CHAPTER EIGHT: SUNNI RESPONSES
As shown, there are influential individuals and institutions within the Shi‘i community in Indonesia that have, despite their small number, created opportunities to propagate the teachings of Shi‘ism. However, there remain a number of obstacles to the growth and development of the Shi‘is in Indonesia, the most significant being the responses to this growth by the majority Sunni Muslim community. These responses are complex and range from the extremely negative to the moderate. This chapter deals with the complex responses to Shi‘ism and its development in Indonesia in the period of post-Iranian revolution. For details of the response by Sunni Arab descendants in the early 20th century, I have noted two books by Sayyid Uthman bin Yahya and Sayyid Hasan bin Shahab. These responses to Shi‘ism are a direct result of the nature of Islam in the Indonesian society and state. The majority Muslim population is Sunni, but within this group there are reformist and traditionalist factions, with several related organisations. The chapter commences with an examination of the attitude of existing Islamic organisations in the country towards Shi‘ism. Secondly, it will deal with the fatwa of the Indonesian ‘ulama’, a religious authority in Indonesia. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the response of the Department of Religious Affairs (DEPAG) as a representative of the Indonesian government. Fourthly, it deals with the ways in which anti-Shi‘i propagation is executed and also examines the tensions between Shi‘i and Sunni groups in Indonesia. Finally, it will examine the moderate attitude of Muslim intellectuals that has provided a space for the spread of Shi‘ism.
A. The General Attitude of Islamic Organisations
By and large, Indonesian Islam is characterised by the strong resistance of Muslim individuals, organisations, and institutions to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘is in Indonesia. The most active and negative response to the development of Shi‘ism comes from the reformist Muslim groups, such as Persis and Al-Irsyad, and those individuals and institutions linked to them.
Persis was established in 1923 and claims to follow the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a even though the intellectual works of its leading figures, including Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958), make little mention of this. The main purpose of Persis is to implement - through propagation and instruction - the pure teachings of Islam, based on the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, in all aspects of Muslim life.
Persis emphasises the need to abolish all beliefs and practices which are considered contrary to these two principal sources of Islam. The history of this reformist Islamic organisation is littered with fierce attacks on the religious beliefs and rituals understood and practiced by traditionalists, who constitute the majority of the Indonesian Muslim population. Since its establishment, Persis has been “straightforward in its expression, and unrelenting, and [has] denounced or condemned others quite readily.”
There is no mention of Shi‘ism to be found in any Persis publications in the pre-Iranian revolution era. This can be attributed firstly to a widespread ignorance about the existence of Shi‘is in Indonesia at this time; and secondly, to Persis being focused on its concerns with traditionalist beliefs and practices, the developing ideologies of the state and with Christianity. However, within a matter of months after the victory of the Iranian revolution, we see Persis publications carrying articles related to Shi‘ism. One of the initial responses to events was the inclusion of an article on mut‘a
(literally, ‘enjoyment’, temporary marriage) in Al-Muslimun, the Persis magazine in Bangil. The article describes the classical arguments between the Sunni and Shi‘i views on this topic and reiterates the validity of the Sunni perspective, which rejects the practice of mut‘a. More importantly, however, this article indicates the emerging awareness among Persis members of the spread of Shi‘ism in the country. Over the years, Persis has induced intense resistance to Shi‘ism and Shi‘is in Indonesia, using a variety of methods. Quite simply, Persis believes that Shi‘ism is a heretical sect and it sees itself as the frontline in the fight to protect Sunni Muslims in Indonesia.
This resistance is most evident when analysing Persis’s close links to Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council), known as DDII.
DDII is closely associated with the reformist Muslim group Indonesia, and is well-known for its very negative response to the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. The organisation’s co-founder and first leader was Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993), who was a student of Ahmad Hassan, the leader of Persis, and a former leader of the Masyumi party. Since its establishment on 26 February 1967 DDII has been one of the most, (if not the most), active and progressive institutions in the field of da‘wa in Indonesia. Its claims to be a unifying symbol of the umma and calls for cooperation between existing missionary institutions. DDII urges its missionaries to avoid khilafiya (disputed) matters, and instead expects them to promote those basic principles of Islam which are common to all Muslim factions, reformist and traditionalist. It believes this will prevent confusion among the laity and reduce the burden among the missionaries themselves.
DDII’s anti-Shi‘i propagation is a manifestation of the concept of difa‘ (self-defence) which is directed towards Christianisation (seen as an external threat) and ‘paham-paham dan aliran-aliran sesat’ (the threat of heterodox ideological currents and religious views) such as secularism, Islam Jamaah (LDII), Ahmadiya, and also towards Shi‘ism (seen as an internal threat).
DDII views Shi‘ism as a heterodox sect even though the term ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a is absent in its statute. DDII, and its related individuals and institutions, have organised a number of missionary activities for the purpose of protecting Indonesian Muslims from being influenced by Shi‘ism or particular teachings of Shi‘ism. It is widely accepted that DDII, along with its leaders and institutions, is one of the great opponents to the propagation of Shi‘i teachings in Indonesia.
DDII established connections with Saudi Arabia, and specifically the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-‘alam al-islami),
one of the vice-leaders of which was Natsir. From an international perspective, it is clear that the anti-Shi‘i movement in Indonesia receives strong support from Middle Eastern countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, whilst the Shi‘i movement is supported by Iran. In this context, competition and conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘is in Indonesia is fuelled by competition and tension over Muslim primacy, between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The relationship between these two countries was at its lowest ebb during the period of Khomeini’s leadership, in the first decade following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s successfully established an Islamic state and claims to be the sole authority and representative of ‘genuine’ Islam. This, along with its attempts to propagate these beliefs to the whole Muslim world, was a direct challenge to the Saudi kingdom and its hold on the Muslim primacy. Iran’s revolutionary message, opposes the Saudi regime - which Khomeini depicts “as oppressive and as the ally of other oppressive Muslim governments”
- and its brand of Islam, namely Wahhabism, seen by many as a false sect which aims “to create factionalism and division between the world’s Muslim” and “to eliminate the history of Islam”.
Aware of the growing influence of the Iranian revolutionary spirit, the Saudi’s responded by promoting the message that Iran is an exporter of terrorism and imperialism, determined to destabilise the Gulf States.
The dissemination of the Saudi brand of Islam, Wahhabism, by the Muslim World League is a particular source of tension. The promotion of Wahhabism has direct connections to a worldwide anti-Shi‘i movement, also active in Indonesia. The Muslim World League owns periodicals, publishing houses, agencies and has missionaries scattered all over the world. It has organised meetings and financed Islamic centres, Islamic education, publication, and missionary activities in Indonesia.
The second Muslim reformist organisation, known for its anti-Shi‘i stance, is Al-Irsyad, a non-Sayyid Arab organisation, which was founded in 1914. Its anti-Shi‘i attitude appears to run parallel to its anti-Sayyid activities, carried out through Jami‘at Khair, to which Ahmad Surkati was affiliated. A simple explanation is that Al-Irsyad’s anti-Shi‘i sentiments are unsurprising given that a large number of Sayyids, (the organisation’s long-standing enemy), adhere to Shi‘i Islam. However, this explanation calls for refinement. Clearly theological reasons dominate the anti-Shi‘i attitude of Al-Irsyad, coupled with its strong ties to anti-Shi‘i groups in the Middle East. The reformist character of its religious doctrines are strongly influenced by Wahhabism, and there are strong historical and psychological factors which contribute to its prominent role in Indonesia’s anti-Shi‘i movement. It came as no surprise, then, that during Al-Irsyad’s 36th National Conference, held in Pekalongan, Central Java, on 23-26 October 1996, the organisation appealed to the government to prohibit the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
The motion urges DEPAG and other government institutions to adopt a firm attitude:
To prohibit Shi‘ism and other streams contrary to the teachings of the Qur’an and hadith of the Prophet (may God grant him peace and salvation) in the whole de jure region of Indonesia and also all their activities in any forms, either ritual, printing, and publication etc. because in the long period it is worried that these will result in conflicts among the Muslims in Indonesia as adherents of the teachings of ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a.
In contrast, the largest reformist Muslim organisation in Indonesia - Muhammadiyah - appears to take a neutral stance to Shi‘ism, in the sense that it does not get involved in promoting anti-Shi‘i views to its members and Muslims at large. This is particularly true of the central board of Muhammadiyah, (although there is some evidence that local branches and members do conduct anti-Shi‘i activities). Like the above-mentioned reformist associations, Muhammadiyah claims to follow the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a, however, its main concern, (since its establishment in 1912), appears to have been with promoting the necessity of Islamic renewal in Indonesia.
As Noer has pointed out, although the ideology of Muhammadiyah is similar to that of Persis, Muhammadiyah demonstrates a more patient attitude and shows more understanding towards others.
Since Muhammadiyah holds an influential position within Indonesian society, the fact that it refrains from participation in anti-Shi‘i propagation is an interesting phenomenon. Even during the most well-attended anti-Shi‘i seminar of 1997 the Muhammadiyah representative was notably absent among the speakers. However, this should not be taken as meaning that there are no Muhammadiyah scholars willing to enter into discussions about Shi‘ism. A possible explanation is that the main priorities of Muhammadiyah are social, educational and da‘wa activities rather than theological debates about Shi‘ism. The divide between Sunnism and Shi‘ism is a classical matter that has coloured the history of Islam. In a foreword to a book containing a collection of papers from this 1997 seminar,
the Muhammadiyah leader, Amien Rais, avoids mentioning the conclusions and recommendations of the seminar. Rather, the foreword emphasises that differences are unavoidable within the dynamics of Muslim society and that the Shi‘is constitute a valid section of the Muslim umma. Instead of judging Shi‘ism as a false sect, as other reformist organisations might do, this important modernist Islamic organisation sympathetically calls on all Muslims to study Shi‘ism critically, using the Qur’an and hadith as standards. Muhammadiyah is likely to maintain its moderate attitude towards Shi‘ism given that its current chairman, Muhammad Din Syamsuddin, has close relations with Shi‘i figures in Indonesia.
The largest traditionalist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, NU, demonstrates conflicting attitudes towards Shi‘ism. Unlike the majority of the country’s reformist organisations, NU does not tend to get involved in anti-Shi‘i activities, despite claiming to be an ardent follower of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a and probably the strictest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. NU holds the principle that while Shi‘ism differs from Sunnism, it is still a part of the realm of Islam. Its priority is strengthening the teachings of Sunnism among its members and the Indonesian Muslim population at large. However, there has been a noticeable split in the attitudes of NU leaders towards Shi‘ism among the NU leaders. On the one side there is an extremely negative attitude, upheld by several ‘ulama’ of NU, who take part in anti-Shi‘i activity. On the other side, there is the moderate attitude of those such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Said Agiel Siradj. A number of anti-Shi‘i leaders and scholars point to the views, attitude and action of a number of NU leaders, (and in particular of Abdurrahman Wahid and Said Agiel Siradj), which they consider to promote Shi‘i teachings to members of NU.
This contrast between those holding very negative views of Shi‘ism and those with a more moderate opinion has led NU to institutionally abstain from opposing Shi‘i propagation in Indonesia. Thus far, this position has characterised the dynamic development of the largest Islamic traditionalist organisation. However, the complexities of this issue deepen further given that some anti-Shi‘i ‘ulama’ belonging to NU are opponents of Abdurrahman Wahid’s group within the organisation. This group of ‘ulama’ have made Shi‘ism ‘a weapon’ in their opposition to Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership. Also relevant is NU’s view of religious tradition. NU, like adherents of Shi‘ism, opposes Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist stance, which wants to abolish all traditionalist Islamic practices.
Since its establishment in 1926, NU has come to see the Wahhabism promoted by Saudi Arabia, along with reformist organisations such as Persis and Al-Irsyad, as the ‘great enemies’ of traditionalist Muslims.
The above description only takes into account the general attitude of the central boards of these Muslim organisations. It appears that at the local level, branches of both NU and Muhammadiyah, (and actually nearly all local offices of Muslim organisations), tend to demonstrate a negative attitude towards Shi‘ism. This can usually be explained by external factors such as local anti-Shi‘i groups joining forces in their efforts to fight the spread of Shi‘ism in their area. In East Java, for instance, ‘ulama’ of NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, in collaboration with the provincial branch of MUI, met in 1992 in the framework of preventing the dissemination of Shi‘ism in the region.
To recap, it is clear that the response of Islamic organisations to Shi‘ism is affected by a series of interconnected internal and external factors. Of the four organisations examined, the reformist Persis and Al-Irsyad demonstrate a very strong resistance to Shi‘ism while NU and Muhammadiyah tend to have a more moderate response. The puritan character of Islamic organisations and the support of certain Middle East countries - in particular Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabism, which has similar puritan tendencies - all contribute to forming a strong negative response to Shi‘ism. However, the strength of the response is clearly determined by the priorities and the focus of individual Islamic organisations. Muhammadiyah, for instance, differs from Persis and Al-Irsyad because of it tends to focus on social, educational and missionary programmes rather than theological discussions. The response of NU is also more accommodative and moderate. Theologically and institutionally, NU is unlikely to become a friend of the reformist groups, let alone Wahhabism, and therefore also unlikely to actively oppose the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. NU’s main concerns have been with the strengthening of its membership and the Muslims community at large. However, the negative perception of Shi‘ism upheld by some NU and Muhammadiyah figures, particularly at a local level, may become a potential source of negative responses to Shi‘ism. Finally, we note that external factors also influence reactions to Shi‘ism.
B. The Response of MUI
Majlis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of ‘Ulama’), known as MUI, was established in 1975 on the initiative of then President Suharto. The government regards it as an authoritative religious institution, particularly in respect of religious sects and denominations other than the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a (Sunnism) that is adhered to by the majority of Indonesian Muslims and the state. As implied, the government depends heavily on the fatwa (legal opinion) issued by the MUI. Any analysis of the response of the Indonesian ‘ulama’ to Shi‘ism, should also consider the fatwa of MUI related to this matter, “because the fatwa is an important instrument through which the ‘ulama’ express their authority”.
The position of Shi‘ism in Indonesia is complicated by a number of intertwined political and religious aspects. On 8 March 1984, MUI held an annual national meeting in which, among other things, the position of Shi‘ism was discussed. The result of the meeting was a recommendation (tawsiya), which reads as follows:
Shi‘ism as a stream existing in the Islamic world has principal differences from the Sunni madhhab (ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a) that is adhered to by the Indonesian Muslims. The differences, among others, are:
1. Shi‘ism rejects the hadith that is not narrated by the ahl al-bayt whereas ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a does not differentiate them provided they fulfil the requirements [recommended by] the sciences of hadith.
2. Shi‘ism views that the Imams are infallible, whilst ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a views them ordinary men who cannot escape from mistakes.
3. Shi‘ism does not recognise ijma‘ without the existence of the Imams whereas ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a recognises it without requiring the participation of ‘imams’.
4. Shi‘ism views that the establishment of leadership/government (imamate) as a pillar of the religion whereas the Sunnis (ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a) view it as public welfare with the goal of imamate being to guarantee and protect da‘wa and the interest of umma.
5. Shi‘ism in general does not recognise the caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, ‘Umar bin Khattab, and ‘Uthman bin ‘Affan while ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a recognises the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali bin Abi Talib).
Considering the principal differences between Shi‘ism and ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a as mentioned above, especially regarding the difference on imamate (government), MUI appeals to the Indonesian Muslims who uphold ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a to increase awareness of the possibility of the coming of streams that are based on the teachings of Shi‘ism.
Even though its general content resembles that of the circular previously issued by DEPAG, a major point of interest in this recommendation is that it neither deals with the legal opinion of Shi‘ism in Islam nor defines the legal consequences for those who adhere to it and practise its teachings. Besides reiterating the usual arguments which illustrate the contrasts between the Sunni and Shi‘i doctrines, the text only goes as far as to recommend that Sunni Muslims in Indonesia should not follow the teachings of Shi‘i Islam. This issuance of a recommendation, not a fatwa, is unique and interesting. It is also of significance for Indonesia’s Shi‘is, because it does not judge Shi‘ism to be a false brand of Islam whose teachings deviate from orthodox Islam. By implication then, existing Shi‘is can, de jure, practice their beliefs and carry out their activities. Further, the recommendation means that no individual, group or institution can forbid the missionary efforts of Shi‘ism in the country.
Scrutinising the various recommendations issued by MUI from 1975 to 1988, Mudzhar suggests that the recommendation on the Shi‘i movement was issued in support of government policies.
One may question why it was necessary for MUI to give the recommendation on Shi‘ism at the time. Mudzhar tried to explain the rationale behind the issuance by examining the socio-political development during early 1980s:
We know that 1979 was the year of the Iranian revolution, which toppled the secular government of the Shah and replaced it with an Islamic one. Apparently the echo of that resounded beyond Iranian territories and reached Indonesia. It was rumoured that some Muslims youths were to be target of for the exportation of the ideas of the Iranian Islamic revolution. It was in this context that the government saw it necessary to take precautionary steps to prevent such Islamic revolutionary ideas from developing in the country, and it was also in this context that the MUI made it contribution to the efforts to preserve the establishment by issuing the fatwa. Thus, while the arguments of the fatwas were classical and theological in nature, the goals were contemporary and political. It is too obvious to ignore the fact that the actual concern of the fatwa was with the doctrine of the imama and nothing else.
The recommendation was delivered to support government policy regarding its response to the export of revolutionary ideas. This is affirmed in a speech in 1984 given by the Minister of Religious Affairs, which reminded the ‘ulama’ of the growing interest in Shi‘ism and of Iran’s efforts to spread its revolutionary ideas. At the same meeting, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs also emphasised these tendencies.
However, to deny the religious goal of the recommendation completely is misleading. At that time, ‘ulama’ in Indonesia were aware of, or at least had heard of, the growing number of converts to Shi‘i Islam among Muslim youths, the growing distribution and publication of Shi‘i works, and the increasing number of students studying in Iran.
Concerned with this situation, the ‘ulama’ were motivated to formulate the fatwa. In other words, the issuing of the recommendation by MUI was aimed not only at supporting the government policy with respect to Iranian revolutionary ideas but also at preventing Indonesian Muslims from being influenced by teachings of Shi‘ism and from conversion to Shi‘i Islam.
This significant recommendation was a catalyst for controversy regarding Shi‘ism in Indonesia. Both positive and negative reactions were forthcoming. The positive response was also the pragmatic response, that the recommendation reflected the reality occurring in the country following the success of the Iranian revolution. The step taken by the MUI was considered appropriate and important to defend the Sunni community from the influence of Shi‘ism. The more radical and indeed negative elements believed MUI’s recommendation to be ineffective since it had no legal effect. The struggle for the prohibition of Shi‘ism in Indonesia continues to characterize this group today. The negative responses include regret that the recommendation was ever issued. The argument being that in fact it has achieved the opposite of what was intended, actually making Shi‘ism more popular, because a growing number of people are now eager to learn about it.
Reformist groups within Indonesia continue to urge MUI to issue a fatwa on the falsity of Shi‘ism, even though its council has so far resisted these calls. In fact, at the national meeting of 1996, for instance, there were fresh appeals to reaffirm the 1984 recommendation.
For MUI, however, the 1984 recommendation remains its final and only statement on this matter. The position maintained by MUI’s council, as K.H. Ali Yafie affirms, is simply to stress the principal differences between Sunnism and Shi‘ism, as outlined in the 1984 recommendation.
A second religious judgement made by MUI concerns the practice of mut‘a, or temporary marriage, which is permitted in Shi‘ism. In its attempt to solve the religious case in the Muslim community, the department on 11 October 1996 sent a letter to MUI with regard to the importance of issuing a fatwa on mut‘a. The request is connected to the issue of mut‘a spreading among the Muslims, particularly the above-mentioned case of Ali Hasan reported in the national mass media. But MUI has not delivered the requested fatwa until the following year. On 25 October 1997, the fatwa commission of MUI held a meeting regarding the issue of a fatwa on the prohibition of mut‘a. This followed a letter from the Secretary General of DEPAG (11 October 1996) requesting the fatwa and a letter and decision from the chairman of the Muslim association Ittihadul Muballighin (Ittihad al-muballighin, the Unity of Missionaries) on the prohibition of this marriage type. The subsequent fatwa issued by MUI includes the classical arguments against mut‘a and also re-affirms the marriage law in Indonesia. The fatwa goes on to state that, first, mut‘a is proscribed and, second, any person engaged in mut‘a must be brought before a court, in accordance with the prevailing rules of law.
MUI’s issuance of the fatwa cannot be dissociated with the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. First, MUI states that the fatwa is a response to what it considers a growth in the practice of mut‘a among Muslims in Indonesia, and in particular youths and students. Second, according to MUI, there has been anxiety and unrest among parents, ‘ulama’, leaders, educators, and the wider Muslim community, that the practice of mut‘a is being used as a means of Shi‘i propagation in Indonesia. Third, MUI affirms that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are Sunnis who reject Shi‘ism in general and its teaching of mut‘a in particular.
This clearly shows a link between the fatwa and a controversial seminar on the falsity of Shi‘ism that was organised in 1997, and which is described above.
Unlike the seminar, MUI’s fatwa did not attract a significant response from the Muslim community. This can be explained by a number of reasons: First, MUI’s judgement of the widespread practice of mut‘a is questionable because some ‘ulama’, including K.H. Ali Yafie, doubt the relevance of issuing the fatwa, given that the matter is already dealt with clearly in the Islamic law understood by the majority of Muslims in the country. In fact, moderate Muslim intellectuals, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, seem to ignore both the practice of mut‘a and the issuance of the fatwa. The issue of mut‘a also emerged at the National conference of NU in November 1997, about one month after the issuance of MUI’s fatwa. Although the conference concluded that mut‘a is forbidden, unauthentic and to be rejected, interestingly, as Barton and Feilard have shown, the Shi‘i permissibility of mut‘a “did not in itself provoke a major outcry at this national gathering... [and] did not seem to represent automatic grounds for its rejection.”
Second, this focus on and rejection of mut‘a may be regarded as a part of the anti-Shi‘i movement promoted mainly by certain circles of the reformist Islamic group. In fact, some of those active during the meeting of Ittihadul Muballighin suggested that MUI members are speakers for and proponents of the anti-Shi‘i movement in general. Thus, we see the issue of mut‘a being used as a weapon to oppose the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
The local branches of MUI also provided responses to Shi‘ism, however, essentially they were in line with the views of the central institution. On 2 August 1993, for instance, MUI in East Java held a meeting in Surabaya, which invited the ‘ulama’ from various Muslim organisations, including NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, as well as the Al-Bayyinat Foundation, (an anti-Shi‘i organisation). The meeting was led by a well-known anti-Shi‘i figure, K.H. Misbach, chairman of the provincial board of MUI and head of the DDII branch of East Java.
Originally, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a question relating to the Court of East Java and Husein Al-Habsyi’s Quran commentary book, in English, Did the Prophet Frown? However, the meeting developed into a forum for the discussion and judgement of Shi‘ism.
At the meeting, some participants presented their views on Shi‘ism from theological perspectives while others described the development of the Shi‘is in East Java, and in particular in Bangil, where Husein Al-Habsyi lived and headed his famous pesantren. It is evident from the dialogue at the meeting that the most negative views were expressed figures from Al-Bayyinat and Muhammadiyah. Muhammad Baabdullah of Al-Bayyinat of Bangil, for instance, stated that Shi‘i doctrines are more dangerous than Zionism and that Shi‘is do not have the right to live in Indonesia, a country where the state ideology is based on Pancasila (the Five Principles). Similarly, Muammal Hamidy of Muhammadiyah was of the opinion that all Shi‘i activities should be outlawed as they were clearly causing an uneasiness within the community. Hamidy also proposed that the provincial branch of MUI should establish a team to scrutinise the characteristics of this false religion. K.H. Rochim Noer, the head of Muhammadiyah in East Java, shared Baabdullah’s opinion that the Shi‘is are disbelievers, at the same time backing Hamidy’s proposal to form a team to scrutinise Shi‘ism and the Shi‘is, as well as the reasons for their going astray. The meeting of MUI in East Java approved this motion.
Various responses to the MUI meeting followed. The editor of Aula, a magazine of NU in East Java, criticised the product of the meeting as a non-progressive achievement given that on 9 January 1992 MUI in East Java had already cited and distributed the 1984 recommendation on Shi‘ism. The Aula editor argued that rather than establish a team to scrutinise the perceived threat of Shi‘ism in the region, the provincial MUI should produce a plan of action because the national MUI had already formulated a clear recommendation on Shi’ism.
The issuance of the interrelated recommendation and fatwa clearly shows a tolerance by the central board of MUI for the expression of religious authority in Indonesia. This accommodation reflects not only the different elements - reformist (modernist) and traditionalist ‘ulama’ - within the council but also the different and contradictory responses of Islamic organisations and individuals to Shi‘ism. Generally speaking, the 1984 recommendation is a much clearer expression of MUI’s moderate attitude than the fatwa on the prohibition of mut‘a, which can be seen as accommodating the reformist elements of the organisation. It is pertinent to note that another controversial fatwa was issued by MUI in 2005, also dealing with mut‘a. However, this fatwa explicitly avoids any reference to Shi‘ism, most likely because of the influence of moderates within MUI.
C. The Response of DEPAG
The position of DEPAG, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as the representative of the Indonesian government, is an important one in our analysis. In general, DEPAG carries out research and investigations into controversial religious groups and subsequently produces a formal report and opinion. DEPAG is also responsible for maintaining harmony in Indonesian society and it does so by implementing the concept of the ‘trilogy of religious harmony’, which was pioneered by the former Minister Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara (in the period of 1978-1983). This concept promotes harmony between different religious adherents, harmony between adherents of the same religion, and harmony between religious adherents and the government.
It should follow then, that DEPAG also views Shi‘ism from the perspective of the trilogy of religious harmony. However, since the majority of Indonesian Muslims are Sunni, DEPAG is predominantly Sunni, with almost all ministers, officials and staff adhering to Sunnism. Consequently, DEPAG actually categorises the presence of Shi‘ism in Indonesia as a threat to religious harmony in the country and a religious problem that needs to be solved. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Shi‘ism is frequently associated with Iranian revolutionary ideology. Like many Muslim countries in the world, the attitude of the Indonesian government towards the Shi‘is, particularly in 1980s, was interspersed with a fear of the export of revolutionary ideas.
There are a number of cases regarding Shi‘ism which have attracted the attention and energies of DEPAG. However, two of them in particular warrant further examination. The first case from 1982, is in respect of Abdul Qadir Bafaqih, a Shi‘i teacher in Bangsri, Central Java. Following reports that Bafaqih was a Shi‘i ustadh, teaching Shi‘ism in the area, DEPAG’s Body of Research and Development investigated and presented its findings to the Minister, on 10 November 1982. The report details research findings about the ustadh, his Shi‘i teachings and missionary activities, as well as the reactions of local Islamic leaders. In addition, it provides the Minister advice regarding the action to be taken with regard to this religious case. This report makes three important recommendations, which are also crucial to our understanding of the attitude of the Indonesian government towards Shi‘ism. First, from a religious point of view, Shi‘ism cannot be forbidden because it is widely recognised in the Islamic world. Second, action should be taken to withdraw and forbid further distribution of recordings of Bafaqih’s religious preaching among adherents of Sunnism. Third, the Provincial Office of Religious Affairs was advised to approach and guide members of this new Islamic group in order that they adapt to the religious life of the majority Sunni community.
Further, the Inspectorate General of the same ministry was entrusted with the task of investigating the case further. In the Inspectorate General’s report to the Minister, on 27 December 1982, a similar description of Abdul Qadir Bafaqih’s religious teachings and activities was provided, however in this case there was more emphasis on the social and political aspects of the case. First, there was no evidence of political inclination in the activities of the ustadh or the possibility for ‘the third party’(Iran) to use them for its political interest. Second, the report describes how the activities of the ustadh created tension between the ustadh and local ‘ulama’, even though there was no evidence of this provoking public reactions. However, the Inspectorate concluded that the situation had potential to get worse, and so it urged that special guidance, provided by the apparatus of the DEPAG, be carried out for the students of the ustadh, with a view to them living in harmony with other members of the Muslim community.
These two formal reports provide us with important observations. First, religious opinion is avoided in the reports. In other words, they demonstrate a neutral attitude towards the newly emerged Islamic group. No judgement is made about whether Shi‘ism is a true Islamic school. Second, it illustrates the primary concern of the authority - religious harmony among different Islamic groups in the country. The third point is its emphasis on the possible political implications of this religious case, namely that somehow there is a connection with the export of Islamic revolutionary ideas from Iran.
The second case is the textual study on Yaumul Quds, the magazine published by the Iranian Embassy. At the request of the Attorney General, in the mid 1980’s DEPAG’s Body of Research and Development conducted research and provided a recommendation on the content of the magazine. In its scrutiny, after providing a long summary of the magazine, the Body points out that only one article, on walayat (sovereignty), had the potential to create problems in the religious life of society and the state, and it recommended that the article in question should be censored. In a formal letter to the Attorney General, on 15 January 1986, the Body provides the Attorney General with more detailed reasons for its recommendation: First, the article contains inappropriate terms. Second, it interprets Qur’anic verses out of context and without connecting them with the asbab al-nuzul (occasions of revelation). Third, its interpretation of the Qur’anic verses is at odds with the religious comprehension of majority of Indonesian Muslims. Fourth, it suggests that the article is meant to spread the teachings of Shi‘ism in Indonesia, and therefore is at risk creating disorder in religious life, not least because the article has the potential to become the religious basis for political activity. Fifth, its publication in the Indonesian language can be seen as an attempt to distribute Iranian revolutionary ideas in the country.
These two cases demonstrate a clear concern by DEPAG for the social order within Indonesian society and with the political implications of the spread of Shi‘ism in the country. The department recommends censoring the abovementioned article because of what it believes to be both the social and political implications of its distribution. For DEPAG, the fact that the magazine was published by the Iranian Embassy, well-known for its desire to propagate revolutionary ideas to other countries, serves as confirmation that their judgement is correct.
Providing solutions to religious problems is not the only duty of the DEPAG. As we will see below, the department also takes on a preventative role with regard to the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. This is demonstrated by the issuance of a specific Surat Edaran (circular), which can be considered as a reflection of the official view of DEPAG on Shi‘ism. The circular, entitled Hal Ihwal Mengenai Golongan Syi‘ah (Particulars on the Shi‘i Groups), was issued on 5 December 1983 by the Director General of Community Guidance and Hajj Affairs, with approval of the Minister, Munawir Sjadzali (1925-2004). The circular was intended for internal departmental distribution only. It states that the department needs to provide its civil servants with information about Shi‘ism and its differences with Sunnism. The subtext is that the department wants to protect all its civil servants from the influence of Shi‘ism. The circular, which was sent to all sections within the department, is meant to be a manual for civil servants in carrying out their duties. Moreover, there is a political rationale for issuing the circular, namely “in the framework of warding off every irresponsible negative effort through the strife of religion that may be able to rock the national stability and tenacity....”
In order to fully understand the official view of DEPAG, it is necessary to further examine the contents of this circular. Its introduction provides an historical description of the emergence of three groups within the Muslim umma following the death of Prophet Muhammad, namely the majority Sunnis, the Shi‘is, and the khawarij (seceders from the ranks of the partisans of Ali). It then provides an explanation of the four main divisions within Shi‘ism, namely the Zaydiyya - said to be the most moderate of the Shi‘i sects and the closest to Sunnism -, the Isma‘iliyya (Sab‘iyya or ‘Sevener’), the Imamiyya and the Ghulat - the ‘extremists’ that deviate from the true teachings of Islam.
We need to pay particular attention to the DEPAG description of Imamiyya Shi‘ism, which is followed in Indonesia, Iran and by the majority of Shi‘is in the world. DEPAG suggest that this Shi‘i sect has several characteristics: First, its followers believe that Abu Bakr and ‘Umar usurped Ali’s right to the caliphate, so consequently Imamiyya Shi‘is frequently denounce the two caliphs in their religious teachings. Second, they place Ali in a higher position than human beings in general, namely as a mediator between man and God. Third, some followers of this sect even believe that Ali and other Imams have divine attributes. Fourth, they believe that the Imams are infallible of both major and minor sins. Fifth, they do not recognise the consensus of opinion among the ‘ulama’ as a principle of Islamic law unless it is approved by the Imams. As a result, neither ijtihad nor the use of rational opinion is applied in their interpretation of Islamic law. Sixth, they permit the practice of mut‘a. Seventh, they believe that the dead Imams will return to this world before Judgement Day to wipe out all evils and punish all of their opponents.
This explanation clearly indicates a poor understanding of the principal doctrines of Imamiyya Shi‘ism. These misleading views may contribute to a negative attitude among the civil servants of the department towards Shi‘ism and the Shi‘is. The circular goes on to state:
All those [mentioned above] are not in accord with and even contrary to the true teachings of Islam. In the teachings of Imamiyya Shi‘ism thought cannot develop, ijtihad is not permitted. All has to wait for and depends upon the Imam. Between the common people and the Imam there is a wide, gaping gap or distance, which is a fertile place for all kinds of khurafat [superstition] and takhayul [heresy] deviating from the teachings of Islam.
Two serious mistakes are contained in the above explanation, in the sense that it contradicts the historical reality of the Shi‘is. First, it is generally accepted that Islamic thought in the Shi‘i world, particularly its philosophical aspects, continues to develop, and in fact can be said to be more developed than Islamic thought in the Sunni world. Second, ijtihad is always open in Shi‘i Islam and there is a need for the continued existence of a mujtahid, (a religious scholar who has achieved the level of competence necessary to practise ijtihad), given that the laity must follow a living marja‘ al-taqlid - a mujtahid - recognised as a source of emulation in matters of religious law. This has resulted in close ties between ‘ulama’ and lay people in the Shi‘i world. All the misperceptions found in the circular clearly originate from a failure to understand the key concept of imamate in Shi‘ism and from an ignorance of the historical reality of the Shi‘is.
However, the most significant part of DEPAG’s circular is its statement that Muslims in Indonesia are the followers of ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a, whose views differ from those of the Shi`is. In the context of the response to the Shi‘is in Indonesia, the link between DEPAG’s circular and the previously described recommendation of MUI, (which was issued some months after the issuance of the circular), cannot be ignored.
We should bear in mind that DEPAG is not an institution of ‘ulama’, and so it cannot produce fatwa or religious judgements that bind the community. The department carries out its duty in providing solutions to existing religious problems and in its prevention of the possible emergence of new religious problems in the Indonesian society and nation. Thus, DEPAG can only request that MUI make recommendations on Shi‘ism and issue fatwa on mut‘a, for example. These requests must be based on considerations of the religious life of Muslim society, and in particular with a view to resolving problems between Sunnis and Shi‘is in order to promote religious harmony in the country.
D. Anti-Shi‘i Propagations
With regard to the Sunni-Shi‘i relations in Indonesia, a large number of activities have been undertaken by anti-Shi‘i groups for the purpose of preventing or reducing the spread of the teachings of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. These missionary activities include publishing, seminars or discussions, appealing to government authorities, and preaching carried out by the reformist group, in particular DDII and its missionaries and related institutions. Among other attempts to reduce or to compete with the growth of Shi‘ism in Indonesia, the publication of anti-Shi‘i works has been of major importance. Coser affirms that, like its opponent, the anti Shi‘i group realises the great importance of books as “carriers and disseminators of ideas.”
The publication of books in the vernacular is meant to provide Indonesian Muslims with Sunni views on Shi‘ism, in the hope that they will be less susceptible to the teachings of Shi‘ism and thus less likely to convert. These publications are also intended to compete with the growing number of Shi‘i works, particularly those translated from the Arabic, English and Persian originals. In other words, publishing has been used as a means of anti-Shi‘i propagation for the purpose of protecting Sunni Muslims in the country from being influenced by the growing Shi‘i missionary activities. In this regard, Mohammad Natsir and other Muslim leaders in the country were truly aware of the growing phenomenon. Natsir once wrote: “In the meantime begins the publication of books and brochures on Shi‘ism in Indonesian. Some are original works, others are translations from Arabic and English books. They are published in West Java, Central Java, and East Java etc. and get a wide market of readers particularly among our youths.”
The anti Shi’ism literature were certainly works strongly rejecting the existence of Shi‘ism and its teachings, (supported by both textual and rational proofs). However, it leans heavily on translations, of Arabic originals, of the most famous anti-Shi‘i works, because no Indonesian ‘ulama’ and leaders were able to produce such works themselves. Through the international network established by the reformist leaders, a choice was made for the popular anti-Shi‘i works in the Middle East written by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969) and Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (d. 1987). Al-Khatib was born in Damascus and, from 1920, took up permanent residence in Cairo, where he became one of the most resolute advocates of Wahhabism. This was a direct result of the great influence of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1323) on his educational background. Al-Khatib was a journalist, commentator, editor and publisher of his own periodicals, al-Zahra (1924-1929) and al-Fath (1926-1948), and he also produced editions of classical Arabic books and Wahhabi writings. He had a fiercely negative stance towards Shi‘ism and strongly opposed any attempts to reach rapprochement and conciliation between Sunnism and Shi‘ism.
Zahir was described as “the most prolific Sunni polemicist in recent years.”
He was the editor of the Islamic journal, Tarjuman al-Hadith (the Hadith Interpretations) published in Lahore and the secretary-general of Jam‘iyyat ahl al-hadith (Society of People of Hadith), a Wahhabi movement. When a bomb exploded during a rally by the movement in Lahore on March 1987 he was fatally wounded and died a few days later in Riyadh. He was buried in Medina.
Regarding the translation and publication of his books, on March 1986, Zahir visited Indonesia, including Surabaya, where he became acquainted with a translator of his books, Bey Arifin, and the director of Bina Ilmu Publisher, who published Zahir’s works in Indonesian. Like his predecessor, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Zahir was strongly anti-Shi‘i and an opponent of all Sunni sympathisers who promoted ideas of rapprochement, in particular the Jam‘iyyat al-taqrib bayn al-madhahib al-islamiyya (the Society of Rapprochement between the Islamic Denominationalism), established in Cairo in 1947.
The most influential of these translated anti-Shi‘i works, were those by Zahir. The most important of his books translated into Indonesian include Salah Faham Sunnah Syi‘ah (‘Sunni Shi‘i Misunderstanding’, 1983), Syiah dan Sunnah
(Shi‘ism and Sunnism, 1984), and Syi‘ah Berbohong atas nama Ahlul Bait (The Shi‘is Lie in the Name of Ahl al-Bayt, 1987). These are followed by al-Khatib’s al-Khutut al-Arida,(The Broad Outlines) which was translated into Indonesian under the title Mengenal Pokok-pokok Ajaran Syiah Al-Imamiyah dan Perbedaannya dengan Ahlussunnah
(‘Introducing Principal Teachings of Imamiyya Shi‘ism and their Difference from Those of Sunnism’, 1985). The foreword of this book was written by Muhammad Nasif, the then secretary general of the Muslim World League. It is important to note that al-Khatib regards Shi‘ism as a religion outside Islam rather than a madhhab within Islam. It is true that these books are distributed widely in Islamic institutions, organisations and libraries throughout Indonesia and this has made them very popular among large segments of Indonesian Muslim society, including Sunni and Shi‘i scholars. Their popularity is indicated by the fact that they are frequently, if not always, referred to when Sunni Muslims in the country discuss Shi‘ism. The front cover of Zahir’s Syiah dan Sunnah states: “Buku ini Dibagikan dengan Cuma-Cuma Tidak Untuk Diperjualbelikan” (This book is distributed for free, Not for sale). This indicates an absence of commercial interest in the publication of these books. In fact, an introductory note by the translator Bey Arifin to his book Shi‘ism and Sunnism, (1984), suggests that the Muslim World League, a Saudi-based organisation, promoted and financed the translation and publication of the books: “The Muslim World League Centre in Mecca al-Mukarrama with its letter no.1/6/16 on 23 Safar 1404H through the Muslim World League Office in Jakarta with its letter no.133/VII/1404 on 8 December 1983 requested me to translate the book al-Shi‘a wa al-Sunna into Indonesian.”
Even though there is as yet no quantitative data on the Indonesian versions of Arabic anti-Shi‘i works, we can assume that the number has increased since the 1980s. However, they are still no match for the plethora of Shi‘i works. To mention but a few of the most popular in Indonesia: Muhammad Malullah’s Syiah dan Pemalsuan Al-Qur’an (‘Shi‘ism and Falsification of the Qur’an’) published in 1982 by Pustaka Mantik in Jakarta, Muhammad al-Tunsawi’s Beberapa Kekeliruan Akidah Syi‘ah (‘Several Mistakes of Shi‘i Doctrine’) and Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi’s Dua Wajah Saling Menentang antara Ahlu Sunnah dan Syi‘ah (‘Two Opposing Faces between Sunnism and Shi‘ism’), both published by Bina Ilmu, Surabaya in 1984 and 1987 respectively. The tendency continues today with different types of publications, from brochures to voluminous works, and with different tones, from provocative to more moderate. The most important of which might be As-Salus’s Ensiklopedi Sunnah-Syiah (‘Sunni-Shi‘i Encyclopaedia’), originally consisting of four volumes of Arabic work. The encyclopaedia was praised by Muhammad Hidayat Nurwahid, the current spokesman of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly and prominent leader of PKS, in his introductory notes to the publication. Hidayat Nurwahid, who is known to have a negative attitude towards Shi‘ism, claims that this book is a “serious and scientific work, which can fulfil the scarcity of authoritative literature on Shi‘ism.”
A recently translated work, Al-Buhairi’s Gen Syi‘ah (‘Gene of Shi‘ism’, 2001), is probably the most provocative of the anti-Shi‘i works published in Indonesia.
The author, who is motivated by his strong anti-Shi‘i attitude, came from Mecca to Indonesia looking for a translator for his work.
Al-Buhairi has good connections with the reformist organisation Al-Irsyad.
Furthermore, as he admits, his motivation for writing the book was his personal experiences of the existence of Shi‘is in India and Indonesia.
Al-Buhairi invites, or even challenges, Sunni scholars to hold a dialogue or debate with their Shi‘i counterparts and he has even offered to cover any expenses that such an event incurred.
Significantly, the translation of Al-Buhairi’s book is the only publication to have been criticised by Indonesian Shi‘is. For example, the book is heavily criticised on the website of the Fatimah Foundation.
Thus its contents warrant further review. The content of the book is summarised by the translator in his introductory notes as follows:
Shi‘ism was bred by Jews, raised by Zoroastrians, supported by Christians and Hindus, contributed by Romans and Greeks, and financed by colonisers. Led by the liars or ignoramuses. Metaphorically, Shi‘ism is a name of cake of which the ingredients consist of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Rome and Greek religion.
Another finding is that Shi‘ism and lie are inseparable like twin. Lying is compulsory for Shi‘is, paradise can only be gained by lies whilst hell is gained by a frank, just, and honest attitude.
The Shi‘i is a collection of stupid people, seen from the spectacles of the Qur’an and Tradition of the Messenger of God (may God grant him peace and salvation). They, says Ustadh Mamduh, are Baqarun bila Qurun (cows without horns), meaning man’s head but cow’s brain.
None of such works contain positive or even moderate views on Shi‘ism. Two general, but related, points can be drawn from their content. Firstly, emphasis is placed on controversies between the two madhhab, but with no intention of providing rapprochement. Secondly, the main issues of these controversies remain the same as those of past disputes. Ende correctly subsumes the interrelated topics on which the Sunni interpretation disagrees with Shi‘ism including: 1) the Qur’an, Shi‘i interpretation, and alleged distortion (tahrif) of its text, 2) the authenticity and Shi‘i view of hadith, 3) the Shi‘i view of the Prophet’s companions, 4) the history and Shi‘i concept of imamate, 5) certain legal norms, in particular mut‘a (temporary marriage), 6) the Shi‘i teaching of taqiyya, and 7) certain Shi‘i religious rituals.
The same topics of controversy have also coloured the books written by Indonesian anti-Shi‘i authors whose interpretations rely heavily on the mentioned Sunni polemical works.
The reformist groups not only publish translated works but also produce their own anti-Shi‘i writings. Apart from being greatly influenced by the above-mentioned works, these writings can be considered superficial. By and large, the anti-Shi‘i works written by Indonesian Islamic scholars are articles published in reformist periodicals and booklets. A large number of articles are to be found in Al-Muslimun of Bangil; from September 1979 to January 1998 there are 32 titles of anti-Shi‘i articles published in this reformist magazine. This is the largest number among the existing Islamic periodicals. In addition, polemical works in the national media indicate the dynamic opposition to the Shi‘is in the country.
The works can be classified into two categories: a general category covering the rejection of Shi‘ism as a valid madhhab in the context of Islamic orthodoxy; and a specific category dealing with particular aspects of Sunni-Shi‘i controversies. Indonesian anti-Shi’ism publications began to appear in 1984, the year that DDII published two booklets, the institution’s Soal Syi‘ah (On Shi‘ism) and Rasjidi’s Apa Itu Syi‘ah (What is Shi‘ism), which point out false teachings of Shi’ism. It should be noted that Rasjidi, a former Minister of Religious Affairs (12 March 1946 - 2 October 1946), professor of Islamic law at the University of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah activist, Masyumi figure, and a vice chairman of DDII is one of Indonesia’s Muslim leaders who is greatly concerned about the anti-Shi‘i propagation. To borrow Azra’s term, Rasjidi was a guardian of the faith of the umma against Christianity and heterodox currents.
In the years following the Iranian revolution, Rasjidi became an active speaker at Sunni-Shi‘i discussions held around the country and produced several polemical works on the subject. Rasjidi’s booklet, which includes the circular by DEPAG as its appendix, generally deals with those topics which are sources of past Sunni-Shi‘i controversy, so it is not necessary to describe its content here. However, his conclusion is of importance as it directly relates to Islam in the Indonesian social context. Rasjidi writes:
We the Indonesian are given great blessing and true guidance with Islam by God, the Creator of the sky. We thank God that the Islam we adhere to is Sunni Islam, which is based on the existing, and the only one, Qur’an and the hadith that has been scrutinised, selected, and specified in detail by hadith scholars from Bukhari [d.870], Muslim [d.815], Abu Daud [d.889], Nasa’i [d.915], Turmudhi [d.892], until Ibn Majah [d.886].
The late Rasjidi, was a polemicist, educated in Cairo, at the Sorbonne and in Canada. In the 1970s he became involved in a polemic with Nurcholish Madjid on the idea of secularisation. Following MUI’s 1984 recommendation on Shi‘ism, Rasjidi wrote a short article entitled “a mere contribution on Shi‘ism”, which was published in Tempo
and in a slightly different version in Al-Muslimun.
The article was intended to expand on Ahmad Ghazali’s criticism of the MUI recommendation.
In it Rasjidi restated the classical Sunni description of Shi‘ism, mainly based on Zahir’s polemical works, and stressed the essential influence of Persian political culture on religious doctrines of Shi‘ism. Rasjidi - reflecting the attitude of Sunni Muslims in general and of DDII - mixed up the topics of Shi‘ism and war in the article, blaming Iran for the Iran-Iraq conflict. He concluded: “This is what I want to contribute to Indonesian Muslims. We do not hate the Shi‘is but we do not accept their doctrine that is contrary to the pure Islamic doctrine, the Sunni doctrine.”
Criticisms from Shi‘i adherents, albeit many anonymously, followed. One of the fiercest critics of Rasjidi was Agus Abubakar Arsal Al-Habsyi, who provides us with strong arguments to suggest that Rasjidi makes a number of fatal mistakes in his analysis of Shi‘i doctrines, teachings and history. Let me take one example:
In the paragraph seven it is written: “Imam in Shi‘ism means political leader...” and so on. From all Shi‘i literature that I have once read, never did I find such a definition. Or maybe Mr. Rasjidi has other references. In the Imamiyya Shi‘i understanding, an Imam has the task of carrying out the same duty as a prophet does. Like prophets, Imams are the people chosen by God through His prophet’s appointment. The only difference is that prophets receive revelation and Imams, through a special gift, receive the prophet’s commands. Thus, a prophet is God’s messenger, an Imam is prophet’s messenger.
Other critics include Ali Muchsin and Ibrahim Abdullah Assegaf who use their writings to demonstrate a number of errors and misperceptions by Rasjidi.
, (although their arguments are perhaps not as compelling as Al-Habsyi’s). Interestingly, Rasjidi only refuted the writings of Ali Muchsin and Ibrahim Assegaf, ignoring Al-Habsyi’s arguments. In his refutation, published in Al-Muslimun, Rasjidi suggests that Ali Muchsin has in fact made mistakes in his writing. Reiterating a common understanding on certain teachings of Shi‘ism, Rasjidi claims that both Assegaf and Muchsin appear not to comprehend the principal difference between Shi‘ism and Sunnism. However, Rasjidi agrees with his critics on the importance of Islamic brotherhood. Rasjidi concludes by accusing the Iranian Embassy of propagating teachings of Shi‘ism to Muslim youth in Indonesia in an unacceptable way.
The second polemical writer of anti-Shi‘i work is A. Latief Muchtar (1931-1997), the general chairman of Persis for 14 years (1983-1997), who, like other reformist Muslim leaders, had a very negative stance on Shi‘ism. His primary and secondary education was undertaken in the Persis schools. He completed his undergraduate degree in Islamic studies in Cairo and gained both a masters degree and a doctorate in the same field from the IAIN of Jakarta. Muchtar had a reputation as a well-qualified reformist scholar in the field of religious studies. His anti-Shi‘i stance is indicated by his membership of DDII and the Muslim World League. In 1986, responding to the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia, Muchtar - under the penname Abu Irfan (his first son being Irfan Setiawan) - wrote a controversial article, provocatively titled “Awas Akidah Syiah” (Beware of Shi‘i Doctrine), which was published in Risalah, the magazine of Persis in Bandung
. (Between 1986-1987 Risalah published a discourse on Shi‘ism between its opponents and proponents). Muchtar admitted that his writing was intentionally provocative, as he wanted Indonesian Muslims to be aware of the spread of Shi‘ism in their country. He emphasised that his writing should be understood in the framework of Islamic da‘wa - that is to enjoin to do good and to desist from evil (amr ma‘ruf, nahy munkar). Muchtar began his polemic by mentioning the triumph of Iranian revolution and its impact on the Shi‘is in other places, such as Lebanon, as well as on Indonesia’s Sunnis. He writes: “the extreme and radical Shi‘i movement has attracted some of the Muslim youth in Indonesia with its concept of imamate....”
He explains the origin of Shi‘ism as a consequence of political matters following the death of the Prophet Muhammad and also demonstrates the divisions within Shi‘ism. His sources were the (aforementioned) Indonesian versions of books by al-Khatib (published in 1985), Zahir (published in 1984) and al-Tunsawi’s (published in 1984), as well as Rasjidi’s booklet (published in 1984). Muchtar reiterates the common issues and arguments which strongly reject, what he considers to be, Shi‘i doctrines, including imamate, infallibility, mahdism, raj‘a (return) and taqiyya. However, I believe his uncritical method of reading the sources meant that the mistakes and misunderstandings about Shi‘ism which litter were inevitable. One of his critics, Abdi Mahaestyo Soeherman, in a no less provocatively titled article, “Syiah bukan Sampar” (Shi‘ism is not a Contagious Disease), published in the same magazine, identifies the weaknesses and misperceptions contained in Muchtar’s article and his sources, Soeherman then goes on to provide a Shi‘i version of Shi‘i teachings and history that are mainly based on contemporary Shi‘i sources. We do not have information on this person, but his writing and sources suggest that he is Shi‘i. To refute this criticism, Muchtar produce yet another long article, praising al-Khatib and Zahir and their works and re-iterating the need to fight against the Shi‘i doctrine
.
The polemics continued. Saeful Abdullah, M. Syaifullah and Muhammad Khalid were among those who lined up to advise Muchtar to check his sources, discuss his thoughts with Shi‘i ‘ulama’ or to read Shi‘i sources. Ikhwatu Iman and Ika Tanumaja, criticising the critics, offered support to Muchtar. Jalaluddin Rakhmat also became embroiled in the controversy by delivering an Indonesian translation of Mahmud Shaltut’s famous fatwa and also of Muhammad al-Ghazali’s, (the leader of Ikhwan al-Muslimun), view on the validity of observing Islamic worship according to the Twelver Shi‘ism.
Rakhmat was clearly seeking authoritative legal religious recognition from international Sunni scholars, including Shaltut who was the first to recognise Shi‘ism as a completely equal denomination. Rakhmat responds to Muchtar’s opinions on Shi‘ism in his introductory note to the publication of the collected works of Muchtar (1998). One of the most important elements in the controversy is the involvement of the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta, which issued an official statement, signed by Alireza Motevali Alamoti, the Embassy’s Second Secretary. The essential part of the text reads:
Abu Irfan’s description of Shi‘ism is his own personal beliefs and ideas which have completely no relevance to the reality of Shi‘ism.
We believe that his description of Shi‘ism mentioned above is based only on his imagination; it even appears that he does not have information as well as basic knowledge about the broad and deep Shi‘i ideology.
Included in the general category of anti- Shi‘ism works rejecting the validity of Shi‘ism, is a compilation of papers originating from an LPPI seminar in 1997. The book, Mengapa Kita Menolak Syi‘ah (Why we reject Shi‘ism), contains a collection of the seminar papers, a conclusion and recommendation, clippings from the media and several forewords from existing Islamic organisations and institutions.
The fact that MUI, Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, Al-Irsyad, Al-Khairat of Palu, DDII, Ikatan Masjid Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Mosque), and Al-Bayyinat of Surabaya endorse the book, illustrates the widespread support by Islamic organisations, (with certain exceptions), for the prevention of the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
In addition, there are two booklets written by M.O. Baabdullah
and Fuad M. Fakhruddin worthy of mention.
Baabdullah’s bi-lingual booklet (Indonesian and Arabic) regarding the fatwa and the stance of Sunni ‘ulama’ on Shi‘i doctrine is probably the more important of the two; not least because of its harsh content regarding the Shi‘i as infidel. The late Baabdullah was a famous anti-Shi‘i figure in East Java. He lived in Bangil and was affiliated to the Manarul Islam Mosque of Bangil, Al-Irsyad and also had strong ties with Saudi Arabia. Baabdullah was known to be a harsh opponent of the late Husein Al-Habsyi. Both he and Husein Al-Habsyi were Arab descendants, but Husein Al-Habsyi was a Sayyid and M.O. Baabdullah non-Sayyid. Baabdullah believed that Shi‘is are kafir (infidel), even though they pronounce the confession of faith that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger. He based his views on the fatwa and opinions of great Sunni ‘ulama’ such as Imam Malik (d. 795), Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855), Bukhari (d. 870), Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787). Baabdullah emphasised that the infidelity of the Shi‘is is clearly demonstrated in their thoughts, which are contrary to the true teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. His booklet examines the recent development of the Shi‘is, and in this regard makes two important points to support his view that Shi‘ism is a religious sect outside Islam: First, Baabdullah writes that the Shi‘i theological doctrine on the distortion of the Qur’an and a number of other false principal doctrines clearly show that the Shi‘i group of today is more evil than its predecessor. Second, he writes that the contemporary Shi‘i group has mixed up various evil and dangerous currents and follows polytheistic ways of life.
In the category of books dealing with specific issues relating to aspects of Sunni-Shi‘i controversies, there are a number of booklets which should be mentioned: There are at least two booklets dealing with the prohibition of mut‘a, one by the previously mentioned Fakhruddin
, the other written by Muhammad Sufyan Raji Abdullah.
Mut‘a appears to be the most popular topic for discussion, with at least five articles on the subject in Persis’Al-Muslimun. Aside from the texts quoted and used to reject the Shi‘i permissibility of mut‘a, the writings frequently allege dangerous consequences of the practice, including the high rate of babies born without being acknowledged by their father and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV-Aids. In addition, there are other booklets concerning imamate, history of the Prophet’s companions, tafsir and hadith. Most of these anti-Shi‘i works criticise the growing number of works by Indonesian Shi‘i intellectuals. In the field of Islamic history, Saleh Nahdi criticises Hashem’s Saqifah, re-iterating the idea that the event of saqifa - the designation of Abu Bakr as the first caliph succeeding the Prophet Muhammad - was the origin of unity in the umma. In the field of tafsir, Ja‘far Umar Thalib
criticises Husein Al-Habsyi
re-asserting that the Prophet did frown; and in the field of hadith, Husnan responds to a chapter of Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s Islam Aktual. There are also a number of articles published in Al-Muslimun reacting to the works of these Shi‘i writers: Abu Hanifah’s critique of Hashem’s Saqifah,
Ibnu Mursyid’s critique of Husein Al-Habsyi’s tafsir,
and Hasyim Manan’s criticique of Rakhmat’s Islam Aktual.
In general, these polemical writings use the same arguments on the falsity of the teachings of Shi‘ism, and they all cite textual and rational proofs from Middle Eastern anti-Shi‘i works. Once more we should reiterate that publishing is a popular missionary way for anti-Shi‘i groups to defend their religious ideology and demonstrate what they believe to be the falsity of Shi‘ism.
The second means of anti-Shi‘i propagation is the organising of seminars, discussions, and debates concerning Shi‘ism and Sunni-Shi‘i relations. A large number of these activities have been organised with the purpose of opposing the spread of Shi‘i teachings. In other words, these activities are carried out in the framework of Islamic da‘wa rather than intellectual achievement. It is no exaggeration to say that Sunni-Shi‘i seminars, and other similar activities, on Islamic doctrine, history and development have become the hottest and most controversial in Indonesia. It is perhaps unsurprising then that some of these seminars - such as the one organised in 1994 in the Pesantren Darunnajah, Jakarta, in which Rasjidi and Jalaluddin Rakhmat were speakers - descended into chaos because of the high tension between the two opposing groups of participants.
Two of the most popular seminars should be examined in detail: One of the first seminars of this kind in Indonesia, (and which attracted media interest), was the “the Seminar on Islamic Doctrine” organised in Jakarta’s Hotel Indonesia on 14 January 1988, by the Middle East Alumni of Jakarta. This seminar can be seen as a counteraction to a similar activity held in Jakarta about a month earlier (8 December 1987), at which all the speakers were famous liberal thinkers and ‘enemies’ of the reformist groups, and DDII people in particular. (Speakers at this event included Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, and Abdurrahman Wahid
). In the eyes of the anti-Shi‘i group this seminar was clearly meant to contribute to the spread of Shi‘ism in the country
. The controversial anti-Shi‘i seminar in question involved three main speakers - M. Rasjidi, Ibrahim Hosen and Fuad M. Fakhruddin
- who all agreed that Shi‘ism was the main causal factor of the Iran-Iraq war. They also concurred on the danger of Shi‘ism for the Indonesian nation. In accordance with the general goal of the seminar, namely to confirm Shi‘ism as a heterodox sect in the framework of Islamic da‘wa, the participants were given four anti-Shi‘i books consisting of Indonesian translations of Middle Eastern works by Said Hawa, al-Tunsawi, al-Khatib, and Zahir.
Abdul Malik M. Aliun, chairman of the seminar’s organising committee said, “that the Middle East alumni think it necessary to correct Islamic doctrine from false streams, one of which is Shi‘ism, and we the Muslim umma need to know Shi‘ism in order not to be plunged into sin.”
The above opinion inevitably provoked angry reactions from the more moderate participants at the seminar, including Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Alwi Shihab. In addition, no less than six critics wrote articles that were published in the national magazine, Tempo, responding in particular to Fakhruddin’s statement that “‘Ali bin Abi Talib tried to fulfil his personal ambition for the caliphship and therefore he is not Islamic”. These critics, including Alwi Shihab, see that this view would be provocative to both Sunnis and Shi‘is, because of the undoubted personal quality of ‘Ali and the prohibition of discrediting one of the four rightly guided caliphs.
In his response to Alwi Shihab, Fakhruddin, who has strong anti-Shi‘i views, maintained his stand.
The most impressive anti-Shi‘i seminar took place in the hall of the Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta on 21 September 1997. It was organised by LPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, Institute of Islamic Studies and Research), in collaboration with Gema, a bulletin of Al-Irsyad. LPPI is directed by Amin Djamaluddin who claims to be a student of Natsir. As a DDII activist receiving a monthly allowance from the organisation, Djamaluddin has a vested interest in blocking the development of religious currents considered false. This also demonstrates the link between LPPI and DDII and their organisation of da‘wa activities.
The importance of this anti-Shi‘i seminar lies in its success, not only in getting several Muslim leaders, representing great Islamic organisations and institutions in the country, as speakers. (Among them was K.H. Hasan Basri (1920-1998), the then general chairman of MUI, who delivered an opening speech to the seminar) but also in attracting a large number of participants comprising state officials, military personnel, ‘ulama’, Muslim leaders, leaders of Islamic organisation and ‘ordinary’ people. This seminar was widely reported and became the source of a long-running controversy in the Indonesian media.
Amin Djamaluddin, chief of the seminar’s organising committee, stated that the seminar was conducted so that authoritative Islamic scholars could provide an explanation of the nature of Shi‘ism to the government, security authorities and other related groups, in order that they may “formulate steps to stop the action of the Shi‘i people working the land of the Sunni in Indonesia.”
To achieve this goal, the speakers invited were known anti-Shi‘i figures, including Moh. Dawam Anwar (a secretary of the Religious Advisory Council of NU), Irfan Zidny (head of the astronomy board of NU), Thohir Al-Kaff (Al-Bayyinat Foundation of Surabaya), A. Latief Muchtar (the then general chairman of Persis), Nabhan Husein (the chairman of Jakarta DDII), Muhammad Hidayat Nurwahid (the head of Al-Haramain Foundation of Jakarta and later Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), and Syu‘bah Asa (Vice-editor of Panji Masyarakat). What is very evident is that none of the speakers hold positive views on Shi‘ism. Insofar as we can understand the content of the papers presented in the seminar, no new interpretations and arguments, regarding the sources of Sunni-Shi‘i controversies, were presented. It is evident however that all the speakers have great interest in efforts to prohibit the growing spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. For example, K.H. Irfan Zidny, expresses his regret for the number of Indonesian Muslim students and intellectuals supporting or even adhering to the teachings of Shi‘ism, in spite of the fact that they only learn these teachings in a short period of time and from Indonesian Shi‘i figures who do not have a thorough knowledge of Islam. Zidny suggests that it is the duty of ‘ulama’, and leaders of Islamic organisations and institutions, to cooperate with state authorities and address the phenomenon of Shi‘ism which he believes to be dangerous to the unity of umma.
Ten of the twelve points in the seminar conclusion, formulated by the committee, reiterate those well-worn arguments contained in Sunni polemical works, including the Shi‘i view of the Qur’an that has been corrupted by the companions of the Prophet, the acceptance of hadith only through the ahl al-bayt of the Prophet, the rejection of the caliphate of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman, the practice of taqiya and mut‘a, and the belief in Imams and their infallibility.
Two particularly significant points made in the conclusion need to be noted: The first is a statement that reads “Indonesian Muslims have the responsibility and obligation to prevent various efforts of falsification and destruction of Sunni doctrines adhered to by Muslims in Indonesia.”
This claim and invitation is formulated to fulfil the goal of the seminar, namely to defend the Sunni land from the presence and spread of Shi‘ism. The second and highly provocative point made is that throughout history Shi‘is have proved to be criminals, traitors, and terrorists.
This can be considered as a libellous accusation, unless of course the committee can prove it.
Regardless of the teachings of Shi‘ism and the reality of the Shi‘is in Indonesia, the conclusion supports the ten points of recommendation formulated by the seminar committee. The recommendation formulated below is clearly intended to prohibit the existence and activities of Shi‘is in all forms:
Based on the conclusions and to protect the stability, the safety and unity of society, the Indonesian nation and state, this seminar recommends:
1. To urge the Indonesian government, in this case the Indonesian Attorney General to immediately prohibit Shi‘ism in the whole of Indonesia because, besides having caused society uneasiness, [it] is a source of destabilisation of the life of the Indonesian nation and state because it is impossible that the Shi‘i have a loyal attitude to the Indonesian government since in their teachings of Islam there is no concept of consensus but only the absolute decision from the Imam.
2. To request the Indonesian Attorney General and all related government institutions to cooperate with the MUI and the Board of Research and Development of the Department of Religious Affairs to scrutinise books containing Shi‘i views and to prohibit their distribution throughout Indonesia.
3. To urge the government cq the Minister of Justice to withdraw the license of all Shi‘i foundations or those spreading the teachings of Shi‘ism in Indonesia such as Muthahhari in Bandung, Al-Muntazar in Jakarta, Al-Jawad in Bandung, Mulla Sadra in Bogor, YAPI in Bangil, Al-Muhibbin in Probolinggo, and Al-Hadi in Pekalongan.
4. To request the government, in this case the Minister of Information to require all publishers to report and deposit examples of all their published books to the MUI to get scrutinised.
5. To remind all Islamic organisations, educational institutions (school, pesantren and university) throughout Indonesia of keeping on guard against Shi‘ism that can influence their members and students.
6. To invite the whole Indonesian Muslim society to be alert of Shi‘ism because Shi‘ism is an infidel, false, and falsifying sect.
7. To appeal to all women to avoid practising mut‘a (‘contract marriage’) that is practised and propagated by followers of Shi‘ism.
8. To appeal to all mass media (print, electronic, audio-visual) and book publishers not to spread Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
9. To appeal to the Indonesian government to prohibit activities of spreading Shi‘ism by the Iranian Embassy.
10. Specifically, to expect that LPPI immediately cooperates with MUI and Department of Religious Affairs to publish a short manual on the falsity of Shi‘ism and its principal differences from Sunnism.”
There were huge responses - both positive and negative - to this anti-Shi‘i seminar and its conclusion and recommendations. Many can be found in the letters to the editor of national newspapers and magazines. Those reacting positively to the seminar - thus negatively to Shi‘ism - expressed their appreciation of the seminar, with its emphasis on the impossibility of unity between Sunnis and Shi‘is, and doubts about the capability of Shi‘is to prove the truth of Shi‘ism.
It is clear that the authors agree with the seminar and with its content and recommendations. In contrast, those reacting negatively to the seminar offer various opinions, including that the seminar discussed questions of Shi‘ism while ignoring the contribution made by the Shi‘is to Islam. They also point to the inaccuracy of seminar’s decision, its non-proportionality and even its non-scientific character.
A Shi‘i ustadh Alwi Husein al-Muhdar, an alumnus of Al-Azhar University, provides the readers with views of contemporary Middle Eastern ‘ulama’, including Sayyid Tantawy and Yusuf Qardawi, who suggest that there are only minor differences between Sunnism and Shi‘ism.
Several more serious articles have been published in the Indonesian media in response to the seminar. The writers, generally proponents of Islamic brotherhood, include Muhammad Amin Sadik, Islah Gusmian, Masyhuri and Sihbudi who write articles questioning the relevance of seminar, suggesting it made a subjective judgement on Shi‘ism, regarded as an in absentia judgement.
It should not automatically be assumed that all the proponents of this view are Shi‘is, although clearly some of them are, including Alwi Husein. These negative responses to the seminar can be subsumed into two categories: First, those stating the irrelevance of the Seminar’s decision because it did not involve prominent Muslim intellectuals in the country, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Amien Rais. Second, those propagating the idea of unity or rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi‘is, believing that there are only minor, surmountable differences between the two madhhabs.
Among the adherents of Shi‘ism, O. Hashem has provided the most comprehensive emotional response to the seminar through his article “Jawaban Lengkap...” which was then extended to become a book entitled Syi‘ah Ditolak Syi‘ah Dicari (Shi‘ism is Rejected, Shi‘ism is Sought)
. In his response, Hashem declares strong opposition to the seminar, its conclusion and recommendations and restates Shi‘i views on classical topics that are the sources of Sunni-Shi‘i controversy. One of O. Hashem’s statements is particularly interesting: “Do not think that the Minister of Religious Affairs will join the crazy [action] to prohibit Shi‘ism. Our Minister of Religious Affairs is not a stupid person...”
In response to Hashem, Djamaluddin and Hidayat Nurwahid wrote an article demonstrating what they saw as the weakness of Hashem’s arguments from a Sunni perspective. On the above statement, Djamaluddin writes: “... according to us, it is not that the person who prohibits Shi‘ism who is crazy but it is exactly the person who defend Shi‘ism who is crazy.”
Djamaluddin ends his writing by emphasising that “Shi‘ism is false, falsifying, and a sect of infidels.”
Again it is significant to note the involvement of the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta in these discussions of the anti-Shi‘i seminar. Via its Social Relations Division, the Embassy issued a statement making the point that these accusations regarding Shi‘ism are not based on the reality of Shi‘ism
. Of the nine points presented by the Embassy, three need mentioning: First, it states that the intent of the committee and speakers at the seminar was to destroy national stability and unity, as well as the international image of Indonesia as a pluralistic and tolerant society. The second item is directed to a point in the seminar’s conclusion stating: “the Constitution of Iran decides that the official religion of Iran is Islam which is the Ja‘fari Ithna ‘ashariyya school of Islam....”. In response, the Embassy points out: “the choice of ideology is a legal right of each nation. For us, such a statement has the same meaning as interference in internal affairs of other nations”. Thirdly, the Embassy statement deals with the accusation that Shi‘is are terrorists and criminals, (as mentioned in point 12 of the seminar conclusion). The Embassy suggests that this is simply repeating the propaganda of Zionist and certain arrogant countries.
Amin Djamaluddin not afraid to speak out. As the chief organiser of the seminar and head of LPPI, he provided both emphasis and explanation in his refutation to the Iranian Embassy.
Djamaluddin affirms that the seminar was conducted as an Islamic da‘wa provided for Indonesian Muslims, pointing out that involving Iran in any discussions and/or move to prohibit the presence of Shi‘is in Indonesia is unavoidable simply because the majority of Iranians are Shi‘is. However he denies that this amounts to interference in Iran’s internal affairs. What’s more, he even accuses Iran, through its Embassy, of interfering in the pluralistic religious life of the Indonesian nation which is “to be destroyed through the Shi‘i religion, strategically and systematically”..Some of Djamaluddin’s explanations simply restate the controversial topics and should not be described here. The controversy was never solved, but did eventually die down over time. Suffice it to say that seminar has been used as a vehicle of anti-Shi‘i propagation in Indonesia.
The third method of anti-Shi‘i propagation is to make an appeal to the Indonesian government. A clear-cut example is the anti-Shi‘i group’s approach to the government asking for the realisation of the LPPI seminar recommendations. About a month after the seminar had taken place, LPPI wrote a letter,(signed on 17 October 1997), requesting that the government - in this case the Attorney General, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Education and Culture, and the Minister of Religious Affairs - forbid the existence of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. The group also called a press conference, after which 15 Islamic leaders - including the LPPI director, Amin Djamaluddin and speakers from the seminar - went to the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Religious Affairs to present the same request.
In the previous year, LPPI had also sent the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General, and the chairman of MUI a similar appeal for the prohibition of Shi‘i Islam in the country. The Indonesian government failed to respond to either request.
As previously mentioned, Al-Irsyad also made a similar approach to government in 1996.
The struggle for the prohibition of Shi‘ism in Indonesia continued. It became particularly strong following MUI’s issuance of the fatwa prohibiting the practice of mut‘a. Working towards its goal of ridding Indonesia of Shi‘ism, LPPI distributed a leaflet
and urged MUI to issue a fatwa on the falsity of Shi‘ism and the prohibition of its spread in Indonesia.
Despite the request, MUI did not issue the fatwa, stating that its 1984 recommendation was sufficient.
Similar actions took place in other parts of the country, particularly in those places where major Shi‘i institutions are located. The Association of Middle East Alumni of Madura copied the steps of LPPI in its attempts to prohibit Shi‘ism. In 1992, in Pekalongan, Central Java, where the Pesantren Al-Hadi is situated, Sunni groups made a resolution on Shi‘ism containing four demands: First, for the Pesantren Al-Hadi to cease all activities; second, to bring Ahmad Baragbah, the leader of Al-Hadi, before the court as he has organised unlawful marriages; third, to watch and prohibit all Shi‘i activities in Pekalongan; and fourth, to call on the central government to declare, via its GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad Outlines of the Nation’s Direction), that the only form of Islam recognised by the state is ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a. The resolution was delivered to the mayor of Pekalongan and the district People’s Representative Council.
The fourth method used by anti-Shi‘i supporters to protect Muslims from the influence of Shi‘ism is conventional preaching (tabligh) in religious gatherings (pengajian). In this regard, we find, or are told, that anti-Shi‘i figures throughout the country include the falsity of Shi‘ism as a topic in their sermons at mosques or other places. Wisananingrum reported her experiences in 1991 when she witnessed a leader of MUI delivering a religious sermon about the falsity of Shi‘ism at the Al-Muslimun Mosque in Bandung. She believes such actions to be a part of the anti-Shi‘i propagation aimed at getting the Muslim community to reject the teachings of Shi‘ism.
A number of anti-Shi‘i sermons were also carried out at the DDII mosque in Jakarta. Further, similar sermons are widely disseminated though radio stations such as At-Thohiriyah FM in Jakarta, who produced a programme about ‘false currents’, presented by a journalist, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, who is also an activist for DDII and LPPI.
There are many other examples, too numerous to be mentioned, however a Sunni religious gathering in Bangil in 1993 is worthy of note. It is also an important case in that it reveals the religious tensions between Sunni and Shi‘i groups in Indonesia. It was called the religious gathering of ahl al-Sunna, and consisted of elements of NU, Persis, Muhammadiyah and the Al-Bayyinat Foundation, and was attended by hundreds of participants. In this forum, the group not only learned the teachings of Sunnism but also criticised the teachings of Shi‘ism. This gathering was undertaken as a response to the religious gathering of ahl al-Bayt, which was headed by Zahir Yahya (Husein Al-Habsyi’s son-in-law) and Ali Al-Habsyi (his son).
It is important to bear in mind that religious preaching is the most common and widespread means of anti-Shi‘i propagation in the country.
The four ways of anti-Shi‘i propagation are directed at all segments of the community and state, the laity and elite. They include both cultural and structural approaches. In the eyes of the anti-Shi‘i group, not only are the community members to be protected from the influence of Shi‘i teachings but the Indonesian government is expected to take a decision on the prohibition of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. So far it has not possible to examine the effectiveness of anti-Shi‘i propagation by means of publication, seminar, and religious preaching, but clearly the structural approach to the government has failed, with the notable exception of the city of Mataram in West Nusa Tenggara. In June 2003, the mayor of Mataram issued an instruction for the prohibition of Shi‘ism in the city. The instruction stated that Shi‘ism may not be distributed to the Sunni groups.
The prohibition led not only to disappointment from the Shi‘i followers in Mataram but also negative reactions from members of Mataram’s society.
The attempts by the Sunni reformist group to protect the Sunni community from the influence of Shi‘ism and to prohibit the existence of Shi‘ism in the country inevitably leads to high tensions between the two groups. Shi‘i figures in Indonesia recount many bitter experiences in the face of negative reactions from the anti-Shi‘i group. The reactions are directed not only to individuals but also to institutions, and they vary in their severity. One example of an individual experience occurred in 1996. Ali Hasan, a teacher at a junior high school and a religious teacher at his house in Sragen, Central Java, was imprisoned for three and a half years after being accused of having illegal sexual relations with three girls. These sexual relations were said to be based on mut‘a.
Ali, supported by a number of his students, denied the accusations and stated that his trial had been a joke (dagelan). He believed that his arrest had been a way to stop the religious gatherings at his house which had become increasingly popular.
There are also examples of destructive anti-Shi‘i actions which have coloured Sunni-Shi‘i relations. The burning down of the branch of Pesantren Al-Hadi in Batang, Central Java, in April 2000, is an extreme case in point. It is said that the building and facilities of the pesantren were burnt down and destroyed by a large number of people, intent on putting a stop to its activities. In fact, before the tragedy occurred the regent of Batang and the district attorney apparatus had issued instructions to stop teaching activities at the pesantren. In the eyes of the pesantren, this was a result of efforts by the anti-Shi‘i group to influence the authority. The pesantren had plans to bring the case to the court, but during this judicial process the tragedy took place.
This case is evidence that, anti-Shi‘i propagation in response to the spread of Shi‘ism has also involved the destruction of Shi‘i institutions, in the name of religious belief and Islamic da‘wa.
E. The Moderate Response of Muslim Intellectuals
Amidst the growing efforts of the anti-Shi‘i movement in Indonesia, which is supported by many Islamic leaders, the Shi‘is in the country can count a number of leading Muslim intellectuals who tend to protect the existence of the Shi‘is as a minority religious group. They include Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, all of whom are known to have moderate or sympathetic views towards Shi‘ism and its adherents. Consequently, they have been criticised by anti-Shi‘i supporters, who accuse them of providing a space for Shi‘is to propagate the teachings of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. In the eyes of their critics, these intellectuals, at least indirectly, contribute to the development of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. This idea that they have made an indirect contribution is perhaps correct. In addition, these intellectuals are accused of creating the many barriers that are faced by the anti-Shi‘i group in their struggle to prohibit the existence of Shi‘ism in the country. Given these suggestions, it is important to try to pinpoint these alleged attempts by prominent Muslim intellectuals to provide a space for the Shi‘is and Shi‘ism in Indonesia.
It is not without reason that a number of Muslim intellectuals were invited to become discussants at a seminar on the religious and political thought of Jalaluddin Rakhmat, on 30 October 1997, (held in the framework of the distribution of Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s compilation book, Catatan Kang Jalal: Visi Media, Politik, dan Pendidikan. This seminar is interesting in the context of Sunni-Shi‘i relations in Indonesia because many people saw it as the counter-seminar, based purely on the fact that Jalaluddin Rakhmat is a prominent Shi‘i leader in Indonesia. The speakers were the above-mentioned prominent intellectuals, Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais and Said Agiel Siradj (who substituted Abdurrahman Wahid), known for their moderate view of Shi‘ism. Discussions on Sunni-Shi‘i relations did arise during the seminar, and Rais, for instance, suggested that followers of both Sunnism and Shi‘ism should respect and cooperate with each other.
Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, does not provide us with extensive views on Shi‘ism in his writings or comments, but rather his general attitude is likely to correspond with his positive attitude towards the Iranian revolution. When questioned about his opinion on the LPPI’s seminar, he was apprehensive. He suggested that the Sunnis should avoid cynicism when discussing Shi‘ism, and vice versa, and that both Sunnis and Shi‘is should have a mutual respect.
He appears to avoid giving his opinion about Shi‘ism, as result neither the Shi‘i nor anti-Shi‘i groups can claim that Amien Rais is among their supporters or, indeed, a supporter of the other. That said, Rais strongly rejects Shi‘ism on the field of doctrine, in particular the immunity of Imam and Mahdism. It appears to be the political aspects of Shi‘ism, particularly the Iranian revolution, that have attracted Rais’s sympathy. Moreover, Iran’s strong opposition to the West meets with his approval. Therefore, Rais’s moderate stance to Shi‘ism has, in a way, to be understood in the framework of his political attitude towards the West. This attitude is also indicated by his links to Muhammadiyah, an organisation more concerned with educational, social and missionary activities than theological debates.
Amien Rais’s contribution to the development of Shi‘ism in the country can be seen from his translation of Ali Shari‘ati’s book into Indonesian, although it should be noted that he denies any intention to promote Shi‘i thought in Indonesia, and to expose the classical political conflict between the Sunnis and Shi‘is. In his introduction to Shari‘ati’s work, Rais writes:
Dr. Ali Shari‘ati is a Shi‘i whereas the translator is a Sunni Muslim. The motif to translate this book is not to offer fragments of Shi‘i thought in Indonesia. For the translator, the Sunni-Shi‘i difference is an old-fashioned historical legacy that has resulted in the weakness of Islamic umma as a whole. What we need to do is not to expose the past political conflict that will clearly be of no use.
Amien Rais’s sympathetic and moderate attitude to Shi‘ism has provoked challenges, particularly from the reformist Muslim group. When Rais proposed the levying of the fifth portion of income for the religious alms of professionals (zakat profesi),
he was seen to have been influenced by the Shi‘i teaching of khums (a fifth). Consequently, he was judged by many to be a disbeliever. In response, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, with whom Rais shares a very close relationship, defended Amien Rais’s view from the Shi‘i perspective.
Another criticism of Rais, this time by Mudzakkir Husein, is directed at his frequent praise of Iran while disparaging other Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia.
Rais’s attitude can also be seen in the context of his close relations with Muslim intellectuals and students, some whom happen to be adherents of Shi‘ism. Many Shi‘i figures in Indonesia have close relations with Amien Rais and when he established his political party, the National Mandate Party, he instantly gained support from this segment of Muslim society. A number of his party members successfully fought for membership of the national or regional People’s Representative Council. From this perspective, Rais’s attitude to Shi‘ism can be seen as a socially and politically motivated.
One of the most persistent defenders of Shi‘ism is the intellectual Nurcholish Madjid
, who once advised youth at the Al-Azhar mosque of Jakarta to learn about Shi‘ism - a statement that is said to have created unease with the mosque’s organisers.
In the above-mentioned seminar of 1988, when Ibrahim Hosen said that the Shi‘is have their own Qur’an, Nurcholish Madjid produced a Qur’an printed in Iran, containing Khomeini’s introductory note, showing it to the audience and stating that it was no different from the Sunni one. He emphasised that an objective and scientific attitude is required when looking at Shi‘ism.
In one of his articles, Madjid affirms that by reading the Qur’ans published by the Shi‘is, the opinion, or even accusation, that the Shi‘is have a different Qur’an to the Sunni’s is invalidated.
Commenting on the seminar, he said he was upset because the three main speakers denounced the Shi‘is, creating dissension rather than peace within Muslim society. Madjid also strongly rejected the view of speakers at the event that Shi‘ism was the main factor in the Iran-Iraq war, stating that the Sunni-Shi‘i divide has existed since the early history of Islam.
Furthermore, Madjid’s moderate view of Shi‘ism can be identified in his paper presented.
In Madjid’s view, the existence of Shi‘ism should not be considered as a religious or political problem but instead as a reality which colours Islamic history and society.
According to Madjid, the Sunnis will gain greater benefits if their intellectual interaction with Shi‘ism is open and receptive. For example, one benefit is to be found in the field of philosophy, because the philosophical tradition Shi‘ism continues to develop, while in Sunnism it tends to stagnate. Madjid emphasises that Shi‘ism appears to be better than Sunnism in inheriting and advancing the philosophical intellectual tradition.
On Sunni-Shi‘i relations, Madjid points out that each should have a mutual understanding and respect. Each should learn to recognise the other’s existence in the framework of equality and fraternity. Madjid writes:
So once again, the division of human being into groups, like Sunni and Shi‘i, is genuine, natural and unavoidable because [it] is a product of historical process that may not be erased. What is not natural, not genuine, and not accord with basic human character (fitra) is when someone or a group claims their own absolute truth, then immediately forces his or her will and view on others. This is shirk, polytheism, which is unforgivable by God.
Madjid also reiterates his view on the need to develop a non-sectarian attitude - one of the basic Islamic teachings propagated by the Prophet Muhammad. The non-sectarian spirit is in accordance with the Qur’anic concept of hanif, (which refers to Abraham’s monotheistic religion
as the hanif religion).
Thus, Madjid’s moderate attitude towards Shi‘ism has a strong theological basis in Islamic tradition. The fact that he provides theological legitimacy for the need for a pluralistic attitude is an important religio-intellectual achievement, and has contributed to the religious life and development of Indonesia, (a contribution that cannot be equalled by Rais or Wahid).
Unsurprisingly, Madjid’s moderate stance is criticised by anti-Shi‘i people, such as Syu‘bah Asa, who accuse him of contributing to the spread of Shi‘ism in Indonesia. Madjid shares close relations with a number of Shi‘i figures, including Jalaluddin Rakhmat. This is evidenced by the fact that Jalaluddin Rakhmat was given an opportunity to present some Shi‘i teachings during a religious course organised by Madjid’s foundation, Paramadina. Asa cynically describes how Rakhmat’s religious lecture was well prepared in terms of fulfilling Madjid’s ideals of providing his audience with views different from those upheld by the majority in the country. “With all pleasure he spreads doubt about all established Islamic teachings and historical interpretation, grows su’ al-zan (specific character of the Shi‘is) in order to divide the umma image of the Prophet’s companions that is perceived by the Muslims (Sunni) as integrated totality....”
The presence of Jalaluddin Rakhmat was said to have resulted in an anti-Shi‘i element of the foundation withdrawing its support. In addition, ICAS (Islamic College for Advanced Studies), the Jakarta branch of the London-based Shi‘i institution of higher learning, has organised a Masters programme in the field of Islamic philosophy and Sufism, in cooperation with the Paramadina University.
Former Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid’s moderate attitude towards Shi‘ism is integral to his tolerance of all minority groups in the country. He uses many ways to protect the position of the Shi‘is, who are strongly opposed by the majority of Muslim leaders including those of his own organisation, NU. He focuses more on the sustainability of the Sunni community itself than on the accusations and attacks on the Shi‘i group. In July 1993, for instance, Wahid gave a speech at a thanksgiving of the Tijaniyya Order, mentioning and praising the last two Sufi saints of the 20th century, namely Muhammad Alawi al-Jaza’iri and Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. This provoked harsh reactions from certain members of the participants who opposed Wahid’s views. This was followed by a dialogue between two representatives of the Al-Bayyinat Foundation, a famous anti-Shi‘i foundation, and Abdurrahman Wahid. In the dialogue Wahid answered questions related to Sunni-Shi‘i controversies and responded to rumours that he is Shi‘i and propagates Shi‘ism in Indonesia. In addition, he advised the Al-Bayyinat representative to adopt an objective attitude and engage in a dialogue with Shi‘i leaders such as Jalaluddin Rakhmat. In turn, Al-Bayyinat told him of their concerns about the spread of Shi‘ism in particular areas of East Java and about the tensions between Sunni and Shi‘i groups. The Al-Bayyinat representative said, “there is going to be a war between the Shi‘i and Sunni.”
Al-Bayyinat also requested Wahid’s support for its action against the propagation of Shi‘ism being organised by Husein Al-Habsyi in Bangil, East Java. The transcript below shows how Wahid coped with the not insignificant pressure, (threats even) to support their cause:
AB
: Indeed, we already have reacted in a positive manner. But they (Ustadz Husein and his son-in law) do not care for our call [not to spread Shi‘ism]. Therefore, there still are religious gatherings of ahl al-bayt and ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a. Even, we have cooperated with the military authorities. We have given them the data on them. We got the data because we smuggled our people to their place. They pretended to study there. We cooperate with the military in order that they fear.
GD: (Listening to the explanation Gus Dur looked sad and shed tears), abki akhi, abki akhi, abki akhi (I am crying, my brother; I am crying, my brother; I am crying, my brother). To solve religious problems, why did you cooperate with the military authorities? You have even given the data to the authorities. This is the same as that you want to kill our own brothers. It is like in the Dutch colonial era when many ‘ulama’ died because of action of their own brothers.
AB: Well, what else can we do? If [faced] with the military authorities they will fear.
GD: Do you think that using the military authorities will solve the problem. Solve it well, internally. I think it can [be solved]. As well, we can, for example, publish books. We list the teachings of Shi‘ism that we consider deviating. Then, below it we write the true teachings. And in writing this down a scientific and simple language should be used.
AB: If just through writings it cannot [work] Abuna [our father]...
GD: Who say so? In the era of Imam al-Ghazali the development of Shi‘ism was even greater but with only one book the Shi‘is were already confused. Coping with Shi‘ism in your way is like killing cockroaches with a bombardment. It does not reach the target. Therefore, it needs good strategy.
Abdurrahman Wahid, in his attempt to protect the Shi‘is, believes that some cultural aspects of Shi‘ism are actually already practiced by NU. For example, according to Wahid, referring to a prayer of adoration widely practiced among NU members, NU shows loving devotion to the ahl al-bayt comprising five people: the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Ali, Fatima, Hassan and Husayn. This is similar to the concept adopted by Shi‘is. The supplication reads: li khamsatun utfi biha har al-waba’ al-hatima, al-Mustafa wa al-Murtada wa ibnahuma wa Fatima (I have five persons with whom I extinguish the ‘heat’ of crushing disease, the Prophet, ‘Ali, Hasan, Husayn, and Fatima). For Wahid, it is not unnatural to take on this Shi‘i view, as the Shi‘is also adopted many aspects of the Sunni tradition.
However, it is important to make it clear that NU does not take on Shi‘i doctrine.
Another indication of Abdurrahman Wahid’s sympathetic attitude towards Shi‘ism is his providing an opportunity for Shi‘i figures to present their views before NU figures. Jalaluddin Rakhmat, for instance, became one of the speakers in a training programme for young ‘ulama’ called the Programme for the Developing of ‘Ulama’ Vision (Program Pengembangan Wawasan Keulamaan, abbreviated PPWK),which lasted one year (1995-1996). Moreover, in 1993 he not only allowed the Shi‘i group, Forum Silaturrahmi Ahlul Bait, to commemorate the ritual of ‘ashura in the Al-Munawwarah Mosque in Ciganjur next to his house but also delivered the opening speech at the commemoration
. In this speech, Wahid states: “Frankly, the Sunni has even to learn much from brothers from the Shi‘i madhhab. Why? Because the Shi‘i madhhab is never interrupted in the philosophical tradition.”
Consequently, Wahid has been accused of promoting Shi‘ism. In response to his critics, Wahid reiterates that the Shi‘is should not be regarded as an enemy.
Greg Barton gives four reasons for Abdurrahman Wahid’s support of the Shi‘is: First, by nature Wahid tends to help wronged and oppressed minorities. Second, he opposes anything that impinges the freedom of faith and principle. Third, for Wahid, all Muslim intellectuals can profit from delving into Shi‘i scholarship and its on-going tradition of ijtihad and metaphysical philosophy. Fourth, he argues that many NU rituals and approaches to Sufism are actually rooted in Persian Shi‘ism, and therefore NU scholars are advised to understand Shi‘i Islam in order that they can understand the nature of Sunni Indonesian Islamic traditionalism.
The moderate attitude of the Muslim intellectuals can also be seen in their criticism of the anti-Shi‘i seminar of 1997. Abdurrahman Wahid, for instance, regards the seminar as ‘kurang kerjaan’ (‘not enough work’). He says that it produced subjective judgements without intellectual honesty, judging Shi‘ism in absentia. He states that Muslims should unite in order to solve crucial problems. He goes on: “The Shi‘is are Muslim as well. They have the right to live. If the government prohibits [Shi’ism] I will demonstrate.”
This is a powerful statement in support of the existence of the Shi‘is, and through which the Shi‘is become more aware of Abdurrahman Wahid’s protection. In this regard, even though Wahid does not have the same close relations with Shi‘i figures as Rais and Madjid do, his position as a charismatic leader of the largest Islamic organisation is considered strategically important for the existence and development of the Shi‘is in Indonesia.
The most significant impact of Abdurrahman Wahid’s moderate attitude with respect to the struggle of the Shi‘is in Indonesia, came in 2000, (when Wahid was President of Indonesia) in the form of the government’s recognition of the national Shi‘i organisation, IJABI. The Shi‘i leaders recognise, (and exploited) this period as the best opportunity for them to strive for the national recognition. The legal recognition is extremely important for the existence of the Shi‘is, allowing this Islamic group to carry out social, educational, and missionary activities, under the auspices of IJABI. Not only Wahid but also Rais and Madjid supported the establishment of the national Shi‘i organisation, and Madjid was a speaker at the second national conference of IJABI on 27-29 February 2004, before an audience of hundreds of Shi‘is from all over Indonesia.
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Author: Zulkifli
