THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD

THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD40%

THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD Author:
Translator: Abdullah al-Shahin
Publisher: Ansariyan Publications – Qum
Category: Imam al-Jawad
ISBN: 964-438-653-1

THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD
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THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD

THE LIFE OF IMAM MUHAMMAD AL-JAWAD

Author:
Publisher: Ansariyan Publications – Qum
ISBN: 964-438-653-1
English

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HIS COMPANIONS AND THE NARRATORS OF HIS TRADITIONS

A great mass of scholars and narrators surrounded Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) taking from the flowing springs of his knowledge and sciences that he had inherited from his grandfather the messenger of Allah (a.s). They wrote down his sayings and fatwas and all the wonderful maxims and arts he stated. It was by virtue of these scholars and narrators that this precious heritage had been written down and become one of the great treasures of the Islamic intellect and culture.

The companions of the infallible imams acted due to their religious beliefs that had bound them to protect the traditions of the imams by writing them down. The jurisprudents of the Twelver Shia depend on these traditions in deriving the legal rulings and without them the Shia would not have such a great, developed jurisprudence, whose depth and genuineness all the men of intellect and law in the world have acknowledged.

The thing that makes one pride on the companions of the infallible imams is that they tried their bests to keep to the imams to record their traditions at a time that was the most difficult and most critical where the Abbasid governments subjected the imams to severe blockades and prevented people from communicating with them lest the Muslim masses would follow them. The confinement against the ulama and the narrators was to a degree that no one of them could utter the name of any of the imams whom narrators narrated traditions from. They just hinted at some of the aspects and features of the imams without declaring their names for fear of being killed or imprisoned.

Anyhow, we shall review what we find of biographies of the companions of Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) because this will complete the study on his life that it will show an important side in his intellectual and scientific life.

HIS COMPANIONS

1. IBRAHIM BIN DAWOOD AL-YA’QOOBI

Sheikh at-Toossi considered him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions one time and one of Imam al-Hadi’s companions another time.Al-Barqi mentioned him among the companions of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and Imam al-Hadi (a.s).The apparent thing is that he was a Twelver Shia but somehow unknown.

2. IBRAHIM BIN MUHAMMAD AL-HAMADANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of the companions of Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and Imam al-Jawad (a.s). Al-Kashshi mentioned in the biography of this companion that he was a deputy (to the imams) and that he had offered the hajj forty times. In the previous chapters we have mentioned the letter of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) to him that showed his trust in him and his high position near him (near Imam al-Jawad).

Al-Kashshi mentioned a tradition from Ibrahim saying, ‘Once, I wrote to Abu Ja'far (a.s) describing to him what a beast of prey had done to me and he wrote to me with his handwriting: May Allah hastens your victory over

him who has wronged you and save you from his burden (troubles). I bring you a good news of the victory of Allah soon and the reward later on (in the afterlife). Praise Allah too much!’

3. IBRAHIM BIN MAHZIYAR ABU ISAAQ AL-AHWAZI

He had written a book called al-Bisharaat. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of the companions of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and Imam al-Hadi (a.s). Al-Kashshi mentioned a tradition that Ahmed bin Ali bin Kulthoom had said, ‘He (Ibrahim bin Mahziyar) was one of the jurisprudents and he was reliable in narrating the Hadith. Once, Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Mahziyar said to me, “My father (Ibrahim), when he was about to die, gave me some money and gave me a certain sign. No one knew about this sign except Allah the Almighty. He said to me, ‘Whoever show you this sign, you have to give him this money.’ I went to Baghdad and stopped at an inn. On the following day, someone came and knocked the door. I asked the servant to see who he was. The servant said, ‘An old man at the door.’ I said, ‘Let him come in.’ The old man came in, took a seat and said, ‘I am al-Umari. Give me the money that is with you which is so-and-so.’ He showed me the sign and I gave him the money.”

The author of Mu’jam Rijal al-Hadith mentioned Ibrahim bin Mahziyar and that he had signed his name in about fifty traditions.

Sheikh as-Saduq mentioned him and mentioned a detailed tradition narrated by him.

4. IBRAHIM BIN MIHRWAYH

He was from the people of Babylon Bridge. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions. It is apparent that he was a Twelver Shia but somehow unknown.

5. AHMED BIN HAMMAD AL-MIRZAWI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him among the companions of Imam al-Jawad (a.s). Once, Imam al-Jawad (a.s) wrote him a letter saying to him, ‘As for this worldly life, we are audiences in the land. But, whoever likes his friend and believe in him, he will be with him even if he is far away from him. And as for the afterlife, it is the eternal abode.’

One day, an argument took place between Ahmed and Abul Huthayl where Ahmed proved the necessity of imamate. Here is the argument:

Ahmed said to Abul Huthayl, ‘I come to you to ask you about something.’

Abul Huthayl said, ‘Ask whatever you like and I ask Allah for preservation (infallibility)’

Ahmed said, ‘Is it not from your religion that infallibility and success do not come except from Allah and not due to a deed of yours?’

Abul Huthayl said, ‘Yes, it is.’

Ahmed said, ‘Then, what does your supplication mean? Do and take!’

Abul Huthayl said, ‘Offer your question!’

Ahmed said, ‘My master, if I ask you about a question that you neither find in the Book of Allah, nor in the Sunna of the messenger of Allah, nor in

the sayings of his (the Prophet’s) companions nor in the answers of jurisprudents, what will you do?’

Abul Huthayl said, ‘Ask!’

Ahmed said, ‘My master, ten men, who were all impotent. All of them made love with a woman in the same period after one of her menstruations. Some of them could satisfy some of his need (lust), others as far as they could. Is there, now, anyone who knows the legal punishment of each one of them according to the extent of sin he has committed to be punished in this life and purified in the afterlife? That is to be known that religion is complete…

Abul Huthayl said, ‘How far!’

Ahmed bin Hammad was one of the famous, reliable scholars of the Shia. Some criticism was mentioned in some traditions against him but al-Khoo’iy refuted them and proved their falseness.

6. AHMED BIN ISAAQ AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI

He was the deputy of the people of Qum to the infallible imams (a.s) to take juristic issues from them. He narrated traditions from Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and Imam al-Hadi (a.s). He was a scholar and an author. He had written “Ilal as-Salat” and “Massa’il ar-Rija li Abil Hasan ath-Thalith”.

It was mentioned in al-Khulasa that he was reliable and was the deputy of the people of Qum. He narrated from Abu Ja'far the second and Abul Hasan. He was a close companion to Abu Muhammad and he was the chief of the people of Qum. He had seen Imam al-Mahdi (a.s) the Man of Time (may Allah hasten his reappearance).

Ahmed bin Isaaq had a high position near the imams of Ahlul Bayt (a.s). Al-Kashshi mentioned that Ahmed bin al-Husayn al-Qummi al-Aabi Abu Ali had said, ‘Muhammad bin Ahmed bin as-Salt al-Qummi wrote a letter to (ad-Dar) and mentioned in it the story of Ahmed bin Isaaq al-Qummi and his companionship and that he wanted to perform the hajj and needed one thousand dinars. He said in the letter, ‘If my master (Imam as-Sadiq) sees that he orders to borrow him this amount and get it back from him in his country when he comes back, I shall do (give him the money).’ Imam (as-Sadiq) wrote, ‘It is a gift from us to him and when he comes back, he will get another gift from us.’

Many news were mentioned in the books praising him and that he was one of the eminent companions of the imams through his virtue, asceticism and piety.

7. AHMED BIN ABDULLAH AL-KUFI AL-KARKHI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

8. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN ABU NASR AL-BIZENTI

He was a reliable man from Kufa. He accompanied Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and had an eminent position near him. He narrated a book from Imam ar-Redha. He had written some books such as: al-Jami’, an-Nawadir and a book of rarities.

An-Najashi said, ‘He accompanied ar-Redha and Abu Ja'far and he had a great position near them.’

Al-Kashshi narrated a tradition from him saying, “Once, Safwan bin Yahya, Muhammad bin Sinan and I went to Abul Hasan (a.s). We stayed with him for some time and then we got up to leave. He said to me, ‘As for you, please sit down!’ I sat down and he began talking with me. I asked him and he answered me until a part of the night passed. When I wanted to leave, he said to me, ‘O Ahmed, would you go or spend the night here?’ I said, ‘May I die for you! It is up to you. If you order me to go, I shall go and if you order me to stay, I shall stay.’ He said, ‘Stay! This is the guard and people calmed down and slept.’ He got up and left. When I thought he went in, I prostrated myself before Allah saying, ‘Praise be to Allah! The authority of Allah and the heir of the knowledge of the prophets liked my company from among my brothers.’ While I was in my prostration and thanks, I felt Imam Abul Hasan (a.s) come in. He took my hand, shook it and said, ‘Once, Ameerul Mo’mineen (Imam Ali) visited Sa’sa’a when he was ill. When he got up to leave him, he said to him, ‘O Sa’sa’a, do not pride yourself before your fellows on my visiting you. Fear Allah!’ And then he left me.”

The Imams of Ahlul Bayt (a.s) did not approve pride and haughtiness and thought it was a kind of being away from Allah whereas a Muslim should be closer to Allah by keeping to Him sincerely and not to associate anyone or anything with Him.

He narrated about seven hundred and eighty-eight traditions and al-Khooei mentioned the narrators whom he had narrated his traditions from.

This great scholar died in 221 AHand the Muslims, at that time, lost one of the great scholars of piety and jurisprudents.

10. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN UBAYDA AL-QUMMI AL-ASH’ARI

He was one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions as mentioned by Sheikh at-Toossi.

11. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN KHALID AL-BARQI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and Imam al-Hadi’s companions. We must have a stop to talk about him.

His works

He wrote many books such as al-Mahasin, al-Iblagh, at-Tarahum wet-Ta’atuf, Adaab an-Nafs, al-Manafi’, al-Mu’asharah, al-Ma’eeshah and others that were more than one hundred as mentioned by an-Najashi and Sheikh at-Toossi in his Fihrist.

Criticism against him

He was criticized of narrating traditions from weak narrators and of depending on mursaltraditions.

Ibn al-Ghadha’iry says, ‘The people of Qum criticized him though the criticism was not against him but against those whom he narrated from. He was indifferent in taking traditions whether from this or that like the way of news tellers. Once, Ahmed bin Eesa excelled him from Qum and then

allowed him to come back and apologized to him. He said, ‘I found a letter having a mediation between Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Eesa and Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Khalif. When he died, Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Eesa escorted his corpse barefooted and bareheaded to free himself from the criticism he had set against him.’

His class in narrations

He narrated about eight hundred and thirty traditions. Sayyid al-Khooei mentioned the narrators whom Ahmed had narrated traditions from.

12. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN BINDAR AL-AQRA’

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions. It seems that he was a Twelver Shia but somehow unknown.

13. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN UBAYDILLAH AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions and so did al-Barqi. An-Najashi said, ‘He is the sheikh (teacher) of our companions. He is reliable. He had narrated traditions from Abul Hasan the third (Imam al-Hadi) (a.s)…He had written a book on strange events.’

14. AHMED BIN MUHAMMAD BIN EESA AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions. He was the first one who had dwelled in Qum. He was surnamed as Abu Ja'far. Al-Kashshi said, ‘Abu Ja'far was the chief of the people of Qum, their notable and jurisprudent with no equal. He also was the chief who met the rulers. He met Imam ar-Redha (a.s), Abu Ja'far the second (Imam al-Jawad) (a.s) and Abul Hasan al-Askari (Imam al-Hadi) (a.s).’

His works

He has written a number of books such as at-Tawheed (monotheism), Fadhl an-Nabiy (the virtue of the Prophet), al-Mut’a (temporary marriage), an-Nawadir (rarities), an-Nasikh wel Mansookh (the abrogating and the abrogated), Fadha’il al-Arab (virtues of the Arabs) and others.

His class in narrations

He has narrated about 2290 traditions. He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far (al-Baqir) (a.s), Imam Ali bin Muhammad (al-Hadi) (a.s), Abu Thabit, Abu Ja'far al-Baghdadi, Abul Hasan and others.

15. AHMED BIN MO’AFA

Abu Dawood, in the first part (p.135) said that Sheikh at-Toossi had mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions and considered him as reliable but his name is not mentioned in Sheikh at-Toossi’s book.

16. ABUL QASSIM IDRIS AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him among Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

17. ISAAQ AL-ANBARI

He narrated from Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and Muhammad bin Eesa bin Ubayd narrated from him. Al-Kashshi mentioned him in the biographies of Hashim bin Abu Hashim and Abu as-Samhari.

18. ISAAQ BIN IBRAHIM BIN HASHIM AL-QUMMI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and Ali bin Mahziyar narrated from him.

19. ISAAQ BIN MUHAMMAD BIN IBRAHIM AL-HUDHAYNI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions and added that he had met Imam ar-Redha (a.s).

20. UMAYYA BIN ALI AL-QABASI ASH-SHAMI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad. He had written a book.Ibn al-Ghadha’iry said, ‘He was weak in narration.’

21. JA’FAR BIN DAWOOD AL-YA’QOOBI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

22. JA’FAR BIN MUHAMMAD BIN YOUNUS AL-AHWAL AS-SAYRAFI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) and Ahmed bin Eesa narrated from him. He had written a book on rarities.

23. JA’FAR BIN MUHAMMAD AL-HASHIMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.He narrated from Abu Hafs al-Attar and Ali bin Mahziyar narrated from him.

24. JA’FAR BIN YAHYA BIN SA’D AL-AHWAL

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.An-Najashi said that he was from the men of Abu Ja'far the second (a.s).

25. JA’FAR AL-JAWHARI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.He narrated from Zakariyya bin Adam and Mansor bin al-Abbas narrated from him.

26. ABU ALI AL-HASAN BIN RASHID AL-BAGHDADI

He was reliable. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him from Imam al-Jawad’s companions and Sheikh al-Mufeed mentioned him in his ar-Risalah al-Adadiyya as one of the eminent jurisprudents and famous scholars from whom the verdicts of permissibility and impermissibility were taken and who had no defect to be criticized for.

He was a deputy of Imam al-Hadi (a.s) on Baghdad and the villages surrounding it. Imam al-Hadi (a.s) had written to the people of Baghdad and those villages saying, ‘I have appointed Abu Ali bin Rashid in the position of Ali bin al-Husayn bin Abd Rabbih and my deputies before him. I

imposed on you obeying him because it is obedience to me and in disobeying him is disobedience to me.’

This letter shows the high position of this man near Imam al-Hadi (a.s) that he has compared his obedience to his own obedience and his disobedience to his own disobedience. Of course, this man had not got this high position unless he was devout to Allah and religion. Al-Kashshi related that Muhammad bin Eesa al-Yaqteeni had said, ‘Abul Hasan al-Askari (Imam al-Hadi) (a.s) wrote a letter to Abu Ali bin Bilal in 232 AH saying after basmalah,‘I praise Allah and thank Him for his might and mercy and pray Him to have blessing and mercy on Muhammad the Prophet and his progeny. I have appointed Abu Ali in the position of al-Husayn bin Abd Rabbih and entrusted him with that for the knowledge he has that no one is preferred to him. I know you are the chief of your district and so I wanted to honor you by writing this book on that to you. You have to obey him and deliver to him all the dues that are with you and you have to inform my manumitted slaves and recommend them of that for this will support and suffice him and save us efforts and please us. Doing this, you will have the reward of Allah and Allah gives whoever He likes. He is the Giver, Who rewards with His mercy and you are in the trust of Allah.’

This letter shows how trusted al-Hasan bin Rashid was by Imam al-Hadi (a.s) that he had ordered his followers to obey him and deliver the legal dues to him. Imam al-Askari (a.s) eulogized him after his death by saying, ‘He lived happy and died a martyr.’ He had got this high position near the imam through his piety, obedience and asceticism in the worldly life.

27. AL-HASAN BIN SA’EED AL-AHWAZI

He and his brother al-Husayn were from the companions of Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and Imam al-Jawad (a.s) as al-Barqi says.An-Najashi says, ‘He has participated with his brother in these thirty classified books: al-Wudu’ (ablution), as-Salat (prayer), az-Zakat, as-Sawm (fasting), al-Hajj, an-Nikah (marriage), at-Talaq (divorce), al-Atq wet-Tadbeer wel-Mukataba (Setting slaves free, management and correspondence), al-Eeman wel-Nuthoor (faith and vows), at-Tijaraat wel-Ijarat (trades and rents), al-Khums, al-Shahadaat (witnesses), as-Sayd wel-Thaba’ih (hunting and slaughtering), al-Makasib (gains), al-Ashribah (drinks), az-Ziyaraat (visits or praying for holy persons), at-Taqiyya (concealment of one’s true beliefs), ar-Rad ala al-Ghulat (refuting the exaggerators), al-Manaqib (virtuous), al-Mathalib (defects), az-Zuhd (asceticism), al-Muruwwah (chivalry), Huqooq al-Mu’mineen wa Fadhluhum (the rights of believers and their virtue), Tafsir al-Qur’an, al-Wasaya (recommendations), al-Fara’idh (obligations), al-Hudood (punishments), ad-Diyyaat (blood monies), al-Malahim (battles or heroisms) ad-Du’a (supplication).’

These books show the scientific wealth he had. Besides the jurisprudential researches and the commentary of the Holy Qur’an, these books discuss different historical and theological subjects.

28. ABU ALI AL-HASAN BIN AL-ABBAS IBN AL-HAREESH AR-RAZI

He related traditions from Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s). An-Najashi says, ‘He is very weak. He had written a book called (Inna anzalnahu fee laylatil qadr:Surely We revealed it on the Night of Predestination). His traditions are weak with confused words.’Ibn al-Ghadha’iry says, ‘This man is not paid attention and his traditions are not recorded.’

29. AL-HASAN BIN ABBASBIN KHARASH

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

30. ABU MUHAMMAD AL-HASAN BIN ALI BIN ABU UTHMAN

He was surnamed as Sajjadah and he was from Kufa. Our scholars considered him weak. He had a book on rarities.Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.Al-Kashshi mentioned a tradition narrated by this man showing his bad beliefs and vain doctrine. We turn away from mentioning it.

31. AL-HASAN BIN YASAR

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

32. AL-HUSAYN BIN ASAD

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions and said he was reliable of correct traditions.He narrated traditions from Hammad bin Eesa. Al-Husayn bin Suleiman narrated from him a tradition on the reward of ziyarah of Imam Husayn (a.s) on Ashura.

33. AL-HUSAYN BIN SA’EED BIN HAMMAD AL-AHWAZI

He was reliable. He narrated traditions from Imam ar-Redha (a.s), Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and Imam Abul Hasan the third (a.s). He was the brother of al-Hasan bin Sa’eed whom we have mentioned above and mentioned the books he had written with his brother. He participated in narrating about five thousand and twenty traditions. He narrated from Imam Abul Hasan Musa (a.s), Imam Abul Hasan ar-Redha (a.s), Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and others.

34. AL-HUSAYN BIN SAHL BIN NOAH

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.So did al-Barqi.

35. AL-HUSAYN BIN DAWOOD AL-YA’QOOBI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad’s companions.

36. AL-HUSAYN BIN ALI AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

37. AL-HUSAYN BIN MUHAMMAD AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and al-Himyari narrated from him.

38. AL-HUSAYN BIN MUSLIM

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Barqi. He narrated from Imam Abul Hasan (a.s) and Muhammad bin Isma’eel narrated from him.

39. AL-HUSAYN BIN IMAM MUSA BIN JA’FAR (A.S)

He was the son of Imam Musa al-Kadhim (a.s). Once, a Bedouin asked him about Imam al-Jawad (a.s) by saying, ‘Who is this young man?’ Al-Husayn said to him, ‘This is the guardian of the messenger of Allah.’

40. AL-HUSAYN BIN YASAR

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

41. HAFS AL-JAWHARI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Barqi. He narrated from Imam al-Hadi (a.s) and ibn Eesa narrated from him.

42. HAMZA BIN YA’LA AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI ABU YA’LA

He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s). He was a reliable, notable man. He had written a book.

43. KHALAF AL-BASRI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad, Imam ar-Redha, and Imam Musa bin Ja’far al-Kadhim’s companions.

44. KHAYRAN AL-KHADIM AL-QARATEESSI

Al-Kashshi says, ‘I found in the book of Muhammad bin al-Hasan bin Bandar al-Qummi with his handwriting that al-Husayn bin Muhammad bin Aamir had told him that Khayran al-Khadim (the servant) al-Qarateessi had said, ‘I have performed the hajj at the time of Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Ali bin Musa (al-Jawad). I asked about some servant who had a respectable position near Abu Ja'far (a.s). (After finding him) I asked him to take me to Abu Ja'far (a.s). When we arrived in Medina, he said to me, ‘Get ready for I want to go to Abu Ja'far (a.s).’ I went with him and when we were at the door, he asked permission and went in. When he was late, I asked about him and it was said to me that he had left. I was confused. While I was so, a servant came out of the house and asked me, ‘Are you Khayran? I said, ‘Yes, I am.’ He asked me to come in and I did. I found Abu Ja'far (a.s) standing on a bench with no rug to sit on. A servant brought a rug and spread it on the bench and Abu Ja'far (a.s) sat down. When I looked at him, I was filled with reverence, veneration and astonishment. I went to go up to the bench without steps and Abu Ja'far (a.s) pointed to the steps. I went up and greeted him. He replied to my greeting and gave me his hand. I took his hand, kissed it and put it on my face. He seated me with his hand. I took fast hold of his hand out of my astonishment and he left it in my hand (blessing and peace be on him). When I felt quiet, I set his hand free. Ar-Rayyan bin Shabib had said to me, ‘When you go to Abu Ja'far (a.s), please say to him: your servant ar-Rayyan bin Shabib sends you his greetings and asks to pray Allah for him and for his son.’ When Abu Ja'far (a.s) began talking to me, I

mentioned to him what ar-Rayyan had told me. Abu Ja'far (a.s) prayed Allah for ar-Rayyan but he did not pray for his son. I repeated that to him three times but he prayed for ar-Rayyan only without his son. I said goodbye to him and got up to leave. When I went towards the door, I heard him saying something but I could not understand it. The servant came after me. I asked him, ‘What did my master said?’ The servant said that Abu Ja'far (a.s) had said, ‘Who is he that who thinks he guides to himself? He was born in the land of polytheists and when he lived there, he became worse than them, but when Allah wanted to guide him, He guided him.’

45. ABU HASHIM DAWOOD BIN AL-QASSIM BIN ISAAQ BIN ABDULLAH BIN JA’FAR BIN ABU TALIB AL-JA’FARI

He had a high position near the infallible imams (a.s). He was a reliable, noble man.Sheikh at-Toossi says, ‘He was from Baghdad. He was noble having a great position near the infallible imams (a.s). He had met some of them like Imam ar-Redha, Imam al-Jawad, Imam al-Hadi, Imam al-Askari and Imam al- Mahdi (peace be upon them). He narrated traditions from all of them. He composed good poetry and had written a book. He was preferred by the rulers.’

Al-Kulayni mentioned a tradition narrated by Dawood bin al-Qassim saying, ‘Once, I went to Abu Ja'far (a.s) and I had three charters with me that were not signed with any name. I was uncertain whose ones they were and so I was distressed. He (Abu Ja'far) took one of them and said, ‘This is Ziyad bin Shabib’s’ and took the other and said, ‘This is of so-and-so’. I was astonished. He looked at me and smiled. I said, ‘May I die for you! I am interested in eating clay. Would you please pray Allah for me?’ He kept silent. Three days later, he said to me, ‘O Abu Hashim, Allah has taken eating clay away from you.’ After that, eating clay became too disgusted to me.’

46. DAWOOD BIN MAFANNA AS-SARMI

 He was from Kufa, surnamed as Abu Suleiman. He was the mawla of bani Qurra and then of bani Sarma. He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s). He lived until the days of Imam al-Hadi (a.s).He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) and Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Eesa narrated from him a tradition about the reward of the ziyarah of Imam ar-Redha (a.s).

47. DAWOOD BIN ALI AL-KHUZA’IY

He defended Ahlul Bayt (a.s) and struggled for them. He offered his life, intellect, and passions to spread their virtues and exploits. He met serious harms and troubles for the sake of them. The police of the Abbasids and their inspectors chased him but he did not care for that and remained resistant announcing the virtues of the infallible imams (a.s) and criticizing the rulers of the Abbasids who had seized the wealth of the Muslim peoples and spent it on their pleasures and lusts instead of spending it on the development of the economical and social life of the Muslims.

Studying the life of this great hero requires an independent book. His life was full of jihad in the way of his beliefs and principles. He fought against

the strongest government in the world at that time. He severely criticized the Abbasid rulers who had authority over most of the countries in the world.

Besides that he was one of the great men of political intellect and literature, he was one of the great ulama. He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s). Ali bin al-Hakam narrated from him.

48. DAWOOD BIN MAHZIYAR

He was the brother of Ali bin Mahziyar the companion of Imam al-Jawad (a.s).

49. ZAKARIYYA BIN ADAM BIN ABDULLAH BIN SA’D AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI

He was a reliable, noble man. He had a respectable position near Imam ar-Redha (a.s). He had written a book.

Al-Kashshi mentioned a tradition from Abdullah bin as-Salt al-Qummi saying, ‘Once, I went to Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) at the last of his life and I heard him saying, ‘May Allah reward Safwan bin Yahya, Muhammad bin Sinan and Zakariyya bin Adam with all good for they have been loyal to me.’This shows the high standing he had near the Imam (a.s).

Ali bin al-Musayyab says, “Once, I said to Imam ar-Redha (a.s), ‘I live too far and I suffer too much in my way to you. I cannot come to you at every time. From whom would I take the rulings of my religion?’ He said, ‘From Zakariyya bin Adam al-Qummi who is trustworthy with religion and life.’ When I left, I went to Zakariyya bin Adam and asked him about the questions I needed.”

This tradition shows that Zakariyya was a jurisprudent and a religious authority from whom Muslims took fatwas. Historians have mentioned many news on praising him.

50. SA’D BIN SA’D BIN AL-AHWAS AL-ASH’ARI AL-QUMMI

He was reliable. He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and Imam al-Jawad (a.s). He had written a book.Imam al-Jawad (a.s) had prayed Allah for him and for Zakariyya bin Adam.

51. SAHL BIN ZIYAD AR-RAZI

An-Najashi said about him, ‘He was weak and unreliable in traditions. Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Eesa accused him of exaggeration and lying and exiled him from Qum to ar-Riyy. He exchanged letters with Imam al-Askari (a.s) through Muhammad bin Abdul Hameed al-Attar. He had written a book called “at-Tawheed-monotheism”.Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

52. SHATHAN BIN AL-KHALIL AN-NAYSHABORI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

53. ABUL KHAYR SALIH BIN ABU HAMMAD AR-RAZI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi says, ‘Salih bin Abu Hammad met Imam al-Hadi

(a.s). He was ambiguous. He was known by some and denied by others. He had written some books such as “the Sermons of Imam Ali”.

54. SALIH BIN MUHAMMAD BIN SAHL

He was the agent of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) on the entails in Qum. Al-Kulayni mentioned a tradition from Ali bin Ibrahim that his father had said, “One day, I was with Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) when Salih bin Muhammad bin Sahl, who was entrusted with the entails in Qum, came to him and said, ‘My master, would you exempt me from ten thousand (dirhams or dinars) that I have spent?’ Abu Ja'far (a.s) said to him, ‘You are exempted.’ When Salih went out, Abu Ja'far (a.s) said, ‘Someone takes the monies of the progeny of Muhammad, their orphans, poor and wayfarers and then comes to say: exempt me from them. Do you think he thought I would say to him: no, I would not? By Allah, Allah will ask them on the Day of Resurrection about that insistingly.”

55. SALIH BIN MUHAMMAD AL-HAMADANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Al-Barqi mentioned him among the companions of Imam al-Hadi (a.s). Ibn Shahrashub in his book al-Manaqib mentioned him as one of the reliable, close companions of Abul Hasan Ali bin Muhammad (al-Hadi) (a.s). He narrated from Ibrahim bin Is~haq an-Nahawandi. Abu Salih Shu’ayb bin Eesa narrated from him about the reward of the ziyara of Imam ar-Redha (a.s).

56. SAFWAN BIN YAHYA AL-BAJALI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of the companions of Imam al-Jawad, Imam al-Kadhim, and Imam ar-Redha (peace be on them).Safwan had been brought up with the intellect of Ahlul Bayt (a.s) and he imitated them in his conducts and guidance. He was one of the most pious, religious men in Islam and one of the best companions of the infallible imams (a.s) in his virtues and knowledge. We have to stop a little to talk about him.

1. His reliability

Narrators and historians had agreed unanimously on his reliability. Sheikh at-Toossi said, ‘He was the most reliable man to the people of Hadith at his time.’An-Najashi said, ‘He is reliable, reliable.’

2. His worship

Safwan was one of the most devoted men in his worships at his time. He offered one hundred and fifty rak’as in every night and fasted for three months every year and paid the zakat of his properties three times every year.

3. His piety

Safwan was one of the most pious people. Historians said that one day, some man asked him to carry two dinars with him to his (that man’s) family in Kufa. Safwan said to him, ‘My camels are hired and I have to take the permission of the tenants.’This was the utmost level of piety.

4. His covenant with his companions

He had concluded a covenant with two of his pious companions in the Holy House (the Kaaba) that whoever from them died, the others should do for him as that which they would do for themselves of good deeds and charities. They kept sincerely to that covenant. The last of them who remained alive was Safwan. Whatever he did for himself, he did the like for his two companions.

5. His asceticism in life

Safwan was ascetic in all sides of life. He refused authority. Imam Abul Hasan (a.s) said, ‘No two predatory wolves in sheep whose shepherds are absent are more harmful to the religion of a Muslim than being fond of authority…but Safwan does not like authority.’

6. His obedience to the infallible imams

Safwan followed the infallible imams (a.s). He did never disagree with them or turn away from their guidance neither in saying nor in doing. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) had praised him for that. Ali bin al-Husayn bin Dawood al-Qummi said, ‘Once, I heard Abu Ja'far (a.s) mentioning Safwan bin Yahya and Muhammad bin Sinan and saying: may Allah be pleased with them for I am pleased with them. They have never dissented from me and have never dissented from my father at all.’

7. His jurisprudence

Safwan was one of the most famous jurisprudents in his time. Al-Kashshi mentioned that Muhammad bin Sinan had said, ‘Whoever wants to ask about problematic questions let him come to me and whoever wants to ask about halal and haram (permissible and impermissible things) let him go to the sheikh; he means Safwan bin Yahya.’

8. His works

Safwan had written about thirty books such as the books of Wudu’, Prayer, Fasting, the Hajj, Zakat, Marriage, Divorce, Obligations, Recommendations, Buying and Selling, Setting slaves free and Management, Good tidings and others.These books show that he was so expert in jurisprudence.

9. His death

This great scholar had died in 210 AH in Medina. Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) sent the shroud and other requirements of burial and ordered Isma’eel bin Musa to offer the prayer on him.Then, he buried him in al-Baqee’ graveyard and so his life that he had devoted to Allah, His messenger and Ahlul Bayt (a.s) had come to an end.

57. AL-ABBAS BIN UMAR AL-HAMADANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

58. ABDUL JABBAR BIN MUBARAK AN-NAHAWANDI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

59. ABDURRAHMAN BIN ABU NAJRAN

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) and

his father narrated from Imam Abu Abdullah (as-Sadiq)…Abdurrahman was trustworthy, trustworthy and reliable in what he narrated. He had written many books such as al-Mat’am wel Mashrab (foods and drinks), Youm wa Laylah (a day and a night) and an-Nawadir (rarities).’

He narrated from Imam Abul Hasan the second (a.s), Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s), Abu Basir, Abu Jamilah, Abu Harun al-Makfoof, ibn Abu Umayr and others.

60. ABU TALIB ABDULLAH BIN AS-SALT

He was the mawla of bani Tamim bin Tha’laba. He was reliable from Imam al-Jawad's companions as Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned.It was mentioned that he had written to Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) asking his permission to elegize his father Imam ar-Redha (a.s). Abu Ja'far (a.s) wrote to him, ‘Elegize me and elegize my father!’

61. ABDULLAH BIN MUHAMMAD AR-RAZI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

62. ABDULLAH BIN MUHAMMAD BIN HUSSAYN AL-KHUDHAYNI AL-AHWAZI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was trustworthy, trustworthy. He had written a book called “al-Masa’il lir-Redha”.

63. ABDULLAH BIN MUHAMMAD BIN SAHL BIN DAWOOD

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

64. ALI BIN ASBAT BIN SALIM

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was from Kufa and he was reliable. He was Fatahite.He argued on that with Ali bin Mahziyar through letters. They referred in that to Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) and then Ali bin Asbat renounced his belief and gave up. He had narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) before. He was one of the most trustworthy and truthful people. He had written some books such as ad-Dala’il, at-Tafsir, al-Mazar, and a famous book on rarities.He narrated from Imam Abul Hasan Musa al-Kadhim, Imam Abul Hasan ar-Redha, Abu Ja'far the second (peace be upon them) and others.

65. ALI BIN BILAL

He was a reliable man from Baghdad. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said that he narrated from Imam Abul Hasan the third and that he had written a book.

66. ALI BIN HADID BIN HAKEEM AL-MADA’INI AL-AZDI AS-SABATI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions. An-Najashi said that he had written a bookand Imam al-Jawad (a.s) asked

people to offer congregational prayer behind him. Al-Kashshi mentioned that Abu Ali bin Rashid had said, “Once, I said to Abu Ja'far the second (a.s): may I die for you! Our companions have disagreed. Would I offer the prayer behind the companions of Hisham bin al-Hakam? He said, ‘You would offer prayers behind Ali bin Hadid.’ People did that.”He narrated from Imam Abul Hasan al-Kadhim, Imam ar-Redha, Imam Abu Ja'far the second and others. Abu Ja'far, ibn Abu Umayr, ibn Jumhur and other men narrated from him.

67. ALI BIN HASSAAN AL-WASITY AL-MUNAMMIS

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

68. ALI BIN AL-HUSAYN BIN ALI BIN UMAR BIN AL-HUSAYN BIN ALI BIN ABU TALIB

He was from Imam al-Jawad's companions.He narrated from Ali bin Ja’far bin Muhammad and Ali bin Mahziyar narrated from him.

69. ALI BIN AL-HAKAM

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions. He narrated from Suleiman bin Nuhayk and Ibrahim bin Hashim narrated from him.

70. ALI BIN KHALID

He was a Zaydite and then he turned to believe in the imamate after he saw the miracles of Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s). He narrated some of the virtues and qualities of Imam al-Jawad (a.s). He narrated traditions from Imam al-Jawad (a.s), Ahmed bin al-Hasan bin Ali, Ahmed bin Abdus, Abdul Karim and others. Ibn Suma’a, al-Hasan bin Muhammad, Sa’d bin Abdullah and others narrated from him.

71. ALI BIN ABDULLAH AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was reliable from our companions. He had a book called “al-Istita’a”.’

72. ALI BIN ABDULLAH AL-MADA’INI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Barqi.

73. ALI BIN ABDUL MELIK

Al-Barqi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

74. ALI BIN MUHAMMAD BIN SULEIMAN AN-NAWFALI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) and Musa bin Ja’far narrated from him.

75. ALI BIN MUHAMMAD BIN HARUN BIN MAHBOB

He was from Imam al-Jawad's companions.

76. ALI BIN MUHAMMAD AL-ALAWI AL-HASANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

77. ALI BIN MUHAMMAD AL-QALANISI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

78. ALI BIN MAHZIYAR

He was one of the best companions of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and one of the most famous scholars with virtue and piety in his time. We would better talk a little about him:

1. His converting to Islam

Ali bin Mahziyar was a Christian and then Allah guided him to faith and he converted to Islam and became one of the most loyal, devoted Muslims.

2. His piety

Ali bin Mahziyar was unequaled in his piety and obedience. From his worshipping was that when the sun rose, he prostrated himself to Allah and he did not raise his head from prostration until he prayed Allah for one thousand of his brothers as he prayed for himself. On his forehead there was like the knee of a camel because of his much prostration for Allah.

3. His reliability in narrations

Historians had agreed unanimously on his reliability in narrating traditions. An-Najashi said, ‘He was reliable in his traditions that no one could accuse him of anything.’

4. His works

He had written a good collection of books showing his abundant knowledge. From among these books are the following: Wudu’, Prayer, Zakat, Fasting, Hajj, Divorce, Punishments, Blood Money, at-Tafsir, The Virtues, Setting Slaves Free and Management, Gains, Defects, Supplication, Courtesy and Chivalry, al-Mazar (shrine), Refuting the exaggerators, Recommendations, Inheritances, Khums, Witnesses, the Virtues of the Believers, Heroism, Reservation (Taqiyya), Hunting and Slaughtering, Asceticism, Drinks, Vows and Oaths and Penances, Letters (huroof), al-Qa’im (al-Mahdi), Good Tidings, Prophets, Rarities, the Letters of Ali bin Asbat, and other books.Most of these books are on jurisprudential subjects which show that he was one of the great jurisprudents in Islam.

5. The letters of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) to him

Imam al-Jawad (a.s) sent many letters to Ali bin Mahziyar which shows the close relation between them and the high position of Ali near the imam. Here are some of those letters:

A. After the introduction, Imam al-Jawad (a.s) wrote to him, “Your book has come to me and I understood what you have mentioned in it. You have pleased me, may Allah please you. I pray the Sufficer, the Defender to save you from the intrigues of every intriguer inshallah…”This letter shows that Ali bin Mahziyar has offered a service to Imam al-Jawad's companions which has filled his blessed heart with pleasure and delight and therefore he prayed Allah for him.

B. In another letter Imam al-Jawad said, ‘I understood what you mentioned about the affairs of the people of Qum; may Allah endow them with safety and deliverance. You pleased me with what you mentioned and

you still do that; may Allah please you with Paradise and be contented with you for my contentment with you. I pray Allah for pardon and mercy and say: Allah is Sufficient for us and Most Excellent is He on Whom we rely!’

The letter shows that Ali bin Mahziyar has relieved the people of Qum from an ordeal that made Imam al-Jawad (a.s) be pleased and pray Allah for him.

C. In another letter Imam al-Jawad (a.s) wrote to him, ‘…Go to your house, may Allah make you to the best of houses in your life and your afterlife.’Imam al-Jawad (a.s) ordered him to retire to his house after he had completed his services to him.

D. In another letter Imam al-Jawad (a.s) said to him, ‘…I pray Allah to keep you safe from before you and from behind you and in all your states. Be delighted! I hope Allah to drive misfortunes away from you and I pray Allah to make it better to you that which He has determined to you to go on Sunday. Put off your going until Monday inshallah! May Allah be with you in your travel, keep your family, carry out your trusts for you and make you safe by His omnipotence.’

E. Once, Ali wrote to Imam al-Jawad (a.s) a letter asking him affluence and to permit him to dispose of the money of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) that was in his possession. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) replied to him, ‘May Allah give more affluence to you and to those of your family whom you asked affluence for. O Ali, there is more than affluence from me to you. I pray Allah to be with you in affluence and good health, make you prosper with soundness, and suffice you with soundness, He is the Hearer of prayer.’

F. One day, Ali wrote a letter to Imam al-Jawad (a.s) asking him to pray Allah for him. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) replied to him, ‘As for praying Allah for you that you asked me for, yet you do not know in what position Allah has made you to me. I might mention you with your name and surname with my great care and love to you besides that which I know in you. May Allah maintain to you the best of his blessings and be pleased with you, and make you get to the best of your intention and put you up in the Paradise with His mercy; He is the Hearer of prayer. May Allah save you, take you in His charge and keep misfortunes away from you by His mercy…’

G. From among the letters of Imam al-Jawad (a.s) to Ali is this letter that has been narrated by al-Hasan bin Sham’on. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) says, ‘O Ali, may Allah reward you with the best of His reward, house you in His Paradise, save you from disgrace in this life and in the afterlife, and resurrect you with us. O Ali, I have tested you and tried you in loyalty, obedience, service, reverence and performance of your duties and if I say that I have not seen anyone like you, I might be truthful. May Allah reward you with the Gardens of Paradise. Neither your position nor your services in the hot and cold and in the day and night have been unknown to me. I pray Allah, when He will gather the creatures on the Day of Punishment, to have enviable mercy on you. He is the Hearer of prayer.’

This letter and the previous ones have given to Ali a bright picture about his high position near Imam al-Jawad (a.s) and that he was incomparable in his piety and devotedness. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) did not forget the services and loyalty Ali had towards him.

6. His narrations

He had narrated four hundred and thirty traditions. He narrated from Imam al-Jawad (a.s), Imam Abul Hasan the third (al-Hadi) (a.s), Abu Dawood al-Mustarraq, Abu Ali bin Rashid, ibn Abu Umayr and others.With these words we end our research on this great companion who had devoted his life to serve Imam al-Jawad (a.s) until the imam was so loyal to him and he loved him as much as love had a meaning.

79. ALI BIN MUYASSAR

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Barqi.

80. ALI BIN NASR.

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Barqi.

81. ABUL HUSAYN ALI BIN YAHYA

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

82. AL-QASSIM BIN AL-HUSAYN AL-BIZENTI

He was the companion of Ayyoub bin Noah. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

83. MUHAMMAD BIN IBRAHIM AL-HUDHAYNI AL-AHWAZI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Hamdan al-Hudhayni said to Imam al-Jawad (a.s), ‘My brother-he means Muhammad-has died.’ Imam al-Jawad (a.s) said, ‘May Allah have mercy on your brother. He was one of my closest Shia.’He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and Ali bin Mahziyar narrated from him.

84. MUHAMMAD BIN ABU ZAYD AR-RAZI

He was from Qum. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.So did al-Qummi.

85. MUHAMMAD BIN ABUL SAHBAN

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He narrated from Abdurrahman bin Abu Najran and Sa’d bin Abdullah narrated from him.

86. MUHAMMAD BIN ABU QURAYSH

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

87. MUHAMMAD BIN ABU NASR

Al-Barqi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

88. ABU ALI MUHAMMAD BIN AHMED BIN HAMMAD AL-MAHMODI

Al-Kashshi mentioned that Imam al-Jawad (a.s) had consoled him for the death of his father by writing to him, ‘Your father has passed away and may Allah be pleased with him and with you. He was praiseworthy near us and you will not be but so.’

89. MUHAMMAD BIN ISMA’EEL BIN BAZEE’

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam ar-Redha and Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was one of the best companions of the imams in his piety and religiousness. Here, we talk in brief about him.

His relation with Imam ar-Redha (a.s)

Muhammad had a close relation with Imam ar-Redha (a.s). He regarded him with high respect and reverence. Al-Husayn bin Khalid as-Sayrafi said, ‘Once, we were with Imam ar-Redha (a.s). We were a group of men. Muhammad bin Isma’eel was mentioned and Imam ar-Redha (a.s) said addressing his companions, ‘I wish that one like him were among you.’

He narrated from Imam ar-Redha (a.s) his saying, ‘Allah has at the gate of tyrants (in their courts as officials) some men whom He has guided with evidence and endowed with abilities in the land to protect through them His guardians and reform the affairs of Muslims. To them is the resort of the believers from harms, and to them is the resort of the needy of our Shia, and by them Allah relieves the fright of the believers in the courts of the unjust. These are the real believers. These are the trustees of Allah in His earth. These are lights among their fellows on the Day of Resurrection. Their light shines to the inhabitants of the heavens as stars shine to the inhabitants of the earth. From the lights of these people on the Day of Resurrection the afterlife will bright. By Allah, they are created for Paradise and the Paradise is created for them. Blessed are they with that. Would any of you get all that if he likes?’ He (Muhammad bin Isma’eel) said, ‘May I die for you! How is that?’ He said, ‘By being with them to please us through pleasing the believers of our Shia. O Muhammad, be one of them!’

With Imam al-Jawad (a.s)

Muhammad bin Isma’eel had a close relation with Imam al-Jawad (a.s) too. He believed in his imamate and he narrated from him some traditions concerning legal verdicts. He asked Imam al-Jawad (a.s) to give him a shirt that he had put on (had touched his body) to make it as his shroud. Imam al-Jawad (a.s) sent him one.

His works

Muhammad bin Isma’eel had written some books such as “the Hajj”, “the Reward of the Hajj” and some other books.

90. MUHAMMAD BIN ISMA’EEL AR-RAZI

He narrated from Imam al-Jawad (a.s), Suleiman bin Ja’far al-Ja’fari and Sahl bin Ziyad. As-Sayyari narrated from him.

91. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HASAN BIN ABU KHALID AL-ASH’ARI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and al-Husayn bin Sa’eed narrated from him.

92. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HASAN BIN AMMAR

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) and Muhammad bin Khallad narrated from him.

93. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HASAN BIN MAHBOB

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

94. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HASAN AL-WASITI

He was one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Al-Fadhl bin Shathan narrated that he had a high position near Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) and that Imam Abul Hasan (a.s) had sent him some money when he was ill, enshrouded him and held obsequies when he died.

95. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HASAN BIN SHAMMON AL-BASRI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Ibnul Ghadha’iri said, ‘Muhammad bin al-Hasan bin Shammon was from Basra…He was weak (in narration), collapsed and no one paid attention to him or to his narrations or anything ascribed to him.’

An-Najashi said about him, ‘He was very weak of bad beliefs. He believed that Imam Musa bin Ja’far (a.s) was alive (forever) and had not died. From his fabrications was that he claimed he had heard Imam Musa bin Ja’far (a.s) saying, ‘Whoever tells you that he has nursed me, washed me (after death), enshrouded me, put me in a coffin, buried me and shook dust off his hand, do not believe him.’ He also claimed that Imam Musa bin Ja’far (a.s) had said, ‘Whoever asks about me, you say to him: He is alive, praise be to Allah. May Allah damn whoever asks about me and says that I died.’ He had written some books such as “as-Sunan wel Aadab wa Makarimul Akhlaq; rules, morals and nobilities of character”, “al-Ma’rifa; knowledge” and a book on rarities. He died when he was 114 years old.

96. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HUSAYN AL-ASH’ARI

He narrated from Imam Abu Ja'far al-Jawad (a.s) and Ali bin Mahziyar narrated from him.

97. ABU JA’FAR MUHAMMAD BIN AL-HUSAYN BIN ABUL KHATTAB AZ-ZAYYAT AL-HAMADANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said about him, ‘He is honorable of high rank and he is reliable. He has narrated too many traditions and is trustworthy in his narrations. He has written good books. From his books there are “at-Tawheed”, “al-Ma’rifa wel-Bada’”, “ar-Radd ala Ahl al-Qadar”, “al-Lu’lu’a”, “Wasaya al-A’imma” and “an-Nawadir”.’

Muhammad bin al-Hasan had narrated one hundred and eghty-nine traditions. He narrated from Abu Dawood al-Munshid, ibn Abu Nasr, ibn Mahbob and others.

98. MUHAMMAD BIN HAMZA AL-ALAWI

He narrated from Imam al-Jawad (a.s). Ali bin Mahziyar said, “Once, Muhammad bin Hamza wrote to Abu Ja'far (a.s) saying, ‘One of your mawali has ordered one hundred dirham for me. I often heard him saying: “all that is mine is for my master (Imam al-Jawad). He died and left this money without saying anything about it. He had two wives. One of them is in Baghdad but I do not know exactly where she is now and the other is in

Qum. What do you order me to do with these one hundred dirhams?’ Abu Ja'far (a.s) wrote to him, ‘Pay to the two wives of this man their right in this money which is one eighth if he had a child but if he had no child, their right is one quarter and pay the rest as charity to those whom you know they are in need of money.’

This tradition shows that Imam al-Jawad (a.s) trusted in this man where he entrusted him with his money to dispose of it in stead of him.

99. ABU ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD BIN KHALID AL-BARQI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He said he was reliable and had a book called an-Nawadir as mentioned in al-Fihrist. Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Eesa and Ahmed bin Abu Abdullah narrated from him. An-Najashi said, ‘He was weak in traditions. He was a man of letters and had a good knowledge in history and the sciences of Arabic. He had written some books such as “at-Tanzeel wet-Ta’beer: revelation and expression”, “Youm wa Laylah: a day and a night”, “at-Tafsir”, “Mecca wel Medina”, “the Wars of al-Ouss wel Khazraj”, “al-Ilal: causes” and “al-Khiteb: sermons”.’

Ibnul Ghadha’iri said, ‘His narrations are denied. He often narrates from weak narrators and depends on mursaltraditions.Some researchers have depended on the opinion of Sheikh at-Toossi on this man and paid no attention to the opinions of an-Najashi and al-Ghadha’iri.

100. MUHAMMAD BIN SALIM BIN ABDUL HAMEED

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

101. ABU JA'FAR MUHAMMAD BIN SINAN AZ-ZUHRI AL-KHUZA’IY

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He said in al-Fihrist that Muhammad bin Sinan had narrated the letter of Imam Abu Ja'far (a.s) to the people of Basra. An-Najashi said that Muhammad bin Sinan was very weak. Al-Fadhl bin Shathan said, ‘I do not permit you to narrate the traditions of Muhammad bin Sinan.’Muhammad bin Sinan said when dying, ‘Do not narrate anything from me. They were just books I had bought from the market.’His narrations were criticized and he was accused of exaggeration and carelessness in religion. Al-Kashshi said, “I have seen in some book of the exaggerators a tradition from al-Hasan bin Ali from al-Hasan bin Shu’ayb that Muhammad bin Sinan had said, ‘Once, I went to Abu Ja'far the second (a.s) and he said to me, ‘O Muhammad, how will you be if I damn you, disavow you and make you a trial to people to guide through you whomever I want and misguide through you whomever I want.’ I said to him, ‘You can do with your slave whatever you like, my master. You have power over all things.’ Then he said, ‘O Muhammad, you are a slave that has been loyal to Allah. I prayed Allah for you but He refused except to guide through you many people and misguide through you many people.’There are many other denied traditions and superstitions like this one that had been narrated from him.

102. ABU AS-SAHBAN MUHAMMAD BIN ABDUL JABBAR AL-QUMMI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions. It was mentioned in al-Wajeeza, al-Bulgha and Mushtarakat al-Kadhimi that he was reliable.

103. MUHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH AL-MADA’INI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companionsand added that he had joined Imam Musa bin Ja’far al-Kadhim (a.s) when he had been taken from Medina to Baghdad.

104. ABU JA'FAR MUHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH BIN MIHRAN AL-KARKHI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions and added that he was accused of exaggeration and weakness in narration.An-Najashi said, ‘He was exaggerator, liar and of bad beliefs. This was well-known about him. He had written some books such as “al-Mamdohin wel Mathmomin: the praised and the dispraised”, “Maqtal Abul Khattab: the murder of Abul Khattab”, “al-Malahim: heroisms”, “at-Tabsira: enlightenment” and “an-Nawadir: rarities” which was the nearest of his books to the truth while the others were full of confusion, ambiguities and nonsense.’

105. ABU BASHIR MUHAMMAD BIN ABDA

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions without describing him.

106. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-FARAJ AR-RAKHJI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was from the notables of the Shia. When Imam Muhammad al-Jawad (a.s) died, the Shia gathered together in this man’s house to know the next imam after Imam al-Jawad (a.s).He had good traditions mentioned by historians.

107. MUHAMMAD BIN NASR AN-NAB

Al-Barqi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

108. MUHAMMAD BIN NASR

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

109. MUHAMMAD BIN NOAH

Al-Barqi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

110. MUHAMMAD BIN AL-WALEED AL-KHAZZAZ AL-KIRMANI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

111. MUHAMMAD BIN YOUNUS BIN ABDURRAHMAN

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam ar-Redha’s companions and another time of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Al-Kashshi mentioned that when the Abbasid government forced ibn Abu Umayr to mention the

names of the Shia to be imprisoned, he refused and so he was whipped one hundred times and he was about to reveal their names out of torture but when he heard Muhammad bin Younus saying: “O Muhammad bin Umayr, remember your standing before Allah (on the Day of Resurrection)”, he tolerated the torture and did not reveal the names.

112. AL-MUKHTAR BIN ZIYAD AL-ABDI AL-BASRI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions and added that he was reliable.

113. MARWAK BIN UBAYD BIN ABU HAFSAH

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi mentioned that Muhammad bin Mas’ood had said, “Once, I asked Ali bin al-Hasan about Marwak bin Ubayd and he said, ‘He is reliable and truthful’.”Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned in al-Fihrist that Marwak had written a book.

114. MUSADDIQ BIN SADAQA AL-MADAYINI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He saw Imam as-Sadiq (a.s) and narrated from him and he narrated from Imam Musa bin Ja’far al-Kadhim (a.s). He was one of the great ulama and jurisprudents.

115. MO’AWIYA BIN HAKEEM BIN AMMAR AD-DUHNI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions. An-Najashi said, ‘Mo’awiya bin Hakeem is a reliable, noble man from the companions of Imam ar-Redha (a.s). Abu Abdullah al-Husayn bin Ubaydillah said he had heard his sheikhs saying, ‘Mo’awiya bin Hakeem had narrated twenty-four traditions only. He had some books such as “at-Talaq: divorce”, “al-Haydh: menstruation”, “al-Fara’idh: obligations”, “an-Nikah: marriage”, “al-Hudud: punishments”, “ad-Diyaat: blood monies” and a book of rarities. Al-Kashshi said, ‘He was a Fatahiteand he was fair and knowledgeable.’

116. MUNTHIR BIN QABOS

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘Munthir bin Muhammad bin Sa’eed bin Abul Jahm al-Qabosi Abul Qassim was from the progeny of Qabos bin an-Nu’man bin al-Munthir…he was trustworthy from a great honorable house. He had written some books such as “Wufod al-Arab ila an-Nabiy: the delegations of the Arabs to the Prophet”, “Jami’ al-Fiqh: collection of jurisprudence”, “al-Jamal: the camel”, “Siffeen” and “al-Gharaat: raids”.

117. ABUL HUSAYN MANSOR BIN AL-ABBAS AR-RAZI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions one time and another as one of Imam al-Hadi’s companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He lived and died in Baghdad. He was not exactly known to be honest. He had a book on rarities.

118. MUSA BIN DAWOOD AL-YA’QOBI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad and Imam al-Hadi’s companions. He was unknown.

119. MUSA BIN DAWOOD AL-MINQARI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

120. MUSA BIN ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL MELIK BIN HISHAM

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

121. MUSA BIN UMAR BIN BAZEE’

He was the mawla of al-Mansor. Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was reliable from Kufa and had a book.’It was mentioned in al-Wajeeza, al-Bulgha and al-Khulasah that he was reliable.

122. MUSA BIN AL-QASSIM BIN MO’AWIYA BIN WAHAB AL-BAJALI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam ar-Redha and Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was a reliable noble man of clear traditions and a good way in narration. He had written some books such as “Wudu”, “Prayer”, “Zakat”, “Hajj”, “Marriage”, “Divorce”, “Punishments”, “Blood money”, “Witnesses”, “Oaths and Vows”, “Morals of the believers”, “al-Jami’: the collector” and “Etiquettes”.’

123. NOAH BIN SHU’AYB AL-BAGHDADI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions and quoted from al-Fadhl bin Shathan that Noah was a benevolent, pious jurisprudent.

124. HARUN BIN AL-HASAN

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.An-Najashi said, ‘He was reliable and truthful. He narrated from his father and had a book on rarities.’

125. YAZDAD

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

126. ABU JA'FAR AL-BASRI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.Al-Kashshi considered him as reliable when he mentioned that al-Fadhl bin Shathan had said, ‘Abu Ja'far al-Basri narrated to me. He was reliable, pious and virtuous.’

127. ABUL HUSSAYN

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

128. ABU KHIDASH AL-MIHRI AL-BASRI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

129. ABU SARA

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

130. ABU SUKAYNA AL-KUFI

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned him as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.He was unknown.

As for the women who narrated from Imam al-Jawad (a.s), they were:

131. ZAYNAB BINT MUHAMMAD BIN YAHYA

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned her as one of Imam al-Jawad's companions.

132. ZAHRA’ UMM AHMED

Sheikh at-Toossi mentioned her as of the women who had had the honor of asking Imam al-Jawad (a.s) about legal questions.

Here, our talk on some of Imam al-Jawad's companions comes to an end. Among those companions there were famous men of intellect, knowledge and literature at that time. This number of Imam al-Jawad's companions shows the abundant treasures of knowledge he had, for they accompanied him to ladle from the springs of his knowledge.

Will and Natural Urge

An explanation that is necessary here is that his application of the principle of employment to all animate beings is not acceptable. In my footnotes to the chapter I have discussed the issue in a manner which does not assume such a generalization. It is not even true of man in all his voluntarily acts but only of some of his voluntarily actions which are performed thoughtfully. It is here that the issues of moral imperative and the rational character of what is moral and immoral arise. The acts of immature persons, like infants taking milk, are rather derived from instinct.

Elsewhere I have drawn a distinction between urge and will. The animal, contrary to what is said loosely that an animal is that which moves voluntarily, acts according to inclination and urge. In a mature human being there is a relation between will and reason on the one hand and between inclination or appetite and reason on the other. Urge is a passive state.

In an animal or man that acts under urge, the greater the influence of urge the lesser is the role of thought, consciousness and reason and the action takes an involuntary form. For example, when man sees food, he feels inclined towards it and it is as if there were something external that draws him towards itself. On the contrary, when man acts according to his will, he withdraws from what is external to his being and his decision arises from his inner being.

For example, if he has feels an inclination for a certain kind of food, he thinks over its consequences and then decides to take some other food for which he feels a lesser inclination. He controls himself by his will and it is his will which enables him to dissociate himself from that which is external to his being.

Hence will is identical with freedom. Reason and will liberate man from the tyranny of urges and make him rely upon himself. Of course, sometimes both inclination and will may be present. That is, one may be inclined towards something which may be the object of one's will due to the judgement of reason.

Q: Is will totally absent in cases where there is an inclination, or is it only weak?

A: Will is there, but it is weak. What I want to point out is that will and inclination are two separate things. To the extent that man is subject to inclination, his will is proportionately weak. I do not agree with Mulls Sadra (though elsewhere he has expressed an opposite opinion), Mulls Had! Sabzawari and Ibn Sina in considering inclination and will as one thing. Elsewhere they, including even Ibn Sina, have drawn a distinction between the two. Will is the state of self-possession of the soul, a state of resolution, where reason is involved and rational calculations are made and the judgement of reason prevails.

Moral imperatives relate to man as a rational being (in the same way as early Muslim Philosophers consider them as part of practical reason), not to the soul from a practical aspect. Moral approval and disapproval are judgements of practical reason (the contemplative faculty which comprehends universals) from the aspect of the government of the body. Otherwise moral norms are irrelevant to animals or to man from the viewpoint of not being subject to the judgements of reason.

Metaphorical ideas are exclusive to man. His thought has reached the point where he can apply the term for something to another thing. For instance, he sees the moon and then sees a human being possessing beauty to whom he is drawn. He applies the term for the former to the latter and transfers to the latter his feelings evoked by the moon.

This act signifies man's developed nature and no animal is capable of such an act. This act is a kind of make up and adornment; i.e. man observes a kind of beauty in someone and then he adds to it by supplementing accidental graces, while he knows that these graces do no belong to that person but are charms borrowed from extraneous colour, water, and line but which heighten his feelings of attraction towards that person. This is what happens in metaphorical and poetical expressions.

When the poet refers to something with metaphors, that thing assumes a greater charm in his sight, as in the case of Rudaki who wrote those verses for the Samanid prince using those metaphors for Bukhara. Bukhara remained what it was but he projected the city in such charming terms that they moved the prince. These are miracles of the human mind.

Q: Is this the Pavlovian conditioned reflex?

A: No. Pavlovian conditioned reflex relates to the materialist approach to perception (not to normative concepts) which tries to give a materialist interpretation to human thought. Pavlov talks of involuntary human reflexes. The issue of conditioned reflex or association of ideas is different from the issue of values and metaphor. In the latter there is no succession and association. Here one sees something as something else. That is, he joins it to the other and applies the definition of one thing to another thing. There is no succession of ideas as in association. In metaphor there is a simultaneous unification of two things, not a succession of several things. This is what gives the power of passion and pathos to elegies.

Thus one of the objections against the Allamah's view is that he generalizes the faculty of normative formulation to all animate beings, whereas it is exclusive to man and that too to his practical reason.

Early Muslim philosophers defined practical wisdom, which includes ethics, as the science of man's voluntary actions in respect of how they ought to be and how they can be best and most perfect. This definition given by early Muslim philosophers is somewhat similar to that of theoretical wisdom which deals with the most perfect order and the question whether or not the existing order is the best and most perfect order possible. This question however relates to whether something exists or not, and in the discussion of man's voluntary acts the question relates to how something ought to be and how it can be most perfect.

According to modern philosophers ethics deals with the question, How should one live one's life, i.e. it does not deal with how men live but with how they should live. This almost amounts to the same thing with certain added qualifications. One relates to universality. When the early Muslim philosophers defined ethics as a science of man's voluntary acts they meant a universal prescription for all human beings, not for any particular person.

The other point that should be mentioned here is that when modern philosophers hold that ethics deals with how one should live one's life, a qualification is to added here-and they often add it themselves, thus coming closer to the viewpoint of ancient philosophers-stating that what is meant is a life imbued with sublimity and sanctity. The meaning of ethics is loaded with a sense of sublimity and sanctity, or value in contemporary terms.

Another point whose mention here is not without benefit is that when it said that ethics is the science of how one must live one's life, that includes behaviour and habit, that is, what kind of conduct and habits one must have to lead a worthy life.

Another point that is mentioned nowadays, which is also found in our philosophy, is that ethics deals only with how man should live and it is assumed that man's nature is already known, and it is with the knowledge of this nature that the question of how he must live so that his life possesses sublimity and sanctity arises.

As we know, the existentialists have certain views about the fundamentality of existence (Mulls Sadra's philosophy is also based on the fundamentally of existence) and they hold man to be a potential and indeterminate being. That is, his essence is not predetermined and it is man's acts which form his habits and these habits constitute man's identity and essence. Man does not have an essence apart from his habits and they constitute the substantial actuality of man's existence.

It is his habits and traits which make and determine man's being. More precisely, ethics is not only the science of how one should live but the science of what one should become.

When we talk of ethics as the science of how one should live, it is assumed that we know what we are and then go one to discuss how man with his fixed nature and essence, which is the same in all men, is to live. But if we hold that habits constitute the essence of man then ethics will take a new dimension. If man can shape his reality with his morals and habits, then his inner being and essence will change and accordingly ethics assumes a more profound meaning.

Men have the same form, but from the spiritual viewpoint their reality depends on their morals and habits. Hence the definition of `man' may apply to some persons in respect of form while in respect of their inner being the term `animal' may be true of them.

With this definition of practical wisdom let us follow up the foregoing discussion. We said that the issue of moral imperatives signifies man's relation to a certain act and stems from his feeling. That is man's nature seeks certain goals and in consonance with those ends certain feelings emerge in his conscious faculty. He desires what his nature seeks, and this finally leads him to declare, `I like that thing' and `It is good.'

Bertrand Russell and others hold-and Allamah Tabatabai's views lead to the same conclusion-that there can be no objective criterion for ethics. For instance, when I say that something is good, it means I like it, and my liking it does not mean that somebody else should also like it. Others may like something else. Those who lived in the past regarded what they liked as good, while today people regard something else as good.

Here a question arises: How can ethical issues be demonstrated?, How can we argue as to what is good and what is bad? The Allamah is of the view that these are indemonstrable, for normative matters cannot be proven. We can only test them on the basis of utility (futility). That is, the mind's normative formulations are meant to achieve certain goals and if they do not help one reach them they are invalid.

Moral issues cannot be tested except through the test of utility. They are not objective matters that can be proven by experiment or reasoning. They can be proven neither be deduction nor by the empirical method. In deduction the premises are based on self evident-principles, or on empirical experience, whereas practical wisdom is concerned with the concept of good and bad and these concepts are derive from ought and ought not, which in their turn depend upon likes and dislikes,

which are not identical in all people and vary according to their personal situation, interests, pursuits and their attachments to various creeds, groups, and nations. Therefore, every individual and groups likes certain things and therefore moral values are inevitably subjective and relative. Hence moral concepts are not objective issues susceptible to logical proof or deductive or inductive methods.

Three Ethical Theories

Bertrand Russell is one of the thinkers who arrived at the same conclusion through his philosophy of logical analysis. In his book, A History of Western Philosophy, while examining Plato's conception of justice and Trasymachus's famous objection against it, that justice is nothing but the interests of the powerful, Russell is of the view that this is the basic problem of politics and ethics: is there any criterion iii ethics to distinguish between good and bad except that which is meant by those who use these terms? If there is no such criterion then most of Trasymachus's conclusions will inescapable.

But how can one say that such a criterion exists? Elsewhere Russell says that the difference between Plato and Trasymachus is very important. Plato thinks that he can prove that his idea of republic is good. A democrat who accepts the objectivity of ethics may think that he can prove the Republic to be immoral; but anyone who agrees with Trasymachus will say: There is no question of proving or disproving; the only question is whether you like or not.

If you do, it is good for you; if you do not it is bad for you. It is like matters of taste; one may like a certain kind of food and say that this food is good and others may like another kind and say that, that food is good. There is no absolute good to compare other goods with. He further says that if you like it, it is good for you; if you do not, it is bad for you.

If some like it and some don't the matter cannot be decided by reason, but only by force. That which is said that justice belongs to the powerful, that is because when some people like something and others don't, those who have greater power impose their wishes on others by force and that becomes law.

The gist of Russell's statements is that the concepts of good and bad indicate the relation between man and the thing in question. If this relation is one of liking it is good and if it is one of dislike then it is bad. If it is neither liked nor disliked, then it neither good nor evil. We have written that the answer to Russell is that first we have to trace the roots of why man likes something and dislikes something else.

Man likes anything that serves the purpose of life even if from a particular aspect. In other words, nature always moves towards its perfection and in order to impel man to carry out that which must be accomplished through his will and choice it has placed desire, liking and love in him in the same way that it has informed him with the notions of good and evil.

As nature moves towards individual perfection and expediency, it also moves towards the perfection of the species as well. Basically the individual's perfection is not separable from the perfection of his species. The individual's perfection lies in that of the species, and inevitably a kind of likes equally shared by all individuals take shape equally in all individuals. These similar, uniform, universal and absolute likes constitute the universal criterion of morality.

Justice and other moral values are the ends towards which nature moves for the perfection of the kind. In order to attain such ends through voluntary action it creates a liking for these ends in all individuals. By virtue of that liking the oughts and ought nots appear in the form of a series of universal imperatives in die soul.

Accordingly, to have a universal criterion in ethics it is not necessary to consider good and evil objective entities like whiteness and blackness, roundness and squareness. Russell considers the ego in "I like it," as an ego solely concerned with its material and physical interests, not as an ego which is concerned with its spiritual nobility or as an ego that is concerned with the interests of its kind.

Here we will mention two or three hypotheses and then try to substantiate the above remarks. First we have to see whether or not there actually exists a set of common, universal and permanent imperatives in man's soul (this minor premise has to be derived through experience). That is, do there exist in the human conscience any notions commonly held by all individuals in addition to the temporary, particular, and individual notions of good and bad? I mean those universal imperatives that are devoid of personal preferences and tastes in which all that is relevant is personal interest. Do such imperatives exist according to which man makes judgements occasionally even despite his personal preferences?

One may say I don't know the analysis of such an issue, but I know this much that I and all people have certain universal precepts according to which we judge, for instance, that honesty is good in itself, whatever the basis of this judgement, or that it is good to return kindness for kindness. This judgement transcends all personal interests, and one cannot deny if someone says that a kindness returned for kindness a thousand years ago is praiseworthy or that anyone who ever returned evil for kindness is blameworthy.

Undeniably there are two kinds of acts involved here; one act is praiseworthy and valuable for man and the other is worthless or has a negative value. If one were to compare with a free mind two kinds of characters, such as Abu Dharr and Mu'awiyah, in order to make a judgement concerning them, he will see that Abu Dharr was a man to whom Mu'awiyah was ready to give everything to buy his loyalty and to make him relinquish his higher principles. He did not surrender to the devices of Mu'awiyah who had made everything a means of attaining his ambitions.

Here one naturally commends the former and condemns the latter. The same test may be applied in case of other characters and the result will invariably be the same. We are not concerned with the opinion that all judgements concerning goodness and badness derive from likes or dislikes. That may be true, but firstly we want to see whether or not there exist common and universal judgements. Secondly, if they do, how can we justify them? Are they justifiable according to what the A(lamah and Russell have said?

We said that there are two kinds of ought and ought not; one kind is particular and individual which we regularly come across in everyday life. For instance, I ought to eat such food, I ought to wear such a dress, and so on. The second kind of imperatives, of which examples were cited, is universal in nature.

Now the question is what is the basis of such universal judgements? If we do not agree with the theologians in considering goodness and badness as objective attributes and hold that these notions ultimately pertain to man's relation to a thing, then how can we justify universal moral judgements?

First Theory

There are three kinds of justification. According to the first, man has certain urges which serve to fulfill his individual needs. For instance when hungry, he feels an urge for food. Man has also another kind of urges which are species oriented. That is, man may desire something which is not for his individual benefit but for the sake of others. For instance, man does like others to, go hungry in the same way that he does not want to remain hungry himself. God has created man such. If we accept this justification, then the Allamah's view becomes implausible for he holds that man's motives are consonant with his natural urges. That is, man's motives are subject to his individual nature.

He holds the principle of employment to be a universal principle and this conflicts with the foregoing justification. For according to it a self-seeking act is ordinary and mediocre, but when the same act is formed for the sake of others it is considered to be sublime and sacred. Here serving others is a criterion of sanctity and self-seeking a criterion of its absence.

If an act is meant for one's own benefit it is for individual benefit and if it is for others it is for mankind in general, and such an act is moral in nature. Thus the criterion of the moral or immoral character of an act depends in one sense on its being for one's own self or for the sake of others, that is, in its purpose being individual or universal. It is universality that gives value to an act although in other respects it is no different from an act done for personal and individual motives.

Accordingly, it is true that `It is good' means `I like it', but sometimes I may like something for myself and sometime for the sake of others. Inevitably, what I like for others and for their benefit takes a universal aspect (for it is not for the sake of any particular persons among others) and is permanent value. Accordingly, moral acts are also universal and permanent. A moral act is one that stems from liking others' good and benefit. This makes ethics universal and permanent. This approach to ethics also justifies certain cases like lying for the sake of some beneficial purpose. Why is truthfulness good? Because the general good lies in truthfulness.

If truthfulness should prove to be injurious then it is immoral, for truthfulness is not good in itself. The criterion of goodness is service to others. In cases where truthfulness amounts to betraying others, it becomes bad. Here ethics assumes solely asocial dimension (nowadays `ethics' is usually considered to mean social ethics).

Accordingly, we arrive at a conclusion that there is a universal principle in ethics which is eternal and permanent, although. it may have changing instances. There is a diference between the impermanence of an ethical principle and the impermanence of its instances. The question is whether moral principles are permanent or not. Accordingly to our justification moral acts are reducible to one immutable principle, that is, service to others.

Q: In fact this principle is a kind of hypothesis, that is, it is assumed that ethics is service to others, then it is declared that it is universal and permanent principle. However, someone may make some other assumption and hold that ethics means self-help in which case he would produce another immutable and universal principle.

A: You have missed the first premises. As I said there are certain issues on which all men make the same judgement. That-is, all viewpoints are identical about a certain act. Besides, all consider it a valuable act. Service to others is something about which I and you have the same feeling. Moreover, I view it as something sublime and above personal interests in the same way that you view it.

Then we posed the question as to how such a universal principle could exist when values like goodness and badness stem from likes and dislikes, which are changeable. Yes, if all likes were rooted in selfish motives, as Russell believes and as can be inferred from the Allamah's words, then such an objection could be valid, but not if it is held that man is created with two kinds of motives.

Q: The word `others' in the foregoing discussion is somewhat ambiguous. It seems that it cannot be taken in an absolute sense. For example, a soldier who fights for the interest of foreigners, fights for others but his act is not ethical.

A: By `others' I mean mankind. That is, an act that is for the sake of mankind, not for the benefit of one individual and to the detriment another. We have an individual ego as well as a collective ego, which includes a person's family and relations (every tyrant is a benefactor for his family). Here the concept of the self is extended. Moral acts go beyond the limit of the ego and sometimes transcend even the domain of humanity (being for the sake of God). Morality begins where the confines of the ego are transcended.

However, this theory cannot be accepted due to the objections that arise against it on the basis of the Allamah's theory, which cannot be set aside so simply by conceding that there is a disharmony between man's conscious being and his individual nature. For that would mean that individual nature moves in one direction and his conscious being in another, solely pursuing the perfection of species without attending to individual perfection. The result would be that man's conscious being, which is at the service of his nature-and so it must be-will be brought into the service of the species without any concern for the individual's interests.

Q: On the basis of what you have said, service to the species is also part of man's nature?

A: No. Service to species is not part of individual nature, but man takes pleasure in helping others and that is not without reason. For individual nature cannot derive pleasure without moving towards perfection. According to Ibn Sina if man feels pleasure, it does not mean that nafure and feeling move on different independent courses. Rather it is nature that achieves its perfection, and when that happens pleasure is felt if it is perceived through knowledge by presence.

That is, the very movement of nature from potentiality to perfection is identical with pleasure when perceived through knowledge by presence. Pleasure is nature's attainment to perfection when it is perceivable. It is impossible for man to take pleasure without nature attaining a perfection.

Second Theory

There is another theory advocated by some contemporary thinkers. According to it, it is impossible for man to desire anything that is unrelated to his own self. Whatever the individual enjoys doing is ultimately related to his own self. However, man has two selves: an individual self and a collective self. Biologically man is an individual, but from the social point of view he has also a social self.

The other point that Durkheim and others have made-and Allamah Tabatabai has derived it from the Qur'an without being aware of their ideas-is that society has also a self and personality which is real and objective. Society is not a sum total of individuals in the sense of a numericat totality, and it is not the case that it is individuals who are fundamental and they merely influence society.

Rather, society is a real and unique compound of individuals (of course, it is different from natural compounds in which individual elements totally lose their independent identity). In this kind of composition, individuals, who retain their separate wills and independence, share in a single self. Every member has a feeling of possessing two selves; sometime it is conscious of the individual self and sometime of the social self. According to some sociologists society reaches self-consciousness in the individual; that is, society is conscious of its being in the individual being.

The sufis and gnostics hold a similar view. William James also has a similar view. With certain a difference the gnostics believe in a kind of unity among the souls and hold that the real self is the universal self. They say that man mistakenly considers his own as a distinct self and they ultimately reduce the real self to God, believing that the individual self is nothing more than a manifestation of that real self. It is as if there were a universal spirit that reveals itself in different individuals and all these selves derive from the one Divine self.

William James also arrived at the same conclusion through psychological experiences. He holds that there is an inner connection between individual selves of which they are often unaware. One who purifies his self can get to know the contents of consciousness of other selves through that inner connection (like wells that are connected to each other under the ground while they are separate on the surface).

This connection stems from their union with the Divine source. But sociologists are of the view that individuals on merging in society develop a social self which is a real cultural entity. Sometime man is conscious of this self which is not his individual self but a universal social self. Accordingly man's has two kinds of activities those motivated by individual motives and others prompted by social motives.

According to the first theory man has dual motives, one of which is directed to serves his own self and the other to serve others. According to the second theory man has two selves and two sets of feelings: the individual self and feeling which serve the individual self and another self and feeling which serve the collective self.

A moral act is one which is not motivated by the individual self but by the collective self. The collective self is permanent and universal. The conclusion that follows from the second theory is that every action that stems from the collective self is a moral act and that which stems from the individual self is not moral in nature. Of course, the instances of this principle may vary, but in any case this can be a universal and permanent principle.

Third Theory

There is a third theory according to which it is impossible that man should do anything which is unrelated to the domain of his self and has no relation to his personality, being exclusively in the service of something external and without being related to the realm of his being. Man, however, has two selves, higher and lower.

That is, man is a being with dual aspects. In one aspect he is an animal like other animals and in the other he has a higher reality. It is amazing why Allamah Tabatabai did not advance such a view, for it is consistent with his own principles including those relating to ethics. When we speak of `man's nature,' we mean man's reality, not merely his physical nature.

Man has an ontological reality and his emotional being is subordinate to that reality. The ontological being of man one plane consists of his animal being and on a higher plane of his spiritual being.

Man completely realizes this higher self in himself or rather considers it his more original self. When animal needs conflict with his judgement based on reason and will and he wishes to subject his animal needs to his reason there may be two kinds of consequences. At times he succeeds and at other time he fails.

For instance, in the matter of food and its quantity, reason has its own judgement whereas his appetite requires something else. When man yields to his appetite he has a feeling of defeat, and when he overcomes his appetite he feels victorious, while in reality he has neither been defeated by anyone nor has he been victorious over anyone.

Here one aspect of his existence is dominated r by another aspect. Apparently, he should feel either defeated or victorious in both cases, for both belong to the realm of his existence. But practically we see that it is not so. When reason dominates over appetite, he has a feeling of victory and when appetite overcomes reason he feels defeated.

That is because his real self is the one associated with reason and will, and his animal aspect constitutes his lower self. Actually the lower self forms a prelude to his real self. If we believe in such a duality in man's being then we can justify ethical principles in the following manner.

Man has certain perfections by virtue of his spiritual self. These perfections are real and not conventional, for man is not only body but soul as well. Any act that is consistent with man's spiritual perfection is valuable, and any act that is irrelevant to the higher aspect of our soul is an ordinary and mediocre act.

I agree with the Allamah, Russell, and others that good and bad, ought and ought-not derive from man's likes and dislikes. But the question is: the likes or dislikes of which self are to taken as the criterion, those of the higher self or those of the lower self? Moral value arises if it is the higher self that likes.

This is the reason why ethics is felt to have a higher station. That man sees one aspect of his existence and acts pertaining to it as possessing sublimity is not a mental construct or convention. Rather, that is because he feels that aspect to be a more perfect and stronger aspect of his being. All his perfections derive from that aspect of his existence and its intensity, and all defects derive from its weakness.

In accordance with this approach, virtues like honesty, truthfulness, kindness, mercy, beneficence and the like are notions which have affinity to the higher self. The philosophers have also said that practical wisdom relates to voluntary acts from the viewpoint of being more perfect and excellent.

They relate the matter ultimately to the soul, and maintain that the human soul possesses two kind of perfections: theoretical and practical. Theoretical perfection of soul lies in the knowledge of the realities of the world and the higher virtues are considered practical perfection of the soul. That is, they develop the soul practically and brings about a harmony in its relation with the body and pave the way for the real perfection of the soul.

Here we reach a most significant Islamic principle which has not been discussed by the philosophers. That principle is as follows: man has an innate nobility and sublimity which is the same as his spiritual being and the Divine breath. Subconsciously he senses that dignity within himself. In confrontation with actions and habits he ascertains whether they are compatible with his innate nobility or not. When he feels that there is a compatibility and harmony, he regards it as good and virtuous, otherwise as evil and vicious. In the same way that animals are guided by instinct to what is beneficial or harmful for them, the human soul has perfections transcending nature and some actions and habits are compatible with those perfections.

Universal values relating to good and evil, oughts and ought-hots may be justified in the following manner: Human beings are created alike in respect of that in which their spiritual perfection lies, with similar and uniform likes and viewpoints. Although physically and naturally all men live in different conditions and situations and with varying physical needs, but they are equally situated in respect to their spiritual perfection.

Inevitably, in that domain likes and dislikes and notions of what is good and evil assume a uniform, universal and permanent aspect. All moral virtues, whether individual or social, such as patience and the like, can be explained from this viewpoint. The two theories mentioned earlier can explain only social values like self-sacrifice, helping others, etc., but they cannot explain values like patience, fortitude and so on. The last theory on the contrary can explain all moral values.

Though I agree with the view that all perceptions of good and evil signify a thing's relation with its perfection, nevertheless such perceptions of good and evil can be universal and permanent.

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Will and Natural Urge

An explanation that is necessary here is that his application of the principle of employment to all animate beings is not acceptable. In my footnotes to the chapter I have discussed the issue in a manner which does not assume such a generalization. It is not even true of man in all his voluntarily acts but only of some of his voluntarily actions which are performed thoughtfully. It is here that the issues of moral imperative and the rational character of what is moral and immoral arise. The acts of immature persons, like infants taking milk, are rather derived from instinct.

Elsewhere I have drawn a distinction between urge and will. The animal, contrary to what is said loosely that an animal is that which moves voluntarily, acts according to inclination and urge. In a mature human being there is a relation between will and reason on the one hand and between inclination or appetite and reason on the other. Urge is a passive state.

In an animal or man that acts under urge, the greater the influence of urge the lesser is the role of thought, consciousness and reason and the action takes an involuntary form. For example, when man sees food, he feels inclined towards it and it is as if there were something external that draws him towards itself. On the contrary, when man acts according to his will, he withdraws from what is external to his being and his decision arises from his inner being.

For example, if he has feels an inclination for a certain kind of food, he thinks over its consequences and then decides to take some other food for which he feels a lesser inclination. He controls himself by his will and it is his will which enables him to dissociate himself from that which is external to his being.

Hence will is identical with freedom. Reason and will liberate man from the tyranny of urges and make him rely upon himself. Of course, sometimes both inclination and will may be present. That is, one may be inclined towards something which may be the object of one's will due to the judgement of reason.

Q: Is will totally absent in cases where there is an inclination, or is it only weak?

A: Will is there, but it is weak. What I want to point out is that will and inclination are two separate things. To the extent that man is subject to inclination, his will is proportionately weak. I do not agree with Mulls Sadra (though elsewhere he has expressed an opposite opinion), Mulls Had! Sabzawari and Ibn Sina in considering inclination and will as one thing. Elsewhere they, including even Ibn Sina, have drawn a distinction between the two. Will is the state of self-possession of the soul, a state of resolution, where reason is involved and rational calculations are made and the judgement of reason prevails.

Moral imperatives relate to man as a rational being (in the same way as early Muslim Philosophers consider them as part of practical reason), not to the soul from a practical aspect. Moral approval and disapproval are judgements of practical reason (the contemplative faculty which comprehends universals) from the aspect of the government of the body. Otherwise moral norms are irrelevant to animals or to man from the viewpoint of not being subject to the judgements of reason.

Metaphorical ideas are exclusive to man. His thought has reached the point where he can apply the term for something to another thing. For instance, he sees the moon and then sees a human being possessing beauty to whom he is drawn. He applies the term for the former to the latter and transfers to the latter his feelings evoked by the moon.

This act signifies man's developed nature and no animal is capable of such an act. This act is a kind of make up and adornment; i.e. man observes a kind of beauty in someone and then he adds to it by supplementing accidental graces, while he knows that these graces do no belong to that person but are charms borrowed from extraneous colour, water, and line but which heighten his feelings of attraction towards that person. This is what happens in metaphorical and poetical expressions.

When the poet refers to something with metaphors, that thing assumes a greater charm in his sight, as in the case of Rudaki who wrote those verses for the Samanid prince using those metaphors for Bukhara. Bukhara remained what it was but he projected the city in such charming terms that they moved the prince. These are miracles of the human mind.

Q: Is this the Pavlovian conditioned reflex?

A: No. Pavlovian conditioned reflex relates to the materialist approach to perception (not to normative concepts) which tries to give a materialist interpretation to human thought. Pavlov talks of involuntary human reflexes. The issue of conditioned reflex or association of ideas is different from the issue of values and metaphor. In the latter there is no succession and association. Here one sees something as something else. That is, he joins it to the other and applies the definition of one thing to another thing. There is no succession of ideas as in association. In metaphor there is a simultaneous unification of two things, not a succession of several things. This is what gives the power of passion and pathos to elegies.

Thus one of the objections against the Allamah's view is that he generalizes the faculty of normative formulation to all animate beings, whereas it is exclusive to man and that too to his practical reason.

Early Muslim philosophers defined practical wisdom, which includes ethics, as the science of man's voluntary actions in respect of how they ought to be and how they can be best and most perfect. This definition given by early Muslim philosophers is somewhat similar to that of theoretical wisdom which deals with the most perfect order and the question whether or not the existing order is the best and most perfect order possible. This question however relates to whether something exists or not, and in the discussion of man's voluntary acts the question relates to how something ought to be and how it can be most perfect.

According to modern philosophers ethics deals with the question, How should one live one's life, i.e. it does not deal with how men live but with how they should live. This almost amounts to the same thing with certain added qualifications. One relates to universality. When the early Muslim philosophers defined ethics as a science of man's voluntary acts they meant a universal prescription for all human beings, not for any particular person.

The other point that should be mentioned here is that when modern philosophers hold that ethics deals with how one should live one's life, a qualification is to added here-and they often add it themselves, thus coming closer to the viewpoint of ancient philosophers-stating that what is meant is a life imbued with sublimity and sanctity. The meaning of ethics is loaded with a sense of sublimity and sanctity, or value in contemporary terms.

Another point whose mention here is not without benefit is that when it said that ethics is the science of how one must live one's life, that includes behaviour and habit, that is, what kind of conduct and habits one must have to lead a worthy life.

Another point that is mentioned nowadays, which is also found in our philosophy, is that ethics deals only with how man should live and it is assumed that man's nature is already known, and it is with the knowledge of this nature that the question of how he must live so that his life possesses sublimity and sanctity arises.

As we know, the existentialists have certain views about the fundamentality of existence (Mulls Sadra's philosophy is also based on the fundamentally of existence) and they hold man to be a potential and indeterminate being. That is, his essence is not predetermined and it is man's acts which form his habits and these habits constitute man's identity and essence. Man does not have an essence apart from his habits and they constitute the substantial actuality of man's existence.

It is his habits and traits which make and determine man's being. More precisely, ethics is not only the science of how one should live but the science of what one should become.

When we talk of ethics as the science of how one should live, it is assumed that we know what we are and then go one to discuss how man with his fixed nature and essence, which is the same in all men, is to live. But if we hold that habits constitute the essence of man then ethics will take a new dimension. If man can shape his reality with his morals and habits, then his inner being and essence will change and accordingly ethics assumes a more profound meaning.

Men have the same form, but from the spiritual viewpoint their reality depends on their morals and habits. Hence the definition of `man' may apply to some persons in respect of form while in respect of their inner being the term `animal' may be true of them.

With this definition of practical wisdom let us follow up the foregoing discussion. We said that the issue of moral imperatives signifies man's relation to a certain act and stems from his feeling. That is man's nature seeks certain goals and in consonance with those ends certain feelings emerge in his conscious faculty. He desires what his nature seeks, and this finally leads him to declare, `I like that thing' and `It is good.'

Bertrand Russell and others hold-and Allamah Tabatabai's views lead to the same conclusion-that there can be no objective criterion for ethics. For instance, when I say that something is good, it means I like it, and my liking it does not mean that somebody else should also like it. Others may like something else. Those who lived in the past regarded what they liked as good, while today people regard something else as good.

Here a question arises: How can ethical issues be demonstrated?, How can we argue as to what is good and what is bad? The Allamah is of the view that these are indemonstrable, for normative matters cannot be proven. We can only test them on the basis of utility (futility). That is, the mind's normative formulations are meant to achieve certain goals and if they do not help one reach them they are invalid.

Moral issues cannot be tested except through the test of utility. They are not objective matters that can be proven by experiment or reasoning. They can be proven neither be deduction nor by the empirical method. In deduction the premises are based on self evident-principles, or on empirical experience, whereas practical wisdom is concerned with the concept of good and bad and these concepts are derive from ought and ought not, which in their turn depend upon likes and dislikes,

which are not identical in all people and vary according to their personal situation, interests, pursuits and their attachments to various creeds, groups, and nations. Therefore, every individual and groups likes certain things and therefore moral values are inevitably subjective and relative. Hence moral concepts are not objective issues susceptible to logical proof or deductive or inductive methods.

Three Ethical Theories

Bertrand Russell is one of the thinkers who arrived at the same conclusion through his philosophy of logical analysis. In his book, A History of Western Philosophy, while examining Plato's conception of justice and Trasymachus's famous objection against it, that justice is nothing but the interests of the powerful, Russell is of the view that this is the basic problem of politics and ethics: is there any criterion iii ethics to distinguish between good and bad except that which is meant by those who use these terms? If there is no such criterion then most of Trasymachus's conclusions will inescapable.

But how can one say that such a criterion exists? Elsewhere Russell says that the difference between Plato and Trasymachus is very important. Plato thinks that he can prove that his idea of republic is good. A democrat who accepts the objectivity of ethics may think that he can prove the Republic to be immoral; but anyone who agrees with Trasymachus will say: There is no question of proving or disproving; the only question is whether you like or not.

If you do, it is good for you; if you do not it is bad for you. It is like matters of taste; one may like a certain kind of food and say that this food is good and others may like another kind and say that, that food is good. There is no absolute good to compare other goods with. He further says that if you like it, it is good for you; if you do not, it is bad for you.

If some like it and some don't the matter cannot be decided by reason, but only by force. That which is said that justice belongs to the powerful, that is because when some people like something and others don't, those who have greater power impose their wishes on others by force and that becomes law.

The gist of Russell's statements is that the concepts of good and bad indicate the relation between man and the thing in question. If this relation is one of liking it is good and if it is one of dislike then it is bad. If it is neither liked nor disliked, then it neither good nor evil. We have written that the answer to Russell is that first we have to trace the roots of why man likes something and dislikes something else.

Man likes anything that serves the purpose of life even if from a particular aspect. In other words, nature always moves towards its perfection and in order to impel man to carry out that which must be accomplished through his will and choice it has placed desire, liking and love in him in the same way that it has informed him with the notions of good and evil.

As nature moves towards individual perfection and expediency, it also moves towards the perfection of the species as well. Basically the individual's perfection is not separable from the perfection of his species. The individual's perfection lies in that of the species, and inevitably a kind of likes equally shared by all individuals take shape equally in all individuals. These similar, uniform, universal and absolute likes constitute the universal criterion of morality.

Justice and other moral values are the ends towards which nature moves for the perfection of the kind. In order to attain such ends through voluntary action it creates a liking for these ends in all individuals. By virtue of that liking the oughts and ought nots appear in the form of a series of universal imperatives in die soul.

Accordingly, to have a universal criterion in ethics it is not necessary to consider good and evil objective entities like whiteness and blackness, roundness and squareness. Russell considers the ego in "I like it," as an ego solely concerned with its material and physical interests, not as an ego which is concerned with its spiritual nobility or as an ego that is concerned with the interests of its kind.

Here we will mention two or three hypotheses and then try to substantiate the above remarks. First we have to see whether or not there actually exists a set of common, universal and permanent imperatives in man's soul (this minor premise has to be derived through experience). That is, do there exist in the human conscience any notions commonly held by all individuals in addition to the temporary, particular, and individual notions of good and bad? I mean those universal imperatives that are devoid of personal preferences and tastes in which all that is relevant is personal interest. Do such imperatives exist according to which man makes judgements occasionally even despite his personal preferences?

One may say I don't know the analysis of such an issue, but I know this much that I and all people have certain universal precepts according to which we judge, for instance, that honesty is good in itself, whatever the basis of this judgement, or that it is good to return kindness for kindness. This judgement transcends all personal interests, and one cannot deny if someone says that a kindness returned for kindness a thousand years ago is praiseworthy or that anyone who ever returned evil for kindness is blameworthy.

Undeniably there are two kinds of acts involved here; one act is praiseworthy and valuable for man and the other is worthless or has a negative value. If one were to compare with a free mind two kinds of characters, such as Abu Dharr and Mu'awiyah, in order to make a judgement concerning them, he will see that Abu Dharr was a man to whom Mu'awiyah was ready to give everything to buy his loyalty and to make him relinquish his higher principles. He did not surrender to the devices of Mu'awiyah who had made everything a means of attaining his ambitions.

Here one naturally commends the former and condemns the latter. The same test may be applied in case of other characters and the result will invariably be the same. We are not concerned with the opinion that all judgements concerning goodness and badness derive from likes or dislikes. That may be true, but firstly we want to see whether or not there exist common and universal judgements. Secondly, if they do, how can we justify them? Are they justifiable according to what the A(lamah and Russell have said?

We said that there are two kinds of ought and ought not; one kind is particular and individual which we regularly come across in everyday life. For instance, I ought to eat such food, I ought to wear such a dress, and so on. The second kind of imperatives, of which examples were cited, is universal in nature.

Now the question is what is the basis of such universal judgements? If we do not agree with the theologians in considering goodness and badness as objective attributes and hold that these notions ultimately pertain to man's relation to a thing, then how can we justify universal moral judgements?

First Theory

There are three kinds of justification. According to the first, man has certain urges which serve to fulfill his individual needs. For instance when hungry, he feels an urge for food. Man has also another kind of urges which are species oriented. That is, man may desire something which is not for his individual benefit but for the sake of others. For instance, man does like others to, go hungry in the same way that he does not want to remain hungry himself. God has created man such. If we accept this justification, then the Allamah's view becomes implausible for he holds that man's motives are consonant with his natural urges. That is, man's motives are subject to his individual nature.

He holds the principle of employment to be a universal principle and this conflicts with the foregoing justification. For according to it a self-seeking act is ordinary and mediocre, but when the same act is formed for the sake of others it is considered to be sublime and sacred. Here serving others is a criterion of sanctity and self-seeking a criterion of its absence.

If an act is meant for one's own benefit it is for individual benefit and if it is for others it is for mankind in general, and such an act is moral in nature. Thus the criterion of the moral or immoral character of an act depends in one sense on its being for one's own self or for the sake of others, that is, in its purpose being individual or universal. It is universality that gives value to an act although in other respects it is no different from an act done for personal and individual motives.

Accordingly, it is true that `It is good' means `I like it', but sometimes I may like something for myself and sometime for the sake of others. Inevitably, what I like for others and for their benefit takes a universal aspect (for it is not for the sake of any particular persons among others) and is permanent value. Accordingly, moral acts are also universal and permanent. A moral act is one that stems from liking others' good and benefit. This makes ethics universal and permanent. This approach to ethics also justifies certain cases like lying for the sake of some beneficial purpose. Why is truthfulness good? Because the general good lies in truthfulness.

If truthfulness should prove to be injurious then it is immoral, for truthfulness is not good in itself. The criterion of goodness is service to others. In cases where truthfulness amounts to betraying others, it becomes bad. Here ethics assumes solely asocial dimension (nowadays `ethics' is usually considered to mean social ethics).

Accordingly, we arrive at a conclusion that there is a universal principle in ethics which is eternal and permanent, although. it may have changing instances. There is a diference between the impermanence of an ethical principle and the impermanence of its instances. The question is whether moral principles are permanent or not. Accordingly to our justification moral acts are reducible to one immutable principle, that is, service to others.

Q: In fact this principle is a kind of hypothesis, that is, it is assumed that ethics is service to others, then it is declared that it is universal and permanent principle. However, someone may make some other assumption and hold that ethics means self-help in which case he would produce another immutable and universal principle.

A: You have missed the first premises. As I said there are certain issues on which all men make the same judgement. That-is, all viewpoints are identical about a certain act. Besides, all consider it a valuable act. Service to others is something about which I and you have the same feeling. Moreover, I view it as something sublime and above personal interests in the same way that you view it.

Then we posed the question as to how such a universal principle could exist when values like goodness and badness stem from likes and dislikes, which are changeable. Yes, if all likes were rooted in selfish motives, as Russell believes and as can be inferred from the Allamah's words, then such an objection could be valid, but not if it is held that man is created with two kinds of motives.

Q: The word `others' in the foregoing discussion is somewhat ambiguous. It seems that it cannot be taken in an absolute sense. For example, a soldier who fights for the interest of foreigners, fights for others but his act is not ethical.

A: By `others' I mean mankind. That is, an act that is for the sake of mankind, not for the benefit of one individual and to the detriment another. We have an individual ego as well as a collective ego, which includes a person's family and relations (every tyrant is a benefactor for his family). Here the concept of the self is extended. Moral acts go beyond the limit of the ego and sometimes transcend even the domain of humanity (being for the sake of God). Morality begins where the confines of the ego are transcended.

However, this theory cannot be accepted due to the objections that arise against it on the basis of the Allamah's theory, which cannot be set aside so simply by conceding that there is a disharmony between man's conscious being and his individual nature. For that would mean that individual nature moves in one direction and his conscious being in another, solely pursuing the perfection of species without attending to individual perfection. The result would be that man's conscious being, which is at the service of his nature-and so it must be-will be brought into the service of the species without any concern for the individual's interests.

Q: On the basis of what you have said, service to the species is also part of man's nature?

A: No. Service to species is not part of individual nature, but man takes pleasure in helping others and that is not without reason. For individual nature cannot derive pleasure without moving towards perfection. According to Ibn Sina if man feels pleasure, it does not mean that nafure and feeling move on different independent courses. Rather it is nature that achieves its perfection, and when that happens pleasure is felt if it is perceived through knowledge by presence.

That is, the very movement of nature from potentiality to perfection is identical with pleasure when perceived through knowledge by presence. Pleasure is nature's attainment to perfection when it is perceivable. It is impossible for man to take pleasure without nature attaining a perfection.

Second Theory

There is another theory advocated by some contemporary thinkers. According to it, it is impossible for man to desire anything that is unrelated to his own self. Whatever the individual enjoys doing is ultimately related to his own self. However, man has two selves: an individual self and a collective self. Biologically man is an individual, but from the social point of view he has also a social self.

The other point that Durkheim and others have made-and Allamah Tabatabai has derived it from the Qur'an without being aware of their ideas-is that society has also a self and personality which is real and objective. Society is not a sum total of individuals in the sense of a numericat totality, and it is not the case that it is individuals who are fundamental and they merely influence society.

Rather, society is a real and unique compound of individuals (of course, it is different from natural compounds in which individual elements totally lose their independent identity). In this kind of composition, individuals, who retain their separate wills and independence, share in a single self. Every member has a feeling of possessing two selves; sometime it is conscious of the individual self and sometime of the social self. According to some sociologists society reaches self-consciousness in the individual; that is, society is conscious of its being in the individual being.

The sufis and gnostics hold a similar view. William James also has a similar view. With certain a difference the gnostics believe in a kind of unity among the souls and hold that the real self is the universal self. They say that man mistakenly considers his own as a distinct self and they ultimately reduce the real self to God, believing that the individual self is nothing more than a manifestation of that real self. It is as if there were a universal spirit that reveals itself in different individuals and all these selves derive from the one Divine self.

William James also arrived at the same conclusion through psychological experiences. He holds that there is an inner connection between individual selves of which they are often unaware. One who purifies his self can get to know the contents of consciousness of other selves through that inner connection (like wells that are connected to each other under the ground while they are separate on the surface).

This connection stems from their union with the Divine source. But sociologists are of the view that individuals on merging in society develop a social self which is a real cultural entity. Sometime man is conscious of this self which is not his individual self but a universal social self. Accordingly man's has two kinds of activities those motivated by individual motives and others prompted by social motives.

According to the first theory man has dual motives, one of which is directed to serves his own self and the other to serve others. According to the second theory man has two selves and two sets of feelings: the individual self and feeling which serve the individual self and another self and feeling which serve the collective self.

A moral act is one which is not motivated by the individual self but by the collective self. The collective self is permanent and universal. The conclusion that follows from the second theory is that every action that stems from the collective self is a moral act and that which stems from the individual self is not moral in nature. Of course, the instances of this principle may vary, but in any case this can be a universal and permanent principle.

Third Theory

There is a third theory according to which it is impossible that man should do anything which is unrelated to the domain of his self and has no relation to his personality, being exclusively in the service of something external and without being related to the realm of his being. Man, however, has two selves, higher and lower.

That is, man is a being with dual aspects. In one aspect he is an animal like other animals and in the other he has a higher reality. It is amazing why Allamah Tabatabai did not advance such a view, for it is consistent with his own principles including those relating to ethics. When we speak of `man's nature,' we mean man's reality, not merely his physical nature.

Man has an ontological reality and his emotional being is subordinate to that reality. The ontological being of man one plane consists of his animal being and on a higher plane of his spiritual being.

Man completely realizes this higher self in himself or rather considers it his more original self. When animal needs conflict with his judgement based on reason and will and he wishes to subject his animal needs to his reason there may be two kinds of consequences. At times he succeeds and at other time he fails.

For instance, in the matter of food and its quantity, reason has its own judgement whereas his appetite requires something else. When man yields to his appetite he has a feeling of defeat, and when he overcomes his appetite he feels victorious, while in reality he has neither been defeated by anyone nor has he been victorious over anyone.

Here one aspect of his existence is dominated r by another aspect. Apparently, he should feel either defeated or victorious in both cases, for both belong to the realm of his existence. But practically we see that it is not so. When reason dominates over appetite, he has a feeling of victory and when appetite overcomes reason he feels defeated.

That is because his real self is the one associated with reason and will, and his animal aspect constitutes his lower self. Actually the lower self forms a prelude to his real self. If we believe in such a duality in man's being then we can justify ethical principles in the following manner.

Man has certain perfections by virtue of his spiritual self. These perfections are real and not conventional, for man is not only body but soul as well. Any act that is consistent with man's spiritual perfection is valuable, and any act that is irrelevant to the higher aspect of our soul is an ordinary and mediocre act.

I agree with the Allamah, Russell, and others that good and bad, ought and ought-not derive from man's likes and dislikes. But the question is: the likes or dislikes of which self are to taken as the criterion, those of the higher self or those of the lower self? Moral value arises if it is the higher self that likes.

This is the reason why ethics is felt to have a higher station. That man sees one aspect of his existence and acts pertaining to it as possessing sublimity is not a mental construct or convention. Rather, that is because he feels that aspect to be a more perfect and stronger aspect of his being. All his perfections derive from that aspect of his existence and its intensity, and all defects derive from its weakness.

In accordance with this approach, virtues like honesty, truthfulness, kindness, mercy, beneficence and the like are notions which have affinity to the higher self. The philosophers have also said that practical wisdom relates to voluntary acts from the viewpoint of being more perfect and excellent.

They relate the matter ultimately to the soul, and maintain that the human soul possesses two kind of perfections: theoretical and practical. Theoretical perfection of soul lies in the knowledge of the realities of the world and the higher virtues are considered practical perfection of the soul. That is, they develop the soul practically and brings about a harmony in its relation with the body and pave the way for the real perfection of the soul.

Here we reach a most significant Islamic principle which has not been discussed by the philosophers. That principle is as follows: man has an innate nobility and sublimity which is the same as his spiritual being and the Divine breath. Subconsciously he senses that dignity within himself. In confrontation with actions and habits he ascertains whether they are compatible with his innate nobility or not. When he feels that there is a compatibility and harmony, he regards it as good and virtuous, otherwise as evil and vicious. In the same way that animals are guided by instinct to what is beneficial or harmful for them, the human soul has perfections transcending nature and some actions and habits are compatible with those perfections.

Universal values relating to good and evil, oughts and ought-hots may be justified in the following manner: Human beings are created alike in respect of that in which their spiritual perfection lies, with similar and uniform likes and viewpoints. Although physically and naturally all men live in different conditions and situations and with varying physical needs, but they are equally situated in respect to their spiritual perfection.

Inevitably, in that domain likes and dislikes and notions of what is good and evil assume a uniform, universal and permanent aspect. All moral virtues, whether individual or social, such as patience and the like, can be explained from this viewpoint. The two theories mentioned earlier can explain only social values like self-sacrifice, helping others, etc., but they cannot explain values like patience, fortitude and so on. The last theory on the contrary can explain all moral values.

Though I agree with the view that all perceptions of good and evil signify a thing's relation with its perfection, nevertheless such perceptions of good and evil can be universal and permanent.

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Will and Natural Urge

An explanation that is necessary here is that his application of the principle of employment to all animate beings is not acceptable. In my footnotes to the chapter I have discussed the issue in a manner which does not assume such a generalization. It is not even true of man in all his voluntarily acts but only of some of his voluntarily actions which are performed thoughtfully. It is here that the issues of moral imperative and the rational character of what is moral and immoral arise. The acts of immature persons, like infants taking milk, are rather derived from instinct.

Elsewhere I have drawn a distinction between urge and will. The animal, contrary to what is said loosely that an animal is that which moves voluntarily, acts according to inclination and urge. In a mature human being there is a relation between will and reason on the one hand and between inclination or appetite and reason on the other. Urge is a passive state.

In an animal or man that acts under urge, the greater the influence of urge the lesser is the role of thought, consciousness and reason and the action takes an involuntary form. For example, when man sees food, he feels inclined towards it and it is as if there were something external that draws him towards itself. On the contrary, when man acts according to his will, he withdraws from what is external to his being and his decision arises from his inner being.

For example, if he has feels an inclination for a certain kind of food, he thinks over its consequences and then decides to take some other food for which he feels a lesser inclination. He controls himself by his will and it is his will which enables him to dissociate himself from that which is external to his being.

Hence will is identical with freedom. Reason and will liberate man from the tyranny of urges and make him rely upon himself. Of course, sometimes both inclination and will may be present. That is, one may be inclined towards something which may be the object of one's will due to the judgement of reason.

Q: Is will totally absent in cases where there is an inclination, or is it only weak?

A: Will is there, but it is weak. What I want to point out is that will and inclination are two separate things. To the extent that man is subject to inclination, his will is proportionately weak. I do not agree with Mulls Sadra (though elsewhere he has expressed an opposite opinion), Mulls Had! Sabzawari and Ibn Sina in considering inclination and will as one thing. Elsewhere they, including even Ibn Sina, have drawn a distinction between the two. Will is the state of self-possession of the soul, a state of resolution, where reason is involved and rational calculations are made and the judgement of reason prevails.

Moral imperatives relate to man as a rational being (in the same way as early Muslim Philosophers consider them as part of practical reason), not to the soul from a practical aspect. Moral approval and disapproval are judgements of practical reason (the contemplative faculty which comprehends universals) from the aspect of the government of the body. Otherwise moral norms are irrelevant to animals or to man from the viewpoint of not being subject to the judgements of reason.

Metaphorical ideas are exclusive to man. His thought has reached the point where he can apply the term for something to another thing. For instance, he sees the moon and then sees a human being possessing beauty to whom he is drawn. He applies the term for the former to the latter and transfers to the latter his feelings evoked by the moon.

This act signifies man's developed nature and no animal is capable of such an act. This act is a kind of make up and adornment; i.e. man observes a kind of beauty in someone and then he adds to it by supplementing accidental graces, while he knows that these graces do no belong to that person but are charms borrowed from extraneous colour, water, and line but which heighten his feelings of attraction towards that person. This is what happens in metaphorical and poetical expressions.

When the poet refers to something with metaphors, that thing assumes a greater charm in his sight, as in the case of Rudaki who wrote those verses for the Samanid prince using those metaphors for Bukhara. Bukhara remained what it was but he projected the city in such charming terms that they moved the prince. These are miracles of the human mind.

Q: Is this the Pavlovian conditioned reflex?

A: No. Pavlovian conditioned reflex relates to the materialist approach to perception (not to normative concepts) which tries to give a materialist interpretation to human thought. Pavlov talks of involuntary human reflexes. The issue of conditioned reflex or association of ideas is different from the issue of values and metaphor. In the latter there is no succession and association. Here one sees something as something else. That is, he joins it to the other and applies the definition of one thing to another thing. There is no succession of ideas as in association. In metaphor there is a simultaneous unification of two things, not a succession of several things. This is what gives the power of passion and pathos to elegies.

Thus one of the objections against the Allamah's view is that he generalizes the faculty of normative formulation to all animate beings, whereas it is exclusive to man and that too to his practical reason.

Early Muslim philosophers defined practical wisdom, which includes ethics, as the science of man's voluntary actions in respect of how they ought to be and how they can be best and most perfect. This definition given by early Muslim philosophers is somewhat similar to that of theoretical wisdom which deals with the most perfect order and the question whether or not the existing order is the best and most perfect order possible. This question however relates to whether something exists or not, and in the discussion of man's voluntary acts the question relates to how something ought to be and how it can be most perfect.

According to modern philosophers ethics deals with the question, How should one live one's life, i.e. it does not deal with how men live but with how they should live. This almost amounts to the same thing with certain added qualifications. One relates to universality. When the early Muslim philosophers defined ethics as a science of man's voluntary acts they meant a universal prescription for all human beings, not for any particular person.

The other point that should be mentioned here is that when modern philosophers hold that ethics deals with how one should live one's life, a qualification is to added here-and they often add it themselves, thus coming closer to the viewpoint of ancient philosophers-stating that what is meant is a life imbued with sublimity and sanctity. The meaning of ethics is loaded with a sense of sublimity and sanctity, or value in contemporary terms.

Another point whose mention here is not without benefit is that when it said that ethics is the science of how one must live one's life, that includes behaviour and habit, that is, what kind of conduct and habits one must have to lead a worthy life.

Another point that is mentioned nowadays, which is also found in our philosophy, is that ethics deals only with how man should live and it is assumed that man's nature is already known, and it is with the knowledge of this nature that the question of how he must live so that his life possesses sublimity and sanctity arises.

As we know, the existentialists have certain views about the fundamentality of existence (Mulls Sadra's philosophy is also based on the fundamentally of existence) and they hold man to be a potential and indeterminate being. That is, his essence is not predetermined and it is man's acts which form his habits and these habits constitute man's identity and essence. Man does not have an essence apart from his habits and they constitute the substantial actuality of man's existence.

It is his habits and traits which make and determine man's being. More precisely, ethics is not only the science of how one should live but the science of what one should become.

When we talk of ethics as the science of how one should live, it is assumed that we know what we are and then go one to discuss how man with his fixed nature and essence, which is the same in all men, is to live. But if we hold that habits constitute the essence of man then ethics will take a new dimension. If man can shape his reality with his morals and habits, then his inner being and essence will change and accordingly ethics assumes a more profound meaning.

Men have the same form, but from the spiritual viewpoint their reality depends on their morals and habits. Hence the definition of `man' may apply to some persons in respect of form while in respect of their inner being the term `animal' may be true of them.

With this definition of practical wisdom let us follow up the foregoing discussion. We said that the issue of moral imperatives signifies man's relation to a certain act and stems from his feeling. That is man's nature seeks certain goals and in consonance with those ends certain feelings emerge in his conscious faculty. He desires what his nature seeks, and this finally leads him to declare, `I like that thing' and `It is good.'

Bertrand Russell and others hold-and Allamah Tabatabai's views lead to the same conclusion-that there can be no objective criterion for ethics. For instance, when I say that something is good, it means I like it, and my liking it does not mean that somebody else should also like it. Others may like something else. Those who lived in the past regarded what they liked as good, while today people regard something else as good.

Here a question arises: How can ethical issues be demonstrated?, How can we argue as to what is good and what is bad? The Allamah is of the view that these are indemonstrable, for normative matters cannot be proven. We can only test them on the basis of utility (futility). That is, the mind's normative formulations are meant to achieve certain goals and if they do not help one reach them they are invalid.

Moral issues cannot be tested except through the test of utility. They are not objective matters that can be proven by experiment or reasoning. They can be proven neither be deduction nor by the empirical method. In deduction the premises are based on self evident-principles, or on empirical experience, whereas practical wisdom is concerned with the concept of good and bad and these concepts are derive from ought and ought not, which in their turn depend upon likes and dislikes,

which are not identical in all people and vary according to their personal situation, interests, pursuits and their attachments to various creeds, groups, and nations. Therefore, every individual and groups likes certain things and therefore moral values are inevitably subjective and relative. Hence moral concepts are not objective issues susceptible to logical proof or deductive or inductive methods.

Three Ethical Theories

Bertrand Russell is one of the thinkers who arrived at the same conclusion through his philosophy of logical analysis. In his book, A History of Western Philosophy, while examining Plato's conception of justice and Trasymachus's famous objection against it, that justice is nothing but the interests of the powerful, Russell is of the view that this is the basic problem of politics and ethics: is there any criterion iii ethics to distinguish between good and bad except that which is meant by those who use these terms? If there is no such criterion then most of Trasymachus's conclusions will inescapable.

But how can one say that such a criterion exists? Elsewhere Russell says that the difference between Plato and Trasymachus is very important. Plato thinks that he can prove that his idea of republic is good. A democrat who accepts the objectivity of ethics may think that he can prove the Republic to be immoral; but anyone who agrees with Trasymachus will say: There is no question of proving or disproving; the only question is whether you like or not.

If you do, it is good for you; if you do not it is bad for you. It is like matters of taste; one may like a certain kind of food and say that this food is good and others may like another kind and say that, that food is good. There is no absolute good to compare other goods with. He further says that if you like it, it is good for you; if you do not, it is bad for you.

If some like it and some don't the matter cannot be decided by reason, but only by force. That which is said that justice belongs to the powerful, that is because when some people like something and others don't, those who have greater power impose their wishes on others by force and that becomes law.

The gist of Russell's statements is that the concepts of good and bad indicate the relation between man and the thing in question. If this relation is one of liking it is good and if it is one of dislike then it is bad. If it is neither liked nor disliked, then it neither good nor evil. We have written that the answer to Russell is that first we have to trace the roots of why man likes something and dislikes something else.

Man likes anything that serves the purpose of life even if from a particular aspect. In other words, nature always moves towards its perfection and in order to impel man to carry out that which must be accomplished through his will and choice it has placed desire, liking and love in him in the same way that it has informed him with the notions of good and evil.

As nature moves towards individual perfection and expediency, it also moves towards the perfection of the species as well. Basically the individual's perfection is not separable from the perfection of his species. The individual's perfection lies in that of the species, and inevitably a kind of likes equally shared by all individuals take shape equally in all individuals. These similar, uniform, universal and absolute likes constitute the universal criterion of morality.

Justice and other moral values are the ends towards which nature moves for the perfection of the kind. In order to attain such ends through voluntary action it creates a liking for these ends in all individuals. By virtue of that liking the oughts and ought nots appear in the form of a series of universal imperatives in die soul.

Accordingly, to have a universal criterion in ethics it is not necessary to consider good and evil objective entities like whiteness and blackness, roundness and squareness. Russell considers the ego in "I like it," as an ego solely concerned with its material and physical interests, not as an ego which is concerned with its spiritual nobility or as an ego that is concerned with the interests of its kind.

Here we will mention two or three hypotheses and then try to substantiate the above remarks. First we have to see whether or not there actually exists a set of common, universal and permanent imperatives in man's soul (this minor premise has to be derived through experience). That is, do there exist in the human conscience any notions commonly held by all individuals in addition to the temporary, particular, and individual notions of good and bad? I mean those universal imperatives that are devoid of personal preferences and tastes in which all that is relevant is personal interest. Do such imperatives exist according to which man makes judgements occasionally even despite his personal preferences?

One may say I don't know the analysis of such an issue, but I know this much that I and all people have certain universal precepts according to which we judge, for instance, that honesty is good in itself, whatever the basis of this judgement, or that it is good to return kindness for kindness. This judgement transcends all personal interests, and one cannot deny if someone says that a kindness returned for kindness a thousand years ago is praiseworthy or that anyone who ever returned evil for kindness is blameworthy.

Undeniably there are two kinds of acts involved here; one act is praiseworthy and valuable for man and the other is worthless or has a negative value. If one were to compare with a free mind two kinds of characters, such as Abu Dharr and Mu'awiyah, in order to make a judgement concerning them, he will see that Abu Dharr was a man to whom Mu'awiyah was ready to give everything to buy his loyalty and to make him relinquish his higher principles. He did not surrender to the devices of Mu'awiyah who had made everything a means of attaining his ambitions.

Here one naturally commends the former and condemns the latter. The same test may be applied in case of other characters and the result will invariably be the same. We are not concerned with the opinion that all judgements concerning goodness and badness derive from likes or dislikes. That may be true, but firstly we want to see whether or not there exist common and universal judgements. Secondly, if they do, how can we justify them? Are they justifiable according to what the A(lamah and Russell have said?

We said that there are two kinds of ought and ought not; one kind is particular and individual which we regularly come across in everyday life. For instance, I ought to eat such food, I ought to wear such a dress, and so on. The second kind of imperatives, of which examples were cited, is universal in nature.

Now the question is what is the basis of such universal judgements? If we do not agree with the theologians in considering goodness and badness as objective attributes and hold that these notions ultimately pertain to man's relation to a thing, then how can we justify universal moral judgements?

First Theory

There are three kinds of justification. According to the first, man has certain urges which serve to fulfill his individual needs. For instance when hungry, he feels an urge for food. Man has also another kind of urges which are species oriented. That is, man may desire something which is not for his individual benefit but for the sake of others. For instance, man does like others to, go hungry in the same way that he does not want to remain hungry himself. God has created man such. If we accept this justification, then the Allamah's view becomes implausible for he holds that man's motives are consonant with his natural urges. That is, man's motives are subject to his individual nature.

He holds the principle of employment to be a universal principle and this conflicts with the foregoing justification. For according to it a self-seeking act is ordinary and mediocre, but when the same act is formed for the sake of others it is considered to be sublime and sacred. Here serving others is a criterion of sanctity and self-seeking a criterion of its absence.

If an act is meant for one's own benefit it is for individual benefit and if it is for others it is for mankind in general, and such an act is moral in nature. Thus the criterion of the moral or immoral character of an act depends in one sense on its being for one's own self or for the sake of others, that is, in its purpose being individual or universal. It is universality that gives value to an act although in other respects it is no different from an act done for personal and individual motives.

Accordingly, it is true that `It is good' means `I like it', but sometimes I may like something for myself and sometime for the sake of others. Inevitably, what I like for others and for their benefit takes a universal aspect (for it is not for the sake of any particular persons among others) and is permanent value. Accordingly, moral acts are also universal and permanent. A moral act is one that stems from liking others' good and benefit. This makes ethics universal and permanent. This approach to ethics also justifies certain cases like lying for the sake of some beneficial purpose. Why is truthfulness good? Because the general good lies in truthfulness.

If truthfulness should prove to be injurious then it is immoral, for truthfulness is not good in itself. The criterion of goodness is service to others. In cases where truthfulness amounts to betraying others, it becomes bad. Here ethics assumes solely asocial dimension (nowadays `ethics' is usually considered to mean social ethics).

Accordingly, we arrive at a conclusion that there is a universal principle in ethics which is eternal and permanent, although. it may have changing instances. There is a diference between the impermanence of an ethical principle and the impermanence of its instances. The question is whether moral principles are permanent or not. Accordingly to our justification moral acts are reducible to one immutable principle, that is, service to others.

Q: In fact this principle is a kind of hypothesis, that is, it is assumed that ethics is service to others, then it is declared that it is universal and permanent principle. However, someone may make some other assumption and hold that ethics means self-help in which case he would produce another immutable and universal principle.

A: You have missed the first premises. As I said there are certain issues on which all men make the same judgement. That-is, all viewpoints are identical about a certain act. Besides, all consider it a valuable act. Service to others is something about which I and you have the same feeling. Moreover, I view it as something sublime and above personal interests in the same way that you view it.

Then we posed the question as to how such a universal principle could exist when values like goodness and badness stem from likes and dislikes, which are changeable. Yes, if all likes were rooted in selfish motives, as Russell believes and as can be inferred from the Allamah's words, then such an objection could be valid, but not if it is held that man is created with two kinds of motives.

Q: The word `others' in the foregoing discussion is somewhat ambiguous. It seems that it cannot be taken in an absolute sense. For example, a soldier who fights for the interest of foreigners, fights for others but his act is not ethical.

A: By `others' I mean mankind. That is, an act that is for the sake of mankind, not for the benefit of one individual and to the detriment another. We have an individual ego as well as a collective ego, which includes a person's family and relations (every tyrant is a benefactor for his family). Here the concept of the self is extended. Moral acts go beyond the limit of the ego and sometimes transcend even the domain of humanity (being for the sake of God). Morality begins where the confines of the ego are transcended.

However, this theory cannot be accepted due to the objections that arise against it on the basis of the Allamah's theory, which cannot be set aside so simply by conceding that there is a disharmony between man's conscious being and his individual nature. For that would mean that individual nature moves in one direction and his conscious being in another, solely pursuing the perfection of species without attending to individual perfection. The result would be that man's conscious being, which is at the service of his nature-and so it must be-will be brought into the service of the species without any concern for the individual's interests.

Q: On the basis of what you have said, service to the species is also part of man's nature?

A: No. Service to species is not part of individual nature, but man takes pleasure in helping others and that is not without reason. For individual nature cannot derive pleasure without moving towards perfection. According to Ibn Sina if man feels pleasure, it does not mean that nafure and feeling move on different independent courses. Rather it is nature that achieves its perfection, and when that happens pleasure is felt if it is perceived through knowledge by presence.

That is, the very movement of nature from potentiality to perfection is identical with pleasure when perceived through knowledge by presence. Pleasure is nature's attainment to perfection when it is perceivable. It is impossible for man to take pleasure without nature attaining a perfection.

Second Theory

There is another theory advocated by some contemporary thinkers. According to it, it is impossible for man to desire anything that is unrelated to his own self. Whatever the individual enjoys doing is ultimately related to his own self. However, man has two selves: an individual self and a collective self. Biologically man is an individual, but from the social point of view he has also a social self.

The other point that Durkheim and others have made-and Allamah Tabatabai has derived it from the Qur'an without being aware of their ideas-is that society has also a self and personality which is real and objective. Society is not a sum total of individuals in the sense of a numericat totality, and it is not the case that it is individuals who are fundamental and they merely influence society.

Rather, society is a real and unique compound of individuals (of course, it is different from natural compounds in which individual elements totally lose their independent identity). In this kind of composition, individuals, who retain their separate wills and independence, share in a single self. Every member has a feeling of possessing two selves; sometime it is conscious of the individual self and sometime of the social self. According to some sociologists society reaches self-consciousness in the individual; that is, society is conscious of its being in the individual being.

The sufis and gnostics hold a similar view. William James also has a similar view. With certain a difference the gnostics believe in a kind of unity among the souls and hold that the real self is the universal self. They say that man mistakenly considers his own as a distinct self and they ultimately reduce the real self to God, believing that the individual self is nothing more than a manifestation of that real self. It is as if there were a universal spirit that reveals itself in different individuals and all these selves derive from the one Divine self.

William James also arrived at the same conclusion through psychological experiences. He holds that there is an inner connection between individual selves of which they are often unaware. One who purifies his self can get to know the contents of consciousness of other selves through that inner connection (like wells that are connected to each other under the ground while they are separate on the surface).

This connection stems from their union with the Divine source. But sociologists are of the view that individuals on merging in society develop a social self which is a real cultural entity. Sometime man is conscious of this self which is not his individual self but a universal social self. Accordingly man's has two kinds of activities those motivated by individual motives and others prompted by social motives.

According to the first theory man has dual motives, one of which is directed to serves his own self and the other to serve others. According to the second theory man has two selves and two sets of feelings: the individual self and feeling which serve the individual self and another self and feeling which serve the collective self.

A moral act is one which is not motivated by the individual self but by the collective self. The collective self is permanent and universal. The conclusion that follows from the second theory is that every action that stems from the collective self is a moral act and that which stems from the individual self is not moral in nature. Of course, the instances of this principle may vary, but in any case this can be a universal and permanent principle.

Third Theory

There is a third theory according to which it is impossible that man should do anything which is unrelated to the domain of his self and has no relation to his personality, being exclusively in the service of something external and without being related to the realm of his being. Man, however, has two selves, higher and lower.

That is, man is a being with dual aspects. In one aspect he is an animal like other animals and in the other he has a higher reality. It is amazing why Allamah Tabatabai did not advance such a view, for it is consistent with his own principles including those relating to ethics. When we speak of `man's nature,' we mean man's reality, not merely his physical nature.

Man has an ontological reality and his emotional being is subordinate to that reality. The ontological being of man one plane consists of his animal being and on a higher plane of his spiritual being.

Man completely realizes this higher self in himself or rather considers it his more original self. When animal needs conflict with his judgement based on reason and will and he wishes to subject his animal needs to his reason there may be two kinds of consequences. At times he succeeds and at other time he fails.

For instance, in the matter of food and its quantity, reason has its own judgement whereas his appetite requires something else. When man yields to his appetite he has a feeling of defeat, and when he overcomes his appetite he feels victorious, while in reality he has neither been defeated by anyone nor has he been victorious over anyone.

Here one aspect of his existence is dominated r by another aspect. Apparently, he should feel either defeated or victorious in both cases, for both belong to the realm of his existence. But practically we see that it is not so. When reason dominates over appetite, he has a feeling of victory and when appetite overcomes reason he feels defeated.

That is because his real self is the one associated with reason and will, and his animal aspect constitutes his lower self. Actually the lower self forms a prelude to his real self. If we believe in such a duality in man's being then we can justify ethical principles in the following manner.

Man has certain perfections by virtue of his spiritual self. These perfections are real and not conventional, for man is not only body but soul as well. Any act that is consistent with man's spiritual perfection is valuable, and any act that is irrelevant to the higher aspect of our soul is an ordinary and mediocre act.

I agree with the Allamah, Russell, and others that good and bad, ought and ought-not derive from man's likes and dislikes. But the question is: the likes or dislikes of which self are to taken as the criterion, those of the higher self or those of the lower self? Moral value arises if it is the higher self that likes.

This is the reason why ethics is felt to have a higher station. That man sees one aspect of his existence and acts pertaining to it as possessing sublimity is not a mental construct or convention. Rather, that is because he feels that aspect to be a more perfect and stronger aspect of his being. All his perfections derive from that aspect of his existence and its intensity, and all defects derive from its weakness.

In accordance with this approach, virtues like honesty, truthfulness, kindness, mercy, beneficence and the like are notions which have affinity to the higher self. The philosophers have also said that practical wisdom relates to voluntary acts from the viewpoint of being more perfect and excellent.

They relate the matter ultimately to the soul, and maintain that the human soul possesses two kind of perfections: theoretical and practical. Theoretical perfection of soul lies in the knowledge of the realities of the world and the higher virtues are considered practical perfection of the soul. That is, they develop the soul practically and brings about a harmony in its relation with the body and pave the way for the real perfection of the soul.

Here we reach a most significant Islamic principle which has not been discussed by the philosophers. That principle is as follows: man has an innate nobility and sublimity which is the same as his spiritual being and the Divine breath. Subconsciously he senses that dignity within himself. In confrontation with actions and habits he ascertains whether they are compatible with his innate nobility or not. When he feels that there is a compatibility and harmony, he regards it as good and virtuous, otherwise as evil and vicious. In the same way that animals are guided by instinct to what is beneficial or harmful for them, the human soul has perfections transcending nature and some actions and habits are compatible with those perfections.

Universal values relating to good and evil, oughts and ought-hots may be justified in the following manner: Human beings are created alike in respect of that in which their spiritual perfection lies, with similar and uniform likes and viewpoints. Although physically and naturally all men live in different conditions and situations and with varying physical needs, but they are equally situated in respect to their spiritual perfection.

Inevitably, in that domain likes and dislikes and notions of what is good and evil assume a uniform, universal and permanent aspect. All moral virtues, whether individual or social, such as patience and the like, can be explained from this viewpoint. The two theories mentioned earlier can explain only social values like self-sacrifice, helping others, etc., but they cannot explain values like patience, fortitude and so on. The last theory on the contrary can explain all moral values.

Though I agree with the view that all perceptions of good and evil signify a thing's relation with its perfection, nevertheless such perceptions of good and evil can be universal and permanent.

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