Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

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A Short History of ‘Causation’

Menno Hulswit

University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

www.alhassanain.org/english

A Short History of ‘Causation’[1]

Menno Hulswit

University of Nijmegen

P.O. Box 9102

6500 HC, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

mennoh@sci.kun.nl

Notice:

This version is published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english

The composing errors are not corrected.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT 6

1. CAUSATION IN ANCIENT GREECE 7

1.1. Aristotle: four types of explanation 8

1.2. The Stoics: causation, exceptionless regularity, and necessity 10

2. CAUSATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 11

2.1. Thomas Aquinas 12

3. CAUSATION IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY 14

3.1. THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS FROM DESCARTES TILL LEIBNIZZ 15

3.1.1. Descartes: dismissal of substantial forms 16

3.1.2. Hobbes: causation and motion 18

3.1.3. Spinoza: causation is logical necessitation 19

3.1.4. Leibniz: sufficient reason and the denial of intra-substantial causality 20

3.2. CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM LOCKE TILL MILL 22

3.2.1. Locke: causation and power 23

3.2.2. Newton: rejection of the principle of causality 24

3.2.3. David Hume: Causation and Regularity 26

3.2.4. Kant: causation as an a priori conception 28

3.2.5. John Stuart Mill: causes and causal circumstances 31

4. CONCLUSION: IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF CAUSE 33

References 36

NOTES 39

ABSTRACT

Philosophical theories are always answers to questions raised within certain historical contexts, which involve the common presuppositions of an era. A thorough insight into a particular philosophical problem therefore requires a historical perspective. Thus, in order to better understand the contemporary approaches to the complex issue of causation, and the problems they raise, it is necessary to have a clear insight into the historical evolution of the concept of cause.

In this article, I will show that the development of the history of the concept of cause reveals a remarkable discrepancy between the constancy in the use of terminology and the gradual shift in the meaning of the terms used. This development - which has largely remained unnoticed - requires analysis, if only because most contemporary discussions on the subject, which almost invariably stand in the tradition of Hume, seem to have been victimized by it. For, contrary to what is generally supposed, causation is not a univocal conception (which either can or cannot be further analyzed). It is an ambiguous conception, with at least two (or three) different meanings, each of which requires a critical analysis on its own. Hume's celebrated criticism concerns only one of these senses of cause, which is notably just a derivative sense.

The objective of this article is to discuss some important historical moments in the evolution of the concept of cause, and, more specifically, to discuss the conceptual tensions that are inherent to this historical development. I will focus my attention upon the conception of cause in, successively, Ancient Greek Philosophy (Aristotle and the Stoics), the Middle Ages (Aquinas), and the Modern period (Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Hume, Kant, and Mill).

1. CAUSATION IN ANCIENT GREECE

Though the concept of causation has emerged in Pre-Socratic philosophy, it was probably Plato who first stated the principle of causality: "everything that becomes or changes must do so owing to some cause; for nothing can come to be without a cause" (Timaeus 28a). But Plato emphasized the causal importance of formal causes. Nothing can be unless there be a changeless pattern of formal causes of which the individual sensible phenomenon is a mere appearance. However, since Aristotle was the first philosopher to give an extensive account of causes, I will start my discussion with his theory.

1.1. Aristotle: four types of explanation

The most important passages where Aristotle discussed his theory of ‘causation’ are to be found in his Posterior Analytics, his Physics, and his Metaphysics. The context always concerns both a certain being and the conditions of knowledge of that being. Thus, Aristotle said, for example, in his Posterior Analytics (I.2, 71b9-12) that knowing a thing involves knowing its aitiai.

Aristotle stated that, in reference to any singular entity, the question ‘What is this?’ could be answered in four different ways, each of which corresponded to what he called a ‘cause’ in the sense of ‘something without which the thing would not be’ (aitia). Thus, given a marble statue, the question ‘What is this?’ could correctly be answered in one of the following ways: ‘This is marble’, ‘This is what was made by Phydias’, ‘This is something to be put in the temple of Apollo’ and ‘This is Apollo.’ These answers are the answers to four different questions, respectively: ‘What is this made of’, ‘Who is this made by?’ ‘What is this made for?’ and ‘What is it that makes this what it is and not something else?’ The answers have come to be known as, again respectively, the material cause, the efficient cause, the final cause and the formal cause. Though a complete answer to the original question would encompass those four different answers, and therefore the four different causes, Aristotle argued that the most important and decisive cause was the formal cause (Physics II.3,194b23-195a3).

Only the efficient aitia has features we now associate with the idea of causation. Aristotle conceived efficient causes as 'things responsible' in the sense that an efficient cause is a thing that by its activity brings about an effect in another thing. Thus, the efficient cause was defined by reference to some substance performing a change: it is the "primary source of the change" (Metaph. V.4, 1014b18-20). That which is produced is either some new substance, such as ashes from wood, or simply a change in some property of a given substance.

Efficient causation involves a form being transmitted from the efficient cause to the effect. Thus, for example, the efficient cause of the statue is the form in the mind of the sculptor (Metaph. VII.7, 1032a11-1032b23). The form of the statue (effect), which is the same qua form in his mind, comes about from him by means of the motion he originates (Generation of Animals I, 21-22).

It is a matter of dispute whether Aristotle also defended the modern idea that efficient causes necessitate their effects. There is evidence that he associated explanation by efficient cause not simply with what happens always and necessarily, but with what happens for the most part. Indeed, given a certain man, he must have a father, but given a man, there is nothing that determines him to be a father. In other words, Aristotle defended the view that, given a certain effect, there must be some factors that brought about that effect. But he nowhere inferred from this that given certain conditions, some effect necessarily follows.[2]

However, it would appear that there is another kind of necessity involved in the efficient cause. Efficient causation presupposes that in some way a form is transmitted, and it is precisely this form which is some kind of boundary condition; it determines that a particular substance can behave in such-and-such a way, but not in another way; the form of man, for example, does not determine what a particular man will do, but it determines that he cannot, for example, fly as a bird.

1.2. The Stoics: causation, exceptionless regularity, and necessity

The Stoic cosmos is an organism imbued with divine reason (logos), and its entire development is providentially ordained by fate. The Stoics were the first philosophers to systematically maintain the idea that every event is necessitated by certain causal conditions. This so-called principle of causality has come to dominate our whole western outlook up to the present time.

Thus, one of the main innovations of the Stoics was that the idea of cause is linked both to an exceptionless regularity and to necessity. The Stoics strictly held to the view that each event has a cause. They rejected the idea that there could be any uncaused events, because that would undermine their basic belief in the coherence of the universe (e.g. Cicero, De Fato, 43). They held, moreover, that each particular event necessitates its effect. According to Alexander, for example, it is necessary that the same effect will recur in the same circumstances, and it is not possible that it be otherwise. Given the same cause and circumstances surrounding the cause (periestekota), the same effect could not fail to occur (many Stoics expected that in future times, an exact repetition of circumstances was going to occur) (Sorabji 1980, 64-9).

The Stoic principle of universal causation - which entails that 'chance' and 'possibility' only refer to our ignorance of the causal connections between events (Long 1996, 164) - is very well expressed in the following passage by an unknown Stoic author:

Prior events are causes of those following them, and in this manner all things are bound together with one another, and thus nothing happens in the world such that something else is not entirely a consequence of it and attached to it as cause. [...] From everything that happens something else follows depending on it by necessity as cause. (Quoted in Long 1996, 164)

Though this passage could very well have been written by a contemporary philosopher, there is an important difference with the modern conception of cause: contrary to the modern conception, the necessity involved in the causal relation does not pertain to types of events, but only to the relation between particular causes and particular effects (Sorabji 1980, 64-69).

2. CAUSATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES

In the thirteenth century, most Christian philosophers tried to reconcile Aristotle's philosophy with the Christian idea that God created the world out of nothing. As a consequence, Aristotle's ‘unmoved mover’ was transformed into a ‘creating cause of existence’ (Gilson 1962). More generally, the Liber de Causis - a Neo-Platonic Arabic work of the ninth century, translated into Latin in the twelfth century - had a decisive influence on the concept of cause. In accordance with the view exposed in that book, most thirteenth century philosophers,[3] contrary to Aristotle, distinguished two quite different sorts of efficient cause: causa prima and causa secunda. The first type of efficient cause is the originative source of being. The second type of efficient cause is to be found only in created things, and refers to the origin of the beginning of motion or change. The First Cause works in all secondary causes, which may be considered as instrumental causes subservient to the first.

This conception of the primary efficient cause involves a radical switch in respect of the Aristotelian notion of efficient causality. Whereas in Aristotle, efficient causation was the origin of a change or a motion by means of the transmission of form, in medieval philosophy, primary efficient causality concerns the creation of both matter and form.

In this article, however, I will restrict myself primarily to the concept of secondary efficient causality, and in this section, to the view of Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-74), who may be regarded as one of the most influential representatives of later medieval philosophy.

2.1. Thomas Aquinas

In the Summa Theologiae (Ia 2,3), Aquinas formulated five ways of arguing for the existence of God. His fifth way concludes from the observation of finality within natural bodies that there must be some intelligent being, God, by which all natural things are ordered to their end. Like Aristotle, Aquinas distinguished between internal and external final cause. Whereas all natural things have internal final causes themselves, created by God, the ultimate external goal is God himself. For, while the primary goal of created things is self-realization, this striving toward self-realization coincides with the striving toward the ultimate goal, which is God. In the formation of the world, but also in all created causality, final causality comes first and works in and through the efficient causes. The efficient causes are subordinate to the final causes inasmuch as they are means to ends (SCG II: 42.5).

The (secondary) efficient cause is that which induces some form in natural things. Thus, fire may communicate its form (fire) to something else, and the form of the house that exists in the builder's mind, may cause a real house. Particular agents necessarily require pre-existing matter from which to produce their effects by bestowing a form upon it (SCG II: 16.7).

In natural things, the necessity is derived from the form of the things. Thus, given the efficient cause, "the natural thing necessarily tends to its end in accordance with the power of its form." This necessity is absolute inasmuch as the way toward the end state is completely determined by the form and the other causal circumstances ("every agent which acts by natural necessity is determined to one effect"). It is interesting to see that, with Aristotle, Aquinas mentioned 'gravity' as an example of final or formal causality (SCG II: 30.15), and not as an instance of efficient causality, as has been commonly supposed since the rejection of final causation in the modern period.

Whereas Aquinas held that all inanimate things behave according to natural necessity, he made a distinction between two kinds of efficient cause, which, in modern terminology, might be called 'loose causes' and 'tight causes.' Whereas tight causes necessitate their effects independently of any other causal circumstances, loose causes require that other conditions be fulfilled (cf Collingwood [1938] 1991, 153).

Thus, in some cases (‘tight causes’) necessary connection is associated with the efficient cause as such; "the sun's motion, for example, necessarily gives rise to changes in terrestrial bodies" (SCG II: 29.18) and is therefore absolute necessity. In other cases (‘loose causes’) it is relative to both the agent and the patient; "if fire is hot, it necessarily has the power of heating, yet it need not heat, for something extrinsic may prevent it" (SCG II: 30.12).

However, given both the agent and the patient, the necessity is just as absolute as in those cases in which the efficient cause itself is a sufficient cause. Aquinas therefore concluded that all inanimate things are characterized by natural necessity: "For, as nature is, so is its action; hence, given the existence of the cause, the effect must necessarily follow" (SCG II: 35.4). Whereas man is endowed with free will, "inanimate things, plants, and brute animals" behave according to natural necessity (SCG II: 47.3), which is responsible for the uniform behavior of natural things: “... the power of every agent which acts by natural necessity is determined to one effect; that is why all natural things happen in the same way, unless there be an obstacle; while voluntary things do not” (SCG II: 23.2).

By saying that "all natural things happen in the same way," Aquinas meant that things belonging to the same type act similarly in similar causal circumstances. By thus relating efficient causality to natural necessity, and natural necessity to law-like behavior, Aquinas would have a major impact on the development of the modern conception of causality.[4]

3. CAUSATION IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

In the seventeenth century a movement of thought arose that has come to be known as modern science. This evolution involved a radical change in the development of the concept of cause. Explanations by formal causation and final causation were rejected; the only valid explanations were explanations by efficient causation. Moreover, the concept of efficient causation itself had radically changed. More specifically, in the seventeenth century the idea took root that (a) all causation refers exclusively to locomotion, (b) that causation entails determinism, and (c) that efficient causes were just the inactive nodes in the chain of events, rather than the active originators of a change. These changes have had a lasting influence on the evolution of our conception of cause, and indeed our entire Western outlook.

The history of the development of this outlook is extraordinarily complex, and was influenced by a web of both theological and scientific beliefs. However, the idea that causation involves determinism does not have a scientific origin, but a theological one. In spite of differences in detail, the arguments for determinism in the writings of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz, are very similar. In no case did the conclusion that all things are determined receive its justification from a concern with empirical fact. The idea was that all things are causally determined because, and only because, determinism is entailed in the idea of God's omnipotence and omniscience. If God knows everything and can do everything, whatever is must be. For the same reason, it is misleading to say that any finite agent is a genuine cause, that is to say, an active initiator of a change. Only God can be the cause of anything.

This straightforward determinism had important consequences for the development of the diverse conceptions of causation in the seventeenth century. In this section I will first discuss the rationalist conceptions of causation of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz - some of the most important seventeenth century metaphysicians. Next, I will discuss the views of the empiricist approaches of Locke, Newton, Hume, Kant and Mill.

3.1. THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS FROM DESCARTES TILL LEIBNIZZ

3.1.1. Descartes: dismissal of substantial forms

The ‘founding father of modern philosophy,’ who said to break with the tradition by starting completely anew, did not doubt the principle of causation. However, his interpretation of efficient causes as mechanical causes was an important new development. His mechanistic worldview involved that the principles of nature were identical to the principles of mechanics.

It seems appropriate to say that the primary aim of Descartes’ natural philosophy was the dismissal of the scholastic doctrine of active qualities and substantial forms as causal factors in natural processes, and their replacement by purely mechanical principles of explanation. The idea of substantial forms and active qualities as causal factors has no basis whatever in our experience of things:

Let another, if he likes, imagine in this piece of wood the Form of fire, the Quality of heat, and the Action which burns it as things altogether diverse; for my part I, who fear I shall go astray if I suppose there to be more in it than I see must needs be there, am content to conceive in it the movement of its parts. (Descartes, quoted in Miles 1988, 100)

By thus raising a few simple questions about the example of a piece of wood being burned, Descartes laid open what is perhaps the most important problem with any theory of causation based upon a substance ontology: how can a substantial form be transmitted from a cause to its effect?

The rejection of the fourfold causality of Aristotle and the Scholastics by Descartes (and Galilei and Bacon) had a profound influence on subsequent thinkers. Whereas he endorsed matter, and in this particular sense may be said to have subscribed to material causality, he rejected the idea of substantial forms or formal causality. And though he did not deny the existence of final causes - which he identified as God's intentions - he denied the usefulness of such a search. In order to explain nature, we need only examine the efficient causes of things (Descartes [1644] 1983, I: 28). Thus, in effect, there was only one type of cause for Descartes: the efficient cause.

However, Descartes endorsed two very different concepts of efficient causality. There are particular causes and there is one general cause. Descartes attributed to God the status of a general cause, which insures the constancy of quantity of motion in the universe ([1644] 1983, II: 36). Interestingly, the particular causes are not the motions of the individual parts of matter, but the general principles or laws of nature ([1644] 1983, II: 37). In the beginning, God created matter and motion, and he conserves exactly the same quantity of motion for all time. God is the efficient cause of any change of motion in an otherwise inert matter. And He does so according to the laws of nature, which became secondary causes. Thus, Descartes attributed some efficient causality to the laws of motion, which determine all particular effects. By doing so they provide causal, mechanical explanations. The only 'active initiator of change' that remained was the cause of all causes: God.

Descartes’ theory entailed a radical change in the concept of cause: by thus identifying efficient causes with deterministic laws, causes were no longer conceived as particulars, but as types. Moreover, they were no longer identified as the 'active initiators of a change,' but, instead, as some inactive instruments of God.[5] This change had a tremendous impact upon the scientific view of the world.

3.1.2. Hobbes: causation and motion

Like Descartes, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) presupposed causal determinism, rejected formal and final causation, and thought that causation was only relevant to motion. He explained all phenomena, even psychological and sociological ones, in terms of causal relations between moving bodies.

However, not the bodies but the accidents of bodies are the causal elements. Hobbes defined a(n) (efficient) cause as "the aggregate of accidents in the agent or agents, requisite for the production of the effect" (Hobbes [1655] 1839, 9.4). And he defined an effect as "that accident, which is generated in the patient" ([1655] 1839, 9.1). But, given that the accidents themselves are motions of parts of the body that is changed, causation consists, ultimately, in motion ([1655] 1839, 9.3; 9.9). Thus, the causal relata are not particular bodies or substances, but their motions; causation is a relation between the motions of different bodies. Nothing would happen if nothing moved, and the only things that move are bodies. Moreover, all causation occurs by contact, that is to say, it consists in motion of contiguous bodies ([1655] 1839, 9.7). There is no action at a distance.

Consistent in his attempt to resolve all phenomena to motion, Hobbes rejected the concept of formal or final causes, which are nothing but 'disguised' efficient causes ([1655] 1839, 10.4). Yet, Hobbes maintained a distinction between efficient cause and material cause. Whereas the material cause is just the receptor of the agent's activity, "the aggregate of accidents in the patient," the efficient cause is the aggregate of properties in the agent required for the production of the effect. The material and efficient causes are both part of the entire cause ([1655] 1839, 9.4). Necessity or necessary connection is not associated with the efficient cause as such, but with the entire cause, which entails both the agent and the patient. Entire causes are complex conditions (of both agents and patients) that are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of the effect ([1655] 1839, 9.3).

Consequently, in Hobbes's universe, everything happens by necessity: "all the effects that have been, or shall be produced, have their necessity in things antecedent" ([1655] 1839, 9.5). Moreover, given the cause, "it cannot be conceived but that the effect will follow" ([1655] 1839, 9.7; italics mine). This description of cause (involving necessity) corresponds with what Taube thought to be the definition of necessity that was current in the seventeenth century, namely: "that the opposite of which is inconceivable" (Taube 1936, 102). A connection is necessary inasmuch as it is inconceivable, or contradictory, that the connection should not obtain. However, this supposed necessity is not based on any matter of fact relation. Hobbes (and most of his seventeenth century colleagues) secured necessary connection by postulating God in the causal relations of finite things. To hold that an entity acts in a manner not determined by God was inconceivable.

3.1.3. Spinoza: causation is logical necessitation

Spinoza (1632-77) was perhaps the most straightforward defender of the view that necessitation means implication. Causes logically necessitate their effects, and, conversely, they are themselves logically necessitated by their effects.

Spinoza made a distinction between 'free causes' and 'necessary causes.' Whereas free causes act from the necessity of their own nature (and are therefore the initiators of a change) necessary causes are necessitated by other causes (and are therefore just inactive nodes in a chain) (Spinoza [1677] 1949, Def. 7). God is the only free cause, by which is meant that, though He simply had to create what He did, He was not forced to do this by some external cause. He alone exists and acts from the necessity of his own nature. Only God is a genuine cause: "God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence" ([1677] 1949, Prop. 17). The other 'causes' are just the nodes of a chain, completely compelled by previous links.

But, irrespective of the kind of cause, be it God or just some secondary cause, the relationship between cause and effect is one that involves necessity: “From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given it is impossible that an effect can follow” ([1677] 1949, Axiom 3). Given the reciprocity of the necessary relation between cause and effect, and given that "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" ([1677] 1949, part II, Prop. 17), the necessity involved in the causal relationship must be understood as logical necessity. Causes logically necessitate their effects, and, conversely, effects logically necessitate their causes.

Moreover, the causal order is also understood in terms of the mechanical model. Spinoza radically rejected final causation as an anthropomorphic fiction. Ideas of purpose are derived from our tendency to act with an end in view. From this habit we incline to look at the universe as though it too had a purpose. But it is utterly wrong to look at ourselves and at the universe in this way. "This opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity if mathematics, which does not deal with ends but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth" ([1677] 1949, 74). The truth is that everything just happens from the necessity of God's eternal nature, which simply is. By rejecting final causation and by considering all events as modifications of the eternal substance, Spinoza reduced the causal order to the mechanical order, and the mechanical order to the timeless order of mathematics. By doing so, he came to understand causation as some sort of logical necessitation.

3.1.4. Leibniz: sufficient reason and the denial of intra-substantial causality

The principle of sufficient reason is one of the foundations of the great metaphysical system of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). It refers both to the logical ground and to the real cause of things: "there is nothing without a reason, or no effect without a cause" ([ca. 1680-84] 1969, 268).

Leibniz's very peculiar view of causality has its origin in his rejection of the reduction of metaphysical change to locomotion (Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza). This rejection in turn was the consequence of a fundamental critique of the Cartesian concept of matter as extended substance: "I do not think that substance is constituted by extension alone, since the concept of extension is incomplete. Nor do I think that extension can be conceived in itself, but I consider it an analyzable and relative concept" (Leibniz [1699] 1969, 516). Thus, instead of being an ultimate, unanalyzable quality, extension is an analyzable relation.

However, Leibniz's view of extension as a relation entails that the final constituents of bodies are not extensive. If they were, they would themselves be relations. Thus, Leibniz concluded that the ultimate existents must be non-extensive monads. The material bodies have monads as their constituents. The characteristic features of matter - extension, solidity, inertia, etcetera - are derived from the relations between the constituent monads. Thus matter is just a derivative entity, constituted by the relations between the primary existents (cf Leclerc 1986, 87).

Leibniz's analysis of matter had significant consequences for the concept of motion. Because motion is a modification of the extensive relations, it too is of secondary importance when compared to the action of the monad, which is always perception: "This is the only thing - namely, perceptions and their changes - that can be found in a simple substance. It is in this alone that the internal actions of simple substances can consist" (Leibniz [1714] 1969, 644).

Given this critique of matter as extended substance and of the reduction of change to locomotion, Leibniz necessarily had to develop a different concept of causality. In the first place, he rejected the idea that the ultimate constituents of reality (the monads) have a causal relation to each other. Instead, he proposed that the history of each individual monad consists of one causal chain.

Each individual substance has a concept from which everything follows that will ever be true about it: "The complete or perfect concept of an individual substance involves all its predicates, past, present, and future" ([ca. 1680-84] 1969, 268). The completeness of the individual concepts entails that there is a mutual causal independence of created substances. The correspondence of individual substances is explained by the doctrine of pre-established harmony: God has programmed the world in such a way that each monad develops in synchrony with all other monads. Just like a good clockmaker who constructs a number of clocks that keep perfect time, God pre-established the harmony of the universe at the beginning of things ([ca. 1680-84] 1969, 268-9).

Thus, all individual created substances are different expressions of the same "universal cause." However, though God caused their existence, their successive states are (normally) produced by their own natures. Every state of every monad is completely determined by its nature or substantial form, which is an internal, active causal principle. Thus every simple substance is "spontaneous," that is to say, "the one and only source of its modifications" ([1712] 1973, 175). The doctrine of the spontaneity of substance ensured for Leibniz that created individual substances were centers of activity, a feature he took to be a necessary condition of genuine individuality.

The internal forces of monads, which were identified with the substantial forms, Leibniz conceived as appetites. The appetites or substantial forms are teleological principles, which lead the monad from one perception to another in a pre-established way. This aspect of teleological causation, however, does not preclude efficient causality. On the contrary, efficient causality and final causality are complementary. Each efficient cause happens in accordance with a general rule or final cause, which is preordained by God [1712] 1973, 174). Thus, final causation and efficient causation are not different types of causation, each of which would act in different situations. But in each act of causation there is an efficient and a final component.

Leibniz's doctrines of final causality and of the spontaneity of simple substances fully agree with his brand of determinism: each monad behaves in accordance with its original purpose, that is to say, with its nature or substantial form, which it received from the beginning through God's creation. Leibniz's determinism - which is based on his principle of sufficient reason - entails that the necessity involved in the relation between cause and effect is as strong as logical necessity. A complete knowledge of the causes would yield the premises from which by reasoning alone the effects could be concluded.

3.2. CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM LOCKE TILL MILL

3.2.1. Locke: causation and power

After the metaphysical systems in which Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz tried to give an insight into the structure of reality, John Locke (1632-1704) merely hoped to discover what kind of things God has fitted us to know, and how we should use our intellect and understanding. Living in the century that witnessed the birth of modern natural science, Locke wished to defend its empiricist ontology against the weight of the philosophical tradition, which was rationalist in temper.

Basic to Locke's approach to the concept of causation was the idea of power. He held the Aristotelian belief that causes are substantial powers put to work:

Power being the source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are called Causes; and the Substances which thereupon are produced […] are called Effects. (Locke [1690] 1975, II, xxii, 11)

Thus, a cause is a particular substance putting its power to work. Apparently, Locke conceived causes and effects as particulars. In his entire discussion of power there is no reference to either uniformity or necessary connection. 'Power' and 'necessary connection' are kept separate in Locke's thought, for although we do perceive powerful or changing objects and thus have the ideas of power and cause, we do not perceive any necessary connections between ideas ([1690] 1975, IV, iii, 1).[6] By linking causation to power, but not to necessity, Locke clearly upheld what is nowadays called a singularist approach to causation.[7] This view conflicts with the modern received view of causation (ever since Hume), according to which causation involves uniformity or necessary connection according to law.

In the next section I will show that Isaac Newton defended a view that, though similar qua basic insights, was even more radical than Locke's. Whereas it was Locke's view that the idea of causation does not involve the idea of necessary connection according to law, Newton took the far more radical step of separating causation from law-like behavior.

3.2.2. Newton: rejection of the principle of causality

In his masterpiece, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Newton (1642-1727) set forth the mathematical laws of physics and "the system of the world." The world system consists of material bodies (masses composed of "solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles") at rest or in motion and interacting according to his three famous laws of motion, which are stated in implicitly causal terms:

(1) Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.

(2) The alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.[8]

(3) To every Action there is always opposed an equal Reaction; or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts. (Newton [1687] 1968, I: 19-20)

The meaning of his implicit reference to causation in expressions such as "motive forces impressed upon" a body, which "compel" the body to move differently than if they had been absent, and the relationship between the concept of cause, these compelling motive forces, and the laws of motion, can only be understood by studying the Scholium.

In his Scholium (on absolute space and time), Newton made a distinction between "true motion" and "relative motion." Whereas true motion refers to some absolute standard (for example: a sailing ship in relation to the immovable earth), relative motion is motion in respect of some relative standard (for example: a man walking on a sailing ship). It is in his attempt to explain the difference between true motion and relative motion that Newton showed what he meant by 'cause':

The causes by which true and relative motions are distinguished, one from the other, are the forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated nor altered, but by some force impressed upon the body moved; but relative motion may be generated or altered without any force impressed upon the body. For it is sufficient only to impress some force on other bodes with which the former is compared, that by their giving way, that relation may be changed, in which the relative rest or motion of this body did consist. Again, true motion suffers always some change from any force impressed upon the moving body... (Newton [1687] 1968, I: 14; italics mine)

Thus, Newton meant by cause precisely the above mentioned (in the first two laws of motion) "motive force impressed upon" a body, which "compels" it to move differently. Put more precisely: causes are forces or constraints that compel moving bodies to behave differently than they would have done without them. Thus ‘caused’ means constrained or compelled. Newton used the expression "free" motion to refer to unconstrained motions. Thus, every body that continues in its state of rest, or of uniform behavior in a straight line, is uncaused or free.

Thus Collingwood rightly concluded that "in Newton there is no law of universal causation; he not only does not assert that every event must have a cause, he explicitly denies it." Any movement that happens according to the first law of motion is an uncaused event. Thus if a body moves freely from A to B to C, the event which is the movement from A to B, is in no way the cause of the event which is the movement from B to C; it is not caused at all. The first law of motion is in fact a law of free or causeless motion (Collingwood [1938] 1991, 159; italics mine).

Thus, Newton may be said to radically reject the principle of universal causation, and to defend a fundamental distinction between causation and law-like behavior. For, there are two classes of events in Newton's universe: (a) those that happen according to a law, and (b) those that are the effects of causes. Causation and law-like behavior (or necessary connection according to law) are mutually exclusive notions.

In the next section, we shall see that Hume neglected (or misrepresented) both Locke's and Newton's basic insights. He simply assumed that the concept of cause involves the concept of necessity, which he identified with the concept of power.

3.2.3. David Hume: Causation and Regularity

Hume (1711-76) started from the observation that we think that our concept of causation involves the concept of necessity: events or states of objects follow their causes with some kind of necessity. More specifically, he held that the causal relation is characterized by three factors: (1) contiguity (in space and time) of cause and effect, (2) priority in time of cause to effect, and (3) a necessary connection between cause and effect. He considered the third factor to be by far the most important, because it is the criterion by which we seem to distinguish causal from non-causal relations (Hume [1739] 1978, 77).

The problem is that given the concept of causal necessity, there seems to be no way of rationally justifying it. To Hume such justification could be given only if causal necessity could be shown to be as stringent as logical necessity. But this is impossible. Hence, the necessity that we read into causal relationships is illusory; the illusion is born from our expectations, which are due to habit.

In accord with the empiricist principle that ideas are derived from impressions, Hume explained that in order to clarify and justify our idea of causation, we must find the impression that has given rise to it. The idea of necessity cannot be derived from our experience of individual cases of causation. For, in a single instance of causation, we can never discover any necessary connection or power. Instead, the idea of necessity arises from our experience of a great many similar instances. The constant conjunction produces an association of ideas - so if we see a flame, by sheer habit an idea of heat will come to mind. But the constant conjunction also produces a feeling of necessary connection in the mind. Thus, there are two roots of our idea of necessity: constant conjunction of the objects, and the feeling of necessary connection in the mind. The habitual transition from impression to idea feels like a necessitation, as if the mind were compelled to go from one to the other. The necessary connection is not discovered in the world but is projected onto the world by our minds ([1739] 1978, 266).

Most contemporary philosophers believe that Hume refuted the views of the rationalists before him (Descartes, Hobbes Spinoza, and Leibniz), who all held that there is an element of genuine a priori reasoning in causal inference. According to Hume, however, causal relations are not logically necessary, and hence they cannot be known a priori. To say that causation is not a logically necessary relation is to say that even if A caused B, it is not logically impossible to suppose that, given A, B might not have occurred. So far as reason and logic are concerned, given a particular event, anything may happen next. This is precisely the reason why causal relations cannot be known a priori; in order to determine whether or not a causal relation holds between A and B we must rely on our experience of similar relations. "There are no objects," wrote Hume, "which by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the causes of any other; and no objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes" (Hume [1748] 1975, 75).

Today, Hume’s idea that regularity or constant conjunction is a necessary condition for causation is generally accepted.[9] If HIV is the cause of aids, then HIV and aids are constantly conjoined. This view seems to agree with our common sense view. We expect similar causes to have similar effects. But Hume held that regularity is also a sufficient condition for causation. This view was easily shown to be false by Thomas Reid (1710-96): there are many examples of constant conjunctions, such as day following night, that are not causal relations (Reid [1846] 1967, 627).

Chapter 1: The Character and Moral Traits of the Holy Prophet

1. From Ibn Shahr Ashub in al-Manaqib: al-Tirmidhi in al-Shama’il, al-Tabari in al-Tarikh, al-Zamakhshari in al-Fa’iq and al-Fattal in al-Raudhah have all narrated about the character of the Holy Prophet (S) with numerous narrations. From among these: Narrated from Amir al-Mu’minin (as), Ibn Abbas, Abu Hurayrah, Jabir ibn Samarah and Hind ibn Abi Halah: That he (S) used to be revered and venerated, dignified in the eyes (of the people) and honored in the hearts. His face would shine like the full moon, bright and white with a hint of redness.

He was neither too thin, nor too fat. He had a white forehead and a pleasant countenance. The white of his eyes was intensely white and the black of his eyes was intensely black, the edges of his eyelids were black, he had long narrow eyebrows, a moderately large and proportionate head and was of appropriately average height.

He had a wide forehead, the bridge of his nose was slightly raised, a little redness could be seen in the white of his eyes, his eyebrows were joined, and he had soft fair cheeks, long and broad forearms, large shoulder-joints, wide shoulders, strong hands and moderately large feet.

He had no hair on his chest, the soles of his feet were curved in the middle, lines were visible around the flesh near his backbone, he had long eyelashes, a thick beard, a full moustache, a mixture of black and white hair, a perfectly formed mouth and nose, fine white separated teeth, lank hair, a line of very small hair from the middle of his chest to his navel and a proportionate body. His stomach was aligned with his chest. He had a wide chest. His neck was beautiful like an image of pure silver.

His had extended fingers; the heels of his feet were bony and empty of flesh. He had a short chin. His forehead was slightly inclined to the front, his thighs were fleshy and muscular, and there was a slight swelling in his flank. His limbs were firm. He was of average height, neither too tall nor too short. He had curly hair not open falling hair. His face was neither skinny nor fleshy and its color was not as white as the white of the eyes. He had large joints. There was no hair on his stomach or chest except for a line of hair extending from his upper chest down to his navel. He had a large upper back. White hair was seen on the sides of his (S) head next to his ears (as a result of old age).

His hands were like the hands of a perfume seller - always scented with perfume. He had wide palms. The bones of his arms and legs were proportionately long. When he was happy and joyful his face was like a shiny mirror. He walked inclining forward1 , with a humble gait. He would rush ahead of the people to perform good deeds. When he walked, he would raise his feet as if he was descending a declivity. When he smiled, his teeth would shine when exposed briefly, before being covered by the lips.

He was handsome, well-mannered, decorous and friendly. When he turned to face the people, they felt that his face was like a bright lantern, and the (drops of) sweat on his face were like pearls, and the scent of his perspiration was better than the most excellent musk. He had the seal of prophethood between his shoulders.2

2. Abu Hurayrah: When he (S) would turn to see the front or back, he would turn his whole body (not just his head).3

3. Jabir ibn Samarah: He was slender in the shanks.4

4. Abu Juhayfah: White hair covered the sides of his beard and the hair between his chin and the edge of his lower lip.5

5. Umm Hani: I saw the Holy Prophet (S) having four locks of hair.

Ibn Shahr Ashub says: In actuality he had two locks of hair and the one who started this (tradition of keeping the hair in this way) was Hashim (the Noble Prophet’s great-grandfather).6

6. Anas: I did not count more than fourteen white hairs on the Holy Prophet’s (S) head and beard.7

7. It has been said: He had seventeen (white hairs).8

8. Ibn ‘Umar: The sign of old age in him was (the presence of) about twenty white hairs.9

9. al-Bara’ ibn ‘Azib: His hair reached up to his shoulders.10

10. Anas: He had hair descending behind his ears up to the earlobes.11

11. ‘Aaisha: His hair extended beyond the earlobes but not up to the shoulders.12

12. In Qisas al-Anbiya’: There would be no place from which the Noble Prophet (S) passed but that all who would pass from there would know that he had been there from the scent of his fragrant sweat. He would not pass by a stone or tree except that it would prostrate before him.13

13. From al-Saffar in Basa’ir al-Darajat: Narrated from Zurarah from Abi Ja’far (as) that the Holy Prophet (S) said: Verily we, the prophets, sleep with our eyes but not with our hearts and we see what is behind us with the same clarity as what we see in front of us.14

14. From al-Qutb in al-Khara’ij wa al-Jara’ih: From his (S) miracles which have been confirmed by numerous sources, and disbelievers and believers have acknowledged it, was the seal of prophethood on the hair that had accumulated between his shoulders.15

15. In al-Manaqib: His (S) shadow did not fall upon the earth.16

16. From al-Kulayni in al-Kafi: Narrated from ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-Nawfali from Abi al-Hasan (as), he said: I mentioned to him about (good) voice. He said: When ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn (as) used to recite (the Qur’an) and a person would pass by, he would swoon because of the beauty of his voice; and if the Imam manifests any of this, the people would not be able to bear its beauty. I said: Did the Holy Prophet (S) not lead the people in prayer, raising his voice in recitation of the Qur’an? He (as) said: He would recite in a way that was bearable for the people behind him.17

Note: And this has been narrated with numerous other chains of narrators.

17. From al-Saduq in Ma’ani al-Akhbar: By way of Ibn Abi Halah al-Tamimi from al-Hasan ibn ‘Ali (as) and (in another narration) by way of al-Rid’a from his fathers, from ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn, from Husayn ibn ‘Ali (as) and also (in yet another narration) by way of a man from the lineage of Abi Halah from his father, from al-Hasan ibn ‘Ali (as) who said: I asked my maternal uncle, Hind ibn Abi Halah - who always used to talk about the

Noble Prophet (S) - to describe for me something about him so that I may increase my love for him. So he said:

The Prophet (S) was revered and venerated. His face would shine like the full moon. He was taller than those who were short and shorter than those who were tall (i.e. he was of average height). He had a moderately large head and curly hair. If his hair could be combed he would comb it otherwise, if he let his hair grow, he would not let it exceed up to the length of his earlobes.

He had a light complexion, a wide forehead, long narrow eyebrows that were broad but not conjoined, with a vein running between them which became visible when he was angry. There was a light which elevated him such that if one who saw him did not notice it, he would think he was raising his head with haughtiness.

His beard was short and thick; his cheeks were smooth and wide. He had a broad mouth with clear separated teeth. He had fine hair on his chest. His neck was like a beautiful image of pure silver. His body was proportional (all his limbs were the perfect size in relation to his body). His stomach and chest were equal in size. He had broad shoulders. His joints were fleshy. He had a wide chest. The unclothed parts of his body shone with brightness. He had a line of hair extending from his chest to his navel; other than this, his chest and stomach were bare.

His forearms, shoulders and upper chest were hairy. He had long forearms and wide palms. His hands and feet were thick and firm. He had extended fingers and bones that were without any protuberances in the forearms and shanks. The middle of the soles of his feet was raised from the ground and his feet were wide. Water would not soak them. When he walked he raised his legs from the ground and inclined forwards, treading lightly with soft steps. He walked briskly as though he was descending a declivity. When he turned to face someone, he would turn his entire body (not just his head).

His eyes were lowered; his gaze toward the ground was longer than his gaze toward the sky. He would look with short glances. He was the first to salute (say salam to) whomever he met.

He (as) then said: Describe to me his speech. He replied: He (S) was afflicted with continued sadness, always deep in thought and never at ease. He was silent for long periods of time. He never talked unnecessarily. He started his speech and ended it with great eloquence. His discourse was relevant and concise, without superfluity and not lacking the necessary details. He was soft-spoken and never rude or insulting. He would consider blessings to be great even if they were small, never complaining about them. However, he neither criticized nor praised what he tasted (or ate).

The world and its disappointments never made him angry. But when someone’s rights were usurped, he would become so angry that nobody would recognize him and nothing would stand in his way until he had helped him (get back his rights). When he pointed to something he pointed to it with his whole hand and when he was surprised he turned his hand upside-down. When he talked he would join his hands together, and would tap the back of his left thumb with his right palm. When he became angry he

turned his face away and when he was annoyed he looked down. His laughter was manifested by a smile and (when he smiled) his teeth were seen to be like hailstones.

Al-Sadiq (as) said: Up to this point it has been the narration of Qasim ibn al-Muni’ from Isma’il ibn Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Ja’far ibn Muhammad and the rest, up to the end, is the narration of ‘Abd al-Rahman ...

Imam Hasan (as) said: I kept this hidden from al-Husayn (as) for some time then I told him about it, but I found he already knew of this before me so I asked him about it and found out that he had asked his father about how the Holy Prophet (S) was, inside the home and outside, his sitting and his appearance; and he did not leave out anything.

Imam Husayn (as) said: I asked my father about the conduct of the Holy Prophet (S) when he entered his home. He said: He (S) entered the home when he wanted to and when he came to his home, upon his entrance, he divided his time into three parts: a part for Allah, a part for his family and a part for himself. Then he divided his own time between himself and the people, keeping his portion for his special companions and the other portion for the general public; and did not save any time for his personal work. It was from his practice, in the portion devoted to (meeting) the people, to give preference and respect to the people of distinction and he would categorize them according to their excellence in religion.

From among them were those with one need and those who had two needs and even those with many needs, so he occupied himself with them and occupied them with what was good for them. He would ask them about the community and in informing them about what was necessary he would say: “Those who are present from among you should inform those who are absent, and inform me about the need of one who is unable to inform me of his need. For surely the one who informs a person in authority of the need of the one who cannot express it, Allah will make his feet firm on the Day or Reckoning.” Nothing other than this would be mentioned in his presence and he would not accept from anyone anything other than this. They would come in seeking (knowledge and wisdom) and they would not disperse until they had received it and they would leave as guides (for others).

I asked him about the conduct of the Noble Prophet (S) outside the home - how was it? He (as) replied: The Prophet (S) would remain silent except when it was necessary for him to speak, and he would be affable with the people and would not alienate them. He would honor the honorable of every community and would make them in charge of their affairs. He would be careful with the people and would be cautious not to be impolite or turn away from them, frowning. He would seek to know about the condition of his companions and he would ask the people about the condition of others (like their relatives or neighbors).

He used to admire the good deed and encourage it while censuring the evil action and discouraged it. He was unwaveringly moderate in his affairs. He was never unmindful (toward the people) out of fear of their becoming negligent and deviating (from the right path). He would never fall short of the truth and would never overstep it. Those who were near him were from the best of the people. The best from among them, in his view, was the one

who gave more advice and guidance to the Muslims and the ones who were of greater status in his eyes were those who were more caring and helpful to them.

He said: Then I asked him (as) about his (manner of) sitting, so he said: He would neither sit nor stand but by remembering Allah (SwT). He never reserved a place specifically for himself and forbade others to have places reserved for them. When he arrived at a gathering, he sat wherever there was a place to sit and he enjoined others to do the same. He would give a chance to all those who were sitting with him, without giving preference to one over the other because he held him in greater esteem. When someone would come to sit with him he would remain seated patiently until he stood up and left. If someone asked him for something, he would give him exactly what he had asked for or if he did not have it he would offer kind words to him.

The people were so pleased with his character that he became like a father to them and they were all treated as equals by him. His gathering was a gathering of forbearance, respect, honesty and trust. There were no raised voices in it and neither were there any evil imputations. Nobody’s mistakes were repeated outside the gathering. Those who were in the gathering were fair to one another and were, in this, linked to each other with piety. They were humble, respectful to the elderly and merciful to the young, charitable to the needy and hospitable to the outsider.

I said: How was his interaction with those who were in his company? He (as) said: He was always cheerful, easygoing, approachable and soft-spoken. He was never rude or harsh. He never laughed loudly, never uttered obscenities, never looked for faults in people and never flattered anyone. He ignored that which was not liked by him in such a manner that it would neither cause any despair nor make one feel hopeless. He kept three things away from himself: arguing, being loquacious and talking about things that did not concern him. He also stayed away from three things related to people, namely: he would never rebuke anyone, never reproach him and never look for his slip-ups or faults. He would not speak except that for which he hoped to be rewarded by Allah (SwT).

When he spoke, those who were sitting with him were mesmerized and motionless and silent with awe - as though there were birds perched on their heads. When he became silent they spoke. They never debated in his presence; when one would speak, the others would listen to him until he had finished and they would take turns to speak in his presence. He would laugh when they laughed and express surprise when they expressed surprise. He used to be patient with the incivility of the outsider in his questioning and speech, even if his companions objected. He would say: “If you see a person in need then assist him.” He would not accept praise except from one who was sincere in his professing himself a Muslim. He never interrupted anyone’s talk until he had exceeded the limits, in which case he would interject by asking him to desist or by standing up.

He said: I then asked him (as) about the silence of the Holy Prophet (S) so he (as) said: His silence was based on four things: forbearance, caution, consideration and contemplation. As for (his silence in) consideration, this

was in order to look and listen to everyone equally. As for contemplation, it was about what remains and what perishes. He had a perfect balance of forbearance and patience. Nothing would enrage him or upset him. He was cautious in four things: in his performing a good deed so that others would emulate him, in his abandoning evil so that others would also reject it, in his struggling to make the best decisions for reforming his community, and in his performing that which secures the good of this world and the next.18

Note: It is also narrated it in Makarim al-Akhlaq19 quoting from the book of Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Ibrahim al-Talqani with in his narration from those whom he deemed trustworthy, from al-Hasan and al-Husayn (as).

He says in al-Bihar: And this narration is from the famous narrations that have been mentioned by the‘ammah in many of their books.20

18. In Makarim al-Akhlaq, al-Tabarsi narrates from Anas ibn Malik who said: The Noble Prophet (S) had a white complexion like the color of a pearl, and he inclined forward when he walked; and neither the scent of musk nor of ambergris would be better than his scent; and neither the feel of silk brocade not that of (pure) silk would be softer to touch than the hand of the Holy Prophet (S).21

19. (Also) from him, from Ka’b ibn Malik who said: When something made the Holy Prophet (S) happy, his face would shine like the full moon.22

20. From al-Ghazali in al-Ihya: Of all men, he (S) had the most eloquent diction and most pleasant speech. He would say: “I am the most eloquent of the Arabs”; and the people of paradise will speak in the dialect of Muhammad and he (S) spoke in a concise manner, neither exceeding nor falling short (of his purpose), as though the words followed each other; there was a pause between his speech that enabled the listener to remember what he said and understand it. He had a powerful and most melodious voice.23

21. In al-Manaqib, narrated from ‘Aaisha: I said: “O Prophet of Allah! I saw you entering the toilet, and when you came out I entered (the toilet) but did not find anything except the scent of musk?!” He said: “We, the company of prophets, have bodies that are nourished by the heavenly spirits, so nothing comes forth from it but that the earth swallows it.”24

22. In al-Mahasin: From ‘Abdallah ibn al-Fad’l al-Nawfali, from his father, from Abi ‘Abdillah (as) who said: The Holy Prophet (S) said: Allah created the intellect and said to it: Retreat! So it retreated. Then He said to it: Advance! So it advanced. Then He (SwT) said: I have not created anything more dear to Myself than you. Allah gave Muhammad (S) ninety-nine parts (of it) and divided the remaining one part among the rest of His servants.25

23. From al-Shaykh al-Tusi in al-Tahdhib: In his narration from Ishaq ibn Ja’far, from his brother Musa, from his forefathers, from ‘Ali (as) who said: I heard the Prophet (S) saying: “I was sent with the most noble and refined character.”26

24. From al-Saduq in al-Faqih: In his narration from ‘Abdallah ibn Miskan from Abi ‘Abdillah (as) who said: Allah (SwT) distinguished His prophet with a noble character; so test yourselves, if you have it in you then praise Allah the Almighty and desire more of it. He mentioned ten things (to

be tested): Certainty, contentment, patience, thankfulness, forbearance, good manners, generosity, honor, bravery and valor.27

Note: al-Kulayni has also narrated this, as has al-Saduq in all his other books.28

25. In Makarim al-Akhlaq, quoting from the book al-Nubuwwah: From Anas who said: The Noble Prophet (S) was the bravest of all men, and kindest of all men, and most generous of all men. One night the people of Madinah heard a loud noise which frightened them, so they (all) went towards where the sound had come from. The Holy Prophet (S) met with them; and he had preceded them (and already investigated it), and he was saying: “Don’t be alarmed,” while he was on the horse of Abi Talha and had a sword tied around his neck. He began telling the people: “Do not be afraid, we found it to be only a loud noise (of no consequence).”29

26. Also: From ‘Ali (as) who said: In the heat of war, when the two sides would charge at each other, we sought refuge in the Holy Prophet (S) as (he would be at the forefront of the battle and) there was nobody closer to the enemy than him.30

27. Also: From Abi Sa’id al-Khudri who said: The Noble Prophet (S) was more bashful than a virgin girl behind a curtain. When he disliked something we would see it in his face.31

28. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Hafs ibn Ghiyath who said: Abu ‘Abdillah (as) said (to me): “O Hafs, verily the one who was patient had little patience and the one who was impatient had little impatience.” Then he said: “You must be patient in all your affairs, for Allah (SwT) send Muhammad (S) and commanded him to be patient and gentle and He said:

“And be patient with what they say, and keep away from them in a graceful manner. Leave me to deal with the deniers, the opulent, and give them a little respite.” (Surat al-Muzammil (73): 10-11)

And He said: “‘Repel [evil] with what is best. [If you do so,] behold, he between whom and you was enmity, will be as though he were a sympathetic friend. But none is granted it except those who are patient, and none is granted it except the greatly endowed.” (Surat al-Fussilat (41): 34-35)

So he was patient until they defamed him and accused him of grave transgressions and this made him distressed.

So Allah revealed to him:“Certainly We know that you become upset because of what they say. So celebrate the praise of your Lord and be among those who prostrate.” (Surat al-Hijr (15): 97-98)

Then they called him a liar and accused him, and he became sad by this. So Allah revealed:

“We certainly know that what they say grieves you. Yet it is not you that they deny, but it is God’s signs that the wrongdoers impugn. Apostles were certainly denied before you, yet they patiently bore being denied and tormented until Our help came to them. Nothing can change the words of God, and there have certainly come to you some of the accounts of the apostles ...” (Surat al-An’am (6): 33-34)

So the Holy Prophet (S) prescribed patience for himself, but when they exceeded the limits and when he mentioned Allah (SwT), they called him a

liar. So he (as) said: “I have been patient with regards to myself, my family and my reputation, but I do not have patience when it comes to the remembrance of my Lord.”So Allah (SwT) revealed:

“So be patient with what they say ...” (Surat Qaf (50): 39)

So he remained patient at all times. Then the glad tidings ofImamah were given to his progeny and they were described as having patience and Allah (SwT) said:

“And amongst them We appointed Imams who guide [the people] by Our command, when they had been patient and had conviction in Our signs.” (Surat al-Sajdah (32): 24)

At this point the Holy Prophet (S) said: “Patience is to faith as a head is to the body” and he thanked Allah for this great blessing, so Allah revealed:

“ ...and your Lord’s best word [of promise] was fulfilled for the Children of Israel because of their patience, and We destroyed what Pharaoh and his people had built and what they used to erect.” (Surat al-A’raf (7): 137)

Upon which the Holy Prophet (S) said: “It is glad tidings and a (promise of) vengeance.” And Allah had made it permissible for him to fight the polytheists, and Allah (SwT) revealed:

“Kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them and besiege them and lie in wait for them at every ambush” (Surat al-Tawbah (9): 5)

and

“And kill them wherever you confront them” (Surat al-Baqarah (2): 191, Surat al-Nisa (4): 91)

So Allah slew them at the hands of the Holy Prophet (S) and his dear companions and He gave him the reward for his patience in addition to the treasures that were reserved for him in the hereafter. “Therefore, the one who is patient and persevering, and leaves his accounting to Allah, will not leave this world until Allah has pleased him by vanquishing his enemies in addition to the rewards that he will get in the hereafter.”32

29. In Ma’ani al-Akhbar: In his narration from Ahmad ibn Abi ‘Abdillah from his father in a hadith attributed to the Noble Prophet (S) that he said: Jibra’il (as) came and said: “O Prophet of Allah! Allah has sent me to you with a gift which He has not given to anyone before you.” The Holy Prophet (S) said: “What is it?” Jibra’il said: “It is patience; and something better than it.” He said: “And what is that?”

Jibra’il said: “It is pleasure; and something better than it.” He asked: “And what is that?” Jibra’il said: “It is abstinence; and that which is better than it.” He said: “What is it?” Jibra’il said: “It is sincerity; and better than that.” He said: “And what is it?” Jibra’il said: “It is certainty; and better than it.” The Holy Prophet (S) said: I said: “What is that O Jibra’il!” He said: “The way to attain all of them is to trust in Allah (SwT).”

I said: “O Jibra’il! What is the meaning of trusting in Allah?” He said: “Knowing that the creation can neither cause any harm nor benefit and can neither give nor withhold (anything), and having no hope (of getting anything) from the creation. When the servant reaches this state, he does not do anything save for Allah, and he does not desire nor fear anyone but Allah

and he does not set his hopes on anyone except Allah. This is the meaning of trusting in Allah.”

The Holy Prophet (S) said: I said: “O Jibra’il! What is the meaning of patience?” He replied: “One must be forbearing and patient in times of affliction as he is in times of joy and in poverty as he is in wealth and in calamity as he is in comfort; without complaining of his condition because of what has befallen him.”

I said: “And what is the meaning of contentment?” He said: “To be satisfied with whatever comes to him in this world, being content with whatever little he has and thanking (Allah) for it.”

I said: “And what is the meaning of pleasure?” Jibra’il said: “It means that one should never be displeased with his Master, whether he gets (the comforts) of the world or not, and not to be pleased with one’s few good deeds.”

I said: “And what is the meaning of abstinence?” He said: “That one loves whatever His creator loves and hates whatever He hates and is very careful about what is lawful and does not (even) glance at what is unlawful; for what is lawful is to be accounted for and what is unlawful will entail punishment. He is merciful to all Muslims as he is merciful to himself. He avoids useless speech just as he avoids a corpse with an intensely foul smell. He avoids the possessions and embellishments of this world as he keeps away from the fire - that it should not cover him. He has no great hopes or desires and he always remembers his death.”

I said: “O Jibra’il! And what is the meaning of sincerity?” He said: “A sincere person is one who does not ask for anything from people until he obtains it (himself) and whenever he obtains it, he is pleased with it. If something extra remains with him, he gives it in the way of Allah. By not asking for anything from others, he has shown that he is truly a servant of Allah. If he obtains what he wants, he becomes happy, the Almighty is pleased withiand he is pleased with Allah, and Allah him. When he gives from it in the way of Allah, he has reached the stage of fully relying on his Lord.”

I said: “And what is certainty?” He said: “A man with certainty performs actions for the sake of Allah as though he sees Him. Even if he does not see Allah, he knows that Allah sees him; and he is certain that what is coming to him (by the will of Allah) will not pass him by, and what is not meant to be for him will not come to him. These are all branches of trust in Allah and abstinence (from worldly pleasures).”33

30. In the book of ‘Asim ibn Hamid al-Hannat: From Abi Basir who said: I heard Aba Ja’far (as) saying: An angel came to the Holy Prophet (S) and said: “O Muhammad! Your lord sends His salutation to you and says: If you wish I will place for you pebble of gold in an area the size of Makkah.” So he (as) raised his head to the heavens and said: “O my Lord! I eat one day so I praise you and I remain hungry another day so I invoke you.”34

31. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Muhammad ibn Muslim who said: I heard Aba Ja’far (as) mentioning that an angel came to the Noble Prophet (S) and said: “Allah has given you the choice between being a humble servant or a wealthy king.” So he looked at Jibra’il (as) who made a sign with his hand

to him to choose humility. So he said: “(I choose to be) a humble servant messenger.” So the sent angel said: “Even if (you choose to be a king) it will in no way reduce your status in front of your Lord.” He (as) said: And he had the keys to the treasures of the earth.35

32. In Nahj al-Balagha: He (as) said: “So follow your Prophet, the noble, the pure He took the least (share) from this world and did not take a full glance at it. Of all the people of the world, he was the least sated and the most empty of stomach. The world was offered to him but he refused to accept it. When he knew that Allah, the Glorified, hated a thing, he too hated it; that Allah held a thing low, he too held it low; that Allah held a thing small, he too held it small. If we love what Allah and His Prophet hate and hold great what Allah and His Prophet hold small that would be enough isolation from Allah and transgression of His commandments. The Holy Prophet used to eat on the ground, and sat like a slave. He repaired his shoes with his own hands and patched his clothes with his own hands. He would ride on an unsaddled donkey and would seat someone behind him.

If there was a curtain on his door with pictures on it, he would say to one of his wives: “O so-and-so! Take it away out of my sight because if I look at it I recall the world and its allurements.” Thus, he distanced his heart from this world and removed its remembrance from his mind. He wished that its allurements should remain hidden from his eyes so that he should not take wealth from it, nor regard it a place of stay and hope to live in it. Consequently he removed it from his mind, distanced it from his heart and kept it hidden from his eyes, just as he who hates a thing would hate to look at it or to hear about it.36

33. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Talha ibn Zayd from Abi ‘Abdillah (as) who said: There was nothing in this world that pleased the Holy Prophet (S) more than remaining hungry and fearing Allah.37

Note: This has also been narrated from Hisham and others from the Imam (as).38

34. From al-Tabarsi in al-Ihtijaj: From Musa ibn Ja’far, from his father, from his fathers, from Husayn ibn ‘Ali (as), in a lengthy narrative mentioning the condition of the Holy Prophet (S): He would cry out of the fear of Allah until his prayer mat would become wet (from his tears) - despite not having committed any sin.39

35. In al-Manaqib: He (S) would cry until he became unconscious. Someone asked him: “Has Allah not forgiven all your sins, of past and future?” He replied: “Should I not be a thankful servant?” And this was the same condition of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (as), his successor, when he worshipped.40

36. From al-Daylami in al-Irshad: It is narrated that a sound of weeping, like the sound of boiling from a cooking-pot would be heard from Prophet Ibrahim (as) when he prayed - out of fear of Allah (SwT) and the Holy Prophet (S) was the same.41

37. From Shaykh Abi al-Fattah in his Tafsir: From Abi Sa’id al-Khudri who said: When the verse

“Remember God with frequent remembrance” (Surat al-Ahzab (33): 41)

was revealed, the Noble Prophet (S) became so engrossed in the remembrance of Allah that the infidels said he had become insane.42

38. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Zayd al-Shahham from Abi ‘Abdillah (as) who said: The Prophet (S) used to seek repentance seventy times a day. I asked: did he say: ‘Astaghfirullaha wa Atubu Ilayh’ (I seek repentance from Allah and turn to Him)? He replied: No, but he used to say: ‘Atubu Ilallah’ (I turn to Allah). I said: The Prophet (S) used to repent and not repeat and we repent and repeat (our sins), so he (as) said: Allah is the provider of succor.43

39. Also: Narrated from Talha ibn Zayd from Abi ‘Abdillah (as): The Holy Prophet (S) never used to stand up from a gathering, even when almost everyone had departed, until he had sought repentance from Allah (SwT) twenty-five times.44

40. In Makarim al-Akhlaq, quoting from the book al-Nubuwwah: From Amir al-Mu’minin (as) who, when describing the Holy Prophet (S) would say: He was the most openhanded, the most valiant, the most truthful, and the most loyal in fulfilling his obligation, the most soft-hearted and the noblest of all people. When a person saw him for the first time he was awed by his presence and when one mingled with him he would (immediately) love him. I have never seen anyone like him (S) before him nor after him.45

41.From al-Shaykh al-Tusi in al-Amali: Narrated from Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn ibn Zayd ibn ‘Ali from al-Rid’a from his fathers (as) who said: The Holy Prophet (S) said: You must adopt an honorable character, for Allah (SwT) has sent me with it. From the honorable character is for one to show forgiveness to the one who wrongs him, to give the one who deprives him, to keep contact with the one who cuts him off and to visit the sick one who does not visit him (when he is sick).46

42. In al-Kafi: From ‘Isa ibn ‘Abdillah ibn ‘Umar ibn ‘Ali from his father (as) who said: It was from the attestation of the Holy Prophet (S) to say: No, and I seek forgiveness from Allah.47

43. In Makarim al-Akhlaq: From Ibn ‘Umar who said: The pleasure and displeasure of the Noble Prophet (S) could be seen in his face. When he was pleased, it would be apparent by the brightness of his face, and when he became angry, the color of his face paled and became darkened.48

44. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Muhammad ibn ‘Arafah from Abi ‘Abdillah (as) who said: The Holy Prophet (S) said (to his companions): “Should I not inform you of the one from among you who is most similar to me?” They said: “Yes, O Prophet of Allah!” He said: “The one with the best character from you, the most soft-hearted towards the people, the most beneficent to his relatives, the most intense in his love for his brothers in faith, the most patient with regards to the truth, the one who represses his anger the most, the most forgiving and the most intense in his upholding justice, in pleasure and anger.49

45. From al-Ghazali in al-Ihya’: When he (S) became very excited he would touch his noble beard frequently.50

46. Also: He said: And he (S) was the most generous of all men. Neither a dinar nor a dirham was left with him in the evening. If night fell and he had something extra and did not find anyone to give it to, he did not return

to his home until he was able to give it to the one who needed it. He did not take from what was given to him by Allah except his annual provisions, from the dates and barley that were easiest for him to get, and he gave the rest in the way of Allah. He was not asked for a thing but that he gave it. Then (after giving away the excess) he returned to his annual provisions and preferred to give from it. Even when it was possible that he would require it before the end of the year if nothing (else) was to come to him he would enforce the truth, even if it meant a loss for himself or his companions he would walk alone among his enemies, without a bodyguard he was not moved by any of the worldly affairs He sat with the poor and ate with them. He honored the people of virtue for their good character and he won the hearts of the noble ones by respecting them.

He kept close ties with his near relatives without preferring them to the one who was better than them (in virtue). He did not oppress anyone and accepted the excuse of the one who asked for pardon and he had a male and female slave but never ate better food or wore better clothes than them. Not a moment of his time was passed without doing an action for Allah, or (doing) that which was necessary for the probity of his soul. He would visit the gardens of his companions. He never looked down on a poor man due to his poverty or misfortune, nor did he fear a king because of his power; (rather) he would urge them equally to Allah.51

47. Also: He said: Of all men he (S) was the least angry and the easiest to please. He was the most caring, courteous and helpful towards the people.52

48. Also: He said: When he (S) rejoiced and was pleased, he was the best of the pleased ones. If he preached, he preached seriously; if he got angry - and he never got angry except for the sake of Allah - nothing could withstand his anger. This was how he was in all his affairs. When some difficulty came upon him, he entrusted it to Allah and renounced his (own) strength and power, and sought guidance from Allah.53

49. In al-Kafi: Narrated from Salam ibn al-Mustanir from Abi Ja’far (as) who said: The Prophet (S) said: Verily for every act of worship there is eagerness (in the beginning) then it becomes languid. So the one whose eagerly performed worship is in accordance to mysunnah has found guidance, and the one who acts against mysunnah has strayed and his deeds are in ruin. As for me, I pray and I sleep, I fast and I open my fast, I laugh and I cry. So the one who forsakes my ways and mysunnah is not from me.54

Note: The narrations on this subject are numerous. We have quoted one or two narrations from each topic. However, there are many more narrations on detailed aspects (of his (S) character).

References

1. This is indicative of strength. (Tr.)

2. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:155, Fayd’ al-Qadir 5:76-79, Wa`sail al-Wusul Ila Shama`il al-Rasul: 37-47

3. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:157

4. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:157, Fayd’ al-Qadir 5:80

5. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:158

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. al-Faqih 1:122, Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:158

9. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:158, Bihar al-Anwar 16:191

10. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:158

11. Ibid.

12. al-Faqih 1:129, Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:158

13. Bihar al-Anwar 16:172 quoting from Qisas al-Anbiya`: 287, Makarim al-Akhlaq: 24

14. Basa`ir al-Darajat: 420, no. 8

15. al-Khara`ij wal-Jara`ih 1:32, no. 29, Bihar al-Anwar 16:174, Kamal al-Din wa Tamam al-Ni’mah 1:165, and in the book of ‘Abd al-Malik: 99

16. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:124, more about this is narrated in al-Khara`ij: 221

17. al-Kafi 2:615, and al-Tabarsi has narrated the same thing in al-Ihtijaj: 204

18. Ma’ani al-Akhbar: 83, ‘Uyun Akhbar al-Rid’a, 1:246, al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah of Ibn Kathir 2:601

19. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 11

20. Bihar al-Anwar 16:161

21. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 24, ‘Awarif al-Ma’arif: 224

22. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 19, Majma’ al-Bayan 5:69 - Surat al-Tawbah (9)

23. Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din 2:367

24. Manaqib Ale Abi Talib 1:125, Makarim al-Akhlaq: 24

25. al-Mahasin: 192, no. 8

26. We did not find this in al-Tahdhib, but we found it in Amali al-Shaykh al-Tusi 2:209, al-Fiqh al-Rid’a: 353, Mishkat al-Anwar: 243, ‘Awarif al-Ma’arif: 211

27. al-Faqih 3:554

28. Ma’ani al-Akhbar: 191, al-Khisal: 431, Tuhf al-’Uqul: 362, al-Kafi 2:56 (and in it is `He distinguished His prophets), Amali al-Saduq, 184

29. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 19

30. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 18, Nahj al-Balaghah: 520, Kashf al-Ghummah 1:9

31. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 17

32. al-Kafi 2:88

33. Ma’ani al-Akhbar: 260, ‘Uddat al-Da’i: 94

34. al-Usul al-Sittata ‘Ashar: 37, Makarim al-Akhlaq: 24, al-Kafi 8:131, Jami’ al-Akhbar: 295, Amali al-Tusi 2:144, Bihar al-Anwar 16:283 and 70: 318

35. al-Kafi 2:122 and 8:131, Amali al-Saduq: 365, Bihar al-Anwar 18:334

36. Nahj al-Balaghah: 227 Sermon 160, Makarim al-Akhlaq: 9, Bihar al-Anwar 16:285

37. al-Kafi 2:129

38. Ibid., 8:129

39. al-Ihtijaj: 223 - in the debate of Imam ‘Ali (as) with the Jews.

40. al-Mustadrak 11:247, Irshad al-Qulub: 91, and we did not find it in al-Manaqib.

41. Irshad al-Qulub: 105, ‘Uddat al-Da’i: 137

42. Rawhul Jinan wa Ruhul Jinan (Tafsir of Abi al-Fattuh al-Razi) 1:375 - Surat al-Baqarah: 147

43. al-Kafi 2:438, ‘Uddat al-Da’i: 250

44. al-Kafi 2:504, ‘Uddat al-Da’i: 250

45. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 18, Bihar al-Anwar 16:194 Section 8 Hadith no. 33

46. Amali al-Shaykh al-Tusi 2:92

47. al-Kafi 7:463

48. Makarim al-Akhlaq: 19

49. al-Kafi 2:240, Tuhf al-’Uqul: 48

50. Ihya` ‘Ulum al-Din 2:387

51. Ihya` ‘Ulum al-Din 2:360, al-Manaqib 1:145, al-Mahajjat al-Bayd’a` 4:123

52. Ihya` ‘Ulum al-Din 2:369

53. Ibid. - The author has an explanation on this hadith, refer to al-Mizan 6:311 - Surat al-Ma`idah (5): 116-120

54. al-Kafi 2:85