among the people, they see him but cannot recognize him. We see a number of people from morning to evening on the streets but don’t know them. Or, do we recollect now as to how many people we saw yesterday on the roads?

Therefore, Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is not like Jinn, angel, fairy, etc. nor does he walk through a wall (like the invisible man). Incidentally, he does not always live a life with miracles nor does he claim to always walk through closed doors and walls nor does he claim to dominate minds in a way that they be unable to see him or recognize him.

From the above, we can state that the occultation of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is not like that of Allah the Almighty because He is without place but Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) does occupy space by residing in a place.

Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) resides on this very earth of God, walks, eats, sleeps, rests and perhaps, like all other humans, is also subject to illnesses and sickness. Of course, those who have seen him earlier and recognized him, if they see him, possible might recognize him. Thus, generally, Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) does not go to such people. Those who do not recognize him, perhaps they may see him a number of times but fail to notice him. Hence, the concept of occultation is that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is without an address. We don’t know where and how he resides.

Now, as we don’t know where and how he resides, does it mean that our ignorance is the cause of his non-existence? We approach Hazrat Yaqub (a.s.) and ask him, ‘O Yaqub! Is your son alive or not?’ He (a.s.) will reply in the affirmative. ‘Will you see him in the future?’ Again, his response is positive. We question him again, ‘Where is he now?’ He will say ‘I don’t know.’ ‘What does he eat?’ ‘I don’t know.’ ‘What does he do?’ ‘I don’t know.’ Certainly, he does not know despite being a prophet the whereabouts of his son Yusuf (a.s.). For, Allah the Almighty has not granted him this knowledge.

Similarly, if we ask the brothers of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) concerning the whereabouts of their brother, they will reply in the negative and perhaps, might even go to the extent of saying that probably their brother is not alive. Therefore, they lied in the very presence of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) and hence he did not come forward to introduce himself initially[36] . There was a gap of only 20-30 years between the brothers but they could not identify him. This is the very concept of occultation[37] . Hence, at the time of reappearance, a number of people, on seeing Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.), will vouch to have seen him earlier.

From another aspect, it cannot be said that he does not have any address at all because he does have a general address. For instance, it is said to us that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) participates in the Haj rituals every year and during this season, he is present there as the chief of the pilgrims. He does make annual trips to Mena and Arafaat.

This is one address. Any other address? Yes, he has been seen at Karbala too and at the shrines of other Imams (a.s.), his holy ancestors. Religious scholars (ulama ) of the past have also seen him at Masjid-e-Jamkaran (near Qum). But does he always sit in Masjid-e-Jamkaran that people should come there and see him? Certainly not. Similarly, there are also possibilities of meeting him at Masjid-e-Kufa, the shrine of Ameerul Momineen (a.s.) at Najaf, Masjid-e-Sahlah (in Kufa), the Cellar (at Saamarra) and other such places, but not always.

Attention and Care of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) Toward the Shias

Some of the speakers, in order to make their speeches successful, swear that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is present in their congregations. What is the proof of their claim? One should not make such claims with such ease and without any qualms. Yes, they must indeed talk about his attention and care (but not to make such claims). For, being present in one place is one thing and being attentive and caring is completely another thing. For example, I am sitting right here but can see the farthest end of this room and am also aware about it. If I open this window, my view will become more extensive and if I use binoculars, then my vision will certainly improve by leaps and bounds and I can even relate to you the details. Although I am not present there, but with the help of some unusual tools, my attention is focussed on it. Of course, one vision I have is that of the eyes.

Allah the Almighty has opened one of the windows of the unseen for His messengers (a.s.) and the infallible Imams (a.s.) that whenever they intend to refer to it, they can do so. But very often it happens that man does not want to know many things and as he does not have any intention of knowing a particular thing, his ignorance is not a defect in him. Rather, we can term it as voluntary ignorance. For example, if you ask me that how much change does you have. I will reply that I don’t know. Will this be called as ignorance? No because it is enough for me that I put my hand in my pocket, bring out the change, count it and let you know.

Thus, if a Prophet (a.s.) or an Imam (a.s.) says for a question that I don’t know or if they question others about something, it is because they don’t always use their knowledge of the unseen and this is certainly not their shortcoming. Only if he intends to know something but fails to do so, then it can be called as an imperfection. And if you question him that being in touch with the Almighty, how are you unaware about this matter, he will retort that He has not permitted here (to know).

The difference between Allah and His messengers (a.s.) and Imams (a.s.) is that everything is present with Allah. His knowledge is not made out of ignorance but is absolute. But the knowledge of His messengers (a.s.) and that of the Imams (a.s.) is with their intention and Allah’s permission. If He does not permit, they cannot know the answer of a particular question.

Thus, it is possible that sometimes we are under the direct vigil of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) and many a time, only our deeds are presented to him and he browses through them. For, it is available in traditions that the actions of the Shias are furnished before Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). Even in this scroll of deeds, he can either cast a cursory glance or go through the details of a person’s conduct. In the letter that he wrote to Shaykh Mufeed (a.r.), Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) declared,

« فإنّا يْحيطُ عِلمْنا بِأنبائِكُم و لا يُعزْبْ عنّا شيءٌ مِن أخبارِكُم ».

“Then surely our knowledge encompasses your news and none of your information is hidden from us. [38] ”

The word ‘your news’ encompasses the particulars and details of everybody’s actions as well as the general condition of the Shiite society. Hence, sometimes he becomes attentive toward the particulars of an individual's life and informs about its profound aspects. Thus, the knowledge of the unseen does not mean to have encompassing knowledge about everything at all times. Also, it does not imply that as Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is aware of us, then definitely he is present over here.

The conclusion of our discussion is that occultation means not being in a specific or known place like the occultation of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) or the distancing of Hazrat Yunus (a.s.) from his people. There are quite a few books in which an entire chapter is devoted to the likeness of Imam-e-Zaman’s (a.t.f.s.) occultation to that of the Prophets (a.s.). For instance, Hazrat Moosa (a.s.) was in hiding from his nation for forty days. Did he go to the skies? No, he went to the mountains. The Messenger of Islam, Hazrat Muhammad (s.a.w.a.) went in occultation. Where did he go? The people of Mecca were unaware. He went towards Medina, but neither the Medinites knew about his exact whereabouts in the vast desert and the cave in which he was not hiding nor were the Meccans aware about his precise location.

Many of the Prophets (a.s.) and Imams (a.s.) had such an occultation and when we say that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is in hiding, it is in this very meaning. Anybody, who goes to perform the Haj, is more hopeful that perhaps the man sitting next to him in Mena is Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) or that he may see him in Arafaat. Especially, as the duration of stay in Arafaat is much shorter than that in Mena, (from noon to sunset), one is almost sure that during this brief period, Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) will certainly come and he may get the opportunity to visit him. This feeling or emotion is not found in any other venue except Arafaat, where one is sure that Allah’s proof is bound to be present there at that time.

The spirituality observed in Mena and the almost surety of the acceptance of the believers’ prayers in it is due to the supplications of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) there. This topic should be discussed in detail in the special discussion related to“seeing Imam-e-Zaman” (a.t.f.s.) so that in such instances, we know how we should behave in such contacts wth Imam (a.t.f.s.).

The life of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.)

During Occultation

After the concept of occultation, let us proceed to talk about the life of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) during occultation. Here, the question that immediately comes to mind is, ‘Is Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) married or not?’ Often this question comes in the guise of a doubt. That is, if he is married, then it is obvious that he must be having a wife/wives and children, leading to the exposure of his secret life and people recognizing him. For, his wife would say that my husband is so and so, his children would say, ‘our father is Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.)’, and hence, nothing would remain a secret. Therefore, his marriage contradicts his occultation.

So, if we believe that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) has family and children, such questions are bound to arise. But if we say that he has not married at all, it will give rise to another objection i.e. Is Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) not a Muslim? For, the Holy Prophet (s.a.w.a.) has said,

« النّكاحْ سْنّتي فمن رُغِبُ عن سنّتي فَلَيسُ مِنّي ».

“Nikaah is from tradition (sunnah). Thus, whoever is disinclined from my tradition is not from me.”

How come even after more than a thousand year of living on this earth, he is not yet married?!

If he is married, then this doubt and if he is not married, then that doubt! Thus, when we see objections raised from both probabilities, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) does not exist at all!

To answer the above queries, first and foremost let us analyze the quoted tradition of the Holy Prophet (s.a.w.a.). The term used in it is‘whoever is disinclined from my tradition…’ Sometimes a personis disinclined in doing a particular work. On other occasions, he is not disinclined in that deed but the conditions are inappropriate for it and the premises or foundation of that work is not provided for. Or, perhaps, he has got a more important and difficult work at hand that needs to be performed. Thus, in such cases, if a person cannot execute a task, then it will not be called as disinclination. So, if Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) has not married, he has not disobeyed the instructions of the Holy Prophet (s.a.w.a.).

Another important point is that marriage itself or its absence is not a part of our core belief. That is, marriage of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is not among the essentialities of our faith. These are particulars that are not generally covered a priori in the traditions. Rather, this is a query that is to be put to Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) himself that did he get married after attaining maturity? Therefore, this is not something that Imam Hadi (a.s.) or Imam Askari (a.s.) or Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib (a.s.) have stated in their sermons or traditions that our son Mahdi will get married.

Generally, the previous infallible Imams (a.s.) have not discussed the personal details. These are related to Imam-e-Zaman’s (a.t.f.s.) personal life and should be asked from him only. Even those who had the opportunity to meet Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) during occultation had more important matters to be sought and discussed than raise queries over this issue. Fundamentally too, such trifle questions are not asked. Often we are acquainted with a person for a number of years but don’t deem it necessary to question him as to how many children you have or which family does your wife belong to?

For the seventy-four years of minor occultation(ghaibat-e-sughra) , one does not see any information or news about Imam-e-Zaman’s (a.t.f.s.) marriage, family and children, and no clue in this regard can be seen from the four special deputies either. When the main issue itself is inconsequential, then to discuss whether he’s married or unmarried does not make sense at all. Even if we assume that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) has married in the major occultation, then does it mean that a wife should know all the intimate details of her husband’s life? For, to act upon the tradition on the Prophet’s (s.a.w.a.) tradition concerning marriage, it is not necessary that she should be aware of all the particulars of his life.

Moreover, is it necessary that from every marriage, there should be children? Well, maybe Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) has married a woman who cannot bear children. And even if she begot children, is it obligatory that they continue to live? It’s quite possible that they were stillborn or died some time after their birth. Let’s assume that the children survived, grew and turned into men but were unable to recognize their father with all the particulars…Is it essential, in all cases, that the children know their father completely in and out? Or, does knowing mean that it should be announced publicly?

Thus, it’s not right to think that had he been married, certainly he would have had children who would know him and also let these facts be known to the people around them. No, none of these assumptions that we have discussed above will affect our belief in Imamat in any way.

In traditions and supplications concerning Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.), one can see some talk about his children and his progeny. For instance, in Doa-e-Nudbah, it is said,“O Allah! Bless Muhammad and the progeny of Muhammad” . This sentence is not about the Holy Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.a.) but about the last Muhammad (al-Mahdi) because it is followed by the sentence. “..And bless Muhammad, his ancestor, your Messenger, the Master, the Great. ” Hence, here the first supplication is for Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) and the second one is for the Holy Prophet (s.a.w.a.).

In other supplications too, we find sentences like“O Allah! Grant him concerning himself, his progeny, his followers…and the leaders from his sons. [39] ” Therefore, in invocations and supplications one can find references to the children of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). Well, now let us see as to which century did these children belong to? Are they present in our times today? We don’t know. Let’s assume that in the fifth century, he bore children who grew and died. Or, in the eighth century again, he had some more offspring. Yes, it is not essential that if we believe that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) had children during the period of occultation, then they should be living in this era too.

Concerning the abode of Imam-e-Zaman’s (a.t.f.s.) children, it is possible that they are in an island. For, we have traditions, which need not be necessarily subscribed to but there’s no reason to reject them either. Somebody relates that we were traveling in a ship when it was wrecked. We prayed to Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) when suddenly we saw a few people who saved us. Thereafter, they took us to a lush, green island, which was called too as Greenland. We noticed that the inhabitants of this island were very good looking and beautiful. It was a fantastic place from all aspects. They informed us that this place belongs to Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). We were treated and entertained for one complete week and after bringing us to the shore, they made us board another ship, after which we could never find that place[40] .

Now, is this incident true or false? Perhaps, it may be either of the two. For, we cannot say with certainty that it is false. If we locate the narrator of this incident and find him to be a truthful and reliable person, then on what grounds can we refute his narration?

Of course, some people object that had there existed such a place, then certainly the geography experts would have found it by now and named it. We reply that this objection is not sustainable because all islands on the globe have not been discovered yet nor have all the villages on earth. A few days ago, a newspaper in Khorasan (a province in Iran) did not write that a hamlet in Khorasan was discovered that did not have any contact with Mashhad (its nearest city) for three hundred years nor did any government official ever pay a visit to them.

Anyway, this is not an essential part of our creed that if we don’t believe in it we will turn apostates. Nor do we have the right to reject a narration as being a lie or a superstition. So, there are some matters relating to the life of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) that we are not aware of and it is not necessary to know them either. Like we don’t know as to what he eats or wears. The clothes that are attributed to him are not necessarily a turban, cloak, and sandals. In other words, it is not obligatory for Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) to wear a blackammamah , a cloak, a pair of yellow sandals, etc.

People have seen Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) in the dress of the Ulama, in Arabic robe and in tribal Iraqi attire as well. The great scholar, late Shaykh Hashim Qazveeni (r.a.) of Mashhad used to say that don’t be surprised if you happen to see Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) in modern Western outfit. Hence, it’s wrong to think that certainly and surely Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) will have only one sort of a dress and that of a religious scholar and it is not at all obligatory or essential for us to have such a belief.

Of course, it should be known that although Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) changes his dress but his appearance is constant and unchangeable. Thus, if we meet an old man or an infant or a blind or lame person, we can say with cent percent surety that this is not Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). For, he is young in looks and his appearance does not change. Even in traditions one can find that the passage of time does not affect him, notwithstanding the fact that his age keeps increasing.

Vis-à-vis his residence too, it is possible that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) keeps changing his dwelling. That is, he spends some time in the mountains, some in the villages and yet some other time in the deserts. Sometimes, he is in Iraq, sometimes in Iran and sometimes in some other country. Hence, it is not essential to believe that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) always lives in Mecca. In the letter to Shaykh Mufeed (a.r.), he wrote,“Due to reasons, I have left my previous abode and have begun to live in far-off mountains. Soon, I will forsake them too and come to the deserts and then to inhabited towns and villages.”

Anyway, these particulars of his life are in no way connected to the essentialities of faith. As mentioned in traditions, Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) lives a very normal life. That is, he sleeps, eats, and drinks. We also find in the narration of the infallible that the food of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is not very delicious, fatty or made up of large portions. His dress too is not very soft and expensive[41] . This is because he has used this opportunity of longevity for excessive worship of Allah and attainment of perfection, a subject that shall be discussed exclusively at a later gathering, God willing. Then, we shall see that if Ameerul Momineen Ali (a.s.) has worshipped his Lord in such glorious style and manner in a brief life span of 63 years, how his son al-Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) must be extolling his Lord in his thousand plus years- ranging from his namaz, recitation of Quran, fasting, nightly prayer vigils, etc. If such worship and reverence are factors in human perfection (which they certainly are) then these thousand plus years of divine examination and test, must have certainly made Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) Allah’s most perfect creature, a topic in itself that shall be discussed at its appropriate place.