A History of Muslim Philosophy Volume 1

A History of Muslim Philosophy4%

A History of Muslim Philosophy Author:
Publisher: www.muslimphilosophy.com
Category: Islamic Philosophy

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A History of Muslim Philosophy

A History of Muslim Philosophy Volume 1

Author:
Publisher: www.muslimphilosophy.com
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


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Chapter 9: Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’an

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’an by Abul Al’a Maududi, Editor, Tarjamanul Qur’an, Lahore (Pakistan)

Economic Teachings

1. The first economic principle emphasized by the Qur'an with repeated stress is that all natural means of production, and resources which subscribe to man's living, have been created by God. It is He who made them as they are and set them to follow the laws of nature that make them useful for man. It is He who allowed man to exploit them and placed them at his disposal.1

2. On the basis of the aforesaid truth the Qur'an lays down the principle that an individual has neither the right to be free in acquiring and exploiting these resources according to his own sweet will, nor is he entitled to draw a line independently to decide between the lawful and the unlawful. It is for God to draw this line; for none else. The Qur'an condemns the Midians, an Arabian tribe of old, because its people claimed to possess a right to acquire and expend wealth in any way they liked without restriction of any kind.2

It calls it a “lie” if a man describes a certain thing as lawful and another unlawful on his own account.3 The right to pronounce this rests with God and (as God's deputy) His Prophet.4

3. Under the, sovereign command of God and within the limits imposed by Him, the Qur'an recognizes the right of holding private property as implied in several verses.5

The economic scheme presented in the Qur'an is based entirely on the idea of individual ownership in every field. There is nothing in it to suggest that a distinction is to be made between consumption goods and production goods (or means of production) and that only the former may be held in private ownership, while the latter must be nationalized.

Nor is there anything in the Qur'an suggesting or implying that the above‑mentioned scheme is of a temporary nature to be replaced later by a permanent arrangement in which collectivization of all means of production may be desired to be made the rule. Had that been the ultimate object of the Qur'an, it would have certainly stated it unequivocally and given us instructions with regard to that future permanent order.

The mere fact that it mentions in one place that “the earth belongs to God”6 is not enough to conclude that it either denies or forbids private owner­ship of land and sanctions nationalization. Elsewhere it says, “Whatever is in the heavens and the earth belongs to God,”7 but nobody has ever concluded from this verse that none of the things in the heavens or the earth can be held in individual possession or that all these things should be State property. If, a thing which belongs to God ceases to belong to human beings, certainly it ceases to belong to individuals and States alike.

It is equally erroneous to draw from verse xli,10 the inference that the Qur'an desires to distribute all the means of livelihood in the earth equally among all men, and conclude that since this can be achieved only under nationalization, the Qur'an advocates or favours the introduction of that system. For the purpose of this interpretation the verse is wrongly rendered to mean that “God has put in the earth its means of sustenance proportionately in four days, alike for those who seek.”8

But even this wrong translation does not serve the purpose. It would be incorrect to apply the words “alike for those who seek” to human beings alone. All kinds of animals, too, are among “those who seek,” and there is little doubt that their means of sustenance have also been placed by God in the earth. If this verse, then, denotes an equal share to all who seek, there is no justification for restricting this equality of share to members of the human species alone.

Similarly, it would be wrong to stretch those verses of the Qur'an which emphasize providing for the weak or the have‑nots to extract from them the theory of nationalization. It should be seen that wherever it stresses this need of providing for the poor, it also prescribes the only way of meeting it, namely, that the rich and the well‑to‑do of a society should spend their wealth generously for the welfare of their poor kin, the orphans, and the needy for the pleasure of God; in addition to this, the State should collect a fixed portion of it and spend it for the same purpose.

There is no hint in the Qur'an of any other scheme proposed to be put in practice to meet this end.

No doubt, there is nothing in the Qur'an to prevent a certain thing from being taken over from individual control and placed under collective control, if necessary; but to deny individual ownership altogether and adopt nationali­zation as an economic system does not go with the Qur'anic approach to man's economic problems.

4. The fact that, as in other things, all men do not enjoy equality in suste­nance and means of earning, is described in the Qur'an as a feature of God's providence. Extravagant disparities devised by various social systems aside, natural inequality, as it goes, is described as the outcome of His wise apportionment, issuing from His own dispensation. The idea that this inequality is to be levelled up and substituted by dead equality is alien to the Book of God.9

The Qur'an advises people not to covet that by which Allah has made some of you excel others; men shall have the benefit of what they earn and women shall have the benefit of what they earn, and ask Allah of His grace.10

It is sometimes tried to conclude from verses xvi, 71 and xxx, 28 that the Qur'an desires equality of provision for everybody. But both the words and the context of these verses tell that they do not attempt to disparage inequality and urge equality to take its place, but press this fact (of inequality among men) as an argument against taking some of God's creatures as His partners.

They argue that when men are not prepared to share their wealth (given by God) with their slaves as equal partners, what on earth leads them to think that God will share His powers with His servants and have partners with Him from amongst His creation?11

5. The Qur'an also asserts with full and repeated emphasis that God has created His bounties for men so that they use them for their benefit. It is not His intent that men should have nothing to do with them and live a life of renunciation. However, He desires that they should distinguish between things pure and impure, lawful and unlawful. They should use and exploit only what is pure and lawful, and there too should observe moderation.12

6. To achieve this end the Qur'an ordains that wealth should be acquired by lawful means only and that unlawful ways and means should be discarded altogether: “O you who believe, take not your wealth among yourselves in wrongful ways, but let there be trade among you by mutual agreement . .”13

These “wrongful ways” have been detailed at length by the Holy Prophet and the great jurists of Islam have elucidated them in books of law. Some of them, however, have been described in the Qur'an as under:

(a) “And do not eat one another's property among yourselves in wrongful ways, nor seek by it to gain the nearness of the judges that you may sinfully consume a portion of other men's goods and that knowingly.”14

(b) “If one of you deposits a thing on trust with another, let him who is trusted (faithfully) deliver his trust, and let him fear God, his Lord.”15

(c) “He who misappropriates (the public money) will come on the Day of Judgment with what he has misappropriated; then shall everyone be given in full what he earned.”16

(d) “The thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands.”17

(e) “Those who devour the property of orphans unjustly, devour fire in their bellies, and will soon endure a blazing fire.”18

(f) “Woe to the defrauders who, when they take the measure from men, exact full measure, but when they measure or weigh for them, give less than is due.”19

(g) “Those who love those indecent things should spread among the believers, for them is a painful chastisement, in the life of this world and the hereafter.20

(h) “Force not your slave‑girls to prostitution that you may enjoy (some) gain of the present life, if they desire to live in chastity.”21 “And approach not fornication, surely it is a shameful deed and an evil Way.”22 “The adulterer and the adulteress, flog each of them with a hundred stripes.”23

(i) “O ye believers, wine and gambling and idols and divining arrows are an abomination of Satan's handiwork; so avoid them that you may prosper.”24

(j) “God has permitted trade and forbidden usury.”25 “O ye believers, fear God and give up what remains (due to you) of usury if you are believers (indeed). If you do not do so, take notice of war from God and His Messenger. But if you repent you shall have your principal. Neither you wrong, nor shall you be wronged. If the debtor is in straitened circumstances, give him time till it is easy (for him to pay), and that you remit (the debt), by way of charity, that is the best thing for you, if you only knew.”26

Thus we see that the Qur'an has prohibited the following ways of acquiring wealth:

(i) Taking another's property without, his consent or remuneration or with consent and with or without remuneration in such a way that the consent is forced or obtained by guile.

(ii) Bribes.

(iii) Forcible acquisitions.

(iv) Fraud, whether with private or public wealth.

(v) Theft.

(vi) Mis­appropriation of orphans' property.

(vii) Taking or giving wrong measure

(viii) Businesses which help to spread indecency.

(ix) Prostitution and its earnings.

(x) Manufacture, buying and selling, and carriage of wines.

(xi) Gambling, including all such ways in which the transfer of wealth from one person to another depends on mere chance.

(xii) Manufacture, buying, and selling of idols, and service of temples where idols are kept or worshipped.

(xiii) Earnings from businesses like astrology, foretelling of fate, divination, etc.

(xiv) Usury.

7. After prohibiting these wrong ways of acquiring wealth the Qur'an also strongly condemns the amassing of wealth in a covetous and niggardly way.27 Along with this we are warned that love of wealth or a hankering after riches and pride of fortune hae always been among the causes that have led men astray and ultimately sent them to ruin.28

8. On the other hand, the Qur'an condemns it in equally strong terms that one should squander one's properly acquired wealth in wasteful pursuits, spend it for one's own lust or luxury, and put it to no use save raising one's own standard of living.29

9. The proper course for man, according to the Qur'an, is to spend moderately on his own needs and those of his family. He and his dependants have rights to his wealth which must be granted without stint, but he cannot be allowed to squander everything on himself and his family, for there are other obligations, too, which must be recognized.30

10. After he has satisfied his own needs with moderation, a man should spend what is left over of his well‑earned wealth in the following ways:

“They ask you what they should spend (in charity). Say: `Whatever exceeds your needs.”'31

“It is not piety that you turn your faces towards east or west. Piety is that a man should believe in God and the Last Day and the angels and the Book and the Prophets, and give his wealth for the love of God to his kinsfolk and the orphans and the needy and the traveller and to those who ask, and for setting the slaves free.”32

“You will never attain piety until you spend what you love (of your wealth). And whatever you spend, God knows it well.”33

“Serve God, and associate no partner with Him, and be kind to parents and kinsmen and orphans and the needy, and the neighbour who is of kin, and the neighbour who is a stranger, and the companion by your side, and the traveller, and the slaves that your right hands own. Surely God does not love the proud and the boastful.”34

“(Charity is) for those poor people who are so restrained in the way of God that they cannot travel in the land to earn their living. The ignorant man regards them as wealthy because of their self‑possession. You shall know them by their mark, they do not beg of men importunately. What­ ever (wealth) you spend (on them) God surely knows it.”35

“They (the righteous) feed the needy, the orphan, and the captive, for the love of God, saying: `We feed you for the sake of God alone. We desire no reward from you nor any thanks.”'36

“(Excepted from the fire of hell are) those in whose wealth there is a fixed portion for the beggar and the destitute.”37

The Qur'an not only tells that this kind of spending is the essence of piety but also warns that its absence in a society must mean its decay and ruination: “Expend in the way of God, and cast not yourself with your own hands into ruin.”38

11. Besides this general and voluntary spending in the way of God the Qur'an enjoins expending of wealth as expiation of omissions and sins. For instance, if a man takes an oath and then forswears it, “the expiation for it is to feed ten poor persons with the average of food which you serve to your own folk, or to clothe them, or to give a slave his freedom; or if anyone does not find (the wherewithal to do so) let him fast three days.”39

Similarly, if anyone makes his wife unlawful for him by declaring her to be his mother or sister by zihar40 and later seeks to retract and take her again, it is ordained that “he should free a slave before the two touch each other, and he who has not (the wherewithal for that) should fast for two months consecutively . and he who is unable to do so let him feed sixty poor per­sons.”41

Like expiations have also been ordained to make up for omissions in the performance of piilgrimage42 and proper observance of the month of fasting.43

12. But all such expense will count as expense in God's way only if it is really free from selfishness, guile, and display, and there is no attempt to hurt or lay anyone under obligation. One must also make no attempt to sort out the worse of one's goods to disburse in charity. One must give the choice of them, and bear nothing in mind except the love and pleasure of God.44

13. This expending of wealth which the Qur'an variously terms as “spending in God's way” or charity or zakat, is not a mere act of piety, an almsgiving; rather it is the third among the five pillars of Islam, viz., (1) the witness of faith (iman), (2) prayer (salat), (3) charity (zakat), (4) fasting (saum) and (5) pilgrimage (hajj). It has been mentioned constantly with prayer (salat) some thirty‑seven times in the Qur'an and both of them have been described with full emphasis as essentials of Islam, without which there can be no sal­vation.45 Zakat, it says, has been a pillar of true religion preached by all the prophets of God.46

And so this zakat is a pillar of Islam now in the religion of the last Prophet of God. It is as essential for one who joins the fold of Islam as bearing witness to the truth of faith (iman) or prayer (salat).47

Zakat is not only for the good of society; it is also necessary for the moral development and edification of the giver himself. It is for his own purification and salvation. It is not only a tax, but also an act of worship just like prayer. It is an essential part of that programme which the Qur'an prescribes for the amelioration of man's soul.48

14. But the Qur'an was not content to infuse a general spirit of voluntary benevolence and philanthropy among people. It instructed the Prophet as the Head of the Islamic State to fix an obligatory minimum for it, and arrange for its regular receipt and disbursement.

“Take a charity from their wealth.”49

The words “a charity” pointed out that a certain fixed measure determined by the Prophet was to be enjoined on people, besides the usual charity they practised of their own accord. Accordingly, the Prophet fixed a maximum allowable limit in respect of different kinds of wealth, and the following rates were fixed for the holdings that stood above that limit50

(1) On gold, silver, and cash hoardings51 - 2 1/2 % annually

(2) On agricultural produce from unirrigated land - 10 % annually

(3) On agricultural produce from artificially irrigated land - 5 % annually

(4) On livestock kept for breeding and trade‑the rates are different for sheep, goats, cows, camels, etc.

(5) On mines in private ownership and treasure‑troves - 20 % annually

The Prophet of God imposed these rates of zakat as a duty on Muslims like the five daily prayers. As duties, and in being incumbent, there is no difference between the two. According to the Qur'an, it is one of the basic objects of an Islamic State that it should institute prayer (salat) and manage regular re­ceipt and distribution of zakat.52

It should be noted that although, as seen above, the collection and disburse­ment of zakat is a duty of an Islamic State, the believers will not be absolved from paying it (privately), just as they are not absolved from prayer, in case the Islamic State ceases to exist or is neglectful of its duty.

15. To the funds collected under zakat the Qur'an adds another item‑a part of the spoils of war. The rule prescribed by the Book is that the soldiers fighting in a battle should not loot the spoils which fall into their hands after a victory, but bring everything before the commander who should distribute four‑fifth of the whole booty amongst soldiers who participated in the engagement and hand over the remaining fifth to the State for the following purposes:

“Know that whatever booty you take, the fifth of it is for God and the Prophet and the kinsmen and the orphans and the needy and the traveller.”53

16. The income from these two sources, according to the Qur'an, is not a part of the general exchequer maintained to furnish comforts and provide for essential services for all including those who contribute to the zakat fund. On the contrary, it is reserved for use on the following items:

Alms are meant for the poor54 and the needy55 and those who work on them (i. e., collect, disburse, and manage them) and those whose hearts are to be reconciled,56 for the ransoming of slaves57 and those in debt, and the cause of God58 and the traveller59 ‑ a duty from God.”60

17. The Qur'anic rule with regard to the property which a person leaves behind him after his or her death is that it should be distributed among his parents, children, and wife (or husband, as the case may be) according to a specified ratio. If he leaves neither parents nor children, his brothers and sisters (real, step, or uterine) should divide it. Detailed instructions relating to this may be seen in chapter iv of the Qur'an.61 We omit to reproduce them here to avoid prolixity.

The guiding principle here is that property accumulated by a person during his life‑time should not remain accumulated there after his death but scatter among his kinsfolk. This is opposed to the principle underlying primogeniture, the joint family, and other like systems which aim at keeping accumulated wealth accumulated even after the death of its holder.

The Qur'an also rejects the system of adopting children to make them heirs, and lays down that inheritance should go to those who are actually related, not to those fictitiously adopted as sons and daughters to pass on property.62

However, after ensuring blood relations their rights, the Qur'an advises them to be generous to the other relations who are not going to inherit but are present on the occasion of the division of property. They also may be given something out of kindness.63

18. In prescribing the law of inheritance the Qur'an allows a person's right to make a will before he dies in respect of the property he is leaving behind him.64

This ordinance instructs a man who is passing away to urge his offspring to be kind to his parents‑the young being often inclined to neglect the proper care of their aged grand‑parents; and to bequeath some of his property to those of his kinsfolk who deserve help but are not entitled to inherit anything under the law. Besides this if a person is leaving much wealth he may bequeath a part of it for charitable purposes or works of social welfare, for the above­ quoted verse does not ask him to restrict his will to his parents and relatives alone.65

It is evident from these laws of inheritance that the rule in respect of the heritage of private property is that two‑thirds of it must be divided among legal heirs and the remaining one‑third left to the discretion of the dying person to dispose it of as he wills, provided, however, the purpose for which he means to bequeath it is just and lawful, and no one is robbed of his right.66

19. As for those people who cannot husband their property well on account of idiocy or want of intelligence and are wasting it away or, it is genuinely feared, are likely to do so, the instruction is that they may not be allowed to hold it in their care. Such property should lie in the care of their guardians or responsible judicial officers and may be restored to them only when there is satisfaction that they are able to manage their affairs properly.67

An important point described in this verse about private possessions is that although they are the property of their owners according to law, yet they do not wholly be­long to them, because the interest of society is also involved in them. That is why the Qur'an calls them “your property” instead of “their property.”

That is also why, where unintelligent use of private property is causing, or is likely to cause, harm to the collective interest of society, it allows guardians or magis­trates to take it over in their own hands, without, however, disturbing the owner's right of owning it or benefiting by it.68

20. The Qur'anic direction in respect of properties, wealth, and incomes that belong to the State is that they should not be used for the welfare of rich classes only but of all alike and particularly the poor whose interest deserves more looking after than that of any other class.

“Whatever God has bestowed on His Messenger, (taking it) from the people of these towns, is for God and the Messenger69 and the kinsfolk70 and the orphans and the needy and the traveller, in order that it may not circulate among the rich of you (only) (It is also) for the poor emigrants who have been expelled from their homes and possessions.”71

21. In the matter of levying taxes the Qur'an teaches the principle that their incidence should lie on those who possess more than they need, and on that part of their wealth which is surplus after all legitimate needs have been met.

“They ask you what they should spend. Say: `What is spare after meeting your needs.”72

The characteristic features and basic principles of the economic scheme drawn by the Qur'an for man and described in the above twenty‑one para­graphs may be summed up as follows

i. It works a happy co‑ordination between economic and moral values. Instead of being treated as distinctly separate things, the two are drawn to­gether into a harmonious blend. The economic problem has been tackled not from the purely “economic” point of view; it has been solved after being appropriately placed in the overall scheme of life based on ethical concepts of Islam. (paras 1, 2, 4, 5.)

ii. All resources and means of living are regarded as God's magnanimous gift to mankind; this implies that all kinds of monopolization, individual, collective, or national, should be discouraged and all men should be provided with free opportunities of earning on God's earth to the maximum limit possible. (para 5.)

iii. It allows individual right of ownership but not to an unlimited extant. Besides putting restrictions on it in the interest of other individuals and society as a whole, it admits on a person's property the rights of his relatives, neighbours, friends, the needy, the unfortunate, and, so to speak; of all members of society. Some of these are made enforceable by law; as for others, arrangement has been made to educate people morally and intellectually enabling them to understand these rights and prepare themselves to honour them of their own free‑will. (paras 3, 5, 7‑14, 16, 18, 19.)

iv. The natural way for the economic system to operate according to this scheme is that individuals should work it and try to improve it with free endeavour. However, they are not left to do as they may without checks and restraints of any kind. For their own cultural and economic welfare and for that of their society this freedom has been curtailed within limits. (paras 6, 14, 21.)

v. Man and woman are alike declared owners of the wealth they earn, in­herit, or acquire by other lawful means, and allowed to derive benefit from their possessions. (paras 3, 4, 17.)

vi. To preserve economic balance people have been urged to give up miserlyness and renunciation, and take to putting the gifts of God to good use. But at the same time they have been strongly warned not to indulge in extrava­gance of any kind. (paras 5, 7, 8.)

vii. To secure economic justice it has been assured that unjust means are not employed to force the flow of wealth in particular channels. Nor should wealth acquired by just means remain stored at a place and fall out of circula­tion. Arrangement is also made to ensure that wealth remains in constant use and circulation, particularly for the benefit of those classes which are deprived of their due and reasonable share for one reason or another. (paras 6‑8, 10, 11, 14, 16‑18, 20.)

viii. The scheme does not depend much upon the interference of law or the State to ensure economic justice. After declaring a few unavoidable things to be the responsibility of the State for this purpose, it seeks to enforce the other items in its plan through the intellectual and moral uplift of the individuals comprising a society and its general amelioration. Economic justice is thus secured in perfect concord with the principle of allowing the exercise of in­dividual freedom in the economic field. (paras 5‑21.)

ix. Instead of producing class conflict it puts an end to the causes of such conflicts and produces a spirit of co‑operation and comradeship among the different classes of society. (paras 4, 6‑10, 12, 14‑16, 20, 21.)

When these principles were worked out and put into practice in govern­mental and social spheres during the time of the Holy Prophet and his “Guided Successors,” many more injunctions and precedents came into exist­ence. But our present study precludes that discussion. Books of history, bio­graphy, traditions, and jurisprudence abound in such matters and may be consulted for details.

Political Teachings

1. The political philosophy of the Qur'an is essentially based on its fun­damental concept of the universe which should be clearly kept in mind for its proper appreciation and right appraisal. If we study this concept of the universe from the political point of view, the following four points vividly come into prominence

(a) That God is the creator of the whole of this universe including man and all those things which he exploits and harnesses into his service .73

(b) That God Himself is the sole master, ruler, director, and administrator of His creation.74

(c) That sovereignty in this universe does not and cannot vest in anyone except God. Nor has anyone else any right to share this sovereignty with Him.75

(d) That all attributes and powers of sovereignty are solely His prerogatives. He is living, self‑existent, self‑sufficient, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and exalted above all flaw, defect, or weakness. His is the supreme authority; everything submits to Him willingly or unwillingly; to Him belong all powers. He can dictate whatever He likes and none has the power to interfere in or review His commandments. No one can intercede with Him save by His leave. Nobody has the power to harm those whom He intends to benefit and none can protect whom He intends to harm.

He is accountable to none; everyone else is accountable to Him. He is the guardian of one and all. He can protect against all, but none can give quarters against Him. His are the powers of inflicting punishment or granting forgiveness. He is the supreme Lord over all other rulers. He grants an opportunity to rule on His earth to whomsoever He desires and withdraws this privilege whenever He so wills.

These essential powers and attributes of a sovereign being vest solely in God.76

2. On the basis of this concept of the universe the Qur'an asserts that the real sovereign of mankind too is the same as the sovereign of the whole uni­verse. His is the only rightful authority in human affairs just as in all other affairs of creation. No one else, be he human or non‑human, has any right to give orders or decide matters independently.

There is, however, one vital difference.

In the physical sphere of the universe the sovereignty of God is established by itself regardless of whether one willingly submits to it or not. In that sector of his life even man has no option to do otherwise. He too finds himself totally regulated by the inexorable laws of nature like any other object from the tiniest speck of an atom to the magnificent galaxies in space.

But in the volitional sphere of his life man has been allowed a certain amount of free‑will and God has not coerced him to an unwilling submission. Herein He has chosen only to invite and persuade mankind through His revealed Books (the last of which is the Holy Qur'an) to surrender themselves before His Lordship and acknow­ledge His sovereignty with deliberate willingness. The Qur'an has discussed the different aspects of this subject at great length. For instance:

(a) The Lord of the universe is indeed the Lord of man, and this position must be fully recognized by him.77

(b) God alone has the right to decide and order. Mankind should submit to none save Him. This is the only right course.78

(c) The right to rule belongs to God alone because He is the creator.79

(d) The right to order and decide belongs to God because He is the ruler of the universe.80

(e) His rule is right and just, because He alone comprehends reality and none else is in a position to give unerring guidance.81

3. On these grounds the Qur'an lays down that an unadulterated obedience is the due of God alone; that it is His Law that should rule supreme; and that to obey others or to follow one's own wishes against the Law of God, is not the right way.82

The Qur'an also asserts that no one has the right to transgress the limits that have been laid down by God for the regulation of human affairs.83

It also points out that all orders and decisions in contravention of the Law of God are not only wrong and unlawful but also unjust and blasphemous. It condemns all such orders as anti‑Islamic and the attempt to abide by them as negation of faith.84

4. Then the Qur'an says that prophets are the only source of our knowing the Law of God. They alone are the bearers of revelation and are in a position to convey to mankind the commandments and directions of their Lord.

They again are the persons divinely authorized to explain those commandments by their word and deed. Thus, the prophets are embodiments of the legal sovereignty of God. That is why obedience to them has been considered to be obedience to God Himself and faith in them has been made a necessary condition for demarcating belief from disbelief.85

5. According to the Qur'an, the commandments of God and the Prophet of Islam constitute the Supreme Law and the Muslims as such cannot adopt any attitude other than that of complete submission to it. A Muslim is not allowed to follow his own independent decisions in matters which have been finally and unequivocally decided by God and His Apostle. To do that is a negation of faith.86

6. The right form of government for mankind according to the Qur'an is one in which the State relinquishes its claim to sovereignty in favour of God and, after recognizing the legal supremacy of God and His Apostle, accepts the position of Caliphate (vicegerency) under the suzerainty of the Rightful Ruler. In this capacity all the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State will necessarily be circumscribed by the limits which have been described in paras 3, 4, and 5 above.87

7. The conception of Caliphate as it has been put forth by the Qur'an, can be summed up in the following terms

(a) All the powers that man possesses in this world are in fact not his own, but have been endowed to him by God Almighty. The Lord Himself has assign­ed to man the position in which he may exercise these delegated powers within the limits prescribed by Him. Man is thus not an independent master but a vicegerent of the real Sovereign.88

(b) Every nation that acquires the power and authority to rule over any part of the world is in reality a vicegerent of God in its domain.89

(c) This vicegerency, however, cannot be right and lawful unless it is subservient to the commandments of the real Sovereign. Any State independent of Him and not subservient to His commands is not a vicegerency. It is really a revolt against the Lord.90

8. The powers of a true Caliphate do not vest in any individual nor in any clan, class or community, but in those who believe and do good. The text of xxiv, 55 that “God has promised to those of you who believe and do good that He will most certainly make them His vicegerents on the earth...” is quite clear on this point. According to this verse, every good Muslim is fit to hold the position of a Caliph.

It is this aspect of Islamic Caliphate that distin­guishes it from a kingship, an oligarchy, and a theocracy. It is different even from modern democracy. There is a basic difference between the two. The edifice of democracy is raised on the principle of popular sovereignty; while in Islamic Caliphate the people themselves surrender their independence to the sovereignty of God and of their own accord limit their powers within the four corners of the divine Law and the promise of vicegerency has been held out to them only if they are morally good.

9. The government of a State established with a view to running an Islamic Caliphate cannot claim an absolute or unlimited obedience from the people. They are bound to obey it only so far as it exercises its powers in accordance with the divine Law revealed in nature and the Sacred Book. There can be neither obedience nor co‑operation in sin and aggression.91

10. In all affairs of the State, right from its constitution to the election of its Head and members of its parliament, and the matters of legislation and administration, the Muslims should make it a rule to take counsel among them­selves.92

11. The following qualifications must be kept in view in choosing the people responsible to run the State:

(a) They must have faith in the principles according to which they have to manage the affairs of the Caliphate. Evidently, an ideological system can­not work in the hands of those who do not subscribe to its principles.93

(b) They should not be unjust, licentious, forgetful of God, or transgressors of divine limits. They should be, on the other hand, honest, trustworthy, God­fearing, and virtuous.94

(c) They should not be unwise and ignorant. They must be rather educated, wise, intelligent, and both bodily and intellectually fit to pilot the State.95

(d) They should be men of integrity so that they may be safely entrusted with public responsibilities.96

12. The constitution of such a State shall be based on the following princi­ples:

(a) “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Apostle and those of you who are in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the Apostle if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end.”97

This verse elucidates five constitutional points:

(i) That obedience to God and His Apostle must be given priority to every other obedience.

(ii) That obedience to those who are in authority is subject to the obedience to God and His Apostle.

(iii) That the Head of the State must be from amongst the believers.

(iv) That it is possible for the people to differ with the government and its rulers.

(v) That in case of dispute the final authority to decide between them is the Law of God and His Apostle.

(b) The Qur'an does not give us any hard and fast rules about the method of election and consultation. It lays down only broad‑based principles and leaves the problem of their practical implementation to be decided in accordance with the exigencies of time and the requirements of society.

(c) In those matters about which clear injunctions have been given or definite principles laid down or limits prescribed by God and His Apostle, the legislature has only the right to interpret them, or to frame bye‑laws and rules of procedure to bring them into practice.

As for those matters about which the Supreme Law is silent, the legislature is allowed to legislate for all pur­poses and needs of the society keeping in view the spirit and the general principles of Islam. The very fact that no clear injunction exists about them in the Qur'an and Sunnah is sufficient to show that the Lawgiver has Him­self left it to the good sense of the believers.

(d) The judiciary must be free from every pressure and influence to adjudicate impartially without being carried away by the public or the people in authority. Its foremost duty is to give verdict strictly in accordance with the law and requirements of justice without being swayed either by the passions or preju­dices of its own members or those of others.98

13. This State comes into being for two main purposes. First, that justice and equity should be established in human affairs,99 and, secondly, that, the powers and resources of the State should be harnessed for the welfare of the people, i. e., for promotion, for them, of all that is good and eradication of all that is evil.100

14. All citizens of the State, whether Muslims or non‑Muslims, must be guaranteed the following fundamental rights, and it is the bounden duty of the State to safeguard them against all types of encroachment:

(a) Security of person.101

(b) Security of property.102

(c) Protection of honour.103

(d) Right of privacy.104

(e) The right to protest against injustice.105

(f) The right to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil. This includes the right of criticism.106

(g) Freedom of association, provided it is used for good ends and does not become an instrument for spreading dissensions and creating fundamental differences in the society.107

(h) Freedom of faith and conscience.108

(i) Protection against wrongfully hurting one's religious susceptibilities.109 The Qur'an has clearly laid down in this connection that in matters of religious differences an academic discussion can be held, but it must be conducted in a fair and decent manner.110

(j) Limiting the responsibility of every person only to his or her own deeds.111

(k) Security from action being taken against anyone on false reports about his or her crime.112

(l) The right of the destitute and the needy to be provided with basic necessities of life by the State.113

(m) Equal treatment of all its subjects by the State without discrimination114 ..

An Islamic State has the following rights against its citizens:

(a) That they must submit to its authority.115

(b) That they must be law‑abiding and should not disturb the public order and tranquillity.116

(c) They must give unstinted support to the State in its rightful activities.117

(d) They must be prepared to sacrifice their life and property for the defence of the State.118

16. The Qur'an gives the following important directions about the foreign policy of the Islamic State:

(a) Sanctity of treaties and pledges.119 (b) Honesty and integrity in all transactions.120 (c) International justice.121 (d) Respect for the rights of neutrals in war.122 (e) Love of peace.123 (f) Non‑participation in the efforts directed to self‑aggrandizement and oppression in the world.124 (g) Friendly treatment to all non‑hostile powers.125 (h) Fair deal with all those who are good and honest in their dealings.126 (i) Retaliation in proportion to the high‑handedness of others and no more.127

The salient features of the State envisaged in these sixteen points laid down by the Holy Qur'an are as follows:

(i) This State is brought into existence by a conscious resolve on the part of a politically free nation to renounce all claims to sovereignty in favour of God Almighty, to surrender its autonomy accepting the position of vicegerency under Him, and to work according to precepts and directions given by the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Apostle.

(ii) It is theocratic in so far as it is based on the doctrine of sovereignty of God but, in actual and practical realization of this doctrine, it is vitally different from theocracy. Instead of delegating the vicegerency of God to a particular order of priests and vesting them with the full powers to rule, it vests the believers whose deeds are good with the right of Caliphate.

(iii) It is democratic in the sense that the formation of government, change in its administrative set‑up, and its working wholly depend upon the general will. But the rights of the people in this system are not so unlimited that they may change the law of the State, its ideology, its internal and external policy, and its resources according to their own sweet will.

On the other hand, the Supreme Law of God and His Apostle with its legal and moral code provides a permanent and inviolable check which always keeps the life of the community on the right keel and on a broad pattern which can be changed neither by the executive, nor by the legislature, nor by the judiciary, nor even by the whole nation unless it decides to renounce the religion of God and break its pledge with Him.

(iv) It is an ideological State which must be run only by those who accept its basic ideology and principles wholeheartedly. As for those who do not subscribe to its ideology but live within its territorial bounds, the State guarantees them the same civil rights as are enjoyed by the other inhabitants provided they pledge to behave as law‑abiding citizens.

(v) It is a State which makes no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of race or colour and is not bound by any linguistic or geographical barriers. It is a purely ideological State. All peoples, no matter to whatever race, nation, or country they belong, can accept this ideology and become equal partners in all the affairs of the State. Such an ideological State bids fair to become a world State.

But even if more than one such States are established in different parts of the world, all of them will be equally Islamic. And instead of there being any nationalistic conflicts among them, they will extend fraternal support and co‑operation to one another. Not only that, there is every possibility of their joining together in a world confederation of their own.

(vi) The real spirit of this State lies in subordinating politics to morality and conducting affairs conscientiously and God‑fearingly. Honour and eminence must come through moral excellence alone. Paramount importance should be given to character besides ability in selecting men of authority. Honesty, fairness, and justice are to prevail in every sphere of domestic administration. And the whole foreign policy is to devolve upon truth, faithfulness, love of peace, fair dealing, and international justice.

(vii) Policing is not the only function of this State. It does not come into existence merely to maintain law and order and to defend its territory against external attacks. It is a State with a purpose and a mission. It must positively strive for the achievement of social justice, promotion of good, and eradication of evil.

(viii) Equality of rights, status and opportunities, supremacy of Law, co­-operation in virtue and non‑co‑operation in vice, sense of accountability to God Almighty, sense of duties more than that of rights, unity of purpose be­tween the individuals, society, and the State, guarantee of the basic necessities of life to everyone in need, are the fundamental values of this State.

(ix) The relations between State and individual are so balanced in this system that neither the State has been vested with absolute authority reducing individuals to virtual slavery, nor has individual freedom been allowed to turn itself into licence threatening the interest of society.

On the one hand, by guaranteeing fundamental rights to its citizens and by making the State authority subject to the Supreme Law of God and the democratic process of shura, it provides ample opportunities for the development of individual personality and protection from undue interference by others.

And, on the other hand, it binds the individual to a definite code of morality, makes it obligatory for him faithfully to obey the orders of the State working in accordance with the Law of God, to co‑operate wholeheartedly with it in the cause of virtue, to avoid disturbing its tranquillity, and to sacrifice even his life and property in its defence.

Notes

1. Qur’an, II, 29; VII, 10; XIII, 3; XIV, 32‑34; LVI, 63‑64; LXVII, 15.

2. Ibid., XI, 87.

3. Ibid., XVI, 116. “This verse strictly prohibits that people should decide accord­ing to their own views or wishes what is lawful and what is unlawful” (Baidawi, Anwar al‑Tanzil, vol. III, p. 193). “The purport of this verse is, as `Askari explains, that you should not call a thing lawful or unlawful unless you have learnt of its being so from God or His Prophet, otherwise you would be telling a lie on God; for nothing makes a thing lawful or unlawful save a commandment of God” (Alusi, Ruh al‑Ma'ani, vol. XIV, p. 226, Idarat al‑Taba`at al‑Muniriyyah, Egypt, 1345/1926)

4. Qur’an, VII, 15,7.

5. Ibid., II, 275, 279, 282, 283, 261; IV, 2, 4, 7, 20, 24, 29; V, 38; VI, 141; IX, 103; XXIV, 27; XXXVI, 71; LI, 19 ; LXI, 11.

6. Ibid., VII, 128.

7. Ibid., II, 284.

8. The words of the text are: fi arba'ati ayyamin sawa’ al‑lissa'ilin. Zamakhshari, Baidawi, Razi, Alusi and other commentators have taken sawa' to go with ayyamin and interpreted it to mean “in full four days.” No commentator of distinction has taken sawa’' to go with sa'ilin. However, even if it is allowed to go with it; it would mean “provided for the sake of all who seek,” and not “for all who seek in equal measure.” This latter interpretation is just untenable.

9. Qur’an, VI, 165; XVII, 21, 30; XXXIV, 39; XLII, 12; XLIII, 32.

10. Ibid., IV, 32.

11. This will be absolutely clear on reading Surah xvi, verses 71‑76, and Surah xxx, verses 20‑25. The subject of discussion in both cases is the assertion of the unity of God and refutation of polytheism.

12. Qur’an, II, 29, 168; V, 88; VII, 31, 32; LVII, 27.

13. Ibid., iv, 29. By trade is meant exchange of commodities and services. (Al­ Jassas, Ahkam al‑Qur'an, vol. II, p. 21, Matba'at al‑Bahiyyah, Egypt, 1347/1928; ibn al‑`Arabi, Ahkam al‑Qur'an, vol. I,p.17, Matba'at al‑Sa'adah, Egypt, 1331/1912.)

The condition of “by mutual agreement” explains that there should be no coer­cion, fraud, or trick about it to which the other party would not agree if it came to its notice.

14. Qur'an, ii, 188. Seeking to gain the nearness of the judges includes resorting to law‑courts to lay a false claim to other people's property, or offering bribes to the judges to obtain a favourable decree. (Alusi, op. cit. vol. II, p. 60.)

15. Qur’an, II, 283.

16. Ibid., III, 161.

17. Ibid., V, 41.

18. Ibid., IV, 10.

19. Ibid., LXXXIII, 1‑3.

20. Ibid., XXIV, 19.

21. Ibid., XXIV, 33.The purpose of this verse is to prohibit prostitution. Slave­girls are mentioned because in old Arabia prostitution was conducted with slave­girls. People would install their young and beautiful slaves in the brothels and eat of their earnings. (Ibn Jarir, Jami` al‑Bayan fi Tafsir al‑Qur'an, vol. XVIII,pp. 55‑58, 103‑04, Matba'at al‑Amiriyyah, Egypt, 1328/1910; ibn Kathir, Tafsir al‑Qur'an al‑`Azim, vol. III, pp. 89, 288, Matba'ah Mustafa Muhammad, Egypt, 1947; ibn `Abd al‑Barr, al‑Isti`ab, vol. II, p. 762, Dairatul Maarif, Hyderabad, 1337/1918.)

22. Qur’an, XVII, 32.

23. Ibid., XXIV, 2. Along with making adultery a criminal offence, the earnings of adultery are also declared forbidden. The Prophet of God (may peace be upon him) called it the most abominable of earnings. (Bukhari, Book 34, Ch. 113; Book 37, Ch. 20; Book 68, Ch. 50; Book 76, Ch. 46; Book 77, Ch. 96; Muslim, Book 22, Tr. No. 39, 41; abu Dawud, Book 22, Ch. 39, 63; Tirmidhi, Book 9, Ch. 37; Book 12, Ch. 46; Book 26, Ch. 23; Nasa'i, Book 42, Ch. 5; Book 44, Ch. 90; ibn Majah, Book 12, Ch. 9.)

24. Qur'an, V, 93. The manufacture of and trading in all things prohibited in the Qur'an are also prohibited. Full prohibition calls for complete ban on profiting by anything connected with what is prohibited. (A1‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. II, p. 212.)

25. Qur'an, ii, 275. This makes it clear that in the case of trade the profit which a person makes over his invested capital, or in the event of a partnership in trade the profit which the partners of an enterprise divide according to their shares in it, is lawful and allowed, but whatever a creditor charges from his debtor over his principal is unlawful and God does not allow it as truly earned income like the profit earned in trade.

26. Ibid., II, 278‑80. It is evident from the words used here that this injunction is related to transactions of debt and in such transactions if a creditor charges anything more than what he has advanced it would be riba (excess, usury, interest). The rate of interest to be charged, high or low, makes no difference in it. It is also immaterial for what purpose the sum is borrowed.

27. Ibid., III 180; IX, 34; XLVII, 38; LVII, 24; LXIV, 16; LXIX, 34; IXX, 21; IXXIV, 45; LXXXIX 15‑20; XC II, 11; CIV, 3; CVII, 1, 2, 3, 7.

28. Ibid., XXVIII, 58; XXXIV, 34, 35; CII, 1‑3.

29. Ibid., VI, 141; VII, 31; XVII, 23.

30. Ibid., XVII, 29 ; XXV, 6 7 ; XXVIII, 77.

31. Ibid., II, 219.

32. Ibid., II, 177.

33. Ibid., III, 92.

34. Ibid., IV, 36. as in the days of the Holy Prophet these were the four hundred volunteers who had come from the four corners of Arabia and settled at Madinah. They had dedicated their lives to the pursuit of the knowledge of Islam and were prepared to go with any expedition of propagation or war when and wherever the Holy Prophet sent them. Having devoted their whole time to these services they could do little to earn their livelihood. (Zamakhshari, al‑Kashshaf, vol. 1, p. 126, al­ Matba'at al‑Bahiyyah, Egypt, 1343/1924.)Similarly, this verse will now apply to those persons who devote their whole time to study, or propagation of faith or other works of social welfare and do not find opportunity to attend to their own business.

35. Qur’an, II, 273.

36. Ibid., LXXVI, 8‑9.

37. Ibid., LXX, 25.

38. Ibid., II, 195.

39. Ibid., V, 89.

40. It was an old Arab custom to divorce a woman by uttering the formula “Thou art to me as the back of my mother.” This formula was called “the zihar.” Divorce by zihar freed the husband from any responsibility for conjugal duties but did not leave the wife free to leave the husband's home or to contract a second marriage. This pagan system of divorce unfair to women was abolished (LVIII. 2).

41. Qur’an, LVIII, 4.

42. Ibid., II, 196; V, 95.

43. Ibid., II, 184.

44. Ibid., II, 262‑63, 268, 271; IV, 38; XXIV, 33.

45. Ibid., II, 3, 43, 83 110, 177, 277; IV, 77, 162; V, 12, 55; VIII, 3; IX, 5, 11, 18, 71; XIII, 22; XIV, 31; XIX, 31, 55; XXI, 73; III, 35, 41, 78; XXIII, 2; XXIV, 37, 56; XXVII. 3; XXXI, 4; XXXIII, 33; XXXV, 29; XLIII, 38; LVIII, 13; LXX, 23; LXXIII, 20; LXXIV, 43; XCVIII, 5; CVII.

46. Ibid., II, 83; XIX, 30, 31, 55; XXI, 73; XCVIII, 5.

47. Ibid., II, 2, 3; V, 55; VIII, 2, 3, 4; IX, 11; XXII, 78.

48. Ibid., III, 92; IX, 103; LXIV, 16.

49. Ibid., IX, 103.

50. Al‑Shaukani, Nail al Autar, vol. IV, pp. 98, 126, Mustafa al‑Babi, Egypt, 1347/1928.

51. Later it was decided by ijma` (consensus of opinion) that zakaton merchandise goods would also be charged at the rate of 2 1/2 % per annum. (Al‑ Shaukani, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 117.) This principle of zakaton commerce will likewise apply to factories which manufacture different kinds of goods for sale.

52. Qur’an, IX, 103; XXII, 41; XXIV, 55, 56.

53. Ibid., viii, 41. During his life, the Prophet took a part of this fifth of spoils for his own and his kins' needs as neither he nor they had any right in zakat. After his death it was a disputed point as to who should take the Prophet's and kinsmen's share. Some people opined that the Prophet was entitled to it for being the Head of the State and thus after his death it should go to the Caliph and his kinsfolk. Others thought that it should still belong to the kinsfolk of the Prophet. At last it was agreed that it should be set aside for the military requirements of the Islamic State. (Al‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 75, 77.)

54. Arabic fuqara', singular faqir. Literally, faqr is want, and fuqara' are those who earn less than they need and thus deserve help. (Lisan al‑`Arab, vol. V, pp. 60, 61, Beirut, 1956.)

55. Arabic masakin, singular miskin. The Caliph `Umar says that miskin is he who cannot earn his living or does not find opportunity to do so. (Al‑Jassas, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 151.) According to this definition, all those helpless children who are not yet able to earn, and the cripple, and the old who are no longer able to make a living, and the unemployed, and the invalids who are temporarily rendered unfit to earn livelihood, are masakin.

56. Three kinds of men were given money for “reconciling of hearts,” during the Prophet's life: 1. Staunch opponents of Islam who persecuted weak Muslims or set themselves hard against the faith were given something. and persuaded to adopt a lenient attitude. 2. Those who forcibly prevented the people of their tribes or clans from embracing Islam were persuaded to give up this obstruction. 3. The new entrants in faith were given monetary help to get over their financial difficulties, so that they should live in their new environments amoung Muslims with equani­mity. (Al‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. III; p. 152.)

57. Refers to the Muslims who were captured in war by the enemies as well as the non‑Muslims who came as war captives to the Muslims and wanted to be set free on payment of ransom; reference is also to the slaves who lived in bondage from old.

58. The cause of God includes jihad (war) and ,hajj (pilgrimage). One who proceeds on war can avail oneself of zakateven if one is well‑to‑do so far as personal effects go, because one's personal effects are often inadequate to enable one to prepare for war and provide for the expenses of the way. Similarly, one who runs short of money on pilgrimage deserves to be helped with zakat. (al‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 156‑57; al‑ Shaukani op. cit., vol.. IV, pp. 144‑46.)

59. A traveller, even though he is rich at home, deserves to be helped with zakatif he runs short of money on the way (Al‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. III, p. 157).

60. Qur’an, IX, 60.

61. Verses 7‑12 and 176. According to the Holy Prophet's elucidation, in the absence of the nearest relations the inheritance will go to the nearer, and in their absence, as a last resort, to those who have at least some relation with the deceased in comparison with mere strangers. But if the deceased leave no relation of any kind, the property will be added to the general exchequer of the Islamic State. (Al‑Shaukani, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 47, 56.)

62. Qur’an, XXXIII, 4, 6.

63. Ibid., IV, 8, 9.

64. Ibid., II, 180.

65. Al Shaukani, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 32, 33. Seen in the light of the Holy Prophet's elucidation, the Qur'an does not seem to favour the idea that one should leave one's kinsfolk deprived and spend on works of social welfare. The words of the Prophet quoted in Nail al‑Autar from Bukhari, Muslim, and other books of Tradi­tion are: “Your leaving your heirs rich is better than your leaving them poor, spreading their hands before people (for help).”

66. Elucidating the law in this matter, the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him) has imposed three restrictions on the right of demise. First, that a person can exercise this right to the extent of one‑third of his property only. Secondly, that no will should be made in favour of any of the legal heirs without taking the consent of other heirs. Thirdly, a will cannot be made to deprive an heir of his entitlement or to give him less than his due share. (Al‑Shaukani, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 31, 35.)

67. Qur’an, IV, 5, 3.

68. Ibn al‑`Arabi, op. cit., vol. I, p. 123; ibn Kathir, Tafsir al‑Qur'an, vol. I, p. 482; al‑Jassas, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 72, 73.

69. By this is meant the expenditure on the administration and defence of the Islamic State. The Holy Prophet (on whom be peace) and his successors, the Caliphs drew their own subsistence and paid their officials (except those of the zakat department) from this source.

70. For explanation, see note 54.

71. Qur’an, LIX, 7‑8.

72. Ibid., II, 219.

73. Ibid., II, 29; IV, 1; VI, 73; XIII, 16; XXXV, 3; LVI, 58‑72.

74. Ibid., VII, 54; XX, 8; XXX, 26; XXXII, 5.

75. Ibid., II, 107; III, 154; VI, 57; XIII, 16; XVI, 17; XVIII, 26; XXV, 2; XXVIII, 70; XXX; 4; XXXV, 40‑41; LVII, 5.

76. Ibid., II, 255, 284; III, 26, 83; V, 1; VI, 18; VII, 128; X, 65, 107; XIII, 9, 41; XVIII, LL, 26, 27; XXI, 23; XXIII, 88; XXXVI, 83; LIX, 23; IXVII, 1; LXXII, 22; LXXXV, 13‑16; XCV, 8.

77. Ibid., VI, 164; VII, 54; X, 31; CXIV, 1‑3.

78. Ibid., III, 154; XII, 40; XLA, 10.

79. Ibid., VII, 54.

80. Ibid., V, 38‑40.

81. Ibid., II, 216, 220, 255, 232; IV, 11, 176; VIII, 75; IX, 60; XXIV, 58‑59; LX, 10.

82. Ibid., VII, 3; XIII, 37; XVI, 36; XXXIX, 2, 11‑12; XL, 18; XCVIII.

83. Ibid., II, 229; LVIII, 4; LXV, 1.

84. Ibid., IV, 60; V, 44, 45, 46, 50.

85. BID., IV, 64, 65, 80, 115; LIX, 7.

86. Ibid., IV, 51; XXIV, 47‑48; XXXIII, 36

87. Ibid., V, 48; XXXVIII, 26.

88. Ibid., II, 31; VII, 10; XXII, 65.

89. Ibid., VII, 69, 74, 129; X, 14.

90. Ibid., XXIV, 55; XXXV, 39; LXXXI, 17‑24; LXXXIX, 6‑11.

91. Ibid., C, 2; LX, 12; LXXVI,

92. Ibid., XLII, 38.

93. Ibid., III, 118; IV, 59; IX, 16.

94. Ibid., II, 124; XVIII, 28; XXVI, 151‑132; XXXVIII, 28; X1IX, 13.

95. Ibid., II, 247; IV, 5, 83; XII, 55; XXXVIII. 20; XXXIX, 9.

96. Ibid., IV, 58

97. Ibid., IV, 59.

98. Ibid., IV, 58; VI, 48; XXXVIII, 26.

99. Ibid., LVII, 25.

100. Ibid., XXII, 41.

101. Ibid., XVII, 23.

102. Ibid., II, 188; IV, 29.

103. Ibid., XLIX, 11‑12.

104. Ibid., XXIV, 27; XLIX, 12.

105. Ibid., IV, 148.

106. Ibid., III, 110; V, 78‑79; VII, 165.

107. Ibid., III, 11.

108. Ibid., II, 191, 236; X, 99.

109. Ibid., VI, 108.

110. Ibid., XXIX, 46.

111. Ibid., VI, 164; XVII, 15; XXXV, 18; XXXIX, 7; LIII, 38.

112. Ibid., IV, 58; XVII, 36; X1IX, 6.

113. Ibid., LI, 19.

114. Ibid., XXVIII, 4.

115. Ibid., IV, 59.

116. Ibid., V, 33; VII, 85.

117. Ibid., V, 2.

118. Ibid., IX, 38‑41.

119. Ibid., VIII, 42, 58 ; IX, A ; XV I, 91‑92 ; XV II, 34.

120. Ibid., XVI, 94.

121. Ibid., V, 8.

122. Ibid., IV, 90

123. Ibid., VIII, 61:

124. Ibid., XXVIII, 83.

125. Ibid., LX,.8.

126. Ibid., LV, 60.

127. Ibid.. II, 1,94; XVI, 126; XLII, 40‑42.

Chapter 5: Alexandrio Syriac Thought

Alexandrio Syriac Thought by C.A Qadir

The Neo‑Pythagoreans

The great conquering sweep of Alexander the Great eastwards not only destroyed the old, intense and narrow life of the self‑contained Greek City­ States but also marked a decisive change in the intellectual and spiritual life of Greece.

With the spread of Greek civilisation over the Near East, the hori­zons of the individual Greeks were greatly enlarged; but the break‑up of the old City‑States engendered a sense of isolation and rootlessness which made people look inward for stability and security, rather than outward as hitherto done.

Another and a more potent reason for this shift in Greek thinking can be discovered in widespread scepticism after the death of Aristotle. True, scepticism also prevailed when Socrates was born, but the metaphysical speculations of pre‑Socratic thinkers led them into the inextricable confusion of doubt.

Socrates asked people to look at man instead of nature, for in the domain of human problems the competence of reason could be demonstrated more easily than in that of the physical or the metaphysical. But the protest which scepticism made after Aristotle was more devastating. It was declared by the sceptics that the entire philosophical venture of their predecessors was hopelessly wrong and also that their error was without a remedy.

This was indeed very saddening. It amounted to the confession that not only were the solutions of the so‑called perennial problems of philosophy nonsensical but also that no satisfactory solution was possible, at least with the techniques and methods hitherto pursued.

Reason thus assailed could find refuge only in faith. In the period that follows we find philosophy renouncing its independence and becoming merely an instrument of theology.

Ritter says, “The feeling of alienation and the yearning after a higher revelation are characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world; this yearning was, in the first place, but an expression of consciousness of the decline of the classical nations and their cultures, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called into life not only Christianity but also before it pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism and other related developments.”1

No longer finding Greece a cordial home for philosophy, the philosophers went over to Egypt and Rome, carrying their doctrines with them. They delivered courses of lectures which were attended with great zeal and enthu­siasm by the populace. But the venture did not succeed so well in Rome as it did in Alexandria. In Rome philosophy could lend its weight to poetry, oratory, jurisprudence, and some topics of conversation, but it was in Alex­andria that it produced men who gave it originality, vigour, and drive.

Alex­andria was not simply a centre of Greek culture and scholarship, but also and more significantly a meeting‑place for Greek and Eastern thought. It took a cosmopolitan character and showed a marked leaning towards Oriental thought. The result of this interpretation of Greek and Semitic cultures was the syn­thetic civilization known as Hellenism in contradistinction to the Hellenic or purely Greek civilization. Hellenism rose to supremacy not only in Alexandria and Syria but throughout Western Asia.

It would be incorrect to identify the present geographical boundaries of Syria with its old ones. In Roman days, at the beginning of the Christian era Syria denoted the country west of the Euphrates and north of the Arabian Desert, including Palestine and Palmyra and extending north to the Taurus. The usual language of Syria was Aramaic, a language akin to Hebrew.

The Hebrew word “Aram” is rendered as “Syria” and originally the words Aramaean and Syrian were synonymous. After the Hellenization of the country, the Greek language was used by the ruling class and the officials with very little influence on the masses who continued using their dialect. This state of affairs con­tinued till the first/seventh century when after the Muslim conquest Syriac gradually gave way vernacularly and to some extent liturgically to Arabic, though it had great influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of Arabic which supplanted it.

For purposes of studying Alexandrian and Syriac philosophy, for the two run together and interpenetrate, we can divide our subject into:

(1) Neo‑Pythagoreanism,

(2) The Jewish‑Alexandrian Philosophy,

(3) Neo‑Platonism, and

(4) Early Christianity.

To all these speculations what is common is the dualistic opposition of the divine and the earthly; an abstract conception of God excluding all knowledge of the divine nature; contempt for the world of sense, on the ground of the Platonic doctrines of matter and the descent of the soul of man from a superior world into the body; the theory of intermediate potencies or beings through whom God acts upon the world of phenomena; the requirements of an ascetic self‑emancipation from the bondage of sense; and faith in a higher revelation to man when in a state called Enthusiasm.”2

Both Neo‑Pythagoreanism and the Judaic‑Alexandrian philosophy are found together in the beginning of the Christian era. The Neo‑Pythagoreans who were fundamentally religious in their outlook and practices were represented by P. Nigidus Figulus, Sotion, and particularly Apollonius of Tyana, Modera­tus of Gades, and, in later times, Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius of Apamea.

The Neo‑Pythagoreans were highly eclectic in character. They were greatly influenced by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, not to speak of ancient Pytha­goreans whose doctrines they attempted to revive.

Neo‑Pythagorean doctrines could not flourish in Rome, where, Seneca says they could not find a professor to teach them, but gained a stronghold in Alexandria. The Neo‑Pythagoreans combined monotheism with the fatalistic cult of gods and demons but transformed it at the same time with the help of Platonic‑Aristotelian teachings into a reverence for God as a pure spirit who is to be served not by outward sacrifices but by silent prayers and with wisdom and virtue.

Like Plato and Aristotle, the Neo‑Pythagoreans distinguished between unity and plurality and also between the divine and the earthly. Several attempts were made to get rid of this dualism. There arose consequently a great diversity of opinion with regard to the nature of God and the relation He bears to the world. Some identified God with the world‑soul of Plato.

Others thought of Him as an ineffable “Monad” from which flowed both unity and plurality. Still others considered Him immanent but free from all contacts with matter which might pollute Him. It was, therefore, imperative for the Neo‑Pythagoreans, especially the last ones, to introduce a Demiurge as a mediator between God and matter.

The metaphysics of the Neo‑Pythagorean school required four principles. viz., God, the world‑reason, the world‑soul, and matter, out of which the first three helped in formulating the Christian conception of triune God, while the fourth one paved the way for the doctrine of emanation.

The Neo‑Pythagoreans gave a deeper metaphysical meaning to Number. The ultimate ground of all good as well as the order of the universe was provided by the Monad while the Dyad was held responsible for all disorder and imperfection. The Monad became the symbol for Godhead and the Dyad for matter. The gulf between the two, viz., the Monad and the Dyad, was bridged by the introduction of the idea of a world‑soul which was built upon the Stoic, Aristotelean, and Platonic conceptions.

Certain numerological conceptions of the Neo‑Pythagoreans appear gro­tesque to the modern mind It was held by them that the movements of the heavenly bodies were harmoniously adjusted by number‑an idea of Egyptian origin‑and so certain numbers were regarded as having a sacred character, particularly number 10 which represents the sum of a pyramid of four stages, 4‑3‑2‑1=10.

In such conceptions, their imagination ran riot to such an extent that one can gain the impression that Neo‑Pythagoreanism is nothing more than astrology, occultism, and twaddle about the mysterious properties of numbers.

In epistemology they closely followed Plato, classifying knowledge into spiritual perception, discursive reason, opinion, and sensuous perception. Science, we owe to discursive reason; inference, to opinion; and beatific vision, to spiritual perception.

Nicomachus of Gerasa who lived about 140 A.D. was one with Plato in holding that ideas were temporally prior to the formation of the world and also in holding that ideas were numbers. But, whereas Plato had accorded an independent existence to ideas, Nicomachus was content with giving them dependent role. He conceived of ideas as existing in the divine mind and so acting as patterns according to which the things of this world are fashioned.

Another thinker who attempted a synthesis of Plato and Pythagoras was Maximus of Tyre who taught in the first half of the second century. He was a Sophist and a rhetorician besides being an eclectic. Like other Platonists he opposed God to matter and made demons play an intermediary role between God and man.

A long hierarchy of demons and angels was instituted by him which served as ministers to God and guardian‑angels to man. He identified God with pure reason and considered matter to be a source of imperfection of the universe. Sins were due to the misuse of free‑will by man and were not the result of any evil agency acting from without. Maximus did not believe in any evil world‑soul, to whom human lapses could be attributed.

Maximus thought, very much like Rumi and other Muslim mystics that the soul is temporarily imprisoned in the human body and is ever yearning for release and reunion with the Divine Source.

Still another eclectic thinker from Syria by the name of Numenius of Apamea, who lived in the second half of the second century, is by many regarded as the real founder of Neo‑Platonism. Hitti says

“Plotinus the Greek philosopher of Egypt, credited with that distinction, was popularly accused of basing his teachings on those of this Apamean and of strutting around m his feathers.”3

In his writings, Numerous combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such a manner that while granting Pythagoras the highest authority and even accusing Plato of borrowing from him, he yet gave a predominant place to Platonic ideas. He traced the philosophy of the Greeks back to the Orientals and called Plato an “Attic‑speaking Moses.”

Numenius, however, was not simply a camp follower of Plato. He differed from him too, since he distinguished the world‑builder as a second god from the highest Deity. The basis of this distinction is to be found in his metaphysics where God who is identified sometimes with the Reason of Aristotle, some­times with the Monad of Pythagoras, and sometimes with both, stands against the creation which because of its imperfections is far inferior to Him.

The universe is created by a second god, the Demiurge, who is good by participation in the essence of the first. He acquires knowledge by gazing at the super­sensible archetypes and brings the world into being. The universe which is created by the second god is regarded as the third god by Numenius. Thus considered, God becomes a cosmic triunity comprising three divinities: Father, Creator, and Creature, which Numenius termed father, son, and grandson.

The psychology of Numenius is as dualistic as his metaphysics. Man, being both spiritual and corporeal, participates in both the world‑souls. Numenius was wise enough not to condemn body outright. It had to be condemned only when it stood in the way of reason and served as a cat's‑paw in the hands of the evil world‑soul.

But in spite of his better thinking Numenius could not completely shake off the influence of the prevailing mode of thinking. He held that the encasement of the rational part of the soul in the human body did indicate a fall for the soul and that the liberation of the soul could be effected through a long series of reincarnations:

Hence the present life should be one of self‑denial and renunciation, that is to say, a life of reason devoid of pas­sions. In his stress upon transmigration as a means of liberation, Numenius betrays, like his teacher, Pythagoras, the influence of Hindu thought.

A passing reference may be made to P. Nigidius Figulus for his interest in the Pythagorean philosophy and also to Apollonius of Tyana who distinguished the one God from other gods. The First being ineffable and absolutely pure could not come in contact with earthly things on account of their material constitution.

Apollonius did not like offerings to be made to the one God these he reserved for the lesser gods. We may also briefly mention Moderatus of Gades who incorporated Platonism and non‑theological doctrines into Pythagoreanism. Number one he regarded as the symbol of unity and two as that of difference and inequality.

The Jewish‑Alexandrian Philosophy

Among the precursors of Neo‑Platonism are to be counted Neo‑Pythagorean­ism and Jewish‑Alexandrian philosophy in addition to a host of other tendencies which cannot be discussed here for want of space. Even out of the Jewish thinkers we shall pick out Philo, leaving other luminaries altogether, again for want of space.

Philo, a Jew, was born at Alexandria a few years before Christ. His philo­sophy is an attempt to find an adjustment between the traditions of Israel and those of the Greeks. Philo felt that the aesthetic elements in Greek culture were repugnant to some of the elements involved in Jewish religion. To smooth out differences and to show the concordance between the two systems of thought and practice, Philo adopted the allegorical method of interpreting the Scriptures already in use among the Alexandrian Jews.

On this interpre­tation, circumcision, for example, would signify and hence serve as a symbol for the cutting off of passions and ungodly opinions. Philo often criticized the literalists for their word‑picking habits. But Philo was not a thoroughgoing symbolist. He knew that if once you defend an external practice on the ground that it is useful as a symbol, it is very hard to assert that it is obligatory for all times to come.

Philo, therefore, recognized that the literal sense is often accompanied by a more profound sense and that both the senses have to be accepted since both go together. “Although circumcision properly symbolizes the removal of all passions and sensibility and impious thoughts, yet we may not, therefore, set aside the practice enjoined, for in that case, we should be obliged to give up the public worship of God in the temple and a thousand other solemnities,” says he in De Migratione Abrahami.4

Philo was primarily a religious preacher rather than a philosopher. He had no desire to propound a theory of the universe which could stand the scrutiny of logical reason. He was essentially concerned with the life of soul and its attaining the beatific vision. Keeping this objective in view he demarcated the mystical experience from all other psychical experiences on the ground that while the former lifts you out of the ordinary plane of life and brings you in direct contact with some tremendous reality, the latter keeps you earth­bound and sense‑bound.

In this Philo was following in the footsteps of Plato who exhibits a religio‑mystic vein in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, with the difference that Philo being a Jew first and last could not identify God with the impersonal divine reason of Plato. However, in suggesting methods for “soul‑cultivation,” he again turned his attention to the Greeks, borrowed their psychology, and on its basis framed rules for the systematic training of the soul to receive the vision of God.

The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. The Jewish doctrine shows God as intimately concerned with the world; the Platonic, though insisting upon the divine governance and divine formation of the world, does not hold that the relation which God has to the world‑is neces­sary or automatic. The Middle Platonism recognized a hierarchy of divine beings, insisted upon the transcendence of God, and regarded the visible world as being governed and made by lower intermediary divine powers. Philo had to reconcile these two conceptions.

Philo believed in one God, eternal, unchanging, passionless, far removed above the world of phenomena as the First Cause of all that exists. Causation, however, implies change and so God could not be regarded as directly creating the universe. Intermediary powers are, therefore, needed to explain the gover­nance and formation of the world and what it contains. These powers Philo described very confusedly. Sometimes he talked of powers, sometimes of two powers, sometimes of one.

The problem before Philo was that of the development of multiplicity from absolute unity. The solution was sought in the inability of the contemplating mind to reproduce the absolute unity in itself. Philo gives an account of the “multiple” apparition of God to human intellect in the De Migratione Abrahuami.When the soul is illumined by God, it sees Him triple, one with a double shadow; but at the highest point, the shadow vanishes and God is seen as One.

In the Quaestiones in Genesim, Philo says that the mind “sees God triple” due to the weakness of its vision. “Just as the bodily eye sees a double appear­ance from one light, so the eye of the soul, since it cannot apprehend the one as one, makes a triple perception, according to the appearance of the chief serving powers which stand beside the One.”5

The highest of all the divine forces is the Logos (Word). Sometimes Philo, in common with Aristobulus and other earlier commentators gave to it the name of Sophia, but the more commonly used word by him is the Logos.

In some of his writings he gives to Sophia the highest of the parts into which the Logos is divided. Logos has a dual nature. In man it is reason and also the spoken word. In the All it divides itself into the incorporeal and arche­typal ideas of which the intelligible world consists, and the copies of these incorporeal ideas constitute the world of perception.

In other, passages Philo has called Sophia the mother of the Logos­-ordinarily he calls it divine Logos without qualification or distinction‑the mediator between God and man. It is so to say the instrument by which God makes the world and the intermediary by which the human intelligence after being purified ascends to heaven.

Philo is not clear on the independent existence of the Logos: On all accounts it seems that in Philo's mind the powers had little or no existence apart from their function. “His conception of them is affected by contemporary Greek ideas, but perhaps they really belong to that mysterious class of instrumental and subordinate quasi‑beings which accompany the Divinity in Semitic and Persian thought, the Angel, the Wisdom, the Breath of God in the Jewish Scriptures, the Uncreated Law of the Rabbis and the quasi‑personified Divine Virtues or the attributes of Persian (Zoroastrian) theology, the Amesha Spentas.”6

Anyhow Philo was not clear on this subject. As Ueberweg says in his History of Philosophy, Philo wavered between, the attributive and the substantive conception of the Logos. He both hypostatized the Logos into a person and reduced it to a mere attribute or function of the first person.7 What is, how­ever, important for subsequent thinking is not the nature of the Logos as such but the identification of the Logos with the Platonic world of forms and the use of this conception in explaining the creation of this world.

This led to a very great development in the thought of the medieval theologians. Philosophically speaking, the Philonian Logos is nothing but the principle of unity in diversity, of the separating and uniting of contraries in the material world. But perhaps Philo would not like to be judged philosophically.

The idea of Logos was not a metaphysical necessity for him; it was psychologically needed for coming in contact with God.

Philo's doctrines of “pneuma” and mystical union are equally important. The former is a free creative in‑breathing by God, becoming the image of God in man and constituting thereby the highest part of man's soul, superior to the “psyche.”

Other schools outside Jewish circles were also emphasizing one God, eternal and invariable, as the Source and the First Cause of the universe. The Gnostic sects which were of philosophic origin accepted God as the First Cause, above the imperfections and variations of the mundane world and, therefore, re­quiring an intermediary or an emanation to explain the production of an imperfect and variable world.

Neo‑Platonism

Plotinus

The ancestry of Neo‑Platonism can be traced to Neo‑Pythago­reanism, Jewish Gnosticism, and other tendencies including Christianity, which so to say had become the Weltanschauung of most of those who had any living religion in the world of Greek culture: cruder and more superstitious forms of it in the lower strata of society, more refined and Hellenized forms among the educated.

The founder of Neo‑Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plo­tinus. Saccas means the sack‑bearer and as a surname indicates the occupation by which Ammonius earned his living. Nothing definite can be asserted with regard to his philosophic convictions. Some have asserted that he proclaimed the identity of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines and also the immortality of the soul.

But there is no historical evidence to decide one way or the other. Nor is there any justification for holding that Ammonius was the first to formulate the doctrine that the One is exterior to the world of ideas‑a doc­trine of fundamental importance in the system of Plotinus.

Plotinus was an Egyptian of Greek speech and culture, born probably in 205 A. D. About his race and parentage nothing is certain, for he was, as Por­phyry says,“like a man ashamed of being in the body.”

At the age of twenty‑eight he went to Alexandria to receive philosophical training. He was surely disappointed till at last he came to Ammonius whose teachings satisfied him completely. With Ammonius he remained for eleven long years and left him only to accompany the Emperor Gordian in the hope of studying Persian and Indian philosophy.

The mission proved unsuccessful and Plotinus had to flee for his life to Antioch. At the age of forty, he went to Rome where he succeeded in winning the king and queen over to his doctrines. With the approval of the king he wanted to found a Philosopher's City, where the inhabitants should live according to the teachings of Plato.

The timely intervention of the nobles dissuaded the king from accepting such a silly proposal. In Rome he established his own school and taught there for the rest of his life. A painful death, probably cancer of the throat, marked in 270 A. D. the end of his illustrious career.

It is certain that Plotinus was conversant with the principal doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, particularly Aristotelian and Platonic. He had read very assiduously the works of Numenius and came under his influence. This probably accounts for the complexities and tensions that one finds in his writings. It was not an easy task to synthesize the extremely complicated traditions that Plotinus had inherited.

There is a double purpose in his philosophy, the cosmic and the religious. He purports to give a complete account of reality which should also serve as a guide to spiritual life. These two strains go together and can be kept apart for theoretical purposes only. However, there is no denying the fact that the double task put a great strain on Plotinus' philosophical endeavour and led him to say much that sounds bizarre to the modern ear.

Reality, for Plotinus, is an ordered hierarchical whole comprising two move­ments, one of descent and the other of ascent. The first is an automatic creati­vity by which the higher generates the lower, while the second is a movement of return by which the soul attains reabsorption in the Divine Source.

The first is a movement from unity to multiplicity, the second is a reverse movement, that is to say, from multiplicity to unity. Plotinus sometimes emphasizes the one and sometimes the other and says things which are hard to reconcile. It is evident from his writings that he imposed upon himself a task which by its very nature was impossible to accomplish.

At the head of his system stands a transcendent First Principle, the One which is ineffable and incomprehensible to the discursive as well as the intuitive reason. Below the One lie the two hypostases which are the universal correla­tives of the whole range of human life, physical and intellectual.

These are Nous, Aristotle's active intellect, and the world‑soul whose function is to contemplate as well as to direct the material world. The hypostases are united with each other and with the One, first, by emanation which is the radiation of the lower from the higher and, second, by return in contemplation by the lower upon the higher.

Plotinus conception of the One is very complicated and has been variously interpreted. The One may be regarded as the Neo‑Pythagorean Absolute Unity from which all plurality proceeds. The One cannot be said to have a being, for this way of thinking introduces a duality between subject and object and there can be no duality in Pure Unity. In the absolute state, in its first and highest hypostasis, the One is neither existence nor thought, neither moved, nor movable; it is simple unity or, as Hegel would say, the Absolute Nothing, the Immanent Negative.

There is a tendency in Plotinus derived from the Platonists and Middle Stoics to deny all predications to the One for fear of compromising Its unity. This tendency is, however, corrected by another much more positive approach. If the One is called God, then God is God not because He is nothing but because He embraces everything. He is, however, better than the reality of which He is the source.

The ideas no doubt form the content of His mind but they are nevertheless imperfect images as compared to the one Good, and receive radiance, “a grace playing upon their beauty” from the Primal Source. The positive aspect of the One is stressed so much at places that it seems to contradict Plotinus basic assumptions.

The One, he says, is pure will, loves Itself and is the cause of Itself. This characteri­zation conflicts with his earlier stand and justifies the use of human language for the basic reality.

In Plotinus, the negative and positive aspects go together. The positive aspect is, however, more pronounced The One may be transcendental, but if It is a reality, It should not simply be a Great Denial about which nothing positive can be asserted.

This point can receive further clarification from an examination of the reli­gious life of Plotinus. There is no doubt that he had a genuine mystical ex­perience. Porphyry bears testimony to it and the whole spirit and the tenor of the Enneads lends weight to it. But what is the nature of this experience and what is its goal? Some make Plotinus a pantheist and an anti‑rationalist, for whom the goal is dissolution of the self into nothingness.

Some think that he was trying to realize his pre‑existing identity with the One through his own efforts, while others think that his experience was genuinely mystical, akin to that of the great Christian and Muslim mystics. The first interpretation is absurd, the second is partially true. It is, however, the third one which truly explains his viewpoint.

Plotinus was torn so to say by the conflicting traditions he had inherited.

The One was both transcendental and the Unity‑Absolute. Again, the One was both inaccessible and also the goal of our own self‑realization. Plotinus contradictions and tensions are the product of these irreconcilable strains in his Weltanschauung. In both cases the positive aspect predominates. But it should not be ignored that the tension is real and fundamental.

How did the world originate from the One? Thinkers before Plotinus had assumed dualism; they had distinguished the world from its creator. But dualism was no answer to the problem. If the creator and the created differ in essence the question whence came the world remains as unsolved as ever Plotinus answered the question by saying that the world is distinct from God in act rather than in essence. The world is God but God is not the world. To explain it Plotinus had the theory of emanation.

Plotinus found it very hard to explain emanation except through metaphors. Both Nous and soul are produced by a spontaneous and necessary efflux of life from the One. They leave their source undiminished. The relation between the One and the other hypostases is described as being like that of the sun and its light or “in similes from the radiative effect of fire, snow or perfumes.

Can any philosophical meaning be given to this conception? It is difficult to see what meaning can be attached to emanation or radiation when attached to spiritual beings. Again, why, if the process is eternal, can one emanation be inferior to another? These are points which pass comprehension.

Plotinus has another way to explain his theory of emanation. He represents the One as a root or seed, the potentiality from which all things evolve into actuality. This comparison is used to describe the relation of the lower hypostases to the higher. About the soul, he says, it has potentialities which can only be actualized in the material world. Plotinus writes, “If then it is necessary that not only the One should exist . in the same way it is also necessary that not only souls should exist in the absence of those things which come into being through them; that is supposing that every nature has this inherent quality of making that which comes after it and of unrolling itself as if proceeding from a sort of partless seed as a beginning to the perceptible end.

The prior being remains always in its proper place and that which comes after is as it were generated from an ineffable power (or potency).”8 This will show that the comparison to a seed is applied to all the hypostases including the One Itself. But it will be evident to every student of Plotinus that the comparison sets up an impossible contradiction to the rest of the Enneads.

The One may be the beginning of everything, but it cannot be the spermatic beginning. The system of Plotinus is teleological rather than evolutionary: the main thrust of the universal forces is upwards and not downwards.

The second hypostasis, the first emanation of the One, the Nous, is a very complicated notion. It is an image of the former and turns towards It to grasp and comprehend It. Through turning, it becomes Nous (reason)‑sensory per­ception when the object of comprehension is sensible, and rational apprehen­sion when the object of comprehension is supersensible. The Noun includes in itself the world of ideas. Consequently, the ideas are immanent in the Nous and do not exist as external to it.

It is clear that Plotinus needed an emanation in order that the First Cause should remain unchanged. It is the Nous which is the reality behind the world of phenomena; the things perceived are only the shadows of the real ones.

From the Nous proceeds the third hypostasis, viz., Psyche, the principle of life and motion, the world‑soul, which is in the universe and is shared by every living creature. The whole world is alive, he held, and seems to par­ticipate in a life similar to our own. Further, life requires a cause which must be found in intelligence, for everywhere one finds intelligent activities. Plotinus maintains that the intelligent activity is nothing but a soul.

Porphyry

The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry, born in 232 A.D., probably at Batanaea in Syria. He was altogether a lesser man but all the same a very loyal disciple and a devout follower, who by his pleasing diction brought within the range of understanding of all men the doctrines of Plotinus, which in the language of its author had seemed difficult and obscure. Porphyry was more practical and religious than his master.

He declared the end of philosophizing to be the salvation of the soul. The cause of evil is the desire for the low and the base, and the means of deliverance are self‑purification, asceticism, and philosophic cognition of God. While in Sicily, he wrote a book in which he criticized the doctrines of Christianity, especially the divinity of Christ.

He is the first among the successors of Plotinus to defend Hellenic paganism against Christianity. His interest in demons as intermediaries between God and man is very much pronounced and he has a great deal to say about them.

Iamblichus

Iamblichus was a native of Chalcis in Coelesyria and a pupil of Porphyry. Like his master he taught at Rome after the death of Plotinus but retired in later life to Syria where he died in 330 A. D.

The philosophy of Iamblichus is marked by an inrush of Syrian theology with its grosser conceptions, its wild and nonsensical trick of playing with numbers, and its craving for the baser forms of the supernatural. Iamblichus put faith above history and revelation, renounced the later Greek philosophy, and asserted that God could do everything.

After Plotinus, the Neo‑Platonists were up against the mighty surge of Christianity. To stem it, they worked to bring about a complete and thorough theology based on the Dialogues of Plato, Chaldaean oracles, and the ancient myths: Greek, Egyptian, or Near Eastern. They were also concerned with elaborating the system of Plotinus and making it absolutely complete.

Iamblichus assumes still another absolutely ineffable and indeterminate first One above the One of Plotinus. The latter has produced the intelligible world, out of which the intellectual world has emanated. The objects of thought belong to the intelligible world while thinking belongs to the intellectual world. Then there is further splitting up, sub‑division, or classification which makes the whole system nonsensically abstract and hopelessly unreal. Plotinus had distinguished Being, Life, and Intelligence, but had never gone so far as to break the complex unity into three hypostases. This was done by Iambli­chus and his followers.

Hence complications arose not because their philo­sophical principles were fantastic‑which indeed they were‑but because they tried to accommodate every god, demon, and hero of the pagan mythology into their system. The motive behind this attempt was a genuine desire to explain the emergence of multiplicity from unity which was accomplished by the interpolation of the intermediate terms.

It was, however, forgotten that no such attempt was destined to succeed as there can be nothing intermediate between the Absolute and other things. Increase in the number of deities, demons, and spirits cannot, philosophically speaking, solve the old riddle of the One and the many.

In the hands of Iamblichus and his followers philosophy became a conglo­meration of mythical beings, an amazing metaphysical museum with entities labelled and classified, leaving no room for any free intellectual and spiritual quest.

The philosophy of Iamblichus and his followers was the last Neo‑Platonic attempt to provide an alternative scheme of thought and life to Christianity which was forging ahead among the masses and the intellectuals. After a brief success Neo‑Platonism failed to capture the imagination of the common man, with the result that the centres of its teaching in Syria, Alexandria, and Athens were closed by a royal edict in 529 A. D.

Early Christianity

A great part of the Christian belief was formed of notions current in the Hellenic world. When the early preachers of Christianity explained the posi­tion of Jesus in the totality of things, they did so in terms which bore a close resemblance to conceptions already current in the pagan and the Jewish worlds. Christianity had to assimilate elements from its Hellenistic environ­ment. Its theology was influenced by gnosticism, which has been aptly termed as Hellenistic theology.

It was common to all forms of Hellenistic theology that the material world accessible to senses is evil and consequently very much inferior to the trans­cendental world; further, that the soul which has divine origin could win its way back through self‑denial and purification.

While talking of evil the gnos­tics primarily thought of the material world and evils connected with sensual passions and not the injustice of the actual state of things or the inequality in the distribution of economic goods or the pains of poverty, disease, and oppression which are ordinarily associated with evil by the modern man.

With regard to the person of Jesus, there is a difference of opinion in the Hellenistic theology. It is argued that in Jesus a pre‑existing heavenly being was present upon earth, but as to the manner of his corporeal manifestation, there is a variety of speculations. All alike regard Jesus Christ as a compound; they differ, however, with regard to the nature and mode of the combination of the human and divine elements in his person.

All these beliefs and controversies were taken over to the Christian Church and formed a basis for their understanding of the Testament. The Christians had their own philosophers too who endeavoured to reconcile philosophy and Christian theology. The prominent among them at Alexandria were Clement and Origen.

The former was a Platonist of the older type who shows in his Stromateis how the general body of the Christian doctrine is adapted to the theories of Platonic philosophy. The latter also undertook a defence of the Christian faith against the objections of a Platonist. He was first among the Christian theologians to set forth the doctrines of the Christian faith in a systematic form.

Both Clement and Origen founded the Christian school of philosophical theology. But the attempt did not find favour with the people. The same Justinian who closed the school of the Neo‑Platonists in 529 A. D. condemned Origenism in nine anathemas in about 540 A. D.

Having been made to quit Alexandria, Origen returned to Palestine and founded a school at Caesarea, on the model of that in Alexandria. It did not succeed like the original one but nevertheless exercised a potent influence on the Syrian Church. A rival school was set up at Antioch by Malchion. Fifty years later another school was established at Nisibis, right in the heart of the Syriac‑speaking community. It was here that the text‑books studied at Antioch were rendered into Syriac.

The Church had no philosophy of its own. It had to adapt itself to the Alex­andrian philosophy, particularly to Neo‑Platonism and Aristotelian meta­physics and psychology. This led to senseless controversies as the Arian doc­trine shows. Both the Alexandrian and the Syrian Churches agreed that Christ was an emanation, eternal like God, but differed in their interpretation of eternity.

The school of Antioch thought that God being the cause, there was a time when God existed but not the Son. This was denied by the Alex­andrians who maintained that eternity does not admit of before and after. If God is Father He is so from eternity and the Son should for ever be issuing from the Father as the source.

The Arian controversy died by the fifth century A. D. giving place to an­other which concerned the person of the incarnate Christ. It was largely a question of psychology. In De Anima Aristotle had defined soul as the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life “and described its four faculties as the nutritive, the sensible, the locomotive, and the intellectual.

The first three are common to men and animals, being concerned with the intake of food and with knowledge through sense and desire. The fourth one which is the intellect, Nous, or the rational soul is peculiar to man. It is inde­pendent of the body and the presumption is that it has its source not in the body.”

Man is therefore a compound of psyche and the rational soul, the first signi­fying the first three functions of the soul, the second, the fourth one which later philosophy regarded as the emanation of Logos or the Agent Intellect. Difficulty arose about the co‑presence of these elements in the personality of Christ. What would be the relationship between the Logos and psyche, its own emanation, when they come together in the same person? The question was discussed by the gnostics too.

They regarded human nature, that is, the psyche of Jesus Christ, either as a mere illusion or so detached from the divine that we have really two persons. On the second view the man Jesus is regarded as having been originally distinct from the heavenly Christ. The latter des­cended into him at his baptism and the compound Jesus Christ came to be. Some people put the coalescence of the two at an early date.

Both these positions were taken by the Church. The Alexandrians thought that the psyche and Logos fused in the person of Christ, while the school of Antioch headed by Nestorius rejected the hypothesis outright. Nestorius con­ceived of Christ as uniting in himself two persons, the Logos and a man although the two persons were so united that they might in a sense be deemed one.

As the controversy became acute a council was held at Ephesus in 431 A. D. where the Alexandrians succeeded in getting Nestorius and his followers con­demned as heretics. They were persecuted and forced to migrate from Egypt. Accordingly, they founded a school in Edessa, a Syriac‑speaking district. The school became the resort of the Nestorians and centre of the vernacular ­speaking Syriac Church. This school was also banned and the scholars had to take refuge in Persia.

The Nestorians had to support their theories by the prevailing philosophy and so every Nestorian missionary was to some extent a propagandist of Greek philosophy. They translated into Syriac the works of Aristotle and his commentators, and also the works of the theologians.

The Nestorians had no sympathy with the government which had persecuted them. Consequently they spurned its language and celebrated the sacrament only in Syriac. They promoted a distinctly native theology and philosophy by means of translated material and Syriac commentaries.

The advocates of the fusion theory, the Monophysites or Jacobites as they were called, the rivals of the Nestorians, fared no better at the hands of the government. They were also persecuted and expelled. Consequently, they too bycotted the Greek language and began using Coptic and Syriac. In philosophy they were inclined more towards Neo‑Platonism and mysticism than the Nestorians.

Ibas who led the Nestorian migration to Persia translated Porphyry's Isagoge, a manual of logic, into Syriac, while Probus produced commentaries on this book as well as on Aristotle's Hermeneutica, De Sophisticis Elenchis, and Analytica Priora. Sergius, a Jacobite, wrote about the Isagoge, the “Table of Porphyry,” Aristotle's “Categories” and De Mundo. He also wrote treatises on logic in seven volumes.

Ahudemmeh composed treatises on the definition of logic, on free‑will, on the soul, on man considered to be a microcosm, and on man as a composition of soul and body. Paul the Persian produced a treatise on logic which he dedicated to a Persian king.

The Jacobites produced works no less than the Nestorians. Their productions are enormous no doubt but, all the same, they lack originality. For the most part they are only the transmission of received texts with their translations, commentaries, and explanatory treatises. But it cannot be denied that they fulfilled a genuine need and became a means of spreading Greek philosophy and culture far beyond its original home.

References

F. Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, tr. G. S. Morris and N. Porter, 2 Vols., ?odder & Stoughton, London, 1872; E. Zeller, The Philosophy of the Greeks, 2 Vols., Longmans Green, London, 1897 ; A. H. Armstrong An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy Methuen, London, 1947; The Works of Philo, tr. F. H. Colson and C. H. Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library, Heineman, New York, 1929; H. Lewy, Selections from Philo, 1947 ; H. A. W Wolfson, Philo, 2 Vols.,1947 ; E. R. Goodenough, An Introduc­tion to Philo, 1940; T. Whittaker, The Neoplatonists, 2nd ed., 1901; P. Klibanaky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, Aedibus Instituti Warburgiani, London, 1940; Plotinus, Enneads, tr. S. MaeKenna, 1883‑84; W. R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 2 Vols., 3rd ed., Longmans Green, London, 1948; A. E. Taylor, Platonisrn and Its Influence, Harrap, London; Paul Elomer, Platonism; E. Brehier, La philosophie de Plotin, Paris, 1928; E. R. Dodds, Select Passages Illustrating Neo­platonism, S. P. C. K., London, 1923; F. Heinemann, Plotin, Leipzig, 1921; C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Oxford, 1913; Life of Porphyry, tr. T. Taylor, 3rd ed., 1918; Iambliehus, Theurgia or the Egyptian Mysteries, tr. A. Wilder, Rieder, London, 1911.

Notes

1. C. Ritter, History of Philosophy, p. 330.

2. Zeller, Phil. der Grichen Istesitum, Vol. III. p. 566.

3. P. K. Hitti, History of Syria, Macmillan, London, 1351, p. 324

4. Philo, De Migratione Abrahami, ed. T. Mangey, Vol. I, p. 450.

5. Idem, Questions in Genesim,quoted by A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1940, pp. 70‑71.

6. A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction, to Ancient Philosophy, Methuen, London, 1947, p. 162.

7. Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, tr. Morris and Porter, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1872, p. 231.

8. R A. H. Armstrong; The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 61.


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