Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

CHAPTER 5, VERSES 15-19

يَا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ رَسُولُنَا يُبَيِّنُ لَكُمْ كَثِيرًا مِّمَّا كُنتُمْ تُخْفُونَ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَيَعْفُو عَن كَثِيرٍۚ قَدْ جَاءَكُم مِّنَ اللَّـهِ نُورٌ وَكِتَابٌ مُّبِينٌ ﴿١٥﴾ يَهْدِي بِهِ اللَّـهُ مَنِ اتَّبَعَ رِضْوَانَهُ سُبُلَ السَّلَامِ وَيُخْرِجُهُم مِّنَ الظُّلُمَاتِ إِلَى النُّورِ بِإِذْنِهِ وَيَهْدِيهِمْ إِلَىٰ صِرَاطٍ مُّسْتَقِيمٍ ﴿١٦﴾ لَّقَدْ كَفَرَ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّ اللَّـهَ هُوَ الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَۚ قُلْ فَمَن يَمْلِكُ مِنَ اللَّـهِ شَيْئًا إِنْ أَرَادَ أَن يُهْلِكَ الْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ وَأُمَّهُ وَمَن فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًاۗ وَلِلَّـهِ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَاۚ يَخْلُقُ مَا يَشَاءُۚ وَاللَّـهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿١٧﴾ وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ نَحْنُ أَبْنَاءُ اللَّـهِ وَأَحِبَّاؤُهُۚ قُلْ فَلِمَ يُعَذِّبُكُم بِذُنُوبِكُمۖ بَلْ أَنتُم بَشَرٌ مِّمَّنْ خَلَقَۚ يَغْفِرُ لِمَن يَشَاءُ وَيُعَذِّبُ مَن يَشَاءُۚ وَلِلَّـهِ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَاۖ وَإِلَيْهِ الْمَصِيرُ ﴿١٨﴾ يَا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ رَسُولُنَا يُبَيِّنُ لَكُمْ عَلَىٰ فَتْرَةٍ مِّنَ الرُّسُلِ أَن تَقُولُوا مَا جَاءَنَا مِن بَشِيرٍ وَلَا نَذِيرٍۖ فَقَدْ جَاءَكُم بَشِيرٌ وَنَذِيرٌۗ وَاللَّـهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿١٩﴾

O People of the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messenger making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book and passing over much; indeed there has come to you a light and a clear Book from Allãh (15); with it Allãh guides him who follows His pleasure into the ways of peace and brings them out of utter darkness into light by His permission and guides them to a straight path (16). Certainly they disbelieve who say: “Surely, Allãh - He is the Messiah, son of Mary.” Say: “Who then could control anything as against Allãh if He wished to destroy the Messiah son of Mary and his mother and all those on the earth together?” And Allãh's is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between them; He creates what He pleases and Allãh has power over all things (17). And the Jews and the Christians say: “We are the sons of Allãh and his beloved ones.” Say: “Why does He then chastise you for your faults? Nay, you are men from among those whom He has created; He forgives whom He pleases and chastises whom He pleases;” and Allãh's is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between them, and to Him is the eventual return (18). O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explaining to you after a cessation of the Messen-gers, lest you say: “There came not to us a giver of good news or a warner,” so indeed there has come to you a giver of good news and a warner; and Allãh has power over all things (19).

COMMENTARY

It was described above that Allãh had made a covenant with the People of the Book that they would help respectfully His Messengers and would preserve the Book that was revealed to them but they broke the covenant, which they had made with their Creator. After this pre-amble, Allãh invites them to believe in His Messenger whom He has now sent and the Book, which has been revealed to him. For this pur-pose, Allãh has introduced the Messenger and the Book to them and has established proof of truth of his messengership and the Book and finally, He has completed that proof for them.

As for the introduction, it is contained in these sentences: O People the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messenger making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book and passing over much; indeed therehas come to you a light and a clear Book from Allãh. And then, O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explaining to you after a cessation of the Messengers . .

As for establishment of the proof, we see it in the Divine words: making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book and passing over much. There could be no better proof of the truth of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) who was an unlettered Arab and was revealing to them what they were hiding that could be known only to their own scholars with specialized knowledge. Likewise, the sentence: with it Allãh guides him who follows His pleasure into the ways of peace . gives a convincing proof; the true ideas are the best proof for the truth of Messengeship and veracity of the Book.

As for completing the proof, it is asserted in the last sentence: lest you say: “There came not to us a giver of good news or a warner,” so indeed there has come to you a giver of good news and a warner, and Allãh has power over all things.

Also, Allãh has refuted in the passing the belief of a group of them that: “Surely, Allãh - He is the Messiah, son of Mary”, and the saying of the Jews and the Christians both: “We are sons of Allãh and his beloved ones.”

QUR’ÃN: O People of the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messenger making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book and passing over much: We may quote the following verses to see how the Prophet made clear to them what they were hiding: Those who follow the Messenger, the Prophet, the ummī, whom they find written down with them in the Tawrãt and the Injīl . (7:157). Those whom we have given the Bookrecognize him as they recognize their sons; . (2:146). Muhammad is the Messenger of Allãh, and those with him are severe against the unbelievers, compassionate among themselves . that is their description in the Tawrãt and their description in the Injīl; like as seed produce that puts forth its sprout . (48:29). Also, as he (s.a.w.a.) disclosed the order of stoning which they had hidden and wanted to use the Prophet to get it changed as the verse 41 of this chapter will show: O Messenger! Let not those grieve you who strive together in hastening to unbelief . We find even today the law of stoning clearly mentioned in Deuteronomy, 22:23-24.

As for the Messenger's passing over much of their misbehav-iour, suffice it to say that he left undisclosed many things, which they were hiding of their Book. It may be ascertained from the contradic-tions and errors still found in the Tawrãt and the Injīl. The Tawrãt, for example, contains many things concerning Tawhīd (Divine Unity) and Prophethood which cannot be ascribed to Allãh: That He has got abody, He enters into a place and things like that; also unacceptable accusations against the Prophet that they indulged in kufr, sins and other misdemeanours. Also, the Tawrãt is totally silent about the res-urrection, while no religion can stand on its feet without this important belief. As for the Gospels, they, and especially the Gospel according to St. John are full of idolatrous ideas.

QUR’ÃN: indeed there has come to you a light and a clear Book from Allãh: The construction of the sentence manifestly shows that the coming one depends on Allãh as a speech depends on the speaker and an explanation depends on the explainer. Accordingly, the light would refer to the Qur’ãn; and in that case the conjunction: “and a clear Book”, would be an explicative apposition; thus, the light and the clear Book both would indicate the Qur’ãn. Allãh has called theQur’ãn a light in several places; for example: . and follow the light which has been sent down with him . (7:157). Therefore believe in Allãh and His Messenger and the Light whichWe have revealed . (64:8). .and we have sent to you clear light (4:174).

Alternatively, the light may refer to the Prophet (s.a.w.a.). This explanation gets support from the beginning of the verse; also, Allãh has called the Prophet, “Light”, in the verse 46 of the chapter 33: . and as a light-giving torch.

QUR’ÃN: with it Allãh guides him who follows His pleasure into the ways of peace: “with it” - the preposition “with” is attached to the pronoun of the instrument that refers to the Book or to the Light. It makes no difference whether the light refers to the Prophet or to the Qur’ãn, because the end result is the same. The Prophet (s.a.w.a.) is one of the apparent causes of the guidance and the same is the position of the Qur’ãn; and the reality of guidance comes from Allãh as He has said: Surely you cannot guide whom you love, but Allãh guides whom He pleases . (28:56). And thus didWe reveal to you a spirit by Our command. You did not know what the Book was, nor (what) the faith (was), but We made it a light, guiding thereby whom We please of Our servants; and most surely you guide to the right path. The path of Allãh, Whose is whatsoeveris in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth; now surely to Allãh do all affairs eventually come (42:52-53) . As you see, these verses ascribe the guidance to theQur’ãn and the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) and simultaneously, they ascribe it to Allãh; Allãh is the Guide in reality while others are apparent causes who have been brought in this world to revive the guidance.

The guidance of Allãh benefits him who follows His pleasure. In other words, the Divine guidance will affect only those who would follow His pleasure. Guidance in this verse denotes conveyance to the destination; Allãh takes such people to a way or ways of peace orto many such ways, one after another.

Peace is unrestricted; as such, it denotes safety and freedom from all misery and distress that spoil the happiness of life in this world or the hereafter. TheQur’ãn has described Islam, faith and piety as success, achievement and security and the peace mentioned here fits perfectly on that. We have described in the first volume of our book while explaining the verse: Guide us to the straight path (1:5), that depending on the conditions of the walkers, Allãh has created many lanes in one highway; all walk on the same route related to Allãh which He has named in His Book, 'the straight path': And (as for) those who strive hard for Us, We will most certainly guide them unto Our ways; and Allãh is most surely with the doers of good (29: 69). And (know) that this is My path, the straight one, therefore follow it, and follow not (other) ways, for they will lead you away from His way . (6:153). Allãh has thus shown that He has laid down many lanes but all lead the walkers to the same destination without differen-tiating between walkers of one lane from those of the others. It is un-like the ungodly ways where each way leads to a different destination.

The verse thus means - and Allãh knows better - that Allãh guides, and through His Book or through His Prophet, He leads those who follow His pleasure to the ways that protect the walkers from infelicity of the life of this world and the next, and keeps them away from all things which contaminate the happiness of life.

The guidance to peace and happiness revolves around following the Divine pleasure; and Allãh has said: . and He does not like kufr in His servants; . (39:7). .yet surely Allãh is not pleased with the transgressing people (9:96). Ultimately, it depends on keeping aloof from the way of injustice and avoiding any contact with unjust people. Allãh has excluded them from His guidance and made them despaired of reaching this Divine honour, as He has said: . and Allãh does not guide the unjust people (62:5). The verse: “with it Allãh guides him who follows His pleasure into the ways of peace”, runs in a way paral-lel to the verse 6:82 which says: Those who believe and do not mix up their faith with injustice, those are they who have the security and they are those who go aright.

QUR’ÃN: and brings them out of utter darkness into light by His permission and guides them to a straight path: az-Zulumãt (اَلظُّلُمَاتُ ) is plural of az-zulmah (اَلظُّلْمَةُ = darkness). Darkness has been brought in plural while light is singular. It gives an indication that unlike the path of untruth there is no difference or disparity in the path of truth even if it contains various lanes suitable to various spiritual levels.

If bringing out of utter darkness into light is ascribed to some-one other than Allãh, like the Prophet or the Book, then the Divine permission means His approval and pleasure; as Allãh says: (This is) a Book which We have revealed to you that you may bring forth men, by their Lord's permission from utter darkness into light . (14:1). This verse says that the Prophet was to bring them out from darkness to light, and this action has been qualified with permission of their Lord. The idea is to show that the Prophet was not an independent cause of guidance, because its actual cause is Allãh. Soon after that a verse says: And certainlyWe sent Mūsã with Our signs saying: “Bring forth your people from utter darkness into light . .” (14:5). This verse, has not qualified the guidance with Divine permission because the impera-tive mood has taken care of that.

When this action is attributed to Allãh then 'bringing them out with His permission' means that Allãh takes them out of darkness with His knowledge; al-idhn (الإْذْن = permission) has been used for informa-tion. They say: adhina bihi (اَذِنَ بِهِ = learnt of him), that is, was informed about him. The following verses give the same meaning: And an announcement (information) from Allãh and His Messenger . (9:3). But if they turn back, say: “I have given you warning (information) all alike . .” (21:109). And proclaim (inform) among men the hajj . (22:27); there are several other verses like these.

“and guides them to a straight path”: The verb, “guides them”, has been repeated because another verb: “and brings them out”, has come between “with it Allãh guides Him”, in this sentence. Also, we have explained in the chapter of “The Opening” that the straight path is a highway, which contains many lanes. Therefore, guidance to that path also should be a comprehensive one which would include all kinds of guidance.

“a straight path” is a common noun, yet it refers to the same straight path which is unique and which Allãh always ascribes to Himself alone (the only exception is in the chapter of “The Opening” where it is not ascribed to Allãh but the context makes it clear). The common noun serves to enhance its status and magnify its honour.

QUR’ÃN: Certainly they disbelieve who say: “Surely, Allãh - He is the Messiah, son of Mary”: It refers to one of the three sects men-tioned in the chapter of “The House of ‘Imrãn” who believed that Allãh had become one with Messiah and Messiah is god and man both at the same time. This sentence may fit to the belief of sonship of Messiah as well as the belief of the three persons in one god. Be it as it may, the sentence points to the belief that Messiah had become one with God.

QUR’ÃN: Say: “Who then could control anything as against Allãh if He wished to destroy the Messiah son of Mary and his mother and all those on the earth together?” . .: This is a proof to refute their belief because that belief contains contradiction in term. They say that Messiah is God and at the same time he is man as they have introduced him as the son of Mary; now being a man he is subject to all those changes which afflict any other man on this earth; all human beings like all that is in the heavens and the earth and all that is between them, are owned and controlled by Allah; they are subjugated under His Kingdom and authority; He can dispose them as He wishes and decides for or against them as He thinks fit; He has the right and authority to destroy Messiah as He has the right and authority to destroy his mother and all those who are on the earth together without any distinction for Messiah over others. But if he is God how can he be destroyed? To say that Messiah is man rebuts their claim that he is God.

The words: “who then could control anything as against Allãh”, are an allusion to show that there is no one at all who could stop Allãh from doing anything He wished; otherwise, it would mean that Allãh had no control on that thing. No cause in the universe has an indepen-dent control on its effect; nothing can stop or overwhelm the Divine control on anything; nobody owns anything except Allãh alone who has no partner or colleague; when He makes us owner of a certain thing, His ownership and His authority on it continues as before.

Now, come the words:“ 'if He wished to destroy the Messiah son of Mary and his mother and all those on the earth together?'“ The Messiah is qualified by the phrase “son of Mary” to show that he was a total man, and like other human beings was under the control of the Lord. For this very reason, “his mother” has been added in conjunc-tion because both had the same root and origin. Then, the clause: “and those on the earth together” was added because all are governed by the same law without any difference.

This qualification and conjunction clearly present the proof of ‘Īsã's transience. The Messiah is like any other human being, and like all those on the earth he is subject to all the changes and variations which affect others, because all are similarly transient; if others can be destroyed by Divine order then ‘Īsã too would be affected likewise. There is nothing to save him from it; if he were God he could not be destroyed.

The clause: “And Allãh's is the Kingdom of the Heavens and the earth and what is between them”, gives the reason of the preceding statement. TheQur’ãn generally refers to the creation with the words: “the Heavens and the earth” but here the phrase: “and what is between them” has been added. The aim is to make the proof clearer; now no one can say that Allãh has not mentioned what is between the heavens and the earth while the speech deals with ‘Īsã who was between the heavens and earth. In this sentence, the predicate “and Allãh's is” has been written before the subject, in this way it confines the Ownership to Allãh, and the proof becomes more emphatic. The meaning will be: How can anyone stop Allãh if He wished to destroy the Messiah and others when the Kingdom and unrestricted authority on the heavens, earth and what is between them is reserved for Allãh and no one shares it with Him. Consequently, nobody can stop the implementation of Allãh's order.

“He creates what He pleases; and Allãh has power over all things”: These sentences in their turn explain the reason of the pre-ceding sentence, that is: “and Allãh's is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between them.” The Kingdom - which is a sort of control and ownership - contains in its essential ingredients comprehensive power and effectual will; and such a Kingdom in the heavens, earth and what is between them is reserved for Allãh. He has power over all things and He creates what He pleases. His creating what He pleases and having power on all things is the proof of His Kingdom; and His Kingdom proves that if He wished to destroy all, there is nobody to stop its implementation. Finally, it proves that no one is His partner in His Divinity.

To prove that His will is implemented and His power is com-prehensive, it is enough to say that He is Allãh. Perhaps, for this reason the Divine name, Allãh, has been repeated several times. If He is Allãh then nobody shares Godship with Him.

QUR’ÃN: And the Jews and the Christians say: “We are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones”: Certainly, they did not claim real sonship as the Christians claim for the Messiah (a.s.). Neither the Jews nor the Christian put forward this claim in the literal sense. They called themselves sons of God metaphorically, as a mark of distinc-tion. In their scriptures, a lot of people have been called sons of God, for example, Adam10 , Jacob11 , David12 , Ephraim13 , Jesus,14 and good-doing believers15 .

What they meant with this claim was that their relationship with Allãh was like that of sons with their father. They thought themselves like the sons of a King who had special status in comparison to the subjects. They were nearer to God and God was not supposed to treat them as His other subjects. In a way, they were exempted from the laws and regulations which were revealed for the general public, because they had very close connection with the King and as such, He would not punish them like His other subjects, nor will He keep them standing like common people on the Day of Resurrection. He would not humiliate them like others. All of this was the result of their rela-tionship with God that was a relation of love and honour.

This sonship created a special relationship with God, which brought them very near to Him. The phrase: “His beloved ones” coming after the conjunction is an explicative apposition; it serves no real purpose. This claim of special relation and belovedness was meant to establish its inseparable attribute, that is, they can never be chastised and punished. They are assured of Divine favour and honour because if Allãh were to punish them, it will go against the distinction and honour that He has reserved for them. The proof of the above interpretation is seen in the rebuttal of their claim where Allãh says: He forgives whom He pleases and chastises whom He pleases. There was no reason to give this reply if they had not meant by their claim: “We are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones”, that they cannot be punished at all even if they did not accept the call of truth. Also, there would be no meaning to the statement: Nay you are men from among those whom He has created. In short, when they said:“ 'We are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones' “, they wanted to say that they were the chosen people of God and His beloved ones and Allãh was not going to give them punishment even if they did what they did or left what they left, because full security against every unpleasant result or situation was a concomitant of special relationship and love.

QUR’ÃN: Say: “Why does He then chastise you for your faults?”: Allãh tells His Prophet to refute their claim by bringing two proofs against them:

(1) By contradicting their claim, pointing to the chastisements that were inflicted on them; and (2) Bringing a proof, which would oppose their claim. The sentence under discussion contains the first proof: “Say: 'Why does He chastise you for your faults?'“ If you are right in your claim that you are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones, that you are safe from Divine punishment and in no way you can be chastised, then you should have been safe from every punishment of this world and the next. If so, then why are you constantly being punished for your sins and faults?

As for the Jews, they always committed major sins; they killed their prophets, they murdered their good people, they broke the Divine covenants which were taken from them, they altered the words from their places, they concealed the Divine communications and rejected them, they committed every type of transgression and contravention. Consequently, they always tasted the bitter results of their misdeeds; some were transformed into animals, others were thrown into disgrace and infelicity, unjust rulers were hoisted over them who killed them, disgraced them, and destroyed their towns and cities. Theirs is but a moribundlife, they are neither alive nor dead.

As for the Christians, the sins and crimes that have taken root in their societies and nations are not less than those of the Jews; nor are the various types of chastisement meted out to them different from those of the Jews. Their condition was the same before coming of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.), remained the same in his days and continues unchanged after him until now. History has recorded all this, even more than that; and the Qur’ãn also describes it to a certain extent, as may be seen in the chapters of “The Cow”, “The House of ‘Imrãn”, “Women”, “The Table” and “The Battlements”, etc.

They cannot say that these misfortunes, disasters and calamities that afflict them from time to time are in fact manifestations of Divine love towards them, which they do not emanate from Divine wrath and are not meant as punishment or chastisement. After all, similar misfor-tunes had come upon good servants of Allãh, even His Prophets and Messengers like Abraham, Ishmael, Jacob, Joseph, Zacharia and John the Baptist and others like them; and you too, O Muslims!Have suffered such reversals of fortune as in the battle of Uhud and Mūtah, etc. How can you say that when these catastrophes come to us they are Divine punishment but when you are afflicted you count it as Divine favour?

COMMENT: There is no doubt that these physical troubles, worldly disasters and misfortunes afflict the believers and disbelievers alike, and they catch the good-doers and evil-doers in similar way. It is the Divine custom that covers all the servants of Allãh since time im-memorial. However, it is called with different names and brings about different effects depending on the goodness or wickedness of the men affected. In other words, we have to see what is the status of the servant vis-à-vis his Master.

There is no doubt that when the good traits are entrenched in a servant's psyche and the human excellence has fully covered his being (like the Prophets and their true followers), then the afflictions and worldly troubles which come to him, serve only to unveil his hidden virtues and merits which benefit not only him but even others. This type of afflictions, although they are disliked by human nature, are parts of spiritual training which Allãh puts His good servants through; you may say that through these misfortunes Allãh opens the way to raise their status and rank.

Then comes one whose felicity or infelicity has not taken root and after affliction with calamities and catastrophes, he did not find the way to felicity and happiness, then these trials and tribulations help in exposing his status of belief or disbelief, merit or demerit. The only name that can be given to such misfortunes is that they are tests and trials coming from Allãh, which open the way for the man to the paradise or the hell.

Lastly come those whose life is a permanent tale of base desires; they are depraved and corrupt and are intent on making others depraved and corrupt; they are submerged in the currents of desire and anger; if they get a chance, they would choose depravity over virtue and arro-gance before their Creator instead of submitting to Him; as the Qur’ãn narrates the end results of the unjust nations like the people of Noah, ‘Ãd, Thamūd, Pharaoh, the inhabitants of Midian and the people of Lot. Their bad end was the result of their arrogance against Allãh. The calamities that were poured on them and which annihilated their whole nations have to be counted as Divine punishment, chastisement, and the evil consequences of their deeds. They cannot be explained in any other way.

Allãh has combined these three groups in His noble speech: . and We bring these days to men by turns, and that Allãh may know those who believe and take witnesses from among you; and Allãh loves not the unjust. And that Allãh may purge those who believe and eradicate the unbelievers (3:140-1).

The history of the Jews since the time Mūsã was raised amongst them until Allãh raised Muhammad (s.a.w.a.), (more than 2000 years); and likewise, the history of the Christians since the day the Messiah was raised to heaven till the advent of Islam (nearly six centuries, as they say) are full of various types of sins they did and crimes they committed. There was hardly an evil they did not indulge in, they per-sisted in it and remained stubborn without any shame. In this back-drop, the only name that can be given to the calamities that afflicted them is chastisement, punishment, and retribution.

Of course, the Muslims too have suffered similar afflictions; those misfortunes (in their natural disposition) were such episodes, which the Divine management had brought on the Muslims. Such has been the course of Allãh that has indeed run before: . and you shall not find a change in Allãh's course (48:23). We have to look at the position of the affected Muslims to decide about those misfortunes; if they were steadfast on the path of truth then the misfortune was a trial and test given to them by Allãh, and if they had deviated from the straight path, then certainly it was punishment and chastisement. No one has any badge of honour against Allãh, nor can anyone arbitrarily claim any right on Allãh. TheQur’ãn has never said that the Muslims had any special honour before Allãh nor has it called them sons of Allãh and His beloved ones. In fact,Qur’ãn doesn't care about the names and the titles, which people have taken for themselves.

Allãh has addressed them in these words: Do you think that you will enter the Garden while Allãh has not yet known those who strive hard from among you, and (He has not) known the patient . And Muhammad is no more than a Messenger, the messengers have already passed away before him; if then he dies or is killed, will you turn back upon your heels? And whoever turns back upon his heels, he will by no meansdo harm to Allãh in the least; and Allãh will reward the grateful (3:142-4). (This) shall not be in accordance with your vain desires nor in accordance with the vain desires of the People of the Book; whoever does evil, he shall be requited with it, and besides Allãh he will find for himself neither a guardian nor a helper (4:123).

The phrase:“ 'Why does He then chastise you for your faults?' “, may be taken to refer to the chastisement of the next world. In that case, it would be translated as a future tense and not as a present imperfect tense. The People of the Book accept that they could be punished a little for their faults. The Qur’ãn has quoted the Jews' claim that: “Fire shall not touch us but for a few days” (2:80); and although the Christians say that Messiah sacrificed himself to atone his followers' sins, but this claim in itself admits that they commit sins and that the resulting punishment was taken by Messiah upon himself in the form of crucifixion; in addition to that, the Gospels describe some sins like fornication, etc, and the Church in its turn was admitting it practically by issuing certificates of atonement. However, the earlier interpretation is more appropriate.

QUR’ÃN: “Nay, you are men from among those whom He has created; He forgives whom He pleases and chastises whom He pleases;” and Allãh's is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between them, and to Him is the eventual return: It is the second argument against their claim. It tells them that if we look into your reality it will show the falsity of your claim that you are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones; you are merely mortal human beings from among the creatures of Allãh; you have no superiority in this matter over other creatures of God; whoever is in the heavens and earth and what is between them, his only distinction is that he is one of the creatures placed in the heavens and earth and between them. He is a creature of God, and God is the King who rules over him and about him as well as over others and about others as He wishes and anyhow He wishes; and that creature like other things is to return to his Lord who is the King and ruler over him and the others. Accordingly, it is on Allãh's discretion to forgive whom He pleases or give punishment to whom He pleases; any distinction or nobility or other such things cannot stop Allãh from forgiving him or punishing him as He wishes. Nothing can block Allãh's way and no shield can protect anyone from Allãh's will.

The clause:“ 'Nay , you are men from among those whom He has created' “, is one premise of the argument; the second is: “and Allãh's is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between them”; and the end phrase: “and to Him is the eventual return”, is the third premise. The clause: “He forgives whom He pleases and chastises whom He pleases”, gives the result of the argument that refutes their claim that there was no way they could be punished.

QUR’ÃN: O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explaining to you after a cessation of the Messengers . .: ar-Rãghib has said: “al-Futūr (اَلْفُتُوْرُ ) is tranquillity after heat, softness after hardness and weakness after strength. Allãh has said: O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explaining to you after a cessation of the Messengers, i.e. tranquillity and quiet during which no messenger of Allãh came.”

This verse is the second speech addressed to the People of the Book; and it completes the preceding speech. The first verse has explained to them that Allãh has sent to them a Messenger who is supported by the manifest Book and he guides by Allãh's permission to every good and happiness. Now, this verse explains that this Divine explanation is meant for completing the proof over them, lest they say: “there came not to us a giver of good news or a warner.”

This description makes it clear that the clause related to the verb: “explaining to you”; in this verse is the same, which is mentioned, in the preceding verse. Thus, the full sentence will be: 'explaining to you much of what you concealed of the Book.' You should understand that this religion to which you are invited is exactly the same which you believed in; it confirms what is with you; if there is any difference it is because it makes clear those religious realities which the Divine Books had explained and you had kept them hidden. It means that the speech: “O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explaining to you”, in a way repeats exactly the previous speech and the purpose is to add some more details which were not given before, and which are mentioned in the clause: “lest you say: 'There came not to us a giver of good news or a warner' “. Such repetition is allowed because there is a long gap between the two sentences and it is not unusual in literature.

There is another possibility that it is a completely new speech, and the related clauses of the verb: making clear to youare deleted. This deletion may allude to comprehensiveness i.e. He makes clear to you all those things which require clarification. Or it may show eminence and magnificence of the matter, i.e. makes clear to you a very important and great matter which you needed to know. The clause: “after a cessation of the Messengers” alludes to this need. The meaning then will be: makes clear to you all those things you needed to know because a long period has gone by without there being any messenger who could have explained to you. The words: “lest you say: 'There came not to us a giver of good news or a warner' “, is connected with the verb: indeed there has come to you, showing the reason of his coming.

The sentence: “and Allãh has power over all things”, aims at replying to an unspoken objection. The Jews thought that nosharī‘ah was to come after the Torah because abrogation and al-badã’ were not possible. Allãh refutes their assumption by saying that such thinking goes against the comprehensiveness and generality of Divine Power. We have described in detail about abrogation while writing on the verse 2:106 in the first volume of our book: Whatever signsWe abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring one better than it or like it.

THE WAY OF THINKING TO WHICH THE QUR’ÃN GUIDES

*

No doubt, man's is a life of reflection that requires perception and discernment; we call it faculty of thought. So the life is built on thought. It follows that the more correct and comprehensive the thought is, the more appropriate and sound the life will be. Whatever system a man follows and whichever path he treads upon, his good life is linked to, and bound with, proper thought; as much share it takes from that thought, that much uprightness it enjoys.

Allãh has repeatedly described it in His Great Book in different ways and various styles: Is he who was dead then We raised him to life and made for him a light by which he walks among the people, like him whose likeness is that of one in utter darkness whence he cannot come forth? (6:122). Say: “Are those who know and those who do not know alike?” (39:9). Allãh will exalt those of you who believe, and those who are given knowledge, in high degrees (58:11). . therefore give good news to My servants, those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it, those are they whom Allãh has guided and those it is who are the men of understanding (39:17-18). There are many such verses, which there is no need to quote here. Nobody has any doubt howQur’ãn invites people to the correct thinking and exhorts them to proceed on the path of knowledge.

Also theQur’ãn reminds the readers that what it guides to is a way from among the ways of thinking. Allãh says: Surely thisQur’ãn guides to that which is most upright (17:9); i.e. the religion, custom, or path that is most upright. In any case, it is the path of life and its uprightness depends on the uprightness of the way of thinking, as Allãh has said: indeed, there has come to you a light and a clear Book from Allãh; with it Allãh guides him who follows His pleasure into the ways of peace and brings them out of utter darkness into light by His permission and guides them to the straight path (5:15-16). The straight path is that clear path which is free from contradiction and conflicts, i.e. neither it goes against the truth which one seeks nor its various sections point to different directions.

Allãh, in His Mighty Book, has not pin-pointed the correct and upright thought to which He calls His servants; He has left it to the common sense of the people, expecting them to use their natural reasoning power and the perception engrained in their minds. If you minutely study the Divine Book and meditate upon its verses, you will probably find over three hundred verses which invite people to con-template, remember or ponder; or they teach the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) an argument to prove a truth or negate a falsity; as for example: Say: “Who then could control anything as against Allãh if He wished to destroy the Messiah son of Mary and his mother . .” (5:17). Of the same genre are those verses which describe the arguments and proofs used by His prophets and beloved ones like Nūh, Ibrãhīm, Mūsã and other great prophets, in addition to Luqmãn (Lokman) and the believer from the family of Fir‘awn (Pharaoh) and others, peace of Allãh be on them all. For example: Their Messengers said: “Is there (any) doubt about Allãh, the Maker of the heavens and the earth?” (14:10).And when Luqmãn said to his son while he admonished him: “O my son! Do not associate aught with Allãh; most surely polytheism is a griveous iniquity” (31:13). And a believing man of Fir‘awn's people who hid his faith said: “What! Will you slay a man because he says: 'My Lord is Allãh,' and indeed he has brought to you clear arguments from your Lord?” (40:28). Also, He quotes the magicians of Pharaoh as saying: They said: “We do not prefer you to what has come to us of clear arguments and to He Who made us, therefore decide what you are going to decide; you can only decide about this world's life; surely we believe in our Lord . .” (20:72-73).

Allãh has not ordered His servants even in a single verse of His Book that they should blindly believe in Him, or in things sent by Him; or that they should tread on a path without thinking. He has often hinted to the reasons because of which He has laid down certain regulations and commandments (where a man has no way of knowing their detailed causes) describing some things which could be used as arguments; as He says: . surely prayer keeps (one) away from inde-cency and evil, and certainly the remembrance of Allãh is the greatest . (29:45). O you who believe! Fasting has been prescribed for you, as it was prescribed for those before you, so that you may guard yourselves (against evil) (2:183). Allãh does not desire to put on you any difficulty, but He wishes to purify you so that He may complete His favour on you, that you may be grateful (5:6). There are many other verses of similar nature.

This thoughtful perception, i.e. the way of correct thinking which the Qur’ãn exhorts the human beings to use, on which it has based its call to truth, good or benefit or restrains from falsity, evil or harm - it is that perception which we know and recognise with our nature, which doesn't change or alter, and about which no man dis-putes with others. If there appears some dispute or discord about it then it is like a dispute in self-evident principles; it happens only when one or the both parties do not understand the true meaning of the subject matter because of some miscomprehension.

You may askwhat is this path, which we are supposed to know by our nature . There is no doubt that there are some solid realities which independently exist and do not depend on our actions, like the realities of the genesis of the world and its end or mathematical, physical or other such principles. When we want to understand these matters we refer to basic principles, which are self-evident and are not subject to any doubt. Also, we take help from other principles, which are intrinsically attached to those self-evident principles. Then we arrange them in a particular way until we get the desired result. For example we say:

A is B, and every B is C; therefore A is C.

Or, as we say:

If A is B, then C is D; and if C is D, then G is H. Therefore if A is B then G is H.

Or, as we say:

If A is B, then C is D; and if C is D, then G is H. But A is not B. Therefore G is not H.

These patterns of logic and the principle matters described above are self-evident truths and no man of normal wisdom can have any doubt about them. If anybody doubts them, then it indicates some defect in his power of understanding, because of which it has failed to grasp these clear matters, as is generally seen about those who express doubts about self-evident truths.

If we look at the doubts or uncertainties expressed against this logical way of thinking, we will see that when they want to reach at a result in their claims and objectives they too use the same principles laid down in the logic in its form, pattern and material; if we analyse their speech to the elementary premises used in them, they will turn into logical forms and principles. If somebody changes those premises or the forms in a way that according to logical principles would not lead to any result, the whole speech would become devoid of meaning and you will see that they would not like it. This is a clear proof that these people according to their human nature do accept the correctness of these logical principles, they submit to it and use it; they refute it with their tongues but in their inner selves they believe in it.

1) As some mutakallimūn (experts of scholastic theology) have said: “If the logic were a way leading to the truth then there should not have been any discord among the scholars of logic; but we find them differing among themselves in their opinions.”

COMMENT: This scholar has used hypothetical syllogism without realizing what he was doing. He doesn't realise that when we say that logic is the instrument that prevents man from falling into error, we mean that use of logic in proper way prevents man from falling into error. Nobody claims that everyone who uses logic uses it correctly. Sword is the instrument for cutting; but it will do its work only if it is used in proper way.

2) Some of them have said: “These principles of logic were developed gradually. How can the recognition of true realities depend on them? How can a man who doesn't know them or doesn't use them arrive at the real truth?”

COMMENT: This argument too like the preceding one is hypothetical syllogism. Moreover it is the worst type of sophistry. He has not understood the meaning of development. Development in this context refers to the detailed discovery of those principles which man is vaguely aware of by his nature; development doesn't mean invention.

3) Some have said: “These principles were propagated among the people in order to close the door of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s .), or to divert the people from following the Book and the Sunnah. As such the Muslims must keep aloof from them.”

COMMENT: If we analyse this speech it will result in some conjunc-tive or hypothetical syllogism. If a system is used for improper pur-pose it doesn't mean that the system in itself is not good and proper; it is like a sword, which is used to kill an innocent person or the religion, which is used for something other than the pleasure of Allãh.

4) Some have said: “The intellectual reasoning often leads to what is clearly against the Book and the Sunnah, as we see in the opinions of many philosophers.”

COMMENT: This too is a compound conjunctive syllogism. The mis-take of the philosophers does not emanate from the form of syllogism or from a self-evident truth. It occurs because some wrong proposition is mixed with correct ones.

5) Some people have said: “The whole purpose of logic is to dif-ferentiate between aform that would lead to a correct conclusion from an unsound form; but as far as the matter is concerned, the logic doesn't have any law which would prevent a man from falling into error about it. There is no assurance against committing mis-takes in the matter except referring it to the ma‘sūmīn (a.s.). Therefore, the only safe way is to return to the ma‘sūmīn (a.s.).”

COMMENT: The above argument is sophistic. The scholar wants to prove that khabaru 'l-wãhid16 (خَبَرُالْوَاحِدُ ) or the collection of akhbãru 'l-ãhãd (اَخْبَارُ الأَحَاد ) combined with the apparent meanings of theQur’ãn is al-hujjah (اَلْحُجَّةُ = proof) of sharī‘ah. We know that we can hold fast to the ma‘sūmīn only when me are sure that a hadīth has actually been uttered by them and also know what is the meaning of the speech. But such certainty is impossible concerning akhbãru 'lãh ãd because there is no more than a strong conjecture that the words were spoken by the ma‘sūm (a.s.), and the same is the case with its meaning. And this applies to all those proofs, which are based on strong conjectures. Holding fast to the ma‘sūmīn (a.s.) admittedly depends on the certainty of matter and the certainty of matter may emanate from their words or from logical premises; and in any case, one has to be sure that the form of the argument is not faulty [and it leads us to logic].

They have said that in view of all these doubts, the rational arguments cannot give us any certainty regarding the subject matter.

COMMENT: First of all, it is just an overbearing obstinacy. Secondly, this speech in itself is a rational argument from which he wants to reach to a definite conclusion and even its form is based on logic.

6) Some have said: “All that is needed by human beings is placed in the Mighty Book and stored in the traditions of the ma‘sūmīn (a.s.).Therefore, why should we resort to the left overs of the un-believers and atheists?”

COMMENT: The need of rational and logical arguments is the same, which we observe in this objection itself, because he has composed a logical conjunctive syllogism and has used in it the materials that are admittedly correct. Yet, he has fallen victim of sophistry in two places.

Firstly, he did not realize that these logical principles themselves are a part of what is stored in the Book and the Sunnah and one cannot go to its depth without independent research.

Secondly, it is one thing to say that the Book and the Sunnah do not need any addenda or appendix for making their meaning clear and quite another to say that those who hold fast to the Book and the Sunnah also do not need any additional help in reaching at the correct conclusion. What will they say if a medical doctor who makes re-search about the human body were to claim that he did not need to study any scientific, social, or literary subject, because all are related to human beings. Or, if an ignorant person refused to learn any knowl-edge claiming that all types of knowledge are found in the human nature. These friends of ours are not different from them.

Thirdly, the Book and the Sunnah themselves invite the people to widely use the correct logical and rational arguments. (Such argu-ments are the self-evident premises or those depending on the self-evident propositions.) Allãh says: . therefore give good news to My servants, those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it; those are they whom Allãh has guided, and those it is who are men of understanding (39:17-18). There are many other such verses and traditions. Of course, the Book and the Sunnah forbid us to follow what clearly goes against them. The Book and the definitely proved Sunnah are the things whose veracity and truth has been clearly proved by reason; and it is impossible that the same reason should prove invalidity of what it has definitely proved to be valid earlier. Admittedly, we have to distinguish true rational premises from the false ones, in order that we may hold fast to the correct premises, in the same way, as we have to distinguish the decisive verses and traditions from the ambiguous ones in order that we may hold fast to the decisive ones. The same is the case of the traditions where we have to distinguish those traditions, which have surely emanated from the ma‘sūmīn (a.s .) from the forged and fraudulent ones; and how great their number is!

Fourthly, the truth is truth wherever it is found and however it is found. Its truth is not affected by the belief or disbelief of its conveyor nor his piety or sinfulness makes it tainted. To refuse to accept a truth just because of hatred of its conveyor is nothing but the prejudice of ignorance, which has been condemned by Allãh in His Book and through the words of His Messengers (a.s.).

7) Some have said: “The way of precaution in religion which is preferred in the Book and the Sunnah is to restrict oneself to the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah and to keep aloof from using logical and rational principles, because there is a danger of their pushing one into eternal perdition from which one could never get out.”

COMMENT: The objecter has in this very statement used the logical and rational principles as it contains exceptive syllogism based on rational premises that are acceptable by reason although they are not based on the Book or the Sunnah. However, the risk he mentions might involve those who don't have ability to understand deep rational propositions. But as for those capable persons who have such discern-ment, there is no proof from the Book, the Sunnah, or reason to show that they cannot understand the realities of the deep knowledge. We know that man can have no nobility or greatness except with such understanding and the Book, the Sunnah and the reason all prove it.

8) Some people have said: “The way of our noble predecessors was totally different from the way of the philosophy and ‘irfãn. They used the Book and the Sunnah and had no need to use the logical and rational principles like the philosophers, or to use the ways of spiritual regimen like the Sūfīs. When the Greek philos-ophy was rendered into Arabic in the days of the caliphs, the Muslim mutakallimūn (scholastic theologians) who themselves were among the followers of theQur’ãn decided to fit the philo-sophical ideas on the Qur’ãnic realities. As a result, they were divided into two sects, the Ash‘arites and the Mu‘tazilites. Then, during the same period appeared another group who were called Sūfīs and ‘ãrifs. They claimed that the secrets were open to them and they knew in depth the Qur’ãnic realities. They thought that they had no need to return to the ma‘sūmīn (a.s.). In this way, they separated from the Shī‘ahs who held fast to Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.); things continued like this until about the middle of the thirteenth century of Hijrah (about a 100 years ago). Then these people (the philosophers and the Sūfīs) began forgery and deception; they reinterpreted the themes of theQur’ãn and Hadīth to make them conform to the ideas of philosophy and tasawwuf. They used this method so extensively that the majority of the Shī‘ahs were confused.”

He has inferred from the above statement that these principles go against the correct way to which the Book and the Sunnah guide the people. Then he has mentioned some objections against the logic. For example, the existence of discord among the logicians themselves, and the fact that one is not always safe from errors inspite of using logical formulae and the fact that we do not find a sufficient number of self-evident truths or free from doubt realities which could serve in leading us to the deep realities. Then he has mentioned many themes of philosophy that according to him go clearly against the principles inferred from the Book and the Sunnah.

This is the gist of his writing, which we have given in brief.

COMMENT: would that I knew which aspect of these lengthy ram-blings can be mended and corrected, because the disease has passed the stage of treatment. What he has said about the history of the mutakallimūn and their going against the aimmah of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.) - that they wanted to fit the philosophy on the Qur’ãn which supposedly divided them into two sects of Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites; then the appearance of the Sūfīs and their presumption that they and their followers had no need of the Book and the Sunnah; that the things continued like that until the thirteenth century of Hijrah when the philosophy or ‘irfãn came into being - all these are totally against the known definite history and we shall briefly refer to all of this later on.

Apart from that, he has committed a great blunder by mixing al-kalãm (scholastic theology) and philosophy. The philosophy deals with phenomenal things and matters (which are found in reality) and offers proof for accepted issues and problems through such premises, which are free from doubt. Scholastic theology, on the other hand, deals with matters that may be real and objective or subjective (men-tally posited), and it offers proof for issues and problems through such premises, which could be based on reality or on subjective consider-ation. Obviously, these two fields of knowledge are far removed from one another. How can it be thought that the mutakallimūn would endeavour to make philosophy conform to the Qur’ãn? It is common knowledge that the mutakallimūn from their very beginning until now had remained in conflict and dispute with the philosophers and al-‘urafã’ (اَلْعُرَفَآءُ = here this word has been used for the Sūfīs). Their books and writtings which are in our hands and the reports of their debates and polemical argumentations which have come to us are the best witness to prove it.

Probably, his talk was based on the writings of some orientalists who claim that it was the transference of Greek philosophy to Islam, which caused the appearance of ‘ilmu 'l-kalãm (عِلْمُ الْكَلاَم = scholastic theology) among the Muslims. This man did not know the meaning of al-kalãm or philosophy, nor was he aware of the aims and objectives of the two fields of knowledge. He was also unaware of the factors that led to the appearance of scholastic theology in Islam. He just shot his arrows in the dark.

Even more amusing is his assertion where he describes the difference between al-kalãm and philosophy. He says: “The scholastic theology aims at attesting to the topics of genesis and resurrection keeping in view the aspects of religion; while philosophical dis-cussions talk about the same topics without paying any attention to religious dictates.” Then he has used this supposed difference to claim that the way of logical and rational principles is totally different from the way of religion, and goes against the path laid down by the sharī‘ah. He has confounded the confusion. Every knowledgeable scholar knows that the group which has mentioned this difference between these two disciplines wants to indicate that the syllogisms used in theological discussions are dialectical and composed of uncon-testable premises (the well known undisputable ones), because such arguments lead to undisputed realities; as for the philosophical dis-cussions, some of them are composed of argumentative syllogisms which aim to prove what is truth, not what is universally accepted. In the light of the above, how can it be taken to mean that the way of scholastic theology is the way of religion and the way of philosophy goes against religion and that it should be discarded even if it is true?

As for his objections against logic, philosophy and ‘irfãn, we have already commented on his objections against logic. What he has written concerning philosophy and ‘irfãn, if it is correct quotation and he has correctly understood its meaning that it goes against the clear dictates of the true religion, then nobody doubts that it is invalid and it is among the erroneous ideas of philosophers or those who tread on the path of ‘irfãn; but such errors should be put in the account of those people who have expressed those ideas, and should not be used against philosophy or ‘irfãn as a discipline; it would be merely the defect and deficiency of the scholars concerned.

It was incumbent on him to ponder on the disputes that have grown between various groups of scholastic theologians - Ash‘arites, Mu‘tazilites and Shi‘ites. These differences have divided the single Islamic ummah into 73 sects, then every sect has branched into vari-ous sub-sects, and these subdivisions might be equal in number to the main divisions. He should have thought whatwas the root cause of these differences . Was it not because of following the path of religion itself? Does any research scholar have a right to present these differ-ences to prove that religion is null and void and its way is incorrect? Can any explanation be given for this phenomenon that could not be applied with equal force to logic and philosophy? Can the logicians and philosophers be accused of an inner deficiency that could not be found in the people of religion?

Similar to the scholastic theology is the case of Islamic jurispru-dence. How many sects have developed even within a single sect; how much discords and differences are found among their various fuqahã’? The same is the case of all numerous disciplines and arts as none of them is immune from differences.

All this long talk has led him to declare that all the ways used for argumentation are null and void and the only correct path is that of the Book and the Sunnah that is the path of religion. In short, the only way left to him is that of tadhakkur (اَلتَّذَكرُّ = remembrance). It is a theory attributed to Plato; he says that if man frees himself from lustful mentality, acquires piety and spiritual perfection, and then turns to his inner self, he may reach at the truth.

This explanation is offered of the said Platonic theory. Some ancient Greek and other philosophers had adopted it. Some Muslims and some other occidental philosophers accepted this view too. However, every group has affirmed it in a different way.

1. Some assert that human knowledge is but natural; it is there, present with him actually from the first instant of his existence; as such, when we say that a new knowledge has come to Zayd, it in effect means that he has remembered it.

2. Some others say that when man turns to his soul by isolating himself from material distractions, it causes discovery of realities - it does not mean that knowledge is present with him actually; rather it is with him potentially. Actuality of knowledge is found in the inner human soul - it separates from him when he is heedless, connects with him when he remembers. This view is held by the Illuminists and those cognizant with divine knowledge (implying here the Sūfīs), and their likes from all religions and creeds.

3. Another group offers the same explanation as the no.2 above, but has added to it the condition of piety and adherence to thesharī‘ah in knowledge and practice. It has been asserted by some of our contemporary Muslims and others, as they think that this condition of adherence to thesharī‘ah would separate them from the Sūfīs and ‘urafã’ (those cognizant with divine knowledge). But they are oblivious of the fact that the Sūfīs and ‘urafã’ have already put that condition in their explanations, as evidenced by their reliable books, which are commonly available. So, this view is the same as the one held by the Sūfīs; yet the one differs from the other in the manner of “following” and the exact identification of its meaning. They believe that “following” should inflexibly concentrate on the apparent meanings of theQur’ãn and the Sunnah. Their method is a mixture of those of the Sūfīs and the Akhbãrīs.

If this theory of remembrance is not intended to invalidate ref-erence to logic and rational principles, then it may be deemed correct to a certain extent. When man is created in his essence, he has percep-tion of his person and is cognizant of his personal powers and weak-nesses; this cognition is naturally present with him, and it turns to acquired knowledge under influence of some of his faculties. Every faculty is bound to remain active within its sphere. It is inferred from the above that man, from the first moment of his existence, has some knowledge - that knowledge, although behind in nature, is concurrent with him in time. Also, nobody can deny that man gets some knowl-edge when he isolates himself somewhat from material connections.

But if the theory of remembrance is meant to invalidate refer-ence to logic and rational principles, in other words, if it means that turning to oneself by isolating from external distraction frees one from the need of arranging academic premises for arriving at the results, then this view is most absurd, unworthy of slightest consideration. There are many reasons, which negate this view:

First: Deep research in human fields of knowledge and cognition, shows that man's declarative knowledge depends on his knowledge of the ideas of subject and predicate separately; and his ideas are con-fined to, or abstracted from the knowledge of items perceived by one of the five senses. Analogy and experiments have shown that if a man lacks one of the senses, he remains totally oblivious of all knowledge that depends on that sense - be it ideal or assertive, self-evident or requiring analogical set-up. If the knowledge were actually present with human nature and essence, lack of a sense would not have any adverse effect on that knowledge. If it were said that blindness or deafness obstructed that remembrance, it would contradict the basic theory that remembrance - turning to oneself by discarding material connections - helps in this process by removing the obliviousness.

Second: So far as this remembrance is concerned, only some human beings are blessed with it. As for the general humanity, they achieve their goals of life by combining various premises and deriving the results; they derive in this way thousands and thousands of correct results. This method pervades all fields of knowledge and technical skills. To deny this fact would be haughtiness, and to explain it as a chance would be rashness. To follow this method is but natural for the human beings; and when a species is equipped with a natural and creative apparatus, it is bound to succeed in itsendeavours, it is im-possible for it to stumble in its actions.

Third: If we analyse the results of this “remembrance” we find that it is made up of well-arranged logical premises - disturb any laid down procedure in its form or substance and you disturb the result. So, they do use the logical principle - without knowing what they were doing. The hypothesis of chance and concurrence cannot be applied here. If they want to prove their theory of remembrance, they should bring an academic form based on it, which should have no connection with logic and its principles.

Now, let us look at the view that remembrance frees man from the need of referring to logical principles. It implies that there are two ways: the way of logic and the way of remembrance by following the sharī‘ah; that both of these ways lead to the correct destination, but the way of remembrance is better and preferable, because it is sure to hit the mark by conforming to the ma‘sūm's views; while there is the risk of falling into error, always or mostly, in the way of logic and intellect.

In any case, the second objection to the previous view applies here too. Only a few persons can comprehend all objectives of the Book and the Sunnah with their mysteries and secrets that have such astonishing wide range. Those precious few persons are those who deeply meditate on religious gnosis with its astonishing inter-connect-edness and intertwining roots and branches; some aspects of which are related to belief, others to personal and social activities. Man cannot be asked to perform something beyond his ability and power, neither in creation nor in legislation. People are only required to understand the objectives of religion through normal methods that they use in their lives. That is, arranging the known premises for discovering the unknown. And we know that only some premises ofsharī‘ah are known which have been established by proofs. It is amusing to note that a proponent of remembrance has used this very argument against logic and philosophy. He says that even if we accept for the sake of argument that it was possible to know the actual realities by using the logic and philosophy, only such stalwarts of philosophy as Aristotle and Avicenna could achieve it; general public could not do it. Therefore, how can the Lawgiver order people to use logical and philo-sophical principles to discover the realities?

That man did not realize that the tables could be turned on him and the same question asked from him. If he says, that use of remem-brance is within reach of everybody according to the degree of his following of the sharī‘ah, we shall reply that the use of logic, a little or a lot, is within reach of every body according to his ability of finding the realities - it is not necessary for every one to reach the furthest limit, even if it is beyond his strength.

Secondly, the third objection, mentioned earlier, is applicable here too. These people use the methods of logic in all their arguments they put forward in the name of remembrance. They could not discard those logical methods even when trying to negate the same way of logic and establish the way of remembrance. And this is enough to show its incorrectness.

Thirdly, even those who follow the way of remembrance fall mostly in error. Remembrance, as they claim, was the way used by our good predecessors - and not the way of logic. Yet they were involved in a lot of controversies and differences among themselves, like a number of the companions of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) who are regarded by the Muslims to be perfect in knowledge and adherence to the Book and the Sunnah; or whose knowledge and probity are agreed upon by the majority; and like many companions of the Imãms of the same calibre, like Abū Hamzah, Zurãrah, Abãn, Abū Khãlid, Hishãm ibn al-Hakam, Hishãm ibn Sãlim, Mu’minu 't-Tãq, the two Safwãns and others. Their basic differences with each other are well known. Clearly, when two persons differ on a subject, only one will be on the right. The same is the case with ancient jurisprudents and muhaddithīn like al-Kulaynī, as-Sadūq, at-Tūsī, al-Mufīd, al-Murtadã, and others (may Allãh be pleased with them all). So what is the advantage of remembrance over logical consideration? They must search for some factor other than remembrance to distinguish between right and wrong. The only resort is the logical contemplation.

Fourthly: The gist of their argument is that man by adhering to the sinless personalities saves himself from falling into error. It is because the views of a sinless personality when heard from him properly and when his meaning is perfectly understood are safe from error. This much is accepted by all. Yet the fact is that what is definitely heard or taken from a ma‘sūm, has nothing to do with remembrance or intellec-tual consideration at all; rather its syllogism runs as follows: It is the opinion of a ma‘sūm; and all his opinions are right; therefore it is right. It is a proof that produces difinite result.

On the contrary, what is understood from a tradition narrated by one narrator or other such things which produce only presumption, it has no authority; there is no proof that such solitary traditions have any validity - except in the field of fiqh - unless it is in conformity with the Qur’ãn; nor does presumption lead anywhere when its opposite is proved by academic proofs.

9) Some people have said: “Allãh has spoken to us in theQur’ãn in the language with which we are familiar, with arrangements of words and phrases known to the speakers of this language. The apparent statements contain order and prohibition, promise and threat, stories and wisdom, sermon and arguments in a good manner. For understanding them, one is not obliged to learn logic, philosophy, and other such legacies of unbelievers, polytheists, and unjust persons. Allah has forbidden us to befriend them, incline towards them, or follow their paths. The proper way for one who believes in Allãh and His Messenger is to adhere to the apparent meanings of religious statements, and stop at what a normal intel-lect understands from those words, without interpreting or over-stepping them. This view is held by al-Hashawiyyah (اَلْحَشَوِيَّةُ = those who believe in literal meanings of traditions), al-Mushabbihah (اَلْمُشَبِّهَةُ = those who think that the person of Allah is similar to that of humans), and other traditionalists.”

This view is wrong both in form and in substance. As for the form, this argument uses the principles of logic at the same time when it wants to ban its use! Nobody says that theQur’ãn leads to the use of the logical principles and that it was incumbent on every Muslim to learn logic. Yet its use is unavoidable in daily life. The opponents of logic are not unlike a person who says: The objective of theQur’ãn is to lead us to the goals of religion, as such we are not obliged to learn the Arabic language which is a legacy of the people of Ignorance! Obviously, this assertion has no legs to stand upon, because language is the way man is naturally obliged to use in conversation, and that is why Allãh has used it in His Book and the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) in his traditions. Likewise, logic is a mental way, which man is naturally obliged to tread in the sphere of understanding, and Allãh has used it in His Book and the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) in his traditions.

Coming to the substance of that view, it takes intellectual sub-stance but falls into fallacy by equalizing the apparent meaning with its application. A Muslim is required to understand from the Qur’ãnic words, like knowledge, power, life, hearing, sight, speech, volition and will the meanings that are opposite of ignorance, inability, death, deafness and blindness, etc. But he is not supposed to assert that Allãh hasa knowledge like our knowledge, power and life like our power and life, and hearing, sight, volition and will like those of ours; he is not allowed to say so by the Book, the Sunnah or the reason. We have explained this topic to a certain extent under the discussion of the Decisive and Ambiguous verses in the third volume of this book.17

10) Some others have said: “The only evidence for the validity of the premises which are proved by rational arguments is the rational premise which says that reason's dictates must be followed. In other words, there is no authority for the reason's dictates except the reason itself. And it is clearly a vicious circle. Therefore, there is no escape in controversial issues except to the opinion of a ma‘sūm - the Prophet or Imãm - without following [a non-ma‘sūm].”

But it is a most absurd doubt expressed on this matter. The man wanted to strengthen a structure, but it has led to its demolition. He has invalidated the rational dictate by what he has described as clear vicious circle. Then when he turned to authenticating thesharī‘ah's orders he was obliged to argue through rational arguments (which led to a vicious circle), or through sharī‘ah's dictate (which led to another vicious circle.) Now, he is disconcerted and confused between two vicious circles. Or he may opt to follow a non-ma‘sūm, which will be a second confusion.

He has fallen into confusion when trying to understand the meaning of 'Obligatoriness of following the reason's dictate.' If this obligatoriness refers to what stands with prohibition and permission as a copartner, and whose contravention entails condemnation or pun-ishment (like obligatoriness of obeying a good counsellor, and obliga-toriness of justice in deciding the cases and other similar things), then it is the dictate of practical intellect, and we have nothing to say against it. And if it means that man is necessarily bound to confirm and accept a result - when arguments are offered for it with academic premises and in correct form with perfect conception of all aspects of related issues, then it is a proposition which man sees by his psychic forces. In this case, why should the intellectbe asked for an evidence to prove the authenticity of its proof? Because its authenticity is self-evident; and this case is like other self-evident propositions. Every self-evident clause is its own proof; it needs no outside proof.

11) Some have said: “The ultimate goal of logic is to get at the things' established quiddities, to arrive at the results through firm and established general premises. But academic researches have established today that there is no totality, generality, permanency, or durability - neither in mind nor outside it. The things are governed by the law of general transformation; nothing continues as it is, in an established, permanent, or total condition.”

This assertion is totally wrong. The man has used the principles of logic; in form and substance both, [to argue against the same principles] as any contemplating person will understand. Moreover, the objector has offered this objection only to prove that the old [Aristotlian] logic was not correct; yet it is a result, which is general, enduring and established which contains established concepts. Other-wise, it would not serve his purpose. So, the objection invalidates itself.

Perhaps we have gone beyond the self-imposed condition to keep the book as brief as possible. So, let us return to our previous topic.

The noble Qur’ãn guides the intellect to use what it has been created to use, and to precede on what it knows and is familiar with - that is, to arrange the known premises for arriving at the results, which were hitherto unknown. The intellect has a natural disposition for using authentic and indisputable premises in order to arrive at genuine and authentic results - and it is what is called “Proof”. Also, the intel-lect is used in practical matters which lead to felicity and infelicity, good and evil, benefit and harm; showing what should be taken and adopted and what is to be rejected and discarded - these are mentally posited ideas, well-known or accepted premises - and it is what is called “Debate” or “Disputation”. Alternatively, it uses in matters of assumed good or evil assumed premises, which guide to presumed good or prevent from presumed evil - and it is called “Admonition”. Allãh says: Call to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and have disputation with them in the best manner (16: 125). Clearly, “wisdom” refers to “proof”, as may be understood from its positioning vis-à-vis goodly exhortation and disputation.

Question: The way of logical thinking and contemplation is within the ability of believer and unbeliever both, and human beings whether sinner or pious tread on it. In this background, how can you justify the Qur’ãnic statements where Allãh disallows good knowledge and correct remembrance to all who are not pious and do not follow true religion; as is seen in the following verses: . and none minds but he who turns (to Him) again and again (40:13). .and whoever fears Allãh, He will make for him an outlet (65:2). Therefore turn aside from him who turns his back uponOur reminder and does not desire anything but this world's life. That is the (last) reach of their knowledge; surely your Lord knows best him who goes astray from His path and He knows best him who follows the right direction. (53:29-30).And how will you explain the numerous, nearly-mutawãtir traditions which say that beneficial knowledge cannot be attained except through good deeds?

Reply: There is no doubt that the Book and the Sunnah give importance to piety in respect of knowledge. But it does not mean that they have made piety (or piety coupled with remembrance) an inde-pendent way for acquiring knowledge of realities, separate from the natural way of contemplation which man inevitably treads upon. Otherwise, all the arguments and disputations brought in the noble Book against the unbelievers, polytheists, and immoral and sinful persons would become irrelevant - they do not follow the truth and do not know what piety and remembrance was; accordingly, they would be unable to attain the intended goal. Consequently, it would be irrelevant to argue with them. The same applies to the disputations found in thesunnah against various sects and groups that have gone astray.

In fact, piety is considered necessary for bringing the human intelligent soul back to its natural uprightness. It may be explained as follows:

Man, on his body's side, is made up of contrary animalistic and predatory powers, all related to this material body; each of these powers performs its own function without having any coordination with other powers. The desire of food, for instance, encourages man to go on eating and drinking; it feels no restriction or limitation by itself, except if stomach refuses to accept any more food or drink when it is filled up completely, or if the jaws become tired of chewing, or things like that. These are the things we always observe in ourselves.

In this situation, if man inclines towards one of his powers, follows its dictates and proceeds to where it instigates him to go, that power exceeds its limits, and subjugates the opposite power to such an extent that it is almost negated. For example, giving free rein to desire of food or sex diverts the man away from all important affairs of life, like earning livelihood, social relations, domestic affairs, upbringing of children and all other individual and social responsibilities which he is obliged to do. The same thing happens when man goes on fol-lowing other powers of desire and anger. This too we always see in our own lives as well as in others'.

With this excess and shortcoming, humanity is bound to perish. Man is a person who is controlled by these adverse powers; he is supposed to pull all these powers together by activating them in the way of his felicity in the life of this world and the next. Such life has to be based on knowledge and perfection. He has no option but to give every power its due share in a way that it does not obstruct other powers, nor does it become dormant itself.

Man cannot perfect his humanity unless he creates a perfect balance between his various powers in such a manner that every power keeps in the middle of the way prescribed for it. The top characteristic of proper proportion in these powers is called wisdom, bravery, chastity, etc., and collectively they are called justice, probity.

No doubt, man acquires the thoughts (which are present with him now), and expands his human cognizance and knowledge by instigating these perceptive faculties to do their work. I mean, initially man comes into this world without any of these vast informations and knowledge; he is totally empty-handed. Then his internal faculties perceive their requirements and demand from him what they desire. These elementary perceptions are the starting point of man's knowl-edge. Thereafter he goes on generalising, particularizing, mixing and separating these matters until he completes the process of human thoughts.

A wise person will understand from the above description that if man remains deeply involved in obeying one of his various contra-dictory powers, and exceeds the limit in giving it what it demands, then his thoughts and perceptions would be deviated from right path; he would blindly make its propositions superior and keep other powers' propositions and thoughts subservient to it; he will remain oblivious to the demands of other faculties and powers.

Experience confirms it. It is this deviation, which we observe in intemperate and extravagant persons who have become slaves of their desires. Also it may be seen in unjust, oppressive tyrants who corrupt the life in human society. The former who are submerged in the abyss of desires and are obsessed by pleasures of drinking, entertainment and sexual enjoyments, are almost incapable of thinking about the obligations of humanity and the important matters for which great people vie with each other. Desire has permeated their sitting and standing, their joining and separating and things like that. The later, that is the oppressive and haughty people, are hard-hearted; incapable of thinking about compassion, kindliness, mercy, or humility even where it is essential. Their lives are mirrors of their evil condition which they display in all its manifestations - their talk and silence, their looking and averting of eyes, their advancing and retreating, all are devoid of kindliness. Both groups are proceeding on a wrong path in seeking the knowledge; all are bent upon the perverted and deviated knowledge and thoughts connected with their twisted psyche. They are unaware of what lies beyond their myopic vision. And what lies there? It is beneficial knowledge and true cognizance. Man cannot attain true cognizance and beneficial knowledge unless his morals are excellent and his human virtues are complete. And this is piety, God-fearing.

It is thus proved that it is the good deeds, which preserve the good characteristics, which in their turn preserve the true cognizance, beneficial knowledge, and correct thoughts. There is no good in knowledge if it is devoid of practice.

Although we have explained this topic in academic and ethical terms (because the context demanded it), Allãh has told all this in one short phrase, where He says: And pursue the right course in your going about . (31:19). It is an indication that one should keep on the middle of the path, and remain moderate in life. Also He says: If you fear Allãh, He will grant you a distinction . (8:29). .and make provision, for surely the best provision is piety (guarding oneself against evil); and fear Me, O people of understanding! (2:197); i.e. being men of understanding, you require piety and God-fearing for activating your understanding. Again Allãh says: And (I swear by) the soul and Him Who made it perfect, then He inspired it to understand what is wrong for it and right for it; He will indeed be successful who purifies it, and he will indeed fail who corrupts it (91:7-10). Also He says: . and fear Allãh, that you may be successful (3:130).

On the other hand, He says about the opposite group: But there followed after them an evil generation, who neglectedprayer and fol-lowed the sensual desires, so they shall soon meet (the result of their) sin; except such as repent and believe and do good . (19:59-60).

Allãh states here that following the sensual desire leads to perdition. Also He says: I will turn away from My signs those who are unjustly proud in the earth; and if they see every sign they will not believe in it; and if they see the way of rectitude they do not take it for a way, and if they see the way of error, they take it for a way; this is because they rejected Our signs and were heedless of them. (7:146). Here Allãh reminds that the prisoners of the powers of anger are prevented from following the way of truth and are pulled to the path of error and perdition, then He explains that it all happens because they are heed-less of truth. Again He says: And certainly We have created for hell many of the jinn and the men; they have hearts with which they do not understand, and they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear; they are as cattle, nay, they are in worse errors; these are the heedless ones (7:179). In this verse, He states that these heedless ones are oblivious of the true perceptions, which behove human beings. Their hearts, eyes, and ears do not perceive what a blissful man perceives. Their perception does not reach higher than the level of cattles or even worse - and these are the ideas which grazing cattles and preying beasts are familiar with and inclined to.

The foregoing details clearly show that the Qur’ãn has made thought, remembrance and understanding conditional upon piety (God-fearing), and has joined knowledge with practice in order that man may attain to straight thinking and correct knowledge which is free from animalistic imaginations and Satanic insinuations.

Of course, there is a Qur’ãnic reality which cannot be denied; and that is: If man is brought under the influence of divine guardian-ship and goes near the perimeter of heavenly sanctity, it opens for him a door to the kingdoms of the heavens and the earth, and he sees through it what remains hidden to others - the great signs of Allãh and everlasting lights of His omnipotence.as-Sãdiq (a.s.) has said, “If the Satans had not hovered around the hearts of the human beings, they would have seen the kingdoms of the heavens and the earth.” The Sunnīs have narrated from the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) that he said: “If there were no multiplicity in your talk and confusion in your hearts, you would have seen what I see, and heard what I hear.” Allãh has said: And (as for) those who strive hard for Us, We will most certainly guide them ontoOur ways; and Allãh is most surely with the doers of good (29:69). The apparent meaning of the following divine words prove it: And worship thy Lord until there comes to thee that which is certain (15:99), as it shows that certainty springs from worship. Also He says: And thus didWe show Ibrãhīm the kingdoms of the heavens and the earth, and so that he might be of those who are sure (6:75), as it ties the virtue of certitude to observation of the kingdom. In other verses He says: Nay! If you had known with a knowledge of certainty, you should most certainly have seen the hell; then you shall most certainly see it with the eye of certainty (102:5-7) Nay! Most surely the record of the righteous shall be in the ‘illiyyīn. And what will make you know what the ‘illiyyīn is? It is a written book; those who are drawn near (to Allãh) shall witness it (83:18-21). (A full dis-cussion of this subject will be found in Chapter 5, verses 55 and 105.)

Affirmation of this reality does not go against our earlier stand that the nobleQur’ãn supports the way of natural thinking, on which the structure of human life is founded and man has been created. Because this way is other than meditation and contemplation; it is a divine gift, which is reserved for His selected servants; and the good end is for the pious ones.

A HISTORICAL DISCUSSION

In this discussion we shall have an overall view of the history of Islamic thoughts, and the way, which the Muslim ummah adopted - in spite of its sectarian differences. We do not intend to support or oppose any school of thought. Our aim is to present the historical events to theQur’ãn and let the Holy Book confirm or reject them. We are not concerned with boastings of supporters or apologia of opponents, because the place for it is in a religious discussion.

The nobleQur’ãn deals with all aspects of human life without being restricted with any condition. It governs man - be he an individ-ual or a group, small or big, male or female, be he of white race or black, an Arab or non-Arab, civilized or primitive, learned or ignorant, present or absent; be he at any time and in any place. TheQur’ãn certainly guides him in all his affairs, be it belief, ethics or deeds.

TheQur’ãn interlocks with all academic and industrial aspects related to the human life. Ponder on its verses exhorting people to meditate, think, remember and understand, and you will find that the Book intensely urges man to acquire knowledge and discard ignorance in every field, be it concerned with heavens or earth, whether it is vegetable world, animal kingdom or humanity as parts of this world of ours; and even going beyond that to the angels, satans, the tablet and the pen, etc., in order that it may be a means to acquire gnosis of God and whatever is in any way related to the social human life - ethics, laws, reciprocal rights and social norms.

You have seen that theQur’ãn supports the natural way of thinking, to which the nature inevitably invites; there is no escape from it as the nature demands to proceed in logical way.

TheQur’ãn itself uses all types of logical techniques - proof, argumentation, and sermon. It invites the Muslim ummah to follow its lead and to offer proofs regarding positivistic realities (in practical sphere); and to argue with the help of accepted premises in other spheres as in mentally posited considerations.

The Qur’ãn has offered the Prophetic way of life as its ideal; it has appointed the Messenger of Allãh (s.a.w.a.) as its model; the Muslims used to observe and remember his ways, and follow his knowledgeable steps as a student follows his teacher in his academic progress.

The Muslims during the Prophet's time (i.e. during his stay at Medina) were new to the Islamic teachings. Their condition was not different from the ancient man in academic and industrial field. When they engaged in academic discussion, it was in a simple and untech-nical manner, their only aim being to know divine commandments. In the beginning their attention was fixed on memorizing and recital of Qur’ãn, and memorizing the Prophetic traditions (without writing them) and their transmission. Sometimes they disputed with each other on religious topics; also they entered into arguments with people of some alien faith, especially the Jews and the Christians, because there were some groups of them in Arabia, Ethiopia and Syria. This was the beginning of ‘ilmu 'l-kalãm (Scholastic Theology). They also liked narrating poetry; it was a part of Arabian culture, which Islam did not give importance to; the Book does not contain a single word in praise of poetry or poets, nor thesunnah lauds it much.

When the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) departed from this world, we know what happened regarding the caliphate; the resulting discord further increased the disunity. TheQur’ãn was collected during the reign of the first Caliph after the battle of Yamãmah, when a great number of the reciters were martyred there. The condition remained the same during his time - nearly two years - and the reign of the second caliph.

Although Islam's fame had spread and its domain increased, thanks to the great victories the Muslims had achieved in those days, it kept them busy and prevented them from paying any thought to academic matters, nor did they try to enhance their level of knowl-edge. Or, perhaps with their academic level they did not feel need to any increase or enhancement.

Knowledge and its virtue is not something to be perceived by the five senses, which a nation may know from the other, except when that knowledge is related to craft and industry; then its effect is per-ceivable and general public recognizes it.

Those continuous and growing victories did reawaken in them the characteristics of the Days of Ignorance - the pride and arrogance - which had subsided as a result of the Prophetic teaching and train-ing. But now the spirit of domineering and oppressing nations was sneaking into, and getting hold of them. Its proof may be seen in the division of the Muslim ummah at that time into Arab and clients; also look at the behaviour of Mu‘ãwiyah, then Syria's governor, towards the Muslims, and how he adopted the imperial Caesarian style, in addition to many other indications recorded by history about Muslim armies. This psychology had its effect on the academic progress, es-pecially the Qur’ãnic teachings.

As for their academic development at that time, their involve-ment withQur’ãn was as before; and there appeared its numerous versions attributed to Zayd, Ubayy, Ibn Mas‘ūd, and others.

As for hadīth, it spread widely - and what a spreading it was? Its narrations and records increased to such an extent that ‘Umar for-bade some companions from narration because he was narrating a lot of it. A number of the People of the Book entered into the fold of Islam, and the Muslim muhaddithīn took from them a lot of traditions from their books including the stories of their prophets and nations; then they mixed it with what they had preserved from the traditions of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.).Forgery and uncalled for infiltration freely circulated among the ahãdīth. Today we have got a lot of pieces of traditions, narrated from the companions and their narrators of the early days of Islam, which are clearly rejected by the Qur’ãn.

We may summarize its reason in three factors:

1. The high status which people accorded to the Prophet's companionship and to memorization of his ahãdīth; the prestige and honour enjoyed by the companions and their disciples who narrated to the people the traditions on those companions' authority. This led the people to take traditions - and that too abundantly - even from con-verted People of the Book, and to intense rivalry among narrators of hadīth for gaining precedence and pride of place.

2. Their intense avidity for remembrance and narration of hadīth hindered them from testing the narrative for correctness, and from meditating on it's meaning, especially presenting it to theQur’ãn for verification. The Book of Allãh is the foundation on which the relig-ion's structure is built; and the root from which the religion's branches sprout. The Prophet (s.a.w.a.) had enjoined them to do so, as his correct traditions show. For example: “Certainly forgers and liers against me will increase; so when a tradition is brought to you, present it to theQur’ãn: whatever conforms to it, accepts it, and whatever goes against it, throw it on the wall.”

This environment became a fertile ground for circulation of forged traditions in respect of divine attributes, names and actions; about the lapses ascribed to the noble prophets, and slanderous evil deeds attributed to the Prophet (s.a.w.a.); it took in its fold the myths of genesis and creation, stories of past nations; it even contained the claim that the Qur’ãn had been altered, and numerous such stories which are similar to what is found in the Tawrãt and the Injīl.

At this juncture theQur’ãn and the Hadīth divided advance-ment and practice between themselves. Seeming advancement became the Qur’ãn's lot, but practice was reserved for hadīth; consequently very soonQur’ãn was abandoned. This habit of neglecting to present the hadīth to theQur’ãn has become a permanent feature of the Muslims' behaviour since those early days uptil now, although they do not admit it in so many words: And the Messenger cried out: “O my Lord! Surely my people have treated thisQur’ãn as a forsaken thing.” [25:30]. Exceptions to this malady are rare, countable on fingers.

This negligence is exactly one of the reasons why many ancient national myths and superstitions are still alive in the Muslim nations even after their entering into the fold of Islam. And disease breeds disease.

3. What happened regarding the caliphate after the Messenger of Allãh (s.a.w.a.) turned the opinions of the general Muslims away from the people of the family of the Prophet? Muslims found themselves divided into three groups. There were some who were devoted to them, remained adhered to them; others turned away from them, not caring about them or the position they had in Qur’ãnic knowledge; there were even those who hated them, felt enmity towards them. All this took place when the Prophet (s.a. w.a.) had enjoined them - in traditions whose authenticity is undoubted and whose meaning is accepted by all - that they should learn from the Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.) and should not attempt to teach them because they know the Book of Allãh better than the ummah; he had reminded them that his family members would never make mistake in Qur’ãnic exegesis nor would they go astray in its understanding. He had said in the mutawãtir hadīth of “Two Precious Things”: “Surely I am leaving among you two precious things, the Book of Allãh and my descendants, and they shall not separate from each other until they come to me near the reservoir.” Some of its narratives add: “Do not teach them, for they are more knowledgeable than you.” Also he has said in a nearly-mutawãtir hadīth: “Whoever interpretsQur’ãn according to his opinion, he should prepare his seat in hell.” (It has been fully explained in the discussion on “The Decisive and the Ambiguous Verses”, in the third18 volume.)

That was the biggest loss that afflicted the knowledge of the Qur’ãn, and the way of thinking to which it calls.If you want any proof of this turning away, look at the paucity of the ahãdīth which have been taken from the Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.). Think about the prestige and status ‘ilmu 'l-hadīth enjoyed in the reign of the caliphs, and how the people vied with each other in taking hadīth; and then count how many ahãdīth have been narrated from ‘Alī, al-Hasan and al-Husayn - and particularly those connected with the Qur’ãnic exegesis - and you will see an astonishing phenomenon: As for the companions, they did not narrate from ‘Alī (a.s.) anything worthy of attention. As for their disciples if we count what they have narrated from him in the whole of Qur’ãn, it will not reach a hundred narratives. As for al-Hasan (a.s .), perhaps the number of narratives taken from him would not reach ten; and as for al-Husayn, they have not narrated from him any-thing worthy of mention. You will understand the true position when you come to know that some people have counted the narrations re-garding the Qur’ãnic exegesis and the number has reached seventeen thousand ahãdīth from Sunnī chains.19 The same ratio is found in the tradition of fiqh too.20

Was it because they had abandoned Ahlu 'l-Bayt and turned away from their hadīth? Or was it because they had abundantly taken hadīth from them, and then it was hidden and forgotten during Umay-yad period, because Umayyads were hostile to them? I do not know.

However, seclusion of ‘Alī and his non-participation in the gathering of the Qur’ãn - in beginning and in end - and the life histories of al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be on them all) supports the first alternative.

The situation regarding his hadīth deteriorated to such an extent that some people denied that some of his magnificent sermons in the book, Nahju 'l-balghah were of his saying; while no one casts any doubt about al-khutbatu 'l-batrã’ of the Ziyãd (of illegitimate birth) or Yazīd's poems extolling intoxicants!

The Ahlu 'l-bayt remained under oppression and their hadīth forsaken until the time of the Imãms, al-Bãqir and as-Sãdiq (peace be on them), when there was some intermission because of the ensuing conflict between the Umayyads and ‘Abbãsids. Thus they got a chance to describe the hitherto lost traditions of their ancestors, and renew what had been obliterated of their tracks.

However their traditions as well as those of their forefathers and descendants did not remain safe from infiltration, were not free from forgery, and unauthorised insertion - just like the Prophetic traditions. Those two Imãms had stated it clearly and mentioned by name some forgers, like Mughīrah ibnSa‘īd and Ibn Abi 'l-Khattãb and others like them. Some Imãms refuted many traditions, which were attributed to them and to the Prophet (s.a.w.a.); and commanded their companions and the Shī‘ahs to present the narrated traditions to Qur’ãn, and to accept what conforms to it and reject what goes against it.

But the people (excepting a few individuals) did not follow this order in practice concerning the ahãdīth of the Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s .), and especially in subjects other than fiqh; they followed the same path which the general Muslims had taken in respect of the Prophetic traditions.

The malady spread to such an extent that a group said that the apparent meanings of the Qur’ãn had no authority at all21 ; while the books of traditions like Misbãhu 'sh-sharī‘ah, Fiqhu 'r-Ridã and Jãmi‘u 'l-akhbãr had authority. They went to such an extent that some of them said that hadīth explains the Qur’ãn even when the former goes against the clear meaning of the latter. It is not different from some Sunnīs' view that hadīth abrogates the Book! Perhaps what is seen in the Muslims' behaviour is what a research scholar has said: “The Sunnīs took the Book and abandoned the Ahlu 'l-Bayt; the result was that they forsook the Book too, because the Prophet (s.a.w.a.), has said: 'Surely they will not separate from each other.' And the Shī‘ahs took the Ahlu 'l-Bayt and abandoned the Book; the result was that they forsook the Ahlu 'l-Bayt too, because of the same Prophetic saying: 'Surely they will not separate from each other.' Thus the ummah collectively forsook theQur’ãn and the Ahlu 'l-Bayt (the Book and the Sunnah) altogether.”

The path they had taken regarding hadīth was one of the factors that caused severance of relationship between Islamic subjects (like religion and literature) and the Qur’ãn. This happened while it is known that all Islamic subjects are like branches and fruits growing from this good tree (Qur’ãn) whose root is firmly fixed and whose branches are in heaven, yielding its fruit in every season by the per-mission of its Lord. You will clearly see it if you look at these sub-jects: you will find that they have been developed and arranged in a way that they do not needQur’ãn at all. It is possible for a student to learn and complete all Islamic subjects - morphology, grammar, rhetoric, language, hadīth, rijãl, critical knowledge of hadīth, jurispru-dence and its fundamentals; he may become an expert and authority in these branches of knowledge without even reciting the Qur’ãn or touching the Book. So what share has actually been given toQur’ãn in Muslims' lives? Its recital is only for earning reward in the next world or using it as amulet for protection of their children from misfortunes and untoward occurances! Learn lesson if you have any understanding.

Now, let us return to our original topic:

You have heard what was the position ofQur’ãn and hadīth during ‘Umar's reign. In the same period there was increase in scholastic debate, as the Islamic victories naturally led to mingling of Muslims with other religions and groups, and there were scholars, rabbis, bishops and patricians in those religions who discussed and debated on religious matters. In this way, scholastic theology got boost although it was not much arranged or recorded - its early books are attributed to later scholars.

It continued during ‘Uthman's time, but people turned against the caliph. However, he succeeded in gathering of various collections ofQur’ãn and uniting the Muslims on one version.

The same was the condition during ‘Alī's caliphate; but he remained busy in reform of Muslim society, as there were internal conflicts which led to battles one after another. However, he founded Arabic grammar (syntax) and dictated its general broadlines to his companion, Abu 'l-Aswad ad-Dualī, and told him to write down smaller details. He could not do more, but he delivered important sermons and ahadīth, which contain comprehensive materials of religious knowledge and finest Qur’ãnic mysteries. In addition, his scholastic discussions are recorded in collections of hadīth.

This situation ofQur’ãn and hadīth continued in Mu‘ãwiyah's reign and after him during the Umayyad and ‘Abbãsid periods' upto nearly beginning of the fourth century of hijrah. It coincided with the end of the time of twelve Shī‘ite Imãms. Nothing important happened in respect of discussions aboutQur’ãn and hadīth - except what hap-pened during Mu‘ãwīyah's reign as he tried his utmost to destroy the name of the Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.) and obliterate their tracks. For this purpose he started forgery of ahãdīth in an organized way. The religious rule turned into an autocratic despotic government, and the Islamicsunnah gave way to byzantine splendour and authority. Also in this same period ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdi 'l-‘Azīz gave order to put hadīth in writing; before that muhaddithūn used to take, preserve and trans-mit traditions verbally without recording them on paper.

In this very period, Arabic poetry got wide prevalance in society. It began in Mu‘ãwiyah's time, as he was very keen to spread it, and it continued during Umayyad and ‘Abbãsid periods. Some- times, they rewarded two lines of poetry, or a fine literary point with hundreds and thousands of dinãr. People dedicated themselves to poetry and its transmission, and to history of Arabia and their battles; they earned through it magnificent wealth. The Umayyads benefited very much from spread of poetry and paid good money for it, because it supported their stand vis-à-vis Hãshimites; the same advantage was taken from it by Abbasids vis-à-vis Fãtimids. The rulers paid high respects to scholars in order that they could help them against masses, and could make them do what they (rulers) wanted.

Poetry and literature got so much hold on academic circles that you would see many scholars, while engaged in intellectual or aca-demic discussions, offering a poetry or well-known proverb as their proof, and winning the debate. Often they base theoretical purports on linguistic rules - at least they begin with linguistic explanation of the name of the subject and then enter into its main topics. All these things do have deep influence on scholars' thoughts and their aca-demic proceedings.

In those very days scholastic discussions got wide prevalence; many books and booklets were written on this subject. Soon the scholars were divided into two big sects: the Ash‘arites and the Mu‘tazilites. The seeds of their views were present at the time of the caliphs - nay, of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) himself. Its proof may be found in the recorded arguments of ‘Alī (a.s.) regarding compulsion and delegation, qadar and ability, etc. and in the narrated ahãdīth of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) onthese subjects.22 What happened at this time was clear distinction of the two groups in their opinions. The Mu‘tazilites accorded total authority to dictates of reason over apparent aspects of religion, like the beliefs that good and evil may be understood through intellect; that it is wrong to give precedence to something without a reason; that it is repugnant to force someone to do what is beyond his power; that man is totally independent in his actions, and that he has been given all power, etc. The Ash‘arites, on the other hand, gave total authority to apparent factors of religion on the dictates of reason, like the rejection of idea that good and evil could be understood through intellect; that it was quite in order to give precedence without a reason; that man is not independent in his actions, rather he is under compulsion; that the speech of Allãh is eternal, and many similar ideas which are found in their books.

Then they wrote and arranged the subject of scholastic theol-ogy, coined its terminologies, and added to it some issues with which they faced the philosophers in imaginative topics of general proposi-tion. This happened when the works of Greek philosophy were trans-lated into Arabic and its study spread among the Muslims. Anyhow, it is not correct to say (as some have done) that the scholastic theology began in Islam or divided into I‘tizãl and Ash‘ariyyah after the trans-fer of philosophy to Arabia. The existence in the early traditions of their major issues and opinions is sufficient to refute such an idea.

The Mu‘tazilites continued to multiply in number and their splendour and might kept on increasing from their advent to the early ‘Abbãsid period (early third century of hijrah); then they began their downward slide until the Ayyūbids extinguished their life. Only Allãh knows how many people were massacred at that time and later for the crime of I‘tizãl. This left the field clear for the Ash‘arites to indulge into scholastic discourses without anybody being there to oppose them; so they entered its arena (while previously their jurisprudents used to brand it a sin!). Now, Ash‘ariyyah is the prevalent school among the Sunnīs today.

The Shī‘ites had precedence in scholastic discussions. They began speaking in this vein soon after the departure of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.). Most of their scholars were companions of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.) e.g. Salmãn, Abū Dharr, Miqdãd, ‘Ammãr and ‘Amr ibn al-Hamq and others. Also there were among the tãbi‘īn people like Rushayd, Kumayl and Maytham and the descendants of ‘Alī (a.s.). Umayyads annihilated them; yet they put down new roots and were reinvigorated in the days of the two Imãms al-Bãqir and as-Sãdiq (peacebe on them). They took part in discussions and wrote books and booklets. Their efforts continued in spite of the persecution and suppression of the governments. However they were given some breathing space during the Buwayhids' rule.23 Then again they were strangulated until the advent of the Safavid kingdom24 in Iran - and this situation continues till today.

The characteristic style of their scholastic discussions was more in conformity with Mu‘tazilites than with Ash‘arites. The Shī‘ite and Mu‘tazilite views were almost similar in many aspects, as for example they too believed that good and evil were perceivable through intel-lect, to give precedence without reason was wrong, and in the ques-tions of qadar and delegation. This similarity made some people to think that the Shī‘ites and the Mu‘tazilites went on the same way in scholastic matters, like two competing horses. But they have totally missed the point, because the fundamentals which are narrated from the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.) - which are the authority in the Shī‘ite sect - have no affinity with the Mu‘tazilite taste and style.

In short, the scholastic theology is a noble branch of knowl-edge, which defends the true religious precepts. But the Muslim scholars went awry in their debates and discussions and they made no distinction between intellectual propositions; they mixed truth with acceptable, as we shall explain it later to some extent.

During the same period, ancients' books were translated into Arabic; they were related to logic, mathematics, physics, divinity, medicine, and practical hikmah. Some were translated in Umayyad reign, and the exercise was completed in the early ‘Abbãsid period. Hundreds of books were rendered into Arabic from the Greek, Latin, Sanskirit, Persian and Suriyac languages. People became engaged in studies of various fields of knowledge, and in a short time they formed independent views and opinions. Of course, the religious scholars were enraged by this “development”, especially when they looked at the open attacks against the accepted religious issues launched by atheists, philosophers, Manichaeans and others; they were also infuri-ated by the Muslim philosophers' disparaging the religion and relig-ionists, and insulting the fundamentals of Islam and landmarks of sharī‘ah. And there is no disease like ignorance!

What inflamed their anger most was the philosophers' habit of basing the issues on the principles derived from Greek astronomy and physics, like the arrangement of Ptolemaic celestial bodies, and their belief that those skies were the fifth nature; they could not be rent or mended; they were eternal as was the astronomical system in person; likewise the elements were eternal in species; all species were eternal and so on. In fact, all these issues were based on principles that were taken for granted and for which philosophy had not established any proof. Yet ignorant persons posing as philosophers were presenting them as if they were proven issues. The atheists and their likes who professed to believe in philosophy added to it other false issues like belief in transmigration of soul, rejection of resurrection, particularly the physical one. They used all these suppositions for ridiculing literal meanings of religion. Sometimes one of them would say: Religion is a collection of blindly followed rituals and responsibilities, which the prophets had brought for training and perfecting the simple and primi-tive minds; but a philosopher who has attained real knowledge, does not need them or their message, they had firm standing on the path of argumentation.

This behaviour prompted and called the jurisprudents and scholastic scholars to stand against them and refute their views; to annihilate their influence by all possible means, debating with them, cursing and disavowing them, declaring them out of the fold of Islam. In this way, they broke their force, dispersed their gathering, and destroyed their books during Mutawakkil's reign. Then philosophy was on the verge of extinction; until it was revived by the Second Teacher, Abū Nasr al-Fãrãbī (d. 339 AH) and then ash-Shaykhu 'r-Raīs Abū ‘Alī al-Husayn ibn ‘Abdillãh ibn Sīnã (d. 428 AH) followed by other stalwarts of philosophy like Abū ‘Alī ibn Miskwayh, Ibn Rushd al-Andulusī and others. Since then, philosophy has remained alive although the number of its students has always been small; it rotates between strength and weakness.

Although philosophy was first brought to Arabia, very few Arabs, like al-Kindī and Ibn Rushd got fame as philosophers. Lately it has settled in Iran.

The Muslim scholars of ‘ilmu 'l-kalãm opposed philosophy and vehemently refuted it. However, most of them accorded acceptance to Logic as they found it conforming to the natural way of argumenta-tion; so they wrote books and booklet on this discipline.

But, as you have been told earlier, they erred in its use: They applied the rules of real definition and its parts on mentally posited concepts, and used the proof in propositions of subjective consider-ation - while in fact proof had nothing to do with it, it was the field of argumentative syllogism. You will find them talking on scholastic issues like good and evil, reward and punishment, forfeiture and grace, and they describe its genus, class and limits, they describe its definition. Likewise, they argue regarding issues of usūl and al-kalãm (in branches of religion) on the basis of inevitability and impossibility; it is an example of using realities in mentally posited issues. On the other hand, they say that: 'This is obligatory for Allãh', or 'This is improper for Allãh'. In this way they make subjective considerations rule over realities - and they think that it is proof! In fact, it is just a poetic analogy.

They went ahead in this respect to such a stage that one of them said: Allãh is so sublime that subjective consideration cannot creep into His command and action, such consideration is mere allusion; therefore whatever He has created or legislated are real factual mat-ters. Another one said: Allãh has all power; it would be beneath His omnipotence to give an order and not to be able to establish a proof for it; therefore proof covers both created things and legislated orders. There are other such absurd sayings that, by my life, are tragedies of knowledge and people of knowledge; and even greater tragedy is for me to feel compelled to record and discuss them in academic works.

In this same period, Sūfīsm appeared among the Muslims. Its rudiments were found in the garb of asceticism. Then the Sūfīs began openly showing their colours in early ‘Abbãsid period, when people like Abū Yazīd, Junayd, ash-Shiblī and Ma‘rūf appeared on the scene.

They believe that the true way for reaching real human perfection and attaining realities of cognition is to enter intoan Sūfī tarīqah (path). This path is a sort of diligence in practice ofsharī‘ah for attaining to the reality. A greater part of them - among the Shī‘ites and Sunnītes both - trace their chain to ‘Alī (a.s.).

They claim to perform some supernatural deeds, and their talks contain things that go against clear concepts of religion and dictate of reason (saying that those expressions have correct interpretations which are beyond the understanding of general people!). Consequent-ly, fuqahã’ and general Muslims could not tolerate such utterances; they opposed them, avoided them and decreed that they were infidels. Sometimes they were imprisoned, whipped, killed, crucified, chased away, or banished. All this happened because of their moral depravity and their loose talks that they called mysteries of thesharī‘ah . But if the things were as they claimed, and the Sūfīs' path was the kernel of reality and concepts of religion were merely its shell, then the legis-lator of the sharī‘ah had more right to pay attention to it and make it public - as they are doing. On the other hand, if it is not truth, then what is there after truth except error and falsehood?

The Sūfīs, to begin with, expressed their views relating to the path in words only. After finding some place in people's hearts, they started writing books and tracts after the third century of hijrah. Then they went ahead and declared in clear words their opinion about reality and path together; and what they wrote in prose and poetry spread to all corners of the world.

Their number kept increasing, and so did their strength and influence among Muslim masses. They reached the pinnacle of their prestige in the sixth and seventh centuries of hijrah.

Then began their retreat; their status suffered and general public turned away from them.

There were two factors that led to their downfall:

First: When a system, which involves general public, becomes highly popular attracting the masses, insincere people take its advan-tage seeking to gain worldly riches through it; they disguise them-selves, showing that they were deeply rooted in that system and are particularly attached to it. This exploitation makes people dislike, nay, hate the whole system.

Second: A group of their mashãyikh said that the way to know one's self was an innovation, which the Legislator of the sharī‘ah had not enacted, yet it was a pleasing way which Allãh is pleased with, as He was pleased with monasticism which the Christians had innovated. Allãh says: . and (as for) monasticism, they innovated it - We did not prescribe it to them - only to seek Allãh's pleasure, but they did not observe it with its due observance . (57:27).

The masses agreed whole-heartedly with it. This opened the way to them to create for it rituals and etiquettes hitherto unknown insharī‘ah . They went on innovating fresh procedure that resulted in discarding a procedure of thesharī‘ah . Ultimately a time came when thesharī‘ah was placed on one side and the tarīqah (way) stood on another side. Not surprisingly, it led to indulgence in unlawful things, discarding of obligatory practices of religion - in short, sharī‘ah was treated as abrogated, there appeared groups like al-Qalandariyyah, and nothing remained of Sūfīsm except beggary and addiction to opium and bhang - which they call 'obliteration of the self'.

What have the Book and the Sunnah to say on this subject? They guide to the verdict of reason. According to them, it is true that behind the external aspect of thesharī‘ah there are realities that are its hidden or esoteric meanings. It is also correct to say that man has a way to reach that reality. But that way is to deligently follow and obey the external aspect of thesharī‘ah - nothing else. Far be it from us to think that there was any esoteric idea which the external practices did not lead to; it is the external which identifies the hidden or esoteric realities, and leads to them. Far be it from us to suppose that there was a nearer path than the onelaid down by the Bringer of religion, but the Prophet did not pay heed to it, or showed negligence towards it or ignored it for some reason. Remember what Allãh says: . andWe have revealed the Book to you explaining clearly everything (16:89).

To make a long story short, three methods developed for search-ing and uncovering of realities: the external meaning of religion, the way of intellectual research, and that of purification of soul. A Muslim group adopted each method - and the three groups continue to dispute and quarrel with one another. They are like the angles of a triangle; if one of them becomes bigger, the other two are bound to reduce and vice versa. The methods used in Qur’ãnic exegesis greatly differed from one another resulting from vast differences in exegetes' taste. Usually they imposed their own academic views on the Qur’ãn, instead of letting theQur’ãn shape their views - with rare exceptions.

You have seen that the Book confirms all that is true in each method and way. It cannot be that there is a true hidden reality, which the external sense does not conform to, or that there is a truth - hidden or apparent - which is opposed by true proof.

That is why some ‘ulamã’, according to the knowledge they had, and with diverse tastes, tried to bring conformance between apparent senses of religion and ‘irfãn, like Ibnu 'l-‘Arabī, ‘Abdu 'r-Razzãq al-Kãshãnī, Ibn Fahd, the Second Martyr and al-Fayd al-Kãshãnī; while others endeavoured to bring agreement between phil-osophy and ‘irfãn, like Abū Nasr al-Fãrãbī, ash-Shaykh as-Suhrawardī (the illuminist) and ash-Shaykh Sãinu 'd-Dīn Mahammad Turkeh. Still others attempted to bring conformity between apparent senses of religion and philosophy, like al-Qãdī Sa‘īd and others; while a fourth group endeavoured to make all the above disciplines conform with one another, like Ibn Sīnã in his exegesis and books, and Mullã Sadrã in his books and tracts in addition to some later scholars.

In spite of that, the deep-rooted difference continues as before; the more attempts are made to uproot, it the deeper go the roots; the more water is thrown on this fire, the higher rise the flames.

You find that no amulet is of any benefit.

Scholars of every discipline accuse experts of other fields of ignorance, atheism, or stupidity, while the masses disavow all of them together.

This is the result of initial error when the ummah did not pay heed in the beginning to the call of the Book for joint meditation: and hold fast to the rope of Allãh and be not divided . (3:103)

Conversation drifts from one topic to another.

O Allãh! Guide us to what would makeYou pleased with us; unite our word on truth; give us a guardian from You; and give us a helper from You.

TRADITIONS

It is reported [by as-Suyūtī] under the verse: O People of the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messenger making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book . Ibnu 'd-Darīs, an-Nasã’ī, Ibn Jarīr, Ibn Abī Hãtim and al-Hãkim (who said that it was correct) have narrated from Ibn ‘Abbãs that he said, “Whoever denies stoning, he denies the Qur’ãn from whence he thinks not. Allãh has said: O People of the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messenger making clear to you much of what you concealed of the Book. So, stoning was among what they had concealed.” (ad-Durru 'l-manthūr)

The author says: It points to what we shall write under the verse: O Messenger! Let not those grieve you who strive together . (5:41) that how the Jews had concealed the commandment of stoning in the days of the Prophet (s.a.w.a.), and how he (s.a.w.a.) exposed it.

at-Tafsīr of al-Qummī explains the words of Allãh: after a ces-sation of the messengers, as 'after discontinuation of the messengers'.

[al-Kulaynī narrates] through his chains from Abū Hamzah Thãbit ibn Dīnãr ath-Thumãlī and Abu 'r-Rabī‘ that he said, “We per-formed hajj with Abū Ja‘far (a.s.) in the year when Hishãm ibn ‘Abdu 'l-Malik too went for hajj; and there was with him Nãfi‘ mawlã (client) of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattãb. He looked at AbūJa‘far (a.s.) in the rukn of the Ka‘bah and people had gathered around him.Nãfi‘ said , 'O leader of the faithful! Who is it that people are pressing around him?' [Hishãm] said, 'He is the prophet of the people of Kufah; he is Muhammad ibn ‘Alī.' [Nãfi‘] said, 'I bear witness that I shall certainly go to him and ask him about problems which no one would give me their reply except a Prophet or successor of a Prophet.' [Hishãm] said, 'Then go and ask him; perhaps you would put him to shame.'

“SoNãfi‘ came (near) until he leaned on people; then he was close to Abū Ja‘far (a.s.). Then he said, 'O Muhammad ibn ‘Alī! I have read the Torah, the Injīl, the Zabūr and the Qur’ãn; and I have understood its lawful and its unlawful; and I have come to ask you about problems which no one would reply except a prophet or a successor of the prophet.'“ [ The narrator] said, “So Abū Ja‘far raised his head and said, 'Ask whatever you want to.' [Nãfi‘] said, 'Tell me how many years (had passed) between ‘Īsã and Muhammad?' [AbūJa‘far ] said, 'Should I inform you according to my view or your view?' [Nãfi‘] said, 'Tell me according to both together.' He [AbūJa‘far ] said, 'As according to my view, five-hundred years, and as according to your view, six-hundred years.'“ ( al-Kãfī)

The author says: Various traditions are narrated concerning the reason of revelation of verses. For example, at-Tabarī has narrated from ‘Ikrimah that the Jews had queried the Messenger of Allãh (s.a. w.a.) about the law of stoning. So he asked who was the most knowl-edgeable of them; they pointed to Ibn Sūriyã. He [the Messenger of Allãh] adjured him by Allãh whether there was the commandment of stoning (the adulterer and adulteress) in their books. He said, “When it increased in our society, we flogged hundred (lashes) and shaved (their) heads.” The Prophet sentenced them to be stoned. Then Allãh revealed: O People of the Book! Indeed has come to you Our Messen-ger making clear to you much of what you concealed . and guides them to the straight path [5:15-16].

Also he has narrated from Ibn ‘Abbãs that he said, “Ibn Ubayy, Bahrī ibn ‘Amr and Shãs ibn ‘Adiyy came to the Messenger of Allãh (s.a.w.a.); he talked with them and they talked with him. He called them to Allãh and warned them of His punishment. So they said, 'What are you frightening us with O Muhammad! We, by Allãh! Are the sons of Allãh and His beloved ones' - they used the words of the Christians. Then Allãh revealed about them: And the Jews and the Christians say: 'We are the sons of Allãh and his beloved ones.' Say: 'Why does He then chastise you for your sins?' . [5:18]”

He has also narrated from Ibn ‘Abbãs that he said, “The Messenger of Allãh invited the Jews to Islam; he excited their interest in Islam and frightened them, but they refused to listen. Then Ma‘ãdh ibn Jabal,Sa‘d ibn ‘Ubãdah and ‘Uqbah ibn Wahb said to them, 'O group of Jews! Fear Allãh, because, by Allãh, you certainly know that he is the Messenger of Allãh; you were telling us about him before his being sent, and describing to us his attributes.' So Rãfi‘ ibn Huray-malah and Wahb ibn Yahūdã said, 'We did not tell it to you; and Allãh has not revealed any book after Mūsã, nor did he send any bringer of good news or any warner after him.' Thereupon, Allãh revealed: O People of the Book! Indeed Our Messenger has come to you explain-ing to you after a cessation of the messengers . [5:19]”

as-Suyūtī has narrated it in ad-Durru 'l-manthur from Ibn ‘Abbãs and others; and has narrated other stories too.

These traditions like most of the narratives giving theoretical reasons are, in fact, mere attempts to fit some occurances on a verse, and then claiming that it was revealed for this reason. These are merely theoretical reasons; the verses most probably do have general connotation.

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