CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MASS ORGANISATION: IJABI
Over the course of time, the number of adherents of Shi‘ism in Indonesia, and the number of Shi‘i institutions of da‘wa, education and publishing, has continued to increase. Up to the end of the New Order, the Shi‘is in Indonesia appeared to be a minority religious group, scattered throughout Indonesia but on the whole confined to urban areas. More importantly, they were not unified under a single socio-religious organisation. Then efforts emerged to establish a mass national organisation that would bring together all the geographically diverse Shi‘i communities. From an evolutionary perspective, this stage of development can be classified as the organisational phase, following individual and institutional development. This chapter aims to describe this national Shi‘i organisation and the reaction to it. It commences with a look at the historical process of the establishment of IJABI (Ikatan Jama’ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (The Indonesian Council of Ahli Bait Associations). This is followed by a section dealing with the ideology of IJABI, (within the framework of understanding the nature of this organisation). In the third section, I shall describe the on-going development of this Shi‘i organisation, in particular during the first period of leadership (2000-2004). Finally, I provide a description of the opposition to IJABI and the emergence of a ‘non-IJABI group’.
A. The Foundation of IJABI
After the fall of the New Order in 1998, prominent Shi‘i leaders in Indonesia, including Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Husein Shahab, Umar Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah, agreed on the importance of establishing a socio-religious organisation that could unite the Shi‘i community in Indonesia.
Serious attempts to set up such a body began in earnest in the early 1990s, with senior Shi‘i leaders holding several meetings, (formal and informal), to discuss the urgent need for, and the possibility of, a Shi‘i organisation that would bring together all the adherents of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
The first Shi‘i organisation was called MAHDI, an abbreviation of Majlis Ahlulbait di Indonesia (The Council of the Ahl al-Bayt in Indonesia), and was founded in Jakarta in the early 1990s. It was headed by Ahmad Baragbah, (the head of Pesantren Al-Hadi in Pekalongan), with Furqon Bukhari as the secretary. In addition to its executive leadership, the organisation had an advisory board (pembina), of 14 members, which included Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Umar Shahab and other prominent Shi‘i figures. However, MAHDI did not function well, and almost all of its programmes failed. The fact that MAHDI had no legal status as a socio-religious organisation, and was not recognised by the Department of Home Affairs, clearly contributed to the organisation’s problems. It only ever achieved recognition as a foundation (Yayasan MAHDI). Key figures were Ahmad Baragbah, Zainal Abidin al-Muhdar (Al-Hakim Foundation in Lampung) and Zulfan Lindan (a political activist of Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle). Eventually, Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his associates withdrew from MAHDI, leaving Ahmad Baragbah and his supporters to continue until the organisation ceased activities.
Another factor in MAHDI’s downfall appears to have been that the majority of the Muslim community in Indonesia was simply unaware of its existence. Most significantly however, it failed in its primary aim, to function as a socio-religious organisation that would unite the followers of Shi‘ism in the country and co-ordinate all the Shi‘i foundations.
The failure of this Shi‘i association to operate in Indonesia during the New Order era (1966-1998) can be attributed to two reasons: First, there was no agreement among the various groups or factions within the Shi‘i community itself on how the organisation should be run and what its ideology should be. Differences of opinion developed between Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his associates and Ahmad Baragbah and other ustadh, particularly regarding the legal status of MAHDI as a Shi‘i organisation. Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his supporters believed the procedures for managing and running the organisation should be under the control of the advisory board, whilst Baragbah’s group was much more focussed on defining MAHDI’s vision and activities, preferring that it become an Islamic foundation rather than an organisation. A second reason for MAHDI’s failure can be found in the socio-political situation in Indonesia during the New Order era, which provided very little space for minority religious groups to express their identity and religiosity. In this regard, the Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals in Indonesia saw that the organisation and its members would face difficulties and even threats, not only from members of the majority Sunni Muslim community but also from the New Order regime. For example, any request for MAHDI to be granted legal status as a Shi‘i association would almost certainly have been denied by the government, since the state was, (and still is), heavily dominated by the ideology of Sunni Islam. In 1997, when asked whether Shi‘is in Indonesia would establish a mass organisation, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a declared member of Muhammadiyah responded: “Because I do not want to become dependent on anyone, I will not join. But to muffle the atmosphere so as not to lead to continuous misunderstanding I will state my disagreement if the Shi‘is in Indonesia establish a social-religious organisation.”
For most of the prominent Shi‘i figures, taqiyya is regarded as an essential method for dealing with a socio-political situation which is non-conducive for the position and development of minority religious groups. In sum, a series of complex and interrelated factors - internal and external, religious and socio-political – led to the failure of Indonesia’s first Shi‘i association. In fact, over the years, the majority of Shi‘is in Indonesia seem to have forgotten the existence of MAHDI and its planned role within the Shi‘i community.
After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, there arose fresh encouragement for, and even insistence on, the need to have a national socio-religious organisation to unite the followers of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. These calls elicited significant responses from prominent Shi‘i leaders, and in turn gained much support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. A series of important meetings took place. Four prominent Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals - Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Ahmad Baragbah, Zahir Yahya, and Umar Shahab - together with a representative from Iran held a meeting to discuss the possibility of founding a Shi‘i organisation in Indonesia. This first meeting resulted in an agreement to found a national Shi‘i organisation, but initially failed to form a committee to oversee the process. Eventually, Jalaluddin Rakhmat and other intellectuals formed the necessary committee to establish the organisation and define its ideological foundation and principles. The committee also agreed on a name, (proposed by Jalaluddin Rakhmat), for the organisation - IJABI, an abbreviation of Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, or the Indonesian Council of Ahli Bait Associations. Reportedly, Jalaluddin Rakhmat originally planned to officially declare the association open at the ‘ashura commemoration in 1999, without any agreement from renowned Shi‘i ustadh. However, this would have meant that from the outset IJABI could not claim to represent all Shi‘i groups in Indonesia. Rakhmat subsequently agreed to postpone its inauguration. He also agreed to hold meetings with other prominent Shi‘i ustadh, mainly Qum alumni, in order that IJABI be recognised by all Shi‘i groups. These meetings were instrumental in establishing the concept of a mass Shi‘i organisation to the wider Shi‘i community in Indonesia, and were also intended to recruit Shi‘i ustadh into the process.
One of the most important meetings, conducted in ICC of Al-Huda in Jakarta, brought together Shi‘i figures who had previously clashed during their involvement with MAHDI: Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Zainal Abidin al-Muhdar, Husein Shahab, Umar Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah. This meeting produced a general agreement among all the participants to support Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s proposal to found a Shi‘i organisation in Indonesia named IJABI (Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia).
However, it was not long before old disputes reared their heads and misunderstandings and disagreements between the Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals impacted the development of IJABI. Some reports suggest that these disagreements were not just characterised by differences of ideological opinion but also by personal matters and stereotyping of and by certain groups. In a nutshell, misperceptions and disputes among the intellectuals and ustadh marred both the establishment process and early development of IJABI.
Despite these disagreements, the architect of IJABI – Jalaluddin Rakhmat - decided to go ahead with the organisation’s inauguration on 1 July 2000. Rakhmat visited Iran to inform Shi‘i leaders there of this important strategic plan for the Shi‘i community in Indonesia and, in particular, to gain the support of the wali faqih, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i. The inauguration of IJABI was followed, the next day, by its first national congress. This historical two-event was reported by more than ten national newspapers and local papers in Bandung and Jakarta. Figures suggest that approximately 2000 Shi‘is, (from 20 provinces in Indonesia, as well as from Singapore and Iran), participated in IJABI’s opening ceremony, which took place in Gedung Merdeka, Bandung, where the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference had also been held. The choice of this historic location symbolised, to the public, the significance of this new organisation in the social and religious life of Indonesian society.
Several Muslim scholars - Sunni and Shi‘i - from the home country and abroad, were invited to speak at the seminar following the inauguration. Some of the most high profile of these Shi‘i teachers and scholars were Shaykh Ja‘far Hadi from Iran, Ayatollah Ibrahim Kazerooni from London and Muhammad Baqir and Rusli, both from Singapore. The presence of such dignitaries demonstrates the (international) support for the establishment of IJABI. Iran’s support for the organisation being the most crucial to its success. However, prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, including Nurcholish Madjid and leaders of Muslim organisations such as Ahmad Syafi‘i Ma‘arif of Muhammadiyyah, and Hasyim Muzadi of NU, originally expected to speak at the meeting, were notably absent from IJABI’s inauguration. These absences called into question the support of key elements of the Muslim community in Indonesia, namely the Muslim intellectuals, the modernists and the traditionalists.
4 Umar Shahab, interview, (9/1/2003)
It is widely accepted that IJABI”s inauguration was possible due largely to the democratic atmosphere in Indonesia at that time, fostered by the liberal, moderate President Abdurrahman Wahid. Reporting on the inauguration Gatra, an Indonesian magazine, wrote the headline: “Mumpung Gus Dur Jadi Presiden” (‘Taking advantage when Gus Dur is the President’).
As the title suggests, the socio-political situation in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime gave the opportunity and freedom to minority religious adherents to express their beliefs and religiosity. It is generally acknowledged that Abdurrahman Wahid was a man of openness and pluralism. In addition, the reformation era in Indonesia was marked by the emergence of popular social and religious movements. These movements developed not out of a desire to take part in the development of Indonesian state and society, but rather to establish and demonstrate their own identity and existence, something which had not been possible during the New Order period. These new found freedoms of expression occurred in an environment often described as the euphoria of reformation. Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his associates capitalised on the changed social and political situation in Indonesia during the reformation era, particularly under Abdurrahman Wahid’s government. In fact, Jalaluddin Rakhmat admitted that the IJABI inauguration and national congress were carried out in haste, without sufficient preparations, simply because he and his associates wanted to seize the moment, anxious about the possibility of the fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid. There were rumours that the annual meeting of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) scheduled for August 2000 would start impeachment proceedings against President Abdurrahman Wahid. For this reason, Jalaluddin wanted to get official recognition for IJABI while Abdurrahman Wahid was still in office.
This clearly illustrates Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a prominent Shi‘i intellectual, intending to exploit the existing socio-political situation in Indonesia, which he recognised as being conducive to the further development of minority denominations such as Shi‘ism.
President Abdurrahman Wahid had been invited to attend IJABI’s inauguration and formally open its first national congress, however, he cancelled due to another important State duty in Jakarta. Instead he asked the State Secretary, Djohan Effendy to deputise for him. Effendy did not attend either. In the end, it was the Chief of Directorate of Social and Political Affairs of West Java, Edy Moelyono, acting on behalf of the Governor of West Java who formally opened and delivered a speech at this historical event. The opening ceremony was marked by all participants standing and chanting a salawat (invocation) to the Prophet Muhammad and his Household. While the inauguration went well, inevitably, the absence of Abdurrahman Wahid and other representatives of Central Government came as a blow to the architects of IJABI, and Jalaluddin Rakhmat in particular. He expressed his disappointment that President Abdurrahman Wahid and his government had not sent a representative from Jakarta, which would have sent a clear message that the government supported the organisation. Nevertheless he went on to state the full support of the President Abdurrahman Wahid to the organisation several days before its declaration and even long before he became a president. He, stated Jalaluddin Rakhmat, would have mobilised members of NU if the Shi‘i community had been attacked or if the Indonesian government had prohibited the Shi‘is to live in the country.
As chief of the steering committee for IJABI’s inauguration, Jalaluddin Rakhmat gave an important speech at the event entitled ‘IJABI: Menyerukan Suara Serak Sejarah’ (IJABI: Calling for Historical Husky Voice).
The speech cited important socio-historical reasons for the establishment of IJABI in the reformation era, a time when the country was entering a new millennium with a strong will to establish a new open and democratic Indonesia, free from tyranny and arrogance and allowing its citizens to live according to their beliefs.
Reformation has given us the opportunity to express ourselves without fear and sense of guilt. We all are important parts of this nation and have to make valuable contributions for its prosperity. We have viewed Abdurrahman Wahid’s government as a representation of victory of the Muslim community on the political stage. Long hidden in historical path was a group of Indonesian Muslims who wanted to erect their religiosity on the basis of loving devotion to God, His Messenger (peace be upon him), and his Household. In the past, their voices once in while were heard from small surau (prayer rooms) in villages when they pronounced a supplication: li khamsatun utfi biha har al-waba’ al-hatima, al-mustafa wa al-murtada wa ibnahuma wa Fatima [I have five (persons) with whom I extinguish the ‘heat’ of crushing disease: al-Mustafa (the Prophet), al-Murtada (‘Ali), the two sons (Hasan and Husayn), and Fatima].
In the era of an ‘ulama’s government, at present they jump from the dark path and try to stand up in a light place.
Furthermore, Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s speech defines the general characteristics of IJABI, as a new socio-religious organisation. He emphasised that IJABI’s intention was not to follow Julius Caesar’s statement: Veni, Vidi, Vici, (I came, I saw, I conquered), but rather to exist modestly among the existing Muslim organisations and society while at the same time propagating and implementing those Islamic teachings that side with mustad‘afin (the oppressed). Rakhmat went on to state at a time when many Islamic organisations were joining forces with political parties, his community had established a social organisation without political affiliations. In his view, IJABI was expected to take on the role of assisting people to solve their various difficulties and also to face a variety of challenges in order to gain salvation - like the ship of salvation talked of by the Prophet Muhammad in the famous hadith of safina: “the ahl al-bayt is like Noah’s ark; whoever gets on the ark will be safe and whoever leaves it will be swung”. He stated that the position of IJABI was becoming more important, particularly when Indonesia faced various economic, social and political crises. He appealed to Muslims in Indonesia to join the ship of IJABI, because IJABI would not get involved in political activities: “This ship is not a political vehicle to achieve important positions in either legislative or executive institutions.”
Rakhmat’s speech then is a clear affirmation of the non-political stance of IJABI.
Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s position has been crucial to the development of IJABI. He even describes himself as “a pregnant mother who then gave birth”, saying, “So, I must sacrifice to be pregnant and now give birth.”
This statement contains two important points concerning his position as a Shi‘i figure. First, it can be interpreted as meaning that before the reformation era Rakhmat concealed the existence of the Shi‘i community in Indonesia. During this concealment he experienced various difficulties and threats due to the fact that Shi‘is were seen as being synonymous with hardliners, militants or revolutionaries. Secondly, his statement can be understood as a declaration of the existence of Shi‘is and their organisation in the Sunni-dominated country, thanks to the reformation
. However, Dimitri Mahayana, an engineer and lecturer at ITB, who headed the organising committee of IJABI’s inauguration, rejected this interpretation. He stated that the official declaration of IJABI was not a proclamation of the existence of Shi‘is in Indonesia, rather it was a proclamation of the spirit of Muslim unity, on the basis of loving devotion to the Qur’an and the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet who were trustees of the traditions of the Prophet.
During the first national congress, participants discussed and laid down the Statute of IJABI, its rules of organisation, its programmes, as well as electing its chiefs and organisers. The national congress elected Jalaluddin Rakhmat as the chairman of the Advisory Council and Dimitri Mahayana as the Chief of the Executive of IJABI. The Advisory Council consists of 12 members posited by prominent Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals, from various areas of Indonesia. Notably, some of these members are actually recognised Sunni figures in the Muslim community in Indonesia. The number twelve may symbolise the twelve Imams within the Twelver Imamiyya Shi‘ism. The Advisory Council members were: Sayyid Segaf al-Jufri, Sayyid dr. O. Hashem, K.H. Muchtar Adam, K.H. Djamaluddin Asmawi, Sayyid Muhammad Taufiq Yahya, Sayyid Othman Omar Shihab, Lc., Ust. Hasan Rahmat, Sayyid Ir. Haidar Baqir, MA, Prof. Dr. Ridwan Suhud, Prof. Dr. Sipon Muladi, Sayyid Drs. Ayik Ali Idrus, Sayyid Ja‘far Ali Alqadri.
An examination of the position of these Shi‘i figures, members of the advisory council of IJABI, in Indonesian society in general helps to understand the influence of IJABI in this Sunni majority country. It is important to note that seven of the twelve members are Sayyids. These seven Sayyids are influential figures not only in the Shi‘i community but also in Indonesian society at large. First, Sayyid Segaf al-Jufri is one of the most respected Shi‘i ustadh in Indonesia. He lives in Solo, Central Java, and a number of Shi‘is in the area have studied Shi‘ism under him. (Even Jalaluddin Rakhmat regards al-Jufri as his teacher). Second, O. Hashem of the al-Saqqaf clan is a Shi‘i intellectual and co-founder of YAPI, known for his polemical and controversial works. Third, Muhammad Taufik Yahya, one of the late Husein Al-Habsyi’s sons in-law, lives in Jakarta and is a Shi‘i ustadh engaged in the field of da‘wa. Fourth, Othman Omar Shihab is a famous ustadh in Jakarta who often appears on Islamic television programmes. It should be noted that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia do not acknowledge his adherence to Shi‘ism. Haidar Bagir is a famous intellectual-businessman in the country. He founded and the famous Mizan Publishing Company, well-known for publishing Shi‘i books. The two last names are local leaders: Ayik Ali Idrus is a Muslim scholar in Palembang, South Sumatra, who has held several social positions including the chairmanship of MUI of Palembang. Idrus is not known among the local Muslim community as a Shi‘i. Ja‘far Ali Alqadri is a Shi‘i leader in Pontianak, West Kalimantan.
The non-Sayyids are also influential Shi‘i leaders in various parts of Indonesia. Some became religious teachers at Islamic foundations or pesantren, others university professors. Muchtar Adam is the head of Babussalam, a pesantren located in Bandung. He is also a former member of the National People’s Representative Council (DPR) of the National Mandate Party (PAN) led by Amien Rais, the former chairman of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Adam is engaged in da‘wa and educational activities in Indonesia. As a Muslim scholar, he wrote several books on Islamic teachings and he is known to have a close relationship with Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Another famous Shi‘i teacher in Bandung, (who is also closely related to the chairman of the Advisory Council of IJABI), is Hasan Rahmat, who leads a Shi‘i pesantren in Bandung named Al-Mukarramah. Then, Jamaluddin Asmawi is a famous Shi‘i figure who has played an important role in the spread of Shi‘ism in East Java. He taught Shi‘i teachings at his Islamic foundation in Jember, East Java, and engaged in other da‘wa activities in Indonesia. He had a close relationship with Jalaluddin Rakhmat and the late Husein Al-Habsyi of Bangil. Ridwan Suhud is a professor at a university in Bandung and Sipon Muladi is a professor in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. It is important to note that Ridwan Suhud, a lecturer at ITB, is known to have converted into Shi‘ism long before the victory of the Iranian revolution.
In sum, all those who became members of IJABI’s Advisory Council are prominent Shi‘i ustadh and scholars in Indonesia and respected by Shi‘i adherents.
Like other socio-religious organisations, the executive board of IJABI comprises a chairman, general secretary, treasury, and several departments. The leading positions were occupied by Shi‘i intellectuals; whilst Dimitri Mahayana became the national chairman and Hadi Suwastio became its general secretary. It is important to point out that three influential figures who occupied the key positions in the IJABI leadership structure have close relationships with one another. Both Dimitri Mahayana and Hadi Suwastio learned aspects of Islamic teachings from Jalaluddin Rakhmat while students at ITB. Both are known, particularly among Shi‘is in Indonesia, as prominent young Muslim intellectuals who have played a great role in the development of Shi‘ism in the country.
Soon after its declaration and national congress, as well as the inauguration of its leaders and organisers, IJABI requested legal status from the Department of Home Affairs in Jakarta. On 17 August 2000, the formal letter, supplemented by the organisations statute, rules of association, national guidelines for the programmes and leadership structure, was signed by Dimitri Mahayana, the chairman of executive board, and Hadi Suwastio, the general secretary, and brought to Jakarta. In response, the Department of Home Affairs granted IJABI formal legal status as a societal organisation on 11 August 2000.The quick processing of IJABI’s application and the fact that a Shi‘i association was legally recognised can be put down to conditions of the reformation. Legal recognition means that IJABI officially becomes a national Shi‘i organisation in Indonesia, an important event within the Islamic history of the country. This recognition is very important symbolic capital in the continuous struggle of the Shi‘is in Indonesia.
B. The Ideological Foundation of IJABI
The nature of IJABI ideology can be gleaned from its Statute which was formulated and ratified at the first national congress on 2 July 2000. The introduction to the Statute clearly states that the establishment of IJABI is based on the principal doctrine of Shi‘i madhhab, even though IJABI itself is declared open to followers of any madhhab regardless of whether it is Sunni or Shi‘i. The Statute goes on to state that the loving devotion to the Prophet’s ahl al-bayt has become the axis that unites the fellow Muslims, regardless of their madhhab. It is agreed that loving devotion to God can only be achieved through loving devotion to his Prophet and, in turn, loving devotion to the Prophet can only be achieved through loving devotion to his ahl al-bayt.
By using the name ‘ahl al-bayt’ the organisation is giving a clear indication of its Shi‘i nature. (Although loving devotion to the Prophet’s ahl al-bayt is also recognised in Sunnism). Imam Shafi‘i, the founder of the Shafi‘i school of jurisprudence - a school of thought adhered to by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia - once wrote: “If the Shi‘i loves the Household of the Prophet Muhammad, witness oh Genie (Jinns) and Mankind that I am a Shi‘i.”
Given these facts, the Statute states that, for centuries, Indonesian Muslims have attempted to preserve and develop loving devotion to the ahl al-bayt and that the establishment of IJABI is an attempt to continue the struggle of previous ‘ulama’ and Muslim leaders in Indonesia in this respect.
The Statute itself does not provide a definition of ahl al-bayt, however, Jalaluddin Rakhmat suggests that the term ahl al-bayt has a broad meaning. He interprets the term ‘lovers of the ahl al-bayt’ as not only Shi‘is, or those with genealogical lines to the Prophet Muhammad, but all followers of any madhhab in Islam who love the Household of the Prophet Muhammad.
By adopting this very broad definition of ahl al-bayt, IJABI intended to attract a large number of followers regardless of their madhhab. However, the reality is that only Shi‘is join and participate in the association. The reasons for this our examined below.
Despite its policy of openness and inclusivity, IJABI is clearly Shi‘i in nature. This is illustrated in its belief in the five articles of faith (usul al-din), as stated in the introduction to its Statute: “the lovers of ahl al-bayt in Indonesia are willing to unite and strengthen fronts by establishing a social organisation based on the beliefs in Oneness of God (tawhid), Prophecy (nubuwwa), imamate (imama), justice (‘adala), and return of servants to Lord, the Most Merciful and the Beneficent”. Unlike the six pillars of faith within Sunnism, these five articles of faith are specific to Shi‘ism. Moreover, Jalaluddin Rakhmat declared on one occasion, the lovers of ahl al-bayt mean adherents of Shi‘ism.
As stated previously, the introduction of the Statute cites the famous hadith of the Prophet Muhammad regarding ahl al-bayt, namely: “the ahl al-bayt is like Noah’s ship (while typhoon and flood were occurring). Whoever gets on the ship is safe; whoever leaves it is swung and flung.” This is used as a textual proof for the establishment of IJABI, which is seen as a ship of salvation which will protect its members, helping them to gain salvation both in this world and in the hereafter. In addition, there is an explicit expression of the belief in the twelfth Imam - Imam Mahdi - and recognition of his leadership within Shi‘ism. This is followed by a desire for his blessing in the establishment and running of the organisation. The Statute also states the position of IJABI as a part of a worldwide movement of Shi‘i organisations. In the last paragraph of its introduction, the Statute says:
By saying bi ism Allah majraha wa mursaha [in the name of Allah, whether we sail or not] and with the emission of enlightening radiation of the stars of the Prophet’s ahl al-bayt, we sail the ship of IJABI that will protect all lovers of the ahl al-bayt from their enemies, advance thought spiritually, intellectually, and morally, and make all believers prosper physically and spiritually. Finally, we would like to join this ship together with other ships in the whole world under the blessing and leadership of the Lord of the Age, Imam Mahdi, the Awaited, ‘ajjala Allah farajah al-sharif [may God speed up his noble appearance].
IJABI’s ideology is also reflected in its logo, an image of Noah’s ship. IJABI expects the followers of ahl al-bayt in Indonesia to embark on this ship: “Aboard they will be transported to the eternal realm of Divine love and directed by the infallible Imams”. The ship is also a well-known symbol of Indonesia, an archipelago stretching along the equator, between Asia and Australia and between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Historically, Indonesians spent most of their lives exploring the oceans in order to sustain life and to learn. The use of the ship logo reflects IJABI’s connection to Indonesia, something not necessarily found in other Shi‘i organisations.
The IJABI logo depicts spread twin sails, which represent al-thaqalayn (the “Two Weighty Matters”), that is, al-Qur’an and the purified ahl al-bayt of the Prophet (‘itra) as mentioned in a hadith familiar to the followers of Shi‘ism. This hadith is in clear contrast to the one well-known among Sunnis, that it are the Qur’an and sunna, which are the fundamental legal sources.
As explained in the previous chapter, in Shi‘ism, both the Qur’an and the ahl al-bayt guide mankind towards salvation and the return to the all-encompassing Divine Mercy. IJABI believes that all its programmes should be in accordance with thaqalayn, (that is, the Qur’an and the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet) and with the missionary goal to propagate Islamic teachings narrated through the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet Muhammad.
In the logo, the red blood colour of the sails represents bravery while the white symbolises purity, holiness and cleanliness of the innermost essence of human beings. Furthermore, the red used in the outermost lines and the white space within refer to jamal (beauty) and jalal (strength) of Divine Attributes.
The ship itself is drawn? in the form of spiral lines indicating the arms of ahl al-bayt that are ready to accept the divine blessing. The logo includes five lines that describe ahl al-Kisa (the People of Cloak), and below these five lines the ship is sailing on nine waves, each representing one of the Imams who lead and guide the whole universe. These 14 waves and lines refer to the fourteen Infallibles, which include the twelve Imams, the Prophet Muhammad and his daughter Fatima. The text Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia, the name of the organisation, encircles the ship. The spread twin sails combined with the circle appear as a beacon, symbolising the light of the universe. The ship is moving from the east, that is, the sunrise, the source of illuminations. It is sailing across the ocean bringing with it the light that tears away the veils of darkness in the world of non-existence.
It is important to remember that the term ahl al-kisa (the People of Cloak) refers to five people that are addressed in the Qur’anic verse
that is known, within Shi‘ism, as the tathir (purification) verse. This Qur’anic verse, which becomes the principal designation for the immunity of the ahl al-bayt, is memorised by every Shi‘i. The verse states that God wished to remove all abomination from members of the ahl al-bayt. (The members are the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Ali bin Abi Talib, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn). The first meaning of ahl al-bayt of the Prophet within Shi‘ism refers to the five purified people. The second meaning of the term also includes nine Imams (symbolised by nine waves in the logo) who are also considered infallible. The Statute says that the foundation of this socio-religious organisation is Islam and the loving devotion to the Prophet’s ahl al-bayt (article 3) and its identity is the Qur’an, the Prophetic Traditions, and the loving devotion to the purified Household of the Prophet (article 4). Then, IJABI has five goals:
1. To teach people to live in accordance with the principles of co-existence and the imamate.
2. To introduce and propagate the Islamic teachings narrated through the Prophet’s ahl al-bayt (peace be upon him).
3. To empower low economic communities and the oppressed (mustad‘afin).
4. To advance spiritual and intellectual studies.
5. To maintain good relations with all Islamic organisations (article 5).
These goals can be achieved by undertaking several actions as mentioned in article 6 below:
1. To establish and develop educational (ta’dib), economic, social and da‘wa institutions.
2. To establish and develop Islamic libraries.
3. To conduct Islamic studies and research.
4. To publish bulletins, books, magazines, and newspapers.
5. To establish approaches to Islamic organisations and to create Islamic brotherhood among fellow Muslim communities.
The first and second goals clearly indicate the Shi‘i characteristic of IJABI. The first goal is about establishing a community of Shi‘i adherents in Indonesia. IJABI wants to unite Indonesian Shi‘i under the umbrella of its organisation. This corresponds with the function of IJABI as a mass organisation, that is, to assemble the community of ahl al-bayt in Indonesia (article 9). Related to this is the necessity of the community not only to believe in imamate but also to practice all the teachings of Islam, particularly those of the Imams. This goal can be seen as the internal orientation of IJABI’s mission in the sense that it focuses first and foremost on the development and progress of its members and Shi‘is in Indonesia in general. The second goal is external. It implies that the true teachings of Shi‘ism have not yet spread and been understood among the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. For this reason it is the duty of IJABI to introduce them to these ideas and teach them about Shi‘ism. Both these goals can be categorised as the religious characteristic of IJABI.
The third goal reflects the social characteristic of the organisation, which is to support the oppressed. This is one of the most important aspects of Shi‘ism, and is frequently emphasised in Shi‘i writings. This need to side with those less fortunate perhaps originates from the experiences of the Shi‘is themselves as a minority religious group. In the context of Sunni-Shi‘i relations, the Shi‘is have generally been the oppressed party. For these reasons, IJABI aims to undertake programmes that are designed to transform the poor and the oppressed. The fourth goal of IJABI clearly demonstrates the intellectual and scientific characteristics of the organisation. IJABI states its interest and involvement in studies and research in the scientific field and also suggests that this will advance spiritual research and development. IJABI’s belief in a unified system of both spiritual and intellectual research and development can be seen as a reflection of its Shi‘i nature.
Whilst the first four goals correspond with the first four actions, the fifth goal correlates to the fifth action. Regarding this last goal, as a new Muslim organisation IJABI attempts to forge good relationships not only with existing Muslim associations in Indonesia, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis, but also with other international Muslim - both Sunni and Shi‘i - organisations, as well as non-Muslim associations. As a recognised socio-religious association in Indonesia, IJABI, together with other associations participates in the development of Indonesian society as a whole.
According to its Statute, IJABI is independent and non-sectarian (article 7). Its independence is reflected in the fact that it is not affiliated to any political party or to the state. Jalaluddin Rakhmat has said that IJABI is not a political means for anyone to gain executive or legislative positions. This is affirmed by the fact that those who are active in a political party cannot join the executive committee of IJABI at the same time. Its non-sectarian characteristic means that followers of any madhhab within Islam may join IJABI, provided they are an adult Muslim and willing to obey the Statute of the organisation (article 11). Article 11 is formulated specifically for the purpose of attracting a large number of members to the organisation. Interestingly, recognising the need for a broad membership, Jalaluddin Rakhmat tried to deny the specific Shi‘i characteristic of IJABI:
IJABI is not a social organisation that provides an umbrella for the Shi‘i adherents but it is a social organisation open to all madhhab and Muslim groups in Indonesia. Within IJABI at this present, there are indeed many people who are originated from a variety of madhhabs and groups. They are united in order to love God, His messenger, and his ahl al-bayt.
Like other socio-religious organisations in Indonesia, IJABI has formulated its own vision, that is, “to present an intellectual movement which enlightens Islamic thought and to empower the oppressed people (mustad‘afin)”, and mission, that is, “to assemble all lovers of the ahl al-bayt from any madhhab.”
Dimitri Mahayana, the then chairman of IJABI’s Executive Council, pointed out that IJABI is meant to assemble all Muslims who love the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet and also to establish the Muslim community through intellectual activities and empowerment of the oppressed, based on the Qur’an and the loving devotion to the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet. Dimitri Mahayana went on to elaborate on the various kinds of oppression, including socio-economic oppression and oppression of self-expression. It is argued that socio-economic oppression is a result of global capitalism and the subsequent gap between North and South - the developed and the developing countries - which in turn leads to a new form of imperialism. Oppression in the field of religious expression is a consequence of a lack of tolerance and mutual respect.
Similarly, Jalaluddin Rakhmat emphasised that IJABI is an umbrella organisation for a community which has been marginalised throughout history, pointing out that IJABI does not represent any political elites, but takes the side of the common man and the oppressed. The statements of Dimitri Mahayana and Jalaluddin Rakhmat are in accordance IJABI’s goal to empower the oppressed (mustad‘afin) who have been neglected by many other social groups and organisations in the country.
IJABI is expected to play a role in realisation of a just and civilised masyarakat madani (civil society) (article 10). Article 10 demonstrates IJABI’s concern not only for its members but also for establishing a just Muslim community in Indonesia as a whole. Dimitri Mahayana’s outlines two aspects of empowerment in relation to IJABI’s membership: material and intellectual. Material empowerment means generating a variety of business and economic opportunities in various fields. Thus, IJABI attempts to establish business networks, (which tie in with existing international Muslim business networks), through which the organisation can improve the economic condition of the Muslim community in Indonesia in general and of the members of IJABI in particular. In respect of intellectual empowerment, Dimitri Mahayana suggests that real empowerment comes from the spiritual depth of human beings, both individually and socially. For this reason, IJABI hopes to empower the Muslim community in general and its members in particular by undertaking activities that will set in motion a transformation process that produces dynamic thought and a worldview based on the principles of tawhid (Oneness of God) and of Divine love practiced in daily life.
This leads us on to another important aspect of the ideology of IJABI - the paradigm of love. Dimitri Mahayana points to an historical example of the love paradigm, as practiced by Imam ‘Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Imam within Shi‘ism, who is said to have frequently bathed with the lepers living in suburban areas.
Leaders of IJABI regard this love paradigm as a unique characteristic of their new socio-religious organisation. Many works by Jalaluddin Rakhmat, for example, promote the importance of love in social and religious life. He once stated that Madhhab Alawi (Shi‘ism) is the madhhab of love, (as it is represented in the whole life history of ‘Ali bin Abi Talib).
We have now established that IJABI was founded on the principal doctrines of Shi‘ism. The next step is to scrutinise its organisational principle, and in particular the structure of its leadership. In this respect, IJABI resembles NU, the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation in Indonesia. The national leadership of IJABI consists of an Religious Advisory Council (Dewan Syuro) and an Executive Council (Tanfidziyah). This system is chosen in order to confer status on the position of ‘ulama’, although they do not have the highest authority. IJABI’s Religious Advisory Council is a collective consultative leadership and is positioned at the top of the institutional element of the organisation. The Executive Council is responsible for the implementation of all congress decisions. As stated in the Statute (article 14), each part of the leadership is headed by a general chairman (ra’is ‘am). However, the highest authority in IJABI is not in the hands of the Religious Advisory Council, instead it is held by congress (muktamar) - either national or extraordinary - at the national level and by regional or district conference (musyawarah) at the regional or district level (article 12). The Rules of Organisation state, “congress holds the highest authority” (article 10.2). From this we can deduce that the authority structure of IJABI is based on the democratic principle that anyone can participate in making organisational decisions through congress or conference.
As the top institutional element of the organisation, the Religious Advisory Council advises and supervises the Executive Council regarding the implementation of all congress decisions. It has no authority to ignore the authority of the Executive Council. The final report of the Executive Council with regard to the implementation of congress decisions is evaluated by the next session of congress, not by the Religious Advisory Council. The relationship between the Religious Advisory Council and the Executive Council is purely consultative. However, it should be noted that the Rules of Organisation (article 20.3) state that the members of the Religious Advisory Council consist of ‘ulama’, ustadh and intellectuals who “understand Islamic and modern sciences, understand Indonesian social and political context, take care of their self-esteem, do not follow passions, and attempt to take care of Islamic teachings.” These qualifications reflect the high status of the Religious Advisory Council within the organisation.
IJABI’s decision to make congress, not the Religious Advisory Council, the highest authority is similar to situations in other social and religious organisations in Indonesia. IJABI does not imitate the leadership model of wilayat al-faqih which gives the highest authority to ‘ulama’. Consequently, the majority of ustadh of Qum alumni view IJABI as an organisation that does not reflect the leadership principle of Shi‘ism, and hence, a reason for their rejection of IJABI. For the leaders of IJABI, the rule is simply a manifestation of a democratic.organisation. In short, IJABI’s leaders see it as a Shi‘i organisation, based on the principal doctrines of Shi‘ism, but also based on the principles of democracy, specifically in terms of member participation in the organisation.
C. The Development of IJABI
Although it is too early to evaluate the development of this new socio-religious organisation, let alone predict its future, it is relevant to describe its early growth and the implementation of its programmes. As previously mentioned, the size of attendance at IJABI’s inauguration and first national congress, in Bandung in July 2000, illustrates the great enthusiasm among Shi‘is in Indonesia for its emergence. The number of participants, (according to media reports), reached more than 2,000, with people coming from 20 provinces throughout Indonesia. At the time of the inauguration, Jalaluddin Rakhmat claimed that IJABI had about three million followers from a variety of backgrounds, including Shi‘is from an ex-dissident Muslim group (which he called the ‘traditionalist element’), Muslim intellectuals and even poor people, (which he called mustadh‘afin (the oppressed people)). According to Rakhmat’s analysis, the majority of the first group come from Makassar, South Sulawesi, and West Java, and that the social basis of IJABI can be compared with that of the Darul Islam movement. It is certainly true that some members of IJABI are ex-members of Darul Islam (DI/NII). The second group - the intellectuals – comes from the university students and campus groups who have been introduced to the religious and intellectual discourse developed by IJABI leaders. The third element, the poor, generally come from West Java and who, in accordance with Shi‘i ideology, have been brought up and educated by figures who founded or joined IJABI.
However, as with other socio-religious organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah which also claim millions of followers, these figures cannot be proved. In fact, IJABI meetings and gatherings of late seem to have attracted fewer participants than the first national congress.
Following IJABI’s inauguration, it seems that its Executive Council has tried to implement both long-term and short-term programmes, as outlined in the National Guidelines for Programmes (2000-2004). Both programmes have both internal and external elements. The IJABI executive structure comprises six departments each with its own programme, namely, organisation, empowerment of Muslim community, intellectual development and Da`wa, education, media and information technology, and international relations. As a new organisation, IJABI appears to give priority to raising the profile of the organisation throughout the country by establishing branches, including regional/provincial leadership councils (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, DPW), district leadership councils (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD) and sub-district leadership councils (Dewan Piminan Cabang, DPC). Some months after its foundation, the national Executive Council of IJABI began to implement it various programmes, while the Shi‘i leaders in some provinces began organise regional conferences. Often these regional conferences were combined with a seminar which invited the chairman of the Religious Advisory Council, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, along with other Shi‘i intellectuals and local Muslim intellectuals and leaders, to discuss a specific topic. The regional branch of South Sumatra, for instance, was officially inaugurated on 17 September 2000. It held a conference on the same day which included guests such as Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Sri Adyanti Rachmadi, and Muslim intellectuals from the capital city of Palembang - including Prof. Jalaluddin, the then rector of IAIN Raden Fatah, and Mal An Abdullah, the general chairman of the provincial branch of NU – who were asked to speak on “Inter-religious Tolerance.”
Such activities show the early growth of IJABI as a new socio-religious organisation that is gaining recognition in this Sunni-dominated country.
In February 2004, IJABI had 14 provincial, 48 district and 25 sub-district branches. The regional or provincial branches include South Sumatra, West Java, South Sulawesi, JABODEBEK
(Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Bekasi), Yogyakarta, Lampung, North Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, Bangka Belitung and Central Sulawesi. Additionally, there are so-called regional coordinators for provinces where a regional branch of IJABI has yet to be established, including Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, Banten, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Bali, and East Nusa Tenggara. IJABI has also established autonomous institutions such as Ikatan Pelajar Ahlul Bait Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Students), Badan Advokasi dan Pengembangan Hukum dan Hak Azazi Manusia (Board for Advocacy and Development of Law and Human Rights) and Fatimiyyah (Ahl al-Bayt Women). IJABI has also established a branch in Qum, Iran. Some regional or district branches have initiated their programmes, while others - possibly most others - have not yet been active in implementing programmes for the development of Shi‘ism in their areas.
The departments of the national Executive Council of IJABI have organised some (long-term) programmes although these have been less successful than the short-term programmes, including the establishment of provincial and district branches, as outlined in the guidelines. It appears that IJABI relies heavily on the Division of Imdad Mustad‘afin at the Muthahhari Foundation, to execute it programme in the field of empowerment of the Muslim community. This division has considerable experience in the empowerment of poor children and orphans, for example, on 2 July 2000, it carried out a mass circumcision programme in the framework of the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday and the inauguration of IJABI.
(Several other regular programmes of this division involve the participation of students from Muthahhari’s Senior High School). This close co-operation between the two institutions is explained by the fact that the head of this division of Imdad Mustad‘afin, Sayyid Abu Ali Al-Aydrus, is also the head of the division of the oppressed within IJABI’s department of empowerment of Muslim community. In this regard, this programme of IJABI has been relatively successful in terms of its aims to empower the oppressed.
IJABI’s development is also indicated by the fact that the department of empowerment of Muslim community organised a ‘business training’ programme, aimed at providing participants with ‘financial intelligence’, so that may go on to create business opportunities for their own personal and organisational benefit. This programme was carried out in cooperation with the McDonald’s Company in Indonesia, owned by Bambang Rachmadi. This programme attracted many participants from a number of regional and district branches of IJABI. The idea behind this activity is for members of IJABI to be able to improve their economic condition.
Another relatively active department seems to be that of intellectual development and da‘wa. This department is responsible for celebrating holy days within the Shi‘i tradition, including the Prophet’s birthday, the Imams’ and Sayyida Fatima’s birthday, ‘ashura, and arba‘in. Additionally, this department has organised several training activities in fields such as philosophy, Islamic law, akhlaq, and Sufism. Discussions and seminars - national and local - on various topics have been held. Like the empowerment of Muslim community programme, these activities are usually carried out in cooperation with the Muthahhari Foundation and sometimes with the Sehati or Tazkiya Sejati Foundations, (headed by Sri Adyanti Rachmadi, wife of the aforementioned Bambang Rachmadi). Furthermore, IJABI has already sent several students to pursue their learning in Iran and this annual programme is expected to run well. IJABI is also looking into the possibility of sending students to other countries such as England, America, Australia, and Syria.
One of the most important da‘wa activities conducted by IJABI was a muballigh training known as Pengkaderan Muballigh (the Forming of Preacher Cadre). This training is important not only for Shi‘i da‘wa (as described in Chapter Four) but also for the consolidation of IJABI members and leaders throughout the country. The training was aimed at providing the cadre of IJABI with the capability to defend the madhhab of ahl al-bayt, to enlighten the Muslim umma and also to defend Islam in the context of global political developments. The training dealt not only with topics of Shi‘ism and da‘wa techniques but also discussed a number of problems its members were confronted with. The participants are asked to fight against ideas that are contrary to the Statute and principles of IJABI.
In general, the early development of IJABI has, without question, depended on its central figures, (Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Dimitri Mahayana, and Hadi Suwastio in particular), and other related foundations, especially the Muthahhari Foundation and Tazkiya Sejati. The support of rich patrons such as Sri Adyanti Sudharmono has also contributed significantly to the early growth of this Shi‘i organisation. However, in April 2003, a breakdown in the relations between Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Sri Adyanti Sudharmono and her brother Tantyo Sudharmono resulted in internal dissension within IJABI. Following this upset, Jalaluddin Rakhmat resigned from his position as the director of the Tazkiya Sejati Foundation, which he had occupied since 1997. Tantyo Sudharmono was removed from his position as the chairman of the JABODEBEK branch of IJABI, to be replaced by Budiono.
This recent and dramatic episode has clearly affected the later development of IJABI.
The exact reasons behind the discord remain unclear. Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his IJABI associates hint at slanderous remarks towards Jalaluddin Rakhmat during his time at Tazkya Sejati. This resulted in him issuing a circular which contained statements cursing his opponents. The circular was sent to all the provincial and district branches of IJABI, and received both positive and negative reactions from IJABI members and members of the Shi‘i community at large. Later, Rakhmat justified his cursing through his publications, Al-Tanwir
and Bahtera.
In an article entitled, ‘The Command of Cursing in the Qur’an and Sunna’, Rakhmat states: “There are several ignorant people among the followers of ahl al-bayt who do not bother to curse those who should be cursed.” He goes on to cite several verses of the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams that permit the cursing of certain sinful people - including slanderers. In short, Rakhmat was trying to make the point that no textual and rational proofs reject the permissibility of cursing.
Dissention also occurred in local branches of IJABI, including South Sumatra, Central Java and Yogyakarta. Internal conflicts in Palembang, South Sumatra, for instance, contributed to the withdrawal from IJABI of renowned Shi‘i figures such as Jailani and his wife Mariatul Fadilah. As a result, IJABI programmes in the area have not run smoothly. The former chairman of the Central Java branch of IJABI was dismissed from his position because of his involvement in the Yaum al-Quds demonstration in 2003. This is an annual demonstration, held on a Friday, in the first week of Ramadan, as prescribed by Ayatollah Khomeini. In Indonesia, Shi‘i ustadh organised this demonstration to demonstrate their adherence and loyalty to the leader of the Iranian revolution. Given that IJABI promotes itself as a non-political organisation, it forbids its members to get involved in any political activities - including demonstrations - which may threaten the legal status of IJABI. Consequently, a number of IJABI’s executive members, active in political parties, resigned. This has further reduced the social basis of this organisation.
In response to the internal discord, IJABI tried to strengthen its position. In so doing, it formulated ten attributes of non-IJABI behaviour, namely racism, intolerance, tarekatism (following certain Sufi orders and confessing the high spiritual achievement through the Sufi orders), mahdism (confessing a capability to communicate with the Imam Mahdi), to promote a state based on Islamic shari‘a (like DI/NII), salafism (Wahhabism), fiqh-orientation, politics, utilising IJABI for personal gain and disloyalty. Each of these ten attributes was believed to have been present among members of IJABI, threatening the existence and unity of IJABI and decreasing the efficiency of its programmes. By formulating this list, IJABI hoped its members would disaccustom themselves from these ten attributes rendering IJABI the ideal social-religious organisation.
The problems outlined above resulted in a decrease in membership and leadership of IJABI. Its second national congress, in Jakarta on 27-29 February 2004, was marked by a lack of support from prominent Shi‘i figures and Iranian representatives in Indonesia. Those prominent figures who had attended its inauguration and first national congress were mainly absent. There was no representative from Iran or ICC of Al-Huda, for example. Nonetheless, hundreds of participants did attend the seminar, which followed the congress, on the topic “Building Ethics Paradigm in the Life of Society and Nation” in which Nurcholish Madjid, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, and Juanda from the Indonesian Navy were speakers. Representatives of provincial and district branches of IJABI from throughout the country attended. Although they acknowledged the problems and weaknesses of IJABI’s leaders, the participants of the congress unanimously accepted the reports presented by Jalaluddin Rakhmat as the chairman of its Religious Advisory Council and Dimitri Mahayana as the chairman of its Executive Council. They also agreed to re-appoint Jalaluddin Rakhmat to his top position in the Religious Council and elect Furqon Bukhari as the new chairman and Khalid al-Walid as the new secretary general of the Executive council.
D. The Response to IJABI
During the process of establishing IJABI, there appeared to be consensus among followers of Shi‘ism in Indonesia, and particularly intellectuals, scholars and ustadh, about the importance of a national organisation, (and also that this organisation should be called IJABI). This consensus was demonstrated at meetings held in the Al-Huda Islamic Centre in Jakarta, attended by many renowned Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals. Clearly at this point in time, Indonesia’s Shi‘is were united by a common purpose. However, as previously mentioned, this unity was short-lived and tainted by disputes and misunderstandings between the proponents of IJABI - Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his associates - and Shi‘i ustadh, mainly Qum alumni. Consequently, the majority of Shi‘i ustadh and scholars were absent from IJABI’s inauguration and first national congress in Bandung.
These disputes and misunderstandings between the two groups continue to this day. Discord at the elite level has become widespread among members of the Shi‘i community. Public criticism of opponents and use of certain da‘wa activities to defend points of view has become commonplace. It is not unusual, for example, for a leaders to criticise opponents during pengajians (religious discussion groups), in the hope of gaining support. In short, there is a schism in the Shi‘i community in Indonesia between those members affiliated to IJABI, who are now split into two opposing groups: supporters of IJABI and their opponents; IJABI and non-IJABI.
However, it would be an oversight to neglect the third category – those Shi‘is who refuse to join either of these camps. Members of this ‘neutral’ group are clearly troubled by the fact that the establishment of IJABI, instead of promoting unity within the Shi‘i community in Indonesia, has rather exaggerated existing fractures. This group includes a number of well-known Shi‘i figures who have made attempts to bridge the divide. For example, Sayyid Seggaf al-Jufri’s has made efforts to organise Islamic rituals and commemorations that bring together the IJABI and non-IJABI groups in Solo, Central Java. Another prominent Shi‘i intellectual, known for his harmonious relationship with all Shi‘i groups is Haidar Bagir, the head of Mizan Publishing Company. Despite the fact that he was listed as being a member of IJABI’s Religious Advisory Council, Bagir has never participated in any IJABI activities. He refuses to take sides with either of the opposing groups, preferring to offer general moral and material support to Shi‘i activities.
Haidar Bagir is not alone. In fact, the majority of Shi‘i scholars who are officially listed as members of IJABI’s Religious Advisory Council do not publicly show support for IJABI or its programmes. Some even go so far as to reject the organisation outright. This extraordinary situation is exacerbated by the fact that a number of people listed as being members of IJABI’s central board or members of its regional or district branches rarely participate in IJABI programmes, let alone lead or organise an activity. Furthermore, a number have even been proactive in destabilising the organisation and its influence. Inevitably this serious lack of support has led to IJABI programmes being severely compromised and more often than not unable to achieve results.
As previously explained, those proponents of IJABI include elements of the intellectual, ex-dissident Muslim group, along with those grassroots members who had relations with IJABI’s leaders long before the organisation was established. These elements are brought together through da‘wa and educational activities held at Shi‘i foundations located in various regions. Such activities usually involve eminent Shi‘i intellectuals being invited to deliver a religious lecture. In addition, IJABI supporters maintain their ties through the publication of books and periodicals, in which prominent intellectuals write about Shi‘i teachings and ideology. On the whole, the leading figures among IJABI supporters are intellectuals who have considerable influence over the other elements of this group. The majority of them graduated from secular universities but learned and committed to practice Islamic teachings according to the Shi‘i madhhab. A small number graduated from the hawza ‘ilmiyya in Qum.
In terms of religious thought, it is widely known that IJABI places more emphasis on the importance of akhlaq or Sufism than jurisprudence. Moreover, IJABI leaders are openly critical of those who uphold what they call the fiqh paradigm - a controversial term coined by Jalaluddin Rakhmat - in their religious life and da‘wa activities. In his Sunday religious gatherings, Jalaluddin Rakhmat continues to present Islamic teachings derived from the Sufi tradition in its widest meaning, including the traditions of the Imams. These beliefs are also reflected in his numerous religious works. For Rakhmat and his associates, Sufism and Shi‘ism are not only inseparable but also united as an integrated teaching of Islam. As explained in a previous chapter, Jalaluddin Rakhmat even recommends ignoring the observance of aspects of jurisprudence for the sake of Islamic fraternity in accordance with the teaching of taqiyya.
In contrast, opponents of IJABI are mainly Shi‘i ustadh. Most graduated from the hawza ‘ilmiyya of Qum, a few from other Islamic educational institutions in Indonesia or abroad. The majority are Sayyids. They have a significant number of followers and activists who support their institutions and activities. Before the establishment of IJABI, a number of leading figures in this group had headed the organisation of (the aforementioned) Yayasan Mahdi, which had been set up as a mass Shi‘i organisation. Like the IJABI group, this group has also established Shi‘i foundations and pesantren, which claim to follow the hawza ‘ilmiyya system of Islamic education in Qum. As mentioned in a previous chapter, a few of the Shi‘i ustadh have written Islamic books published by Shi‘i publishers. Some of their foundations also produce Islamic periodicals. Like the IJABI group, IJABI opponents use these activities to sustain their contacts and their relationship.
Unlike the proponents of IJABI, however, the ustadh pay great attention to the entire teachings of Shi‘ism, including Ja‘fari jurisprudence. For this reason, IJABI supporters view them as a fiqh-oriented group. In their foundations and pesantren they continue to promote all aspects of Shi‘i teachings. For this group, being a Shi‘i means leaving behind all the non-Shi‘i elements of Islam and, instead, upholding all the teachings and traditions of Shi‘ism, commonly called tashayyu‘ (which literally means ‘Shi‘ism’). This is necessary, they believe, in order for Shi‘is become true believers and so that the Shi‘i community in Indonesia does not become isolated from other Shi‘i communities in the world.
The divide between the two groups in terms of social and educational background and religious orientation intricately leads to conflict and competition with regard to the accumulation of social, cultural and economic capital. The explanation below illustrates that complex factors contribute to creating competition and conflict between IJABI and non-IJABI within the Shi‘i community in Indonesia. The competition and conflict originates in the differences in social background among the Shi‘i community in Indonesia: Arab descendant group versus campus group, as well as ustadh versus intellectuals. The divide is sustained by a number of interrelated personal, religious, political, and economic factors. Each group has its own identity which they tend to preserve and strengthen. This identity becomes even stronger when faced with the other group. Each group propagates their own religious ideology, trying to attract as many followers as possible, as well as trying to exert influence among the wider Indonesian Shi‘i population. Whenever possible these groups attempt to set up a Shi‘i organisation, providing a place for Shi‘i adherents to gather, with a view to becoming the dominant force within the community. This act of establishing a socio-religious organisation can be seen as a political one, even though the organisation itself is non-political. Political interests are also evident in the strategies used by members of these groups to gain influential positions within the new organisation and even influence the formulation of its statute and rules. This valuable social capital can be in turn converted into economic capital, as a statement made by Bahruddin Fanani, (speaking for all those Shi‘is who choose not to join either of the competing groups), affirms. He points out that the main source of conflict between IJABI and non-IJABI are social position and economic resources.
In the context of accumulating capital the different groups compete, rather than cooperate, which each other.
There are further issues - some major, some minor matters, some related to the above-mentioned differences - giving the ustadh cause to reject IJABI. Ahmad Baragbah suggests, three reasons for their rejection of IJABI. The first concerns the name of the organisation. The name of an organisation reflects its identity. The ustadh had originally proposed that the appropriate name for a Shi‘i organisation was Ahlulbait (ahl al-bayt). Not only is it succinct and easy to remember, but the term is very important to and frequently used by the Shi‘i community. Some may view this as a minor problem. The second, perhaps more important, matter, concerns the position of wilayat al-faqih in relation to the organisation. This political concept, which is implemented in the Islamic Republic of Iran, gives the faqih (learned man of religion) the highest authority over other segments of society. The faqih is designated as leader of the Shi‘i community, not just in Iran but worldwide, and the Shi‘is in Indonesia are expected to recognise this political-religious leadership. Indonesia’s Shi‘i ustadh believe that the concept wilayat al-faqih should be mentioned explicitly in IJABI’s Statute, demonstrating the Shi‘i nature of the organisation and its deference to the leadership of wali faqih in the Shi‘i world. In fact, the term is absent in the Statute. This, then, is one of the main rationale for the ustadh to reject, and even oppose, IJABI’s existence. Quite simply, the ustadh group regards IJABI as an opponent of wilayat al-faqih. A third factor, also related to the Statute and Rules of organisation, concerns authority. The IJABI Statute and Rules of organisation state that the highest authority is the national congress. The ustadh argue that this power, like the appointment of the chairman of the Executive Council, should be in the hands of the Religious Advisory Council (Dewan Syuro), and not based on a ballot of the national congress. They believe that an election will not be able to produce the best results. In support of this argument, they point to experiences at the first national congress, which they believe was not well-prepared, something the organiser, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, also admits to.
The ustadh group considers IJABI, which does not support wilayat al-faqih, to be raushan fikr (reformed intellectuals). In Iran these raushan fikr have different political orientation to the ‘ulama’ who have led the country since the Islamic revolution of 1979. Indonesia’s ustadh, believe IJABI supporters resemble the raushan fikr in Iran in that they emphasise the importance of intellectuals, (rather than ‘ulama’ or the position of jurist in social and political fields), in various aspects of Muslim life. The Shi‘i ustadh cautious attitude to the position of intellectuals is supported by a statement written by Khomeini. “Islam will not be protected by raushanfikr (intellectual). It is raushanfikr that fools the clear verses of the Qur’an.”
There is a further issue which is the source of conflict between the IJABI and non-IJABI groups, and that is Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s attitude towards Sayyids. Some Sayyids know Rakhmat as anti-Sayyid, (though Rakhmat himself rejects this accusation). They point to several statements made by Rakhmat in an interview on national television, which, they say, indicate his negative attitude toward Sayyids. (Some respondents offer a recording of the programme and cite witnesses to support their position). Consequently, many Sayyids are terribly annoyed with Jalaluddin Rakhmat. This is evident in a discussion of M. Hasyim Assegaf’s (M. Hashem’s) book, Derita Putri-Putri Nabi: Studi Historis Kafa’ah Syarifah (Anguishes of Daughters of the Prophet: A Historical Study of Kafa’a Sharifa). The book was published by Rosda in Bandung in the framework of celebrations of Fatima’s birthday held by IJABI, (in cooperation with Rosda and the Sehati Foundation), in Jakarta in September 2000. One of the main themes of the book is that kafa’a (equality of rank) in marriage is the product of Arab culture, and is legitimised by the Sunni schools of jurisprudence, and Shafi‘i in particular. Kafa’a in marriage is not recognised in Ja‘fari jurisprudence. This was perceived to be a criticism of the widely held view among the Arab community in Indonesia that a Sharifa (Syarifah) - a title given to female descendants of the Prophet - may only marry a Sayyid.
(This is known as kafa’a sharifa). Assagaf makes the point that the Imams strongly reject this racial discrimination. In Shi‘ism, ancestry is not permitted to be the basis for the legality of marriage. Even Khomeini’s daughter married a non-Sayyid man.
Assagaf goes on to state that the obligation of Sharifas to marry only Sayyids is also contrary to the principle of human rights.
Assagaf - himself a Sayyid -, Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Maria Ulfa Anshar were all speakers at the event in Jakarta. Among the participants in the discussion were many Sayyids and Sharifas. During the discussions, a number of criticisms, as well as rude statements, were addressed solely to Jalaluddin Rakhmat, rather than to Assegaf or Anshar. For example, demonstrating her bitter criticism of Rakhmat, one Sharifa even shouted: “even dogs look for good partner.”
It is important to remember that the Sayyid issue is a classical and sensitive matter that, in the early 20th century, divided the Arab community in the Dutch East Indies into pro- and anti-Sayyids.
The conflicts between these groups even attracted attention of the colonial government, who tried to solve the problem. The fact that IJABI would organise a discussion on this topic can be seen as provocative. In this regard, Zein Al-Hadi, a Shi‘i teacher in Jakarta, sent Jalaluddin Rakhmat a letter, warning him that organising such an activity would be very unpopular.
Jalaluddin Rakhmat ignored this advice, considering it to be an important intellectual activity, and an opportunity to implement one of IJABI’s programmes. Clearly, the central problem is not the content of the book per se, but rather the deliberate raising of the sensitive issue of Sayyid versus non-Sayyid.
The Sayyid-non-Sayyid divide is generally acknowledged within the Shi‘i community in Indonesia. Some Shi‘i leaders suggest that this divide corresponds to the divide between IJABI and non-IJABI, others disagree. However, it is a fact that both Sayyids and non-Sayyids have used their organisations and religious gatherings as vehicles to both defend and strengthen their own position, while at the same time highlighting the weaknesses of their opponents.
Some Sayyids have tried to understand Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s negative attitude toward Sayyids. Some suggest that it is a result of bad experiences in personal relationships with Sayyids. For example, one Sayyid informant suggested that Jalaluddin Rakhmat had failed to marry his son to a Sharifa in Lampung because the Sharifa’s father had opposed the union.
Whether this anecdote is true or not, there is no question that a number of Sayyids have a disharmonious relationship with Jalaluddin Rakhmat and consequently reject the existence of IJABI as a national Shi‘i organisation in Indonesia and also refuse to participate in its activities. One well-known famous Sayyid leader, Zainal Abidin al-Muhdar, actually became embroiled in a public spat with Jalaluddin Rakhmat. The two openly squabbled about the Sayyid issue at the Iranian embassy in Jakarta and again at the ICC of Al-Huda in Jakarta. Even though they were seen to apologise to each other at ICC of Al-Huda, their disharmonious relationship continues to this day.
Jalaluddin Rakhmat and other IJABI leaders strenuously deny that they have a negative attitude toward Sayyids. They may well have a point - seven out of twelve members of the IJABI Religious Advisory Council are Sayyids, and other Sayyids occupy positions on its Executive Board, including Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s confidant, Sayyid Abu Ali Al-Idrus. (Abu Ali has headed the division of Imdad Mustad‘afin at the Muthahhari Foundation and the division of Mustad‘afin at IJABI). Jalaluddin Rakhmat himself insists that he is not at all anti-Sayyid, even though he is reported as having used some ethnic stereotypes
when referring to Arabs in Indonesia. For example, he quoted the professor of anthropology, Michael Gilsenan, who in a meeting with Rakhmat referred to the uniqueness of the Arabs in Indonesia, saying that they have a racist attitude towards the native population, despite being a minority group in the country.
Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his supporters group insist that the ustadh had actually agreed on the establishment of IJABI, but that during the process - before the inauguration and congress - the ustadh, and the Arab descendants of Qum alumni in particular, decided that they should become the dominant leaders of the organisation. In other words, the Arab descendants agreed to the establishment of IJABI as long as they could become part of the leadership.
Jalaluddin Rakhmat stuck to his belief that every decision has to be decided through congress.
He once stated that he was forced to fight against the Arab descendants for the sake of democracy.
As explained above, the ustadh disagreed with the position of congress as the highest authority.
In addition to the issues mentioned above, the rejection of IJABI can also be attributed to misunderstandings which occurred during a series of meetings during the process to establish IJABI. Disharmony reached its peak following a statement by Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Dimitri Mahayana which suggested that a number of the Shi‘i ustadh who were striving to become leaders of the Shi‘i community in Indonesia, including IJABI, were incapable of such a role. In response, the Shi‘i ustadh demanded a written apology from Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Rakhmat did write an apology letter, but his opponents saw its content as cynical. Consequently, he was asked to come to the last meeting, three days before the IJABI inauguration, to explain his letter, Rakhmat did not attend the meeting. As a result most of them took the decision to not only boycott IJABI’s inauguration and national congress but also to reject IJABI as an organisation.
For the non-IJABI group, Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s personality is frequently cited as a source of tension. For example, after the spat and subsequent apologies between Rakhmat and Zainal Abidin al-Muhdar at the ICC of Al-Huda, Rakhmat is reported to have told the evening religious gathering at Tazkiya Sejati that he had been attacked by overwhelming numbers of Sayyids. Furthermore, he is said to have frequently humiliated a number of Shi‘i ustadh, and in particular those without a university education. He never invites them to deliver religious lectures at the Tazkiya Sejati Foundation or to attend the religious gatherings held by Sri Adyanti Sudharmono.
It is widely acknowledged that teaching religious gatherings such as those at Paramadina and Tazkiya Sejati, (which have a mainly middle class audience), receives significant remuneration. In addition, Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s statements in religious gatherings and to the national media, discrediting the ustadh, are significant sources of disharmony between IJABI and non-IJABI.
Among the initial reactions to the establishment of IJABI, one came from a meeting of a number of ustadh of Qum alumni at the Al-Jawad Foundation on 18 June 2000, (before IJABI’s inauguration). Ustadh at the meeting included, Ahmad Baragbah, Zahir Yahya, Muhsin Labib, Husein Al-Kaff, Abdullah Husein al-Aydrus and Muhammad Sueb. The meeting produced two conclusions, which were signed and sent to Jalaluddin Rakhmat: first, a recommendation to cancel the inauguration ceremony and put the establishment of IJABI on hold because it was ill-prepared. Second, a rejection of the ideological foundations of IJABI, including its refusal to accept the principle of wilayat al-faqih in the structure of the organisation.
Other subsequent attempts have been made to reject the existence and development of IJABI. One of them included a letter stating their rejection of the organisation, signed by 36 prominent Shi‘i ustadh and intellectuals, and sent to the international Shi‘i leader, wali faqih in Iran, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i. This was one of the most important anti-IJABI strategies employed, because from a religious perspective, the Shi‘i community in Indonesia is an integral part of the Shi‘i world, under the headship of the wali faqih. There have, however, been a number of proponents of IJABI who studied in Iran who came out in defence of their organisation. Khalid Al-Walid, the then chairman of the Iranian branch of IJABI and current secretary general of IJABI, visited the Rahbar’s office to make a number of clarifications regarding the disputes between the proponents and the opponents of IJABI.
Despite recurring efforts by IJABI’s enemies to convince the centre of Shi‘i leadership that the organisation should be rejected, it is clear that IJABI - as a national Shi‘i organisation in Sunni-dominated Indonesia and as a part of the worldwide group of Shi‘i organisations – still has the formal recognition by the office of the international Shi‘i leader in Iran.
A group of Indonesian students in Qum, affiliated to the Association of Indonesian Students of Qum (Himpunan Pelajar Indonesia, HPI) also publicly rejected the existence of IJABI, in a letter, dated on 22 March 2001, signed by its presidium. Ibrahim Al-Habsyi (Husein Al-Habsyi’s son), Abdullah Beik and Muchtar Luthfi, (all of whom have close connections to prominent ustadh of Qum alumni in Indonesia). Their rejection was based on the ideological foundations of IJABI and its refusal to accept the principle of wilayat al-faqih. The letter emphasised that an organisation designed to bring together all Shi‘is in Indonesia must absolutely obey the leadership of wali faqih during the occultation of Imam Mahdi because he is the representative of the Imam.
The letter states:
In the view of HPI, ‘to hold wilaya’ [spiritual investiture] cannot be just jargon. There are several derivations from the principles that are required by the organisation. Therefore, the principles must be implemented in a systematic, not technical, matter.
Systematically, the establishment of organisation may not use the principle of ‘absolute democracy’ (the highest authority is determined totally on the basis of the quantity of votes) because the Western version of absolute democracy in the view of the wilayat al-faqih system is ‘rubbish’ and has already a long time ago been thrown out by this pure system. From this perspective, HPI cannot accept a Shi‘i organisation that claims ‘to hold wilaya’ in the system of establishing leadership, using ways contrary to the principles of wilaya.
Technically, the procedure of the organisation may not be contrary to the clear and agreed shari‘a laws and there is no contextual reason to renounce them (with a reason of taqiyya, for instance), HPI cannot accept an organisation acting on behalf of Shi‘i community but, in fact, neglects matters that precisely become a symbol and identity of Shi‘i madhhab.
Another important strategic attempt to repudiate IJABI, came from a consolidation of the leaders of the Shi‘i foundations. Following a series of meetings, they agreed to reject IJABI and all its programmes. One of these meetings was called ‘workshop of the Ahl al-Bayt Foundations all over Indonesia’ and was held in Jakarta, 7-8 June 2001. The workshop was organised by ICC of Al-Huda to mark the celebration of mawlid of the Prophet. It was attended by a number of guests from Iran, including Ayatollah Shaykh Akhtari. This is a clear indication of the lack of support for IJABU from ICC of Al-Huda. Just before the workshop was to take place, IJABI issued a circular, (signed by Dimitri Mahayana, the chairman of Executive Board, and Hadi Suwastio, the general secretary), on 31 May 2001. The circular lists a number of reasons for declaring the workshop invalid: First, IJABI remains the umbrella organisation for all Shi‘i foundations and congregations in Indonesia and so no other organisation is required. Second, the establishment of another organisation, if this was the aim of the workshop, would threaten the success of any programmes run by IJABI and the new organisation. Third, the workshop was designed to create disunity within the Islamic community and lead to confusion among the adherents of Shi‘ism. The, the opponents of IJABI refuted the IJABI circular by issuing a ‘Declaration of Attitude of Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Foundations to IJABI’ on 8 June 2001, in Jakarta. This declaration clearly rejects the position of IJABI as the umbrella organisation for existing Shi‘i foundations in Indonesia. The main part of the declaration says:
Considering and seeing several points below:
- The claim that IJABI is an umbrella organisation for Indonesian all ahl al-bayt foundations and congregations is not true;
- As a fait accompli among the Indonesian ahl al-bayt community, the existence of IJABI has precisely resulted in various continuing disputes, dissensions, and controversies;
- Demeanour of some IJABI personnel both in the centre and in the branches that has become slanderers that endanger the existence of a number of foundations as well as individuals related to them;
- The unclear IJABI vision and mission has resulted in the separation of IJABI from other Indonesian ahl al-bayt foundations.
Herewith, we on behalf of foundations that are undersigned state several following attitudes:
1. Take no responsibility for any IJABI activities and any related foundations and individuals;
2. Reject to be under the organisational umbrella of IJABI;
3. Appeal for unity of all foundations and communities of the lovers of the ahl al-bayt in Indonesia under the shade of the Master of Affair of Muslims, the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Ali Khamene’i.
27 Shi‘i foundations and one local association from all over Indonesia signed the declaration, including such major institutions as Fatimah and Madinatul Ilmi of Jakarta, IPABI of Bogor, Al-Jawad of Bandung, and Al-Hadi of Pekalongan.
The majority of the signatories were the chiefs of the foundations, while others were staff members, including staff of ICC of Al-Huda of Jakarta, an Iran-sponsored Shi‘i foundation in Indonesia. This represents a significant rejection of IJABI by the country’s Shi‘i foundations.
Another significant development by opponents of IJABI is the establishing of three local Shi‘i associations in Java: KIBLAT (Komunitas Ahlul Bait Jawa Barat, West Java Ahl al-Bayt Community) in West Java, WASIAT in Central Java, and FAJAR (Forum Jamaah Ahlul Bait Jawa Timur, Forum of East Java Ahl al-Bayt Congregation) in East Java. In contrast to IJABI, these three Shi‘i organisations only function to coordinate the existing Shi‘i foundations within their areas. Proponents of these organisations accuse IJABI’s provincial and district branches of usurping the position and function of Shi‘i foundations in the regions. They say this has led not only to opposition from the leaders of the Shi‘i foundations but also to inactivity at the branches of IJABI, who are failing to implement their programmes. They believe that both the existing Shi‘i foundations and the regional and district branches of IJABI are likely to have the similar programmes, leading to a duplication of efforts.
The leaders of these coordinating organisations are prominent Shi‘i teachers who are Qum alumni. Husein Al-Kaff and Abdullah Assegaf became the founders and leaders of KIBLAT, while Ahmad Baragbah and Miqdad are the founders and leaders of WASIAT. The influential leaders of FAJAR are Zahir Yahya and Muhsin Labib. All of these men graduated from Qum and have become prominent Shi‘i teachers and leaders in Indonesia. They have close connections with one another based on their shared ideology and aim to propagate Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
KIBLAT is an assembly of six Shi‘i foundations located in several cities and towns in West Java, including Al-Jawad of Bandung, As-Syifa of Garut, Al-Kazhim of Cirebon, Al-Kautsar of Bandung, Al-Mujtaba of Purwakarta and IPABI of Bogor. KIBLAT’s first congress was held in August 2001. WASIAT in Central Java was officially declared at the end of 2002 and has yet to make significant progress. FAJAR, which is centred in Malang in East Java, (home to a large Shi‘i community), was officially inaugurated on 21 April 2000, although it had been initiated in 1998. FAJAR used to have significant influence on the Shi‘i community in East Java, however, this has since decreased, partly due to its leaders - Zahir Yahya and Muhsin Labib - moving to Australia and Jakarta, respectively, for study. Of the three associations, KIBLAT has been, and continues to be, active in its role as coordinator of the six Shi‘i foundations, as well as organising their training and education programmes and the celebration of Shi‘i holy days. Its activity may be seen as an attempt to compete with IJABI, partly because of its geographically location, close to the national centre of IJABI in Bandung. As for the development of the local associations, WASIAT does not run particularly well. Moreover, these three local coordinating associations are not recognised nationally or legally by the Indonesian government.
A marked difference between these local associations and IJABI can be seen in their incorporation of the concept wilayat al-faqih in their statutes and organisations. The goal of these associations is to establish a community based on the principle of wilaya, so that the Shi‘i community in Indonesia completely accepts and lives under the umbrella of wilayat al-faqih. As an imitation of wilayat al-faqih, the structure of these local associations places the so-called mustashar (adviser) - a position occupied by prominent local ustadh and Qum alumni – as the highest authority in such crucial matters as formulating ideological, conceptual, and strategic policies of the association, and even giving it the power to dissolve the association. As this position is connected to the wali faqih, it is considered to have legitimacy in shari‘a..
Thus, unlike IJABI, these local associations implement a top-down leadership, giving authority to local ustadh, rather than making decisions through congress.
There is a desire among proponents of these local Shi‘i organisations to found another national Shi‘i organisation, different from IJABI in terms of religious and organisational principles, and using their local Shi‘i associations as its model. This was seen in 2003 when the ustadh group in Jakarta established Forum Al-Husainy, which aims to assemble and unite nearly all renowned ustadh and activists in the capital city of Indonesia. With the involvement of key figures such as Husein Shahab and Hasan Daliel Al-Aydrus, this forum succeeded in bringing together the majority of ustadh and activists in the area. They attempted to organise various da‘wa activities using, what they call, a spiritual, intellectual and social approach. The spiritual approach, for example, includes organising a monthly dhikr congregation in the Al-Bina Mosque in Jakarta. In terms of the intellectual approach, several series of da‘wa training have been organised. In addition, da‘wa activities have been undertaken using a social approach.
This forum, however, differs from the three local institutions, not least because of its emphasis on da‘wa programmes rather than on the formulation of Statutes or other organisational apparatus. While IJABI is only supported by a small number of Shi‘is in Indonesia, the majority of the country’s ustadh and activists agree on the necessity to have a single national organisation that is recognised by all groups within the Shi‘i community. Husein Shahab makes the point that that there is always an aspiration among Shi‘i leaders to have a single umbrella organisation to ensure programmes of da‘wa, education and culture achieve maximum results.
To sum up, IJABI has achieved legal recognition from the government, resulting in the accumulation of symbolic capital and it exercises power in terms of its existence and activities. IJABI is based on the principal doctrines of Shi‘ism, however, its operated in accordance with the principles of democracy, placing the highest authority in the hands of national congress. Despite its legal status, IJABI lacks support from the internal Shi‘i community, and the ustadh in particular, who actively reject its nationally recognised position by employing a variety of strategies. The main reason for this rejection is IJABI’s refusal to accept the concept wilayat al-faqih in its ideology. Consequently opponents have established local associations that may ultimately manifest as another national Shi‘i organisation. This schism has its origins in the historical formation and structure of the Shi‘i community in Indonesia.
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Author: Zulkifli
