THE STRUGGLE OF THE SHI‘IS IN INDONESIA

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THE STRUGGLE OF THE SHI‘IS IN INDONESIA

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SHI‘IS IN INDONESIA

Author:
Publisher: www.openaccess.leidenuniv.nl
English

Important Notice:

The matters written in this books are according to the viewpoint of the Author not alhassananain Network's.

www.alhassanain.org/english

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SHI‘IS IN INDONESIA

Thesis to obtain the degree of Doctor at Leiden University, 2009

Zulkifli

www.alhassanain.org/english

THE STRUGGLE OF THE SHI‘IS IN INDONESIA

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden, volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op donderdag 24 september 2009

klokke 11.15 uur

door

Zulkifli

geboren te Bangka

in 1966

Promotiecommissie:

Promotor: Prof. dr. C. van Dijk

Co-Promotor: Dr. N.J.G. Kaptein

Referent: Prof. dr. D. Douwes (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Overige leden: Prof. dr. H.L. Beck (Universiteit van Tilburg) Prof. dr. M.S. Berger Prof. dr. W.A.L. Stokhof

Notice:

1- This version is published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english

2- The composing errors are not corrected.

3- The matters written in this books are the according to the viewpoint of the Author not Alhassanain Network’s

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 8

A Note on Transliteration 9

INTRODUCTION 10

Previous Studies on Shi‘ism in Indonesia 11

Theoretical Framework 17

Methodology 18

The Structure of the Study 18

CHAPTER ONE: THE FORMATION OF THE SHI‘I COMMUNITY 20

A. The Arab descendant 20

B. The Qum Alumni 29

C. The Campus Group 34

D. Conversion to Shi‘ism 40

CHAPTER TWO: LEADERS 46

A. Ustadh and Intellectual 46

B. Husein Al-Habsyi (1921-1994) 48

C. Husein Shahab 57

D. Jalaluddin Rakhmat 60

CHAPTER THREE: MADHHAB 71

A. The Madhhab of Ahl al-Bayt 71

B. Imamate 75

C. The Mahdi 80

D. Ja‘fari Jurisprudence 84

E. Aspects of Shi‘i Piety 89

F. Taqiyya 94

CHAPTER FOUR: DA‘WA 98

A. General Developments of the Da‘wa Institution 98

B. The Ideals of the Shi‘i Institution 102

C. The Institutional Elements 106

D. Types of Da‘wa Activity 111

E. Da‘wa Training 119

CHAPTER FIVE: EDUCATION 122

A. Pesantren 122

B. Schools 134

CHAPTER SIX: PUBLISHING 142

A. The Shi‘is’ Publishers 142

B. The Translation of Shi‘i Books 148

C. Works by Indonesian Shi‘is 156

D. Shi‘i Periodicals 161

E. The Impact of Shi‘i Publishing 165

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MASS ORGANISATION: IJABI 170

A. The Foundation of IJABI 170

B. The Ideological Foundation of IJABI 177

C. The Development of IJABI 183

D. The Response to IJABI 187

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUNNI RESPONSES 198

A. The General Attitude of Islamic Organisations 198

B. The Response of MUI 202

C. The Response of DEPAG 207

D. Anti-Shi‘i Propagations 210

E. The Moderate Response of Muslim Intellectuals 225

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 231

SAMENVATTING 236

GLOSSARY 245

BIBLIOGRAPHY 252

Magazines, Newspapers, Websites: 272

NOTES 273

INTRODUCTION 273

CHAPTER ONE: THE FORMATION OF THE SHI‘I COMMUNITY 274

CHAPTER TWO: LEADERS 281

CHAPTER THREE: MADHHAB 284

CHAPTER FOUR: DA‘WA 288

CHAPTER FIVE: EDUCATION 289

CHAPTER SIX: PUBLISHING 291

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MASS ORGANISATION: IJABI 294

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUNNI RESPONSES 295

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 300

The Author 301

Acknowledgements

This thesis has grown out of academic endeavor that has been nourished by the support, suggestion, and advice from individuals and institutions to whom I am indebted. I wish I could mention them all. I shall record the great debt to INIS (Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies) for the scholarship and facilities that enabled me to conduct research and academic activities. At INIS, I sincerely thank Prof. W.A.L. Stokhof, Dick van der Meij, and Rosemary Robson in Leiden and Prof. Jacob Vredenbregt in Jakarta. My gratitude is also expressed to the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) for its programs and academic atmosphere that enabled me to increase my academic quality and extend my scholarly network.

My sincere gratitude is expressed to all my Shi‘i informants and respondents to become the subject of my research. They provided me with the chance to interview them, use their collections, and even participate in a variety of activities. Without their permission and cooperation, this thesis would not have been completed.

My special thanks also go to IAIN Raden Fatah Palembang, particularly the Faculty of Adab, that freed me from academic duties during my PhD program.

I also thank my Indonesian fellows in Leiden. They have assisted me in their own way which was important for my life in Leiden. Mufti Ali, Anwar Syarifuddin, Didin Nurul Rosidin, Muslih, Euis Nurlaelawati, Jajat Burhanudin, Noorhaidi, Nur Ichwan, Arief Subhan, Dahlan, and Suryadi are only several names I could mention here.

Last, but not least, I thank my wife, Ai Juariah, my daughter Dhea UZ and my son Azka KZ who gave moral support to finish this thesis. To them I dedicate this thesis.

Leiden-Sukabumi, 2009

A Note on Transliteration

For Arabic words, I have used the system of transliteration adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies but diacritics have been reduced for simplification. For the plural forms of Indonesian words I do not add ‘s’ and therefore such words as ustadh and santri may be singular or plural. But I maintain the plural forms of some Arabic words like ‘ulama’ (‘alim, singular) and maraji‘ (marja‘, singular). For names of persons, I follow exactly the way they are written by themselves. For the translation of Qur’anic verses, I use Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, New Edition with Revised Translation and Commentary, 1991.

INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the Shi‘is1 in Indonesia, and their position as a minority Muslim group within the overwhelming Sunni majority, and the ways in which they act to gain recognition in the country. For the purposes of this study Shi‘ism is confined to Ithna ‘ashariyya (also known as Twelver or Ja‘fari Shi‘ism). This is a madhhab (school of Islamic thought) which believes in the twelve Imams who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad and has adopted a specific set of practices as a consequence of this belief system. Shi‘ism is a minority denomination of Islam and Shi‘is, constituting around 10 percent of the world’s Muslim population, have frequently been stigmatised by the Sunnis who form the majority. While most Shi‘is reside as a minority group in Muslim countries, they form a majority in Iran (around 90 percent), Iraq (60 percent), and Bahrain (60 percent). The Shi‘is in Iran came to the world’s attention with the Islamic revolution of 1978-1979 and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Shi‘is there have played an increasingly significant political role in the country and a moderate form of Shi‘ism, adhered to by Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has formed a powerful web of networks that is expected to strengthen civil society in southern Iraq.

Scholars, not only in the Muslim world but also in the West have generally focussed their attention on Sunnism. In the Muslim world Shi‘ism is often seen as a heterodox schism deviating from the true teaching of Islam with regard to theology and jurisprudence. Western scholars of Islam who used to rely on Sunni interpretations of Shi‘ism have contributed to misperceptions about the nature of Shi‘ism. Kohlberg2 reveals that this lack of appropriate understanding of Shi‘ism can easily be found in the writings of the prominent Hungarian scholar Goldziher and others. Shi‘ism did not become a subject of central research until the Iranian revolution forced scholars to understand its ideological foundation which is strongly rooted in Shi‘i tenets.3 This led to the association of Shi‘ism with radical and revolutionary movements. Much attention has been paid to Shi‘ism in Iran, creating an impression that Shi‘ism is identified with Iranian society and culture. Indeed, as a result of Iran’s ambitious attempts to export its version of revolution to other Muslim countries, studies of Shi‘ism outside Iran tend to be an attempt to measure the effects of the Iranian revolution on Shi‘i communities in Iraq, the Gulf states, Lebanon, Syria, and South Asia,4 as well as on Sunni communities in Southeast Asia.5 However, more than a quarter of a century on, no revolution following the Iranian model has occurred elsewhere, even in countries such as Iraq and Bahrain where the Shi‘is constitute a majority, and where Iran has allegedly supported Shi‘i movements. What is striking is that in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988), Iranian Shi‘is doing battle against Iraqi soldiers were fighting their co-religionists. Nakash has shown historical, economic, and political features of Iraqi Shi‘i society that are significantly different from that of Shi‘is in Iran.6 This clearly indicates that a monolithic perspective on Shi‘ism does not aid understanding of the diverse realities of Shi‘is. A study on Shi‘ism necessitates consideration of social, political, and cultural aspects unique to a certain society, region and history for the simple fact that the Shi‘is “employed a wide range of strategies in different times and places.”7

While the Sunnism that predominates the Indonesian population has been widely studied by scholars from a variety of aspects and approaches, the reality of Shi‘ism in Indonesia and its related historical, sociological, political, and religious aspects is hardly known among scholars and even the majority of Muslims themselves. This study attempts to address this imbalance and understand the reality of the Shi‘is in Indonesia by describing the main aspects of the social and religious life of this minority Muslim group including the formation of the Shi‘i denomination, an examination of its prominent leaders, beliefs and practices, da‘wa, education, publication, organisation, and the Sunni responses to it. An understanding of the nature of this Muslim group is crucial for our understanding of Indonesian religion and society at large.

Previous Studies on Shi‘ism in Indonesia

Despite the fact that the Shi‘is in Indonesia constitute a minority group amidst the overwhelming Sunni majority, a number of scholars, (including Muslim scholars), historians and social scientists have written articles or books concerned with certain aspects of Shi‘ism in this region. In particular, historians and Muslim scholars studying the Islamisation of the Indonesian archipelago have dealt with the development of Shi‘ism in the country. Here we find two opposing views with regard to whether it was Shi‘ism or Sunnism which came first to the area that is currently called Indonesia: The first theory, widely accepted among historians, social scientists, and Indonesian Muslim scholars, such as Hamka8 and Azra,9 neglects the existence of Shi‘ism and generally affirms that Sunnism was the first branch of Islam to arrive in Indonesia and continues to predominate the Muslim community today. In contrast, proponents of ‘Shi‘i theory’ such as Fatimi,10 Jamil,11 Hasymi,12 Azmi,13 Aceh,14 and Sunyoto15 , believe that the Shi‘is have been present in Indonesia since the early days of Islamisation of the region and that, in fact, its adherents have played an important part in this process. Their theory is based on several elements of Shi‘i tradition practiced by Muslim communities in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, as well as on Arabic, Chinese and local written sources and the existing material cultures. Proponents of this theory generally admit that most Shi‘i traces have vanished over the course of time and as a result of the huge impact Sunnism has had on the country.

Fatimi, Azmi, and Aceh establish the view that Shi‘ism came to the Malay-Indonesian world before Sunni Islam had such a tremendous influence on the region. Like their opponents, the proponents of ‘Shi‘i theory’ believe Aceh Province to be the first place in Indonesia that experienced Islamisation. Abubakar Aceh speculates that Arabs, Persians or Indians coming from Gujarat, India -all followers of Shi‘ism - were among the first propagators of Islam in the archipelago.16 Kern shares a similar opinion that Islam came from Gujarat to the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and argues that the influence of Shi‘ism in Gujarat had not been less than in other areas of India.17 On the contrary, Fatimi points to the kingdom of Champa, in parts of present day Vietnam and Cambodia, a place from which the Shi‘is came to the Malay-Indonesian areas of Southeast Asia. According to Fatimi, there is a strong possibility that there were “Muslim settlements in the neighbourhood of Champa in the second half of the 8th century” which adhered to Shi‘ism.18 Based on a variety of sources, Fatimi also tries to show the close (though often neglected) relationship between the Chams and the Malays, throughout history from the 7th century onwards.19 Following Fatimi’s viewpoints, Azmi tries to connect Fatimi’s description with the development of Muslim kingdoms in Aceh. He goes on to point out that the Shi‘is then spread through trading centres in Southeast Asia, including Perlak in Northern Sumatra which is said to have become the first Muslim Sultanate in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.20

The first Shi‘i king of the Perlak sultanate was said to be Sultan Alaiddin Sayyid Maulana Abdul Azis Shah who reigned from 840 until 864. But, during the reign of the third king, Sultan Alaiddin Sayyid Maulana Abbas Shah (888-913), the Sunnis began to spread and exert influence on the Perlak population.21 In this regard, writers such as Azmi, Jamil and Hasjmy, who base their theories on local sources, conclude that the Shi‘is not only arrived in the early days of Islamisation but, during this period, had considerable political power in the archipelago. It was at this time that the Shi‘is and the Sunnis became embroiled in a long and bitter political struggle. These scholars suggest that around the end of the 10th century, as a result of four years of civil war between the Shi‘is and the Sunnis, the Perlak sultanate was divided into two: The Shi‘i coastal Perlak and the Sunni hinterland Perlak. Both territories had their own kings. It is suggested that the two kingdoms were united in the face of an attack from the Sriwijaya kingdom. During the long war which ensued, the Shi‘i king died and this marked the end of the Shi‘i sultanate in Aceh. Sriwijaya ceased its attack, and the Sunni Perlak sultanate continued to exist until its collapse in 1292.22 Sunyoto, acknowledging the existence of the Shi‘i Perlak sultanate that was in place for nearly a century, points out that the collapse of the sultanate led Shi‘i followers to migrate to other regions. Some moved to Pasai, an area dominated by the Sunnis, Sunyoto suggests that the result ing interrelationship between the two branches of Islam led to a specific formulation of Shi‘ism and Sunnism. He goes on to claim that while officially the Muslims in Pasai followed the Shafi‘i school of jurisprudence, they also practiced several Shi‘i rituals and ceremonies such as the commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn (‘ashura), the celebration of the fifteenth day of the eighth month in the Muslim calendar (nisf Sha‘ban), the commemoration of the dead on the first, third, seventh, fortieth, and so on, and the annual death commemoration (hawl).23

Sunyoto goes on to apply his theories to the Muslims in Java. He suggests that such Shi‘i traditions were taught in Java by some of the so-called Wali Sanga24 (Nine Saints) who were known to have propagated Islam and founded Islamic tradition among the population of the island. According to Sunyoto, two of them in particular, Sunan Kalijaga and Syaikh Siti Jenar, were responsible for popularising Shi‘i traditions among the people of Java. He admits, however, that in contrast to Shaykh Siti Jenar and Sunan Kalijaga, the majority of Wali Sanga expounded Sunni Islam. A moderate figure, Sunan Bonang, attempted to bridge the two opposing groups. Sunyoto emphasises that this moderate, ‘third way’ - that is culturally Shi‘i but theologically Sunni - had a great impact on the formulation of Islam in Java.25 Basing his ideas on a local Javanese source, Babad Tanah Jawi, Muhaimin points out that Shaykh Siti Jenar, also known as Lemah Abang, was said to follow Twelver Shi‘ism upholding “a doctrine that claims that the Imam should be the supreme political figure in the state”. This doctrine, also adhered to by the Persian Sufi martyr Mansur al-Hallaj (d. 922),26 is the Sufi wujudiyya doctrine. Muhaimin suggests that Siti Jenar came to Java from Baghdad and he is said to have converted a number of rulers and their subjects on the island.27 Similarly, Rachman tries to trace Shi‘i philosophical and operational elements in Java. He points to the belief in the arrival of the Imam Mahdi, the twelfth Imam within Shi‘i Islam, a belief which has been traditionally and historically predominant in Java. Even though Rachman agrees with the rather speculative views that the Islam that first came to the archipelago was Sufi Islam, he supports the hypothesis that there was peaceful interaction between Sunnis and Shi‘is. This interaction “greatly and equally contributed to the emergence of the unique Islamic community in the region.”28

Another issue relevant to the study of Shi‘ism in Indonesia is the widespread commemoration of ‘ashura, the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the third Imam within Shi‘ism, at Karbala, Iraq, on 10 October 680 (10 Muharram 61AH).29 The ‘ashura ceremony is generally celebrated throughout Indonesia with the cooking of ‘ashura porridge (bubur sura), however on the west coast of Sumatra - in Bengkulu and Pariaman - a so-called tabut (in Iran, ta‘ziya)30 ceremony takes place instead. Snouck Hurgronje provides us with an interesting account of the ceremonies related to the ‘ashura festivals held in Aceh as well as in Bengkulu and Pariaman at the end of the 19th century. He suggests that the carnival originated during one of two waves of Shi‘i influence in Indonesia in the late-17th and early 18th centuries, at a time when the British brought the Sipahis (Sepoys) from India.31 Djajadiningrat remarks that the widespread ceremonies in Indonesia relating to the martyrdom of Husayn clearly indicate the Shi‘i influence on Indonesian Islam.32 Kartomi33 and Feener34 have provided historical accounts of the tabut ceremony in Pariaman and Bengkulu respectively. Kartomi uncovered evidence of substantial Shi‘i elements in the coastal Sumatran towns including the annual tabut festival. She observes that there are very few Shi‘i families in the towns of Pariaman and Bengkulu. The Shi‘i families that are there claim to be descendants of British Indian soldiers who came to the area at the end of 17th and early-18th century. Kartomi also suggests that “their beliefs and practices are tolerated, even assisted by local imams (prayer leaders), who pray and chant in the Shi‘i manner on each occasion that a tabut festival is held.”35 The above scholars maintain that there have been changes to the practice of ‘ashura commemoration. Snouck Hurgronje points out that a wave of Islamic orthodoxy from Mecca was to purify Islam in the Dutch East Indies of sundry heresies including the ‘ashura ceremonies.36 Aceh holds a similar view. “International relations between Indonesia and Muslim countries, especially Mecca and Egypt, make traces of the Shi‘i beliefs vanish in the Indonesian Muslim community.”37 Kartomi also points out that since 1974 the tabut ceremony has been diverted towards attracting tourists and this has meant a loss of “the essential elements of passion, which is a distinguishing feature of Shi‘ism.”38

Other studies related to Shi‘ism in Indonesia are concerned with the existing literature in the region. In scrutinising the Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyyah,39 a major Shi‘i literary work, (which was translated into Malay from Persian not much later than the 14th century), Brakel attempts to review some remarks on the relationship between the hikayat (Malay epics) and the Shi‘i character of early Islam in Indonesia. He points out that the possibility for such a Shi‘i text to be received into the body of Malay literature implies a definite role for Shi‘i influences in the formation of early Indonesian Islam.40 Brakel writes:

The mere fact that a Shi‘a text of the more extreme kind was received into Malay literature at all, to thrive there up till the present day, is already of great significance. It provides strong proof not only of the strong links between Malay and Persian literature, but no less of the heretical character of early Indonesian Islam. 41

Similar studies were made by Baried. After examining 17 Malay stories that are said to contain Shi‘i elements42 , Baried concludes that these stories are rough and imperfect data, as “they constitute only fragments of stories about Ali and his family.”43 She argues that these ‘fragments’ fail to indicate real Shi‘i elements and that the corpus in fact represents all the existing Malay documents that clearly indicate Shi‘i elements. This very limited study, which is based on synopses from old manuscripts catalogues, can only produce a general statement rather than a conclusion. In order to discover any real elements of Shi‘ism in the Malay literature, all existing Malay documents would need to be carefully scrutinised to “bring light that Shi‘i elements exist in stories other than those of which the contents have bearing on Shi‘i narratives.”44

In some of his studies Wieringa remarks that through a fairly extensive range of Malay-Indonesian literature one can find Shi‘i traces in Indonesian Islam which are not recognised by common readers. He affirms that traces of Shi‘ism were gradually purged over time (particularly from the 19th century onwards), due to close contacts with Middle Eastern Islam. Wieringa regards this as “a de-Shi‘itization of Malay hikayat literature.”45 He concludes that the prominent position of Ali and Fatima in Malay hikayat literature has to be understood in the context of early Islamisation of the Malay-Indonesian world: Stories were provided for new Muslim converts at a time when Indonesian Islam was still tinged with Shi‘ism, but gradually the Shi‘i elements of the stories were neutralised to such an extent that they became acceptable for Sunni Muslims.46

Another topic relevant to the study of Shi‘ism in Indonesia is the position and role of the Sayyids (those who claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima) in the Islamisation of the Malay-Indonesian world. Scholars such as Aceh believe that the Sayyids played a major role in the spread of Shi‘ism in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. They point to the fact that a great number of sultans in Aceh used the title Sayyid. Aceh suggests that most of these sultans were Shi‘is or at least sympathetic to this branch of Islam and, consciously or unconsciously, they included the Shi‘i doctrines and worldview in the propagation of Islam.47 Scholars such as al-Baqir,48 and Al-Attas49 also suggest that the Wali Sanga and other leading figures were Sayyids. Al-Baqir cites the Sayyid construction of a grave for the Muslim saints in Indonesia. This was clearly contrary to Sunni tradition, but it was acceptable within Shi‘ism. This, according to al-Baqir, indicates that the first propagators of Islam in the archipelago were Sayyids who upheld Shi‘i beliefs despite the fact that some of them practiced Shafi‘i Islamic jurisprudence.50 Similarly, Pelras mentions the Shi‘i influence on Sayyid Jalaluddin al-Aidid who brought Islam to South Sulawesi, (and the areas of Cikoang Laikang and Turatea in particular), at the start of the 17th century. This Muslim propagator was a son of Sayyid Muhammad Wahid of Aceh and Syarifah Halisyah. He left Aceh for Banjarmasin where by the end of the 16th century he was delivering teachings heavily tinged with the Shi‘ism. Al-Aidid then travelled to Goa in India, where he met with opposition from the ruler, so he moved back to Indonesia, to Cikoang, where he converted the still pagan nobility and population. His arrival is still commemorated every year on the occasion of the mawlid festival.51 Al-Baqir, Al-Attas, and Ibrahim52 have tried to trace the early historical development of the Sayyids that lasted from the 9th to the 13th centuries. They point to the leading historical figure, Ahmad al-Muhajir, (the 8th generation from Ali), and his grandson Alawi bin Ubaidillah who after performing the hajj in 930 left Basrah for Yemen. The Sayyids in Southeast Asia mainly came from Yemen. Protracted debates still exist between scholars who believe these Sayyid figures were Sunni and those who believe they were Shi‘i who practiced taqiyya (dissimulation of religious faith).53

Azra has strongly criticised those who propound the great influence of Shi‘ism in Indonesia prior to the Iranian revolution of 1979. He rejects the existence of the Shi‘i sultanate in Aceh, along with the idea of political struggles between the Shi‘i and Sunni sultanates in Aceh. In his view, the principal weakness of the above writers, particularly Jamil, Hasjmi and Parlindungan,54 is their uncritical and unverified use of local sources and their comparison with other contemporary sources, specifically with regard to the historical development of Islam in the world during the period in question. Azra argues that there is no indication of political and ideological conflicts between Sunnis and Shi‘is in the historical evidence of Islam in the Middle East before the 16th century. He suggests that descriptions of conflicts are likely to be based on Sunni-Shi‘i conflicts in a later period, which are projected to the past and additional support being sought in local sources. While Azra’s criticism on the existence of political conflict can be historically justified, I believe there is ample indication that the minority Shi‘is were present in the past Indonesia.

Azra also rejects views that the celebration of ‘ashura and tabut are clearly influenced by Shi‘i traditions saying they are devoid of Shi‘i theological and political ideology.55 Furthermore he points to a significant Persian influence on Malay-Indonesian Muslim literature. A great number of early Malay-Indonesian Muslim literatures comprise translations or adaptations of Persian texts. Even, Taj al-Salatin, one of the earliest historical works in Malay is a translation of a lost Persian original that may have been brought to the archipelago from India. Similarly, another important Malay history entitled Sejarah Melayu includes a great number of Persian verses and contains terminology foreign to Malay-Indonesian. However, Arabic influences in Malay-Indonesian literature should not be neglected. Azra admits that the relatively high degree of Persian influence upon Malay-Indonesian literature has led to lengthy debates among scholars as to whether Shi‘i doctrines were also found among Muslims in the archipelago.56 In this debate, however, Azra takes a negative stance arguing that Persian is not always identifiable with Shi‘ism, suggesting that “Shi‘i religious thought has hardly ever spread in the archipelago, let alone has strong influence.”57 Based on a variety of written sources, examining the influence of Shi‘ism in the field of politics, literature, and religion, Azra concludes, “It is clear that certain Islamic practices in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago which are associated by some people as Shi’ite, are essentially just similarities, empty from the theological framework and political ideology of Shi‘ism.”58 According to Azra, Shi‘ism as a school of religious and political thought, only attracted followers in Indonesia after the Iranian revolution and through translations of Iranian scholars and thinkers such as Ali Shari‘ati, Muthahhari, and Khomeini.59

Interest in studying Shi‘ism in Indonesia has increased recently. In addition to the above debates concerning the arrival and the influence of Shi‘ism in Indonesia in the historical context, two studies on the contemporary development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia have appeared. First is a preliminary study on Shi‘ism and politics in Indonesia conducted by a research team at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences led by Abdurrahman Zainuddin. It is published under the title Syi‘ah dan Politik di Indonesia (Shi‘ism and Politics in Indonesia).60 Zainuddin et al. attempt to explore the impact of contemporary Shi‘i thought on the political life of Mus lims in Indonesia. They commence by briefly introducing Shi‘ism and its development up to the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 and noting the contemporary Shi‘i concept of wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist). This is followed by a comparison of the political thought of Ayatollah Khomeini (the then leader of Iranian revolution) and Ali Shari‘ati (a famous intellectual considered to be. an ideologue of the Iranian revolution) that derives from the unique nature of Shi‘i political thought which unites religion and politics. While Khomeini maintains that during the occultation of the twelfth Imam, the jurists (sg. faqih) are entitled to rule the Muslim community, Shari‘ati criticising the ‘ulama’ proposes that what he calls “ the reformed intellectuals” should play a major role in government. The book then attempts to explore the impact of the revolution on the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. The book tries to explain the implications of this development on the political life of Indonesian Muslims, and appeals for dialogue between the two Muslim groups in order to prevent conflict. It also includes Azra’s critical article and interview notes with Indonesian Shi‘i intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat, which were previously published in Ulumul Qur’an. Many criticisms have been directed towards this book, such as those by Nurmansyah61 who questions the significance of the comparison between the political thought of Khomeini and Shari‘ati and accuses Azra of ignorance of Shi‘i history. In my opinion, one of the most noticeable weaknesses of the book is its failure to examine the identity and reality of the Shi‘is in Indonesia.

Another study by Syamsuri Ali focuses on the intellectual discourse and social relations among the Indonesian alumni of hawza ‘ilmiyya (‘college of learning’) of Qum, Iran, and how this relates to the transmission of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.62 In this pioneering research, Ali provides us with important information on the educational institutions and figures that send students to Qum, biographies of Qum alumni, their intellectual discourses on aspects of Shi‘ism, and their role in establishing Shi‘i institutions and local associations in Indonesia. However, Ali’s work comes with a caveat: The scope of his account of Qum alumni is limited, particularly in terms of actors and regions discussed. The same is admitted by Jalaluddin Rakhmat who is a co-promoter of the thesis as well as the most prominent Shi‘i intellectual in Indonesia.63 Ali’s research focus excludes the important role of ustadh and intellectuals of non-Qum alumni. As a result, the true nature of Shi‘ism in Indonesia is not revealed in Ali’s account. Despite this caveat, Ali’s study has made an important contribution to the study of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.

Although there have been a considerable number of studies relevant to Shi‘ism in Indonesia, as yet the nature of the Shi‘i denomination in the country -its leading figures, beliefs and practices, institutions, organisation as well as the reactions from the majority community – is still to be fully revealed. This study will deal with these aspects in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of Shi‘ism, within the context of the Sunni majority in the country, as well as the complex nature of Indonesian religion and society.

Theoretical Framework

In analysing the Shi‘is in Indonesia as a minority Muslim group amidst the overwhelming Sunni majority, this study employs the theory of stigma64 proposed by sociologist Goffman.65 I follow Stewart’s steps in his study of the Twelver Shi‘i response to Sunni legal theory. Stewart maintains the applicability of this theory to Shi‘is, “who have lived as a stigmatised minority dominated by a potentially hostile majority in most areas of the Muslim world and during most periods of Muslim history.”66 According to Goffman’s theory, stigmatised groups tend to adopt strategies that fit into a social system dominated by the majority. While Sunnism has become a norm in the Muslim world, Shi‘ism is considered ‘abnormal’ and Shi‘is have to implement strategies in order to gain recognition from the Sunni majority.

Methodology

This study is based on fieldwork and library research. Two periods of fieldwork (both lasting eight months) were conducted in several cities and towns in Indonesia, mainly Jakarta and Bandung. Each period lasted eight months: first, from June 2002 until January 2003, second, from October 2003 until May 2004. I interviewed Shi‘i figures and adherents, observed and participated in a number of religious activities at Shi‘i institutions, visited their libraries, engaged in dialogue with them, and collected Shi‘i and anti-Shi‘i books, periodicals, pamphlets, cassettes, VCD’s, and others. I also gathered information from the websites of organisations and institutions. My relationship with the Shi‘is was such that I was welcome to participate in their activities and have conversations with them in a way that allowed me to collect as ‘natural’ data as possible. To facilitate my interaction with members of I took a three-month Persian course at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Jakarta (January-March 2004). To collect data on Sunni responses, I visited the office of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council), the office of LPPI (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penelitian Islam, Institute of Islamic Studies and Research) in Jakarta, centres of Persis (Persatuan Islam) in Bandung and Bangil, the library of MUI (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian ‘Ulama’) in the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, of the Office of Research and Development and Training, Department of Religious Affairs, (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Departemen Agama) in Jakarta, and of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Ciputat, Banten, and UIN Sunan Gunung Djati in Bandung.

The Structure of the Study

This study is presented in nine chapters, in addition to introduction. Chapter one describes major elements and factors in the formation of the Shi‘i community in Indonesia. This is followed, in chapter two, by a description of the type of leaders in the Shi‘i community and portraits of Husein al-Habsyi, Husein Shahab and Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Chapter three examines the characteristics of Shi‘ism as a madhhab as it is understood and practiced by the Indonesian Shi‘is themselves. This includes outlining the concept of ahl al-bayt, the doctrine of imamate and the Mahdi, the Ja‘fari jurisprudence, aspects of Shi‘i piety and the teaching and practice of taqiyya (dissimulation of faith).

Chapters four, five and six deal with the Shi‘i efforts to spread their teachings to Indonesian society and to gain recognition for Shi‘ism as a valid interpretation of Islam. They examine institutions founded by the Shi‘is and include analysis of the fields of da‘wa, education, and publications. In the chapter on da‘wa I shall describe characteristics of Shi‘i institutions and the ways da‘wa has been conducted. This includes their stated ideals, types of da‘wa activity, and da‘wa training. The chapter on education presents different portraits of educational institutions organised by leading Shi‘i figures. Another important means of disseminating Shi‘ism is publication and this is dealt with in chapter six with a look at Shi‘i publishers, their products - Indonesian translations, works by Indonesian Shi‘i figures and periodicals – and the impact of such publications.

Chapter seven scrutinises IJABI, (Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, the Indonesian Council of Ahlulbait Associations), the mass organisation established by the Shi‘is as a means of gaining legal recognition from state authorities. An historical account of its establishment, its ideological foundation, its development, and negative reactions to the organisation are presented in this chapter.

The study of Shi‘ism in Indonesia will never be well-understood unless a description of the varied responses of the Sunni majority to the Shi‘is is covered. Chapter eight includes analysis of the general attitude of large Sunni organisations (both traditionalist and reformist) to Shi‘ism, and the responses of the Council of Indonesian ‘Ulama’ and the Department of Religious Affairs. It also presents a description of ways in which anti-Shi‘i groups propagate the fight against Shi‘ism. This is followed by an examination of the moderate attitudes of influential Muslim intellectuals which have paved the way for the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. Chapter nine provides a conclusion for this study.

Chapter 1: Mahdi in Islam

1-1 Messianism in Islam

According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Messianism may be described in general terms as an ideology consisting of a complex of ideas, doctrines, attitudes, and expectations which, at a particular moment in history and as a result of a specific configuration of facts, has the potential to materialize in a Messianic movement with a markedly eschatological or Utopian revolutionary character and message.

Messianism, which tends to develop in conditions of frustration, stress and suffering, includes both a negative evaluation of the present as well as a hope and expectancy that the time process will bring about a major change for the better, leading either to the restoration of a past golden age or to the creation of a new one. Although Messianism both as ideology and as movement is not necessarily centered upon a Messianic figure, Messianic movements are usually initiated by a charismatic personality.1

Messianism is a widespread ideology present among people from all kinds of cultural and religious background. As A.A. Sachedina states: “The notion of an expected deliverer who is to come... and establish the rule of justice and equity on earth, is shared by all major religions in the world. Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians who at different times were subjected to the rules of those who did not share their religious heritage, cherished their traditions concerning a Messiah or Saoshyant of a divinely chosen line.”2

Also Shari’ati in his Expectation: a School of Protest, acknowledges that the “yearning instinct” for a saviour is a universal phenomenon in all human cultures and that Islamic yearning for the Mahdi is identical to the expectation in Christianity of Christ’s second coming and to a universal hope for establishing a “golden age”.3

The similarity of this ideology in all religions and the question of its origin often leads to studies and conclusions on the influence of one religion on another as regards the Messianism issue. For example, we find studies about the Jewish influence upon Christian and Islamic Messianism or Persian and Zoroastrian influence on Jewish, Christian or Muslim apocalypticism, Messianism and eschatology.

In modern scholarship, these conclusions are a subject of controversy. In fact, the sheer extent of belief in this ideology would seem to reflect the universality and innateness of humanity's hope for a better future.

In the Islamic context, Messianism is emblemized by the eschatological figure of the Mahdi who, it is believed, will rise to restore the purity of the faith and to create an ideal religio- political system under a just social and legal order, a world free from oppression in which the Islamic Revelation will be the norm for all nations.

However, it is difficult to discuss Messianism as a concept within the Islamic faith in general without first considering it separately within the two main branches of Islam, Sunnism and Shi’ism, as the dimensions, the functions and the importance of this ideology vary between them.

1-2 Mahdi in Sunnism

Al-Mahdi, “The Rightly Guided One”, is the name given to the restorer of religion and justice who, according to a widely held Muslim belief, will rule before the end of the world. The term Mahdi as such does not occur in the Qur’an but is derived from the Arabic root h-d-y commonly used in the Qur’an with the meaning of divine guidance.4

During the Second Civil War, after the death of Mu’awia, the term first came to be used for an expected ruler who could restore Islam to its original perfection. Among religious scholars, discussions about the Mahdi and his identity can be traced back to that time. These discussions developed in different directions and influenced later beliefs about the Mahdi to varying degrees.5

There are a number of differences between the two main branches of Islam as to the conception of the creed in the final restorer. According to the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, the status of the Mahdi awaited by the Sunnites is different from that of the twelfth Imam awaited by the Shi’ites. The essence of Sunnite Islam is that the Muslim people will accede to self-rule, attaining a state of truth and certitude through their own exertions.

The idea of an absolute Mahdi as an infallible guide is therefore rejected by Sunni theologians.6 The Sunnites, in fact, expect the Mahdi to be the ultimate Caliph of the Prophet7 and to spread justice throughout the Earth. They do not believe in the future restorer as one of the fundamental principles of faith, as do the Shi’ites.

Furthermore, a minority among the Sunnites do not accept that the Restorer will be called Mahdi and, indeed, entertain doubts as to his existence. The Encyclopaedia of Islam asserts that: “Lingering doubts concerning the Mahdi may partly account for the absence of any traditions about him in the Sahihs of al-Bukhari (810/870 AH) and Muslim (817/875 AH).”8 “There is no mention of the Mahdi in either of the two Sahih’s of Muslim or Bukhari”.9

There are also controversial discussions about whether the idea of Messianism rightly belongs to Islam or not. Some claim that the idea of Messianism is not Islamic. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica says that “Islam is not a Messianic religion and has no room for a Saviour-Messiah.”10

Riffat Hasan supports this thesis and states that: “Messianism appears to be incompatible with the teachings of the Qur’an, nonetheless in the Muslim world it is a widespread phenomenon, playing a pivotal role in the lives of many present-day Muslims from all segments of society.”11

Also: “Normative Islam as embodied in the Qur’an does not support the idea of Messianism in any of its forms, while Messianism is an essential part of religious belief and practice for almost all Shi’a Muslims. Shi’a Messianism does not fit theologically or logically into the framework of normative Islam.”12

Riffat Hasan also relies on Fazlur Rahman’s comments showing that Messianism was not a part of original Islam. He stated: “As for Messianism, it was originally adopted in Islam either by Shi’ism or Sufism, but in any case it came to Sunni Islam through the Sufis or rather through the precursors of the Sufis - the public preachers of the 2nd/8th century who consoled and satisfied the politically disillusioned and morally starved masses by holding out Messianic hopes.”13

These discussions are ongoing even though the belief in the Mahdi is essentially Islamic and is widely accepted among scholars and ordinary Muslims. Even though it is not an essential part of the Sunni creed, it is accorded widespread belief among this community. Indeed, early Sunni sources record several traditions from the Prophet about the appearance and attributes of the Mahdi.

These traditions are designated as Mutawatir, meaning that they have been reported from the Prophet successively by so many different unbroken chains of transmission and such a number of narrators in every generation that it would be virtually impossible to fabricate their existence without such fabrication becoming known.14

The verses of the Qur’an concerning the Mahdi have also been interpreted by numerous traditions through Sunni chains of transmission, as will be seen in the third chapter. There are many other important terms and practices widely accepted by the Sunnis but that are not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an. The authenticity or otherwise of the traditions of classical and post-classical collections of hadith are open to discussion as regards all fields of Islamic thought, not only on the subject of the Mahdi.

Moreover, despite the absence of the term “Mahdi”, both the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions (hadith) in the two Sahihs provide strong grounds for expecting the appearance of someone who, both through thought and deed, will represent the long-awaited spiritual “guide”.

Indeed, in different hadiths the two Sahihs allude to the coming of a personage at the End of Time, someone whom Jesus will accompany. For example, let us cite two hadiths: The Sahih of Bukhari mentions a tradition reported by Abu Hurayra: “The Prophet said: ‘How will you react when the son of Mary (Jesus) descends among you while your Imam will be from among yourselves?’”15

The Sahih of Muslim reports a tradition from Jabir b. ‘Abdullah: “I heard the Prophet saying: ‘A group of Pure ones from my Community will fight continuously for the Truth (Haqq) until the Day of Judgement.’ He said: ‘Then will descend ‘Isa ibn Maryam. And your Leader (Amir) will tell him: Come and lead the prayer for us. He will answer: No, for some of you are leaders of others, that is what God has granted to this Community.’”16

In the rest of the authoritative collections of traditions, the Mahdi and all that concerns his advent is explicitly mentioned in traditions from the Prophet, which allows us to think that the idea is not exclusively Shi’ite. Several compilers of hadith like Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.241 AH/857 AD), Ibn Madja (d.273 AH/887 AD), al-Tirmidhi (d.279 AH/892 AD), Abu Dawud al-Sajistani (d. 275 AH/889 AD), Ahmad al-Bazzar (d.292 AH/904 AD), Abu Ya’lah al-Mawsili (d.307 AH/919 AD), al- Tabarani (d.360 AH/971 AD), al-Hakim al-Naysaburi (d.431 AH/1040 AD), and al-Bayhaki (d.1077 AD) have specifically recorded traditions about the Mahdi in their collections.

According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the Mahdi traditions contained in the canonical Sunni hadith collections of Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Madja and al-Nassa’i as well as the Musnad of Ibn Hanbal, were numerous enough to provide a solid basis for the popular belief in the Mahdi as well as in the post-classical collections of hadith like those of al-Tabarani, al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, and al-Bayhaki.

The eschatological role of the Mahdi became generally more pronounced, but it never became an essential part of Sunni religious doctrine and Sunni creed rarely mentions it. The view that the Mahdi would rule the Muslim community at the time of the descent of Jesus was commonly accepted17 .

Ibn Khaldun (d. 405 AD), who refutes the certainty of the majority of the hadith concerning the Mahdi, nevertheless accepts a minority of them.18 In his Muqaddimah, he has summarized the Sunnite position on the question of the future restorer of the faith in the following terms:

“It has been well known (and generally accepted) by all Muslims in every epoch, that at the end of time a man from the family (of the Prophet) will without fail make his appearance, one who will strengthen Islam and make justice triumph. The Muslims will follow him, and he will gain domination over the Muslim realm.

He will be called the Mahdi. Following him, the Antichrist will appear, together with all the subsequent signs of the Hour (the Day of Judgement), as established in (the sound traditions of the Sahih)” [authoritative collections of the prophetic sayings recognized by the Sunnites]. After the Mahdi, ‘Isa (Jesus) will descend and kill the Antichrist. Or, Jesus will descend together with the Mahdi and help him kill (the Antichrist), and have him as the leader in his prayers.”19

In spite of support for the belief in the Mahdi by some prominent traditionists, opposition to the belief in him did not entirely disappear among the hadith scholars.20 In the early period of the Islamic history, a minor group of Muslim scholars denied the appearance of the Mahdi and claimed that only Jesus would come.

Ibn Madja reports this hadith (“la Mahdi illa ‘Isa; there shall be no Mahdi except Jesus”) in his Sunan and says that it was reported by one person only, and that is Idris Shafi’i.21

Furthermore, Imam Qurtubi states that there are unknown transmitters in the chain of the narration of this hadith and that it is therefore weak. He also states that this hadith contradicts all the hadiths reported by the Prophet about the Mahdi, descended from the Prophet’s family through Fatima.22

On the other hand, in the middle of the 7th/13th century, several Sunnite scholars supported the Shi’ite belief that the twelfth Imam was the expected Mahdi, relying solely on Sunnite traditions and countering Sunnite objections to the Mahdi-ship of the twelfth Imam.

Among them, Sibt ibn al- Djawzi, shortly before his death in 654 AH/1256 AD in Damascus, assembled reports from Sunni sources about the virtues of ‘Ali and his descendants, and at the end affirmed that the Twelfth Imam was the expected Mahdi in his Tadhkira khawas al-‘umma bi- dhikr khasa’is al-a’imma. Support of the Mahdi-ship of the Twelfth Imam by these Sunni authors, as also by later ones, was regularly noted by Imami apologists.23

Regardless of the authenticity or otherwise of the traditions cited on this question, the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil in the Qur’an and the universal idea of hope in Islam is embodied in the figure of the Mahdi. The belief in a future Saviour and the Messianic concept has had a significant social and psychological impact on Muslims. In every crisis and in times of turbulence, these beliefs served to raise their hopes.

1-3 Mahdi in Shi’ism

In Imamite (Twelver) Shi’ism, the belief in the appearance of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam descended from the Prophet who promised an end to corruption, has been a central aspect of the faith throughout its history, in contrast to the beliefs of Sunnism. This is not only a basic tenet of the creed, but also the foundation on which the entire spiritual edifice of the Imamite religion rests.

The belief in a temporary absence or occultation (ghayba) of the Mahdi and his eventual return in glory is also common. The idea of the Mahdi has a greater significance and presence in the lives of the Shi'ites than in any other religion and is the most important factor in the development of Shi’ism, where unshakeable belief in the advent of the Mahdi continues to be expressed in most of their daily prayers.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the spread of Western-style modernism, Messianic and eschatological aspirations largely disappeared from the mainstream Sunnite discourse, although important Mahdi-st movements emerged in the mid-nineteenth century to subsist well into the twentieth century in different parts of the Islamic world.

On the other hand, in the Shi’ite world, the desire to create a true Islamic community with a Messianic deliverance was more intense than in the Sunni world. In the decade leading up to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, there were some attempts to reassess such themes as the nature of the hereafter, the coming of the Mahdi and the order he is expected to establish. Topics such as the duties of believers during the Occultation were more assertively linked to the questions of political legitimacy and clerical leadership on behalf of the Imam.

There was a gradual distancing from the traditional narrative of the apocalyptic end in favour of portraying the Imam’s return as an all-embracing revolution with this-worldly causes and consequences.

According to Shari’ati, Messianism and futurism in Shi’ite Islam were the outcomes of a “synthesis between the ideals and the realities” of Islam, an ambition to restore the ideals of Ali’s just rule... To reconstruct such an idealized past, Shari’ati believed, the disinherited (mustad’afin) of the earth should strive for a “classless society” in which justice and equality will triumph over exploitation, imperialism and tyranny.24

The difference between Sunnism and Shi’ism is a question of political succession and religious authority. There was the problem of the succession to the Prophet as leader of the community after his death. A small group backed Ali whom they believed to have been designated for this role by appointment (ta’yin) and testament.

They became known as his ‘partisans’ (shi’ah) while the majority agreed on Abu Bakr on the assumption that the Prophet left no instructions on this matter; they gained the name of ‘The people of tradition and consensus of opinion’ (ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah). But more generally the Shi’ite of Ali, in the sense of those who backed and followed him among the Companions, already existed during the Prophet’s lifetime and there are several references to them in prophetic sayings.

Only with the death of the Prophet did they become crystallized as a group distinct from the Sunnis.25 They follow the family and successors of the Prophet (Twelve Imams) as their source for the understanding of the Qur'anic Revelation.

The Imam is the sustainer of the religious law and the guarantor of its continuation. The earth can never be devoid of the presence of the Imam, even if he be hidden or unknown. His duties are essentially to rule over the community as the Prophet's representative, to interpret religious science and law to men and to guide people in their spiritual life.

Like the Imams before him, the twelfth Imam is said to have had a miraculous birth. He was born on the fifteenth day of Sha’ban in the year 255 of the Hijrah. He came out of his mother’s womb prostrate in the attitude of prayer, pure and circumcised, raising his voice in the profession of faith (shahadah).

His mother, called Narjis (Narcissus), is believed to be the grand-daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, who disguised herself as a slave girl, and was captured during a Muslim expedition against Byzantine territory.

Long before her captivity, she was visited in her dreams by Fatimah, the venerable ancestress of the Imams and daughter of the Prophet, who instructed her in the Islamic faith and prepared her for the great role she was to play.

Finally, the Prophets Jesus and Muhammad, with their vicegerents Simon Peter (Shim’un) and Ali, appeared to the girl. Muhammad asked Jesus for Narjis's hand, and Ali and Simon Peter acted as witnesses to the marriage contract. Fatimah and the Virgin Mary also came to bless the sacred marriage.

From that time on, the 11th Imam, Hasan al-‘Askari, the girl’s future spouse, came to see her every night in a dream. He finally ordered her to flee her country and allow herself to be sold into slavery.26 Thus, the twelfth Imam’s lineage combined both royalty and prophecy. More important is the direct presence of Christianity in the popular concept and history of the Imams in Twelver Shi’ism.

According to Imamite authors, none of the previous Imams had been spied upon as had the eleventh. Al-Hasan al- ‘Askari attempted to hide the fact of the birth of his son from everyone but his closest friends.27

The caliph al-Mu’tamid and his entourage, as well as the majority of the partisans of the Imams, were even convinced that the eleventh Imam had passed away (in 260 AH/874 AD) without leaving any progeny.

a) Mahdi in Shi’ite traditions

The literature dealing with the Mahdi, his birth, concealment and return is vast and complex. Sachedina states, concerning this literature, that the primary sources in the study of the doctrinal evolution of the idea of the Mahdi in Imami Shi’ism28 can make an essential contribution to an understanding of the period in which the idea of the Hidden Mahdi became crystallized in Imamite dogma.29

M.A.A. Moezzi explains very clearly that the Imams passed on two kinds of traditions concerning the Mahdi: the first category contained confusing information, where the name of the Mahdi is not specified and was aimed at that large group of disciples who were involved in the writing down of traditions. In fact, the Imams prohibited the pronouncing of the latter’s name (al-nahy ‘an al-ism, al-man’ ‘an al-tasmiya).30

According to the authors, this prohibition was maintained in effect up to at least the beginning of the minor Occultation. A second kind of tradition, aimed only at the closest of disciples, contained specific information about the identity of the Mahdi.

His name was included here, except that, in order to guarantee the safety of his life, this category of traditions was only to be transmitted orally until after the beginning of the Occultation; it could be put into writing only after the life of the son of the eleventh Imam was out of danger.31

Among the first Shi’ite compilers of traditions concerning the number of Imams, the twelfth Imam, his two occultations, his final Return and Rise, let us cite: Shaykh al-Kulayni, who died in 329 AH/940 AD, the same year as the beginning of the major Occultation, and who compiled his Usul min al-Kafi during the period of the minor Occultation; al-Nu’mani Ibn Abi Zaynab (d.circa 345 or 360 AH/956 or 971 AD); Ja’far al- Qummi (d.369 AH/979 AD); Ali ibn Muhammad al-Khazzaz al-Razi al-Qummi (d. in the second half of the fourth AH/tenth AD century); Ibn Bâbuye (d. 381 AH/991 AD) who, especially in his Kamal(Ikmal) al-din, seems to have collected the essentials of all the information from his predecessors; Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Ayyash al-Jawhari (d.401 AH/1101 AD; Al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 413 AH/1022 AD), author of Kitab al- Irshad; id. Al-Fusul al-‘ashara fi al-ghayba; Al-Murtada ‘Alam al-Huda (d. 436 AH/1044 AD), a disciple of al-Mufid; Ali al-Karajaki (d. 449 AH/1057 AD), another of al-Mufid’s disciples; and finally Muhammad ibn Al-Hasan al-Tusi (d.460 AH/1067 AD). All these authors’ works preceded the minor Occultation.32

The Twelver Shi’ite doctrine on the Occultation, based on traditions attributed to the Imams, was authoritatively elaborated by Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Nu’mani in his Kitab al-Ghayba, by Ibn Babuya in his Ikmal al-Din, and by Shaykh al-Tusi in his Kitab al-Ghayba. In Imami traditions, as in Sunni traditions, the Mahdi will rule the world, with Jesus praying behind him after his descent from heaven.

This did not raise a theological problem as it would in Sunnism, since the Mahdi, like all other Imams, according to prevalent Imami doctrine, exceeds all Prophets except Muhammad in religious rank.33

b) The Occultation

The Occultation (ghayba) is a period of concealment chosen by God for the Imam who will continue to live in this state as long as God deems it necessary. Then He will command him to reappear and take control of the world in order to restore justice and equity. The mysterious fate of the son of the eleventh Imam divided the early Shi’ite family into some eleven to fifteen different schisms.34

But the idea according to which the twelfth Imam was alive and hidden and would return at the End of Time, was later adopted by all Imamites due to the tenacious efforts of authors/compilers like al- Kulayni, al-Nu’mani and especially Ibn Babuye, who, through the great mass of traditions surrounding this belief, progressively managed to convince the population of the faithful.35

In fact, early Imamites attempted to present the Imamate and Mahdi-ism of the Twelfth Imam in occultation in a logical and rational way.36 According to Imamite sources, Muhammad ibn Al-Hasan al-‘Askari (al-Mahdi) had a first occultation when he was a child, in 260 AH/874 AD, at the time of his father’s death, and it lasted nearly 70 years.

At Samarra in Iraq, beside the shrines of the tenth and eleventh Imams, is a mosque under which there is a cave from where the Imam Mahdi is said to have disappeared37 when he was five years old. This cave was a place of retreat and meditation for the eleventh Imam and his son, and also a hiding place from the Abbasid agents.38 During this Occultation, the Imam communicated with his faithful via four successive Representatives (nâ’ib):

1. Abu ‘Amr ‘Uthman ibn Sa’id al-‘Umari (or al-‘Amri), representative from 260 AH/874 AD to 267 AH/880 AD.

2. Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman al-‘Umari (or al-‘Amri), the son of the above, from 267 AH/880 AD until 305 AH/917 AD.

3. Abul-Qasim al-Husayn ibn Rawh al- Nawbakhti, from 305 AH/917 AD to 326 AH/937 AD.

4. Abul-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad al-Simarri, from 326 AH/937 AD to 329AH/941 AD.

This was “the minor Occultation” (al-ghayba al-sughra).

Then, around 329 AH/941 AD, came the beginning of “the major Occultation” (al-ghayba al-kubra) after the fourth representative received a last autographed note from the hidden Imam:

“In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful; Ali ibn Muhammad al-Simarri, may God increase, through you, the reward of your brothers [in religion; that is the Shi’ites]; your death will take place in six days. Prepare yourself and name no one as your successor [as representative] after your death.

This is the advent of the second Occultation in which there will be no more manifestation, except if it be with divine permission, and that will only take place after a long time, when hearts will be hardened and the earth filled with violence.

Among my partisans, some will claim to have seen me with their eyes. Beware! He who claims to have seen [me] with his eyes before the raising of al-Sufyani and [the sounding of] the Cry is a liar and an impostor. Greatness and Power belong to God alone.”

Six days later al-Simarri, on his deathbed, was asked, “Who will be your successor?” He replied, “From this point on, the matter is in God’s hands, He will arrange it Himself.” Those were his last words.39

The major Occultation is still in effect, and will not end until the End of Time (akhir al-zaman) when the Mahdi comes back to re-establish Justice on earth. The Imam is not completely cut off from his followers but has spokesmen, in the form of learned jurists (marja’ taqlid), who can act on his behalf and guide the Shi’ites in their religious matters. Imamite traditions give four reasons for the Occultation.40

1. Safeguarding the life of the twelfth Imam.

2. Independence vis-á-vis temporal powers; through his Occultation, the Mahdi will owe allegiance to no temporal powers.

3. Putting the Imamites to the test; the Occultation serves as a long period of trial, a challenge to their faith.

4. Finally, there is a hidden reason for the Occultation, that is said to be the most important of all, although it will not be revealed until the Return of the Mahdi.

With the major Occultation, the secret life of the Twelfth Imam begins, whose occult presence has dominated the Shi’ite religious consciousness for more than ten centuries. The Twelver tradition illustrates this from as early as the fourth AH/tenth AD century, the hidden Imam living in his physical body, providentially endowed with a long life.

To support this claim, Ibn Babuye dedicates six chapters of his Kamal al-din to those known for their extraordinarily long lives in the Arabic tradition. It is also said in the Twelver tradition that the hidden Imam attends the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and that he sees people even if they cannot see him.41

He is visibly present and walks through their marketplaces and into their homes, and nobody recognizes him.42 In this latter case, he is compared to Joseph (Qur’an, sura 12, Yusuf), seen but not recognized by his brothers. As in Joseph’s case, God can allow him to be recognized by some people. The Prophet is said to have stated: “...His faithful are illuminated by his Light; they profit from his wilaya during his Occultation, just as one profits from the sun even when it is covered by clouds.”43

The history of the twelfth Imam during his major Occultation is constituted of stories and narratives recounted by those who saw the Mahdi in their dreams or in reality.44

The compilations of al-Kulayni, al-Nu’mani, and Ibn Babuye, to name the oldest and the best known, and numerous other Shi’ite works throughout the centuries, contain a number of eyewitness accounts from even ordinary people who were in great distress or other unfortunate circumstances and who claim having met the twelfth Imam. “None of these mysterious appearances to his faithful suspends his Occultation but each of these appearances suspends for his faithful the common laws of time and space for Men who do not perceive the occult presence of the Imam.”45

c) The concept of Intizar

Complementary to the doctrine of the greater Occultation is the notion of Intizar, or the expectation and awaiting of the Hidden Imam's return. Intizar is a state of expectancy for the reappearance of the Hidden Imam; it is a doctrine of hope and trust that he will one day reappear and establish an ideal Islamic society.

The expectation of release from suffering, grief and sorrow (Intizar al-faraj) is enjoined upon the believers. The doctrine of Intizar has important connotations for the personal and political lives of the Twelver Shi’ite faithful during the Occultation of the Imam: their personal duties as believers vis-â-vis God and their attitude to the question of religious leadership and earthly government.

The most comprehensive collection of the Twelver Shi’ite narratives on Intizar was made by the Shi’ite scholar Muhammad Baqir Majlisi in his encyclopaedic work on Shi’ite traditions, Bihar al-Anwar.46 The disappearance of the Mahdi and his Occultation are presented in the traditions as a severe test for the Shi’ite faithful, bringing with it much hardship and many schisms.

The Shi’ites will undergo a process of sifting in which the unbelievers will be rooted out from the believers. Several traditions mention the merit of Intizar al-faraj without specifying the nature and cause of suffering. In one tradition, the Prophet is reported to have said: “The best of all acts carried out by my people is their expectation of release from suffering, granted to them by God.”47

Several of the eighty or so traditions on the excellency of Intizar, class it as the most noble (afdal) of all actions, and in one narrative as synonymous with worship (‘Ibada).48 Acts of worship must be carried out clandestinely during the ghayba, are more meritorious than those performed openly after the return of the Imam. One must strive to carry out all of the obligatory duties laid down in the Shari’a, which remain incumbent on the individual despite the absence of the Imam.

The Twelver Shi’ites during the occultation are superior to those in the company of the Mahdi, for the simple reason that the former must contend with tyrannical regimes, against which they move neither tongue nor hand nor sword in opposition.49

The expectation of salvation through the rise of the twelfth Imam is dominant throughout the Occultation. The persistent faith in freedom from grief through his appearance requires the Shi’ites to be on the alert at all times and also to pave the way for the Imam’s reappearance.

Murtaza Mutahhari, a prominent student of Imam Khomeiny and a teacher of philosophy, in his essay on the uprising and the revolution of the Mahdi, no longer treated the advent of the Lord of the Age as a sudden, impromptu event, but as the final stage in an ideologically driven revolution to establish Islam’s “ideal society”.

Mutahhari conceived the coming of the Mahdi as the climax of a revolutionary struggle that in its primary stages requires the believers’ active involvement50 during the Occultation.

Unlike the Marxist theory of revolution, Mutahhari believed that Mahdi’s revolution is divinely inspired and remains contingent upon the alertness and action of the community. Thus, the establishment of a just state became for Mutahhari and like-minded activists a legitimate first step toward the final revolution of the Mahdi.

The well-known work Wilayat-e faqih (authority of the jurist) was clearly meant to provide an answer to the most urgent of these concerns. In this work, Imam Khomeiny advocated the necessity for instituting an Islamic government in the absence of the Hidden Imam in order to prepare the terrain for the Rise of the Mahdi.

He argued that while the Imam is in Occultation, preserving the essence of Islam and defending its sacred values should be accomplished by an Islamic government under a Guardian Jurist to be upheld as the Imam's vicegerent. In support of this doctrine, Imam Khomeiny cites one of the Hidden Imam’s decrees in which the ‘ulama were upheld as “proofs” (hujaj) of the Lord of the Age.

Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977), a major ideologue of revolutionary Shi’ism, in a pamphlet entitled “expectation, a school of protest”, regarded the End of Time as nothing but an “ultimate revolution” for humanity. The Mahdi’s revolution could not come about without Muslims arriving at a new understanding of expectation as a way of acquiring social responsibility, working toward a just and equitable order and rejecting political oppression and cultural degradation.

Complying with the Shi’ite prophecies, he repeated that the Lord of the Age will come when the entire lifespan of humanity reaches its lowest ebb of corruption, but until that time, he recommended that the community of believers should settle on the leadership of a democratically elected jurist (faqih) to serve as the Hidden Imam's general deputy (na’ibe ‘aam).

A true understanding of the End, he stated, will evolve only when Muslims abandon troubling theological entanglements concerning circumstances of the resurrection (and in effect, the Occultation) and instead, develop a perspective conforming to modern social and human sciences, and based on a sociological analysis of class conflict. Shari’ati’s ideological dimensions of expectation go so far as to endorse a Marxist-inspired Islamic revolution.

True expectation, according to Shari’ati, is “believing that in the life of humankind on this very earth and before death, not in the resurrection after death, history will bring about the triumph of the oppressed and destruction of the oppressors”.

d) The Return and the Rise

The future Return and Rise of the Mahdi constitutes the most frequent of the Imam’s predictions and has been described in numerous traditions from the early times in Imamite history. It is believed that the Mahdi will come to fulfill the mission of all the prophets before him, and complete the task of Imam Husayn (the third Imam), the great martyr of Karbala.

He shall appear, according to many traditions, on the day of ‘Ashura, the day on which Imam Husayn, son of Imam Ali, was killed,51 showing himself first in Mecca, Islam's holiest city, where he will be joined initially by 313 believers, the number of the martyrs of Badr, then he will make his headquarters in Kufah where Imam Ali was killed and buried.

The Return as well as the Rising of the Qa’im, will be preceded by signs. The theme of ‘Signs of the Return’ is one of the most developed of those that occur in collections of hadith, in both Sunnite and Shi’ite literature. Sometimes a number of chapters are dedicated to the subject.52 The universal sign of the Return consists in the generalized invasion of the earth by Evil. There are also a great number of more specific signs listed in the compilations.

Notes

1. “Messiah and Messianic Movements” in the New Encyclopaedia Britannica P.1017-1022

2. A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, P.1.

3. Shari’ati, Intizar, p.4

4. W. Madelung: “al-Mahdi” in EI2, p.1230

5. Ibid, p.1231

6. “al-Mahdi” SEI, p.311

7. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, P.14

8. “al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1234

9. “al-Mahdi”, SEI, p.311

10. “Messiah and Messianic Movements”p.1020

11. R. Hasan: “Messianism and Islam”, p.262

12. Ibid, p.267

13. Fazlur Rahman , Islam , p.245

14. Concerning the Mahdi, Hafez Abu Abdullah Ganzi Shafei (d. 658 A.H.) reports in his book al-Bayan: تواترت الأخبار و استفاضت بكثره رواتها عن المصطفى في أمر المهدي (M.R. Hakimi, Khorshid-e Maghreb, p. 81)

15. M. ibn Isma’il al-Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, Bab. Nuzul ‘Isa ibn Maryam

49, Vol. 4, p.143:

...عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله (ص)، كيف أنتم إذا نزل ابن مريم فيكم وامامكم منكم؟

16. Muslim ibn Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Kitab Al-Iman, num. 247, Vol. 1, p. 137: عن جابر بن عبدالله يقول، سمعت النبي (ص) يقول، لاتزال طائفة من أمتي يقاتلون على الحق ظاهرين إلى يوم القيامة، قال فينزل عيسى ابن مريم (ع) فيقول أميرهم: تعال صل بنا، فيقول: لا، إن بعضكم على بعض أمرا تكرمة الله هذه الأمة .

17. “Al-Mahdi” in EI2, p.1234

18. A. Amin, al-Mahdi wal-Mahdawiyah, p.108

19. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, vol. 2, p.156

20. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1234

21. Ibn Madja, Muhammad Ibn Yazid al-Qazwini (207-275 A.H.) Sunan Ibn Madja, Kitab al-Fitan, Bab Shiddat al-Zaman, Vol. 3, p. 434

22. Imam al-Qurtubi, Al-Tadhkirah Fi Ahwal al-Mawta wa umur al-Akhira, Bab Fi al-Mahdi

23. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1237

24. Shari’ati, Expectation: a School of Protest, p. 15

25. H. Nasr, Ideals and realities of Islam, p.149

26. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din , Bab 41 Ma ruwi’ah al-Narjis umm al- Qa’im, vol.2, p.418-423. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, Kitab al-Ghayba, Bab wiladatihi wa ahwal al-ummihi, num. 12, vol. 51, pp.6-7-8

27. Ibn Babuye , Kamal al-din , vol 1, pp.474

28. Imami (or imamate); the Shia who believe in twelve imams

29. Sachedina, “A treatise on the Occultation...” , p.110

30. al-Kulayni , Usul, “kitab al-hujja”, b‚b fi al-nahy ëan al-ism , hadith 1 and 3, vol.1, p.332-333

31. M.A.A. Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.106

32. M.A.A. Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.101

33. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p. 1236

34. Cf. A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 42-55, see also an- Nawbakhti, les sectes shiites (Kitab Firaq al-shi’a), pp.109

35. M.A.A.Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.105

36. Sachedina, “A treatise on the Occultation...” , p.111

37. M. Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P.161

38. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p. 322

39. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, vol. 2, ch. 45, p.516, num.44

40. Al-Kulayni, Usul, Kitab al-Hujja, bab nadir fi hal al-ghayba, vol. 1 pp. 333-335, bab fi l-ghayba, vol. 2 pp. 132- 45. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, vol. 2 , ch. 44 , PP .479 - 82, num 1, 2, 6, 8

41. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, Bab Dhikr man shahada al-Qa’im wa raâhu 43, vol.2, pp.351, num.8

42. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din , vol. 2, ch.33, p.341, num.21. also, al- Kulayni, Usul, Kitab al-Hujja, bab Nahi ëan al- Ism, vol.1, num 1 & 3 , p. 332-333 ; Al-Nu’mani, Kitab al-ghayba, p.257

43. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-dÓn, vol.2, ch.43, p.253, num.3

44. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p. 304

45. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p.306

46. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, Vol. 52, Bab Fazl al-Intizar va madh al-Shi’a fi zaman al-ghayba, pp. 122-127

47. Bihar vol.52, P. 122

48. Ibid

49. Ibid

50. Mutahhari, p.5-10

51. Mufid, p.341

52. Al-Nu’mani , Kitab al-ghayba, ch. 14, 15, 18, 21; Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-Din, ch. 47, 57, 58.

Chapter 1: Mahdi in Islam

1-1 Messianism in Islam

According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Messianism may be described in general terms as an ideology consisting of a complex of ideas, doctrines, attitudes, and expectations which, at a particular moment in history and as a result of a specific configuration of facts, has the potential to materialize in a Messianic movement with a markedly eschatological or Utopian revolutionary character and message.

Messianism, which tends to develop in conditions of frustration, stress and suffering, includes both a negative evaluation of the present as well as a hope and expectancy that the time process will bring about a major change for the better, leading either to the restoration of a past golden age or to the creation of a new one. Although Messianism both as ideology and as movement is not necessarily centered upon a Messianic figure, Messianic movements are usually initiated by a charismatic personality.1

Messianism is a widespread ideology present among people from all kinds of cultural and religious background. As A.A. Sachedina states: “The notion of an expected deliverer who is to come... and establish the rule of justice and equity on earth, is shared by all major religions in the world. Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians who at different times were subjected to the rules of those who did not share their religious heritage, cherished their traditions concerning a Messiah or Saoshyant of a divinely chosen line.”2

Also Shari’ati in his Expectation: a School of Protest, acknowledges that the “yearning instinct” for a saviour is a universal phenomenon in all human cultures and that Islamic yearning for the Mahdi is identical to the expectation in Christianity of Christ’s second coming and to a universal hope for establishing a “golden age”.3

The similarity of this ideology in all religions and the question of its origin often leads to studies and conclusions on the influence of one religion on another as regards the Messianism issue. For example, we find studies about the Jewish influence upon Christian and Islamic Messianism or Persian and Zoroastrian influence on Jewish, Christian or Muslim apocalypticism, Messianism and eschatology.

In modern scholarship, these conclusions are a subject of controversy. In fact, the sheer extent of belief in this ideology would seem to reflect the universality and innateness of humanity's hope for a better future.

In the Islamic context, Messianism is emblemized by the eschatological figure of the Mahdi who, it is believed, will rise to restore the purity of the faith and to create an ideal religio- political system under a just social and legal order, a world free from oppression in which the Islamic Revelation will be the norm for all nations.

However, it is difficult to discuss Messianism as a concept within the Islamic faith in general without first considering it separately within the two main branches of Islam, Sunnism and Shi’ism, as the dimensions, the functions and the importance of this ideology vary between them.

1-2 Mahdi in Sunnism

Al-Mahdi, “The Rightly Guided One”, is the name given to the restorer of religion and justice who, according to a widely held Muslim belief, will rule before the end of the world. The term Mahdi as such does not occur in the Qur’an but is derived from the Arabic root h-d-y commonly used in the Qur’an with the meaning of divine guidance.4

During the Second Civil War, after the death of Mu’awia, the term first came to be used for an expected ruler who could restore Islam to its original perfection. Among religious scholars, discussions about the Mahdi and his identity can be traced back to that time. These discussions developed in different directions and influenced later beliefs about the Mahdi to varying degrees.5

There are a number of differences between the two main branches of Islam as to the conception of the creed in the final restorer. According to the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, the status of the Mahdi awaited by the Sunnites is different from that of the twelfth Imam awaited by the Shi’ites. The essence of Sunnite Islam is that the Muslim people will accede to self-rule, attaining a state of truth and certitude through their own exertions.

The idea of an absolute Mahdi as an infallible guide is therefore rejected by Sunni theologians.6 The Sunnites, in fact, expect the Mahdi to be the ultimate Caliph of the Prophet7 and to spread justice throughout the Earth. They do not believe in the future restorer as one of the fundamental principles of faith, as do the Shi’ites.

Furthermore, a minority among the Sunnites do not accept that the Restorer will be called Mahdi and, indeed, entertain doubts as to his existence. The Encyclopaedia of Islam asserts that: “Lingering doubts concerning the Mahdi may partly account for the absence of any traditions about him in the Sahihs of al-Bukhari (810/870 AH) and Muslim (817/875 AH).”8 “There is no mention of the Mahdi in either of the two Sahih’s of Muslim or Bukhari”.9

There are also controversial discussions about whether the idea of Messianism rightly belongs to Islam or not. Some claim that the idea of Messianism is not Islamic. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica says that “Islam is not a Messianic religion and has no room for a Saviour-Messiah.”10

Riffat Hasan supports this thesis and states that: “Messianism appears to be incompatible with the teachings of the Qur’an, nonetheless in the Muslim world it is a widespread phenomenon, playing a pivotal role in the lives of many present-day Muslims from all segments of society.”11

Also: “Normative Islam as embodied in the Qur’an does not support the idea of Messianism in any of its forms, while Messianism is an essential part of religious belief and practice for almost all Shi’a Muslims. Shi’a Messianism does not fit theologically or logically into the framework of normative Islam.”12

Riffat Hasan also relies on Fazlur Rahman’s comments showing that Messianism was not a part of original Islam. He stated: “As for Messianism, it was originally adopted in Islam either by Shi’ism or Sufism, but in any case it came to Sunni Islam through the Sufis or rather through the precursors of the Sufis - the public preachers of the 2nd/8th century who consoled and satisfied the politically disillusioned and morally starved masses by holding out Messianic hopes.”13

These discussions are ongoing even though the belief in the Mahdi is essentially Islamic and is widely accepted among scholars and ordinary Muslims. Even though it is not an essential part of the Sunni creed, it is accorded widespread belief among this community. Indeed, early Sunni sources record several traditions from the Prophet about the appearance and attributes of the Mahdi.

These traditions are designated as Mutawatir, meaning that they have been reported from the Prophet successively by so many different unbroken chains of transmission and such a number of narrators in every generation that it would be virtually impossible to fabricate their existence without such fabrication becoming known.14

The verses of the Qur’an concerning the Mahdi have also been interpreted by numerous traditions through Sunni chains of transmission, as will be seen in the third chapter. There are many other important terms and practices widely accepted by the Sunnis but that are not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an. The authenticity or otherwise of the traditions of classical and post-classical collections of hadith are open to discussion as regards all fields of Islamic thought, not only on the subject of the Mahdi.

Moreover, despite the absence of the term “Mahdi”, both the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions (hadith) in the two Sahihs provide strong grounds for expecting the appearance of someone who, both through thought and deed, will represent the long-awaited spiritual “guide”.

Indeed, in different hadiths the two Sahihs allude to the coming of a personage at the End of Time, someone whom Jesus will accompany. For example, let us cite two hadiths: The Sahih of Bukhari mentions a tradition reported by Abu Hurayra: “The Prophet said: ‘How will you react when the son of Mary (Jesus) descends among you while your Imam will be from among yourselves?’”15

The Sahih of Muslim reports a tradition from Jabir b. ‘Abdullah: “I heard the Prophet saying: ‘A group of Pure ones from my Community will fight continuously for the Truth (Haqq) until the Day of Judgement.’ He said: ‘Then will descend ‘Isa ibn Maryam. And your Leader (Amir) will tell him: Come and lead the prayer for us. He will answer: No, for some of you are leaders of others, that is what God has granted to this Community.’”16

In the rest of the authoritative collections of traditions, the Mahdi and all that concerns his advent is explicitly mentioned in traditions from the Prophet, which allows us to think that the idea is not exclusively Shi’ite. Several compilers of hadith like Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.241 AH/857 AD), Ibn Madja (d.273 AH/887 AD), al-Tirmidhi (d.279 AH/892 AD), Abu Dawud al-Sajistani (d. 275 AH/889 AD), Ahmad al-Bazzar (d.292 AH/904 AD), Abu Ya’lah al-Mawsili (d.307 AH/919 AD), al- Tabarani (d.360 AH/971 AD), al-Hakim al-Naysaburi (d.431 AH/1040 AD), and al-Bayhaki (d.1077 AD) have specifically recorded traditions about the Mahdi in their collections.

According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the Mahdi traditions contained in the canonical Sunni hadith collections of Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Madja and al-Nassa’i as well as the Musnad of Ibn Hanbal, were numerous enough to provide a solid basis for the popular belief in the Mahdi as well as in the post-classical collections of hadith like those of al-Tabarani, al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, and al-Bayhaki.

The eschatological role of the Mahdi became generally more pronounced, but it never became an essential part of Sunni religious doctrine and Sunni creed rarely mentions it. The view that the Mahdi would rule the Muslim community at the time of the descent of Jesus was commonly accepted17 .

Ibn Khaldun (d. 405 AD), who refutes the certainty of the majority of the hadith concerning the Mahdi, nevertheless accepts a minority of them.18 In his Muqaddimah, he has summarized the Sunnite position on the question of the future restorer of the faith in the following terms:

“It has been well known (and generally accepted) by all Muslims in every epoch, that at the end of time a man from the family (of the Prophet) will without fail make his appearance, one who will strengthen Islam and make justice triumph. The Muslims will follow him, and he will gain domination over the Muslim realm.

He will be called the Mahdi. Following him, the Antichrist will appear, together with all the subsequent signs of the Hour (the Day of Judgement), as established in (the sound traditions of the Sahih)” [authoritative collections of the prophetic sayings recognized by the Sunnites]. After the Mahdi, ‘Isa (Jesus) will descend and kill the Antichrist. Or, Jesus will descend together with the Mahdi and help him kill (the Antichrist), and have him as the leader in his prayers.”19

In spite of support for the belief in the Mahdi by some prominent traditionists, opposition to the belief in him did not entirely disappear among the hadith scholars.20 In the early period of the Islamic history, a minor group of Muslim scholars denied the appearance of the Mahdi and claimed that only Jesus would come.

Ibn Madja reports this hadith (“la Mahdi illa ‘Isa; there shall be no Mahdi except Jesus”) in his Sunan and says that it was reported by one person only, and that is Idris Shafi’i.21

Furthermore, Imam Qurtubi states that there are unknown transmitters in the chain of the narration of this hadith and that it is therefore weak. He also states that this hadith contradicts all the hadiths reported by the Prophet about the Mahdi, descended from the Prophet’s family through Fatima.22

On the other hand, in the middle of the 7th/13th century, several Sunnite scholars supported the Shi’ite belief that the twelfth Imam was the expected Mahdi, relying solely on Sunnite traditions and countering Sunnite objections to the Mahdi-ship of the twelfth Imam.

Among them, Sibt ibn al- Djawzi, shortly before his death in 654 AH/1256 AD in Damascus, assembled reports from Sunni sources about the virtues of ‘Ali and his descendants, and at the end affirmed that the Twelfth Imam was the expected Mahdi in his Tadhkira khawas al-‘umma bi- dhikr khasa’is al-a’imma. Support of the Mahdi-ship of the Twelfth Imam by these Sunni authors, as also by later ones, was regularly noted by Imami apologists.23

Regardless of the authenticity or otherwise of the traditions cited on this question, the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil in the Qur’an and the universal idea of hope in Islam is embodied in the figure of the Mahdi. The belief in a future Saviour and the Messianic concept has had a significant social and psychological impact on Muslims. In every crisis and in times of turbulence, these beliefs served to raise their hopes.

1-3 Mahdi in Shi’ism

In Imamite (Twelver) Shi’ism, the belief in the appearance of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam descended from the Prophet who promised an end to corruption, has been a central aspect of the faith throughout its history, in contrast to the beliefs of Sunnism. This is not only a basic tenet of the creed, but also the foundation on which the entire spiritual edifice of the Imamite religion rests.

The belief in a temporary absence or occultation (ghayba) of the Mahdi and his eventual return in glory is also common. The idea of the Mahdi has a greater significance and presence in the lives of the Shi'ites than in any other religion and is the most important factor in the development of Shi’ism, where unshakeable belief in the advent of the Mahdi continues to be expressed in most of their daily prayers.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the spread of Western-style modernism, Messianic and eschatological aspirations largely disappeared from the mainstream Sunnite discourse, although important Mahdi-st movements emerged in the mid-nineteenth century to subsist well into the twentieth century in different parts of the Islamic world.

On the other hand, in the Shi’ite world, the desire to create a true Islamic community with a Messianic deliverance was more intense than in the Sunni world. In the decade leading up to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, there were some attempts to reassess such themes as the nature of the hereafter, the coming of the Mahdi and the order he is expected to establish. Topics such as the duties of believers during the Occultation were more assertively linked to the questions of political legitimacy and clerical leadership on behalf of the Imam.

There was a gradual distancing from the traditional narrative of the apocalyptic end in favour of portraying the Imam’s return as an all-embracing revolution with this-worldly causes and consequences.

According to Shari’ati, Messianism and futurism in Shi’ite Islam were the outcomes of a “synthesis between the ideals and the realities” of Islam, an ambition to restore the ideals of Ali’s just rule... To reconstruct such an idealized past, Shari’ati believed, the disinherited (mustad’afin) of the earth should strive for a “classless society” in which justice and equality will triumph over exploitation, imperialism and tyranny.24

The difference between Sunnism and Shi’ism is a question of political succession and religious authority. There was the problem of the succession to the Prophet as leader of the community after his death. A small group backed Ali whom they believed to have been designated for this role by appointment (ta’yin) and testament.

They became known as his ‘partisans’ (shi’ah) while the majority agreed on Abu Bakr on the assumption that the Prophet left no instructions on this matter; they gained the name of ‘The people of tradition and consensus of opinion’ (ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah). But more generally the Shi’ite of Ali, in the sense of those who backed and followed him among the Companions, already existed during the Prophet’s lifetime and there are several references to them in prophetic sayings.

Only with the death of the Prophet did they become crystallized as a group distinct from the Sunnis.25 They follow the family and successors of the Prophet (Twelve Imams) as their source for the understanding of the Qur'anic Revelation.

The Imam is the sustainer of the religious law and the guarantor of its continuation. The earth can never be devoid of the presence of the Imam, even if he be hidden or unknown. His duties are essentially to rule over the community as the Prophet's representative, to interpret religious science and law to men and to guide people in their spiritual life.

Like the Imams before him, the twelfth Imam is said to have had a miraculous birth. He was born on the fifteenth day of Sha’ban in the year 255 of the Hijrah. He came out of his mother’s womb prostrate in the attitude of prayer, pure and circumcised, raising his voice in the profession of faith (shahadah).

His mother, called Narjis (Narcissus), is believed to be the grand-daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, who disguised herself as a slave girl, and was captured during a Muslim expedition against Byzantine territory.

Long before her captivity, she was visited in her dreams by Fatimah, the venerable ancestress of the Imams and daughter of the Prophet, who instructed her in the Islamic faith and prepared her for the great role she was to play.

Finally, the Prophets Jesus and Muhammad, with their vicegerents Simon Peter (Shim’un) and Ali, appeared to the girl. Muhammad asked Jesus for Narjis's hand, and Ali and Simon Peter acted as witnesses to the marriage contract. Fatimah and the Virgin Mary also came to bless the sacred marriage.

From that time on, the 11th Imam, Hasan al-‘Askari, the girl’s future spouse, came to see her every night in a dream. He finally ordered her to flee her country and allow herself to be sold into slavery.26 Thus, the twelfth Imam’s lineage combined both royalty and prophecy. More important is the direct presence of Christianity in the popular concept and history of the Imams in Twelver Shi’ism.

According to Imamite authors, none of the previous Imams had been spied upon as had the eleventh. Al-Hasan al- ‘Askari attempted to hide the fact of the birth of his son from everyone but his closest friends.27

The caliph al-Mu’tamid and his entourage, as well as the majority of the partisans of the Imams, were even convinced that the eleventh Imam had passed away (in 260 AH/874 AD) without leaving any progeny.

a) Mahdi in Shi’ite traditions

The literature dealing with the Mahdi, his birth, concealment and return is vast and complex. Sachedina states, concerning this literature, that the primary sources in the study of the doctrinal evolution of the idea of the Mahdi in Imami Shi’ism28 can make an essential contribution to an understanding of the period in which the idea of the Hidden Mahdi became crystallized in Imamite dogma.29

M.A.A. Moezzi explains very clearly that the Imams passed on two kinds of traditions concerning the Mahdi: the first category contained confusing information, where the name of the Mahdi is not specified and was aimed at that large group of disciples who were involved in the writing down of traditions. In fact, the Imams prohibited the pronouncing of the latter’s name (al-nahy ‘an al-ism, al-man’ ‘an al-tasmiya).30

According to the authors, this prohibition was maintained in effect up to at least the beginning of the minor Occultation. A second kind of tradition, aimed only at the closest of disciples, contained specific information about the identity of the Mahdi.

His name was included here, except that, in order to guarantee the safety of his life, this category of traditions was only to be transmitted orally until after the beginning of the Occultation; it could be put into writing only after the life of the son of the eleventh Imam was out of danger.31

Among the first Shi’ite compilers of traditions concerning the number of Imams, the twelfth Imam, his two occultations, his final Return and Rise, let us cite: Shaykh al-Kulayni, who died in 329 AH/940 AD, the same year as the beginning of the major Occultation, and who compiled his Usul min al-Kafi during the period of the minor Occultation; al-Nu’mani Ibn Abi Zaynab (d.circa 345 or 360 AH/956 or 971 AD); Ja’far al- Qummi (d.369 AH/979 AD); Ali ibn Muhammad al-Khazzaz al-Razi al-Qummi (d. in the second half of the fourth AH/tenth AD century); Ibn Bâbuye (d. 381 AH/991 AD) who, especially in his Kamal(Ikmal) al-din, seems to have collected the essentials of all the information from his predecessors; Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Ayyash al-Jawhari (d.401 AH/1101 AD; Al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 413 AH/1022 AD), author of Kitab al- Irshad; id. Al-Fusul al-‘ashara fi al-ghayba; Al-Murtada ‘Alam al-Huda (d. 436 AH/1044 AD), a disciple of al-Mufid; Ali al-Karajaki (d. 449 AH/1057 AD), another of al-Mufid’s disciples; and finally Muhammad ibn Al-Hasan al-Tusi (d.460 AH/1067 AD). All these authors’ works preceded the minor Occultation.32

The Twelver Shi’ite doctrine on the Occultation, based on traditions attributed to the Imams, was authoritatively elaborated by Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Nu’mani in his Kitab al-Ghayba, by Ibn Babuya in his Ikmal al-Din, and by Shaykh al-Tusi in his Kitab al-Ghayba. In Imami traditions, as in Sunni traditions, the Mahdi will rule the world, with Jesus praying behind him after his descent from heaven.

This did not raise a theological problem as it would in Sunnism, since the Mahdi, like all other Imams, according to prevalent Imami doctrine, exceeds all Prophets except Muhammad in religious rank.33

b) The Occultation

The Occultation (ghayba) is a period of concealment chosen by God for the Imam who will continue to live in this state as long as God deems it necessary. Then He will command him to reappear and take control of the world in order to restore justice and equity. The mysterious fate of the son of the eleventh Imam divided the early Shi’ite family into some eleven to fifteen different schisms.34

But the idea according to which the twelfth Imam was alive and hidden and would return at the End of Time, was later adopted by all Imamites due to the tenacious efforts of authors/compilers like al- Kulayni, al-Nu’mani and especially Ibn Babuye, who, through the great mass of traditions surrounding this belief, progressively managed to convince the population of the faithful.35

In fact, early Imamites attempted to present the Imamate and Mahdi-ism of the Twelfth Imam in occultation in a logical and rational way.36 According to Imamite sources, Muhammad ibn Al-Hasan al-‘Askari (al-Mahdi) had a first occultation when he was a child, in 260 AH/874 AD, at the time of his father’s death, and it lasted nearly 70 years.

At Samarra in Iraq, beside the shrines of the tenth and eleventh Imams, is a mosque under which there is a cave from where the Imam Mahdi is said to have disappeared37 when he was five years old. This cave was a place of retreat and meditation for the eleventh Imam and his son, and also a hiding place from the Abbasid agents.38 During this Occultation, the Imam communicated with his faithful via four successive Representatives (nâ’ib):

1. Abu ‘Amr ‘Uthman ibn Sa’id al-‘Umari (or al-‘Amri), representative from 260 AH/874 AD to 267 AH/880 AD.

2. Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman al-‘Umari (or al-‘Amri), the son of the above, from 267 AH/880 AD until 305 AH/917 AD.

3. Abul-Qasim al-Husayn ibn Rawh al- Nawbakhti, from 305 AH/917 AD to 326 AH/937 AD.

4. Abul-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad al-Simarri, from 326 AH/937 AD to 329AH/941 AD.

This was “the minor Occultation” (al-ghayba al-sughra).

Then, around 329 AH/941 AD, came the beginning of “the major Occultation” (al-ghayba al-kubra) after the fourth representative received a last autographed note from the hidden Imam:

“In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful; Ali ibn Muhammad al-Simarri, may God increase, through you, the reward of your brothers [in religion; that is the Shi’ites]; your death will take place in six days. Prepare yourself and name no one as your successor [as representative] after your death.

This is the advent of the second Occultation in which there will be no more manifestation, except if it be with divine permission, and that will only take place after a long time, when hearts will be hardened and the earth filled with violence.

Among my partisans, some will claim to have seen me with their eyes. Beware! He who claims to have seen [me] with his eyes before the raising of al-Sufyani and [the sounding of] the Cry is a liar and an impostor. Greatness and Power belong to God alone.”

Six days later al-Simarri, on his deathbed, was asked, “Who will be your successor?” He replied, “From this point on, the matter is in God’s hands, He will arrange it Himself.” Those were his last words.39

The major Occultation is still in effect, and will not end until the End of Time (akhir al-zaman) when the Mahdi comes back to re-establish Justice on earth. The Imam is not completely cut off from his followers but has spokesmen, in the form of learned jurists (marja’ taqlid), who can act on his behalf and guide the Shi’ites in their religious matters. Imamite traditions give four reasons for the Occultation.40

1. Safeguarding the life of the twelfth Imam.

2. Independence vis-á-vis temporal powers; through his Occultation, the Mahdi will owe allegiance to no temporal powers.

3. Putting the Imamites to the test; the Occultation serves as a long period of trial, a challenge to their faith.

4. Finally, there is a hidden reason for the Occultation, that is said to be the most important of all, although it will not be revealed until the Return of the Mahdi.

With the major Occultation, the secret life of the Twelfth Imam begins, whose occult presence has dominated the Shi’ite religious consciousness for more than ten centuries. The Twelver tradition illustrates this from as early as the fourth AH/tenth AD century, the hidden Imam living in his physical body, providentially endowed with a long life.

To support this claim, Ibn Babuye dedicates six chapters of his Kamal al-din to those known for their extraordinarily long lives in the Arabic tradition. It is also said in the Twelver tradition that the hidden Imam attends the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and that he sees people even if they cannot see him.41

He is visibly present and walks through their marketplaces and into their homes, and nobody recognizes him.42 In this latter case, he is compared to Joseph (Qur’an, sura 12, Yusuf), seen but not recognized by his brothers. As in Joseph’s case, God can allow him to be recognized by some people. The Prophet is said to have stated: “...His faithful are illuminated by his Light; they profit from his wilaya during his Occultation, just as one profits from the sun even when it is covered by clouds.”43

The history of the twelfth Imam during his major Occultation is constituted of stories and narratives recounted by those who saw the Mahdi in their dreams or in reality.44

The compilations of al-Kulayni, al-Nu’mani, and Ibn Babuye, to name the oldest and the best known, and numerous other Shi’ite works throughout the centuries, contain a number of eyewitness accounts from even ordinary people who were in great distress or other unfortunate circumstances and who claim having met the twelfth Imam. “None of these mysterious appearances to his faithful suspends his Occultation but each of these appearances suspends for his faithful the common laws of time and space for Men who do not perceive the occult presence of the Imam.”45

c) The concept of Intizar

Complementary to the doctrine of the greater Occultation is the notion of Intizar, or the expectation and awaiting of the Hidden Imam's return. Intizar is a state of expectancy for the reappearance of the Hidden Imam; it is a doctrine of hope and trust that he will one day reappear and establish an ideal Islamic society.

The expectation of release from suffering, grief and sorrow (Intizar al-faraj) is enjoined upon the believers. The doctrine of Intizar has important connotations for the personal and political lives of the Twelver Shi’ite faithful during the Occultation of the Imam: their personal duties as believers vis-â-vis God and their attitude to the question of religious leadership and earthly government.

The most comprehensive collection of the Twelver Shi’ite narratives on Intizar was made by the Shi’ite scholar Muhammad Baqir Majlisi in his encyclopaedic work on Shi’ite traditions, Bihar al-Anwar.46 The disappearance of the Mahdi and his Occultation are presented in the traditions as a severe test for the Shi’ite faithful, bringing with it much hardship and many schisms.

The Shi’ites will undergo a process of sifting in which the unbelievers will be rooted out from the believers. Several traditions mention the merit of Intizar al-faraj without specifying the nature and cause of suffering. In one tradition, the Prophet is reported to have said: “The best of all acts carried out by my people is their expectation of release from suffering, granted to them by God.”47

Several of the eighty or so traditions on the excellency of Intizar, class it as the most noble (afdal) of all actions, and in one narrative as synonymous with worship (‘Ibada).48 Acts of worship must be carried out clandestinely during the ghayba, are more meritorious than those performed openly after the return of the Imam. One must strive to carry out all of the obligatory duties laid down in the Shari’a, which remain incumbent on the individual despite the absence of the Imam.

The Twelver Shi’ites during the occultation are superior to those in the company of the Mahdi, for the simple reason that the former must contend with tyrannical regimes, against which they move neither tongue nor hand nor sword in opposition.49

The expectation of salvation through the rise of the twelfth Imam is dominant throughout the Occultation. The persistent faith in freedom from grief through his appearance requires the Shi’ites to be on the alert at all times and also to pave the way for the Imam’s reappearance.

Murtaza Mutahhari, a prominent student of Imam Khomeiny and a teacher of philosophy, in his essay on the uprising and the revolution of the Mahdi, no longer treated the advent of the Lord of the Age as a sudden, impromptu event, but as the final stage in an ideologically driven revolution to establish Islam’s “ideal society”.

Mutahhari conceived the coming of the Mahdi as the climax of a revolutionary struggle that in its primary stages requires the believers’ active involvement50 during the Occultation.

Unlike the Marxist theory of revolution, Mutahhari believed that Mahdi’s revolution is divinely inspired and remains contingent upon the alertness and action of the community. Thus, the establishment of a just state became for Mutahhari and like-minded activists a legitimate first step toward the final revolution of the Mahdi.

The well-known work Wilayat-e faqih (authority of the jurist) was clearly meant to provide an answer to the most urgent of these concerns. In this work, Imam Khomeiny advocated the necessity for instituting an Islamic government in the absence of the Hidden Imam in order to prepare the terrain for the Rise of the Mahdi.

He argued that while the Imam is in Occultation, preserving the essence of Islam and defending its sacred values should be accomplished by an Islamic government under a Guardian Jurist to be upheld as the Imam's vicegerent. In support of this doctrine, Imam Khomeiny cites one of the Hidden Imam’s decrees in which the ‘ulama were upheld as “proofs” (hujaj) of the Lord of the Age.

Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977), a major ideologue of revolutionary Shi’ism, in a pamphlet entitled “expectation, a school of protest”, regarded the End of Time as nothing but an “ultimate revolution” for humanity. The Mahdi’s revolution could not come about without Muslims arriving at a new understanding of expectation as a way of acquiring social responsibility, working toward a just and equitable order and rejecting political oppression and cultural degradation.

Complying with the Shi’ite prophecies, he repeated that the Lord of the Age will come when the entire lifespan of humanity reaches its lowest ebb of corruption, but until that time, he recommended that the community of believers should settle on the leadership of a democratically elected jurist (faqih) to serve as the Hidden Imam's general deputy (na’ibe ‘aam).

A true understanding of the End, he stated, will evolve only when Muslims abandon troubling theological entanglements concerning circumstances of the resurrection (and in effect, the Occultation) and instead, develop a perspective conforming to modern social and human sciences, and based on a sociological analysis of class conflict. Shari’ati’s ideological dimensions of expectation go so far as to endorse a Marxist-inspired Islamic revolution.

True expectation, according to Shari’ati, is “believing that in the life of humankind on this very earth and before death, not in the resurrection after death, history will bring about the triumph of the oppressed and destruction of the oppressors”.

d) The Return and the Rise

The future Return and Rise of the Mahdi constitutes the most frequent of the Imam’s predictions and has been described in numerous traditions from the early times in Imamite history. It is believed that the Mahdi will come to fulfill the mission of all the prophets before him, and complete the task of Imam Husayn (the third Imam), the great martyr of Karbala.

He shall appear, according to many traditions, on the day of ‘Ashura, the day on which Imam Husayn, son of Imam Ali, was killed,51 showing himself first in Mecca, Islam's holiest city, where he will be joined initially by 313 believers, the number of the martyrs of Badr, then he will make his headquarters in Kufah where Imam Ali was killed and buried.

The Return as well as the Rising of the Qa’im, will be preceded by signs. The theme of ‘Signs of the Return’ is one of the most developed of those that occur in collections of hadith, in both Sunnite and Shi’ite literature. Sometimes a number of chapters are dedicated to the subject.52 The universal sign of the Return consists in the generalized invasion of the earth by Evil. There are also a great number of more specific signs listed in the compilations.

Notes

1. “Messiah and Messianic Movements” in the New Encyclopaedia Britannica P.1017-1022

2. A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, P.1.

3. Shari’ati, Intizar, p.4

4. W. Madelung: “al-Mahdi” in EI2, p.1230

5. Ibid, p.1231

6. “al-Mahdi” SEI, p.311

7. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, P.14

8. “al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1234

9. “al-Mahdi”, SEI, p.311

10. “Messiah and Messianic Movements”p.1020

11. R. Hasan: “Messianism and Islam”, p.262

12. Ibid, p.267

13. Fazlur Rahman , Islam , p.245

14. Concerning the Mahdi, Hafez Abu Abdullah Ganzi Shafei (d. 658 A.H.) reports in his book al-Bayan: تواترت الأخبار و استفاضت بكثره رواتها عن المصطفى في أمر المهدي (M.R. Hakimi, Khorshid-e Maghreb, p. 81)

15. M. ibn Isma’il al-Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, Bab. Nuzul ‘Isa ibn Maryam

49, Vol. 4, p.143:

...عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله (ص)، كيف أنتم إذا نزل ابن مريم فيكم وامامكم منكم؟

16. Muslim ibn Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Kitab Al-Iman, num. 247, Vol. 1, p. 137: عن جابر بن عبدالله يقول، سمعت النبي (ص) يقول، لاتزال طائفة من أمتي يقاتلون على الحق ظاهرين إلى يوم القيامة، قال فينزل عيسى ابن مريم (ع) فيقول أميرهم: تعال صل بنا، فيقول: لا، إن بعضكم على بعض أمرا تكرمة الله هذه الأمة .

17. “Al-Mahdi” in EI2, p.1234

18. A. Amin, al-Mahdi wal-Mahdawiyah, p.108

19. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, vol. 2, p.156

20. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1234

21. Ibn Madja, Muhammad Ibn Yazid al-Qazwini (207-275 A.H.) Sunan Ibn Madja, Kitab al-Fitan, Bab Shiddat al-Zaman, Vol. 3, p. 434

22. Imam al-Qurtubi, Al-Tadhkirah Fi Ahwal al-Mawta wa umur al-Akhira, Bab Fi al-Mahdi

23. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p.1237

24. Shari’ati, Expectation: a School of Protest, p. 15

25. H. Nasr, Ideals and realities of Islam, p.149

26. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din , Bab 41 Ma ruwi’ah al-Narjis umm al- Qa’im, vol.2, p.418-423. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, Kitab al-Ghayba, Bab wiladatihi wa ahwal al-ummihi, num. 12, vol. 51, pp.6-7-8

27. Ibn Babuye , Kamal al-din , vol 1, pp.474

28. Imami (or imamate); the Shia who believe in twelve imams

29. Sachedina, “A treatise on the Occultation...” , p.110

30. al-Kulayni , Usul, “kitab al-hujja”, b‚b fi al-nahy ëan al-ism , hadith 1 and 3, vol.1, p.332-333

31. M.A.A. Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.106

32. M.A.A. Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.101

33. “Al-Mahdi”, EI2, p. 1236

34. Cf. A.A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 42-55, see also an- Nawbakhti, les sectes shiites (Kitab Firaq al-shi’a), pp.109

35. M.A.A.Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism, p.105

36. Sachedina, “A treatise on the Occultation...” , p.111

37. M. Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P.161

38. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p. 322

39. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, vol. 2, ch. 45, p.516, num.44

40. Al-Kulayni, Usul, Kitab al-Hujja, bab nadir fi hal al-ghayba, vol. 1 pp. 333-335, bab fi l-ghayba, vol. 2 pp. 132- 45. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, vol. 2 , ch. 44 , PP .479 - 82, num 1, 2, 6, 8

41. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din, Bab Dhikr man shahada al-Qa’im wa raâhu 43, vol.2, pp.351, num.8

42. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-din , vol. 2, ch.33, p.341, num.21. also, al- Kulayni, Usul, Kitab al-Hujja, bab Nahi ëan al- Ism, vol.1, num 1 & 3 , p. 332-333 ; Al-Nu’mani, Kitab al-ghayba, p.257

43. Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-dÓn, vol.2, ch.43, p.253, num.3

44. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p. 304

45. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol.4, p.306

46. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, Vol. 52, Bab Fazl al-Intizar va madh al-Shi’a fi zaman al-ghayba, pp. 122-127

47. Bihar vol.52, P. 122

48. Ibid

49. Ibid

50. Mutahhari, p.5-10

51. Mufid, p.341

52. Al-Nu’mani , Kitab al-ghayba, ch. 14, 15, 18, 21; Ibn Babuye, Kamal al-Din, ch. 47, 57, 58.


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