Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Status of Reason

Question No. 20

What is the status of reason in Islamic State?

“Reason” enjoys a high status in Islamic thought and is one of the most important and essential sources for inferring religious laws and decrees. In other words, “reason” is not contrary to “religious law”, but it is one of the elements and pillars of “religious law”. Naturally, Islamic State must make use of “reason” in planning, legislation and administration.

It should be noted that it is definitive reason, and not speculative reason, that is regarded as one of the pillars of religious law. In administrative methods and practical issues of government, instrumental, speculative and empirical reasons (sciences) may also be used. Nevertheless, these kinds of rational instructions are used in cases wherein they are not in contradiction to religious instructions and high human values.1

Note

1. For further information, see Hamid Reza Shakerin, Secularism (discussion on jurisprudential and scientific managements); Sayf Allah Sarami, the article entitled “Aql-e qat’i manba’-e istinbat-e qavanin-e jami’i va hukumat-e Islami”, Hukumat-e Islami magazine, no.20, 6th year, 2nd issue, Summer 1380.

Islamic State and the Demands of the Time

Question No. 21

In case of a contradiction between religious thought (texts and traditions) and Islamic State, which one has priority? Do necessities allow religious rulers to act against religious thought in case a necessity arises?

To answer this question, first it should be clarified what we mean by “religious thought”. Here, there are some possibilities:

First. By “religious thought” we mean religious worldview and beliefs. In this case, religious rulers and government are never permitted to oppose religious thought, and no obligation can be a reason for such priority over religious thought.

Second. By “religious thought” we mean the collection of primary religious decrees in the realm of politics and society. In this case, if a more important social demand arises, the Islamic State can temporarily recess the primary practical decree and enforce the secondary governmental or emergency decree. It should be noted, however, that this reading of “religious thought” is incorrect, leading to a delusion about a contradiction between religious thought and governmental decree, while the secondary and governmental decrees are also subject to religious thought and should not be interpreted as priority of something over religion.

Third. By “religious thought” we mean the primary, secondary and authoritative decrees. In this case, there would be no contradiction between “governmental decrees” and “religious thought” unless the government issues a decree contrary to primary ones without observing the degree of importance and social necessities or expediencies. Here, the government has done a wrong thing and deviated from being religious. It is clear that in such a case, religious thought would have priority; because as it has been stated in traditions, it is not permissible to obey anyone if it involves disobeying God.1

Fourth. By “religious thought” we mean - as stated in the above question itself - “religious texts”. Here, we should say such a definition of “religious thought” is quite wrong, for it includes both rational and transmitted reasons. Some of the transmitted reasons contain the authoritative and controlling decrees (such as the principles of la zarar (no harm), la haraj (no impediment), and ahamm wa muhimm (the degree of importance)) and some others contain the controlled decrees. Islamic State, in case of necessity, can adduce authoritative decrees to issue a decree contrary to the controlled ones. So, these cases can not be regarded as instances of contradiction between “Islamic State” and “religious thought”.

Question No. 22

What are the fixed and changeable elements in Islamic State? Which parts of duties and functions of Islamic State are subject to change if the situation demands?

No doubt, it is impossible to identify all fixed and changeable elements of Islamic State in various times elaborately and comprehensively here. Nevertheless, some points can be clarified synoptically:

First. Some elements in Islamic State are fundamental and essential, and neglecting them would mean negation of Islamic State. These elements will always be fixed and viable, not changing with the pass of time. One example is the principle that a qualified person with necessary qualifications (such as knowledge and justice) must be at the head of the Islamic State. The other examples are the principle of commitment to justice, protecting the independence [of the country], and negating the foreigners’ dominance.

Second. Along with abovementioned elements, there are some changeable elements both in the structure of the government and in the State’s methods, functions, duties, etc. For example, in Iran, Islamic State has been established in the form of Islamic Republic, while it can take other forms as well. Anyway, this model has been chosen among other alternatives as the most ideal one in the present age.

Islamic State can also be formed as “centralized” or “decentralized”. Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi writes:

“The problem of separating the elements of power in Islamic jurisprudence is, just like transaction, subject to changes of the time and place… [Decisions on] whether the government should be conciliar or presidential, the elements of power should be united or separated, are related to the expediencies of the society in any time.”2

On the other hand, today, the states have been assigned a lot of duties - more than before - and the Islamic State is no exception. So, we may conclude that the situations of the time and place can change both the structure of the government and its functions and duties. Nevertheless, Islamic State can not accept any change; rather, it always follows some fixed rules and principles, accepting just those changes which are not in contradiction to fixed religious rules and the authoritative rules controlling religious decrees.3

Notes

1. La ta’ata li-makhluqin fi ma’siat al-khaliq”, Nahj al-Balagha, wisdom no. 165.

2. Falsafiy-e siyasat, p.140.

3. For further information, see: Abdullah Nasri, Intizar-e basher az din, p.140-66; Muhammad Soroush, Din va dowlat dar andishi-y-e Islami, p.70-85.

Legitimacy and Acceptability

Question No. 23

What is the basis of legitimacy of governments in different schools? Compare them with the viewpoints of Islam and Shiism.

To investigate the idea of “legitimacy” in Islam and other schools, we should first have a definition of it; then we can scrutinize its basis in different views and test them.

The definition of legitimacy

“Legitimacy” is derived from the adjective “legitimate” (meaning legal). The term “legitimacy” is used with relatively different meanings in sciences related to politics:

1. In political philosophy, theology and jurisprudence, “legitimacy” means “being right” and is used as contrary to “usurpation”; here it can be called “normative legitimacy”.

2. In political sociology - which is a descriptive science seeking to explain political phenomena, behaviors, and structures through economic, cultural, and social factors, and looks at political structures free from values - “legitimacy” is generally used in the sense of “acceptability”. In this view, there is no room for asking about the relation of “legitimacy” and “acceptability”, since they are used interchangeably. So, this issue must be studied with a normative view.

The sources of legitimacy

Philosophers and politico-sociologists have presented different views on sources of legitimacy. Max Weber mentions three sources for legitimacy: (1) tradition; (2) charisma or particular personal characteristics; (3) law. Accordingly, he believes in three types of legitimacy:

A. Traditional legitimacy, which is rooted in the traditions common among people of a nation, such as hereditary governments, patriarchy, apartheid, aristocracy, and so on.

B. Charismatic legitimacy, which stresses the personal characteristics of the ruler, and is based on the unusual and exceptional submission to a person due to his sacredness, heroism, and exemplarity.

C. Rational/ legal legitimacy, which is based on rational agreements.1

Fredrich believes in five sources for legitimacy:

1. religious; 2. philosophical and legal; 3. traditional; 4. methodical; 5. empirical.2

Some scholars have classified the origins of government and the sources of legitimacy as follows:

First: The libertarian theories

These theories are divided into three groups:

a. The social contract theory. According to this theory, there is a contact between State and the citizens, thereby they feel themselves liable to follow the State’s ordinances and, in return, the State is committed to provide order, welfare and security for them.

b. The public will theory. According to this theory, if all or most of the people demand the ruling of some persons, their government would be legitimate.

c. The consent theory. The consent of the society members to a government is a criterion for its legitimacy, leading to political obedience commitment on their part; in this way, the government will have the right to order and the people to obey.

The critique of the views

Each of the abovementioned views suffers from some specific and some common defects; here, we only mention the common defects for the purpose of brevity:

First. All of these views lack comprehensiveness regarding the criterion of legitimacy. In other words, all of them just consider the question of “where to take the political power from”. However, they do not consider the question of “how to use the power” as a criterion for legitimacy. As a result, if the government does not observe the ethical values, it would be still legitimate. This is not acceptable on any basis other than ethical positivism wherein there is no room for ethical values.3

It may be said that the society can provide enough guarantee for observing moral values in the social contract, change its attitude toward the rulers, or declare its discontent to immoral behaviors to negate the government’s legitimacy, or force the rulers to observe those principles.

It should be said, however, that observing moral principles would be subject to social will, contract and consent, with no role in legitimacy or illegitimacy. Thus, if the society submits to the oppression of the rulers, their legitimacy would persist.

Second. In every society, there is a minor opposition group. Based on the abovementioned theories, it should be known how the situation would be for the minor groups who do not want the government and have not taken part in the social contract, or those who are not content with the existing government, or those who are not qualified to have a role in government (such as minor persons, the mad, etc.). In other words, if legitimacy is only subject to a contract, public will, or the citizens’ consent, then it would no longer justify governing the groups excluded, or obliging them to obey the government. Furthermore, the opposition may be a major group of society, not a minor one. It is reasonable, thus, to look for another source of legitimacy for government, which can justify governing all people. Otherwise, there would be no government in the world justifiable based on the “democratic” theories.

Third. In many cases, the social context changes. For example, with the legal maturity of the minor persons, new individuals would become qualified to take part in the social contract, and some previously qualified persons die. It is probable that these new individuals might have attitudes, wills, or interests different from the previous ones.

Besides, the previous individuals may change their minds. According to democratic theories, as soon as the society’s view changes or the social context alters, the government and the ruler must lose their legitimacy in principle. In this case, by enforcing some changes - such as changing the number of the opposing groups from 49% to 51% - the government or the ruler should be substituted by a new one; here, the previous contract or consent can no longer be effective in the new situation. Therefore, the viability of the government - even for a few determined years - necessitates a better criterion.

Second: The functionalist theories

These are the views which believe in the government’s role and function as the criterion for its legitimacy. The most prominent theories of this kind are as follows:

First. The theory of justice and moral values. In this view, enforcing justice is the source of political legitimacy. Therefore, any government who attempts to enforce justice is legitimate, and those governments or rulers moving in a contrary direction lack legitimacy. Here, by “justice” it is not meant a most essential moral value; rather, what is meant is the enforcement of justice in the political behavior of the rulers. According to this theory, therefore, if a person is oppressive out of the realm of political power but do justice in his political behavior, his government would be legitimate; this legitimacy is not dependant on the rulers’ “personal justice”.

Second. The theory of fulfilling needs. According to this theory, the effort to provide welfare, security and happiness for the members of society is the basis of political legitimacy.

Critique

Putting aside the problem of defining “justice”, the defect of these two theories is their justification of the rulers’ ordinances only; they are silent about other parameters underlying the puzzle of “legitimacy”. Nevertheless, the ordinance’s being merely just, or its being issued for providing public welfare and common good, does not justify a particular person or group’s government; especially if different individuals or groups enforce justice or fulfill society’s needs to an equal degree. In the latter case, which one is legitimate to govern society? Why is it necessary to obey one, and disobey the other? Any criterion in this respect would eventually lead to leaving the basis and moving towards one of the rival theories.

Third: The theory of divine legitimacy

In this theory, the source and criterion for legitimacy is God’s ordinance and permission. The theory of “divine legitimacy” has been discussed in three ways throughout history.4 Here, for brevity purpose, we just mention the viewpoint of “Islam”.

Legitimacy in Islam

In studying the theory of “legitimacy in Islam”, we should distinguish between the origin of legitimacy and the sources for recognizing it. The origin of legitimacy is where the legitimacy has originated from. By the source of legitimacy, we mean the evidences and the sources of discovering legitimacy in Islam, i.e. the Book and the Sunna.

The only intrinsic origin of legitimacy in Islam is God; for the Creator of the universe and human, the owner of all existence, the influential power is the Lord of the universe and all human beings. In Islam, government and political sovereignty - as a kind of dominion over the creatures’ affairs - are considered as matters within the jurisdiction of God. The doctrine of Unity in divine Lordship - whether in the system of creation or the system of legislation - does not accept any other origin along with God. The Holy Quran says on this point:

إِنِ الْحُكْمُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِ

“The decision is only for God.” (6:57)5

إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا الَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَهُمْ رَاكِعُونَ

“Your rulers can only be God and his messenger and those who believe, who establish worship and pay the poor due alms, and bow down [in prayer].” (5:55)6

أَمِ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِهِ أَوْلِيَاءَۖ فَاللَّهُ هُوَ الْوَلِيُّ

“Or have they chosen Lords besides Him? But Allah is the only Lord.” (42:9) 7

Therefore, no one has the right to govern people or interfere in their affairs unless he is proved - through a valid religious evidence - to have been appointed or allowed by God to do so. Divine appointment or permission can be stated either directly or indirectly - by the Prophet or Imams. Besides, all Muslims believe that the Prophet had been appointed by God. This has been mentioned by the Holy Quran in numerous verses. Some of them follow:

النَّبِيُّ أَوْلَىٰ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ

“The Prophet is superior to the believers than themselves.” (33:6) 8

أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ

“... obey Allah and the messenger and those of you who are in authority.” (4:59) 9

وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ إِذَا قَضَى اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ أَمْرًا أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُمُ الْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ أَمْرِهِمْ

“It is not right for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His messenger has decided an affair (for them) that they should claim anything in their own affair.” (33:36 )10

Besides, Imami Shiites, based on definite evidences, believe that Imams have been especially appointed by God.11

Additionally, the Shiite scholars - based on rational and transmitted evidences - believe that just and qualified Muslim scholars have been appointed by the Legislator and are representatives of Awaited Imam in governmental affairs as well as political and social leadership during the Occultation period. Of course, this idea - called “Wilayat-e Faqih” - is not restricted to Occultation period, but is realizable during Imam’s presence while he is able to exercise discretion; Malik Ashtar, for instance, was appointed by Imam Ali (as) as the governor of Egypt.

Choosing the Authoritative Muslim scholar (“Wali Faqih”)

Besides this view - called the theory of “appointment” and well-known to the Imami scholars - a new theory has been presented by some other scholars. According to this view, the “Authoritative Muslim scholar” is not appointed by the Legislator; rather, He has obliged people to choose a just and qualified Muslim scholar as the leader. This latter person enjoys authority after being elected by people, and is allowed to exercise discretionary power in social affairs, taking on the leadership.

A comparative study or value judgment of these views requires a special opportunity. But the important point is to find out whether the basic question of the present discussion has a different answer according to these two views. If so, what is that difference?

Some have called the first view “divine legitimacy” and the second one the theory of “election” or “divine-demotic legitimacy”. It should be noted that the basis of both views is the very theory of “divine legitimacy”, for both of them consider God as the intrinsic origin of legitimacy, not accepting any other source besides Him. Thus, adding the adjective “demotic” is a kind of loose expression of the idea. In other words, the demotic origin of “authority” in this view is a conventional provision stipulated by the Holy Legislator in conferring the authority to the Muslim scholar and affirming it. Therefore:

1. If the theory of “election” considers the government as an earthly and ascending affair, it is completely far from the general attitude of Islam.

2. If it believes in two “earthly” and “celestial” sources, it indulges in dualism.

3. If it considers the demotic legitimacy at a level lower than the divine legitimacy, it is not a theory contrary to divine legitimacy; rather, it is a subcategory of theory of “divine legitimacy”. Such a view is also consistent with the theory of “appointment”. In other words, the theory of “appointment” makes the “divine authority” conceivable in two ways:

First. Absolute appointment, according to which the Legislator does not include people’s choice in the process of Authoritative Muslim scholar’s appointment, insists on authority of the righteous and qualified Muslim scholar, affirms his social controls and obliges submission to his orders in social affairs.

Second. Conditioned appointment, according to which the Legislator affirms the authority of the Muslim scholar after his election by people, not before it.

Notes

1. Max Weber, Economics and Society, p. 273-4.

2. Bonyadhay-e ilm-e siyasat, p. 107.

3. For further information, see Bonyadhay-e ilm-e siyasat, ch. 6; nazariyyihay-e khastgah-e dolat; falsafiy-e siasat, Imam Khomeini Educational an Research Institute.

4. See: Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, falsafiy-e siasat, p.177.

5. The Qur’an, An’am (6), 57.

6. The Qur’an, Ma’ida (5), 55.

7. The Qur’an, Shura (42), 9.

8. The Qur’an, Ahzab (33), 6.

9. The Qur’an, Nisa’ (4), 59.

10. The Qur’an, Ahzab (33), 36.

11. For further information, see Ayatullah Makarim Shrazi, Payam-e Qur’an (thematic commentary of Quran), 9 (Imamate in Quran).

Appointment or Election

Question No. 24

Is the Islamic State based on appointment by the Legislator or election by people? In the former case, can we believe in any role for people in affirmation or denial of the Islamic State?

In Shiite political thought, the “Authoritative Guardian” is appointed by the Legislator. However, it does not mean that people have no role in affirming or denying the government, for the Authoritative Guardian has no right to impose his own views on people in establishing the government and exercising his authority.

Thus, the Islamic government is formed with the people’s consent. There are numerous evidences for this idea. For example, Imam Ali reports from the Prophet that “The Prophet said to me: ‘Oh, Abu Talib’s son! You are responsible for the Guardianship of my community. If they confer you the power safe and sound, agreeing upon your sovereignty contentedly, take on the guardianship of their affairs; otherwise, leave them at that’”.1

Imam Khomeini, replying the Secretariat of Leaders of Friday Prayer, writes on the scope and the nature of “Muslim scholar’s Authority”:

“[The Authoritative Muslim scholar] enjoys authority in all forms. But, guardianship of the Muslim’s affairs and establishing a government depends on the opinion of majority of Muslims. This has been mentioned in Constitution as well, and called in the early years of Islam ‘paying homage to the Muslims’ guardian’”.2

Notes

1. Ibn Tavous, Kashf al-mahja, p.180.

2. Document no. 657, the Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, quoted by Mustafa Kavakibiyan, Mabaniy-e mashru’iyyat dar nizam-e wilayat-e faqih, p.258.

Acceptability and Legitimacy

Question No. 25

What is the relationship between acceptability and legitimacy in Islamic State, particularly regarding the theory of the “Muslim scholar’s Authority”?

The two views mentioned on the theory of legitimacy (i.e. appointment and election) are different as to the relationship between acceptability and legitimacy:

A. According to the theory of “election”, the relationship between “acceptability and legitimacy” is of “absolute generality and specificity” type; thus, acceptability is a more general idea than legitimacy. In other words, acceptability - providing other conditions such as jurisprudential expertise (fiqahat), efficiency, and justice are fulfilled - culminates in legitimacy. Acceptability is conceivable without legitimacy, but legitimacy is not conceivable without acceptability. Thus, legitimacy is absolutely more specific than acceptability, for “legitimacy” is always contingent upon “acceptability”. In other words, three suppositions are conceivable in this respect:

1. (Acceptability + “jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” → legitimacy)

2. (Acceptability - “jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” → non-legitimacy)

3. (“jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” - acceptability → non-legitimacy)

B. According to the theory of “appointment”, the relationship between “legitimacy” and “acceptability” is “generality and specificity in some respect”. That is, here it is different from the previous view just in the third supposition. Thus, the conceivable suppositions are as follows:

1. (Acceptability + “jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” → legitimacy)

2. (Acceptability - “jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” → non-legitimacy)

3. (“jurisprudential expertise + justice + efficiency” - acceptability → legitimacy)

Nevertheless, according to this view, the “Authoritative Muslim scholar” is not permitted to take the political power under any condition and in any form, and to wield his power; this is because without a record of “acceptability”, it is virtually impossible to successfully establish a government.

On the other hand, taking power through dictatorial and insidious methods is not permissible in Islam. What is important according to the theory of “appointment” is the authority of the “Authoritative Muslim scholar” in spite of no social acceptability, while he lacks the nominal government; just as Imam Ali (as) enjoyed authority and legitimacy during the Caliphate of the three Caliphs, while he was lacking the nominal government. As a result of this legitimacy, the “Authoritative Guardian” is legally permitted to issue a governmental decree in such a situation, and it would be incumbent upon people to obey him. But, according to the theory of “election” he essentially enjoys no authority to issue a decree, and if he issue one, it will not be incumbent upon people to obey him.

The Authoritative Muslim scholar’s power to issue governmental decrees does not mean his dictatorship, for he cannot take political power and establish government through force, dictatorship or deception, imposing his own will upon others; however, people will be guilty because of not obeying him. Imam Ali (as) says:

“The Prophet said to me: ‘Oh, Abu Talib’s son! You are responsible for the Guardianship of my community. If they confer you the power safe and sound, agreeing upon your sovereignty contentedly, take on the guardianship of their affairs; otherwise, leave them at that”.1

This tradition shows that:

1. Imam Ali (as) had been appointed by the Prophet to the guardianship of the community; so it is not essentially dependant on people’s vote.

2. Imam Ali’s exercising his own authority is dependant on its acceptability by people. Imam Khomeini says on “Muslim scholar’s Authority”:

“If it is impossible for the Muslim scholars to assemble and establish a government, they would be exempted from establishing the Islamic government; however, they would still enjoy the office of guardianship. Although they have no government, they have authority over the Muslims”.2

In view of what was said, the role and function of the religious ruler’s “public acceptability” - based on the two views - is:

First. The role of acceptability according to the theory of appointment:

1. Participation in establishing Islamic State and preparing the ground for transferring the power to the ruler appointed by God.

2. Participation in making the Islamic State efficient, preserving it, and supporting its viability. These two functions are actually in all instances of Islamic State - including the Prophet’s, the Imam’s and the Authoritative Muslim scholar’s government. As for the Authoritative Muslim scholar and Islamic Republic government, however, there are some other functions as well.

3. If there is just one person - among numerous Muslim scholars - qualified for leadership, the choice of the majority of the people is their indirect participation in the process of identifying the guardian appointed by God; this identification is done through experts. If there are numerous persons qualified for leadership, the people’s vote is preparing a reasonable ground for exercising the authority by one of the qualified persons. Thus, there is no chance for others to exercise power and they would have no responsibility here. To prevent struggle and anarchy, they are deprived of any right to guardianship.

Second. The role of acceptability according to the theory of election:

This theory shares the same opinion on the functions stated in number1 and2 above, but has a different view on the third function. It believes that the people’s vote and the experts elected by people is a religious method not a rational one. In other words, the public affirmation is one of the religious conditions for the Muslim scholar’s authority, just like justice and legal expertise; without people’s vote, the qualified Muslim scholar does not legally enjoy authority. So, there is no difference between the two assumptions - i.e. one qualified person and numerous qualified persons.3

Notes

1. Ibn Tavous, Kashf al-mahja, p.180.

2. Imam Khomeini, al-biy’, 2, p.466.

3. For further information, see: Hukumat-e Islami, 2nd year, no. 4, p.105-106, 127.

Preventing dictatorship

Question No. 26

Supposing the ruler is appointed in Islamic State and people have no right in appointing or deposing him, how can we prevent Islamic State from leading to dictatorship?

To prevent dictatorship and autocracy, there are various methods discussable under the topic of “control” in Islamic State. What can be briefly stated here follows:

First. The appointment by the Legislator is contingent upon the fulfillment of the necessary qualifications. The first qualification is “impeccability”, and in case of occultation of the Impeccable Imam, “legal expertise” and “justice” are among necessary qualifications for the Authoritative Guardian. These are not restricted to the moment of acceding to the power and starting the government; it is also a necessary condition for viability of the power. That is, as long as these conditions prevail, he will be the appointed Authoritative Guardian and his government will be legitimate. As soon as he indulges in dictatorship and corruption, he will lose the necessary qualification and will thus be deposed by the Legislator; he then must abdicate. The society must also remove him and not obey him any more.

Second. The ruler’s appointment does not necessarily negate people’s participation in appointing and deposing him; rather, the religious ruler takes the power only through people’s participation and social acceptability. In Islamic Republic, people choose their leader indirectly through the experts. Thus, in Imam Khomeini’s thought, the religious guardianship of the “Muslim scholar” is mentioned along with people’s choice and voting. To clarify this point, the following excerpts of his speeches are quoted:

“We comply with the people’s votes. We will do as they vote.”1 “The criterion is the people’s vote.”2 “If there is no Muslim scholar, no Muslim scholar’s Authority, there will be illegitimate sovereign. Either God governs or illegitimate sovereign. If God’s command is not followed, and the president is not appointed by the Muslim scholar, [the state] will be illegitimate. When it is illegitimate, it is Devil…”3

Imam Khomeini, in ratifying the late president Rajaie’s presidential prescript, said: “... and as its legitimacy must be ratified by the Authoritative Muslim scholar, I ratify the people’s vote and appoint him as the president of Islamic Republic”.4 He also wrote in a letter to the Council for Revising the Constitution: “The effect of the Authoritative Guardian’s decree is based on the people’s choice”.5

In these statements, the “divine appointment” and the “people’s election” are clearly found besides one another. Thus, divine appointment does not prevent people’s election based on religious principles; the same God who has appointed the “Authoritative Guardian” has attached a great importance to people’s choice.

Question No. 27

Are people’s will and consent regarded as necessary conditions or elements in legitimacy [of the government]?

Three assumptions are conceivable in this respect:

1. A government may be both legitimate and acceptable, such as the Prophet’s, Imam Ali’s, Imam Khomeini’s and Imam Khamenei’s governments.

2. A government may be illegitimate but acceptable, such as some democratic non-Islamic States.

3. A government may be legitimate but not acceptable, such as religious authority of the Impeccable Imam, who is not obeyed or whose government is not accepted by the society; a similar case happened to Imam Hassan. In such cases, if the ruler cannot defend Islamic State peacefully and the society does not support him, he is not allowed to impose dictatorship upon people and must relinquish the government, just as Imam Hassan did so.

However, we may suppose many cases wherein “people’s consent and will” is to some extent involved in legitimacy; that is, when there are two just Muslim scholars who are equally qualified for government and leadership of the society, but one of them enjoys more public acceptability. In that case, it may be said that the public acceptability of one is a kind of reference for rational reasoning [in this respect].6 Nevertheless, it must be noted that acceptability is in general a condition for permitting the exercise of authority not the authority itself.

Another point is that if someone has accepted the “Muslim scholar’s Authority” not as the Legislator’s appointment but as a certain point - i.e. he believes that expertise in jurisprudence is a necessary condition for leadership according to goals of religion, and thus only the competent Muslim scholar is qualified for leadership of Islamic government7 ; according to this view, in the case of numerous qualified persons, the certain point will be the priority of the very elected Muslim scholar.

In other words, if two Muslim scholars have equal qualifications, with one accepted by people and the other not, and we may doubt which one is affirmed by the Legislator, we are certain about the Legislator’s affirmation of the one elected by people, whereas for the other person - while the former is present - the doubt still remains. Thus, with the certain person’s presence, the dubious one would have no priority.

Notes

1. Sahifiy-e nur, 10, p. 181.

2. ibid, iv, p. 422.

3. ibid, iv, p.253.

4. ibid, xv, p. 76.

5. ibid, xxi. P. 129.

6. For further information, see Sayyid Kazim Husseini Ha’iri, Wilayat al-amr fi asr al-ghayba, p. 217-221.

7. Ibid, p. 113, 221.

The Status of God and People in Islamic State

Question No. 28

What are the roles of God’s consent and the faithful people’s consent in Islamic State? Which one has priority?

1. The government’s divine-orientation: The Islamic State is essentially a “divine-oriented” government. Therefore, God’s will and consent is the most essential cornerstone of the Islamic State. This point must be noted, however, that God wishes the man’s felicity and good fortune. His will is exactly equal to the man’s felicity and salvation.

2. People’s consent: People’s consent has certainly a high status in Islamic system; it must be noted, however, that their will and consent are along God’s will and consent. That is:

Firstly, The Most High God has ordered the rulers to do their best to win people’s consent, and they will be questioned on this duty. Imam Ali (as) writes in his letter to Malik Ashtar: “Fill your heart with people’s love and affection. Never be like a beast who grabs the opportunity to devour them. ...for you are dominant on them, and the one who governs you is superior to you, and God is superior to the latter. God has entrusted you the responsibility of managing people’s affairs, and this is a test for you. Never enter a fight with God, for you would not tolerate His chastisement”.1 Here, oppression to people has been equaled to a fight with God.

Secondly, People’s consent and will is noted insofar as it is not against God’s consent and His law. Imam Ali (as) says: “No creature deserves obedience when God is to be disobeyed...”2

Altogether, the following points are worth noting about the status of people’s consent and will in Islamic State:

1. The Islamic government itself is formed based on people’s will, and is never imposed upon them. In other words, Islamic State is for a religious society and the religious society accepts nothing but the Islamic State.

2. In cases where the Legislator has not issued a certain order on a specific subject, leaving it to the government to choose the way, it is necessary [for the government] to consider people’s will in a way consistent with their common good. If, however, their will is contrary to definite divine rules, their will is not considered and followed.

Therefore, Islamic government is neither like dictator and autocrat governments which do not consider any value for people’s will, and nor like the so-called democratic governments which claim following people’s will unquestionably (though this claim has never been realized). Islamic government is a third way wherein people’s will is respected in accordance to divine will and decrees - which guarantee the human’s felicity and good end in this and the other world.

Notes

1. Nahj al-Balagha, letter 53.

2. Nahj al-Balagha, Wisdom no.165; Bihar al-anwar, 1, p. 227.

The status of people

Question No. 29

What is the role of people in policy-making and enforcing laws in Islamic State? What should we do in the case of a contradiction between people’s opinions and views and those of the rulers?

In Islamic State, people play an active and decisive role in legislation, policy-making and enforcing laws. For instance, people participate in legislation and major policy-makings of the society by electing members of the parliament. They participate in collective policy-makings by electing members of the councils. They elect members of the Guardian Council to participate in determining the leader and supervising him. And finally, they elect the president as the highest state official after the leader.

The State Cabinet is elected by people indirectly: on one hand, the elected president introduces the Cabinet, and on the other hand the elected MPs cast vote of confidence for the Cabinet members after investigating their qualifications. Nevertheless, it should be noted that people’s role in all these affairs is in accordance to religious rules and cannot be contrary to them. Article 6 of the Constitution states:

“In Islamic Republic of Iran, the state affairs must be managed based on the public votes: through elections of the president, MPs, the members of the councils, and the like, or through plebiscite”.

The problem of contradiction between people’s views and those of rulers has different forms:

1. People’s will and the decisions of the government’s agents may be equal as far as consistency with religious rules is concerned. In this case, people’s will will be preferable. Reasons such as “the necessity of counsel” can religiously support this idea. Besides, from a sociological viewpoint, this results in more “acceptability and efficiency” of the government. This is true, except when changing the decision is not possible due to some reasons.

2. People’s will may be religiously and legally prior to the decision of government’s agents. In this case, people’s will is preferable.

3. People’s will may be inconsistent with religious rules and principles, or may be contrary to the common good of the society, but the decisions of the government’s agents may be consistent with religious rules and principles; in this case, the latter has priority.