2: SUNNAH AND HADITH
I: SOMETHING MORE ABOUT THE SUNNAH
In the preceding chapter we had tried to underline the fact that the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet was an ideal which the early generations of Muslims sought to approximate by interpreting his example in terms of the new materials at their disposal and the new needs and that this continuous and progressive interpretation was also called "Sunnah", even if it varied according to different regions. This point is so fundamentally important for grasping the true nature of the early development of Islam and appears - after the full development of the Science of Hadith - so new and, indeed, revolutionary, that it is worth our while devoting a little more attention to it in the light of further historical evidence before passing on to our treatment of Hadith.
Abu Yusuf, in his al-Radd 'ala Siyar al Awza'i, states the view of Abu Hanifah that if a person in a non-Muslim territory becomes a Muslim, leaves his home and joins the Muslims, then in case this territory falls to Muslim arms; the property of this person will not be simply returned to him but will be included in the mal al-ghanimah. The Syrian al-Awza'i rejects Abu Hanifah's view, arguing that the Prophet, at the fall of Mecca, had returned the properties of men who had left Mecca, and had joined the Muslims in al-Madinah. According to Abu Yusuf, al-Awza'i said, "The person most worthy of being followed and whose Sunnah is most deserving of being adhered to is the Prophet." Abu Yusuf, defending Abu Hanifah, says that the practice of Muslims has been on Abu Hanifah's side and that the Prophet's treatment of the Meccans was an exception: "Sohas
been the Sunnah and the practice of Islam [although] the Prophet did not do so [at Mecca]." Abu Yusuf then points out that the "Prophet's Sunnah" with the tribe of Hawazin, had been still different. After their defeat, the Banu Hawazin came and implored the Prophet for mercy and release of their captives and return of their property. The Prophet gave up his own share of the booty and was followed by others except some clans who refused to give up their share. The Prophet then compensated these clans and all the property and slaves of the Banu Hawazin were returned.
The first point to be noticed in the above account is al-Awzai’s statement: "The personwhose
Sunnah is most deserving of being followed is the Prophet." It obviously implies(i) that Sunnah or authoritative precedent can be set by any competent person, and (ii) that the Sunnah of the Prophet overarches all such precedents
and has priority over them. But the second, equally important, point is the use of the term "Sunnah" by Abu Yusuf in the above account. Abu Yusuf first distinguishes between the Sunnah with regard to the point under discussion, i.e., the practice accepted by the Muslims on the one hand, and the Prophet's special action in the case of the fall of Mecca on the other. This action of the Prophet is regarded as an exception by Abu Yusuf and, therefore, does not constitute Sunnah for him; for al-Awza'i, on the other hand, it does not constitute Sunnah. Thus, we see how through different interpretations, contrary conclusions are arrived at by these two legists. But also of great interest for us is the use of the term "Sunnah" by Abu Yusuf in his second statement where he speaks of the "Sunnah of the Prophet" with regard to the Banu Hawazin. This case too Abu Yusuf regards as some kind of exception to theSunnah ;
but the exception to the Sunnah is also termed "Sunnah". The most obvious inference from this must be that when the situation so demands, the exception to the rule must be applied as a rule. What a contrast this freedom of interpretation of the Prophetic Sunnah - in order to formulate the concrete Sunnah in sense (ii), i.e. the actual practice of that Community - presents to the rigid and inflexible doctrine of Sunnah inculcated by later legists. Here a freely flowing situational treatment of the Prophetic activity, there a once-and-for-all positing of immobile rules; here a ceaseless search for what the Prophet intended to achieve, there a rigid system, definite and defined, cast like a hard shell.
Abu Hanifah considers undesirable the selling and buying of slaves captured in the enemy territory before they are brought to the land of the Muslims. On these al-Awza’i comments, "The Muslims have always been buying and selling war-captives in the Dar al-Harb.
No two (Muslims) have ever disagreed upon this point until the murder of (the Caliph) al-Walid." Abu Yusuf comments, "Judgment regarding what is lawful and what is unlawful cannot be based upon such statements as 'People have always been practicing such and such. For, much of what people have always been practicing is unlawful and should not be practiced the basis (of judgment) should be the Sunnah of the Prophet, or of the early generations (salaf), i.e. the Companions of the Prophet and men who have an understanding of the law."
Again, criticizing the Sunnah-concept of the Hijazi lawyers, Abu Yusuf writes, "The lawyers of Hijaz give a decision and when they are asked for the authority they reply, 'This is the established Sunnah'. In all probability, this Sunnah is (the result of) some decision given by a market tax-collector (amil al-suq) or a tax-collector in an outlying district."
Certain points clearly emerge from these discussions and arguments and counterarguments. First, the Sunnah-concept as used by early lawyers, including al-Awza'i, although it ideally goes back undoubtedly to the Prophetic Model, is nevertheless, in its actual materieux, inclusive of the practice of the Community. Indeed, al-Awza'i constantly speaks of the 'practice of the Muslims’, 'of the political (and military) leaders of the Muslims (.a'immat aUMuslimin) and 'of the consonance of the learned' as synonymous terms just as Malik talks of the practice of al-Madinah. It is absolutely clear that we are here face to face with the living practice of the early generations of the Muslims. It is also quite obvious that this Sunnah which we called "Sunnah" in sense (ii) in the previous chapter and which may be called the "living Sunnah" is identical with the Ijma of the Community and includes the ijtihad of the 'ulama' and of the political authorities in their day-to-day administration.
The second important point that emerges from this picture is that although the "living Sunnah" is still an on-going process - thanks to Ijtihad and Ijma' - there is at the same time noticeable, by the middle of the second century, a development in the theoretical framework of the Fiqh, a development which is clearly visible in the statements of Abu Yusuf and which began to become conscious first in Iraq. This development reflects a critical attitude towards the living Sunnah and contends that not any and every decision by a judge or a political leader may be regarded as part of the Sunnah and that only those well versed in law and possessed of a high degree of intelligence may be allowed to extend the living Sunnah. The idea of the living Sunnah is certainly not denied but a firm and sure methodology is sought to base this living Sunnah upon it,
II: EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE HADlTH
That Hadith from the Prophet must have existed from the very beginning of Islam is a fact which may not reasonably be doubted. Indeed, during the life-time of the Prophet, it was perfectly natural for Muslims to talk about what the Prophet did or said, especially in a public capacity. The Arabs, who memorized and handed down poetry of their poets, sayings of their soothsayers and statements of their judges and tribal leaders, cannot be expected to fail to notice and narrate the deeds and sayings of one whom they acknowledged as the Prophet of God.
Rejection of this natural phenomenon is tantamount to a grave irrationality, a sin against history. Their new Sunnah - the Sunnah of the Prophet - was much too important (an importance so emphatically enshrined in the Qur'an itself) to be either ignored or neglected, as we sought to establish in the previous chapter.
This fact juts out like a restive rock in the religious history of Islam, reducing any religious or historical attempt to deny it to a ridiculous frivolity: the Sunnah of the Community is based upon, and has its source in, the Sunnah of the Prophet.
But the Hadith, in the Prophet's own time, was largely an informal affair, for the only need for which it would be used was the guidance in the actual practice of the Muslims and this need was fulfilled by the Prophet himself. After his death, the Hadith seems to have attained a semi-formal status for it was natural for the emerging generation to enquire about the Prophet. There is no evidence, however, that the Hadith was compiled in any form even at this stage. The reason, again, seems to be this, viz., that whatever Hadith existed - as the carrier of the Prophetic Sunnah - existed for practical purposes, i.e., as something which could generate and be elaborated into the practice of the Community. For this reason, it was interpreted by the rules and the judges freely according to the situation at hand and something was produced in course of time which we have described as the "living Sunnah". But when, by the third and fourth quarters of the first century, the living Sunnah had expanded vastly in different regions of the Muslim Empire through this process of interpretation in the interests of actual practice, and difference in law and legal practice widened, the Hadith began to develop into a formal discipline.
It appears that the activity of the Hadith transmitters was largely independent of, and, in cases, developed even in opposition to, the practice of the lawyers and judges. Whereas the lawyers based their legal work on the living Sunnah and interpreted their materials freely through their personal judgment in order to elaborate law, the Hadith transmitters saw their task as consisting of reporting, with the purpose of promoting legibility and permanence. Although the exact relationship between the lawyers and the transmitters of the Hadith in the earliest period is obscure for lack of sufficient materials this much seems certain that these two represented in general the two terms of a tension between legal growth and legal permanence: the one interested in creating legal materials, the other seeking a neat methodology or a framework that would endow the legal materials with stability and consistency. It is also quite certain that in the early stages the majority of the Hadith did not go back to the Prophet, due to the natural paucity of the Prophetic Hadith, but to later generations. Certainly, in the extant works of the second century, most of the legal and even moral traditions are not from the Prophet but are traced back to the Companions, the "Successors" and to the third generation. But as time went on, the Hadith movement, as though through an inner necessity imposed by its very purpose, tended to project the Hadith backwards to its most natural anchoring point, the person of the Prophet. The early legal schools, whose basis was the living and expanding Sunnah rather than a body of fixed opinion attributed to the Prophet, naturally resisted this development. We have briefly outlined the role of al-Shafi in this process in the previous chapter. Al-Shafi constantly accuses the lawyers of "not transmitting the Hadith" and of not making use in law, "of the little (Hadith} you transmit".
such criticisms are made by al-Shafi especially against the Hijazis but are equally turned against the Iranians.
By the middle of the second century, the Hadith movement had become fairly advanced and although most Hadith was still attributed to persons other than the Prophet - the Companions and especially the generations after the Companions - nevertheless a part of legal opinion and dogmatic views of the early Muslims had begun to be projected back to the Prophet. We shall produce detailed evidence for this statement presently. But still, the Hadith was interpreted and treated with great freedom. In the last chapter we adduced evidence from Malik who often upholds the practice of al-Madinah against the Hadith and often bases his interpretations on his own opinion (ra'y). In the first section of this chapter we have seen how situationally Abu Yusuf interprets the Hadith produced by al-Awzai’i as an argument. Abu Yusuf's works are full of instances of this kind. We have also seen above how Abu Yusuf regards the expert lawyers as elaborators of the Prophetic Sunnah and creators of the living Sunnah. He rejects "lonely" Hadith by which he does not mean, as was done later, a Hadith which has only one chain of narrators but a Hadith which stands alone as a kind of exception to the general Sunnah. For instance, Abu Hanifah holds that a person who provides two horses for the Jihad is entitled to draw booty share for only one. Al-Awza'i, on the other hand, allows both horses to claim shares and bases himself both on Hadith and practice, saying, "This is a Hadith well known to scholars and on which the political leaders have acted."
Presumably, this was the administrative practice in Syria. Abu Yusuf comments, "No tradition has come down to us from the Prophet or anyone of his Companions about allowing shares to both horses except one. But one Hadith we regard as being solitary and do not consider valid. As for al-Awzai’s statement that, this has been the practice of the political leaders and the view of scholars, this is just like the people of Hijaz who keep asserting 'This is the established Sunnah'. This cannot be accepted as authoritative from ignorant people. Which political leader has practiced it, and which scholar has acceptedit ?
"
In the same work, Abu Yusuf issues a general warning against uncritical acceptance of Hadith: "Hadith multiplies so much so that some Hadiths which are traced back through chains of transmission (yukharraju) are not well known to legal experts, nor do they conform to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Beware of solitary Hadiths and keep close to the 'collective spirit (al-jama'ah)' of Hadith."
He adds: "Therefore, make the Qur'an and the well-known Sunnah your guide and follow it."
Thus, Abu Yusuf establishes as the criterion of the "collective nature or spirit" of Hadith the well-known Sunnah. (The term "collectivity" or "collective nature" is highly significant and we shall show in Section IV of this chapter that it is intimately connected with the term "Sunnah" and is then used to designate the majority or the "collectivity" of Muslims - the Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah.) Abu Yusuf also quotes several Hadiths from the Prophet himself and from his Companions warning against Hadith and even in rejection of it.
This
anti-Hadith Hadith must be, strictly historically speaking, a result of the phenomenon of Hadith itself which is the logical condition for its emergence. But it is, indeed, highly probable that the anti-Hadith Hadith is prior to pro-Hadith Hadith. This lies in the very nature of the Hadith process. Besides, whereas we find the former in Abu Yusuf, the latter does not seem to occur until later, and even al-Shafi'i, the great protagonist of Hadith, produces two or three Hadiths only (which we shall discuss later) and bases his arguments for the acceptance of Hadith, for the most part, on other materials - Qur'anic and historical. But although Abu Yusuf quotes several Hadiths from the Prophet about the forgery of Hadith, he still does not know the famous Hadith which later found a prominent place in the Sihah works and which says, "He who deliberately reports lies about me shall prepare his seat in the Fire." This Hadith was sought to be countered by another one which makes the Prophet Say, "Whatever there be of good saying, you can take me to have said it."
Nevertheless, despite Abu Yusuf's cautions against the "multiplication of Hadith," a good deal of Hadith had been, by his time, obviously projected back. For example, in his Kitab al-Athar a tradition is attributed once to 'A'ishah, wife of the Prophet, and again to the Companion, Ibn Mas'ud saying,(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Evil [or trouble (al-bala)] is a concomitant of dialectical theology (al-kalam)."
. Another Hadith attributes a deterministic doctrine of dogmatic theology to the Prophet himself. The Companion, Suraqah b. Malik, asks the Prophet:
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"Tell us about this Faith of ours as though we were created for it [right] on the hour: are we Working for something which has been already determined by Divine Decree and the Pen has become dry over it, or shall we work for something [of] which [the issue] shall be decided in the future?" The Prophet answered, "Rather for something which has been decided by the Divine Decree and over which the Pen has run dry." "What is, then, our action about? O Prophet of God!" asked Suraqah, and the Prophet replied, "Work on for every person that has been made easy what he has been created for." The Prophet then recited the words of the Qur'an, "As for him who gives generously, fears (God) and approves of good things, we make good easy for him."
We shall explain in Section IV, while discussing the emergence of the Muslim orthodoxy, the nature and the role of the freewill-determinism controversy of which such Hadith as the one quoted here is a result. The verse of the Qur'an quoted in this Hadith is in un-concealed contradiction with the determinism preached in the Hadith.
There is also a definite, though rudimentary, form of eschatological Hadith implying the Second Advent of Jesus, although it is attributed not to the Prophet but to 'Abd al-A'la described either as a qadi as a story- teller (qass) - the latter being most probably correct. An instance of the political Hadith is the following: A man came to 'Ali and said:
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"I have never seen anyone better than you." 'Ali asked, "Did you see the Prophet?" The man replied "No". "Did you see Abu Bakr and 'Umar?" enquired 'Ali and received a negative reply. "If you had told me that you had seen the Prophet," exclaimed 'Ali, "I would have executed you; and if you had said that you had known Abu Bakr and 'Umar, I would have administered dire punishment to you."
A moral legal Hadith runs as follows:
The Prophet said to AbuDharr :
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"O AbuDharr !
Public office (al-imrah or al-imarah) is a trust which on the Day of Judgment shall turn into disgrace and repentance except for those who acquire such office properly and then fulil the obligation (that it lays upon them)." Abu Yusuf's fellow-legist, Muhammad al-Shaybani, says after narrating the same Hadith that the Prophet added, "And how can he possibly do that? O AbuDharr !"
III: THE HADITH MOVEMENT
The Hadith materials continued to increase during the second century and the period represented above constitutes a transition period in the development of both the literature and the status of the Prophetic Hadith.Al-Awza'i regards the Hadith of the Prophet as being endowed with fundamental obligatoriness but the Sunnah or living practice is of the same status with him. His appeals to the practice of the Community or its leaders are, to judge from the extant materials the most regular feature of his legal argumentation. Malik adduces Hadith (not necessarily Prophetic Hadith) to vindicate the Medinese Sunnah but regards the Sunnah in terms of actual importance, as being superior to the Hadith. As for Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani, very few of whose legal Hadiths go back to the Prophet at all, they interpret the Hadith with a freedom whose instances we have seen above. The Iraqi school recognizes the supreme importance of the Prophetic Hadith but the Hadith, according to it, must be situationally interpreted in order that law may be deduced from it. There is only one point in his al-Radd 'ala Siyar al-Awzai on which Abu Yusuf has recanted from Abu Hanifah's position to that of al-Awza'i on the basis of Hadith although he could have easily interpreted that Hadith if he had wished to. The point under discussion is the share of booty to be allotted to a Muslim for his horse for taking part in Jihad apart from his own share. It seems that a horse's share was double the share of a human being and the practice probably originated with the Prophet who wanted to encourage the breeding of horses for war in view of the paucity of riding animals suitable for war in early Islam. Indeed, there is evidence that the Prophet was anxious over this matter in the early stages of the Muslims' struggle against the pagan Arabs. Abu Hanifah thought it improper that an animal should be treated preferentially in relation to a man,
and he had also a precedent of 'Umar who approved of a booty distribution in Syria where one share was given to each man and also one share for every horse.
We do not know what the practice at that time was and it is very likely that the practice differed in different regions. It is obvious that the chief determinant in this issue should be the relative scarcity or otherwise of the horses, the type of horse, the cost involved in maintaining a war-horse, etc. But al-Awza'i states categorically that not only had the Prophet given to a horse twice the share of a soldier but that the "Muslims follow this until today". Abu Yusuf, who otherwise liberally interprets the Prophetic and other precedents throughout, gives up his master's view on the ground that al-Awzai's position is supported by a tradition from the Prophet and from other Companions.18
This case is obviously a clear indication of the increasing power of the Hadith over against the living Sunnah whose very life-blood was free and progressive interpretation. It was against this background that al-Shafi'i, the "Champion of Hadith," carried out his successful campaign to substitute the Hadith for the living Sunnah as briefly described in the previous chapter. We shall illustrate al Shafi’s attitude to the Hadith and free interpretation by two examples which shall indicate the nature of the change and the power of the new trend that had set in the legal thought of Islam. There was a difference of opinion among the jurists about the extent of the sternness of policy towards a non-Muslim people in state of war. Abu Hanifah advocated a consistently stern policy on general grounds of strategy: such questions are con- sidered as to whether enemy livestock and trees should be destroyed ; whether anything should be exported to the enemy territory, especially goods of a strategic character ; whether the enemy, in case they shield themselves, say, with Muslim children, should be shot at ; whether war captives should be allowed to be redeemed by the enemy or not ; whether Muslim soldiers who find themselves without weapons during a battle may take such weapons from the public reserves (without permission, apparently).
On all these matters Abu Hanifah recommends alternatives conducive to a successful issue in favors of Muslims and making for Muslim strength. The net result is an uncompromisingly stern policy. The only guiding principles of Abu Hanifah seem to be those based on pure war strategy. On the first of the above-mentioned questions, where Abu Hanifah seeks to support himself by a Qur'anic verse, al-Awza'i who opposes Abu Hanifah on all these points, adduces no Prophetic Hadith but relies on injunctions reported to have been given by Abu Bakr to the troops, viz., that they should not destroy trees or animals. Abu Yusuf, who takes the side of his master on all these issues and taunts al-Awza'i more than once with ignoring the interests of the Muslims,
controverts the story of Abu Bakr's instructions and seeks to support his view from the incident of the Muslim treatment of Banu Qurayzah.
Al-Shafi'i is questioned on the same point
by a Medinese who says that according to his school enemy property should be spared from destruction and refers to the above-mentioned injunctions of Abu Bakr. Al-Shafi'i declares himself unequivocally in favor of destroying the enemy property, to the exclusion of the animals. He bases himself on the historical Hadith that the Prophet carried out wholesale destruction when the Muslims attacked Banu Nadir, Khyber and al-Ta'if and asserts that this is the Sunnah of the Prophet.
Now, the fact is that with regard to the Jews of Banu Nadir and Khyber, the Prophet had taken specially stern measures and historical facts render the conclusion inescapable that the past behavior of the Jews was responsible for this. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Prophet wanted to drive the Jews out of Arabia. (This was later categorically stated in Hadith form which is, however, historically u acceptable for banishing of Jews is attributed by Hadith to 'Umar also.) As for al-Ta’if, it was the last post of resistance of the pagan Arabs and was stubbornly holding out even after the fall of Mecca. This is the reason why the Prophet tookspecially
strong measures against it and is even said to have bombarded it with a catapult. It is highly illuminating to see that while Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi'i hold the same position, they do so for very different reasons. Whereas Abu Hanifah's real grounds are commonsense war strategy for which he seeks support in the Qur'an, al-Shafi'i bases himself on literal Hadith reports without taking the situational context into account. For al-Awza'i, like the Medinese, the practice of the Muslims is authoritatively indicative of the Prophetic Sunnah and they adduce no arguments from the Prophet’s campaigns against the Banu Nadir, Banu Qurayzah, Khaybar or al-Ta'if. On the question of killing the animals, however, al-Shafi'i takes up a position similar to that of al-Awza’i but again for very different reasons. Whereas the latter appeals to Abu Bakr's instructions, al-Shafi'i has come to base himself on a Hadith generally forbidding the killing of animals except for food - a Hadith which, it is note worthy, was not known to al-Awza'i or to Abu Yusuf.
A second instance of this new trend represented by al-Shafi may be seen in the case of the institution of the waliy or guardian in marriage. The institution of the waliy must have been older than Islam and there are also reports from the Prophet and others about its importance. According to one report, a guardian is necessary only for a first marriage and a remarrying woman can dispense with it, while according to another no marriage is valid without a waliy. 'Umar is said to have forbidden women from marrying without the permission of their guardian, or an elder statesman of their family or the state. A Medinese tells al-Shafi'i that he and his colleagues uphold the waliy institution for noble-born women but do not regard it necessary in the case of low-born ones. The idea behind this attitude seems to be that the waliy endows the marriage with a formal dignity which is not thought necessary in the case of a low-born woman. Al-Shafi'i says to him, "What would you think if someone were to tell you that he will not permit the marriage of a low-born woman without a guardian for she is more liable to enter into a spurious marriage and to fall into evil than a noble-born one who has a sense of honors of her noble origin . Would such a person not be nearer the truth than you? Your opinion is too erroneous to need any more refutation than just to be stated."
Al-Shafi'i maintains that the Hadith must be accepted, no distinctions made and no questionsraised
about it. It will be seen that al-Shafi''s interpretation of the waliy institution is not so much in terms of dignity and honors but in those of protecting the woman from evil and a public guarantee of genuine marriage. But although al-Shaf'i has correctly analyzed the value ('illat al-hukm), he, in fact, warns against this kind of rational activity and recommends a literal acceptance of Hadith.
The Hadith movement, which represents the new change in the religious structure of Islam as a discipline and whose milestone is al-Shafi's activity in law and legal Hadith, demanded by its very nature that Hadith should expand and that ever new Hadith should continue to come into existence in new situations to face novel problems social, moral, religious, etc. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this chapter to treat, in an exhaustive manner, all the fields wherein and points of view wherefrom ever new Hadith came into being but the following shall serve as illustrations of both the nature and the scope of Hadith formation. It is well known and admitted by the classical traditions themselves that moral maxims and edifying statements and aphorisms may be attributed to the Prophet irrespective of whether this attribution is strictly historical or not. It was legal and dogmatic Hadith, i.e. that concerning belief and practice which must, "strictly speaking," belong to the Prophet. First, it may, of course, be doubted once the principle of non-historicity is introduced at some level, whether this principle can stand confined to that level. If one thinks that a certain maxim contains a moral truth and may, therefore, be attributed to the Prophet, why should not a legal dictum which, according to someone, embodies a moral value - for law is nothing but a particular embodiment of moral principles - likewise be attributed to the Prophet? The majority of the contents of the Hadith corpus is, in fact, nothing but the Sunnah-Ijtihad of the first generations of Muslims, an ijtihad which had its source in individual opinion but which in course of time and after tremendous struggles and conflicts against heresies and extreme sectarian opinion received the sanction of Ijma, i.e. the adherence of the majority of the Community. In other words, the earlier living Sunnah was reflected in the mirror of the Hadith with the necessary addition of chains of narrators. There is, however, one major difference: whereas Sunnah was largely and primarily a practical phenomenon, geared as it was to behavioral norms, Hadith became the vehicle not only of legal norms but of religious beliefs and principles as well. We present here some examples.
We have noticed above the warnings against Hadith by Abu Yusuf. Some of these warnings are attributed to the Prophet himself and we have already remarked that it is highly probable that anti-Hadlth traditions originated before the pro-Hadlth traditions. The earliest extant account supporting Hadith by a Hadith is that of al-Shafi'i. He quotes the following tradition:
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"The Prophet said, 'May God make that man prosperous who hears my words, preserves them carefully in memory and then transmits them. For, there is many a bearer of wisdom who cannot understand it himself (but can only transmit it). And many a transmitter of wisdom transmits it to someone who can understand it better. There are three things with regard to which the heart of a Muslim is never stingy:
working sincerely for God, active good-will for the Muslims and adhering to their majority for their mission (da’wah) will render them secure'."
Another tradition quoted by him repeatedly is that the Prophet said:
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"Let me not find anyone of you reclining on his seat and, when a command comes from me commanding something, or forbidding something, saying, 'I do not know (this); I follow that which I find in the Book of God'."
Lastly, there is the tradition according to which the Prophet said:
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"There is no harm in relating traditions from the Banu Isra'il; and relate traditions (also) from me but do not attribute traditions to me falsely."
The first of the above-mentioned three Hadlth is also adduced by al-Shafi'i as an argument for Ijma which we shall discuss below. Here we begin by enunciating a general principle, viz. that a Hadith.which
involves a prediction, directly or indirectly, cannot, on strict historical grounds, be accepted as genuinely emanating from the Prophet and must be referred to the relevant period of later history. We do not reject all predictions but only those which are fairly specific. This principle has been accepted by most classical traditions themselves but has never been applied by them with the full rigour of strict historicity.
While they reject absolutely specific predictions, viz. those which claim to indicate a specific day or date or place, they swallow without qualms predictions about the rise of Muslim theological and political groups and parties. We Muslims must decide whether, in face of strict historical evidence, we can accept and go on accepting predictive Hadith and, if so, how far. There is a type of prediction contained, e.g. in the Qur'anic verse about the relative war-fortunes of the Persians and the Romans:
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This kind of prediction is absolutely rational for while even ordinary human wisdom, with an insight into history, can successfully predict on such points as wars, economic slumps, etc., how much more infallibly can the Divine Wisdom. But I shall show that the predictions which the Hadith involves directly or indirectly are not of this type. Indeed, I shall also show in the next section that the basic function of Hadith was not so much history-writing but history- making andthat contemporary phenomena
were projected back in the form of Hadith in order to succeed in moulding the Community on a certain spiritual, political and social pattern. We must emphasize again that it is not against the predictive quality of the Prophet, arising out of an insight into the workings of historic forces that we argue. On the contrary, we believe that the very greatness of the Prophet lies in the fact that, having a unique insight into the forces of history, he pressed them into the service of a divinely inspired moral pattern. But there is a world of difference between this historic judgment and sooth-saying about, e.g. the false Prophet Musaylimah and the rise of the Mu'tazilah, Khawarij, Shi'ah, etc.
By predictive Hadith we do not mean only such Hadith as has the predictive form but also that which involves a prediction. For example, the Hadith -
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"The Qadaris (i.e. those who uphold the freedom of the human will) are the Magians of this Community," although not directly predictive, involves a prediction.
For, it presupposes a technical consciousness of the philosophical problem of freedom such as could develop only with the rise of dogmatic schisms. Now, in the light of our principle, all the three Hadiths cited above from al-Shafi'i supporting the phenomenonof ,
Hadith itself are, historically speaking, extremely dubious. Take the first one. Besides, the obvious fact that for the Prophet to say what the first part of this Hadith attributes to him is to insult his own Companions by calling them unintelligent, the Hadith could only arise at a time when the legal acumen of the Muslims flared up and brilliant schools of legal opinion developed all over the then Muslim world from Iraq to Egypt. Further, it conjures up a picture of the Prophet and his Companions which is entirely artificial: the Prophet is portrayed as making speeches and issuing statements, not for the immediate needs of the contemporary Community but for the Community to preserve them word for word, for transmission to later generations who should understand them better! Nor will the second Hadith bear examination: it presupposes an acceptance of the Qur'an and a wholesale rejection of the Sunnah, a complete divorce of the latter from the former which, as we pointed out also in the last chapter, cannot be rationally and legitimately attributed to the Companions. How could the Companions, who accepted even the Word of God on the authority of the Prophet, reject that very authority of the Prophet as a whole (as distinguished from murmurs in certain quarters about a particular decision of the Prophet) ?
For the Hadith in question envisages a total rejection of the Sunnah in favor of the Qur'an. It obviously arose in a later situation when the Hadith movement had set in and claimed to be the unique vehicle (at the expense of the living Sunnah) of expressing the PropheticSunnah ;
and its credentials to do so were questioned both by the Ahl al-Kalam and the earlier schools of law. Thus, this Hadith turns out to be blatantly predictive. As for al-Shafi's third Hadith which says, "There is no harm in relating traditions from the BanaIsra'il ;
and relate traditions (also) from me but do not attribute to me traditions falsely," its case is no better. With certain alterations, this Hadith has also survived in al-Bukhari's Sahih. But it is a historical fact that Judeo-Christian religious lore had begun to find its way into Islam at a very early date chiefly through the activity of popular preachers (qussas) who wanted to make their sermons as effective as possible. This movement was criticized by certain early traditions and sayings. There is, for example, a tradition that 'Umar once advocated the acceptance of certain Jewish traditions but was sternly forbidden by the Prophet to do so.
There is also a saying admonishing the Muslims to seek knowledge "not from popular preachers but from the fuqaha.
These endeavors to stem the tide of what came to be called "Isralllyyat" were then sought to be countered by such Hadiths as the present one.So much for the Hadith basis of Hadith.
Let us now turn to Ijma.
Al-Shafi'i has two Hadiths to quote to establish the validity of Ijma. His predecessors, of course, had the idea of Ijma but it seems to have been a natural growth. Even Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani who talk of sticking to the traditions and opinions of al-jamaah and al-ammah, do not bring in any Hadith, i.e. a verbal report from the Prophet to support Ijma'. One Hadith of al-Shafi'i in this connection is identical with the first Hadith quoted above of which the first part we have already discussed concerning Hadith. The second part says:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"There are three things with regard to which the heart of a Muslim is never stingy: sincere, action for God's sake, active good-will for the Muslims and sticking to the majority of the Muslims - for their mission will safeguard them." Al-Shafi'i's second Hadithruns :
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Umar gave a sermon in al-Jabiyah (a place in Syia) in which he said: ' The Prophet (once) stood among us as I now stand among you and declared, Honour my Companions first, then those who follow them and then those who follow these latter. Then (i.e. after these three generations) falsehood will become rampant so that a person will swear without being asked to swear and shall offer to give evidence without being asked to do so. Listen! Whosoever wants to be pleased with a spacious residence in Paradise, should (under these circumstances) stick to the majority of the Community. Satan is the companion of the isolated person; if one person (is joined by another and) Become two, Satan recedes from themproportionately.' ..
."
.
The fact that earlier jurists, although insisting on Ijma', do not support it by any Hadith is itself a fundamentally significant comment on the evolution of the Hadith movement. Indeed, how much the situation had changed in this regard by the time of al-Shafi'i can be tellingly illustrated by one example. Abu Yusuf, while warning against the flood of Hadith, says that the Prophet once said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Hadith in my name will spread; so what comes to you in my name and agrees with the Qur'an, take it as coming from me while what comes to you in my name but is in conflict with the Qur'an cannot be from me."
As we pointed out earlier in this section, this type of atiti-Hadlth Hadith cannot be regarded as genuine. It represents, rather, a genuine effort not only on the part of the Mu'tazillah but on that of orthodox jurists to curb the Hadith movement. But the Hadith movement had become so strong cnly a few decades later that this particular Hadith, regarded by Abu Yusuf as apparently genuine, was rejected by al-Shafi'i as absolutely unreliable.
But what about the two Hadiths quoted by al- Shafi'i to give a theoretical basis for Ijma’? The first of these two Hadiths we have already found reason to declare unhistorical. Further, we shall show that it is part of a massive campaign carried out from the second century onwards to preserve the unitary fabric of the Community and to crystallize a middle-of-the-road orthodox majority, i.e. a majority which by being both a majority and middle-of-the-road would be deserving of the designation "orthodoxy". As for the second Hadith quoted by al-Shafi, it is so manifestly predictive that this hardly needs to be pointed out. This Hadith gives the first formal hint that the first three generations - the Companions, their Successors and the Successors of the Successors - are to be regarded as the Fathers of the Islamic doctrine and practice and their teachings as the permanent basis for the religious structure of the Community. It is a point of great importance and interest to note that it is after approximately these three generations that the "living Sunnah" of these very generations starts getting canonized in the form of the Hadith, Al-Shafi, immediately before quoting the Hadith on Ijma', while defending Ijma', also states :
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"We know (i.e. it is our conviction) that the majority (‘ammah) of them (i.e. Muslims) will not, God willing, agree on an error." After al-Shafi, when Hadith multiplies still further, this statement becomes a Hadith and is attributed to the Prophet in the Sahih of al-Tirmidii by the change of the word "khata' " into "dalalah"
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
and
in the later centuries becomes very famous. Other formulations of this idea also come into existence such as the Hadith, "God's hand is on the majority (al-jama'ah)"
. But, as we said just now, the Ijma'-Hadih is a part of a campaign to crystallize a middle-of-the-road orthodoxy, to the consideration of which we must now turn.
IV: THE HADlTH AND THE ORTHODOX
(al-Sunnah
wa'l-Jama'ah)
A very important feature of the religious history of Islam, neglect or underestimation of which must result in a total misunderstanding of that history, is the fact that from the very moment that political, theological and legal differences threatened the integrity of the Community, the idea to preserve its unity asserted itself. The doctrine that this unity will be some kind of a synthesis or the via media (al-Sunnah)
is
a necessary corollary of the same idea. Hence, the terms "al-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah", as a single phrase, are not merely juxtaposed but are held to be correlates. Indeed, the most basic function of the Muslim 'orthodoxy’ has been, since the very inception of the idea, not to dictate or define religious truth but to consolidate and formulate it ; neither to be an intermediary between God and man nor to be a warring group among groups but to stabilize and keep balance. The agents in this great drama of producing the structure of the orthodoxy are precisely the Ahl al-Hadith.
The political wars, and, in their wake, theological and dogmatic controversies, gave rise to aspecially
prominent type of predictive Hadith known as the 'Hadith about civil wars' (Hadith al-Fitan). Its clear purpose was to steer a middle course especially between the Khariji and Shi'i political and theological extremes. To justify Hadith about civil wars, certain over-arching Hadiths were circulated such as the following from the Companion Hudhayfah who said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"The Prophet once stood among us (to address us) in such a manner that he left nothing (important) that was to happen until the Hour of Judgment but that his address comprehended it. Those who remember it, remember it and there are those who have forgotten it..
There are certain things in this address which I have forgotten but when I am confronted with them I remember them just as a person (vaguely)
remembers
the face of an absent person but when he sees him again he recognizes him." This Hadith is quoted by both al-Bukhari and Muslim.
According to AbuDawud,
Hudhayfah said that the Prophet had identiied every leader of a political dissension who had three hundred or more followers, by his name, his father's name and tribe:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
A typical Fitnah Hadith is the following one from Muslim and al-Bukhari allegedly reported, again, byHudhaayfah :
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"People used to ask the Prophet about good while I used to ask him about evil out of fear lest it should overtake me. So I said, 'O Prophet of God I we have been previously in ignorance and evil and then God brought us this good (through you); will there be evil again after the present good?' 'Yes', said the Prophet. 'And will good return once again after that evil?' I asked. The Prophet said, 'Yes, but there/will be a mixture of corruption in it.' 'What will be its corruption?' I asked. The Prophet replied, 'Some people shall follow other than my Sunnah and shall lead people not whither I lead. Some of their deeds will be good, others bad.' I asked, ‘Will
there be, after this (mixed) good, again evil?' He said, yes, propagandists standing at the gates of Hell; whoever listens to them, they will throw him into it.' 'Describe them for us, O Prophet of God!' I requested. The Prophet said, ‘they are from our own race, speaking the very same tongue.' 'What is your command for me in case I find myself in such a situation?' I asked. The Prophet said, ‘Stick to the majority party of the Muslims and to their political leader.' 'But if they have neither majority party nor a political leader' I enquired. The Prophet replied, 'Then forsake all the factions, even if you have to cling to the root of a tree until death overtakes you in this condition. According to another version in the Sahih} of Muslim the Prophet said, "After me shall come political leaders who will not be guided by my guidance and will not follow my Sunnah, and among them shall arise people whose hearts shall be the hearts of devils in the physical frames of humans." Hudhayfah says he asked, 'What shall I do, O Prophet of God!if
I find myself in such a situation?' Thereupon the Prophet answered, 'Listen and obey the political leader.
And should he even strike your back and wrest your property, you should but listen and obey'."
Neither of these two Hadiths is, of course, accept- able as a genuine Prophetic saying any more than the preceding Hadith (which is designed to be a sheet- Anchor for all predictive Hadith). What they jointly teach is to keep with the majority of the Muslims and obey the political leadership at any cost - except possibly infidelity. Thus, we see that the Ijma- Hadtth is grounded in a dire political necessity. And the dictum that one should obey even an unjust ruler is a counsel of wisdom dictated also by political needs arising out of incessant civil wars; it hearkens especially to those incurable professional rebels, the Kharijites. And a peculiarly anti-KJjariji Hadith is the following which, over against Khariji rebellionism, teaches absolute passivity and isolationism, viz. that the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"There shall be civil wars wherein a sit-at-home will be better than a standing person; and a standing person shall be better than one who walks ; and one who walks will be better than one who runs . "
This Hadith does nothing but to seek to counteract Khariji-activism and zest for political life. In fact, sometimes the isolationist Hadith has gone so far as to annul the Ijma' doctrine and to teach crass individualism. Thus the Prophet is reported to have advised 'Abd Allah b. 'Amr b. al-'As :
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Stick to your home and control your tongue ; take what you recognize as good and leave what you cannot recognize as good ; and mind your own business and have nothing to do with the afairs of the public."
It is noteworthy that the word which we have rendered as "public" is al-'ammah which in early literature is an equivalent of al-jama'ah as we shall presently explain.
Not, however, all Sunni Hadith is anti-Kijarijite.
There is, for example, a Hadith quoted by Ibn Hanbal, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah in which a political doctrine has been incorporated which is originally unmistakably Khariji. According to this Hadith, the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"My (last) advice to you is to fear God and to render absolute obedience (to the political leader) even if he be a black slave. Those of you who survive me shall see great differences (among Muslims) ;
so stick to my Sunnah and that of the rightly-guided and Divinely-led Caliphs."
In this Hadith, the element of absolute obedience is anti-Kharijite but the extension of rulership to a "black slave" is so unmistakably Khariji that it hits the eye. For the Sunnis had upheld that "rulers are from the Quraysh," while the Shi'ah had demanded that rulership must belong to a descendant of the House of 'Ali. The Kharijites alone had extended the privilege of possible political leadership of the Community to every Muslim - "even though hebe
a black slave," the only condition being a man's fitness for the office. This phenomenon, viz. that the Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jamaah have included in their doctrine certain elements from the right and certain others from the left wing, is not confined to this Hadith alone which has been given here only for illustration. This policy of synthesis and mediation is, indeed, of the essence of the Ahl al-Sunnah.
But the idea of the "middle-path-majority", although certainly in its earliest phase born of political necessity, was bound to be applied in a theological-legal sense also as the political factions tended to create for themselves a theological-moral-legal basis. We have pointed, in the last article, to Abu Hanifah's description of himself as one of "Ahl al-'adl wa'l-Sunnah" (i.e. people of balance and the middle path) in the context of a theological controversy. [In this connection one should also recall such terms as "al-jama'ah min al-Hadlth" (i.e. the Hadith recognized by the majority or the collective nature of Hadith) and "al-Sunnah al-ma'rufah" used frequently by Abu Yusuf to Distinguish these from the "peripheral" and "obscure" Opinion.] This controversy, indeed, was the most acute, not only because it was the first general moral-theological controversy in Islam but also because due to its very nature, it threatened the fabric of the Muslim Community most seriously. This controversy was precisely this: What is the definition of a mu’min or a Muslim and can a man continue to be regarded as a Muslim even if he commits a grave moralerror ?
The Kharijites not only declared such a person as a kafir but they attributed kufr also to those who did not declare such a person as a kafir, and further declared the necessity of Jihad against them. Against this alarming challenge the need was felt of a catholic definition of Islam which should be acceptable to the majority". Would not such a definition necessarily be middle-of-the-road - and therefore, correct? The first reaction to the Khariji uncompromising fanaticism was Murji'ism, i.e. the doctrine - most probably favored by the Umayyad state - that a person who professes to be a Muslim should not be declared non-Muslim because of his deeds, and that the state of his inner spirit must be left to God for final judgment. Of course, if the Community was to survive at all some such definition was necessary and a modified Murji'ism - through making some sort of a distinction between Islam and Iman - came, in course of time, to constitute an essential factor of orthodoxy, i.e.The
beliefs of the majoity of the Community. The following famous Hadith is a typical Murji'ite Hadith and is to be found in both al-Bukhari and Muslim. The Companion, Abu Dharr, relates that the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
“There is none who confesses that 'there is no god but God' but that he shall enter Paradise." Abu Dharr asked, "Even though he should commit adultery and theft?" "Even though he should commit adultery and theft", replied the Prophet. Abu Dharr repeated the question three times and got the same answer from the Prophet who added with his third affirmation, "Though Abu Dharr's nose should be in the dust" - i.e. despite the wishes of Abu Dharr. We are told that whenever Abu Dharr related this Hadith, he repeated the phrase (proudly), "Though Abu Dharr's nose should be in the dust."
The same Hadith is related by Abu Yusuf in his Kitab al-Athar, the difference being that here it is not from Abu Dharr but from another Companion, Abu'l-Darda'; and Abu Yusuf adds that Abu'l-Darda' used to relate this Hadith every Friday by the pulpit of the Prophet.
In order partially to redress the moral shock which a sensitive person may experience at being told that people may continue to be good Muslims "even though they should commit adultery and theft," a more compromising and reined view was put forward in a Hadith recorded by Abu Dawud and al-Tirmidhi, viz. that the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"When a person commits adultery, Faith goes out of him and remains above his head like a canopy; but when he passes out of this (state of sinful) act, Faith returns to him."
As a result of this painstaking and heart-searching Hadith activity amidst an atmosphere of interminable conflict, the Muslim orthodoxy - the Ahl al-Sunnah (i.e. the majority of the Community) finally formulated - at the hands of al-Ash'ari and alMaturidi and their successors - a catholic definition of Islam which silenced Kharijism and Mu'tazilism and saved the Community from suicide.
The same overall picture emerges when we turn to the problem of the freedom of the human will versus Divine determinism - the second big rock (which directly grew out of the first, viz. the relationship of Faith to behavior and the definition of a Muslim) that shook the Community during the second and third centuries. But whereas the first challenge came from the Khawarji, the second came from the Mu'tazilah whoare
, in a sense, the theological inheritors of the Khawarij. The two questions are also allied. For, if a man is free to will and (presumably)
to
act according to his will, then his actions are a direct index of the state of his inner Faith, and he is responsible for both his willing and acting. But if so, then the original controversy as to who is a Muslim and who is not will be opened again. In other words, Mu'tazilism is bound to resurrect Kharijism. Besides, the Mu'tazilah rationalism appeared to the religious minded to be a form of gross humanism, an imposition upon God of what a certain number of men regard as truth and justice. Because probably of both these dangers, a vast amount of Hadith came to be circulated emphasizing Divine determinism at different levels - of intention, motivation and act. We have noted above in Section II of this chapter a relatively early form of this deterministic Hadith. But in course of time the Hadith on this point multiplied. The Prophet is, for instance, reported to have said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Believers in freedom of the human will are the Magians of this Community. Do not visit them when they fall sick; do not attend their funerals when they die."
This Hadith, besides advocating an extreme stand of a total boycott of the Mu'tazilah, involves a series of technical steps in a sophisticated philosophic reasoning such as cannot be attributed to early seventh century Arabia. The suppressed argument is on the following lines. God is Omnipotent. But if there is an omnipotent being, no other being can even be potent, let alone omnipotent. But man, in order to have freedom of will and action, must be potent. Therefore, the admission of human freedom is the admission of two ultimate potencies - God and man, since, if we regard human potency as not being ultimate but only derivative from God, then freedom of the will becomes illusory. In history, Zoroastrianism has admitted two ultimate potencies - Yazdin and Ahriman. Belief in freedom of the human will is, therefore, a form of Zoroastrianism. According to another Hadith, the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Do not have social intercourse with the believers in the freedom of the will, nor take your cases to them for decision."
A Hadith contained in Muslim and al-Bukhari reports from the Prophet:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"It is pre-written for the son of Adam as to the exact amount of adultery he should commit. Now, the adultery of the eye is a (lustful) look, the adultery of the tongue is talk; the soul wishes and desires while the sexual organ (only) confirms or belies."
ANumber
of Hadiths state categorically and graphically how God, when He created all the souls in Eternity, destined some to Paradise, others to Hell, and some adding, "I do not care!"
The Prophet, in a Hadith to be found in al-Bukhari and Muslim, says:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"(When the embryo is four months old), God sends an angel with four Decrees which he writes down, viz. its actions, life-span, sustenance and whether it is blissful or damned I swear by Him other than Whom there is no God, one of you continues to perform Paradise-winning acts until, when between him and Paradise, there is but a yard, Fate overtakes him and he performs actions deserving of Fire and thus enters Fire... "
But again, not all Hadith are deterministic in the sense of utter predestination and there are Sunni Hadiths - although fewer in number - which handle the matter quite differently. There is, e.g. the famous Hadith, recorded both by al-Bukhari and Muslim, according to which the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Every child is born in a natural state (i.e. a good state), but then its parents make either a Jew or a Christian or a Magian of it . "
And in a Hadith contained in al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah and Ahmad ibn Hanbal the Prophet was asked by a Companion,(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Do you think that amulets and medicines we use and precautionary measures (against illness, etc.) we take gainsay the Divine determinism?" The Prophet replied "(No), they are themselves a part of Divine determinism."
to this category of Hadith also belongs the report that when 'Umar once ordered that the Muslim army be removed from a place struck with plague, someone objected to his order saying,(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Do you flee from the Decree of God?" Whereupon 'Umar is said to have replied,(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"I flee from the Decree of God to the Decree of God." Despite this second type of Hadith, however, which was to keep balance with the deterministic Hadith, the latter exercised a preponderating effect on the Sunni orthodoxy as distinguished from the Shi'ah (who, in this respect, continued the Mu'tazilah tradition). Later a number of influential voices arose within Sunni Islam against the preponderance of determinism, and especially of the Sufic interpretation of it, among the most eminent of these are Ibn Taymiyyah and Shaykh. Ahmad Sirhindi.
The same endeavour of the Ahl al-Sunnah to steer a "middle path" and keep excessive trends in check is visible in the phenomenon of the pro- and anti-Sufi Hadith. This is not the place to go into details of the origins of Sufism, but without denying that (as in every society) there must have been among the Companions those in whose temperament puritanical and devotional trends were stronger than purely activist traits, it must be admitted that Sufism, as it developed from the second and, especially, third centuries, has little justification in the pristine practice, of the Community. Its original impetuses came from politico-civil wars on the one hand and from the development of the law on the other. Its earliest manifestations are excessive individualist isolationism and ultra-puritanical asceticism. We have noted above the extreme isolationist Hadith in connection with internecine wars. But this type of Hadith expresses not only a political attitude but also a definite spiritual character. Further, according to a Hadith in al-Bukhari, Kitab al- Jihad, the Prophet is represented as recommending that one should go "into a mountain cavity (shi'b), and leave people alone".
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
That this Hadith should occur in the Sahih of alBukhari in the very chapter devoted to Jihad is a remarkable evidence both of the growing power of the Sufi movement and the catholic spirit of the Ahl al-Sunnah. But there are also equally powerful and extremely interesting counter-Hadiths. The Hadiths strongly recommending the earning of livelihood (against the extreme interpretation of the Sufi concept of Tawakkul) and condemning uncompromising indulgence in devotional piety are too well known to be documented in detail.
A pointed Hadith in this connection declares Jihad to be the Islamic equivalent of monasticism:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
But the most remarkable Hadith of this type is the one according to which the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Dear to me among (the things of) this world are women and scent; but my (true) enjoyment is in Prayers."
Each of these three individual elements of this Hadith undoubtedly represents the Sunnah of the Prophet. But the way the enjoyment of this world has been combined with prayers in one breath and the mechanical juxtaposition of values of utterly different genre cannot but be an artificial construction quite unattributable to the. Prophet indeed, it is certain that the Hadith must have been directed against a target, and this target cannot be anything else but a sufistic form of uninterested spirituality.
In the developments outlined in the previous and the present sections we have deliberately chosen examples from what may be said to constitute the;
"Fundamental Hadith, i.e. Hadith which elucidates fundamental developments in the religious history of Islam in its classical, formative period and throws the formation of the orthodoxy (Sunnism) into bold relief.
We have left out on purpose the development of the specifically legal Hadith - although, of course, a concept like that of Ijma' is directly relevant as part of the framework of Muslim law also - because the specifically legal Hadith does not so elucidate the crystallization of the orthodoxy as does the Fundamental Hadith. But otherwise the legal Hadith shares the character of the "Fundamental Hadith" and exhibits the same development in that legalHadith,
reflects the "living Sunnah" of the early generations of the Muslims and not merely the Prophetic Sunnah in a specific and literal sense. Whether the literal Prophetic Sunnah, in its entirety, can be disentangled from the "living Sunnah" reflected in the Hadith is extremely doubtful, if not impossible, although certain fundamental traits can be definitely delineated if a serious and systematic academic effort is made. And, surely, considerations of pure scholarship apart, Muslims areIslamically
duty-bound to make such an effort and to trace the different stages through which legal Hadith passed subsequently, point by point.
Take, e.g. the question of Riba in Hadith. (We are not discussing the question of interest in Islam as such but illustrating the problem of legal Hadith.) There are two things which the Qur'an makes clear about the Ribainstitution :
(i) that it was a system whereby the substantive sum or commodity was multiplied "several-fold" (Qur'an, 3:130), and, therefore, (ii) that it was opposed to fair commerce, even though those who indulged in Riba tied to maintain that it was a form of commercial transaction (Qur'an, 2:275 ff.). The only description or definition of Riba that the historical Hadith gives is what corroborates the Qur'anic statements, viz. that the debtor, after the expiry, of the fixed term of the debt, was asked either to pay up or to increase the capital.
there is no other shred of historical evidence. But the purely legal Hadith subsequently multiplies and most certainly reflects the living Sunnah of the early period for its formulation is based on legal practice and opinion. That there has been a development on the matter is clearly demonstrable. For one thing, there is a "blanket" Hadith attributed to 'Umar saying that the Prophet did not explain what comes under Riba and, therefore, in the spirit of caution one ought to enlarge the coverage of Riba prohibition as much as possible.
But despite the continuous attempt at systematization of legal thought on the matter, not only is this development fairly visible in the Hadith, .but there still remained blatant contradictions, e.g. on the question as to whether selling of animals on the basis of interest in kind is allowed or not - each view is supported by Hadiths.
The oft-quoted Hadith that commodities covered by Riba must be exchanged "in equal amount and con-presently" is obviously contradicted by an equally famous Hadith that Riba is only on deferred payment and has no relevance to conpresent exchange.
This state of affairs apparently reflects two schools of legal opinion on the matter. The tendency has undoubtedly been towards greater strictness and rigidity, and later, indeed, not only interest but even the acceptance of a present by the creditor from the debtor is forbidden by Hadith,
We move far, indeed, from the Qur'anic background and a general principle is put forward in the form of a Hadith which states, "Every advantage that may accrue from the credit is interest".
Even the exchange of manufactured gold and silver for an increased quantity of the same raw materials - an increase justified and, indeed, necessitated by workmanship and labor comes to be forbidden.
V: SUNNAH AND HADITH
We have, in the foregoing, analyzed "adjectively" and, in the eyes of those with strong traditionalist attitudes and sensibilities, ruthlessly (and perhaps also unfairly) some of the main lines of Hadith. But we must be clear as to what exactlyall this
amount to. It is absolutely imperative to be exactly clear about the real issues at stake particularly because there are strong trends in our society which in the name of what they call "progressivism" wish to brush aside the Hadith and the Prophetic Sunnah. In their anxiety to "clear the way", they resort to methods much more questionable than Nero's method of rebuilding Rome. Not only are the trends in question lacking in the foresight, they exhibit a singular lack of clarity of issues and a dismal ignorance of the evolution of Hadith itself. Without any grounding either in scholarship or in insight, they sometimes tell us that the Hadith is unhistorical and therefore unreliable as a guide to the Prophetic Sunnah. At other times we are naively told that Hadith may be history but it has no Shari'ah normativeness, i.e. even if Hadith is genuine, it contains no Sunnah for us. "Progress" we all want, not despite Islam, nor besides Islam but because of Islam for we all believe that Islam, as it was launched as a movement on earth in the seventh century Arabia, represented pure progress - moral and material. But we can neither share nor forgive "confusionism" and obscurantism. What shall we progress from and what shall we progress with, and, indeed, whereto shall we progress? An answer to these questions demands a sober and constructive recourse to our history. What is the real relationship between Sunnah andHadith ?
Go to the contemporary crusading and verbose disquisitions on Hadith for an answer to this crucial question and search in vain for an answer. It may be remarked here that there was no group in classical Islam - be it the Khawarij or the Mu'tazilah - who ever denied the validity of the Sunnah
and that what they objected to was the formulation of the Sunnah in Hadith terms.
We may further point to the pathetic irony that very often the anti-Hadlth argument (which is also assumed to be anti-Sunnah) is based on subjectively and naively selected Hadith to the effect that the Prophet or 'Umar or someone else from the earliest authorities had forbidden or discouraged the transmission of Hadith from the Prophet. Besides the intrinsic irrationality of this point of view, this anti- Hadith Hadith turns out, on closer histoical examination, to be itself a direct product of the Hadith movement. And if all Hadith is given up, what remains but a yawning chasm of fourteen centuries between us and theProphet ?
And in the vacuity of this chasm not only must the Qur'an slip from our fingers under our subjective whims - for the only thing that anchors it is the Prophetic activity itself - but even the very existence and integrity of the Qur'an and, indeed, the existence of the Prophet himself become an unwarranted myth.
We shall now endeavour to show that technical Hadith, as distinguished from the historical and biographical Hadith, although it is by and large not historical, must nevertheless be considered as normative in a basic sense and we shall try to indicate by illustration what this basic sense is. These are the points we wish to make in this connection:
(1) That the technical Hadith is by and large not
historical
in its actual formulations is shown
by
the various examples dealt with in the
preceding
pages. It may be said that we
have
, after all, given a few examples from a
vast
literature and that our conclusion is too
sweeping
. Now the first thing to be remem bered in this connection is that the examples
we
have adduced are what we have called
"Fundamental Hadith", i-e.
Hadith concerned
with
the Islamic Methodology itself. If the
Hadith about the fundamental principles of
Ijma' and Hadith themselves proves
unhistorical
, the prima facie case for the
Historicity of most other Hadith is
demolished
, It must be noticed that we are
saying
"most other Hadith" and not "all other Hadith."
But this difference between "most" and "all" - with the notable exception of Hadith about the Fara'id - is all but theoretical and is, at present at least, neither locatable nordefinable :
the credentials of each Hadith must be separately examined on histoical grounds. The second objection against us must be that we have not taken the Isnad - the guaranteeing chain of transmission - into account. Now, we do not underrate the importance of Isnad. Quite apart from the fact that Isnad gave rise to a vast and genuine biographical information literature - a unique Islamic achievement - , it has' certainly contributed to minimizing Hadith forgery. Indeed, a vast number of forged Hadiths have been eliminated by the untiring activity of our traditions on the basis of Isnad. But although Isnad is important in a negative manner, it cannot constitute a positive final argument. For although a person 'A' who is generally considered reliable may be shown to have actually met another generally reliable person 'B (which point is itself hard to establish), this constitutes no proof that a particular Hadith in question was transmitted by 'B' to 'A'. But the most fatal objection to considering Isnad the positive final argument is that Isnad itself is a relatively late development originating around the turn of the first century.
The professedly predictive Hadiths about political troubles in al-Bukhari and Muslim have excellent Isnads and yet we cannot accept them if we are historically honest.
(2) But the most fundamental objection to our thesis of non-historicity of Hadith will not be scientific but religious, viz., that
Hadith will thus turn out to be a gigantic conspiracy. The question, however, is whether the Ahl al-Hadlth themselves regarded their activity as strictly historical. We recall here the Hadith already quoted above, viz. that the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Whatever of good saying there be, I can be taken to have said it." It is idle to say that this refers only to moral Hadith, for political and legal Hadith has obvious moral implications. Even the famous Hadith according to which the Prophet said:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Whoever tells a deliberate lie about me, should prepare a seat in Hell," was later modified to read, "Whoever tells a deliberate lie . in order to lead people astray. ..
" On this basis then a general principle was formulated that "Hadith arousing pious feelings is not to be rejected." This principle is attributed by al-Nawawi [see his commentary on the Sahih of Muslim, Karachi (n.d.),vol
. I, p. 8] to the Karramiyah and he complains that many ignorant people and preachers have followed it. Even the famousHadith
according to which Hadith which is in consonance with the Qur'an is to be accepted, does anything but argue for his toxicity. It must, therefore, be concluded that Hadith represents the interpreted spirit of the Prophetic teaching - it represents the "living Sunnah".
(3) But if the Hadith is not strictly historical, it is quite obvious that it is not divorced from the Prophet's Sunnah, either. Indeed, there is an intimate and in eliminable connection between the Hadith and the Prophet's Sunnah. We recall what we established in the first chapter, viz. that the earliest generations of Muslims - judges, lawyers, theoreticians and politicians - had elaborated and interpreted the Prophetic Model (Sunnah)
in
the interests of the needs of the Muslims and the resultant product in each generation was the Sunnah in sense (ii), i.e. the living Sunnah. Now, the Hadith is nothing but a 1 reflection in a verbal mode of this living Sunnah. The Prophet's Sunnah is, therefore, in the Hadith just as it existed in the living Sunnah. But the living Sunnah contained not only the general Prophetic Model but also regionally standardized interpretations of that Model - thanks to the ceaseless activity of personal Ijtihad and Ijma'. That is why innumerable differences existed in the living Sunnah. But this is exactly true of Hadith also. This is because Hadith reflects the living Sunnah. Indeed, a striking feature of Hadith is its diversity and the fact that almost on all points it reflects different points of view. This point, while it shows the lack of strict historicity of Hadith, just like the earlier living Sunnah, has been the most potent factor of catholicity in the hands of the Ahl al-Sunnah, i.e. the Majority of the Muslims. For the Ahl al-Sunnah, through Hadith, tied - largely successfully - to steer a middle course and produce a middle-of-the-road synthesis. The main relevant difference between the living Sunnah of the early generations and Hadith formulation is that whereas the former was a living and on-going process, the latter is formal and has sought to confer absolute permanence on the living Sunnah synthesis of roughly the first three centuries. This, no doubt, was the need of the hour, for an on-going process without some formalization threatens, at some point of time or another, to break the continuity of the process itself by destroying its identity. But what resulted from Hadith eventually was not some formalization but a total oxidation. The present need undoubtedly is to re-loosen this formalism and to resume the threads from the point where the living Sunnah had voluntarily emptied itself into the Hadith dam. But it is at precisely this juncture that a voice whispers (besides much other wild- advice), "Hadith and/or Sunnah are incurable reactionarism; leave them roundly if you want to progress". Is this the voice of hope at despair? The application of the principle in the following illustration will tell.
(4) We have said repeatedly - perhaps to the annoyance of some readers - that Hadith, although it has as its ultimate basis the Prophetic Model, represents the workings of the early generations on that model. Hadith, in fact, is the sum total of aphorisms formulated and put out by Muslims themselves, ostensibly about the Prophet although not without an ultimate historical touch with the Prophet. Its very aphoristic character shows that it is not historical. It is rather a gigantic and monumental commentary on the Prophet by the early Community. Therefore, though based on the Prophet, it also constitutes an epitome of wisdom of classical Muslims.
Now, if we listen to the voice referred to above, we get alarming results. We have shown above that the Hadith about Ijma', for example, is historically unacceptable. If we follow the voice, we should reject the doctrine of Ijma'. But, can we? At this stage, however, the voice might say that Ijma' can be grounded in the Qur'an for the Book of God says:
(Arabic sentence is here please see pdf for the Arabic sentence)
"Cling together to the rope of God and do not disperse" (Qur'an, 3:103). But although this is a Command for unity, it is not exactly Ijma', for Ijma' is "unanimously arriving at a decision". If this verse had meant Ijma', al-Shafi and others would long ago have advanced it as an argument on the point. But let us suppose the Qur'anic verse does mean Ijma'. Even then the nature of Ijma' remains unspecified. Is it something statistical or qualitative? i.e., is Ijma' total or does it leave room for difference of opinion? Now, we find a good deal of Hadith which encourages the expression of a dissenting voice, and such Hadith appears in various direct and indirect forms. This shows that one Ijma' may be changed by a subsequent Ijma' and further that Ijma' is a matter of practice and not that of pure theory involving truth values. An Ijma' can be right or wrong, or partly right and partly wrong, rather than true or false. The Community, indeed, cannot take itself for granted claiming theoretical infallibility. It must always aspire both to understand and to do the right.
The character of Hadith is, therefore, essentially synthetic. Further, when we test the Ijma'-Hadlth on what is historically known about the Prophet, we find that the former develops out of the Prophetic Sunnah, for the Prophet not only made every effort to keep the Community together, he both encouraged and elicited a unity of thought and purpose. The Qur'anic term "shura" refers to this activity. And this catholic and synthetic character of Hadith is not confined to this one point - it runs through almost the entire gamut of moral, social, legal and political doctrines. We have brought out this synthetic character of Hadith while discussing the formulation and expression of the Orthodoxy in the last section.
It must, of course, be emphatically pointed out that a revaluation of different elements in Hadith and their thorough reinterpretation under the changed moral and social conditions of today must be carried out. This can be done only by a historical study of the Hadith - by reducing it to the "living Sunnah" and by clearly distinguishing from the situational background the real value embodied in it. We shall find thereby that some of the major emphases of our traditional Orthodoxy will have to be modified and re-stated. Take, e.g. the case of determinism and free-will. At the time of the early Umayyad who advocated pure determinism, free-will had to be emphasized and this is precisely what Hasan al-Basri and the early Mu'tazilah did. But when the Mu'tazilah humanism seemed to run riot and threatened the very bases of religion, Ahmad b. Hanbal and his colleagues accentuated the Will and Power of God over against the Mu'tazilah rationalism. But this doctrine of Divine Power and determinism subsequent became, and remains to this day, the hallmark of Orthodoxy. This has surely outrun its original function and has been in fact very injurious to the moral and social life of the Community especially through its wilder interpretations by later philosophers and Sufis. The preponderant deterministic traditions in the works of Hadith must, therefore, be interpreted in their correct historical perspective and their true functional significance in historical context clearly brought out. The same principle of interpretation must be applied to other spiritual and social problems such as the age-old tension between the Shariah and claims of Sufi adepts.
On the very same principle of situational interpretation, by resurrecting the real moral value from the situationalbackground,
must be handled the problem of legal Hadith. We must view the legal Hadith as a problem to be re-treated and not as a ready-made law to be directly applied. This is certainly a delicate question and must be handled wisely and cautiously, but handled it must be.Recall, e.g., the question of Interest.
The Qur'an, as stated above, brings out the real reason behind the prohibition of Riba saying that it cannot come under the definition of a commercial transaction because it is a process whereby the capital is unjustly increased manifold. The historical Hadith confirms this by informing us that this was, in fact, the practice of the pre-Islamic Arabs. But we have seen the moral strictness by which legal opinion brought various activities under the definition of Riba by formulating a. general principle that every loan which brings any advantage to the creditor is Riba. In the same breath we are told that Riba applies exclusively to the articles of food, gold and silver and beyond these it has no application.
This obviously implies that, say, a certain quantity of cotton may be loaned on the stipulation that six months hence it must be returned with any amount of increase the creditor wishes to impose at the time of stipulation.
This, of course, contradicts the general principle quoted just now. This whole development shows that it is a progressive moral interpretation of the Qur'anic prohibition sought to be rigidly formalized. We have certainly no reason to accept this specific moral-legal interpretation in all situations and under all conditions. Further, that the bank interest of today is legitimately covered by the definition of commerce is difficult to deny. It is for the economists and the monetary technicians to say whether interestless banking can function in today's world or not. If it works, it is all to the good. But if it does not, then to insist that today's commercial banking - with an Overall controlled economy - comes under the Qur'anic prohibition and is banned by the Prophetic Sunnah is not so much historical or religious honesty but an acute crisis of human confidence and uncompromising cynicism. The Qur'an and the Sunnah were given for intelligent moral understanding and implementation, not for rigid formalism.
On some such line of re-treatment, we can reduce the Hadith to Sunnah - what it was in the beginning - and by situational interpretation can resurrect the norms which we can then apply to our situation today. It will have been noticed that although we do not accept Hadith in general as strictly historical, we have not used the terms "forgery" or "concoction" with reference to it but have employed the term "formulation". This is because although Hadith, verbally speaking, does not go hack to the Prophet, its spirit certainly does, and Hadith is largely the situational interpretation and, formulation of this Prophetic Model or-spirit. This term "forgery" and its equivalents would, therefore, be false when used about the nature of Hadith and the term "formulation" would be literally true. We cannot call Hadith a forgery because it reflects the living Sunnah and the living Sunnah was not a forgery but a progressive interpretation and formulation of the Prophetic Sunnah. What we want now to do is to recast the Hadith into living Sunnah terms by historical interpretation so that we may be able to derive norms from it for ourselves through an adequate ethical theory and its legal re-embodiment.
One anxiety will trouble many conscientious Muslims. It is that it is found impossible to locate and define the historically and specificallyProphetic
content of the Sunnah, then the connection between the Prophet and the Community would become elusive and the concept "Prophetic Sunnah" would be irrevocably liquidated. But this worry is not real. To begin with, there are a number of things which are undeniable historical contents of the Prophetic Sunnah. Prayer, zakat, fasting, pilgrimage, etc. with their detailed manner of application, are so Prophetic that only a dishonest or an insane person would deny this. Indeed, the historical Hadith, i.e., the biography of the Prophet, is, in its main points, absolutely clear and would serve as the chief anchoring point of the technical Hadith itself when the latter is interpreted. Indeed, the overall character not only of the Prophet but of the early Community is indubitably fixed and, in its essential features, is not at all open to question - even though there may be questions about the historical details. It is against this background of what is surely known of the Prophet and the early Community (besides the Qur'an) that we can interpret Hadith. The purely prophetic elements in technical Hadith may be hard to trace, it may even be impossible to recover the entirety of them without a shadow of doubt, but a certain amount will undoubtedly be retrieved. But our argument does involve a reversal of the traditional picture on one salient point in that we are putting more reliance on pure history than Hadith and are seeking to judge the latter partly in the light of the former (partly because there is also the Qur'an) whereas the traditional picture is the other way round. But the traditional picture is already biased in favors of technicalHadith ;
there is no intrinsic evidence for this claim and much intrinsic evidence that we have adduced is against it.
The alleged criticism of Muhammad ibn Ishaq, an early biographer of the Prophet, by Malik is probably itself a later traditionist view for we find Abu Yusuf Quoting from Ibn Ishaq.
NOTES
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Author: Dr. Fazlur Rahman
