Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

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Jesus as Kalimat Allah

[The Word of God]

Author(s): Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen

www.alhassanain.org/english

This text explains why Jesus, peace be upon him is named Kalimat Allah, the Word of Allah. It also goes to explain the notions of people of the Book and the gospels (Injeel).

Notice:

This version is published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english

The composing errors are not corrected.

Table of Contents

Abstract 6

[Preface] 7

‘Allamah Tabataba’i (1904-1981) 9

Al-Mizan 10

Interpretations of the “Word of God” 11

The Angel Gabriel 16

Kalam 17

Gospel 18

The Good News and the Kingdom in the Qur’an 22

Conclusion 24

References 25

Notes 27

Abstract

In His Name, Exalted

In all probability, the Book of the Christians who were addressed by God in the Qur’an and described as“People of the Book” was of the genre of ancient biography, and the divine book that is the revelation God sent to Jesus was never published as a text of what God said to him. If the revelation given to Jesus was conveyed to his followers through his life, in word and deed, this would explain the use of the term Injil in the Qur’an for both the divine revelation and for the gospels used by the Christians.

Both could be called Injil because the gospels tell the story of the life that expressed the divine revelation given to Jesus. This would also help to explain why Jesus is given a title,Word of God , that would otherwise seem to signify revelation. Furthermore, it is consistent with the traditional interpretation of the exegetes of the Qur’an, according to which Jesus is the Word of God because his mother, Mary ع became pregnant due to God’s command which resulted in the virgin birth. It also explains why the divine command by which Mary became pregnant is conveyed by the angel of revelation, Gabriel. The divine word that became Jesus, on the interpretation suggested here, is not merely a creative word, but also a word of revelation.

Keywords: Jesus, Mary, Gospel, Injil, revelation, Gabriel, Allamah Tabataba’i, al-Mizan.

*****

[Preface]

In the Qur’an, Jesus, peace be with him1 , is calledKalimat Allah , the“Word of God,” or rather, to be more precise, he is referred to askalimatin min Allah “a Word from God.” Angels called out to Zachariah:

“Allah gives you the good news of John, as a confirmer of a Word from God, eminent and chaste, a prophet, among the righteous.” (3:39)

A few verses later comes the Islamic annunciation, when the angels said:

“O Mary, Allah gives you the good news of a Word from Him, whose name is Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, distinguished in the world and the hereafter, and one of those brought near [to Allah]. He will speak to people in the cradle and in adulthood and will be one of the righteous.” She said, “My Lord! How shall I have a child seeing that no man has ever touched me?” He said, “So it is that Allah creates whatever He wishes. When He decides on a matter He just says “Be!” and it is. And He will teach him the book and wisdom, the Torah, and the Injil (gospel). (3:45- 48) 2

The Christians are admonished against the deification of Jesus in another verse:

“The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only an apostle of Allah, and His Word that He cast toward Mary and a spirit from Him.” (4:171).

Jesus is also called a qawl al-Haqq, “a saying of the Truth,” where al-Haqq, “the Truth” means God:

“That is Jesus, son of Mary, a Saying of the Truth, concerning whom they are in doubt.” (19:34)

The term used is kalimah, meaning “word”, derived from the root klm, from which is also derived kallama (he spoke) and kalām (speech, speaking). All of these terms are used with respect to divine speech in the Qur’an. Although there is no reference to Jesus in the Qur’an that specifically uses the phrase the word of God (al-kalimah Allah), we may be justified in the assertion that God calls Jesus the Word of God in the Qur’an because the expressions mentioned above, e.g., kalimatin min Allah (a word from God) and kalimatuhu (His word), are used exclusively for Jesus among all human beings.

There is no other prophet or any other human being given the title by which Allah honors Jesus as His word; so, in this sense, we can say that Jesus is the Word of God according to the Qur’an. Nevertheless, the words of God are many, and we can understand the designation given to Jesus better if we consider other verses of the Qur’an in which similar phrases are used. Sometimes Kalimah is used for the words spoken by God to Adam3 , Abraham4 , and other “servants” of God5 , including Mary6 (peace be with all of them), and His prophets7 .Sometime what is meant by the word of God is more general, the command of God, or the divine message:

“…He made the word of the faithless the lowest; and the word of Allah is the highest…” (9:40);

“and If all the trees on the earth were pens, and the sea replenished with seven more seas [were ink], the words of Allah would not be spent. (31:27).

The exegetes (mufassirin) of the Qur’an have disputed the question of why Jesus is called “Word of God.” Generally, they agree (explicitly or implicitly) that the term is not to be understood as the Logos in the Christian sense. However, according to some exegetes, including Allamah Tabataba’i, there is an important connection between the “Word of God” as a title for the Messiah, and the creative word of God; not because Jesus as Logos plays any part in creation, but because Jesus is directly created by the command of God without the mediation of a father. This view is in agreement with most of the commentators, both Shi’i and Sunni, as well as Western scholarship8

In what follows, I will take the liberty of criticizing some of the views expressed in Tabataba’i’s interpretation of the Qur’an, Al-Mizan. Before doing so, a few words may be permitted about this work and its author.

‘Allamah Tabataba’i (1904-1981)

Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i was born in a village near Tabriz in 19049 . He came to Qom in 1946 after the Soviets invaded Azerbaijan. He had already begun work on exegesis of the Qur’an, which, he reports, the clerics of Qom considered unworthy of the efforts of anyone capable of the study of Islamic law. Nevertheless, he began teaching the exegesis of the Qur’an soon after his arrival in Qom. While in Qom, he also taught philosophy and authored several books and articles on the subject.

He was also deeply involved in practical and theoretical mysticism.10 Islamic mysticism is usually known as Sufism, and one enters into its study, as a rule, under the direction of a guide who is linked by a succession of teachers that starts with the Prophetص and his son-in-law, Ali. Directed training in the spiritual path is often organized into specific Sufi orders. Sometimes instead of the term tasawwuf (Sufism), ‘irfan (gnosis) is used.

Some authors use tasawwuf for practical mysticism and ‘irfan for theoretical mysticism. In the case of ‘Allamah Tabataba’i, we can find more influence of the Sufi tradition in his philosophical work11 than in his exegesis of the Qur’an.

He also studied the esoteric sciences of numerology and He is called ‘Allamah, which is a title of respect derived from ‘ilm, “knowledge”, and indicating great learning.

He was reputed for his simple living, his deep piety, his mysticism, and for his work in Islamic philosophy and, of course, the exegesis of the Qur’an. Many of his students have become famous scholars in their own right, and his stamp on the understanding of Islam in the Shi’ite world today is indelible. He may be considered the father of contemporary Islamic philosophy, and the reviver of the science of exegesis of his day. Whatever criticism of his views is expressed here should be taken as tribute rather than complaint.

Al-Mizan

The name al-Mizan, means “the scale” and the full title of the work is Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, “The Scale in Exegesis of the Qur’an”. It was begun in 1954 and was completed in 1972. Since ‘Allamah was not teaching and studying Islamic law, he was not receiving the stipend that is normally given to those who study in Qom; and, as a result, he lived in poverty. He was paid a small amount for each volume of Al-Mizan as it appeared, and otherwise lived on money from the sale of a small plot of land.

A former student reports12 that he said he preferred the small amount he earned to asking for the stipend. He wrote out the first draft of each section of the commentary without the dots of the Arabic script, and so, in a kind of shorthand. Then he would go back over it, make slight revisions and add the dots. When asked why he used this method, he said that in this manner he could write eleven pages in the time it would otherwise take to write ten.

Once he was visited by someone who claimed to have the ability to contact the spirits of the dead, who was directed to ‘Allamah by the spirit of Aristotle, who advised the medium to study the Asfar of Mulla Sadra with ‘Allamah.

The students present asked the medium to contact other famous scholars to ask about difficult points in their books and were impressed by the answers they were given. ‘Allamah asked the medium to try to contact his father and ask whether he was satisfied with his son. The medium told ‘Allamah that his father’s only complaint was that he did not share in the blessings due for writing Al-Mizan. ‘Allamah said that he had not thought that the work merited any blessings but that he would offer half of them for his father and the other half for his mother.

After that it was reported that his father was completely satisfied with him. Al-Mizan was written, in part, as a rebuttal to the sort of modernism espoused by Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida in their Al-Manar;13 but ‘Allamah does not advocate a return to tradition. Traditional exegesis often consisted in the collection of narrations pertinent to each verse of the Qur’an, some of which went so far as to exclude any intrusion of the compiler’s own words.

Other interpretations were written that reflected a particular position in kalam (scholastic theology), or the orientation of the Sufis. Instead of interpreting the Qur’an through the lens of some particular theological position, or letting narrations stand in place of interpretation, ‘Allamah proposes that cross references in the Qur’an should be the key to interpretation.

However, in addition to the formal exegesis of each verse, or rather, ayah (sign) of the Qur’an, or group thereof, the relevant narrations attributed to the Prophet and Imams are given, followed by discussions of philosophical, social, or historical questions pertinent to this section of the Qur’an.

Interpretations of the “Word of God”

Tabataba’i considers four interpretations that might be given for“Word of God” in (3:45) . He rejects the first three and accepts the fourth. The reasons given by Tabataba’i in this regard are worth further critical examination.

The first interpretation is to take “Word of God” to mean something like “God’s promise”. Jesus may have been called the “Word of God” because he was a fulfillment of God’s promise. Tabataba’i rejects this interpretation rather quickly. First, he claims that although this interpretation is supported by the Bible, it is not supported by the Qur’an. This implies that the support of the Bible is not sufficient to confirm the interpretation. It is not clear why this should be so, for even given the doctrine that the Bible has been corrupted (tahrif), there should be a presumption that Biblical evidence is sound unless it conflicts with the Qur’an or well-founded hadiths.

Furthermore, if the Biblical promise of the Messiah is taken to be derived from those parts of the Bible that have been corrupted, it would mean that almost the entire Bible should be rejected, and this is inconsistent with the reliance on the Bible for evidence that is found in various Islamic narrations.

‘Allamah himself, when considering the different meanings that have been given for the word Messiah rejects some of those commonly given by other exegetes, e.g., that he was wiped clean from sin, or that Gabriel wiped him with his wings, in favor of the view that it means one anointed with oil to be king, in accordance with the prophecies of the Old Testament, and he cites the gospel of Luke (1:28-33) in support. If we are willing to use this passage to provide a proper understanding of the word masih (Messiah) as it occurs in the Qur’an, we can also refer to its mentioning that Jesus would be given the throne of David and rule over the house of Jacob as a reference to his being a fulfillment of the prophecies.

Tabataba’i claims that according to the Qur’an (61:6), Jesus brought the good news of a prophet who would come after him and “he was not the one whose good news was given by the others.” However, the good news of the coming of Jesus was given to Imran, according to the Qur’an, albeit implicitly. According to narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt14 , Imran was given the good news of the coming of a boy, which led to the surprise reported in the Qur’an at the birth of Mary (3:36). So, with all due respect, it seems that the fact that Jesus brought the good news of Ahmad ص is in no way inconsistent with the Biblical claim that others also brought the good news of his coming, but rather the fact that at least some were given the good news of the coming of Jesus is confirmed by the Qur’an.

Tabataba’i also mentions another argument against this interpretation, that Jesus is the Word of God in the sense of being His promise. According to this interpretation, the “Word of God” means His promise, while it is Jesus himself who is called the “Word of God” and not merely the fact of his coming.

This begs the question against the interpretation, which claims that by a figure of speech the term used for the promise of his coming is applied to the person of whom it was promised that he would come. Despite these criticisms, it seems that Jesus is not called the “Word of God” because he is the fulfillment of God’s promise, for other prophets were also promised by God and yet are not given this title. It the Qur’an meant to single out Jesus as being the fulfillment of a divine promise in an especially pronounced manner, we should expect mention of this feature to figure in the Qur’an more saliently than it does. However, this does not mean that the term “Word of God” lacks the sense, as one meaning among others, of being what was promised.

Similarly, if several people in a tribe have an aquiline nose, one of them might be called “the eagle” because of his keen eyesight, but in conjunction with the shape of the nose, so that both associations are called forth when the term is applied. In some cases, the associations may both be so strong that the person would not have been given the appellation if either of them were absent; but in other cases one of the associations might be weaker. I would venture to guess that in the case of Jesus, the association with the divine promise is part of the meaning of “Word of God”, although the association is not so strong that he would not have been given the title if his coming had not been prophesied.

The second interpretation considered by Tabataba’i is that Jesus was called the “Word of God” because he explained the Torah, giving it the meaning intended by God, and clarifying the religious matters about which there were differences among the Jewish scholars. Tabataba’i rejects this interpretation with the remark that it is simply not supported by the Qur’an. Nevertheless, he himself cites the following ayah:

“When Jesus brought the clarifications, he said, “I have surely brought you wisdom, and to clarify for you some of the things about which you differ. So be wary of God and obey me.” (43:63).

So, why is Jesus not the Word of God in the sense of being the bringer of God’s revelations? One reason is that all the prophets brought revelations, and yet the term “Word of God” is only applied to Jesus. As argued above, the fact that a term could be used in a certain sense for several people but is used for only one of them does not imply that this common meaning is not part of the intended meaning. Of course, there should still be some reason for the distinction.

Later, I will suggest a possibility for such distinction. Perhaps a reason Tabataba’i says that this interpretation is not supported by the Qur’an is that in the places in which Jesus is called God’s Word, special attention is given to affirm that Jesus was a humble servant of God and should not be deified. The points that the Qur’an seems to emphasize are that Jesus works miracles by the permission of God, his birth was miraculous by God’s will, and that he was rejected by the people to whom God sent him just as other prophets were rejected. Furthermore, the creative word “Be” pronounced by God to bring about the conception of Jesus is found repeatedly.

All of this might seem to show that the textual support of the Qur’an favors the view that Jesus is called the “Word of God” because he is brought into being directly by the divine command and is born of a virgin. Nevertheless, the considerations that favor interpreting “Word of God” to mean God’s creative word only rule out the interpretation of “Word of God” as meaning one who brings revelation if the two are incompatible. We can go further to agree with Tabataba’i that if the creative and revelatory meanings are incompatible, a stronger case can be made for the former on the basis of the text of the Qur’an itself. As mentioned, we will have to examine this sort of interpretation more closely later.

The third interpretation mentioned by “Allamah is that the Word of God is the promise given by God to Mary in the annunciation. It is clear, however, Jesusis not the annunciation, and so Tabataba’i rejects this interpretation as obviously incorrect. However, the third interpretation might be interpreted metaphorically in the manner of the first proposed interpretation. Jesus could be understood to be God’s word in the sense of being what was promised through revelation to the Hebrew prophets, ‘Imran, and to Mary in the annunciation. In that case, the third interpretation should be considered to be included in the first.

There is no reason based on the text of the Qur’an to think that Jesus might be called the “Word of God” in the sense of the annunciation to the exclusion of the divine promise of his advent given to others, but the sense of the annunciation can be included in the more general meaning of being what was promised by God. Hence there are three main interpretations reviewed by Tabataba’i that might be called promissory, revelatory, and creative. ‘Allamah argues in favor of the creative interpretation and rejects the others. To the contrary, I would suggest that all three are consistent.

As for the creative sense, Tabataba’i simply states that although everything is brought into existence through God’s creative word, “Be!”, this normally occurs through the usual natural mediating causes. In the case of Jesus, however, the virgin birth implies that Jesus was brought into existence without the mediation of a father.

And in this way, he became the “Word” itself, as we see in the verse:

… and His Word which He communicated to Maryam (4:171).

It gets support from the verse 3:59, coming at the end: Surely the likeness of Jesus is with Allah as the likeness of Adam; He created him from dust, then said to him, “Be”, and he was15 .

Further support could be found for ‘Allamah’s view if he referred again to the gospel of Luke (1:34-35):

“How will this be,” Mary asked the angel, “since I am a virgin?” The angel answered, “The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you. So the holy one to be born will be called the Son of God.” (NIV)

Now, the Qur’an emphatically rejects the appellation “Son of God” which is associated with the deification of Jesus and condemned as polytheism. However, it is here that the Qur’an would replace the term “Son of God” by “Word from God” where Mary is reported in the Bible as asking how she can have a baby while being a virgin. The Biblical answer is that the baby needs no father, for he will be the son of God. This is the apparent meaning of the Biblical verse, without the superimposition of any other theological doctrines that would be associated with the term “Son of God”. The Qur’an rejects the imagery of paternity, but allows that Mary becomes pregnant when God’s spirit is breathed into Mary:

And (remember) her who guarded her chastity; We breathed into her of Our spirit, and We made her and her son a sign for all peoples. (21:91). 16

So, since the Qur’an uses the expression “Word of God” where the Bible uses “Son of God” and the Biblical term is used to explain the virgin birth, we could consider the phrase of the Qur’an as having a similar significance minus the idea of divine fathering to which the Qur’an objects. It would follow that Jesus is called the word of God in the Qur’an because he was brought into existence by God without a father, but by direct divine decree, in accordance with the interpretation of most of the exegetes (mufassirin).

Needless to say, the exegetical methodology suggested above would not be acceptable to the mufassirin because it requires us to make use of a verse of the Bible that conflicts with the Qur’an in order to support an interpretation of the Qur’an! However, the suggestion here is that it should be acceptable to consider how the Bible verse would have to be rewritten to accord with the Qur’an, and that the functional role of the replaced phrases may shed some light on the meaning of those that would have to replace them.

Of course, this would be highly speculative, and such an interpretive methodology could not be considered religiously authoritative; but it should not be dismissed, because familiarity with the Biblical text could have been expected on the part of at least some of those who heard the Qur‟an from the Prophet Muhammad ص , and such expectations would surely be taken into consideration by the divine author of the revelation.

Regardless of whether one accepts this sort of methodology or not, there remain a few questions about the favored interpretation, that Jesus is called God’s word because, as ‘Allamah says, “he became the “Word” itself.” Since there was no Jesus to become the word prior to God’s creative command, it seems that it would have been better to say that the word became Jesus, or as the Gospel of John puts it, “and the word was made flesh.”17

It is precisely at this point that Christian theology brings in discussions of the Incarnation, and the standard Muslim interpretation also seems to say that something became incarnate, if not divinity itself, then at least the divine word. ‘Allamah, however, cautions against such a literal reading. It is not the case that God’s word “Be” (kun) formed from the two Arabic letters kaf and nun somehow were transformed into the flesh and blood of Jesus. What is meant is no more and no less than that Jesus came into being as a result of the direct command of God, where by direct is meant without a father. There is no more incarnation here than there is in the case of Adam.

Commenting on another verse of the Qur’an, ‘Allamah writes:

It is known that when He intends a thing and says to it: ‘Be’ and it comes into being, no word passes from the Creator to the thing created; there is in fact only the existence of the thing, and nothing else. Therefore, that is the thing created, and also it, in itself, is the word ‘Be’. In short, His saying, in matters of creation, is the creation itself, it is nothing separate from it.18

According to a narration reported by Kulayni, when Imam Sadiq was asked about (4:171), he said, “It is a created spirit. God created it in Adam and Jesus. ’Shaykh Saduq says that Imam Baqir said that they were two created spirits, each selected and chosen as the spirit of Adam and the spirit of Jesus.”19 The emphasis here is on the fact that the spirit of God that became Jesus is a created spirit. Jesus is not the Creator, but is, rather, a creature. If it may be said that the spirit of God became incarnate in Jesus, it must be made explicit that what became incarnate is not God, but the created spirit of God.

The Angel Gabriel

There is no inconsistency between the promissory, revelatory and creative senses in which Jesus may be called “the Word of God.” The first link between these senses is the angel Gabriel. Gabriel was the angel who conveyed revelation to all the prophets, and it is Gabriel who conveyed God’s creative word to Mary in the annunciation. In the Qur’an’s treatment of the annunciation, Gabriel does not merely report to Mary that she will have a child, but he conveys to her the divine spirit.20

Hence, the angel of revelation and the angel by which the creative command of God are conveyed to Mary are one. It is consistent with this that the word of revelation and the word of the divine creative command should also be linked in the person of Jesus.

The next indication of a link between revelation and the creation of Jesus by divine fiat, comes in the repeated references to Mary and Jesus (peace be with them) as a sign.21

Certainly We gave Moses the book so that they might be guided/ and We made the son of Mary and his mother a sign (23:49-50).

Here we find a direct comparison in the Qur’an between the revelation given to Moses in the form of a book and the guidance provided through Jesus and his mother. The virgin birth is not compared to the proof miracles brought by Moses against the Pharaoh’s sorcerers, but with the book. This suggests that Jesus and his mother were a revelatory sign, rather than just a miracle. This point is underscored by the manner in which Mary, peace be with her, answers those who tried to slander her.

Kalam

In order to understand why Jesus as the word of God or any other word of God, such as the Torah or even the Glorious Qur’an, cannot be considered as the logos in the Christian sense, we should consider the controversy over divine speech among the Muslim theologians. In Shi’i theology, the divine attributes are divided into attributes of essence and attributes of action.

The attributes of essence include life, power and knowledge. Speech is considered an attribute of action, like creation, because God cannot be considered a speaker until He creates speech, just as He cannot be considered a Creator until He creates. This is an oversimplification. Since God is not in time, there is no before or after, so that God can be considered to be a creator after some date but not before that date; however, the creation itself is temporal and is causally subsequent to God. Hence we can say that the attributes of action depend on the causal relations between God and His creatures, or more simply, on His actions, while the attributes of essence require no consideration of anything other than God. God is powerful regardless of His action, and regardless of how His power is exercised, so His power is considered to be an attribute of essence. On the other hand, God may be considered as a speaker only in consideration of His communication to another being, a creature. Hence, the attribute of speaking is a divine attribute of action.

Some of the early Muslim theologians, the Ash’arites, held the view that God can be considered a speaker even if He does not communicate to anyone else because He can have an internal speech (kalàm al-nafsí), a knowledge of the meanings He intends to convey in the appropriate circumstances. On this basis, the Ash’arites held the view that the Qur’an is eternal, since it always existed, as it were, in the mind of God, and that the attribute of speaking is one of God’s attributes of essence. For the Mu’tazilite and Shi’i theologians, however, there is no internal speech of God, for God has no need of discursive thought. Indeed, for those theologians who take a philosophical stance as well as the Sufi theologians God is considered as pure simple existence. Any logos or meaning would have to be an abstraction in the understanding of human (or angelic) intellects, not a characteristic of divinity itself22 . Hence, for the Shi’ah, the attribute of speaking is one of God’s attributes of action.

The dispute over the speech of God and the eternality of the Qur’an led to a bloody dispute during the Abbasid dynasty, masterfully described by van Ess in scholarly detail23 . What is important for our discussion, however, is to see that however much room there might be to find an analogue to the Christian idea of an eternal logos in the meaning of revelation in the mind of God as affirmed by the Ash’arites, in the philosophical views of God and His attributes that have come to dominate contemporary Shi’ite theology, such a view would be considered anathema and inconsistent with the simplicity and unity of God.

Gospel

One of the exegetical problems that occurs with regard to the issue of Jesus in the Qur’an pertains to the Injil (Gospel). The Qur’an refers to this, in the singular, as the revelation given to Jesus. However, what the Christians know as the gospels are not collections of words from God revealed to Jesus. Hence, when the Qur’an refers to the Injil, it should not be taken to mean the New Testament, or its four gospels, for the gospels were not revealed to Jesus.

Elsewhere, I have argued that this puzzle may be solved if the book revealed to Jesus was considered to be expressed in his life instead of in a formal text24 . The revelation of God to Jesus, Gospel (Injil), is made manifest in his life, and so the four gospels may be called gospels (anajil) because they report the events in the life of Christ.

The term “gospel” (euvaggelion, euaggelion) occurs in the Bible in such phrases as “the gospel of Christ”, “the gospel of God”, and “the gospel of the kingdom.” The word means a reward for good tidings, or the good tidings themselves, and is used to indicate the glad tidings of the kingdom of God, a kingdom that is not to be sought in the distant future, but is near at hand25 , a kingdom that is “not of this world”26 .

Christians generally interpret the gospel to be the teaching of the good news of salvation through faith in Christ’s redemption. Muslims, however, reject the doctrine of the crucifixion on which the doctrine of Christian redemption is based, because of the explicit statement of the Qur’an:

and they did not kill him, and they did not crucify him (4:157).

Hence the Injil of the Qur’an cannot be understood to be the good news of Christ’s redemptive suffering on the cross as taught by Christians.27

If we look at the use of the word Injil in the Qur’an, we find it employed to mean the teachings given by Jesus to his followers: and we followed [the previous prophets] with Jesus son of Mary,

and We gave him the Injil and We put in the hearts of those who followed him kindness and mercy. (57:27).

And We followed them with Jesus son of Mary, to confirm that which was before him of the Torah, and We gave him the Injil containing guidance and light, confirming what was before it of the Torah, and as guidance and advice for the Godwary./ Let the people of the Injil judge by what Allah has sent down in it. (5: 46-47) 28

In these ayat we find that God sent down the Injil to Jesus, so that the Injil is the divine revelation given to Jesus. At the same time, the Christians are said to be the people of the Injil and they are to judge by what Allah has sent down in it, which suggests that the Injil is a book according to which they can judge. Yet the Christians did not possess any book purporting to contain the words that God revealed to Jesus.

One way of consistently reconciling these seemingly distinct uses of the term Injil in the Qur’an, one for the revelation, and the other for the text possessed by the Christians, that is, the gospels, is to take the revelation given to Jesus to be expressed through his words, deeds, and life as described in the gospels (with the exception of those parts that, according to the Qur’an, are corrupt, including the doctrine of the crucifixion). Following ‘Allamah Tabataba’i, our attempt here is only to reconcile the verses of the Qur’an with one another, and like ‘Allamah, we may be allowed to appeal to what is in the Bible to help elucidate the meaning of such terms as Messiah and Injil.

‘Allamah Tabataba’i notices that with regard to the Torah and the Qur’an, there are specific references in the Qur’an about how these books were revealed, being written on tablets and descending in plain Arabic language, respectively. With regard to the Injil, however, there is no such description. Nevertheless, since the revelation of the Injil to Jesus is repeatedly mentioned side by side with the revelation of the Torah and the Qur’an, ‘Allamah takes it that the Injil must be considered to be “a book like the other two.”29

To the contrary, it seems that it may be considered “a book” only in two ways: first, in the sense of being God’s message of good news revealed to Jesus and conveyed to the people through his words and deeds; and second, in the sense that this divine message expressed through the life of Jesus has been reported in the book (the New Testament) of the Christians.

‘Allamah is well aware of the difficulty for the exegesis of the Qur’an posed by the use of the term “Injil”:

The Qur’an insists on naming the book of Jesus as Injil (Gospel, in the singular) and on saying that it was sent down from Allah. It is in spite of the fact that there are several Gospels, and the four attributed to Mathew, Mark, Luke and John existed since before the revelation of the Qur’an and were well-known at that time.30

‘Allamah takes this to mean that there must have been a single book revealed to Jesus, a book just like the Torah and the Qur’an, but that it “was later altered and deleted.” However, the statements of the Qur’an and hadiths that refer to the judgment of the Christians in accordance with the Injil, and that fact that they were called “People of the Book” because of their use of the Bible, suggests that what is meant by the Injil is the book read by the Christians.

One of the difficulties that arises in any attempt to consider the gospels contained in the Bible to be a corruption of an earlier text of revelation to Jesus is the problem of genre. The gospels do not purport to be a book of divinely revealed laws or other propositions revealed to Jesus, but rather report the events of his life, his teachings in word and deed. While the Torah is a collection of revealed sacred history and law, the Gospels are of a different genre, that of ancient biography. In his introduction to the life of Alexander the Great, Plutarch wrote, “I am writing not histories, but lives.”31

Hence, the book revealed to Jesus and the book in the possession of the Christians are of two different genres: the former is the revelation given to Jesus, while the latter is biography. At the same time, the uses of the term Injil in the Qur’an should not be taken to be merely homonymous, for there is no indication to support the idea that a change of meaning is involved.

The puzzle of the shift in genre of the Injil from a book of revelation to an ancient biography can be solved, however, if we consider the ancient biographies of Jesus to report what was revealed to Jesus. Plutarch’s famous line about writing lives rather than histories provides a clue, because “life” (Greek, bios) can also be used to mean the course a person takes from birth to death or a biography.

If God’s revelation to Jesus was the good news of the kingdom that is not of this world as expressed in the words and deeds of Jesus through his life, then a biography of Jesus that focused on his mission of conveying what was revealed to him could also be considered a divine book, not because the biography contains a text revealed by God to Jesus, but because it describes the life in which Jesus manifested to others God’s revelation to him.

Perhaps it will be objected that there may have been a book in the form of a text given by God to Jesus that was called the Gospel (Injil), but that it was lost. However, even a cursory review of early Christian writings makes this hypothesis seem exceedingly implausible. Given an alternative hypothesis that is consistent with the Qur’an and hadiths and is more likely given the historical record, we should reject the view that there was ever a book in the possession of the Christians that contained the text of the divine revelation to Jesus and that was corrupted in such a manner as to result in the Christian gospels.

Indeed, there were Christian gospels other than those that became canonical in the New Testament, but none of them has the form of a book in which Jesus reports revelations that he claims were given to him by God. Most of the non-canonical gospels, like the canonical ones, are biographies, and most of them are believed to have been written later than the synoptic gospels of the New Testament. There are, however, two important exceptions: the Gospel of Thomas and the hypothetical source used by Matthew and Luke that scholars call Q.

The Gospel of Thomas is not a biography, but a collection of sayings attributed to Jesus. Some scholars believe that the Gospel of Thomas predates the canonical gospels. It is also believed that Q was a collection of such sayings. So, Muslims might be disposed to hypothesize that the Injil mentioned in the Qur’an is some such original gospel containing the revelations given to Jesus, just as the Torah and the Qur’an are taken to contain text revealed to Moses and Muhammadص respectively. Furthermore, it might be thought that since the genre of the gospel can be supposed to have changed from collections of sayings to biography (under the assumption that the Gospel of Thomas and Q predate the synoptic gospels), this shows how an original text of revelation may have been corrupted to take a different form in the genre of biography.

This sort of hypothesis, however, is not plausible, for several reasons. First, the sort of sayings that are collected in the Gospel of Thomas, like those that are believed to have made up Q, do not purport to be reports of divine revelation. What we find is a list of sayings each of which is prefaced by, “Jesus said.” Nowhere to we find in the early Christian literature any book that purports to contain what God said to Jesus.

Second, there is no evidence that any such book was in the possession of the Christians who are mentioned in the Qur’an.32

If some Christian gospels, whether canonical or not, are to be considered corrupted forms of an original text of divine revelation to Jesus, this should be determined by inconsistencies between such gospels and what is taken to be authoritative by Muslims in the text of the Qur’an and reliable hadiths, not by suggesting that the gospels of the Christians were so drastically altered that the genre changed from a report of the text revealed by God to a report of the sayings, life and teachings of Jesus.

Just as the divine revelation given to Muhammadص is made manifest in the form of the Qur’an as a book in Arabic, so too, the revelation given to Jesus may be supposed to have been made manifest in the form of his life, including his conduct and teaching. If this is right, we can say that the Torah was revealed in Hebrew, the Qur’an in Arabic, but the Gospel is revealed in deeds as well as words.

All three “books” were originally revealed in all their detail by God, and so, all three are called the word of God. Since, however, the form in which the divine revelation was manifest to the prophets in the cases of Moses and Muhammadص was textual, while in the case of the Gospel it was made manifest in the life of Jesus, Jesus himself is to be considered the word of God, just as the Torah and the Glorious Qur’an are considered the word of God.

The First Inevitability

The first inevitability pertains to man’s individualbehaviour and the history of nations and human communities.

Inevitability theories tackle this field and that, or pertains to individualbehaviour one time, and to man’s history another.

These theories sometimes adopt the belief in Allah as a base and a resource for inevitability; theories as such are the Divine inevitability theories.

In othercases these theories adopt other basic resources to explain inevitability in the individualbehaviour and the movement of history; such theories might be called (Material Necessity Theories). Theories that rely oninevitability as a foundation to understand man’sbehaviour , history, thought and development are old and deep rooted in the history of human culture.

Many elements (namely religious,philosophical and political elements) commingle to shape these theories; it will be very difficult to understand these theories within the framework of science and thought exclusively; political and religious factors that have participated in forming the philosophical formula of these theories must be taken into consideration too.

The Divine Inevitabilities in Man’sBehaviour :

To the religious, the theories of inevitability often pertains to the individualbehaviour of man heading to negate his will in his deeds andbehaviour , viz. man has no role in his deeds and no sovereignty over them.

This theoryis well known by the name of (determinism). The most famous Islamic sect that adheres to determinism is (AlAshairah ) whose founder and leader was (Abul Al Hassan binIsmaeel ALAsha'ary ) who died in the year 330Hejrah .

This doctrine does not negate man’s will and potency directly, rather it believes that man’s action is not begotten by his own will and potency, ratherit is created by Allah the Sublime .

Man has no role in begetting andinnovating any deed; his role is only limited to gain the deed, never to invent it. (AlShaikh AlAsha'ary ) thus tries tojoin together two fundamental origins of religion namely; monotheism (AlTawheed ) and Justice (AlAdl ).

In the first place, he believes that Allah the Sublime creates all man’s deeds, and man has no role in begetting,innovating or inventing them, for Allah the Sublime says:

[But Allah is the One who has created you and the material from which you make your Gods] [4] revised by translator.ASaffat v. 96.

Thus, mankind has no role in begetting or innovating their deeds, for this is related to Allah the Sublime, He is the Creator of deeds and things and creatures. This according to (AlShaikh AlAsha'ary ) is the connotation of (Monotheism doctrine).

Actually, this man believes in the doctrine of casualty, never negating its origin, but he also believes that Allah the Sublime is the direct cause for allcauses which does not mean that He begets something which will be the cause for other things, replacing only one cause for the many causes that all creatures demand.

In the secondplace he thinks that trusting the role of man’s will and potency in begetting any deed is a kind of polytheism, which the following gracious verse completely negates:

[But Allah is the One who has created you and the material from which you make your gods]AsSaffat v. 96.

The Origin of Gain (AlKasb )

What we have mentioned above is the first origin to which (AlShaikh AlAsha'ary ) was committed; his second origin is Gain (AlKasb ) to which he was committed for fear of turning to determinism which might retard the doctrine of reward and punishment, hence man will no more be responsible for his deeds which will result into denying Allah the Sublime’s quality of Justice.[5]

For, assuming that man has no role in his deeds neither sovereignty over them will lead to cripple the doctrine of reward and punishment, for it is unfair to punish a man for committing an act that he had no role and authority whatsoever in begetting it.

(AlAshaa'irah ) differed in explaining the word (AlKasb ); the best one among their theorists who tried to explain this word was the famous (AbuBakr AlBaqulany ).

His opinion about (AlKasb ) in short was:

Every deed has two aspects: the aspect ofbegetting, and the aspect of particularity and title which Allah the Sublime made a criterion for reward and punishment.

These are two diverse aspects, each of whichis definitely attributed to.

The first aspect is begetting which belongs to Allah the Sublime, attributing this aspect to anything otherthat Him is a kind of polytheism.

The second aspect is the title that brings man reward and punishment; (Prayer) for instance, (fasting) (pilgrimage) (Backbiting) and (lying)… etc.

The way the first aspect should not be attributed to man, the second one too should not be attributed to Allah the Sublime, man’s will and potency is only related to the second aspect - never to the first - and it is the criterion for reward and punishment.

Thus, this school - as its proponents believe - conjoins both origins (Monotheism) and (Justice) i.e. deserving reward and punishment.

Hence each deed has two directions - never one -; these two directions belong to two different potencies, that of Allah the Sublime, and that of man. No Problem about this, for diversity of directions justifies the multiplication of potencies to which a deed pertains.

DiscussingAlkasb (gain) as an Origin

We may not attain a clear sight of (AlKasb ), for these titles which man gains are themselves begotten - and (AlAshaa'irah ) attributes begetting a deed to Allah the Sublime, i.e.: praying, pilgrimage means begetting these acts and gestures which when joined together get the title of prayer and pilgrimage. Other deeds like (fasting) which is achieved by not eating or drinking can actually be attained by forsaking these things that break fasting, (forsaking) is something that man does as much as the rest of the acts done by the senses.

(Al Sheikh AlBaqulany ) believes that man’s intention (AlNiah ) is the only thing that determines his responsibility for what he does. He claims that a certain act (deed) differs from one intention to another; killing if intended for aggression is a crime, but the same act with the intention (Niah ) of legal punishment (Quasas and Had) is a legislative duty, for which Allah the Sublime rewards man.

The act itself is from Allah, but the intention ofman which puts the act in a certain direction comes from man, thus reward and punishment do not concern the act itself, they rather concern man’s intention of killing.

We say, if this speech happens to be true, then intention itself is an act of the senses, and there is no difference between one deed and another; I do not know really why should we attribute the intention to man and not the deeditself? An act is an act whether it is done by the senses or by other faculties of man; and if we accept attributing the intention to man himself, we - on the same criterion and justification - ought to attribute to him every deed he commits whether it was done by means of his senses (prayer and pilgrimage) or by his inner faculties (like forsaking food and drinks in the intention of fasting).

Whatever the case might be we do not mean to simplify discussing a theological theory that engaged many Islamic scholastics exerting a lot of time and effort in this way. We only mean to get a sight of this subject. If the reader demands elaboration aboutit we refer him to theological encyclopedias like (Sharh AlMaquasid ) (Altaftazani ), and (Sharh AlMawaquif ) by (AlJurjany ).

Contemporary Material Inevitabilities

When we speak about the (Material Theories)- we do not mean those theories which deny faith in Allah the Sublime -, rather we mean the theories that contradict the theory of (Divine Inevitability) adopted by (AlAsha'irah ), attributing every act and deed in the individual’s lives and movement of history to Allah the Sublime.

These theories attribute the inevitability which governs thebehaviour of individuals and communities to resources other that Allah the Sublime. Some of the advocates of this theory in the west are (Montesquieu) in his book (The Essence of laws), (Spiengler ) in his book (The Decline of the Western Civilization) and (Durkheim) the famous French sociologist who believes that the social life is determined separately from the individual’s will and desires.

Social relations and affairs like manners, knowledge’s, social culture, ease (yusr ) and distress (Ausur ) are characterized by three inseparable qualities namely: (being external), (being inevitable), (being general).

Social affairs by all their particularities are produced by external factors, they never rise from inside the individuals,neither from their will or desires, an individual is obliged to fall under the pressures of social life. Social life as well falls under its own factors of external compulsion, and this is the nature of the relation between causes and results in the movement of history.

The movement of society is (inevitable) so that (results) can never stay behind their (causes). If we may have a look through the reasons and causes of events, we would no doubt have been able to forecastthem, this is (being inevitable).

The third quality (being general). Every thing that takes place at a certain time and a certain place may possibly take place any other time at any other place under the same conditions and causes.

One of the most famous contemporary material inevitabilities is the theory of (Karl Marx) - (Fredrick Ingles) which tries tolegislate laws for the movement of history arranging them into five stages through the factor of (the struggle of classes) between the exploiting class and the exploited one.

But this theory relapsed at the dawn of its emergence at the stage of appliance; reality proved opposite to it, it became a mere theoretical study today.

Criticism of Historical Inevitability

Whatever the way these material inevitabilities follow to interpret history, some of them proved righteous and others proved wrong, regardless of their scrupulous details.

Righteousness lies in the fact that these theories dedicate history to some scientific laws, causes, and reasons that dictate its movement.

A historical event - similar to any other phenomenon in the universe - is conditioned to its causes and reasons, therefore casualty law governs historical events the way it governs the physical, chemical, mechanical phenomena, accurately reigning over all their familiar reasonable essentials like, inevitability, originality and so on.

This is righteousness, whichcan never be suspected , except in the Marxist theory, which fundamentally rejects casualty law replacing it with Dialectical Materialism, which has been extracted from (Hegel).

The wrong aspect of these theories lies in negating man and his independent decision that makes history, considering him a piece of wood floating on the ever flowing waves of history; determining only one destiny for history and man, a destiny that never multiplies or shifts. Certainly, this is wrong,

for man (the individual, society, history) is not conditioned to one cause as a choice, rather he is usually conditioned to fall on a cross way; selecting the right way is related to his will, consciousness, culture and to his own decision to a great extent; so if ever he follows one of these ways according to his own will, decision and opinion he would find no way to get rid of compulsory impacts dictated on him by casualty law. Let us state two examples for this, the first concerns the individual; and the other pertains to society.

In regard to the example of the individual; if ever he moves, activates himself, and learns he will see his way in life; on the other hand, if ever he idles residing to ignorance and laziness he will remain minor, weak, worthless and powerless in life.

Both results are conclusive and inevitable if ever man chooses the right way to attain them.But it does not mean that man faces a one-dimensional inevitable (destiny and fate) in his life.

In the example of society, a society that resists, makes sacrifices, endures the agony of confrontation and the severity ofresistance, it will definitely come safe out of oppression, political suppression and terrorism.

A society that surrenders and does not resist is doomed to the worst kind of political suppression and terrorism. Both are inevitable laws that condition the lives of nations.But society in its political life stands at a crossway, if it chooses the first way the result will be inevitable, and if it chooses the second way the result two would be inevitable. Selecting this way or that falls under man’s will and option,never under the inevitable system of things. Within the course of this research we shall come back to tackle this point again.

The Political Exploitation of Inevitability

Most negative results thatare brought about by belief in these inevitabilities cripple man’s role and movement in history suspending his role in determining his destiny.If man believes that his movement and acts are subject to a chain of inevitable factors foreign to his will and option, he will start feeling that he is a useless element who has no role in making his destiny and the destiny of his society; with such a belief and satisfaction man can never be a resource for movement and change in his individual and social life.

Therefore, faith in inevitability (historical or individual)has all the way through the history of Islam been adopted by oppressive regimes. Such a belief mobilizes people to political surrender taming them to accept injustice.

Benu Aumyah used to adopt the theory of (determinism); (AbuHilal AlAskary ) says: (Muawiah ) was the first to claim that Allah dictates all deeds on mankind;[6] and when Abdullah binOmmar objected toMuawiah’s assignment of his son (Yazeed ) as a successor to govern after him;Muawiah answered him (I warn you, do not segregate the Muslims, disintegrating their unity, spelling their blood. (Yazeed’s ) assignment has been predestined by fate, people have no choice about it).[ 7]

Muawiah adopted the same logic when (Aiyshah ) objected to assigning (Yazeed ) as a successor to caliphate; he told her: (Yazeed’s assignment has been predestined by fate, people have no choice about it).[ 8]

Some scholars took the initiative to confront that trend of determinism, whichBenu Aumyah adhered to, the most prominent of them were (Ma'bed AlJahny ) in Iraq and (Ghaylan AlDamashquy ) in Sham; they advocated free choice and free will.

(Ma'bed ) with his ally (Ibn AlAshaath ) rebelled against (Beni Aumyah ), thus (AlHajaj )killd him. (Ghaylan ) was summoned by (Husham bin AbdulMalik ) theAumayah Caliph to Damascus to be interrogated; he then was condemned and nailed on the cross after having his hands and feet cut.

Apparently (Al Hassan AlBassry ) used to adhere to this opinion too, i.e. free choice.

AlMuquriezy says: (Attaa ' binYessar ) and (Mabed AlJahny ) came to (Al Hassan AlBassry ) and told him:

ThoseAumyah rulers are shedding blood claiming that Allah has predestined their deeds. Al Hassan said:

Foes of Allah are lying. (He was condemned for this statement) [9] . Al Hassan ALBassry used to propagate openly his opinions that oppose the government ofBeni Aumyah ; then some people threatened him by the Caliph, thus he kept quiet.

Ibn Sa'ad in his (AlTabaquat ) relates from (Ayub ) saying: (I challenged Al Hassan AlBassry to discuss fate and destiny more than once,then I threatened him by the caliph. He said: I shall never say anything anymore.[ 10]

(Benou AlAbbas ) did not deviate from following (Benou Aumyah )’s line, they too adhered to AlAshairah’s approach to destiny; except (AlMamoon ) and (AlMutasem ) who chose to adopt (AlMutazilah )’s approach of free choice and authorization.

When (AlMutawkil ) seized reign he adopted AlAshairah’s faith in determinism again, he even used to punish people who do not follow this ideology; his successors too were committed to his line.

Authorization “Free Choice”

Two contradictory trends pertaining to man’s individualbehaviour dominate the Islamic history:

Determinism and Authorization.

The first of which is adopted by (AlAsha'irah ), the second by (AlMutazilah ).

AlMutazilah’s approach of authorization was: Allah the Sublime authorized man to choose whatever he likes, thus man istotally independent in what he does.

This belief completely contradicts the first one.

If the philosophical and ideological justification of the first doctrine was meant to maintain the origin of (monotheism) thus attributing all things and deeds in this universe to Allah the Sublime (But Allah is the one who has created you and the material of which you make your gods).

AsSaffat v. 96; the ideological justification for this doctrine (the second) was meant to deem Allah the Sublime far above compelling man to do things hecan not do, meanwhile Allah the Sublime’s destiny was paradoxical to what He commands or prohibits; it was meant to deem Allah the Sublime far above creating wrong doings, wicked deeds, heathenism, polytheism injustice, aggression in man’sbehaviour .

AbdulKhader AlBaghdady in his book (AlFarqu Bain Al-Firaqu ) demonstrates the dogmas of (AlMutazilah ):

(Some of their dogmas claim that Allah the Sublime is not the Creator of people’s gains (deeds); neither of the acts of animals; they claim that people themselves determine their deeds, and Allah the Sublime has no role or hand neither in their deeds nor in the acts of animals).[11]

AlSayied Al Sharif ALRadhy in his book (Sharh AlMwaqif ) said: (AlMutazilah deduced that many things are attributed to one origin and that is; but for man’s independence to act the way he chooses, assignment (commands) and punishment (which are dictated by the legislations of Allah) would have been suspended, thus there will be no meaning in praising or blaming anybody).

Zuhdi Jar Allah about (AlMutazilah ) relates:

(They have agreed that man is the creator and originator of his deeds, and that Allah the Sublime has no role or hand in man’s deeds (that are gained).) [12]

The lateSadrul Muta'lihien says: (Some groups such as AlMutazilah and the like advocated that Allah the Sublime hascreated mankind enabling people to act; authorizing them to act according to their free choice, thus they are independent to do these deeds according to their own will and potency.

Further they said: Allah wanted people to obey and believe in Him abhorring their disbelief and disobedience.Also they said: The case being thus, some matters become clear:

First: the benefit of commands and prohibitions, and the benefit of promises and threats.

Second: Deserving reward and punishment.

Third: Deeming Allah the Sublime far above ugly and wicked deeds, far above various kinds of atheism, disobediences and bad deeds).[ 13]

AlShahristany in his book (AlMilal wal Nihal ) thinks that (AlMutazila tend to consider people as creators and innovators of their deeds, and that Allah the Sublime has no hand or role in their deeds (which they have gained).[ 14]

AlMutazilah use to advocate authorization (free choice) independence of man in his deeds just to escape from the mistake that (AlAsha'irah ) have committed by claiming that man deserves Allah the Sublime’s punishment for a sin or a crime he made in spite of himself; further they wanted to escape from AlAsha'irah’s claim that Allah the Sublime commands man to do things over his power opposite to what destiny and fate dictate.

In order to deem Allah the Sublime far above this and that (Be He Exalted and raised far above all that) they resorted to advocate authorization and the belief that Allah the Sublime has authorized man to handle all his affairs, bestowing on him absolute potency to be independent in all his deeds andbehaviour , thus entrapping themselves in something worse than the mistake that (AlSha'irah ) made, namely (polytheism), isolating man’s deeds and acts totally from Allah the Sublime’s will, permission, wish and innovation, is equal to polytheism, if not itself polytheism.

There is a clear difference between the theory of Divine authorization and man’s independence to act apart from Allah the Sublime’s will,permission and wish; and between the doctrine of free choice.

Thiswill be thoroughly explained later in this research.

Notes

[1] Behar Al Anwar: 5: 56/120.

[2] AlKafi : Al-Tawheed : 8/362.

[3] AlKafi 1: 3/147 AlBedaa ' -Ketab AlTawheed .

[4] This gracious verse has nothing to do with what they claim for it concerns the conversation that took place betweenIbrahiem (A.S.) and the Polytheists among his people; before it he told them in denouncement [Do you worship things that you have carved by your own hands?]

[5] Though they do not frankly admit this.

[6] ALAwail . AbuHilal AlAskry 2: 125.

[7] (Imamah andSyasah )Ibn Qutaibah : 210 -Bairut 1990.

[8] Ibid.

[9] AlKutat .Almuquriezy 2: 356.

[10]Tabaquat Ibn Sa'ad 7: 167.pb .Bairut .

[11] (AlFarqu Bain AlFiraq ) pub 1994Bairut .

[12] AlMutazilah : 99.Same meaning in (AlMilal Wal Nihal ) 1: 91.

[13] AlAssfar 6: 369 - 370.

[14] AlMilal wal Niha . AlShahrestany 1: 91.

Chapter Two: Al Quran PositionTowards (Inevitability) and (Man’s Independence)

Now we shall try to explore Al Quran stance of the question of Inevitability. A first reading, AL Quran will acquaint us with two important points:

- Al Quran denies the doctrine of inevitability in the way AlAsha'irah present.

- AL Quran as well denies the doctrine of authorization in the way ALMutazilah choose to believe.

In the first point, Al Quran clearly confirms the doctrine of free will; in thesecond it confirms the doctrine of man’s independence and freedom of choice.

These two points do not contradict each other; rather they integrate each other revealing a third doctrine that is neither the first approach nor the second.This is the doctrine that the progeny (A.S.) advocate . We shall declare that later.

Now we move to read theQuranic verses that pertain to both doctrines:

1. The Doctrine of Free Choice in Al Quran

Hereafter we demonstrate the verses taken from the Book of Allah, which confirm the principle of free choice in man’s life.This is a dossier of verses we chose from a vast collection of the Book of Allah verses.

At the first place, Al Quran frankly and clearly determines the principle of assigning Allah’s command-ments to man; such an assignment of course would have no meaning if it does not affirm the principle of free choice.

The Sublime says:

[It is incumbentupon mankind to pay pilgrimage to the Holy House, for those who can afford to make the journey regarding their financial and physical ability] revised by translator.AlImran v. 97.

[Fastingis decreed for you as it was decreed for those before you] ALBaquarah v. 183

[O, you who believe! When the call is proclaimed for the congregational prayer of Friday, thenhasten to Allah’s remembrance, and quit your trade and every business]. Al-Jumah v.9 .

At the secondplace All Quran determines that:

Allah the Sublime did not assign toman his duties only after he had bestowed on him, brain, consciousness and the ability to distinguish things.

The Sublime says:

[Have we not made for him two eyes?And a tongue and two lips?And we did show him the two ways [of truth and falsehood] AlBalad - 8, 9, 10.

[ThenWe showed him the straight path, whether he chooses to be grateful or be in grateful and disbeliever]. Revised by translator AlInsan v.3 .

At the third place AL Quran states that: Allah the Sublime does not charge mankind with their duties only after He perfects His clue on them by giving them a previous note, and after sending His prophets heralding and warning them.

The Sublime says:

[And We do not chastise any people before we send a messenger (for guiding them to the right path] AlIsra'a v. 15.

[And say (O, Messenger), verily evident proofs have come to you from your Creator and Nurturer (to give you) insight about the truth, so whoever keeps his eyes closed on the truth will harm himself.] AlAna'm v. 104.Revised by translator.

[And neveryour Creator and Nurturer did destroy a town before sending a messenger to recite to them our revelations, and we never destroy a land unless its population is transgressors]AlQassas v. 59 revised by translator.

At the fourthplace al Quran states that: Allah the Sublime does not force mankind to do things theycan not do, He only assigns to them duties fit to their potency.

The Sublime says:

[Allah does not put a task on a person beyond his ability. Man gets reward for that good which he has done and he is punished for that evil which he has done] AlBaquarah v. 286.

All this emphasis on the fact that Allah never assigns to mankind their duties unless He enables them to distinguish things, sending to them heralding warning prophets; never asking them to do things over their potency; we say that all this emphasis never comes true unless accompanied by a recognition of free choice as a principle.

At the fifth place: Al Quran attributes man’s deeds and acts to him himself, it states that those deeds are what he has gained. Such a statement never proves true unless man is free to choose whatever he does according to his own free will. He is not a mere container for the acts that he produces the way those who advocate determinism claim. The Sublime says:

[And whatever befalls you people, it is the result of your own deeds.]Revised by translator. AsShu'ra v. 30.

[So woebe to them for what their hands have written and woe be to them for what they earn thereby.]Revised by translator. AlBaquarah v. 79.

[Aye, those who do evil and are encompassed by their sins, those are the inhabitants of the fire and they shall abide therein forever.]Revised by translator. AlBaquarah v. 81.

At the sixth place: Al Quran confirms the principle that man’s deed pertains to him including the sequences of such a deed (being good or evil), Reward or punishment for such a deed emphasize that it is attributed to him himself (which is part of the constitutional reward and punishment that Allah has programmed within the course of the universe); we say that all this may never come true unless man withstands the responsibility for his deeds, which is conditioned to his free choice.

[And say (O messenger!); verily evident proofs have come to you from your Creator and Nurturer (to give you) insight about the truth, so whoever keeps his eyes closed from the truth will harm himself.]Revised by translator ALAnam v. 104.

[Say (O, Messenger!); O men! The truth has come to you from your Creator and Nurturer; whoeveris guided it is only to his own benefit, and whoever goes astray; it is only to his own loss.]Revised by translator. Yunus v. 108.

[Allah does not put a task on a person beyond his ability. Man gets reward for that (good) which he has done and heis punished for that (evil) which he has done.]AlBaquarah v. 286.

At the seventh place: Al Quran confirms that manis rewarded and punished in this mundane world, such an act is conditional to his responsibility for his deeds; the responsibility itself is conditioned to his free choice.

The Sublime says:

[Allah has given an example: some people who lived peacefully in their town and provision came to them in abundance from everywhere, but they did not value the bounties of Allah, and Allah (due to their ingratitude) made them experience and taste hunger and fear.]Revised by translator. An Nahl v. 112.

[So we sent down upon the evil doers a plague from heaven, because of their rebellion against Allah’s command.]Revised by translator, AlBaquarah v. 59.

[Corruptionhas been spread through out the world in sea and land on the account of men’s wrong deeds.]Revised by translator. Ar Rum v. 61.

At the eighth place: Al Quran determines that manwill be rewarded and punished for his good and evil deeds on the Day of Judgment . We have already stated that reward and punishmentare related to free choice; they are never correct without choice:

[And they will be paid for what they did, and Allah better knows what people do.]Revised by translator. AlZumar v. 70.

At the ninth place: Al Quran confirms that Allah the Sublime punishes or rewards everyman according to his deed, never punishing anybody forsomebody’s else wrongdoing.

The Sublime says:

[And no one shall bear the burden of another person’s sin.]AlAnam v. 164.

At the tenth place: Al Quran states that man on Dooms Day will repent his illdeeds which he had committed in this mundane world.

Repentance signifies and confirms free choices of man; for he cannot repent athing he had not chosen.

[O, you who believe! If a spiteful person with a private motive brings you on item of news, try to verify it before making any decision lest you many unknowingly harm other people and then become remorseful of what you have done.] Revised by translator AlHujurat v.6 .

[And they will hide their remorse when they see the torment but it shall be judged about them fairly and they will not be dealt with unjustly.]Yunus v. 54.

At the eleventh place: Al Quran states that; man’s deeds decide his destiny turning him thus a winner or a looser.

The Sublime says:

[And by the soul and the one who created it and gave order and perfection to it, inspiring it both with evil and with good; (by all these oaths) the winner is the one who had not polluted it with sin and corruption and was deprived from the Grace of Allah.]Revised by translator. As Shams v. 7-10.

At the twelfth place: Al Quran states that thechange which Allah the Sublime brings about in the life of people and nations, (A change as enormous as enrichment, annihilation, allurement, torment or deception) is only a result of their deeds, this does not come true unless man enjoys his full freedom.

The Sublime says:

[Allah will not change the inside and facial condition of people until they change what is inside them (of good and evil) themselves.]Revised by translator. Ar Ra'd v. 11.

[That is so because Allah will never change the bounty that He has bestowed upon people unless they change themselves (by rebellion)]AlAnfal v. 53.

At the thirteenth place, al Quran states that, Allah in this mundane worldgives mankind some of or all that they ask (according to their deeds they way He chooses). If giving is done by Allah the Sublime (according to His will and desire), demand - on the other hand - comes from man. Giving (from Allah) comes responding to man’s request. All this has no meaning unless man is free to choose his demands.

[Whoever whishes the temporal quick - passing worldly life,We easily grant him such things for whom we will, afterwards, provide hell; he will reside in it despised and rejected. And whoever desires the good of the hereafter and strives for it wholeheartedly while he is a believer (On the Day of Judgment), then such people are the ones whose efforts will be appreciated (with the test reward).

Toboth groups , these and those in this world, we bestow from the bounties of your Creator and Nurturer; the bounties of your Creator and Nurturer are not spared from anyone.]Revised by translator. AlIsraa v. 18 - 19 - 20.

At the fourteenth place: Al Quran states that Allah the Sublime does not do mankind injustice, rather, it is they who do themselves injustice; the verses that indicate this fact in the Book of Allah are nearly eighty verses, all of them clearly authenticate the principle of man’s free choice; punishing man with the most sever torment and punishment for doing something he had no will in is a kind of injustice which Allah the Sublime is too dignified and Great to commit:

The Sublime says:

[Creator and Nurtureris never unjust to His human creatures.]Fussilat v. 46.

[Allah didnot treat them unjustly , but they did unjust to themselves.]AtTaubah v. 70.

[And whoever brings about an evil deed, will only be recompensed the like of it; And they will not be treated unjustly.]Revised by translator AlAnam v. 60.

[And everyone will be paid fully for what he has done and they will not be dealt with unjustly]An Nahl v. 111.

[We didnot treat them unjustly , rather they did themselves injustice.]Revised by translator. Hud v. 101.

[We did not do them wrong, but they did themselves wrong.]Revised by translator AnNahl v. 118.

[We did not do wrong to them but they did themselves wrong.]Revised by translator. Az Zukhruf v. 76.