Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

www.alhassanain.org/english

Al-Mirza Al-Qummi, Revivalist of ‘Ilm al-Usul

Series: Meeting the Pious n. 3

Author(s): al-Mirza Abu al-Qasim al-Qummi

Translator(s): Hasan Muhammad Al-Najafi

Publisher(s): Ansariyan Publications - Qum

www.alhassanain.org/english

This book tries to shed light upon one of those stars that shone in the world of Islam, undertaking a remarkable role during the Thirteenth Hijrah Century; being a dignitary that managed, through his broad dimensions, in abundantly contributing to the Islamic thought and heritage, represented by al-Mirza Abu al-Qasim al-Qummi. He has been one of the renowned men of thought in modern history, having an all-inclusive and versatile character; he was an eminent ‘alim, laboring hard for God’s sake, the very incarnation of piety and asceticism, possessing all humaneexcellences, and the legend in uprightness and forbearance.

Miscellaneous information:

Al-Mirza Al-Qummi, Revivalist of ‘Ilm al-Usul Series: Meeting the Pious n. 3 Author: Muhammad Husayn al-‘Irfani Translator: Hasan M. Al-Najafi Published by Ansariyan Publications P.O. Box 371851187 Qum Islamic Republic of Iran Tel.:741744 No. of Copies: 2,000 First Edition: 1416 H.- 1995 A.O.

Notice:

This version is published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english

The composing errors are not corrected.

Table of Contents

Publisher’s Foreword 7

Translator’s Introduction 8

Preamble 9

Author’s Preface 11

Chapter 1: A Glance at Al-Mirza’s Biography 12

His Father 12

His Birth 12

The Beginning 12

His Marriage 13

Migration to Iraq 13

Return to Homeland 14

The Village-Mulla’s Intrigue 14

Travel to Isfahan and Shiraz 15

Migration to Qum 15

Turning Toward Iraq 16

Pilgrimage to the Old House 16

His Trip to Kazzaz 17

His Trips to Khunsar 17

Notes 17

Chapter 2: His Academical and Cultural Activity 18

Guardianship of Proficient Disciples 18

1. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Hujjat al- ‘Islam 18

2. Al -Hajj Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kalbasi 19

3. Al-Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali al-Hazarjeribi 19

4. Al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Kermanshahi 20

5. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi al-Khunsari 20

6. Al-Sayyid ‘Ali al-Khunsari 20

7. Al-Mirza Abu Talib al-Qummi 21

8. Al-Hajj al-Sayyid Isma’il al-Qummi 21

9. Al-Mirza ‘Ali Rida al-Qummi 21

10. Al-Shaykh Husayn al­Qummi 21

12. Al-Hajj Mulla Muhammad al-Kazzazi 21

License to Narrate 22

His Valuable Works 22

Propagation and Preaching 25

Notes 26

Chapter 3: Let Us Learn from al-Mirza 27

His Forbearance and Uprightness 27

His Strival in Knowledge Seeking 27

His Academic Status 28

His Tireless Labouring 28

His Curiosity for Knowledge 29

His Poeticalness 29

His Fine Handwriting 29

His Comprehensiveness 29

His Loyalty 30

His Moral Traits 30

Scholars’ Views Regarding al-Mirza 30

His Refusal to King's Affinity 31

A Grace for al-Mirza 32

Al-Mulla ‘Ali al-Nuri’s Meeting with al-Mirza 34

Notes 34

Chapter 4: The Sunset 35

His Heirs 35

1. Al-Mirza Abu Talib al-Qummi 35

2. Al-Hajj Mulla Asad Allah al-Brujerdi 35

3. Al-Mulla Muhammad al-Naraqi 36

4. Al-Mirza ‘Ali Rida al-Tahiri 36

5. Al-Shaykh ‘Ali al-Bahrani 36

6. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq al-Kalbasi 36

7. Al-Mawla ‘Ali al-Brujerdi 36

Al-Mirza in the Memory 37

Notes 37

Bibliography 38

Al-Mirza in the Memory 39

Publisher’s Foreword

The Ansarian Publications received many requests, through contacts or readers’ letters, asking about biography books about these scholars having illuminative role in world of thought and sciences. In response, the Foundation embarked on pursuing the subject attentively, for meeting the sincere desires longing for the Islamic culture and its signs.

While Ansarian Foundation presents the series of Liqa’ ma’a al- ‘Abrar (A Meeting with the Righteous). It hopes for attaining the approval and pleasure of all dear readers. And it is Allah Who helps us to succeed.

Ansarian Foundation

Translator’s Introduction

The last third of the second century witnessed a bitter struggle between the school of principles (usul) and Akhbari trend (narrative) which prevailed at that juncture in history. The great efforts exerted by the vanguard of school of principles, al-Wahid al-Behbahani, led to laying new foundations for ‘ilm al- ‘usul, and they were preserved by his disciples after him. Al-Mirza Abu al­ Qasim al-Qummi, who belongs to the first generation of that school, is considered the most eminent disciple of al­ ‘Ustadh al-Wahid, as is testified by his valuable book Qawanin al- ‘usul that remained as a curriculum for more than half a century.

Al Mirza al-Qummi has been one of the renowned men of thought in modern history, having an all-inclusive and versatile character. Moreover, the ethical pivot that distinguished his life, with the unique straightforwardness and forbearance he enjoyed despite the hard circumstances and implications he experienced throughout his blessed age. He used to spend his study nights, enduring hunger, without being affected or discouraged by this suffering. The dear reader will perceive this great man’s thirst for ‘ilm (knowledge), in all its branches, till attaining to its serene foundations and imbibing from them without being quenched.

The world has shown him its back, making him taste various sorts of torment, bitterness and destitution, depriving him of even the sustenance necessities through which he could survive. But, did this enfeeble him? No, he persisted on withstanding till all the world was humbled before his feet, and the monarch of his time came to him for his flattery. Nevertheless, he never cared for all worldly lusts and enjoyments, despite all temptations of life, maintaining his loftiness and sublimity in the world of knowledge, morals and humanity.

Hasan M Najafi

Preamble

The cultural onslaught is based on two pillars: the first is humiliating the pristine culture, and the second is overstating in publicizing for the substitute Western culture at the same time. Thus, people feel through this cultural ravishment and vilification for the deep-rooted culture, as being belittled before others, neglecting the abundant treasures their culture contains, seeking help from aliens, offering their culture and civilization (for sale) at an underrate.

The defunct Pahlavi regime strove hard to establish this policy in dealing with the West, as an idol for civilization, modernism and art, beside ethics and religion. Whereas it introduced the East as representing savagery and backwardness, and at best the Third World, the non-developed countries. These devilish policies have, to some extent, managed in achieving their goals, as many people - particularly the youth - began to look at the West as representing the free world that safeguards the human rights, and defends democracy and freedom.

But, as the known dictum says, the sun cannot be kept behind clouds forever, as realities have begun to emerge so clear, and the era of Islamic resurgence has started the era characterized with the contemporary generation’s return to its inborn nature, Qur’an, creed and ensigns.

Despite this optimistic illumination auguring well, the state of thought ravishment is still suffering, in many of the critical fields, the consequences of the Western influences.

The high degrees got in the West are still dazzling our sights, the medicine not holding an attractive Western brand is still ineffective and useless, Lot of Western cultural phenomena are penetrative or rather deep-rooted in our society's behaviorism. Besides, the West still selects for us the costumes we wear, identifies the kinds of medals to be granted to the winners, and we even expect to get the literary prizes.for which many are longing eagerly, from the West. But is it right to regard the West, as an ideal?The West whose real identity is revealed through its hollow mottos, and false claims of defending democracy and human rights.

What causes the feeling of having fault before the hangmen of the fifteenth Hijrah Century?!

We still view the West as an ideal, despite its adopting the apartheid policy, and its granting literary prizes to those who are devoid of adab (good manners), like Salman Rushdie, while ordering to prevent Muslim students from participating in the Physics Olympiad.

The Islamic world is asked tostrive bard for forming an “Islamic World Order”, and not to be hopeful of the West’s mottos, like democracy, freedom and defending the human rights.

Is there any hope, while witnessing the tragedies that occurred and still going on in the Islamic lands, in Bosnia Herzegovina, Algeria and Palestine? Whoever is concerned with Muslims’ affairs should know that no outlet or solution (for crises) is there but only through resorting and returning to the Qur’an and its expansive shadows.

Liqa’ ‘ma’a al- ‘Abrar (series) is only a step on the path, the path of recovery to the ego and self, through introducing the beacons of Islamic thought, the great magnates, in whose worlds and pervasive prospects, the leaders and thinkers of other creeds and doctrines, disappear.

The West is more intimidated and worried of the Ummah’s recognizing and attaining its identity, and return to its ensigns to those who managed, through their consolidated efforts, in paving the hard way of Islam.

The series of Liqa’ m’a al- ‘Abrar has undertaken the task of exploring the concealed characteristics and natures of seventy illuminant planets throughout the sky of Islamic thought, and introducing them as luminaries and beacons on the road of construction the construction of the Islamic civilization anew.

Baqir al- ‘Ulum Research Foundation

Qum

Author’s Preface

Man, while striving to attain perfection and nearness to Allah, is need of an example and ideal, to follow his guide and tread his path. Otherwise it is infeasible for him to attain his final objective and aspired end, besides not reaching the apex of sublime humanity.

The best example, guide and ideal for all mankind, being the prophets and Infallible Imams and their acts, without whose teachings and precepts no one can get access to the shore of bliss. After them in order, come the scholars (‘ulama’), who followed their example, and who truly constitute the inheritors of prophets, being vivid examples for piety and submission to Allah the Glorified, turning to be good pattern for others in respect of guidance and preaching.

Hence, the Islamic Ummah is asked to recognize and be acquainted with those bright faces, and be enlightened by those illuminant beacons,who elevated the status of ‘ilm (knowledge) and ‘ulama’ (scholars), beside learning lessons and getting examples from their conduct (sirah).

So, this book tries to shed light upon one of those stars that shone in the world of Islam, undertaking a remarkable role during the Thirteenth Hijrah Century; being a dignitary that managed, through his broad dimensions, in abundantly contributing to the Islamic thought and heritage, represented by al-Mirza Abu al-Qasim al-Qummi.

Talking about such a great, versatile, comprehensive personality is not so easy, as the pen fails and stops short of covering some of his aspects and horizons.

Al-Qummi was an eminent ‘alim, laboring hard for God’s sake, the very incarnation of piety and asceticism, possessing all humaneexcellences, and the legend in uprightness and forbearance. It is preponderant for the contemporary generation - particularly the youth who constitute the real resource for Islamic nations - to be acquainted with this great man who is really a genius in Islamic thought and creed.

Chapter 1: A Glance at Al-Mirza’s Biography

Ayatullah al-Mirza Abu al-Qasim al-Gilani, is the son of Akhund Mulla Hasan or Muhammad Hasan known as ‘al-Mirza al-Qummi’, and one of the great ‘ulama’ of fiqh (jurisprudence) during the 13th Hijrah century. He lived during the reign of Fath ‘Ali Shah, holding the post of Shi’ah leadership and religious high authority (marji’iyyah), being of a great status during his time.

In origin, he is from “Shaft”1 which belongs to Gilan, but he was born and grown up in Jabliq.2 The title al­Qummi is ascribed to him due to spending a long period of his life in the holy town of Qum. His great honour, broad knowledge, and all-inclusive researches and treatises were so influential, and played a great role in making him among the eminent ‘ulama’, so he was called al-Fadil al-Qummi, and al-Muhaqqiq al-Qummi, or Sahib al­ Qawanin (Owner of laws), after authoring his precious book Qawanin al- ‘usul.

His Father

His father is Akhund Mulla Hasan, from the people of Gilan, who departed it during his youth toward Isfahan in the first half of the 12th Hijrah century, which was at that time a big centre for Islamic sciences. There he acquired knowledge under two of its ‘ulama’: al-Mirza Hidayat Allah and his brother al-Mirza Habib Allah. After a short time, the two tutors prepared to travel to Jabliq for undertaking adjudication and administration affairs in that region.

So, no choice was left for the young knowledge-seeker, but to accompany them to that region, hoping for quenching his thirst for knowledge, being pleased with their lofty conduct. So, he has departed Isfahan andemigrated to that distant region, where he persevered on acquiring from their abundant knowledge. Then it was destined for him to get married to the daughter of his tutor, al-Mirza Hidayat Allah, who was a venerable lady known of piety and chastity.

His Birth

Shortly, the product of that blessedmarriage, was a sweet and pure fruit, being a candle that illumined the hearts of the two young spouses, with love and hope, in the year 11513 of the Prophetic migration (Hijrah). Then the Little child, who held the name Abu al-Qasim, has proceeded and was reared upun warm laps, full of piety, faith (iman), chastity and love.

Under an extreme patronage of his father, the boy began to learn the first lessons in shaping his future character, that was lately formed, whose foundation was faith, piety and knowledge.

Hence, his character was formed on two solid pivots, which are: inheritance and education, which enabled him to undertake heavy responsibilities in future, which began to spring forth gradually.

The Beginning

Allah has bestowed upon Abu al-Qasim numerous abilities and talents, reflected through his striving to attain the aspired perfection, and his bright forehead used to augur of a blooming future before him.

He has excelled his companions by his smartness, acumen, understanding and perception. And from the very first days of his age, be used to show keen interest for seeking knowledge, and striving for reaching the perfection. So, he started to get principles of science from his father, who never spared any effort to teach him various branches of knowledge, starting with preliminaries and Arabic literature. On attaining puberty, be asked his father’s permission to travel to Khunsar,4 to learn usul (principles), under its outstanding ‘alim - al Sayyid Husayn al Khunsari.5

His Marriage

Al-Mirza Abu al-Qasim’s acute wit, genius, full acquaintance of ‘ilmi issues, and sublime personality auguring well of a bloomy future, have impressed his tutor’s heart, to the extent that he (tutor) brought him nearer, giving him special position. Then he gave him in marriage his sister, the woman of chastity, purity and virtue, the scion of the honorable ‘Alawi household, whose marriage was regarded as a pattern.Because Islam gives great importance to moral aspect in selecting the spouse, as the criterion being piety and faith, not wealth or prettiness.

Based on this, whoever looks at marriage as a project, subject to void considerations, like dignity, opulence, and superficial charm, is greatly mistaken, as all of these are but speedily vanishing things.Whereas nobility, profound faith, piety (taqwa), chastity and purity are stable pillars never wavering with time changes.

Thus, the ethical characteristics enjoyed by Abu al­ Qasim have prompted al-Sayyid al-Khunsari to offer him marrying his sister, in an episode similar to that of the marriage of our master Moses (A) with Shu’ayb’s daughter. Shu’ayb came to recognize the lofty merits that distinguished Moses from others, on meeting him, so he offered him to marry his daughter saying to him - as stated in the Holy Qur’an:

“He said: Lo! I fain would marry thee to one of these two daughters of mine...”( 28:27). 6

Migration to Iraq

After passage of many years, Abu al-Qasim realized that Khunsar could no more quench his thirst for knowledge, or satisfy his eagerness for more learning. Therefore, he made up his mind to migrate to Iraq, after bidding his tutor al-Sayyid Husayn al-Khunsari farewell, betaking himself then to Karbala’, the metropolis of al-Husayn ibn ‘Ali (A).

There (at Karbala’) he joined the disciples of the great Ustadh al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Behbahani, who was then a torch of knowledge and learning, and an abundant fountainhead outpouring fiqh, culture and light. Then he managed to get school certificate in ijtihad and narration, from him.7

Through some of his poetic verses, al-Mirza mentions the year 1174 (H) in which he migrated to Iraq, as was a usual custom among some poets and literary personages, concerned with chronogram by counting the sentences, according to the numbers opposite to the alphabet.

During his stay in migration house, he learnt under its teachers and scholarly dignitaries, such as al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Mazandarani, al-Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Futuni, beside his teacher al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Behbahani, who have all granted him permission to narrate

Return to Homeland

After spending long years in learning and investigation, al-Mirza al-Qummi felt quenched of knowledge, realizing then the necessity to shoulder a greatresponsibility, that he had to return to his homeland as ordained by the holy verse:

“Of every troop of them, a party only should go forth, that they (who are left behind) may gain sound knowledge in religion, and that they may warn their folk when they return to them, so that they may beware” (9:122)

Thus al-Mirza started his return trip to his birth place Jabliq, residing then in one of its villages called “Durrah Bagh” where he lived with his parents. Then he, in response to the insistence of one of his disciples (al-Hajj Muhammad Sultan, who was a wealthy, benevolent and religious man) shifted to another adjacent village called “Qal’ah Babu”, where he settled down and started his activities of preaching, guiding and teaching. This village was at that time, drowned in a darkness of ignorance (jahl), as his class was only attended by two disciples: al­ Mirza HidayatAllah, and the aforementioned disciple al­Hajj Muhammad Sultan, beside another one whose name was ‘Ali Dust Khan, the son of al-Hajj Tahir Khan. He was teaching them nahw (grammar) and mantiq (logic).

Al-Mirza faced bitter experiences at the hands ofthis village inhabitants , due to their unawareness of his status and sublime position. So, they embarked on vexing and annoying him, preferring to him one of day-school ignorant teachers, or rather they could never distinguish between him and Mulla Shah Murad, who was much lower in rank than Sabz ‘Ali.

The Village-Mulla’s Intrigue

The village Mulla has never missed any chance to conspire against al-Mirza al-Qummi, gazing him with envying eyes,laying for an opportune time to launching an onslaught against him, benefiting from the utter ignorance prevailing over the whole village. The opportunity presented itself, when the villagers gathered at an occasion, so he exploited this chance, claiming before all people that al-Mirza being only an ignorant man, having no bit knowledge of anything, and rather be was illiterate unable to write.

For proving his claim before all, he asked al­ Mirza to write “snake” for him. The great mujtahid never disdained from this silly demand, so he took the pen and nicely wrote the word “snake”. Thereat, the Mulla prepared to direct his blow, so he took the paper and embarked on showing it to the people in a mocking way. Then he drew a sketch like a snake with its triangle head and twisted tail, exposing it then to the villagers, who judged that what was written byal-Mirza had nothing to do with the snake, while what was sketched by their Mulla was the truth!

This caused al-Mirza to have bitter feeling, due to living amongst ignorantpeople, that are deceived easily by the foolish tricks of Sabz ‘Ali and Shah Murad. So, he resorted to implore the Almighty Allah to deliver him of this town of which the people are oppressors.

Travel to Isfahan and Shiraz

The earth, vast as it is, was straitened for al-Mirza, besides his being unable to tolerate staying there, and feeling suffocated in that atmosphere of ignorance and plots, so he made up his mind to travel to Isfahan.

Then he settled down in “Kasah Giran” School, engaged in the profession of teaching. Soon many disciples and knowledge-seekers gathered around him, to get from his abundant knowledge. But this could not last long, due to presence of many jealous people who envied him, and soon many rumours were gossiped here and there, with the aim of poisoning the atmosphere and degrading the status and sublimity of his position.

Then he thought that it was for his convenience to depart this region toward Shiraz, during the reign of Karim Khan Zand. He lived there for about three years, suffering very straitened circumstances, with severe Poverty and destitution; whereat the late al­ Shaykh Abd al-Nabi sent him a sum of money. Then al­ Mirza returned to Isfahan to purchase a collection of books to the fields of fiqh, linguistics and hadith, which were badly needed by him, after which he decided to go back to Jabliq again.

Migration to Qum

Al-Mirza could not settle down in Jabliq, or in “Qal’ah Babu” in particular, the village that was plunged in darkness of ignorance (jahl), being unpleased to live there, due to the absence of knowledge-seekers, or anyone concerned with (Islamic) rulings (ahkam). So, he felt of distress, that led him to migrate this time to the holy town of Qum, where lies the shrine of the pure ‘Alawi “Fatimah” the daughter of al- ‘Imam Musa ibn Ja’far, the Seventh Imam of Ahl al-Bayt( A). He sought refuge at the sacred shrine, solemnly reiterating Allah’s verses:

“Lo! He who wardeth off (evil) and endureth (findeth favour); for lo! Allah loseth not the wages of the kindly.” (12:90)

“But lo! With hardship goeth ease. Lo! With hardship goeth ease.” (94:5- 6)

Then the doors of heaven began to open for him, and God has showered abundantly over him out of His plentiful sustenance, and at the same time people would recognize his worth, with his status being sublimated among them. His arrival coincided with the conflict going on between Muhammad Khan al-Qajar and Lutf ‘Ali Khan Zand, which ended with the defeat of the latter, followed by decline of the Zandi Dynasty forever.

This holy town witnessed shining of a new star in the world of Shi’i marji’iyyah (religious authority), and al­Mirza al-Qummi’s attaining worldwide fame. There at the great marji’ embarked on compilation, classification, teaching, issuing fatwas (verdicts) and preaching, beside undertaking the leadership of Muslim worshippers (imamah) at the town mosque.

During the visit of Fath ‘Ali Shah who has recently assumed the kingdom throne to Qum, he got acquainted with al-Qummi, appreciating his status and knowledge, with praying behind him. After performing the noon and afternoon prayers, the King8 advanced forward for presenting his affection and appreciation to al­ Mirza al-Qummi, making him then to ride his mount, while the King walked along with his procession till reaching his house.

This step taken by the Qajari King did impress the souls, having much influence over hearts, rendering al­ Mirza a worldwide fame.

Though Qum (the small town) was not so important at that time, but al-Qummi’s eminence prompted a large number of men of honour and knowledge, to make pilgrimage to it for acquiring from the ‘ilm of the grand marji’. Knowledge-seekers also rushed toward him like butterflies flying around the candles, longing for the abundance of knowledge whose fountains have gushed out at Qum.

Ever since, the town star glared at the sky of Islamic sciences, turning to be a centre of radiance that began to dazzle the eyes. Within a short time, Qum proved to be the metropolis of knowledge, whereas Isfahan, which used to hoist that banner, started to decline gradually. Then Qum became the Ka’bah for knowledge-seekers who used to visit it from all directions and quarters. So, al-Mirza al­Qummi can be considered the real founder of the Theological School (al-Hawzah al- ‘Ilmiyyah) at Qum, which kept, through his concerted and relentless efforts, on occupying the priority position till the contemporary time.

Turning Toward Iraq

Most of al-Mirza’s life was spent at the sacred town of Qum, during which he made several journeys and trips to different places. They included his travel to visit the sanctuaries at the land of Iraq, before his compiling the book Qawanin al- ‘usul, which he completed in 1205 (H), containing his own opinions and theories on ‘ilm al- ‘usul. He betook himself first to pay homage to the holy shrine of Amir al-Mu’minin ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (peace be upon him).

The ‘ulama’ of Najaf availed themselves of that visit, offering him to hold a debate regarding his opinions, nominating for this task al-Sayyid Husayn al-Husayni al­ ‘Amili, who was the most eminent scholar in‘ilm al- ‘usul. The debate took a long time, and numerous suspicions regarding al-Mirza’s theory were introduced there, for which it was infeasible for him to give answers thereat, so he promised the questioners to give replies afterwards.

All those suspicions and questions were cited by al­ Mirza in his book Qawanin al- ‘usul, in his discussions about ijtihad and taqlid9 (imitation).

Pilgrimage to the Old House

It was one of his trips he made from Qum, betaking himself toward Makkah, with a keen desire for making pilgrimage to Allah’s sanctified House, after long waiting.

This, since he could not find opportune time before, due to his shouldering great responsibilities, like the leadership of al-Hawzah al- ‘Ilmiyyah and undertaking the administration of Muslims’ affairs. So, in the year 1212 (H), he betook himself toward the hearts fascinator: Allah's Sanctuary. After performing the hajj rituals, he made his way toward al-Madinah to visit the tomb of the holy Messenger and the graves of Ahl al-Bayt (A) at al Baqi’.

During his stay there, he met al-Sayyid Bahr al- ‘Ulum, with whom he held significant discussions. It is noteworthy to point out that al-Mirza al-Qummi, during his residence at Najaf, has granted one of its scholars - al­ Shaykh Asad Allah al-Tustari- a school -certificate (ijazah) in narration, with a signature dated “Monday 17th of Rajab, in 1212 (H)”.

His Trip to Kazzaz

His Trip to Kazzaz:10

He travelled to this region from Qum too, where he got married to the sister of al-Hajj al-Mulla Muhammad al­ Kazzazi; who joined afterwards the disciples of al-Mirza al-Qummi.

His Trips to Khunsar

Al-Mirza has made several visits to Khunsar, due to the fact reported by the author of Rawdat al-jannat, being that two Sayyids from Khunsar, who were al-Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi al-Khunsari and his nephew al-Sayyid ‘Ali al­ Khunsari, the grandsons of al-Sayyid Husayn al-Khunsari - the tutor of al-Mirza, as mentioned before have become among the disciples of al-Mirza. So, as a gratitude for his great tutor, he showered special care upon them, being too kind to them, preferring them over his own sons, loving them to the extent that he made several visits to Khunsar.

Notes

1. It is at the south-eastern part of the town of Foman.

2. It is a region at Loristan Province.

3. Some narration state that he was born in 1153 or 1150 H.

4. It is a town situated between Isfahan and Golbaygan and known with its moderate weather.

5. He passed away in 1191 (H), and regarded among the ‘ulama’ of the 12th Hijrah century, leaving numerous works.

6. It is reported that the late al-Mulla Muhammad Taqi al­ Majlisi has offered al-Mulla Salih al-Mazandarani to marry his daughter, due to the knowledge, piety and uprightness he enjoyed, despite the latter’s severe destitution.

7. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Behbahani, known with the title al- ‘Ustadh al-Wahid. He is one of the great Shi’ah fuqaha’ and Imamiyyah prides. He was born in 1118 (H) at Isfahan, and dead in 1205 (H), and his tomb lies now in one of the porticoes of al- ‘Imam al-Husayn’s (A) shrine.

8. This step taken by the king may be interpreted as an attempt to show toadyism toward people, who used to hold the ‘ulama’ in high status.

9. Some are of the opinion that it is al-Mirza who has introduced to the Najaf ‘ulama’ the notion of that debate.

10. It is a district related to Arak Province, famous with growing cereals, beet and grape.

• Aşāla al-Żuhūr (Principality of the Appearance)

Aşāla al-żuhūr - to which all other literal principles refer - is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used a term and one doubts what the speaker has really meant. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the appearance,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its apparent meaning, even though the speaker may have intended another meaning by using it; for using a term in other than its apparent meaning needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

Here, there are two discussions:

1. Whether a specific term is apparent in a specific meaning. Dictionaries deal with this matter. On the other hand, mabāhith al-alfāż of the science of uşūl al-fiqh discuss appearances of some terms whose appearances are a matter of dispute, such as terms of commands and prohibitions, those of general and particular, and so on. In fact, these are some minor premises of the principality of appearance.

2. Whether a term whose appearance is recognized is an authoritative proof in its specific meaning from the divine lawgiver’s view so that both the divine lawgiver and duty-bounds can argue it. That is the major premise by adding its minor premises onewill be allowed to take appearances of Qur’ānic verses and ĥadīths into consideration and act on their basis.

The only proof for authority of the appearance is conduct of the wise (→ binā’ al-‘uqalā’), which consists of the following premises:

2.1. The practical conduct of the wise and their unanimity of opinion is doubtlessly established on that the speaker can content himself with the appearance of his words in communicating his ideas to others; the wise do not oblige the speaker to use only such words that are definite with regard to which no other meaning is probable. On the other hand, based on that practical conduct, they take appearances of words of every speaker into consideration for understanding his ideas whether or not his words are explicit-definite. That is why the appearance is an authoritative proof for both the speaker against the hearer if the latter predicates the former’s words upon something contrary to the appearance and the hearer against the speaker if the former claims that he has meant something contrary to the appearance.It is the legal procedure that the appearance of a judicial confession or acknowledgment should be taken into consideration even though the term may not be explicit-definite.

2.2. It is also indubitably clear that the holy lawgiver has not taken a way other than that of the wise in His communications. For the lawgiver is considered among the wise, and even their chief; therefore, He should have confirmed that conduct. This argument is sound, since there is no problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way on the one hand and no prohibition from Himis proved in this connection on the other.

Itis necessarily and definitely concluded from those two premises that the appearance is treated as an authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver: for Him against the duty-bound, and as an excuser for the duty-bound.

•al-Awāmir → al-Amr

B

•al-Barā’a al-‘Aqliyya (Intellectual Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is not proved by religious proofs but by the intellectual principle of reprehensibility of punishment without depiction (→qā‘ida qubĥ ‘iqāb bilā bayān) it is called al-barā’a al-‘aqliyya.

•al-Barā’a al-Shar‘iyya (Religious Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is proved by religious proofs, it is called al-barā’a al-shar‘iyya.

• Binā’ al-‘Uqalā’ (Conduct of the Wise)

The proof called “the conduct of the wise” consists of two premises:

1. The wise as they are the wise (i.e., human beings as they are intellectual beings and not as they are animate creatures with some emotions, desires, customs, and the like) have such a practical conduct. This reveals thatsuch a conduct is originated by the intellect and not other human faculties .

2. The divine lawgiver has not prohibited from following that conduct. This reveals that He has recognized that conduct; for He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect, and therefore has no other judgment.

The conclusion is that the divine lawgiver has confirmed that conduct and has had no other way in this connection; otherwise, He would have announced and depicted His specificway ordering believers to follow it.

Itshould be noted , however, that the divine lawgiver’s agreement with the conduct of the wise could not be discovered merely through His prohibition not being proved, but rather there must exist some conditions so that one may deduce the divine lawgiver’s agreement with a conduct of the wise:

2.1. There should not be a problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way.Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, agreement of the divine lawgiver cannot be discovered from His prohibition not being proved - as is the case with referring to experts such as lexicographers, for need of the divine lawgiver to experts is nonsensical and makes no sense so that He may have a practical conduct in this connection.

2.2. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, it must be proved that the practical conduct has been prevalent even as to religious affairs in the time of infallible-innocent personalities so that one can infer their acknowledgment from their silence and deduce that the divine lawgiver has been in agreement with the wise.This is the case with, for example, the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb [q.v.]) which is an authoritative proof in the case of doubt about the previous state; for, on the one hand, it is nonsensical that the divine lawgiver should doubt about persistence of His precept, and, on the other hand, the conduct of the wise as to consideration of the previous state has been prevalent in religious affairs. Now, since the conduct of the wise has been prevalent even in religious affairs and the divine lawgiver has not prohibited from that, we can deduce that He has confirmed the conduct in question.

2.3. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible while neither of the two previously mentioned conditions exists, there must be a specific, definite proof announcing agreement and confirmation of the divine lawgiver. Otherwise, agreement of the divine lawgiver with the conduct is merely a conjecture, and “Surely conjecture avails naught against truth.” (Qur., 10: 36)

In other words, in any custom of the wise, the divine lawgiver is either expected to be in agreement with the wise since there is no problem with that, as in the case of single report, or is not expected to be in such agreement because of existing problem, as in the case of the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb).

If the former, if itis proved that the divine lawgiver has prohibited from the conduct, that conduct is definitely not of authority, and if not, it is definitely discovered that He is in agreement with the wise. For He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect; had He not confirmed that conduct having a specific way in this connection other than that of the wise, He would have announced and depicted that way prohibiting believers from following their own conduct.

If the latter, (2.3.2.1.) it is either known that the conduct of the wise as to its consideration has been prevalent in religious affairs, as is the case with istişĥāb, or (2.3.2.2.) that is not known, as is the case with referring to experts for meanings of words.

In (2.3.2.1.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is sufficient for discovering His agreement with the wise, for that is something He caresabout . Had He not confirmed that whilethat custom is observed by His vicegerent , He would have prohibited duty-bounds from following that custom and conveyed that prohibition to them in any way possible. Thus, the very lack of establishment of prohibition reveals His agreement, for it is obviously clear that an actualprohibition which is not conveyed to and has not reached duty-bounds cannot be regarded an actual, authoritative prohibition.

As for (2.3.2.2.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is not sufficient to reveal His agreement, for it is probable that He has prohibited the wise from that custom in religious affairs and they did not do so, or they may have arbitrarily not followed that custom in religious affairs and it is not upon the divine lawgiver to prohibit them from following that custom in irreligious affairs - had He not confirmed that in such affairs. That is why we are in need of a specific, definite proof in order totake such custom into consideration in religious affairs.

D

• Dalāla al-Iqtiđā’ (Denotation of Necessitation)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), two criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. Numerous examplescan be found for such denotation two of which being as follows:

1. In the verse 82 of sūra 12 of the holy Quran, parts of words of Joseph's brothers to their father when they returned from their journey to Egyptare narrated in this way: “Question the city wherein we were,” and it is clear that the city cannot be questioned. Thus, the sentence can rationally be correct only if the word “people” is considered omitted in it, so that the sentence should be “Question people of the city… .”

2. There is a ĥadīth saying, “There are no prayers for the mosque's neighbor except in the mosque,” while we know that should such a person say his prayers in his home it will be juristically acceptable. Thus, the truth and correctness of the sentence is dependent upon the word “perfect”being omitted so that what is negated should be perfection of the prayers and not the prayers itself.

Generally speaking, all implicative denotations to single meanings and all figurative meanings refer to the denotation of necessitation.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

• Dalāla al-Ishāra (Denotation of Implicit Conveyance)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya and dalāla al-iqtiđā’) neither of the two following criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. What is denoted here is only an unclear implicature of the speech or an obvious implicature of the speech in the most general sense - no matter the object of denotation is understood from a single sentence or from a couple of sentences.

An instance of this is denotation of two Qur’ānic verses as to the minimum time of pregnancy: the verse 15 of the sūra 46 “And painfully she gave birth to him his bearing and his weaning being thirty months,” and the verse 233 of the sūra 2 “Mothers will suckle their children two complete years completely for such as desire to complete the suckling,” since to subtract two years, i.e., twenty four months, from thirty months is six and thereby it becomes clear that the minimum time for pregnancy is six months. It is also of this kind the question of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminary, since it is an obvious implicature of the obligation of the thing in the most general sense. That is why they consider obligation of the preliminary of a mandatory act a secondary and not a primary one; for it is not a denotation of the speech by intention and is only understood secondarily, i.e., by the denotation of implicit conveyance.

As for the authority of this denotation, it cannot betreated as an authoritative proof because of authority of appearances, for there is no appearance where it is assumed that such thing is not intended - it is obviously clear that denotation is subject to the intention. Therefore, implicit conveyanceshould only be called adumbration and implicit conveyance without using the term denotation; hence, it is clear that such conveyance is not included in the appearances so that it can be an authoritative proof from that aspect. Of course, it would definitely be an authoritative proof should there be an intellectual implication through which its requisites, whether judgment or otherwise, could be discovered, such as taking requisites of one’s confession into consideration even though he claims that he has not intended them or he denies existence of any implication there.

•al-Dalāla al-Siyāqiyya (Contextual Denotation)

There are some denotations that are included neither in mafhūm [q.v.] nor in manţūq [q.v.], such as the case where the speech denotes implicatively a single word or a single meaning not mentioned in the manţūq, or it denotes contents of asentence which is an implicature of manţūq but not obviously in the most particular sense. Thoseare all called neither mafhūm nor manţūq.

To address those denotations in a general way, a good number of Uşūlīs have called them contextual denotation (al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya) meaning that the context of a speech denotes a single or compound meaning, or an omitted word. Such denotationsare divided into the three following varieties: denotation of necessitation (al-iqtiđā’), hint (al-tanbīh), and implicit conveyance (al-ishāra) [qq.v.].

• Dalāla al-Tanbīh (Denotation of Hint)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), only one criterion, i.e., the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, is taken into consideration. Here, it is the context of the speech that causes certainty that a specific requisiteis meant or makes its non-consideration unlikely. This denotation has numerous instances the most important of whichbeing classified as follows:

1. The speaker whishes to depict something but expresses its logical or conventional requisite. For example, one addresses his friend saying, “It is ten o'clock” in order to remind him that the time they had agreed upon to go somewhere has come.

2. The speech is associated with someword which conveys that something is a cause, condition, impediment, or part of the judgment. To mention the judgment is thereby a hint that the thing mentioned is a cause, condition, impediment, part of the judgment or it is not so. For instance, if the jurist says, “Repeat your prayers,” where he is asked about the doubt concerning numbers of rak‘as of a two-rak‘a prayers , it is understood that the said doubt is a cause for annulment of the prayers and the obligation of repetition.

3. The speech is associated with someword which determines some objects of the act. For instance, when someone says, “I reached the river and drank,” it is understood that what was drunk was water and it was from the river.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

•al-Dalīl al-Faqāhatī → al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī

•al-Dalīl al-Idjtihādī → al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī

• Dalīl al-Insidād (Closure Proof)

The proof known as “the Closure Proof” consists of four preliminaries. Should those preliminaries be accurate, intellect would judge that the duty-bound should acton the basis of any conjecture with regard to precepts - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās [q.v.]).

Those four preliminariescan be summarized as follows:

1. The door of knowledge and knowledge-rooted is closed in the most part of juristic precepts in our time when it is later than our holyImāms’ .This is the fundamental base of this proof upon which all other preliminaries are dependent.

2. It is not allowed to leave obedience of actualprecepts which are known to us in summary fashion, nor is it permissible to reject them in the position of action. To leave and reject actual precepts can be actualized in two ways: either to treat ourselves as animals and children who have no burden, or to refer to the principle of “clearance” (→ aşāla al-barā’a) and that of “non-existence of burden” wherever obligation or unlawfulness of something is unknown. Annulment of those two assumptions is self-evidently clear; therefore, we must take into consideration all actualprecepts which are known in summary fashion.

3. To consider such precepts necessitates clarifying one's obligation, which, in turn, is restricted to one of the following four states: (3.1) to follow the one who believes in the openness of the door of knowledge, (3.2) to act on the basis of “precaution” in every problem, (3.3) to refer to the respective practical principle (the principle of clearance, that of precaution, etc.) in every problem as the circumstances necessitate, and (3.4) to refer to the conjecture where there is one, and to the practical principles where there is none.

Since referring to the first three states is not acceptable, we shouldtake the fourth into consideration . The first is not acceptable, for how can one who believes in the closure of the door of knowledge refer to whom he considers wrong and ignorant in his believing in the openness of that door? The second is not plausible, for it necessitates intolerable hardship, or even disorder of the society if all duty-bounds are burdened with - which are both rejected in the Islamic law. And the third is not acceptable, for the existence of knowledge of mandatory and prohibited affairs in all doubtful problems in summary fashion prevents us from referring to the practical principles even though in some of them.

4. Thus, the only acceptable state is the fourth, i.e., referring to the conjecture. Although conjecture has two sides, i.e., the preferable (al-rādjiĥ) and the chimerical (al-mardjūĥ=al-mawhūm), one is merely allowed to refer to the preferable side; for preferring the chimerical side is intellectually reprehensible. Therefore, one is supposed totake the conjecture into consideration - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās). In case of definite knowledge of non-authority of a conjecture, one should refer to practical principles, precisely as one is supposed to refer to them in doubtful problems with regard to which no conjecture exists. There is no problem with referring to practical principles in such cases, for the knowledge in summary fashion is reduced to the detailed knowledge (al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī) of precepts proved by some authority and primary doubt (al-shak al-badwī) with regard to other cases, in which one is supposed to refer to practical principles [qq.v.].

•al-Dalīl al-Lafżī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dalīl al-Lubbī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dawām (Permanence)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - whatis prohibited is the sheer nature of the act. However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the commandwill be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.

• Dawarān bain al-Aqall wa’l-Akthar→ al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

• Dawarān bain al-Mutabāyinayn → al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

•al-Đidd al-‘Āmm (General Opposite)

The dispute over the general opposite (i.e., eschewal and not doing which is non-existential → mas’ala al-đidd) is not over the necessity in principle, for Uşūlīs apparently agree about the necessity; they disagree only on its nature. They have declared various opinions in this connection. Some have said that the necessity is the sameness, i.e., to command something is the same with prohibitingits opposite. Some have said that since the command is composed of wish of something and prohibition of its eschewal, the prohibition of eschewal is analytical part of meaning of obligation. Some have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most particular sense; hence, the denotation is literal, but implicative. Others have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most general sense or an unclear necessitation; hence, the denotation is merely intellectual.

The justifiable opinion, however, is that there exists no necessity of any kind, i.e., there is no religious prohibition of eschewal necessitated by the very command in such a way that there exists a juristic prohibition beyond the very command to the act. The reason is that the obligation, whether it is denotation of the imperative or its intellectual implication - the latter being true - is not a composite concept; but rather it is a simple, singleone which is necessity of the act. A requisite of obligation of something, of course, is prohibition of its eschewal. However, that prohibition is not a juristic prohibition made by theLord as He is the Lord, but rather is an intellectual secondary prohibition without there being a prohibition from the divine lawgiver beyond the very obligation. The reason is obvious: the very command to do something in an obligatory mode is sufficient to prohibit its eschewal; so, there is no need for the divine lawgiver to prohibit eschewal of something in addition to commanding it.

•al-Đidd al-Khāşş (Particular Opposite)

To hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite (i.e., the existential, incompatible affair, such as eating with regard to prayers → mas’ala al-đidd) is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitation the prohibition of its general opposite (→ al-đidd al-‘āmm); and since there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is no juristic prohibition of the particular opposite either.

•al-Djam ‘ al-‘Urfī (Customary Gathering)

Bydjam‘ is meant taking two contradictory proofs altogether. It is an intellectual judgment that taking two seemingly contradictory proofs altogether is more plausible than leaving either of them. This judgment isdue to the fact that contradiction does not occur unless all constituents of authority exist in either of them as to both chain of transmission and denotation. In case of existence of all constituents of authority, i.e., existence of the origin, nothing may cause leaving the proof but existence of an impediment to the efficacy of the origin; and that impediment can be nothing but their mutual repudiation. On the other hand, possibility of gathering both proofs as to their denotations leaves no room for certainty of their mutual repudiation, which leads to lack of certainty as to the existence of impediment to the efficacy of authority with regard to the proof. Thus, how can one judge that one or both of those proofsis no longer authoritative proof?

However, itshould be noted that such judgment of the intellect is not absolute, but rather is conditional upon the gathering being “customary” or “acceptable,” in the sense that it should not be in a way that custom of people of the language does not confirm it on the one hand and no third proof supports it on the other. (See also: al-muradjdjiĥāt)

F

•al-Fawr (Promptitude)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness (al-tarākhī),both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation (→ al-amr) and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, itcould be performed either promptly or belatedly.

G

• Ghayr al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya (Dependent Intellectual Proofs)

Dependent intellectual proofs are those whose major premises are intellectual while their minor premises are juristic, such as “this act is juristically mandatory,” and “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its preliminary should juristically be mandatory (→ muqaddima al-wādjib),” or “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its opposite should juristically be forbidden (→ mas’ala al-đidd),” and so forth. As clearly seen, minor premises of such syllogisms are proved in the science of fiqh, so they are juristic, while their major premises are intellectual, i.e., it is the intellect’s judgment that there exists an intellectual implication between the precept in the first premise and another juristic precept. The consequence of such minor and major premises becomes a minor premise of a syllogism whose major premise is authority of intellect.

H

• Ĥadīth al-Raf‘ ( Removal)

This is the prophetic ĥadīth argued by uşūlīs for “the clearance from obligatory” (→ awhich declares: “Nine things are removed from my people: error, forgetfulness, what they have done under duress, what they do not know, what they cannot endure, what they have done under compulsion, to take as a bad omen, jealousy, to think of createdness [of the Almighty] so long as one has not uttered it.”

• Ĥāl al-Isnād →al-Mushtaqq

• Ĥāl al-Talabbus →al-Mushtaqq

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Mutasharri‘iyya (Muslims' Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Had such transfer happened after the holy Prophet's time, we would have Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]) according to which any such term found in the Quran and Sunna should be interpreted as its usual, and not juristic, meaning in the process of inferring juristic precepts. Seealso: al-ĥaqīqa al-shar‘iyya.

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya (Juristic-Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Now, the question is that whether such transfer has happened in the holy Prophet's time so that we may have the juristic-literal meaning or it has occurred after him and therefore what we have in hand is Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]).

The answer to that question would make a difference in the process of inferring juristic precepts from the Quran and Sunna. Should there exist the juristic-literal meaning, any such term without contextual evidencewould be predicated to its juristic meaning, while it must be interpreted as its usual meaning if such a juristic-literal meaning does not exist.

It is obviously clear that those new meanings were not made through convention by specification (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘yīnī), for in that case it should have been narrated to us in one way or another. As for the “convention by determination” (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘ayyunī), it must be said that it had doubtlessly happened in Imam Ali's time, for by that time all Muslims have been using such terms in their new juristic meanings for a long time. Hence, since in Shiite jurisprudence only such prophetic ĥadīths thatare narrated by holy Imāms are treated as valuable, all such terms in their words should be predicated to their new juristic meanings where they are void of any contextual evidence. As for the holy Quran, there is no room for such a dispute, since almost all such wordsare used in it along with contextual evidence and convey their new juristic meanings.

•al-Ĥudjdja (Authoritative Proof)

Ĥudjdja literarily means whatsoever capable ofbeing used as an argument against someone else through which one can overcome one’s opponent in a dispute. Overcoming someoneelse is either by making him silent and nullifying his argument, or by making him accept one’s argument - in this sense ĥudjdja being an excuser. In uşūl al-fiqh, however, ĥudjdja means that which proves its object but does not attain the level of certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., it does not cause certitude with regard to its object - since in case of certitude it is the certitude which is ĥudjdja, though in its literal meaning. In other words, ĥudjdja is whatsoever revealing and indicating something else in such a way that the former proves the latter -its proving being made by the lawgiver, duty-maker as it is the actuality. This proving will be sound only by adding theproof which proves validity and authority of that revealing and indicates the thing in the divine lawgiver’s view. Therefore, ĥudjdja in this sense does not include certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., certitude is not called ĥudjdja in this sense, but in the literal sense; for certitude is essentially a way and cannot be made an authoritative proof by anyone. Ĥudjdja in this sense is synonymous with amāra, proof (al-dalīl), and way (al-ţarīq). See also: al-ĥukm al-żāhirī

•al-Ĥudjdjiyya → al-Ĥudjdja

•al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī (Actual Precept)

A precept which is directed to something per se as it is an act - such as the prayers, since the obligation is directed to the prayers as it is prayers and an act per se without consideration of anything else - is called “the actual precept” (al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī) and the proof which proves it “the persuasive proof” (al-dalīl al-idjtihādī).

•al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī (Apparent Precept)

Where a precept is directed to something as its actual precept is unknown and there is no proof for supporting any of the existing opinions, the jurist doubts the primary, actual precept of the disputed matter; and since he is not supposed to remain perplexed practically, there must exist another precept, though intellectual, for him, such as obligation of precaution, clearance from obligation, or ignoring the doubt. Such a secondary precept is called “the apparent precept” (al-ĥukm al-żāhirī) and the proof which proves it “the juristic proof” (al-dalīl al-faqāhatī) or “the practical principle” (al-aşl al-‘amalī [q.v.]). Seealso: al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī.

•al-Ĥukūma (Sovereignty)

Ĥukūma is inclusion or exclusion of something in or from an object by a predicative sentence through expanding or limiting realm of the object or subject; such as “perform ablution for prayers,” and on the one hand: “circumambulation of Ka‘ba is prayers” leading to the conclusion that one should perform ablution while circumambulating in ĥadjdj, and on the other: “funeral prayers is not prayers,” leading to the conclusion that one is not supposed to perform ablution for funeral prayers. Thus, ĥukūma occurs where one of the two seemingly contradictory proofs is supposed tobe given priority over the other because of its sovereignty while both of them are still authoritative proofs, i.e., neither of them repudiates the other. Seealso: al-ta‘āruđ.

I

•al-‘Ibādī (Act of Worship)

‘Ibādī is an act whose religious acceptance is conditional upon the duty-bound’s intention of proximity to God, or that which is the sheer burden made by God for proximity to Him; such as prayers, fast, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like.

•al-Idjmā ‘ (Consensus)

Being defined as consensus of Muslim jurists, that of Muslim community, and so on,idjmā‘ is considered one of the three-fold or four-fold free-standing sources of religious precepts by Sunnī Uşūlīs and jurists. Shī‘a Uşūlīs and jurists, however, do not treat consensus as a free-standing source, but rather as a way through which Sunna can be revealed. Thus, authority and innocence are for words of the infallible-innocent personality, which may sometimes be revealed by theconsensus, and not for the consensus per se.That is why Shī‘a jurists sometimes treat unanimity of opinion of a few individuals whose unanimity is technically not called idjmā‘ as consensus, because of its definite revelation of opinions of the infallible-innocent personality on the one hand, and do not consider a consensus which does not reveal opinions of the infallible-innocent personality as idjmā‘ even though it is technically called so on the other.

Before any argumentation, one point should be noted: it is obviously clear that consensus of all people, or a specific people, as it is consensus has no implication to revealing divine precepts; for it is not of unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise which is an authoritative proof like the Book and Sunna. Unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise is in fact the very intellectual proof, as will be discussed later, and not the technical consensus. The reason why a consensus of people which is not included in the unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise cannot be considered a source for religious precepts is that such a consensus may be caused by people’s habits, beliefs, emotions, or sentiments which are of human characteristic and the divine lawgiver transcends them. Should consensus of people as it is consensus be an authoritative proof, consensus of other people who follow other religions should be an authoritative proof as well - something no Muslim believes in. Thus,some other proof must be presented by Sunnī jurists with regard to the authority of consensus .

As for Shiite perspective, consensus as it is consensus would have no value should it not reveal opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, and that is why it is not considered afree-standing source for religious precepts. In fact, authority is for the revealed, i.e., Sunna, and not for the revealer, i.e., consensus; and consensus precisely plays the role of massive report - with one difference: the latter reveals the very words of the infallible-

innocent personality (and that is why it is called lexical proof (al-dalīl al-lafżī)) while the former reveals the opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not his words (and that is why it is called thematic proof (al-dalīl al-lubbī) which conveys the theme and not the terms). Now that consensus is an authoritative proof because of revealing opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not per se, there is no need for unanimity of all; rather, that of those whose unanimity reveals words of the infallible-innocent personality would be sufficient, no matter how many they are - as explicitly asserted by some great Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs.

As for the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, theyare claimed to be up to twelve four of which being more considerable. However, since most of later Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs have raised doubts about them and followed some specific way called “the way of surmise (ţarīqa al-ĥads),” we will discuss this way only.According to the way of surmise, when one observes that all Shī‘a jurists have a consensus on a precept while they disagree too much on most of precepts, one will definitely become certain that their consensus is rooted in the holy Imām’s opinion and, being handed down from generation to generation, they have received it from their Imām - as is the case with consensus of followers of all other creeds and sects with regard to which no one doubts that the matter of consensus is taken from their leader. It should be emphasized that in the way of surmise, consensus of all jurists of all times, beginning from the era of holyImāms, must be actualized; for disagreement of one earlier generation, and even one single known outstanding jurist, prevents actualization of certitude in this connection.

All detailed discussions and arguments in Shiite uşūl al-fiqh on the authority of consensus as well as the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality deal with al-idjmā‘ al-muĥaşşal (the acquired consensus), i.e., a consensus which is acquired by a jurist who has searched all opinions of all jurists in person.It is this kind of consensus whose authority is a matter of dispute.

However, a case where a jurist has acquired a consensus and then has reported it to others (which is called al-idjmā‘ al -manqūl, i.e., the reported consensus), is also a matter of dispute and different opinions are presented in this connection.Some have considered the reported consensus an authoritative proof since it is a single report, some have treated it as not being an authoritative proof since it cannot be considered an instance of single report, some have considered it an authoritative proof where it reveals religious precepts in the view of the one who is reported to and not the reporter alone, and others have held some other different views in this regard. Detailed discussions on this problemshould be pursued in Shiite books of uşūl al-fiqh.

•Idjtimā‘ al -Amr wa’l Nahy (Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition)

Uşūlīs have disputed from a long time agowhether or not conjunction of command and prohibition in one act, i.e., a single act as it has one existence which is a gathering of two designations, is possible. By conjunctionis meant accidental encounter between the commanded act and the prohibited act in one thing. This may occur only where the command is directed to a designation and the prohibition to another designation which has no relation to the first, but those designations encounter rarely in one thing - here, conjunction of the command and the prohibition occurs, i.e., they encounter one another. Such conjunction of and encounter between two designations is of two kinds: case conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al -mawridī,) and real conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-ĥaqīqī).

Case conjunction occurs where there is no one act which corresponds to both designations, but rather there are two acts which have become synchronous and simultaneous one of which corresponding to the designation of the mandatory act and the other to the designation of the prohibited act. For instance, when someone is performing the prayers and in the meantime looking at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited , looking does not correspond to designation of the prayers, the prayers do not correspond to designation of looking, and both of them do not conform to one act. Such case conjunction is neither impossible nor a matter of dispute in this discussion. Hence, should one look at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited while performing one’s prayers, one would be both obedient and disobedient simultaneously without one’s prayers being annulled.

Real conjunction, even though at a glance and in a conventional view, occurs where there is oneact which corresponds to both designations, such as the well-known example of performing the prayers in an expropriated space. In that example which is the matter of dispute in this discussion, designation of the prayers, which is the commanded act, has no relation to that of expropriation, which is the prohibited act, but it accidentally happens that the duty-bound gathers them by performing the prayers in an expropriated space. Here, designation of the commanded, i.e., the prayers, encounters designation of the prohibited, i.e., expropriation, in that prayers performed in an expropriated space; hence, that single act corresponds to both designations of the prayers and expropriation. Thus, that single act is included in the commanded act from oneaspect which necessitates treating the duty-bound as obedient while it is included in the prohibition from another aspect which necessitates treating him as disobedient.

Now, the matter of dispute in this discussion becomes clear: Is it possible that the command should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and also the prohibition should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and the duty-bound should be considered both obedient and disobedient in one act, or is it not possible and the gathering of the two designations is either commanded only or prohibited only, i.e., either only the command remains actual and the duty-bound is obedient alone or only the prohibition remains actual and he is disobedient alone? Both of these opinionsare held by Uşūlīs each presenting their own proofs in order to establish their claims.

A very important point to be borne in mind is that the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs over possibility or otherwise of conjunction of the command and the prohibition concerns where the duty-bound has a way out (al-mandūĥa), i.e., he is able to obey the command in another case other than the gathering; or, in other words, he has encountered the conjunction deliberately because of misuse of his free will. It is such case that is a matter of disagreement among Uşūlīs: some believe in its possibility and others in its impossibility.

Nevertheless, there is no dispute among Uşūlīs over the impossibility of conjunction where obedience to the command can be actualized exclusively through the gathering and the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction; for it is clear that in case of exclusion, the actuality of two duties becomes impossible, since obedience of both is impossible: if the duty-bound does the commanded act he has disobeyed the prohibition, and if he eschews it he has disobeyed the command. Therefore, all Uşūlīs agree that conjunction of the command and the prohibition in such case is impossible and either the command or the prohibition isactual . However, there is disagreement among Uşūlīs as to which of them is so.

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Ĥaqīqī →Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Mawridī → Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

• Aşāla al-Żuhūr (Principality of the Appearance)

Aşāla al-żuhūr - to which all other literal principles refer - is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used a term and one doubts what the speaker has really meant. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the appearance,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its apparent meaning, even though the speaker may have intended another meaning by using it; for using a term in other than its apparent meaning needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

Here, there are two discussions:

1. Whether a specific term is apparent in a specific meaning. Dictionaries deal with this matter. On the other hand, mabāhith al-alfāż of the science of uşūl al-fiqh discuss appearances of some terms whose appearances are a matter of dispute, such as terms of commands and prohibitions, those of general and particular, and so on. In fact, these are some minor premises of the principality of appearance.

2. Whether a term whose appearance is recognized is an authoritative proof in its specific meaning from the divine lawgiver’s view so that both the divine lawgiver and duty-bounds can argue it. That is the major premise by adding its minor premises onewill be allowed to take appearances of Qur’ānic verses and ĥadīths into consideration and act on their basis.

The only proof for authority of the appearance is conduct of the wise (→ binā’ al-‘uqalā’), which consists of the following premises:

2.1. The practical conduct of the wise and their unanimity of opinion is doubtlessly established on that the speaker can content himself with the appearance of his words in communicating his ideas to others; the wise do not oblige the speaker to use only such words that are definite with regard to which no other meaning is probable. On the other hand, based on that practical conduct, they take appearances of words of every speaker into consideration for understanding his ideas whether or not his words are explicit-definite. That is why the appearance is an authoritative proof for both the speaker against the hearer if the latter predicates the former’s words upon something contrary to the appearance and the hearer against the speaker if the former claims that he has meant something contrary to the appearance.It is the legal procedure that the appearance of a judicial confession or acknowledgment should be taken into consideration even though the term may not be explicit-definite.

2.2. It is also indubitably clear that the holy lawgiver has not taken a way other than that of the wise in His communications. For the lawgiver is considered among the wise, and even their chief; therefore, He should have confirmed that conduct. This argument is sound, since there is no problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way on the one hand and no prohibition from Himis proved in this connection on the other.

Itis necessarily and definitely concluded from those two premises that the appearance is treated as an authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver: for Him against the duty-bound, and as an excuser for the duty-bound.

•al-Awāmir → al-Amr

B

•al-Barā’a al-‘Aqliyya (Intellectual Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is not proved by religious proofs but by the intellectual principle of reprehensibility of punishment without depiction (→qā‘ida qubĥ ‘iqāb bilā bayān) it is called al-barā’a al-‘aqliyya.

•al-Barā’a al-Shar‘iyya (Religious Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is proved by religious proofs, it is called al-barā’a al-shar‘iyya.

• Binā’ al-‘Uqalā’ (Conduct of the Wise)

The proof called “the conduct of the wise” consists of two premises:

1. The wise as they are the wise (i.e., human beings as they are intellectual beings and not as they are animate creatures with some emotions, desires, customs, and the like) have such a practical conduct. This reveals thatsuch a conduct is originated by the intellect and not other human faculties .

2. The divine lawgiver has not prohibited from following that conduct. This reveals that He has recognized that conduct; for He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect, and therefore has no other judgment.

The conclusion is that the divine lawgiver has confirmed that conduct and has had no other way in this connection; otherwise, He would have announced and depicted His specificway ordering believers to follow it.

Itshould be noted , however, that the divine lawgiver’s agreement with the conduct of the wise could not be discovered merely through His prohibition not being proved, but rather there must exist some conditions so that one may deduce the divine lawgiver’s agreement with a conduct of the wise:

2.1. There should not be a problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way.Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, agreement of the divine lawgiver cannot be discovered from His prohibition not being proved - as is the case with referring to experts such as lexicographers, for need of the divine lawgiver to experts is nonsensical and makes no sense so that He may have a practical conduct in this connection.

2.2. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, it must be proved that the practical conduct has been prevalent even as to religious affairs in the time of infallible-innocent personalities so that one can infer their acknowledgment from their silence and deduce that the divine lawgiver has been in agreement with the wise.This is the case with, for example, the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb [q.v.]) which is an authoritative proof in the case of doubt about the previous state; for, on the one hand, it is nonsensical that the divine lawgiver should doubt about persistence of His precept, and, on the other hand, the conduct of the wise as to consideration of the previous state has been prevalent in religious affairs. Now, since the conduct of the wise has been prevalent even in religious affairs and the divine lawgiver has not prohibited from that, we can deduce that He has confirmed the conduct in question.

2.3. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible while neither of the two previously mentioned conditions exists, there must be a specific, definite proof announcing agreement and confirmation of the divine lawgiver. Otherwise, agreement of the divine lawgiver with the conduct is merely a conjecture, and “Surely conjecture avails naught against truth.” (Qur., 10: 36)

In other words, in any custom of the wise, the divine lawgiver is either expected to be in agreement with the wise since there is no problem with that, as in the case of single report, or is not expected to be in such agreement because of existing problem, as in the case of the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb).

If the former, if itis proved that the divine lawgiver has prohibited from the conduct, that conduct is definitely not of authority, and if not, it is definitely discovered that He is in agreement with the wise. For He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect; had He not confirmed that conduct having a specific way in this connection other than that of the wise, He would have announced and depicted that way prohibiting believers from following their own conduct.

If the latter, (2.3.2.1.) it is either known that the conduct of the wise as to its consideration has been prevalent in religious affairs, as is the case with istişĥāb, or (2.3.2.2.) that is not known, as is the case with referring to experts for meanings of words.

In (2.3.2.1.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is sufficient for discovering His agreement with the wise, for that is something He caresabout . Had He not confirmed that whilethat custom is observed by His vicegerent , He would have prohibited duty-bounds from following that custom and conveyed that prohibition to them in any way possible. Thus, the very lack of establishment of prohibition reveals His agreement, for it is obviously clear that an actualprohibition which is not conveyed to and has not reached duty-bounds cannot be regarded an actual, authoritative prohibition.

As for (2.3.2.2.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is not sufficient to reveal His agreement, for it is probable that He has prohibited the wise from that custom in religious affairs and they did not do so, or they may have arbitrarily not followed that custom in religious affairs and it is not upon the divine lawgiver to prohibit them from following that custom in irreligious affairs - had He not confirmed that in such affairs. That is why we are in need of a specific, definite proof in order totake such custom into consideration in religious affairs.

D

• Dalāla al-Iqtiđā’ (Denotation of Necessitation)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), two criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. Numerous examplescan be found for such denotation two of which being as follows:

1. In the verse 82 of sūra 12 of the holy Quran, parts of words of Joseph's brothers to their father when they returned from their journey to Egyptare narrated in this way: “Question the city wherein we were,” and it is clear that the city cannot be questioned. Thus, the sentence can rationally be correct only if the word “people” is considered omitted in it, so that the sentence should be “Question people of the city… .”

2. There is a ĥadīth saying, “There are no prayers for the mosque's neighbor except in the mosque,” while we know that should such a person say his prayers in his home it will be juristically acceptable. Thus, the truth and correctness of the sentence is dependent upon the word “perfect”being omitted so that what is negated should be perfection of the prayers and not the prayers itself.

Generally speaking, all implicative denotations to single meanings and all figurative meanings refer to the denotation of necessitation.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

• Dalāla al-Ishāra (Denotation of Implicit Conveyance)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya and dalāla al-iqtiđā’) neither of the two following criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. What is denoted here is only an unclear implicature of the speech or an obvious implicature of the speech in the most general sense - no matter the object of denotation is understood from a single sentence or from a couple of sentences.

An instance of this is denotation of two Qur’ānic verses as to the minimum time of pregnancy: the verse 15 of the sūra 46 “And painfully she gave birth to him his bearing and his weaning being thirty months,” and the verse 233 of the sūra 2 “Mothers will suckle their children two complete years completely for such as desire to complete the suckling,” since to subtract two years, i.e., twenty four months, from thirty months is six and thereby it becomes clear that the minimum time for pregnancy is six months. It is also of this kind the question of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminary, since it is an obvious implicature of the obligation of the thing in the most general sense. That is why they consider obligation of the preliminary of a mandatory act a secondary and not a primary one; for it is not a denotation of the speech by intention and is only understood secondarily, i.e., by the denotation of implicit conveyance.

As for the authority of this denotation, it cannot betreated as an authoritative proof because of authority of appearances, for there is no appearance where it is assumed that such thing is not intended - it is obviously clear that denotation is subject to the intention. Therefore, implicit conveyanceshould only be called adumbration and implicit conveyance without using the term denotation; hence, it is clear that such conveyance is not included in the appearances so that it can be an authoritative proof from that aspect. Of course, it would definitely be an authoritative proof should there be an intellectual implication through which its requisites, whether judgment or otherwise, could be discovered, such as taking requisites of one’s confession into consideration even though he claims that he has not intended them or he denies existence of any implication there.

•al-Dalāla al-Siyāqiyya (Contextual Denotation)

There are some denotations that are included neither in mafhūm [q.v.] nor in manţūq [q.v.], such as the case where the speech denotes implicatively a single word or a single meaning not mentioned in the manţūq, or it denotes contents of asentence which is an implicature of manţūq but not obviously in the most particular sense. Thoseare all called neither mafhūm nor manţūq.

To address those denotations in a general way, a good number of Uşūlīs have called them contextual denotation (al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya) meaning that the context of a speech denotes a single or compound meaning, or an omitted word. Such denotationsare divided into the three following varieties: denotation of necessitation (al-iqtiđā’), hint (al-tanbīh), and implicit conveyance (al-ishāra) [qq.v.].

• Dalāla al-Tanbīh (Denotation of Hint)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), only one criterion, i.e., the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, is taken into consideration. Here, it is the context of the speech that causes certainty that a specific requisiteis meant or makes its non-consideration unlikely. This denotation has numerous instances the most important of whichbeing classified as follows:

1. The speaker whishes to depict something but expresses its logical or conventional requisite. For example, one addresses his friend saying, “It is ten o'clock” in order to remind him that the time they had agreed upon to go somewhere has come.

2. The speech is associated with someword which conveys that something is a cause, condition, impediment, or part of the judgment. To mention the judgment is thereby a hint that the thing mentioned is a cause, condition, impediment, part of the judgment or it is not so. For instance, if the jurist says, “Repeat your prayers,” where he is asked about the doubt concerning numbers of rak‘as of a two-rak‘a prayers , it is understood that the said doubt is a cause for annulment of the prayers and the obligation of repetition.

3. The speech is associated with someword which determines some objects of the act. For instance, when someone says, “I reached the river and drank,” it is understood that what was drunk was water and it was from the river.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

•al-Dalīl al-Faqāhatī → al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī

•al-Dalīl al-Idjtihādī → al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī

• Dalīl al-Insidād (Closure Proof)

The proof known as “the Closure Proof” consists of four preliminaries. Should those preliminaries be accurate, intellect would judge that the duty-bound should acton the basis of any conjecture with regard to precepts - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās [q.v.]).

Those four preliminariescan be summarized as follows:

1. The door of knowledge and knowledge-rooted is closed in the most part of juristic precepts in our time when it is later than our holyImāms’ .This is the fundamental base of this proof upon which all other preliminaries are dependent.

2. It is not allowed to leave obedience of actualprecepts which are known to us in summary fashion, nor is it permissible to reject them in the position of action. To leave and reject actual precepts can be actualized in two ways: either to treat ourselves as animals and children who have no burden, or to refer to the principle of “clearance” (→ aşāla al-barā’a) and that of “non-existence of burden” wherever obligation or unlawfulness of something is unknown. Annulment of those two assumptions is self-evidently clear; therefore, we must take into consideration all actualprecepts which are known in summary fashion.

3. To consider such precepts necessitates clarifying one's obligation, which, in turn, is restricted to one of the following four states: (3.1) to follow the one who believes in the openness of the door of knowledge, (3.2) to act on the basis of “precaution” in every problem, (3.3) to refer to the respective practical principle (the principle of clearance, that of precaution, etc.) in every problem as the circumstances necessitate, and (3.4) to refer to the conjecture where there is one, and to the practical principles where there is none.

Since referring to the first three states is not acceptable, we shouldtake the fourth into consideration . The first is not acceptable, for how can one who believes in the closure of the door of knowledge refer to whom he considers wrong and ignorant in his believing in the openness of that door? The second is not plausible, for it necessitates intolerable hardship, or even disorder of the society if all duty-bounds are burdened with - which are both rejected in the Islamic law. And the third is not acceptable, for the existence of knowledge of mandatory and prohibited affairs in all doubtful problems in summary fashion prevents us from referring to the practical principles even though in some of them.

4. Thus, the only acceptable state is the fourth, i.e., referring to the conjecture. Although conjecture has two sides, i.e., the preferable (al-rādjiĥ) and the chimerical (al-mardjūĥ=al-mawhūm), one is merely allowed to refer to the preferable side; for preferring the chimerical side is intellectually reprehensible. Therefore, one is supposed totake the conjecture into consideration - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās). In case of definite knowledge of non-authority of a conjecture, one should refer to practical principles, precisely as one is supposed to refer to them in doubtful problems with regard to which no conjecture exists. There is no problem with referring to practical principles in such cases, for the knowledge in summary fashion is reduced to the detailed knowledge (al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī) of precepts proved by some authority and primary doubt (al-shak al-badwī) with regard to other cases, in which one is supposed to refer to practical principles [qq.v.].

•al-Dalīl al-Lafżī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dalīl al-Lubbī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dawām (Permanence)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - whatis prohibited is the sheer nature of the act. However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the commandwill be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.

• Dawarān bain al-Aqall wa’l-Akthar→ al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

• Dawarān bain al-Mutabāyinayn → al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

•al-Đidd al-‘Āmm (General Opposite)

The dispute over the general opposite (i.e., eschewal and not doing which is non-existential → mas’ala al-đidd) is not over the necessity in principle, for Uşūlīs apparently agree about the necessity; they disagree only on its nature. They have declared various opinions in this connection. Some have said that the necessity is the sameness, i.e., to command something is the same with prohibitingits opposite. Some have said that since the command is composed of wish of something and prohibition of its eschewal, the prohibition of eschewal is analytical part of meaning of obligation. Some have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most particular sense; hence, the denotation is literal, but implicative. Others have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most general sense or an unclear necessitation; hence, the denotation is merely intellectual.

The justifiable opinion, however, is that there exists no necessity of any kind, i.e., there is no religious prohibition of eschewal necessitated by the very command in such a way that there exists a juristic prohibition beyond the very command to the act. The reason is that the obligation, whether it is denotation of the imperative or its intellectual implication - the latter being true - is not a composite concept; but rather it is a simple, singleone which is necessity of the act. A requisite of obligation of something, of course, is prohibition of its eschewal. However, that prohibition is not a juristic prohibition made by theLord as He is the Lord, but rather is an intellectual secondary prohibition without there being a prohibition from the divine lawgiver beyond the very obligation. The reason is obvious: the very command to do something in an obligatory mode is sufficient to prohibit its eschewal; so, there is no need for the divine lawgiver to prohibit eschewal of something in addition to commanding it.

•al-Đidd al-Khāşş (Particular Opposite)

To hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite (i.e., the existential, incompatible affair, such as eating with regard to prayers → mas’ala al-đidd) is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitation the prohibition of its general opposite (→ al-đidd al-‘āmm); and since there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is no juristic prohibition of the particular opposite either.

•al-Djam ‘ al-‘Urfī (Customary Gathering)

Bydjam‘ is meant taking two contradictory proofs altogether. It is an intellectual judgment that taking two seemingly contradictory proofs altogether is more plausible than leaving either of them. This judgment isdue to the fact that contradiction does not occur unless all constituents of authority exist in either of them as to both chain of transmission and denotation. In case of existence of all constituents of authority, i.e., existence of the origin, nothing may cause leaving the proof but existence of an impediment to the efficacy of the origin; and that impediment can be nothing but their mutual repudiation. On the other hand, possibility of gathering both proofs as to their denotations leaves no room for certainty of their mutual repudiation, which leads to lack of certainty as to the existence of impediment to the efficacy of authority with regard to the proof. Thus, how can one judge that one or both of those proofsis no longer authoritative proof?

However, itshould be noted that such judgment of the intellect is not absolute, but rather is conditional upon the gathering being “customary” or “acceptable,” in the sense that it should not be in a way that custom of people of the language does not confirm it on the one hand and no third proof supports it on the other. (See also: al-muradjdjiĥāt)

F

•al-Fawr (Promptitude)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness (al-tarākhī),both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation (→ al-amr) and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, itcould be performed either promptly or belatedly.

G

• Ghayr al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya (Dependent Intellectual Proofs)

Dependent intellectual proofs are those whose major premises are intellectual while their minor premises are juristic, such as “this act is juristically mandatory,” and “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its preliminary should juristically be mandatory (→ muqaddima al-wādjib),” or “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its opposite should juristically be forbidden (→ mas’ala al-đidd),” and so forth. As clearly seen, minor premises of such syllogisms are proved in the science of fiqh, so they are juristic, while their major premises are intellectual, i.e., it is the intellect’s judgment that there exists an intellectual implication between the precept in the first premise and another juristic precept. The consequence of such minor and major premises becomes a minor premise of a syllogism whose major premise is authority of intellect.

H

• Ĥadīth al-Raf‘ ( Removal)

This is the prophetic ĥadīth argued by uşūlīs for “the clearance from obligatory” (→ awhich declares: “Nine things are removed from my people: error, forgetfulness, what they have done under duress, what they do not know, what they cannot endure, what they have done under compulsion, to take as a bad omen, jealousy, to think of createdness [of the Almighty] so long as one has not uttered it.”

• Ĥāl al-Isnād →al-Mushtaqq

• Ĥāl al-Talabbus →al-Mushtaqq

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Mutasharri‘iyya (Muslims' Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Had such transfer happened after the holy Prophet's time, we would have Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]) according to which any such term found in the Quran and Sunna should be interpreted as its usual, and not juristic, meaning in the process of inferring juristic precepts. Seealso: al-ĥaqīqa al-shar‘iyya.

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya (Juristic-Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Now, the question is that whether such transfer has happened in the holy Prophet's time so that we may have the juristic-literal meaning or it has occurred after him and therefore what we have in hand is Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]).

The answer to that question would make a difference in the process of inferring juristic precepts from the Quran and Sunna. Should there exist the juristic-literal meaning, any such term without contextual evidencewould be predicated to its juristic meaning, while it must be interpreted as its usual meaning if such a juristic-literal meaning does not exist.

It is obviously clear that those new meanings were not made through convention by specification (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘yīnī), for in that case it should have been narrated to us in one way or another. As for the “convention by determination” (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘ayyunī), it must be said that it had doubtlessly happened in Imam Ali's time, for by that time all Muslims have been using such terms in their new juristic meanings for a long time. Hence, since in Shiite jurisprudence only such prophetic ĥadīths thatare narrated by holy Imāms are treated as valuable, all such terms in their words should be predicated to their new juristic meanings where they are void of any contextual evidence. As for the holy Quran, there is no room for such a dispute, since almost all such wordsare used in it along with contextual evidence and convey their new juristic meanings.

•al-Ĥudjdja (Authoritative Proof)

Ĥudjdja literarily means whatsoever capable ofbeing used as an argument against someone else through which one can overcome one’s opponent in a dispute. Overcoming someoneelse is either by making him silent and nullifying his argument, or by making him accept one’s argument - in this sense ĥudjdja being an excuser. In uşūl al-fiqh, however, ĥudjdja means that which proves its object but does not attain the level of certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., it does not cause certitude with regard to its object - since in case of certitude it is the certitude which is ĥudjdja, though in its literal meaning. In other words, ĥudjdja is whatsoever revealing and indicating something else in such a way that the former proves the latter -its proving being made by the lawgiver, duty-maker as it is the actuality. This proving will be sound only by adding theproof which proves validity and authority of that revealing and indicates the thing in the divine lawgiver’s view. Therefore, ĥudjdja in this sense does not include certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., certitude is not called ĥudjdja in this sense, but in the literal sense; for certitude is essentially a way and cannot be made an authoritative proof by anyone. Ĥudjdja in this sense is synonymous with amāra, proof (al-dalīl), and way (al-ţarīq). See also: al-ĥukm al-żāhirī

•al-Ĥudjdjiyya → al-Ĥudjdja

•al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī (Actual Precept)

A precept which is directed to something per se as it is an act - such as the prayers, since the obligation is directed to the prayers as it is prayers and an act per se without consideration of anything else - is called “the actual precept” (al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī) and the proof which proves it “the persuasive proof” (al-dalīl al-idjtihādī).

•al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī (Apparent Precept)

Where a precept is directed to something as its actual precept is unknown and there is no proof for supporting any of the existing opinions, the jurist doubts the primary, actual precept of the disputed matter; and since he is not supposed to remain perplexed practically, there must exist another precept, though intellectual, for him, such as obligation of precaution, clearance from obligation, or ignoring the doubt. Such a secondary precept is called “the apparent precept” (al-ĥukm al-żāhirī) and the proof which proves it “the juristic proof” (al-dalīl al-faqāhatī) or “the practical principle” (al-aşl al-‘amalī [q.v.]). Seealso: al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī.

•al-Ĥukūma (Sovereignty)

Ĥukūma is inclusion or exclusion of something in or from an object by a predicative sentence through expanding or limiting realm of the object or subject; such as “perform ablution for prayers,” and on the one hand: “circumambulation of Ka‘ba is prayers” leading to the conclusion that one should perform ablution while circumambulating in ĥadjdj, and on the other: “funeral prayers is not prayers,” leading to the conclusion that one is not supposed to perform ablution for funeral prayers. Thus, ĥukūma occurs where one of the two seemingly contradictory proofs is supposed tobe given priority over the other because of its sovereignty while both of them are still authoritative proofs, i.e., neither of them repudiates the other. Seealso: al-ta‘āruđ.

I

•al-‘Ibādī (Act of Worship)

‘Ibādī is an act whose religious acceptance is conditional upon the duty-bound’s intention of proximity to God, or that which is the sheer burden made by God for proximity to Him; such as prayers, fast, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like.

•al-Idjmā ‘ (Consensus)

Being defined as consensus of Muslim jurists, that of Muslim community, and so on,idjmā‘ is considered one of the three-fold or four-fold free-standing sources of religious precepts by Sunnī Uşūlīs and jurists. Shī‘a Uşūlīs and jurists, however, do not treat consensus as a free-standing source, but rather as a way through which Sunna can be revealed. Thus, authority and innocence are for words of the infallible-innocent personality, which may sometimes be revealed by theconsensus, and not for the consensus per se.That is why Shī‘a jurists sometimes treat unanimity of opinion of a few individuals whose unanimity is technically not called idjmā‘ as consensus, because of its definite revelation of opinions of the infallible-innocent personality on the one hand, and do not consider a consensus which does not reveal opinions of the infallible-innocent personality as idjmā‘ even though it is technically called so on the other.

Before any argumentation, one point should be noted: it is obviously clear that consensus of all people, or a specific people, as it is consensus has no implication to revealing divine precepts; for it is not of unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise which is an authoritative proof like the Book and Sunna. Unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise is in fact the very intellectual proof, as will be discussed later, and not the technical consensus. The reason why a consensus of people which is not included in the unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise cannot be considered a source for religious precepts is that such a consensus may be caused by people’s habits, beliefs, emotions, or sentiments which are of human characteristic and the divine lawgiver transcends them. Should consensus of people as it is consensus be an authoritative proof, consensus of other people who follow other religions should be an authoritative proof as well - something no Muslim believes in. Thus,some other proof must be presented by Sunnī jurists with regard to the authority of consensus .

As for Shiite perspective, consensus as it is consensus would have no value should it not reveal opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, and that is why it is not considered afree-standing source for religious precepts. In fact, authority is for the revealed, i.e., Sunna, and not for the revealer, i.e., consensus; and consensus precisely plays the role of massive report - with one difference: the latter reveals the very words of the infallible-

innocent personality (and that is why it is called lexical proof (al-dalīl al-lafżī)) while the former reveals the opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not his words (and that is why it is called thematic proof (al-dalīl al-lubbī) which conveys the theme and not the terms). Now that consensus is an authoritative proof because of revealing opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not per se, there is no need for unanimity of all; rather, that of those whose unanimity reveals words of the infallible-innocent personality would be sufficient, no matter how many they are - as explicitly asserted by some great Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs.

As for the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, theyare claimed to be up to twelve four of which being more considerable. However, since most of later Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs have raised doubts about them and followed some specific way called “the way of surmise (ţarīqa al-ĥads),” we will discuss this way only.According to the way of surmise, when one observes that all Shī‘a jurists have a consensus on a precept while they disagree too much on most of precepts, one will definitely become certain that their consensus is rooted in the holy Imām’s opinion and, being handed down from generation to generation, they have received it from their Imām - as is the case with consensus of followers of all other creeds and sects with regard to which no one doubts that the matter of consensus is taken from their leader. It should be emphasized that in the way of surmise, consensus of all jurists of all times, beginning from the era of holyImāms, must be actualized; for disagreement of one earlier generation, and even one single known outstanding jurist, prevents actualization of certitude in this connection.

All detailed discussions and arguments in Shiite uşūl al-fiqh on the authority of consensus as well as the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality deal with al-idjmā‘ al-muĥaşşal (the acquired consensus), i.e., a consensus which is acquired by a jurist who has searched all opinions of all jurists in person.It is this kind of consensus whose authority is a matter of dispute.

However, a case where a jurist has acquired a consensus and then has reported it to others (which is called al-idjmā‘ al -manqūl, i.e., the reported consensus), is also a matter of dispute and different opinions are presented in this connection.Some have considered the reported consensus an authoritative proof since it is a single report, some have treated it as not being an authoritative proof since it cannot be considered an instance of single report, some have considered it an authoritative proof where it reveals religious precepts in the view of the one who is reported to and not the reporter alone, and others have held some other different views in this regard. Detailed discussions on this problemshould be pursued in Shiite books of uşūl al-fiqh.

•Idjtimā‘ al -Amr wa’l Nahy (Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition)

Uşūlīs have disputed from a long time agowhether or not conjunction of command and prohibition in one act, i.e., a single act as it has one existence which is a gathering of two designations, is possible. By conjunctionis meant accidental encounter between the commanded act and the prohibited act in one thing. This may occur only where the command is directed to a designation and the prohibition to another designation which has no relation to the first, but those designations encounter rarely in one thing - here, conjunction of the command and the prohibition occurs, i.e., they encounter one another. Such conjunction of and encounter between two designations is of two kinds: case conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al -mawridī,) and real conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-ĥaqīqī).

Case conjunction occurs where there is no one act which corresponds to both designations, but rather there are two acts which have become synchronous and simultaneous one of which corresponding to the designation of the mandatory act and the other to the designation of the prohibited act. For instance, when someone is performing the prayers and in the meantime looking at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited , looking does not correspond to designation of the prayers, the prayers do not correspond to designation of looking, and both of them do not conform to one act. Such case conjunction is neither impossible nor a matter of dispute in this discussion. Hence, should one look at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited while performing one’s prayers, one would be both obedient and disobedient simultaneously without one’s prayers being annulled.

Real conjunction, even though at a glance and in a conventional view, occurs where there is oneact which corresponds to both designations, such as the well-known example of performing the prayers in an expropriated space. In that example which is the matter of dispute in this discussion, designation of the prayers, which is the commanded act, has no relation to that of expropriation, which is the prohibited act, but it accidentally happens that the duty-bound gathers them by performing the prayers in an expropriated space. Here, designation of the commanded, i.e., the prayers, encounters designation of the prohibited, i.e., expropriation, in that prayers performed in an expropriated space; hence, that single act corresponds to both designations of the prayers and expropriation. Thus, that single act is included in the commanded act from oneaspect which necessitates treating the duty-bound as obedient while it is included in the prohibition from another aspect which necessitates treating him as disobedient.

Now, the matter of dispute in this discussion becomes clear: Is it possible that the command should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and also the prohibition should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and the duty-bound should be considered both obedient and disobedient in one act, or is it not possible and the gathering of the two designations is either commanded only or prohibited only, i.e., either only the command remains actual and the duty-bound is obedient alone or only the prohibition remains actual and he is disobedient alone? Both of these opinionsare held by Uşūlīs each presenting their own proofs in order to establish their claims.

A very important point to be borne in mind is that the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs over possibility or otherwise of conjunction of the command and the prohibition concerns where the duty-bound has a way out (al-mandūĥa), i.e., he is able to obey the command in another case other than the gathering; or, in other words, he has encountered the conjunction deliberately because of misuse of his free will. It is such case that is a matter of disagreement among Uşūlīs: some believe in its possibility and others in its impossibility.

Nevertheless, there is no dispute among Uşūlīs over the impossibility of conjunction where obedience to the command can be actualized exclusively through the gathering and the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction; for it is clear that in case of exclusion, the actuality of two duties becomes impossible, since obedience of both is impossible: if the duty-bound does the commanded act he has disobeyed the prohibition, and if he eschews it he has disobeyed the command. Therefore, all Uşūlīs agree that conjunction of the command and the prohibition in such case is impossible and either the command or the prohibition isactual . However, there is disagreement among Uşūlīs as to which of them is so.

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Ĥaqīqī →Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Mawridī → Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy