Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Future from the Islamic View

The Quranic View:

We have stated before that Islam, like all other religions, portrays an optimistic picture of the future. This portrayal has been done in the manner most beautiful in the Holy Quran. Therefore, right in the beginning of creation, it is stated that the first creature on earth would be Allah’s Caliph; it was the wish of Allah to appoint His caliph on the earth.

« و إذ قال ربْك لِلملائكَه إنّي جاعلٌ في الأرض خليفه ».

“And when your Lord said to the angels, ‘Surely I am going to appoint a Caliph in the earth.” [6]

At this juncture, the angels expressed their amazement and Allah replied to their query, which is known to one and all. One of my teachers, a highly respectable and knowledgeable person,[7] explains this incident in a very interesting manner. He says that on that day, the angels saw the bridge of Tajrish (in Iran) and the promenades of Paris and said, « أجعل فيها من يفسد فيها؟! » “Will you appoint somebody who will create mischief in it?” and then they saw the first and second World Wars and said, «ويسفك الدماء؟! » “and shed blood?” But Allah the Almighty saw Ali Ibn Abi Talib (a.s.) and said,

« إني أعلم ما لا تعلمون»

“Surely I know what you do not know.”

According to the Holy Quran, the aim of creation of mankind on the earth is based on the very appointment of Allah’s Caliph. Thus, in the beginning of creation, Allah says, “Surely I am going to appoint a Caliph in the earth.” After his advent on the earth, Allah has provided a model for him so that all may strive to emulate him.

For further understanding of this concept, let me cite an example. Suppose that a person builds a school and expresses his desire to educate students to become engineers, doctors, specialists, etc in it. After the passage of some time, when one student passes out of this institution, the builder of these schools brings him forward and says, ‘For him only have we built this institution? All our efforts were directed towards this very individual.’

Some of the traditions that explain the virtues of the Holy Prophet (s.a.) and his pure progeny (a.s.) carry a similar meaning. For instance, Allah the Almighty says to the Holy Prophet (s.a.):

« لَولاك ما خَلقتُ الأفلاك ».

“If you were not there, I would not have created the universe.”[8]

Allah the Almighty created Hazrat Adam (a.s.), the father of humanity, as a role model from all aspects and ordered the others to emulate him and strive to be like him. But as time passed, and other human beings tread on the face of the earth, they failed to emulate their role model, as was expected of them for the fulfillment of the divine promise, and much to the disappointment of the righteous. Yet, Allah the Benevolent, by sending the other Prophets (peace be on them) to them, indicates that the appointment of His Caliph on the earth is not rendered null and void. Rather, He would send more such people on the earth, who would not only be like His first Caliph, but more perfect.

Some are of the opinion that such verses are only for the gradual finalization of Allah’s Promise. Hence, in the Holy Quran, first He says,

« إني جاعل في الأرض خليفه ».

“Surely I am going to appoint a Caliph in the earth” and thereafter the Prophets (peace be on them) reminded the people. And when the series of Prophethood reached to Hazrat Dawood (a.s.) and Hazrat Sulayman (a.s.), Allah says,

« وُ لَقد كَتبنا في الزّبورِ من بعدِ الذّكر أنُّ الأرض يُرِثُها عِباديُ الصّالحونُ».

“Surely I have written in the Psalms after the Old Testament that surely the earth, My righteous servants shall inherit it.”[9]

To understand the above verses in their right context and comprehend their relevance, let me cite an example. You loosen the nuts and bolts of this tape-recorder, dismantle it completely, mix it with some additional screws that do not belong to it and tell somebody to assemble it once again in the desired order. Now, if somebody like me, who is totally ignorant about its technicalities, takes it in his hand, he will never manage to sort out its nuts and bolts with the additional screws or assemble it. But if it is given to somebody who is an expert in this field, immediately, he will get on with the task of separating its nuts and bolts with the additional screws and within no time, he will assemble it and hand it over back to you.

Similarly, the Quranic verses concerning Imamat and Qaemiyyat are as scattered as the parts of the tape recorder in the above example. As we are unacquainted with Allah’s Book, we do not know as to which verse talks about Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). But if we hand over these verses to the one who is well familiar with them, he will bring one verse from the beginning, another from the middle and yet another one from the end. He will place about twenty to thirty verses next to each other in such a manner that they will not be applicable for anybody except the Promised Mahdi (a.t.f.s.).

From such verses, we can select a few. For instance,

« إني جاعل في الأرض خليفه ». Surely I am going to appoint a Caliph in the earth” being one of them. If you ask what this verse means, it will be answered, ‘It means that there must be a divine caliph in the earth.’

The second verse is that very one which has been discussed above and which states that divine promise is definite. For, Allah the Almighty assures,

« وُ لَقد كَتبنا في الزّبورِ مِن بعد الذّكرِ أنُّ الأرض يُرثُها عِباديُ الصّالحون».

“And indeed We have written in the Psalms after the Old Testament (in the various exegesis, the word zikr implies both the Old Testament as well as remembrance-its literal meaning) that the earth, it shall be inherited by My righteous servants.”

So how much of the earth will they inherit? Is it about three hundred or four hundred meters of a land? No, definitely not. It is not talking about just a piece of land but about the whole earth. The definitive article used in the word ‘the earth’ is used to connote the whole in Arabic. Thus, the righteous servants of Allah will inherit the entire earth.

In yet another verse, Allah the Almighty prophesies,

« إنُّ الأرض للّه يورثُها مُن يُشاءُ مِن عباده و العاقبه للمْتّقين ».

“…Surely the earth is for Allah, He causes it to be inherited by anyone of His servants, as He pleases and the hereafter is for the pious ones.”[10]

Here too the servants have been categorized as the righteous and pious servants. The last part of the verse is a pledge where Allah says that this is My promise to you.

It is better to clarify this point over here that some times we speak in general that I will do this work. But at other times, we say it in the form of a vow. We practice this in our daily lives. For instance, one of our friends usually comes to us and says that ‘I intend to invite you’; but this is a general statement. But when? Where? Will he not regret? Thus, it is still not a promise. One day he comes and says, ‘Sir, please note and remember that I intend to invite you.’ Fine, we remember but still he has not taken any commitment from us. But one fine day he comes and takes a promise from us. That is, he says, ‘I want to officially invite you all on such and such day, at such and such time, and in so and so place for dinner.’ These are the three stages of glad tidings.

Of course, it should be known that there are two kinds of prophecies, one is a promise(wa’d) and another is a threat (waeed ). It is certainly better if a threat is not carried out. But if a promise is not fulfilled, it is wrong and evil. In the case of Allah, He has threatened a lot, ‘I will throw you in hell, I will punish you…’ but later, He forgives. On account of His being a Forgiver, maybe He does not carry out His threat. But if He does not fulfill His promise, then it is indeed wrong and evil.

Now, when this is clear, Allah the Almighty, promises,

« وعد الله الذين آمنوا منكم و عملوا الصّالحات ».

“Allah has promised those of you who believe and perform good deeds.” [11]

In the beginning, He said,

« إني جاعل في الأرض خليفه ».

‘Surely I am going to appoint a Caliph in the earth’

But now He says,

« وعد الله الّذين آمنوا منكم و عملوا الصّالحات ليستخلفنهم في الأرض كما استخلف الّذين من قبلهم ».

“Allah has promised those of you who believe and perform good deeds that He will certainly appoint them as heirs in the earth as He has appointed as heirs those before them (one type of such caliphs were Prophets Dawood and Sulayman (a.s.))

« و ليْمكنن لهم دينهم الّذي ارتضي لهم ».

And certainly He will establish for them their religion which He has chosen for them.”

Where in the Holy Quran has this chosen religion been mentioned? It is mentioned in the following verse,

« اليوم اكملت لكم دينكم و اتممت عليكم نعمتي و رضيت لكم الاسلام دينا ».

“Today, I have perfected for you your religion, completed My bounties upon you and chosen for you Islam as a religion.” [12]

So in this verse, it has been explained in clear terms as to which are the religion chosen by Allah for His servants.

Thereafter, He says,“And He will surely convert their fear into security”. What does fear and security imply in this verse? Fear is a general term e.g. fears of hunger, fear of insecurity, fear of world war, fear of an atomic war, etc. All these are fears and hence Allah promises that He will convert their fear into security. In other words, We will change the atmosphere of fear and insecurity into one of security and comfort.

The verse continues,“(as) they worship only Me, do not associate anything with Me. Then whoever disbelieves after that, and then indeed these are the transgressors.”

Therefore, all the above are promises of Allah. Now let us see, whether these statements are definite promises of Allah, tantamount to His Intention, or they are just general statements made by Him. In this regard, there is another verse that pledges,

« وُ نُريد أَن نَمْنُّ علي الّذين استُضعِفوا في الأرضِ و نَجعُلَهْم أئمُّه و نجعلهم الوارثين و نُمكّنُ لهم في الأرض و نُري فِرعون و هامانُ و جْنودُ هْما مِنهْم ما كانوا يُحذرون».

“And We intend to oblige those who have been rendered weak in the earth and that We make them the Imams and We make them the heirs. And We will establish them in the earth and We will show Firaon, Hamaan and their armies what they were dreading from them.” [13]

It should be known that the word “mustaz’af ” does not mean weak. Rather, its true connotation would be those who have become weak willingly and voluntarily or have been rendered weak. For, it is possible that those who have preferred to remain weak willingly could be strong and powerful. (They have preferred being the oppressed one rather than the oppressor.)

The View of Traditions

Traditions narrated from the Holy Prophet (s.a.) in this regard can be classified into three broad categories. The first group of traditions is those that talk about the immediate successor of the Holy Prophet (s.a.). The second group talks about all his successors while the third discusses about his last successor, the reformer of Islam and the promised one of humanity. Under the last category, various topics can be initiated and traditions can be further classified under them.

Initially, it is necessary for us to know that for which type of discussions should we refer to the traditions and on what topics we can rely on them and for what kind of people should these traditions be quoted. For example, can we use traditions as an argument for a youth who cannot digest the concept of longevity of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) or somebody who thinks that what sort of social problems could be solved by believing in Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.)? Certainly not, because such persons are absolutely unwilling to enter the field of traditions. Their question or skepticism is not related to traditions. Even if we quote two thousand traditions for them to prove longevity, they will raise yet another question: Why have the traditions supported a concept that is contradictory to science and intellect?

Then in what circumstances or on what occasions should we rely on traditions? If we consider the appointment of the Imam to be from Allah’s side and that of His messenger (s.a.), then there is no other way to know who the twelfth Imam except through traditions is. If we consider the Prophet (s.a.) as the final authority in the appointment of his successor and Imam, then the appropriate and scientific way would be to refer to his sayings. And if we desire to know about a person and his biography, then the only way would be to refer to the books of traditions and history. Any other approach would be unscientific and incorrect.

It was necessary to present the above preface because in the past we have encountered such people who have demanded that we prove the existence of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) through scientific ways and means. And when somebody forwards traditions and quotes from the Prophet (s.a.), they refute it by countering, ‘Mister, tradition is not science. Prove to me scientifically.’ Maybe somebody might attempt to prove the same scientifically for him. But we prefer to avoid this approach and say, ‘Well, you please prove scientifically that you are the son of your father or that Shah Abbas was a Safavi king!’

Of course, the scientific and correct method to prove this would be the books of history and for every subject; the appropriate approach to solve its intricacies and difficulties would be through its own ways, means and references. If we want to establish the geographical location of a particular place, it certainly would not be through physics, chemistry or mathematics but geography. That too, the geography of Iran under the subject of divisions of states and provinces. Therefore, if somebody refers to the geography books, then indeed he has adopted a scientific approach. Similarly, if somebody refers to the books of traditions regarding the appointment of an Imam, then surely his method is right. Principally, this is the only correct procedure in this discussion.

Hence, today if I have brought books of traditions to present before you some of these, it is with the sole purpose of executing a job in a scientific manner and not to show that I am amullah . Why I’m using the wordmullah orsheikh is that because some people have the habit of driving the opponent away by using such terms like ‘don’t be a mullah or don’t be a sheikh’, and say, if you are right, go to the laboratory and prove your theory. But, a laboratory is a place for a different kind of science. Recently, each science has developed its own form of a laboratory and the laboratory for historical discussions is the history books. This only will be the right approach to solve its problems and there is nothing unscientific about it.

After discussing this preface, let us come to the main topic. We said that numerous books have been written about Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) and plenty of traditions have been narrated about him from both Shia as well as Sunni sources. Among the books that have compiled the traditions concerning Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.), is the book of“Muntakhabul Athar fil Imam al-Thaani Ashar ” by Ayatullah Lutfullah Safi Gulpaygani. Firstly, I would state the sources of this book and then present the list of topics, albeit briefly.

Among the references of this book are Saheeh-e-Bukhari, Sunan-e-Abi Dawood, etc. It is worth mentioning that in this book more than 60 sources of the Ahle Sunnat have been used.

This book comprises of ten chapters, altogether and each chapter is further divided into sub-chapters. At the beginning of each chapter and sub-chapter, the author mentions the subject of its discussion.

The first two chapters of this book are as follows:

First Chapter : Contains traditions that state that the Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number.

It is further divided into eight sub-chapters.

Sub-chapter 1: The Imams are twelve in number and the sources used are Saheeh-e-Bukhari, Saheeh-e-Tirmidhi, Saheeh-e-Muslim, Saheeh-e-Abi Dawood, and many other books of Shias and Sunnis.

Sub-chapter 2: The number of Imams (a.s.) is equal to the number of theasbaat (grandsons) andnuqaba (chosen ones) of Bani Israel and thehawariyyoon (companions) of Hazrat Eesa (a.s.). There were twelve grandsons in the Israelites, twelve companions of Hazrat Eesa (a.s.) and twelve Imams (a.s.) in the Islamic nation. Forty traditions have been narrated in this sub-chapter from the narrators of both the major sects.

Sub-chapter 3: The Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number of whom, the first is Ali Ibn Abi Talib (a.s.). It contains 133 traditions along with their references. The references in this sub-chapter are from the likes of Yanaabiul Mawaddah of Qundoozi.

The Holy Prophet (s.a.) said,

« يا علي أنت وصيي, حُربْكُ حُربي و سِلمْكُ سِلمي و أنتَ الامامْ و أبو الأئمهِ الاِحدي عشر الذينُ هْمْ الطَهُّرونُ المُعصومون, و مِنهم المُهديْ الّذي يملأ الأرض قِسطاً و عدلاً ».

“O Ali! You are my successor. Your war is my war and your peace is my peace. You are an Imam and the father of eleven Imams those that are purified and infallible. Among them is Mahdi, one who will fill the earth with justice and equity.”

Sub-chapter 4: The Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number, of whom the first is Ali (a.s.) and the last is Mahdi (a.s.). It is comprised of 91 traditions.

Sub-chapter 5: The Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number, of whom the last is Mahdi (a.s.). It contains 94 traditions like the following one,

The Messenger of Allah (s.a.) said,

« إن اللّه تعالي أخَذ ميثاقي و ميثاقُ اثني عُشرُ إماما بُعدي و هْم حْججْ اللّهِ علي خَلقِه. الثّاني عشر منهم القائمْ الّذي يملأ بهِ الأرضَ قسطاً و عدلا».

“Surely Allah the Almighty took my covenant and the covenant of twelve Imams after me. They are Allah’s proofs upon His creatures. The twelfth among them is the Qaem who will fill the earth with justice and equity.”

Sub-chapter 6: The Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number, of whom nine are the descendants of Imam Husain (a.s.). It is comprised of 139 traditions.

Sub-chapter 7: The Imams (a.s.) are twelve in number, of whom nine are the descendants of Imam Husain (a.s.), with special emphasis on,

« و تاسِعْهْم قائمْهْم و مُهديْهْم». “…the ninth among them is their Mahdi or their Qaem” . It contains 107 traditions.

Sub-chapter 8: It comprises of traditions that prove the existence of the twelve Imams (a.s.) along with their names. That is, we have traditions wherein the Holy Prophet (s.a.) has given the number of Imams (a.s.) to be twelve and also mentioned their names. It’s a very interesting tradition and contains all of their peculiarities and characteristics. It comprises of fifty traditions, the renowned‘Hadith-e-Lauh’ from Jabir Ibn Abdullah being among them and which will be included in our discussion. It is a very reliable tradition and its references are very authentic.

Second Chapter : It comprises traditions that discuss about the reappearance of Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.), his names, attributes, characteristics and glad-tidings. Forty-nine sub-chapters have been discussed in this chapter.

Sub-chapter 1: Regarding the reappearance and uprising of Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) and glad-tidings concerning him. Contains 657 traditions, among the traditions is the one quoted from Saheeh-e-Tirmidhi which says,

« لا تذهبْ الدْنيا حتّي يُملك العرب رجْل‏َُ مِن أهلِ بيتي , يْواطِي ‎ُ اسمْهْ اسمي ».

“The Holy Prophet (s.a.) says, ‘The world will not come to an end till an Arab from my progeny will rule over it. His name will be like my name.”

Thereafter, a similar tradition with resembling wordings is narrated from Saheeh-e-Tirmidhi and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.

Sub-chapter 2: Regarding the fact that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is from the progeny of the Holy Prophet (s.a.) and from his Ahle Bait (a.s.) and off-spring, containing 389 traditions.

Sub-chapter 3: Concerning the fact that the name and agnomen of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is akin to that of the Holy Prophet (s.a.) and that he is the most similar of men to the latter. Also, that when he reappears he will act on thesunnah of the Holy Prophet (s.a.). It contains 48 traditions.

Sub-chapter 4: Regarding the qualities of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) and are comprised of 21 traditions.

Sub-chapter 5: Concerning the fact that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is from the children of Ameerul Momineen (a.s.). It contains 214 traditions.

Sub-chapter 6: Pertaining to the reality that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is from the children of Hazrat Fatema Zahra (s.a.) and not from any other wife of Ameerul Momineen (a.s.). It is comprised of 192 traditions. Here, the first tradition is from Mustadrakus Saheehain, followed by quotes from Yanaabeeul Mawaddah and Muntakhabo Kanzil Ummal. Thereafter, quotes from Shia books and a few Shia exegesis of Quran are also mentioned.

Sub-chapter 7: Regarding the truth that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is from the progeny of Imam Hasan (a.s.) and Imam Husain (a.s.) and it contains 107 traditions.

Sub-chapter 8: That Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is a descendant of Imam Husain (a.s.). It is comprised of 185 traditions.

Sub-chapter 9: Pertaining to the fact that he is one of the nine Imams (a.s.) from the progeny of Imam Husain (a.s.) and it contains 160 traditions.

Sub-chapter 10: That Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is the ninth son of Imam Husain (a.s.) and it contains 148 traditions.

Sub-chapter 11: That Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the descendant of Ali Ibn Husain (a.s.) and is comprised of 185 traditions.

Sub-chapter 12: That he is the descendant of Imam Baqer (a.s.) and it contains 103 traditions.

Sub-chapter 13: That Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the descendant of Imam Sadeq (a.s.) and it consists 103 traditions.

Sub-chapter 14: Regarding the fact that Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is the sixth descendant of Imam Sadeq (a.s.), comprising 99 traditions.

Sub-chapter 15: That Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the descendant of Imam Musa Ibn Jafar (a.s.). It consist 101 traditions.

Sub-chapter 16: Concerning the truth that he is from the progeny of Imam Musa Ibn Jafar (a.s.) and is his fifth descendant. It comprises of 98 traditions.

Sub-chapter 17: That he is the fourth descendant of Imam Reza (a.s.) and it consists 95 traditions.

Sub-chapter 18: Pertaining to the fact that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the descendant of Imam Muhammad Taqi (a.s.) and is his third offspring. It consists of 90 traditions.

Sub-chapter 19: Concerning the truth that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the descendant of Abul Hasan Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Hadi (a.s.) and comprises of 90 traditions.

Sub-chapter 20: That Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is the son of Imam Hasan al-Askari (a.s.) and consists 146 traditions.

Sub-chapter 21: Regarding the fact that the name of his father is Hasan (a.s.) and comprises 147 traditions.

Sub-chapter 22: That the mother of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) is the chief of the maids and the best of them. It consist 9 traditions.

Sub-chapter 23: Contains two traditions stating that wherever there are three names, Muhammad, Ali and Hasan, in sequence, the fourth has to be Hazrat Qaem (a.t.f.s.). That is, Imam Muhammad Taqi (a.s.), Imam Ali Naqi (a.s.) and Imam Hasan al-Askari (a.s.). This is a tradition from the Holy Prophet (s.a.) wherein he prophesies,

« إذا تَوالَت أربعه أسماء مِنُ الأئمهِ مِن وْلدي, محمد و علي و الحسنْ فُرابِعْها هْوُ القائمْ المأمولُ المنتظَر».

“Whenever the names Muhammad, Ali and Hasan from the Imams from my progeny, are in sequence, then the fourth of them is al-Qaem (a.s.), the Expected, the Awaited.”

Thus, it will not suffice if somebody’s name is Muhammad Ibn Al-Hasan (to claim to be Mahdi). It is essential that his grandfather should be Ali and his great grandfather, Muhammad.

Sub-chapter 24: That Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) is the twelfth and the last Imam. That is, after him there will not be any other Imam. We do not have a thirteenth Imam and he is the seal of the Imams (a.s.). It consists of 137 traditions.

Sub-chapter 25: Regarding the prophesy that he will fill the earth with justice and equity and it comprises 123 traditions.

Sub-chapter 26: That Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) has two occultations. This sub-chapter contains 10 traditions.

Sub-chapter 27: Concerning the fact that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) will have a long and major occultation till Allah the Almighty permits him to reappear. It comprises 91 traditions.

Sub-chapter 28: Regarding the causes of his occultation and it consists of 7 traditions.

Sub-chapter 29: Pertaining to the benefits of his existence, the method by which people can derive benefits from him in occultation and the modus operandi of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) in his works. It comprises 7 traditions.

Sub-chapter 30: Concerning longevity and contains 318 traditions.

Sub-chapter 31: That Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) will possess a youthful visage and it comprises 8 traditions.

Sub-chapter 32: Regarding the concealed birth of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) and it contains 14 traditions.

Sub-chapter 33: Concerning the fact that Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) will not carry the allegiance of anybody on his neck. It consists of 33 traditions.

Sub-chapter 34: That Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) will eliminate the enemies of Allah the Almighty, purify the earth of polytheism, etc. It contains 19 traditions.

All the remaining sub-chapters of this chapter are related to the details of Imam-e-Zaman’s (a.t.f.s.) plan, which is irrelevant to our present discussion.

HADITH-E-LAUH

As stated earlier, among the traditions of this book is the Hadith-e-Lauh of Jaabir or Lauh-e-Hazrat-e-Fatemah (s.a.). It is a tradition that has been relied upon in various Shia books and addresses quite a few problems.

Jaabir Ibn Abdullah Ansari is one of the reliable companions of the Holy Prophet (s.a.), and Shias as well as Sunnis accept his traditions. Incidentally, he lived till the time of Imam Baqer (a.s.) and Imam Sadeq (a.s.). When Imam Baqer (a.s.) questioned him regarding the incident of Lauh, Jaabir explained him thus:

“I hold Allah as Witness that during the life of the Holy Prophet (s.a.), I went to your mother, Hazrat Fatemah (s.a.), to congratulate her on the birth of her son, Imam Husain (a.s.). I saw a green tablet in her hand….I asked, “May my parents be sacrificed for you, O daughter of Allah’s Messenger (s.a.), what is this tablet?” She replied, “Allah the Almighty has gifted His Prophet (s.a.) with this tablet. It bears the names of my father, my husband, my two sons and the names of the Imams (a.s.) from my sons. The Holy Prophet (s.a.) gave me this tablet to give me glad tidings through it.”

Jaabir says, “Your mother gave me this tablet, I read it and copied it down.” Imam Sadeq (a.s.) who was along with his father in this meeting and is the narrator of this tradition, says, “Can you show me your copy?” Jaabir replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, they both went to the house of Jaabir who removed the copy from a leather bag. My father said, ‘O Jaabir, you look in your copy and I will read from mine (in order to tally the two versions).’ Jaabir was checking his copy while my father was reading it and they matched word to word.”

The incident of Jaabir acquiring the Hadith-e-Lauh from Janab-e-Fatemah (s.a.) belongs to 3 A.H. In 10 A.H., the Holy Prophet (s.a.) expired. Ameerul Momineen (a.s.) expired in 40 A.H. Imam Hasan (a.s.) departed from this world in 50 A.H. Imam Husain (a.s.) was martyred in 60/61 A.H. But Jaabir is still alive and on the fortieth day(arbaeen) of his martyrdom, he goes forziyarat-e-arbaeen .

Thereafter, in 85 A.H. (approx.), Imam Sajjad (a.s.) expired and Jaabir who was still alive witnesses the period of Imam Baqer’s (a.s.) Imamate. The aforementioned meeting takes place between them and the authenticity of Jaabir’s copy of Hadith-e-Lauh is established. This tablet has become famous as “Lauh-e-Hazrat-e-Fatemah (s.a.)” because it was gifted to her or as “Lauh-e-Jaabir” because he is the main narrator of this tradition.

From the Shia viewpoint, the oldest book in which this tradition has been narrated is ‘Usul al-Kafi”. And as everyone is aware, this book was written more than eleven hundred years ago.

A person from abroad wrote to one of the scholars from Mashhad, “The present manuscript of al-Kafi that we are having is belonging to the Safavide era. Do you have any idea whether any manuscript of this book that has been written prior to the Safavide era is available? For, if such a manuscript is indeed available then it will dispel the doubt that it was compiled by the scholars of the Safavide reign.” The respected scholar says, “I went and searched in the library of Madrasa-e-Nawwaab of Mashhad and found a copy that was eight hundred years old. Probably, this copy was the oldest available one of al-Kafi in Iran. Perhaps, an older version is available outside Iran.” Anyhow, this tradition has been narrated in Usul al-Kafi as well as in other books.

Now let us see as to what are the contents of this tradition. This tablet was from Allah’s side for His Prophet (s.a.). Initially, some reminders regarding divine recognition are given and thereafter Allah the Almighty says,

« إني لَم أَبعُث نبياً إلّا جُعُلتُ لَهْ وُصيا ».

“Surely I did not raise a Prophet but that I appointed for him a successor.. I have selected your cousin, Ali Ibn Abi Talib as your heir apparent. After him, I will honour you with your two grandsons, Hasan and Husain. The latter will be followed by his son, Ali, the adornment of the worshippers. Then, Muhammad Baqir al-Uloom, the splitter of My knowledge and the treasure chest of My wisdom will follow him. After him, his son Jafar and after him, in a period of utter darkness and deviation, his son, Musa will attain the position of Imamat. He will be followed by his son Ali, who will be martyred by an arrogant demon. He will be buried in a city built by My righteous servant, next to the worst of My creatures (implying Haroon al-Rashid, the Abbaside Caliph because Imam Reza (a.s.) is buried next to his grave).”

Then the Imams (a.s.) after him are mentioned till Imam Hasan al-Askari (a.s.) and then Allah the Almighty says,

« و أكملُ ذلك بِابنِهِ م ح م د ».

“And I will complete this (chain of Imamate) with his son, Meem-Ha-Meem-Daal.”

The alphabets(huruf-e-muqatteaat ) are used because in that period it was prohibited to take the name of Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.). Now, the tablet continues,

« عليه كَمالُ موسي و بُها عيسي و صَبرْ إيوب فَيْذَلُّ أوليائي في زمانِهِ فَيْقتلون و يْحرقون و يُكونون خائِفين مُرعوبينُ وجِلينُ, تُصبُغُ الأرضُ بِدمائِهم و يُفشو الوُيلُ و الرنه في نِسائهِم, اولئكُ أَوليائي حقّا. بِهم أدفَعْ كلَّ فِتنُه عَمياء حِندسٍ و بهِم أكشِفْ الزّلازِلَ و أدفعْ الآصارُ و الأغلال, اُولئكُ عَليهم صَلوات مِن ربهم و رُحمه و اولئك همْ المْهتدون».

“He possesses the perfection of Musa, the brightness of Eesa and the patience of Ayyub. My friends will be degraded in his time (of occultation). They will be killed and burnt and will be in a constant state of fear, apprehension and dread. The earth will be coloured with their blood. Wailing and crying will be aloud among their women. They are My true friends. Through them, I will dispel every dark mischief, remove all tremors because of them, and do away with all doubts, skepticism and chains on account of their blessings. They are those on whom are the blessings and mercy of their Lord and they are the guided ones.”[14]

This tradition is an instance in which the name of Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) and his occultation have been talked about in such an explicit manner. Of course, as stated earlier, there are plenty of traditions in this regard. For example, apart from this Hadith-e-Lauh, Jaabir himself has narrated numerous traditions, of which we explained the aforementioned tradition just as an example.

Thus, we saw in the traditions of the Holy Prophet (s.a.) that while inviting the people towards Prophethood, divine justice, resurrection, and the principle of Imamat, he (s.a.) also introduces a principle in the minds of the Muslims and that is the existence of an unseen reformer. Moreover, he (s.a.) has repeated this concept on various occasions to let the people understand that the belief in Hazrat Mahdi’s (a.t.f.s.) existence is a part of our religious creed.

Aside from the Holy Prophet (s.a.), we see that all the other infallibles (a.s.) have also lend significance to this issue and spoke about it on numerous occasions. Ameerul Momineen (a.s.) says,“Verily, O Allah, the earth cannot be void of a divine proof ”[15] and on another occasion he says, “The Mahdi of this nation is from my descendant .”[16]

When people objected at him for signing the peace treaty with Muaviyah, Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba (a.s.) justified his action in the following words,

« أما علِمتُم أنّه ما مِنّا أحدّ إلّا و يُقَعْ في عْنقِه بُيعهّ لِطاغيهِ زَمانهِ, اِلّا القائمْ الّذي يْصلّي روح اللّه عيسي بنْ مريم خَلفهْ ».

“Do you not know that each one of us (Imams) has to wear the allegiance of the tyrant of his time around his neck, except the Qaem, behind whom Allah’s Spirit, Isa Bin Maryam, will perform namaz?” [17]

Imam Husain (a.s.) has talked about Imam-e-Zaman (a.t.f.s.) in various places. In the sermon that he delivered in the Umayyide Mosque, Imam Sajjad (a.s.), while enumerating the virtues of the Ahle Bait (a.s.), said,

“…Allah’s Messenger (s.a.), Jafar Tayyar in the heaven, the two grandsons (sibtain) of this nation and the Mahdi, the one who will slay Dajjal, are all from us.”[18]

Evidently, when someone talks about his virtues and merits in front of the opponents, he will make a mention of only those qualities that are accepted by the people. Therefore, it becomes known that just as people were aware of the names, position and status of Jafar-e-Tayyar and Hasanain (a.s.), the principle of Mahdaviyyat was also firmly entrenched in their minds and hence Imam Sajjad (a.s.) has mentioned his name in his speech from the pulpit.

Then, we reach to the times of Imam Muhammad Baqer (a.s.) and Imam Sadeq (a.s.), a period when this discussion truly blossomed. More traditions have been narrated from the former than by the latter. Among the traditions quoted from him is the one by Umme Haani-e-Saqafiyyah. Umme Haani is a lady whose equal can be rarely found today. Of course, even in the times of Imams (a.s.), women like her were few and far between. She narrates: I went to Imam Baqer (a.s.) and said, “O son of Allah’s Messenger! I read a verse from the Holy Quran, which amazed me, no end and has indeed made me restless because I could not follow its meaning?” Imam Baqer (a.s.) asked, “Which is that verse?” Umme Haani responded,

« فلا أقسمْ بِالخُنّس الجُوارِ الكُنّس و اللَّيلِ اِذا عُسعسُ و الصُّبحِ اِذا تَنفّسُ ».

But nay! I swear by the stars, That run their course (and) hide themselves, And the night when it departs, And the morning when it brightens. [19]

What are these stars that will hide themselves and what is this night that will depart?”

Of course, it should be borne in mind that Umme Haani is an Arab lady and is well-versed with the literal meaning of these verses. But what she was not aware and was interested to know was its exposition. Umme Haani says, “I reflected a lot but in vain. In fact, I deliberated upon it the entire night.” Rarely do we find someone who reflects and deliberates upon a verse of Quran for a whole night.

Imam Baqer (a.s.) replied her query thus, “O Umme Haani! You have asked a very good question. (These verses refer to) a child who will be born in the last era.”[20]

Thereafter, Imam (a.s.) begins to enumerate the characteristics of Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.), his advent in the world, illuminating the universe with divine light, occultation, the dark periods of the two occultations, and then once again, his reappearance and its infusion of a new life in the world.

In the times of Imams (a.s.), this matter was discussed under various headings. Both Imam Baqer (a.s.) and Imam Sadeq (a.s.) were asked about it. Sometimes the narrator came in the service of the Imams (a.s.) and asked, ‘Sir, are you Mahdi? Are you Qaem?’ Imam (a.s.) used to reply, ‘All of us will establish Allah’s command’ or ‘All of us guide towards Allah.’[21]

In this regard, we have an interesting tradition from Imam Baqer (a.s.). The story of this tradition runs as follows that Kumait Ibn Zaid Asadi, the famous poet came to Imam Baqer (a.s.) and Imam Sadeq (a.s.) during ayyaam al-beedh[22] .After seeking permission from the Imams (a.s.), he began reciting his poems depicting the oppression inflicted on the Ahle Bait (a.s.) till he reached the following verse:

مُتي يقوم الحق فيكم متي يقوم مهديكم الثاني

“When will the truth rise among you, when

Will the second Mahdi from you, rise.”

Hearing this couplet, Imam (a.s.) retorted, “Soon, if Allah wishes, soon.” Imam (a.s.) continued, “Our Qaem is the ninth descendant of Imam Husain (a.s.). As the Imams (a.s.) after the Holy Prophet (s.a.) are twelve in number, the twelfth is Qaem.”

Kumait asked, “Who are these twelve illustrious personalities?” Imam (a.s.) replied, “The first among them is Ali, followed by Hasan and Husain….”Imam (a.s.) named each Imam till he reached Hazrat Mahdi (a.t.f.s.) and then, he explained his reappearance and uprising.[23]

Imam Reza (a.s.) too has posted numerous reminders on this subject. Among these is the invocation that he has recommended to be read in the qunootof every Friday prayer. [24] It is as follows:

« اللّهم أصلِح عُبدك و خَليفَتك‏ بِما أصلَحت بِهِ أنبيائكُ و رسلك وُ حفّه بملائكتكُ و أيدهْ بروح القدس من عندك و رْسلكه مِن بينِ يديهِ و مِن خلفِهِ رصداً يحفظونهْ مِن كلِّ سوْءٍ و أبدِلهْ مِن بعد خوفِهِ أمناً يعبْدْك لا يْشركْ بِك شيئاً و لا تجعل لِأحدٍ مِن خلقِك علي وليك سْلطاناً و أذَن لَهْ في جِهاد عدوك و عدوهِ وِ اجعلني مِن إنصارِهِ, إنَّك علي كلِّ شي ءٍ قديرّ ».

“As we reach to the eras of the last Imams (a.s.), viz. Hazrat Jawaad (a.s.), Hazrat Hadi (a.s.) and Hazrat Askari (a.s.), we observe that they have talked at length on this topic. Thus, if we intend to derive an accepted concept and belief from the history of Imams (a.s.), we do not have any topic that has been talked unanimously by all of them more than the subject under discussion. This fact should be borne in mind that these conclusions have been derived only from the available quotes of the Imams (a.s.) and the present books of traditions, notwithstanding the reality that many traditions have not reached unto us.

• Aşāla al-Żuhūr (Principality of the Appearance)

Aşāla al-żuhūr - to which all other literal principles refer - is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used a term and one doubts what the speaker has really meant. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the appearance,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its apparent meaning, even though the speaker may have intended another meaning by using it; for using a term in other than its apparent meaning needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

Here, there are two discussions:

1. Whether a specific term is apparent in a specific meaning. Dictionaries deal with this matter. On the other hand, mabāhith al-alfāż of the science of uşūl al-fiqh discuss appearances of some terms whose appearances are a matter of dispute, such as terms of commands and prohibitions, those of general and particular, and so on. In fact, these are some minor premises of the principality of appearance.

2. Whether a term whose appearance is recognized is an authoritative proof in its specific meaning from the divine lawgiver’s view so that both the divine lawgiver and duty-bounds can argue it. That is the major premise by adding its minor premises onewill be allowed to take appearances of Qur’ānic verses and ĥadīths into consideration and act on their basis.

The only proof for authority of the appearance is conduct of the wise (→ binā’ al-‘uqalā’), which consists of the following premises:

2.1. The practical conduct of the wise and their unanimity of opinion is doubtlessly established on that the speaker can content himself with the appearance of his words in communicating his ideas to others; the wise do not oblige the speaker to use only such words that are definite with regard to which no other meaning is probable. On the other hand, based on that practical conduct, they take appearances of words of every speaker into consideration for understanding his ideas whether or not his words are explicit-definite. That is why the appearance is an authoritative proof for both the speaker against the hearer if the latter predicates the former’s words upon something contrary to the appearance and the hearer against the speaker if the former claims that he has meant something contrary to the appearance.It is the legal procedure that the appearance of a judicial confession or acknowledgment should be taken into consideration even though the term may not be explicit-definite.

2.2. It is also indubitably clear that the holy lawgiver has not taken a way other than that of the wise in His communications. For the lawgiver is considered among the wise, and even their chief; therefore, He should have confirmed that conduct. This argument is sound, since there is no problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way on the one hand and no prohibition from Himis proved in this connection on the other.

Itis necessarily and definitely concluded from those two premises that the appearance is treated as an authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver: for Him against the duty-bound, and as an excuser for the duty-bound.

•al-Awāmir → al-Amr

B

•al-Barā’a al-‘Aqliyya (Intellectual Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is not proved by religious proofs but by the intellectual principle of reprehensibility of punishment without depiction (→qā‘ida qubĥ ‘iqāb bilā bayān) it is called al-barā’a al-‘aqliyya.

•al-Barā’a al-Shar‘iyya (Religious Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is proved by religious proofs, it is called al-barā’a al-shar‘iyya.

• Binā’ al-‘Uqalā’ (Conduct of the Wise)

The proof called “the conduct of the wise” consists of two premises:

1. The wise as they are the wise (i.e., human beings as they are intellectual beings and not as they are animate creatures with some emotions, desires, customs, and the like) have such a practical conduct. This reveals thatsuch a conduct is originated by the intellect and not other human faculties .

2. The divine lawgiver has not prohibited from following that conduct. This reveals that He has recognized that conduct; for He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect, and therefore has no other judgment.

The conclusion is that the divine lawgiver has confirmed that conduct and has had no other way in this connection; otherwise, He would have announced and depicted His specificway ordering believers to follow it.

Itshould be noted , however, that the divine lawgiver’s agreement with the conduct of the wise could not be discovered merely through His prohibition not being proved, but rather there must exist some conditions so that one may deduce the divine lawgiver’s agreement with a conduct of the wise:

2.1. There should not be a problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way.Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, agreement of the divine lawgiver cannot be discovered from His prohibition not being proved - as is the case with referring to experts such as lexicographers, for need of the divine lawgiver to experts is nonsensical and makes no sense so that He may have a practical conduct in this connection.

2.2. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, it must be proved that the practical conduct has been prevalent even as to religious affairs in the time of infallible-innocent personalities so that one can infer their acknowledgment from their silence and deduce that the divine lawgiver has been in agreement with the wise.This is the case with, for example, the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb [q.v.]) which is an authoritative proof in the case of doubt about the previous state; for, on the one hand, it is nonsensical that the divine lawgiver should doubt about persistence of His precept, and, on the other hand, the conduct of the wise as to consideration of the previous state has been prevalent in religious affairs. Now, since the conduct of the wise has been prevalent even in religious affairs and the divine lawgiver has not prohibited from that, we can deduce that He has confirmed the conduct in question.

2.3. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible while neither of the two previously mentioned conditions exists, there must be a specific, definite proof announcing agreement and confirmation of the divine lawgiver. Otherwise, agreement of the divine lawgiver with the conduct is merely a conjecture, and “Surely conjecture avails naught against truth.” (Qur., 10: 36)

In other words, in any custom of the wise, the divine lawgiver is either expected to be in agreement with the wise since there is no problem with that, as in the case of single report, or is not expected to be in such agreement because of existing problem, as in the case of the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb).

If the former, if itis proved that the divine lawgiver has prohibited from the conduct, that conduct is definitely not of authority, and if not, it is definitely discovered that He is in agreement with the wise. For He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect; had He not confirmed that conduct having a specific way in this connection other than that of the wise, He would have announced and depicted that way prohibiting believers from following their own conduct.

If the latter, (2.3.2.1.) it is either known that the conduct of the wise as to its consideration has been prevalent in religious affairs, as is the case with istişĥāb, or (2.3.2.2.) that is not known, as is the case with referring to experts for meanings of words.

In (2.3.2.1.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is sufficient for discovering His agreement with the wise, for that is something He caresabout . Had He not confirmed that whilethat custom is observed by His vicegerent , He would have prohibited duty-bounds from following that custom and conveyed that prohibition to them in any way possible. Thus, the very lack of establishment of prohibition reveals His agreement, for it is obviously clear that an actualprohibition which is not conveyed to and has not reached duty-bounds cannot be regarded an actual, authoritative prohibition.

As for (2.3.2.2.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is not sufficient to reveal His agreement, for it is probable that He has prohibited the wise from that custom in religious affairs and they did not do so, or they may have arbitrarily not followed that custom in religious affairs and it is not upon the divine lawgiver to prohibit them from following that custom in irreligious affairs - had He not confirmed that in such affairs. That is why we are in need of a specific, definite proof in order totake such custom into consideration in religious affairs.

D

• Dalāla al-Iqtiđā’ (Denotation of Necessitation)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), two criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. Numerous examplescan be found for such denotation two of which being as follows:

1. In the verse 82 of sūra 12 of the holy Quran, parts of words of Joseph's brothers to their father when they returned from their journey to Egyptare narrated in this way: “Question the city wherein we were,” and it is clear that the city cannot be questioned. Thus, the sentence can rationally be correct only if the word “people” is considered omitted in it, so that the sentence should be “Question people of the city… .”

2. There is a ĥadīth saying, “There are no prayers for the mosque's neighbor except in the mosque,” while we know that should such a person say his prayers in his home it will be juristically acceptable. Thus, the truth and correctness of the sentence is dependent upon the word “perfect”being omitted so that what is negated should be perfection of the prayers and not the prayers itself.

Generally speaking, all implicative denotations to single meanings and all figurative meanings refer to the denotation of necessitation.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

• Dalāla al-Ishāra (Denotation of Implicit Conveyance)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya and dalāla al-iqtiđā’) neither of the two following criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. What is denoted here is only an unclear implicature of the speech or an obvious implicature of the speech in the most general sense - no matter the object of denotation is understood from a single sentence or from a couple of sentences.

An instance of this is denotation of two Qur’ānic verses as to the minimum time of pregnancy: the verse 15 of the sūra 46 “And painfully she gave birth to him his bearing and his weaning being thirty months,” and the verse 233 of the sūra 2 “Mothers will suckle their children two complete years completely for such as desire to complete the suckling,” since to subtract two years, i.e., twenty four months, from thirty months is six and thereby it becomes clear that the minimum time for pregnancy is six months. It is also of this kind the question of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminary, since it is an obvious implicature of the obligation of the thing in the most general sense. That is why they consider obligation of the preliminary of a mandatory act a secondary and not a primary one; for it is not a denotation of the speech by intention and is only understood secondarily, i.e., by the denotation of implicit conveyance.

As for the authority of this denotation, it cannot betreated as an authoritative proof because of authority of appearances, for there is no appearance where it is assumed that such thing is not intended - it is obviously clear that denotation is subject to the intention. Therefore, implicit conveyanceshould only be called adumbration and implicit conveyance without using the term denotation; hence, it is clear that such conveyance is not included in the appearances so that it can be an authoritative proof from that aspect. Of course, it would definitely be an authoritative proof should there be an intellectual implication through which its requisites, whether judgment or otherwise, could be discovered, such as taking requisites of one’s confession into consideration even though he claims that he has not intended them or he denies existence of any implication there.

•al-Dalāla al-Siyāqiyya (Contextual Denotation)

There are some denotations that are included neither in mafhūm [q.v.] nor in manţūq [q.v.], such as the case where the speech denotes implicatively a single word or a single meaning not mentioned in the manţūq, or it denotes contents of asentence which is an implicature of manţūq but not obviously in the most particular sense. Thoseare all called neither mafhūm nor manţūq.

To address those denotations in a general way, a good number of Uşūlīs have called them contextual denotation (al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya) meaning that the context of a speech denotes a single or compound meaning, or an omitted word. Such denotationsare divided into the three following varieties: denotation of necessitation (al-iqtiđā’), hint (al-tanbīh), and implicit conveyance (al-ishāra) [qq.v.].

• Dalāla al-Tanbīh (Denotation of Hint)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), only one criterion, i.e., the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, is taken into consideration. Here, it is the context of the speech that causes certainty that a specific requisiteis meant or makes its non-consideration unlikely. This denotation has numerous instances the most important of whichbeing classified as follows:

1. The speaker whishes to depict something but expresses its logical or conventional requisite. For example, one addresses his friend saying, “It is ten o'clock” in order to remind him that the time they had agreed upon to go somewhere has come.

2. The speech is associated with someword which conveys that something is a cause, condition, impediment, or part of the judgment. To mention the judgment is thereby a hint that the thing mentioned is a cause, condition, impediment, part of the judgment or it is not so. For instance, if the jurist says, “Repeat your prayers,” where he is asked about the doubt concerning numbers of rak‘as of a two-rak‘a prayers , it is understood that the said doubt is a cause for annulment of the prayers and the obligation of repetition.

3. The speech is associated with someword which determines some objects of the act. For instance, when someone says, “I reached the river and drank,” it is understood that what was drunk was water and it was from the river.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

•al-Dalīl al-Faqāhatī → al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī

•al-Dalīl al-Idjtihādī → al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī

• Dalīl al-Insidād (Closure Proof)

The proof known as “the Closure Proof” consists of four preliminaries. Should those preliminaries be accurate, intellect would judge that the duty-bound should acton the basis of any conjecture with regard to precepts - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās [q.v.]).

Those four preliminariescan be summarized as follows:

1. The door of knowledge and knowledge-rooted is closed in the most part of juristic precepts in our time when it is later than our holyImāms’ .This is the fundamental base of this proof upon which all other preliminaries are dependent.

2. It is not allowed to leave obedience of actualprecepts which are known to us in summary fashion, nor is it permissible to reject them in the position of action. To leave and reject actual precepts can be actualized in two ways: either to treat ourselves as animals and children who have no burden, or to refer to the principle of “clearance” (→ aşāla al-barā’a) and that of “non-existence of burden” wherever obligation or unlawfulness of something is unknown. Annulment of those two assumptions is self-evidently clear; therefore, we must take into consideration all actualprecepts which are known in summary fashion.

3. To consider such precepts necessitates clarifying one's obligation, which, in turn, is restricted to one of the following four states: (3.1) to follow the one who believes in the openness of the door of knowledge, (3.2) to act on the basis of “precaution” in every problem, (3.3) to refer to the respective practical principle (the principle of clearance, that of precaution, etc.) in every problem as the circumstances necessitate, and (3.4) to refer to the conjecture where there is one, and to the practical principles where there is none.

Since referring to the first three states is not acceptable, we shouldtake the fourth into consideration . The first is not acceptable, for how can one who believes in the closure of the door of knowledge refer to whom he considers wrong and ignorant in his believing in the openness of that door? The second is not plausible, for it necessitates intolerable hardship, or even disorder of the society if all duty-bounds are burdened with - which are both rejected in the Islamic law. And the third is not acceptable, for the existence of knowledge of mandatory and prohibited affairs in all doubtful problems in summary fashion prevents us from referring to the practical principles even though in some of them.

4. Thus, the only acceptable state is the fourth, i.e., referring to the conjecture. Although conjecture has two sides, i.e., the preferable (al-rādjiĥ) and the chimerical (al-mardjūĥ=al-mawhūm), one is merely allowed to refer to the preferable side; for preferring the chimerical side is intellectually reprehensible. Therefore, one is supposed totake the conjecture into consideration - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās). In case of definite knowledge of non-authority of a conjecture, one should refer to practical principles, precisely as one is supposed to refer to them in doubtful problems with regard to which no conjecture exists. There is no problem with referring to practical principles in such cases, for the knowledge in summary fashion is reduced to the detailed knowledge (al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī) of precepts proved by some authority and primary doubt (al-shak al-badwī) with regard to other cases, in which one is supposed to refer to practical principles [qq.v.].

•al-Dalīl al-Lafżī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dalīl al-Lubbī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dawām (Permanence)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - whatis prohibited is the sheer nature of the act. However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the commandwill be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.

• Dawarān bain al-Aqall wa’l-Akthar→ al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

• Dawarān bain al-Mutabāyinayn → al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

•al-Đidd al-‘Āmm (General Opposite)

The dispute over the general opposite (i.e., eschewal and not doing which is non-existential → mas’ala al-đidd) is not over the necessity in principle, for Uşūlīs apparently agree about the necessity; they disagree only on its nature. They have declared various opinions in this connection. Some have said that the necessity is the sameness, i.e., to command something is the same with prohibitingits opposite. Some have said that since the command is composed of wish of something and prohibition of its eschewal, the prohibition of eschewal is analytical part of meaning of obligation. Some have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most particular sense; hence, the denotation is literal, but implicative. Others have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most general sense or an unclear necessitation; hence, the denotation is merely intellectual.

The justifiable opinion, however, is that there exists no necessity of any kind, i.e., there is no religious prohibition of eschewal necessitated by the very command in such a way that there exists a juristic prohibition beyond the very command to the act. The reason is that the obligation, whether it is denotation of the imperative or its intellectual implication - the latter being true - is not a composite concept; but rather it is a simple, singleone which is necessity of the act. A requisite of obligation of something, of course, is prohibition of its eschewal. However, that prohibition is not a juristic prohibition made by theLord as He is the Lord, but rather is an intellectual secondary prohibition without there being a prohibition from the divine lawgiver beyond the very obligation. The reason is obvious: the very command to do something in an obligatory mode is sufficient to prohibit its eschewal; so, there is no need for the divine lawgiver to prohibit eschewal of something in addition to commanding it.

•al-Đidd al-Khāşş (Particular Opposite)

To hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite (i.e., the existential, incompatible affair, such as eating with regard to prayers → mas’ala al-đidd) is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitation the prohibition of its general opposite (→ al-đidd al-‘āmm); and since there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is no juristic prohibition of the particular opposite either.

•al-Djam ‘ al-‘Urfī (Customary Gathering)

Bydjam‘ is meant taking two contradictory proofs altogether. It is an intellectual judgment that taking two seemingly contradictory proofs altogether is more plausible than leaving either of them. This judgment isdue to the fact that contradiction does not occur unless all constituents of authority exist in either of them as to both chain of transmission and denotation. In case of existence of all constituents of authority, i.e., existence of the origin, nothing may cause leaving the proof but existence of an impediment to the efficacy of the origin; and that impediment can be nothing but their mutual repudiation. On the other hand, possibility of gathering both proofs as to their denotations leaves no room for certainty of their mutual repudiation, which leads to lack of certainty as to the existence of impediment to the efficacy of authority with regard to the proof. Thus, how can one judge that one or both of those proofsis no longer authoritative proof?

However, itshould be noted that such judgment of the intellect is not absolute, but rather is conditional upon the gathering being “customary” or “acceptable,” in the sense that it should not be in a way that custom of people of the language does not confirm it on the one hand and no third proof supports it on the other. (See also: al-muradjdjiĥāt)

F

•al-Fawr (Promptitude)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness (al-tarākhī),both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation (→ al-amr) and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, itcould be performed either promptly or belatedly.

G

• Ghayr al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya (Dependent Intellectual Proofs)

Dependent intellectual proofs are those whose major premises are intellectual while their minor premises are juristic, such as “this act is juristically mandatory,” and “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its preliminary should juristically be mandatory (→ muqaddima al-wādjib),” or “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its opposite should juristically be forbidden (→ mas’ala al-đidd),” and so forth. As clearly seen, minor premises of such syllogisms are proved in the science of fiqh, so they are juristic, while their major premises are intellectual, i.e., it is the intellect’s judgment that there exists an intellectual implication between the precept in the first premise and another juristic precept. The consequence of such minor and major premises becomes a minor premise of a syllogism whose major premise is authority of intellect.

H

• Ĥadīth al-Raf‘ ( Removal)

This is the prophetic ĥadīth argued by uşūlīs for “the clearance from obligatory” (→ awhich declares: “Nine things are removed from my people: error, forgetfulness, what they have done under duress, what they do not know, what they cannot endure, what they have done under compulsion, to take as a bad omen, jealousy, to think of createdness [of the Almighty] so long as one has not uttered it.”

• Ĥāl al-Isnād →al-Mushtaqq

• Ĥāl al-Talabbus →al-Mushtaqq

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Mutasharri‘iyya (Muslims' Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Had such transfer happened after the holy Prophet's time, we would have Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]) according to which any such term found in the Quran and Sunna should be interpreted as its usual, and not juristic, meaning in the process of inferring juristic precepts. Seealso: al-ĥaqīqa al-shar‘iyya.

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya (Juristic-Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Now, the question is that whether such transfer has happened in the holy Prophet's time so that we may have the juristic-literal meaning or it has occurred after him and therefore what we have in hand is Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]).

The answer to that question would make a difference in the process of inferring juristic precepts from the Quran and Sunna. Should there exist the juristic-literal meaning, any such term without contextual evidencewould be predicated to its juristic meaning, while it must be interpreted as its usual meaning if such a juristic-literal meaning does not exist.

It is obviously clear that those new meanings were not made through convention by specification (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘yīnī), for in that case it should have been narrated to us in one way or another. As for the “convention by determination” (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘ayyunī), it must be said that it had doubtlessly happened in Imam Ali's time, for by that time all Muslims have been using such terms in their new juristic meanings for a long time. Hence, since in Shiite jurisprudence only such prophetic ĥadīths thatare narrated by holy Imāms are treated as valuable, all such terms in their words should be predicated to their new juristic meanings where they are void of any contextual evidence. As for the holy Quran, there is no room for such a dispute, since almost all such wordsare used in it along with contextual evidence and convey their new juristic meanings.

•al-Ĥudjdja (Authoritative Proof)

Ĥudjdja literarily means whatsoever capable ofbeing used as an argument against someone else through which one can overcome one’s opponent in a dispute. Overcoming someoneelse is either by making him silent and nullifying his argument, or by making him accept one’s argument - in this sense ĥudjdja being an excuser. In uşūl al-fiqh, however, ĥudjdja means that which proves its object but does not attain the level of certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., it does not cause certitude with regard to its object - since in case of certitude it is the certitude which is ĥudjdja, though in its literal meaning. In other words, ĥudjdja is whatsoever revealing and indicating something else in such a way that the former proves the latter -its proving being made by the lawgiver, duty-maker as it is the actuality. This proving will be sound only by adding theproof which proves validity and authority of that revealing and indicates the thing in the divine lawgiver’s view. Therefore, ĥudjdja in this sense does not include certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., certitude is not called ĥudjdja in this sense, but in the literal sense; for certitude is essentially a way and cannot be made an authoritative proof by anyone. Ĥudjdja in this sense is synonymous with amāra, proof (al-dalīl), and way (al-ţarīq). See also: al-ĥukm al-żāhirī

•al-Ĥudjdjiyya → al-Ĥudjdja

•al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī (Actual Precept)

A precept which is directed to something per se as it is an act - such as the prayers, since the obligation is directed to the prayers as it is prayers and an act per se without consideration of anything else - is called “the actual precept” (al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī) and the proof which proves it “the persuasive proof” (al-dalīl al-idjtihādī).

•al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī (Apparent Precept)

Where a precept is directed to something as its actual precept is unknown and there is no proof for supporting any of the existing opinions, the jurist doubts the primary, actual precept of the disputed matter; and since he is not supposed to remain perplexed practically, there must exist another precept, though intellectual, for him, such as obligation of precaution, clearance from obligation, or ignoring the doubt. Such a secondary precept is called “the apparent precept” (al-ĥukm al-żāhirī) and the proof which proves it “the juristic proof” (al-dalīl al-faqāhatī) or “the practical principle” (al-aşl al-‘amalī [q.v.]). Seealso: al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī.

•al-Ĥukūma (Sovereignty)

Ĥukūma is inclusion or exclusion of something in or from an object by a predicative sentence through expanding or limiting realm of the object or subject; such as “perform ablution for prayers,” and on the one hand: “circumambulation of Ka‘ba is prayers” leading to the conclusion that one should perform ablution while circumambulating in ĥadjdj, and on the other: “funeral prayers is not prayers,” leading to the conclusion that one is not supposed to perform ablution for funeral prayers. Thus, ĥukūma occurs where one of the two seemingly contradictory proofs is supposed tobe given priority over the other because of its sovereignty while both of them are still authoritative proofs, i.e., neither of them repudiates the other. Seealso: al-ta‘āruđ.

I

•al-‘Ibādī (Act of Worship)

‘Ibādī is an act whose religious acceptance is conditional upon the duty-bound’s intention of proximity to God, or that which is the sheer burden made by God for proximity to Him; such as prayers, fast, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like.

•al-Idjmā ‘ (Consensus)

Being defined as consensus of Muslim jurists, that of Muslim community, and so on,idjmā‘ is considered one of the three-fold or four-fold free-standing sources of religious precepts by Sunnī Uşūlīs and jurists. Shī‘a Uşūlīs and jurists, however, do not treat consensus as a free-standing source, but rather as a way through which Sunna can be revealed. Thus, authority and innocence are for words of the infallible-innocent personality, which may sometimes be revealed by theconsensus, and not for the consensus per se.That is why Shī‘a jurists sometimes treat unanimity of opinion of a few individuals whose unanimity is technically not called idjmā‘ as consensus, because of its definite revelation of opinions of the infallible-innocent personality on the one hand, and do not consider a consensus which does not reveal opinions of the infallible-innocent personality as idjmā‘ even though it is technically called so on the other.

Before any argumentation, one point should be noted: it is obviously clear that consensus of all people, or a specific people, as it is consensus has no implication to revealing divine precepts; for it is not of unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise which is an authoritative proof like the Book and Sunna. Unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise is in fact the very intellectual proof, as will be discussed later, and not the technical consensus. The reason why a consensus of people which is not included in the unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise cannot be considered a source for religious precepts is that such a consensus may be caused by people’s habits, beliefs, emotions, or sentiments which are of human characteristic and the divine lawgiver transcends them. Should consensus of people as it is consensus be an authoritative proof, consensus of other people who follow other religions should be an authoritative proof as well - something no Muslim believes in. Thus,some other proof must be presented by Sunnī jurists with regard to the authority of consensus .

As for Shiite perspective, consensus as it is consensus would have no value should it not reveal opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, and that is why it is not considered afree-standing source for religious precepts. In fact, authority is for the revealed, i.e., Sunna, and not for the revealer, i.e., consensus; and consensus precisely plays the role of massive report - with one difference: the latter reveals the very words of the infallible-

innocent personality (and that is why it is called lexical proof (al-dalīl al-lafżī)) while the former reveals the opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not his words (and that is why it is called thematic proof (al-dalīl al-lubbī) which conveys the theme and not the terms). Now that consensus is an authoritative proof because of revealing opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not per se, there is no need for unanimity of all; rather, that of those whose unanimity reveals words of the infallible-innocent personality would be sufficient, no matter how many they are - as explicitly asserted by some great Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs.

As for the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, theyare claimed to be up to twelve four of which being more considerable. However, since most of later Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs have raised doubts about them and followed some specific way called “the way of surmise (ţarīqa al-ĥads),” we will discuss this way only.According to the way of surmise, when one observes that all Shī‘a jurists have a consensus on a precept while they disagree too much on most of precepts, one will definitely become certain that their consensus is rooted in the holy Imām’s opinion and, being handed down from generation to generation, they have received it from their Imām - as is the case with consensus of followers of all other creeds and sects with regard to which no one doubts that the matter of consensus is taken from their leader. It should be emphasized that in the way of surmise, consensus of all jurists of all times, beginning from the era of holyImāms, must be actualized; for disagreement of one earlier generation, and even one single known outstanding jurist, prevents actualization of certitude in this connection.

All detailed discussions and arguments in Shiite uşūl al-fiqh on the authority of consensus as well as the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality deal with al-idjmā‘ al-muĥaşşal (the acquired consensus), i.e., a consensus which is acquired by a jurist who has searched all opinions of all jurists in person.It is this kind of consensus whose authority is a matter of dispute.

However, a case where a jurist has acquired a consensus and then has reported it to others (which is called al-idjmā‘ al -manqūl, i.e., the reported consensus), is also a matter of dispute and different opinions are presented in this connection.Some have considered the reported consensus an authoritative proof since it is a single report, some have treated it as not being an authoritative proof since it cannot be considered an instance of single report, some have considered it an authoritative proof where it reveals religious precepts in the view of the one who is reported to and not the reporter alone, and others have held some other different views in this regard. Detailed discussions on this problemshould be pursued in Shiite books of uşūl al-fiqh.

•Idjtimā‘ al -Amr wa’l Nahy (Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition)

Uşūlīs have disputed from a long time agowhether or not conjunction of command and prohibition in one act, i.e., a single act as it has one existence which is a gathering of two designations, is possible. By conjunctionis meant accidental encounter between the commanded act and the prohibited act in one thing. This may occur only where the command is directed to a designation and the prohibition to another designation which has no relation to the first, but those designations encounter rarely in one thing - here, conjunction of the command and the prohibition occurs, i.e., they encounter one another. Such conjunction of and encounter between two designations is of two kinds: case conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al -mawridī,) and real conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-ĥaqīqī).

Case conjunction occurs where there is no one act which corresponds to both designations, but rather there are two acts which have become synchronous and simultaneous one of which corresponding to the designation of the mandatory act and the other to the designation of the prohibited act. For instance, when someone is performing the prayers and in the meantime looking at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited , looking does not correspond to designation of the prayers, the prayers do not correspond to designation of looking, and both of them do not conform to one act. Such case conjunction is neither impossible nor a matter of dispute in this discussion. Hence, should one look at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited while performing one’s prayers, one would be both obedient and disobedient simultaneously without one’s prayers being annulled.

Real conjunction, even though at a glance and in a conventional view, occurs where there is oneact which corresponds to both designations, such as the well-known example of performing the prayers in an expropriated space. In that example which is the matter of dispute in this discussion, designation of the prayers, which is the commanded act, has no relation to that of expropriation, which is the prohibited act, but it accidentally happens that the duty-bound gathers them by performing the prayers in an expropriated space. Here, designation of the commanded, i.e., the prayers, encounters designation of the prohibited, i.e., expropriation, in that prayers performed in an expropriated space; hence, that single act corresponds to both designations of the prayers and expropriation. Thus, that single act is included in the commanded act from oneaspect which necessitates treating the duty-bound as obedient while it is included in the prohibition from another aspect which necessitates treating him as disobedient.

Now, the matter of dispute in this discussion becomes clear: Is it possible that the command should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and also the prohibition should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and the duty-bound should be considered both obedient and disobedient in one act, or is it not possible and the gathering of the two designations is either commanded only or prohibited only, i.e., either only the command remains actual and the duty-bound is obedient alone or only the prohibition remains actual and he is disobedient alone? Both of these opinionsare held by Uşūlīs each presenting their own proofs in order to establish their claims.

A very important point to be borne in mind is that the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs over possibility or otherwise of conjunction of the command and the prohibition concerns where the duty-bound has a way out (al-mandūĥa), i.e., he is able to obey the command in another case other than the gathering; or, in other words, he has encountered the conjunction deliberately because of misuse of his free will. It is such case that is a matter of disagreement among Uşūlīs: some believe in its possibility and others in its impossibility.

Nevertheless, there is no dispute among Uşūlīs over the impossibility of conjunction where obedience to the command can be actualized exclusively through the gathering and the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction; for it is clear that in case of exclusion, the actuality of two duties becomes impossible, since obedience of both is impossible: if the duty-bound does the commanded act he has disobeyed the prohibition, and if he eschews it he has disobeyed the command. Therefore, all Uşūlīs agree that conjunction of the command and the prohibition in such case is impossible and either the command or the prohibition isactual . However, there is disagreement among Uşūlīs as to which of them is so.

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Ĥaqīqī →Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Mawridī → Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

• Aşāla al-Żuhūr (Principality of the Appearance)

Aşāla al-żuhūr - to which all other literal principles refer - is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used a term and one doubts what the speaker has really meant. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the appearance,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its apparent meaning, even though the speaker may have intended another meaning by using it; for using a term in other than its apparent meaning needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

Here, there are two discussions:

1. Whether a specific term is apparent in a specific meaning. Dictionaries deal with this matter. On the other hand, mabāhith al-alfāż of the science of uşūl al-fiqh discuss appearances of some terms whose appearances are a matter of dispute, such as terms of commands and prohibitions, those of general and particular, and so on. In fact, these are some minor premises of the principality of appearance.

2. Whether a term whose appearance is recognized is an authoritative proof in its specific meaning from the divine lawgiver’s view so that both the divine lawgiver and duty-bounds can argue it. That is the major premise by adding its minor premises onewill be allowed to take appearances of Qur’ānic verses and ĥadīths into consideration and act on their basis.

The only proof for authority of the appearance is conduct of the wise (→ binā’ al-‘uqalā’), which consists of the following premises:

2.1. The practical conduct of the wise and their unanimity of opinion is doubtlessly established on that the speaker can content himself with the appearance of his words in communicating his ideas to others; the wise do not oblige the speaker to use only such words that are definite with regard to which no other meaning is probable. On the other hand, based on that practical conduct, they take appearances of words of every speaker into consideration for understanding his ideas whether or not his words are explicit-definite. That is why the appearance is an authoritative proof for both the speaker against the hearer if the latter predicates the former’s words upon something contrary to the appearance and the hearer against the speaker if the former claims that he has meant something contrary to the appearance.It is the legal procedure that the appearance of a judicial confession or acknowledgment should be taken into consideration even though the term may not be explicit-definite.

2.2. It is also indubitably clear that the holy lawgiver has not taken a way other than that of the wise in His communications. For the lawgiver is considered among the wise, and even their chief; therefore, He should have confirmed that conduct. This argument is sound, since there is no problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way on the one hand and no prohibition from Himis proved in this connection on the other.

Itis necessarily and definitely concluded from those two premises that the appearance is treated as an authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver: for Him against the duty-bound, and as an excuser for the duty-bound.

•al-Awāmir → al-Amr

B

•al-Barā’a al-‘Aqliyya (Intellectual Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is not proved by religious proofs but by the intellectual principle of reprehensibility of punishment without depiction (→qā‘ida qubĥ ‘iqāb bilā bayān) it is called al-barā’a al-‘aqliyya.

•al-Barā’a al-Shar‘iyya (Religious Clearance)

If the clearance from obligation (→ aşāla al-barā’a) is proved by religious proofs, it is called al-barā’a al-shar‘iyya.

• Binā’ al-‘Uqalā’ (Conduct of the Wise)

The proof called “the conduct of the wise” consists of two premises:

1. The wise as they are the wise (i.e., human beings as they are intellectual beings and not as they are animate creatures with some emotions, desires, customs, and the like) have such a practical conduct. This reveals thatsuch a conduct is originated by the intellect and not other human faculties .

2. The divine lawgiver has not prohibited from following that conduct. This reveals that He has recognized that conduct; for He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect, and therefore has no other judgment.

The conclusion is that the divine lawgiver has confirmed that conduct and has had no other way in this connection; otherwise, He would have announced and depicted His specificway ordering believers to follow it.

Itshould be noted , however, that the divine lawgiver’s agreement with the conduct of the wise could not be discovered merely through His prohibition not being proved, but rather there must exist some conditions so that one may deduce the divine lawgiver’s agreement with a conduct of the wise:

2.1. There should not be a problem with the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way.Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, agreement of the divine lawgiver cannot be discovered from His prohibition not being proved - as is the case with referring to experts such as lexicographers, for need of the divine lawgiver to experts is nonsensical and makes no sense so that He may have a practical conduct in this connection.

2.2. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible, it must be proved that the practical conduct has been prevalent even as to religious affairs in the time of infallible-innocent personalities so that one can infer their acknowledgment from their silence and deduce that the divine lawgiver has been in agreement with the wise.This is the case with, for example, the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb [q.v.]) which is an authoritative proof in the case of doubt about the previous state; for, on the one hand, it is nonsensical that the divine lawgiver should doubt about persistence of His precept, and, on the other hand, the conduct of the wise as to consideration of the previous state has been prevalent in religious affairs. Now, since the conduct of the wise has been prevalent even in religious affairs and the divine lawgiver has not prohibited from that, we can deduce that He has confirmed the conduct in question.

2.3. Should the divine lawgiver having the same conduct and way be impossible while neither of the two previously mentioned conditions exists, there must be a specific, definite proof announcing agreement and confirmation of the divine lawgiver. Otherwise, agreement of the divine lawgiver with the conduct is merely a conjecture, and “Surely conjecture avails naught against truth.” (Qur., 10: 36)

In other words, in any custom of the wise, the divine lawgiver is either expected to be in agreement with the wise since there is no problem with that, as in the case of single report, or is not expected to be in such agreement because of existing problem, as in the case of the principle of continuity of the previous state (aşāla al-istişĥāb).

If the former, if itis proved that the divine lawgiver has prohibited from the conduct, that conduct is definitely not of authority, and if not, it is definitely discovered that He is in agreement with the wise. For He is among the wise, even chief of the wise and creator of the intellect; had He not confirmed that conduct having a specific way in this connection other than that of the wise, He would have announced and depicted that way prohibiting believers from following their own conduct.

If the latter, (2.3.2.1.) it is either known that the conduct of the wise as to its consideration has been prevalent in religious affairs, as is the case with istişĥāb, or (2.3.2.2.) that is not known, as is the case with referring to experts for meanings of words.

In (2.3.2.1.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is sufficient for discovering His agreement with the wise, for that is something He caresabout . Had He not confirmed that whilethat custom is observed by His vicegerent , He would have prohibited duty-bounds from following that custom and conveyed that prohibition to them in any way possible. Thus, the very lack of establishment of prohibition reveals His agreement, for it is obviously clear that an actualprohibition which is not conveyed to and has not reached duty-bounds cannot be regarded an actual, authoritative prohibition.

As for (2.3.2.2.), the very lack of establishment of divine lawgiver’s prohibition from that custom is not sufficient to reveal His agreement, for it is probable that He has prohibited the wise from that custom in religious affairs and they did not do so, or they may have arbitrarily not followed that custom in religious affairs and it is not upon the divine lawgiver to prohibit them from following that custom in irreligious affairs - had He not confirmed that in such affairs. That is why we are in need of a specific, definite proof in order totake such custom into consideration in religious affairs.

D

• Dalāla al-Iqtiđā’ (Denotation of Necessitation)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), two criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. Numerous examplescan be found for such denotation two of which being as follows:

1. In the verse 82 of sūra 12 of the holy Quran, parts of words of Joseph's brothers to their father when they returned from their journey to Egyptare narrated in this way: “Question the city wherein we were,” and it is clear that the city cannot be questioned. Thus, the sentence can rationally be correct only if the word “people” is considered omitted in it, so that the sentence should be “Question people of the city… .”

2. There is a ĥadīth saying, “There are no prayers for the mosque's neighbor except in the mosque,” while we know that should such a person say his prayers in his home it will be juristically acceptable. Thus, the truth and correctness of the sentence is dependent upon the word “perfect”being omitted so that what is negated should be perfection of the prayers and not the prayers itself.

Generally speaking, all implicative denotations to single meanings and all figurative meanings refer to the denotation of necessitation.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

• Dalāla al-Ishāra (Denotation of Implicit Conveyance)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya and dalāla al-iqtiđā’) neither of the two following criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. What is denoted here is only an unclear implicature of the speech or an obvious implicature of the speech in the most general sense - no matter the object of denotation is understood from a single sentence or from a couple of sentences.

An instance of this is denotation of two Qur’ānic verses as to the minimum time of pregnancy: the verse 15 of the sūra 46 “And painfully she gave birth to him his bearing and his weaning being thirty months,” and the verse 233 of the sūra 2 “Mothers will suckle their children two complete years completely for such as desire to complete the suckling,” since to subtract two years, i.e., twenty four months, from thirty months is six and thereby it becomes clear that the minimum time for pregnancy is six months. It is also of this kind the question of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminary, since it is an obvious implicature of the obligation of the thing in the most general sense. That is why they consider obligation of the preliminary of a mandatory act a secondary and not a primary one; for it is not a denotation of the speech by intention and is only understood secondarily, i.e., by the denotation of implicit conveyance.

As for the authority of this denotation, it cannot betreated as an authoritative proof because of authority of appearances, for there is no appearance where it is assumed that such thing is not intended - it is obviously clear that denotation is subject to the intention. Therefore, implicit conveyanceshould only be called adumbration and implicit conveyance without using the term denotation; hence, it is clear that such conveyance is not included in the appearances so that it can be an authoritative proof from that aspect. Of course, it would definitely be an authoritative proof should there be an intellectual implication through which its requisites, whether judgment or otherwise, could be discovered, such as taking requisites of one’s confession into consideration even though he claims that he has not intended them or he denies existence of any implication there.

•al-Dalāla al-Siyāqiyya (Contextual Denotation)

There are some denotations that are included neither in mafhūm [q.v.] nor in manţūq [q.v.], such as the case where the speech denotes implicatively a single word or a single meaning not mentioned in the manţūq, or it denotes contents of asentence which is an implicature of manţūq but not obviously in the most particular sense. Thoseare all called neither mafhūm nor manţūq.

To address those denotations in a general way, a good number of Uşūlīs have called them contextual denotation (al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya) meaning that the context of a speech denotes a single or compound meaning, or an omitted word. Such denotationsare divided into the three following varieties: denotation of necessitation (al-iqtiđā’), hint (al-tanbīh), and implicit conveyance (al-ishāra) [qq.v.].

• Dalāla al-Tanbīh (Denotation of Hint)

In this denotation (seealso: al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya), only one criterion, i.e., the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, is taken into consideration. Here, it is the context of the speech that causes certainty that a specific requisiteis meant or makes its non-consideration unlikely. This denotation has numerous instances the most important of whichbeing classified as follows:

1. The speaker whishes to depict something but expresses its logical or conventional requisite. For example, one addresses his friend saying, “It is ten o'clock” in order to remind him that the time they had agreed upon to go somewhere has come.

2. The speech is associated with someword which conveys that something is a cause, condition, impediment, or part of the judgment. To mention the judgment is thereby a hint that the thing mentioned is a cause, condition, impediment, part of the judgment or it is not so. For instance, if the jurist says, “Repeat your prayers,” where he is asked about the doubt concerning numbers of rak‘as of a two-rak‘a prayers , it is understood that the said doubt is a cause for annulment of the prayers and the obligation of repetition.

3. The speech is associated with someword which determines some objects of the act. For instance, when someone says, “I reached the river and drank,” it is understood that what was drunk was water and it was from the river.

As for the authority of this denotation, it would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.

•al-Dalīl al-Faqāhatī → al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī

•al-Dalīl al-Idjtihādī → al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī

• Dalīl al-Insidād (Closure Proof)

The proof known as “the Closure Proof” consists of four preliminaries. Should those preliminaries be accurate, intellect would judge that the duty-bound should acton the basis of any conjecture with regard to precepts - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās [q.v.]).

Those four preliminariescan be summarized as follows:

1. The door of knowledge and knowledge-rooted is closed in the most part of juristic precepts in our time when it is later than our holyImāms’ .This is the fundamental base of this proof upon which all other preliminaries are dependent.

2. It is not allowed to leave obedience of actualprecepts which are known to us in summary fashion, nor is it permissible to reject them in the position of action. To leave and reject actual precepts can be actualized in two ways: either to treat ourselves as animals and children who have no burden, or to refer to the principle of “clearance” (→ aşāla al-barā’a) and that of “non-existence of burden” wherever obligation or unlawfulness of something is unknown. Annulment of those two assumptions is self-evidently clear; therefore, we must take into consideration all actualprecepts which are known in summary fashion.

3. To consider such precepts necessitates clarifying one's obligation, which, in turn, is restricted to one of the following four states: (3.1) to follow the one who believes in the openness of the door of knowledge, (3.2) to act on the basis of “precaution” in every problem, (3.3) to refer to the respective practical principle (the principle of clearance, that of precaution, etc.) in every problem as the circumstances necessitate, and (3.4) to refer to the conjecture where there is one, and to the practical principles where there is none.

Since referring to the first three states is not acceptable, we shouldtake the fourth into consideration . The first is not acceptable, for how can one who believes in the closure of the door of knowledge refer to whom he considers wrong and ignorant in his believing in the openness of that door? The second is not plausible, for it necessitates intolerable hardship, or even disorder of the society if all duty-bounds are burdened with - which are both rejected in the Islamic law. And the third is not acceptable, for the existence of knowledge of mandatory and prohibited affairs in all doubtful problems in summary fashion prevents us from referring to the practical principles even though in some of them.

4. Thus, the only acceptable state is the fourth, i.e., referring to the conjecture. Although conjecture has two sides, i.e., the preferable (al-rādjiĥ) and the chimerical (al-mardjūĥ=al-mawhūm), one is merely allowed to refer to the preferable side; for preferring the chimerical side is intellectually reprehensible. Therefore, one is supposed totake the conjecture into consideration - unless a conjecture whose non-authority is definitely proved, such as analogy (qiyās). In case of definite knowledge of non-authority of a conjecture, one should refer to practical principles, precisely as one is supposed to refer to them in doubtful problems with regard to which no conjecture exists. There is no problem with referring to practical principles in such cases, for the knowledge in summary fashion is reduced to the detailed knowledge (al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī) of precepts proved by some authority and primary doubt (al-shak al-badwī) with regard to other cases, in which one is supposed to refer to practical principles [qq.v.].

•al-Dalīl al-Lafżī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dalīl al-Lubbī → al-Idjmā‘

•al-Dawām (Permanence)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - whatis prohibited is the sheer nature of the act. However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the commandwill be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.

• Dawarān bain al-Aqall wa’l-Akthar→ al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

• Dawarān bain al-Mutabāyinayn → al-Shubha al-Mafhūmiyya

•al-Đidd al-‘Āmm (General Opposite)

The dispute over the general opposite (i.e., eschewal and not doing which is non-existential → mas’ala al-đidd) is not over the necessity in principle, for Uşūlīs apparently agree about the necessity; they disagree only on its nature. They have declared various opinions in this connection. Some have said that the necessity is the sameness, i.e., to command something is the same with prohibitingits opposite. Some have said that since the command is composed of wish of something and prohibition of its eschewal, the prohibition of eschewal is analytical part of meaning of obligation. Some have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most particular sense; hence, the denotation is literal, but implicative. Others have said that there exists an obvious necessitation in the most general sense or an unclear necessitation; hence, the denotation is merely intellectual.

The justifiable opinion, however, is that there exists no necessity of any kind, i.e., there is no religious prohibition of eschewal necessitated by the very command in such a way that there exists a juristic prohibition beyond the very command to the act. The reason is that the obligation, whether it is denotation of the imperative or its intellectual implication - the latter being true - is not a composite concept; but rather it is a simple, singleone which is necessity of the act. A requisite of obligation of something, of course, is prohibition of its eschewal. However, that prohibition is not a juristic prohibition made by theLord as He is the Lord, but rather is an intellectual secondary prohibition without there being a prohibition from the divine lawgiver beyond the very obligation. The reason is obvious: the very command to do something in an obligatory mode is sufficient to prohibit its eschewal; so, there is no need for the divine lawgiver to prohibit eschewal of something in addition to commanding it.

•al-Đidd al-Khāşş (Particular Opposite)

To hold that to command something necessitates prohibiting its particular opposite (i.e., the existential, incompatible affair, such as eating with regard to prayers → mas’ala al-đidd) is dependent upon and secondary to the belief in its necessitation the prohibition of its general opposite (→ al-đidd al-‘āmm); and since there is no juristic prohibition of the general opposite, there is no juristic prohibition of the particular opposite either.

•al-Djam ‘ al-‘Urfī (Customary Gathering)

Bydjam‘ is meant taking two contradictory proofs altogether. It is an intellectual judgment that taking two seemingly contradictory proofs altogether is more plausible than leaving either of them. This judgment isdue to the fact that contradiction does not occur unless all constituents of authority exist in either of them as to both chain of transmission and denotation. In case of existence of all constituents of authority, i.e., existence of the origin, nothing may cause leaving the proof but existence of an impediment to the efficacy of the origin; and that impediment can be nothing but their mutual repudiation. On the other hand, possibility of gathering both proofs as to their denotations leaves no room for certainty of their mutual repudiation, which leads to lack of certainty as to the existence of impediment to the efficacy of authority with regard to the proof. Thus, how can one judge that one or both of those proofsis no longer authoritative proof?

However, itshould be noted that such judgment of the intellect is not absolute, but rather is conditional upon the gathering being “customary” or “acceptable,” in the sense that it should not be in a way that custom of people of the language does not confirm it on the one hand and no third proof supports it on the other. (See also: al-muradjdjiĥāt)

F

•al-Fawr (Promptitude)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness (al-tarākhī),both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation (→ al-amr) and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, itcould be performed either promptly or belatedly.

G

• Ghayr al-Mustaqillāt al-‘Aqliyya (Dependent Intellectual Proofs)

Dependent intellectual proofs are those whose major premises are intellectual while their minor premises are juristic, such as “this act is juristically mandatory,” and “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its preliminary should juristically be mandatory (→ muqaddima al-wādjib),” or “whatsoever is juristically mandatory it is intellectually necessitated that its opposite should juristically be forbidden (→ mas’ala al-đidd),” and so forth. As clearly seen, minor premises of such syllogisms are proved in the science of fiqh, so they are juristic, while their major premises are intellectual, i.e., it is the intellect’s judgment that there exists an intellectual implication between the precept in the first premise and another juristic precept. The consequence of such minor and major premises becomes a minor premise of a syllogism whose major premise is authority of intellect.

H

• Ĥadīth al-Raf‘ ( Removal)

This is the prophetic ĥadīth argued by uşūlīs for “the clearance from obligatory” (→ awhich declares: “Nine things are removed from my people: error, forgetfulness, what they have done under duress, what they do not know, what they cannot endure, what they have done under compulsion, to take as a bad omen, jealousy, to think of createdness [of the Almighty] so long as one has not uttered it.”

• Ĥāl al-Isnād →al-Mushtaqq

• Ĥāl al-Talabbus →al-Mushtaqq

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Mutasharri‘iyya (Muslims' Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Had such transfer happened after the holy Prophet's time, we would have Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]) according to which any such term found in the Quran and Sunna should be interpreted as its usual, and not juristic, meaning in the process of inferring juristic precepts. Seealso: al-ĥaqīqa al-shar‘iyya.

•al-Ĥaqīqa al-Shar‘iyya (Juristic-Literal Meaning)

Doubtless all Muslims understand specific juristic meanings from such words as şalāt (the prayers), şawm (fasting), ĥadjdj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the like, while we know that such meanings were unknown to Arabs before Islam and were transferred to those new juristic meanings after the Islamic era. Now, the question is that whether such transfer has happened in the holy Prophet's time so that we may have the juristic-literal meaning or it has occurred after him and therefore what we have in hand is Muslims' literal meaning (al-ĥaqīqa al-mutasharri‘iyya [q.v.]).

The answer to that question would make a difference in the process of inferring juristic precepts from the Quran and Sunna. Should there exist the juristic-literal meaning, any such term without contextual evidencewould be predicated to its juristic meaning, while it must be interpreted as its usual meaning if such a juristic-literal meaning does not exist.

It is obviously clear that those new meanings were not made through convention by specification (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘yīnī), for in that case it should have been narrated to us in one way or another. As for the “convention by determination” (→ al-wađ’ al-ta‘ayyunī), it must be said that it had doubtlessly happened in Imam Ali's time, for by that time all Muslims have been using such terms in their new juristic meanings for a long time. Hence, since in Shiite jurisprudence only such prophetic ĥadīths thatare narrated by holy Imāms are treated as valuable, all such terms in their words should be predicated to their new juristic meanings where they are void of any contextual evidence. As for the holy Quran, there is no room for such a dispute, since almost all such wordsare used in it along with contextual evidence and convey their new juristic meanings.

•al-Ĥudjdja (Authoritative Proof)

Ĥudjdja literarily means whatsoever capable ofbeing used as an argument against someone else through which one can overcome one’s opponent in a dispute. Overcoming someoneelse is either by making him silent and nullifying his argument, or by making him accept one’s argument - in this sense ĥudjdja being an excuser. In uşūl al-fiqh, however, ĥudjdja means that which proves its object but does not attain the level of certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., it does not cause certitude with regard to its object - since in case of certitude it is the certitude which is ĥudjdja, though in its literal meaning. In other words, ĥudjdja is whatsoever revealing and indicating something else in such a way that the former proves the latter -its proving being made by the lawgiver, duty-maker as it is the actuality. This proving will be sound only by adding theproof which proves validity and authority of that revealing and indicates the thing in the divine lawgiver’s view. Therefore, ĥudjdja in this sense does not include certitude (al-qaţ‘), i.e., certitude is not called ĥudjdja in this sense, but in the literal sense; for certitude is essentially a way and cannot be made an authoritative proof by anyone. Ĥudjdja in this sense is synonymous with amāra, proof (al-dalīl), and way (al-ţarīq). See also: al-ĥukm al-żāhirī

•al-Ĥudjdjiyya → al-Ĥudjdja

•al-Ĥukm al-Wāqi‘ī (Actual Precept)

A precept which is directed to something per se as it is an act - such as the prayers, since the obligation is directed to the prayers as it is prayers and an act per se without consideration of anything else - is called “the actual precept” (al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī) and the proof which proves it “the persuasive proof” (al-dalīl al-idjtihādī).

•al-Ĥukm al-Żāhirī (Apparent Precept)

Where a precept is directed to something as its actual precept is unknown and there is no proof for supporting any of the existing opinions, the jurist doubts the primary, actual precept of the disputed matter; and since he is not supposed to remain perplexed practically, there must exist another precept, though intellectual, for him, such as obligation of precaution, clearance from obligation, or ignoring the doubt. Such a secondary precept is called “the apparent precept” (al-ĥukm al-żāhirī) and the proof which proves it “the juristic proof” (al-dalīl al-faqāhatī) or “the practical principle” (al-aşl al-‘amalī [q.v.]). Seealso: al-ĥukm al-wāqi‘ī.

•al-Ĥukūma (Sovereignty)

Ĥukūma is inclusion or exclusion of something in or from an object by a predicative sentence through expanding or limiting realm of the object or subject; such as “perform ablution for prayers,” and on the one hand: “circumambulation of Ka‘ba is prayers” leading to the conclusion that one should perform ablution while circumambulating in ĥadjdj, and on the other: “funeral prayers is not prayers,” leading to the conclusion that one is not supposed to perform ablution for funeral prayers. Thus, ĥukūma occurs where one of the two seemingly contradictory proofs is supposed tobe given priority over the other because of its sovereignty while both of them are still authoritative proofs, i.e., neither of them repudiates the other. Seealso: al-ta‘āruđ.

I

•al-‘Ibādī (Act of Worship)

‘Ibādī is an act whose religious acceptance is conditional upon the duty-bound’s intention of proximity to God, or that which is the sheer burden made by God for proximity to Him; such as prayers, fast, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like.

•al-Idjmā ‘ (Consensus)

Being defined as consensus of Muslim jurists, that of Muslim community, and so on,idjmā‘ is considered one of the three-fold or four-fold free-standing sources of religious precepts by Sunnī Uşūlīs and jurists. Shī‘a Uşūlīs and jurists, however, do not treat consensus as a free-standing source, but rather as a way through which Sunna can be revealed. Thus, authority and innocence are for words of the infallible-innocent personality, which may sometimes be revealed by theconsensus, and not for the consensus per se.That is why Shī‘a jurists sometimes treat unanimity of opinion of a few individuals whose unanimity is technically not called idjmā‘ as consensus, because of its definite revelation of opinions of the infallible-innocent personality on the one hand, and do not consider a consensus which does not reveal opinions of the infallible-innocent personality as idjmā‘ even though it is technically called so on the other.

Before any argumentation, one point should be noted: it is obviously clear that consensus of all people, or a specific people, as it is consensus has no implication to revealing divine precepts; for it is not of unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise which is an authoritative proof like the Book and Sunna. Unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise is in fact the very intellectual proof, as will be discussed later, and not the technical consensus. The reason why a consensus of people which is not included in the unanimity of opinion of the wise as they are the wise cannot be considered a source for religious precepts is that such a consensus may be caused by people’s habits, beliefs, emotions, or sentiments which are of human characteristic and the divine lawgiver transcends them. Should consensus of people as it is consensus be an authoritative proof, consensus of other people who follow other religions should be an authoritative proof as well - something no Muslim believes in. Thus,some other proof must be presented by Sunnī jurists with regard to the authority of consensus .

As for Shiite perspective, consensus as it is consensus would have no value should it not reveal opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, and that is why it is not considered afree-standing source for religious precepts. In fact, authority is for the revealed, i.e., Sunna, and not for the revealer, i.e., consensus; and consensus precisely plays the role of massive report - with one difference: the latter reveals the very words of the infallible-

innocent personality (and that is why it is called lexical proof (al-dalīl al-lafżī)) while the former reveals the opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not his words (and that is why it is called thematic proof (al-dalīl al-lubbī) which conveys the theme and not the terms). Now that consensus is an authoritative proof because of revealing opinion of the infallible-innocent personality and not per se, there is no need for unanimity of all; rather, that of those whose unanimity reveals words of the infallible-innocent personality would be sufficient, no matter how many they are - as explicitly asserted by some great Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs.

As for the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality, theyare claimed to be up to twelve four of which being more considerable. However, since most of later Shī‘a jurists and Uşūlīs have raised doubts about them and followed some specific way called “the way of surmise (ţarīqa al-ĥads),” we will discuss this way only.According to the way of surmise, when one observes that all Shī‘a jurists have a consensus on a precept while they disagree too much on most of precepts, one will definitely become certain that their consensus is rooted in the holy Imām’s opinion and, being handed down from generation to generation, they have received it from their Imām - as is the case with consensus of followers of all other creeds and sects with regard to which no one doubts that the matter of consensus is taken from their leader. It should be emphasized that in the way of surmise, consensus of all jurists of all times, beginning from the era of holyImāms, must be actualized; for disagreement of one earlier generation, and even one single known outstanding jurist, prevents actualization of certitude in this connection.

All detailed discussions and arguments in Shiite uşūl al-fiqh on the authority of consensus as well as the ways through which the consensus reveals opinion of the infallible-innocent personality deal with al-idjmā‘ al-muĥaşşal (the acquired consensus), i.e., a consensus which is acquired by a jurist who has searched all opinions of all jurists in person.It is this kind of consensus whose authority is a matter of dispute.

However, a case where a jurist has acquired a consensus and then has reported it to others (which is called al-idjmā‘ al -manqūl, i.e., the reported consensus), is also a matter of dispute and different opinions are presented in this connection.Some have considered the reported consensus an authoritative proof since it is a single report, some have treated it as not being an authoritative proof since it cannot be considered an instance of single report, some have considered it an authoritative proof where it reveals religious precepts in the view of the one who is reported to and not the reporter alone, and others have held some other different views in this regard. Detailed discussions on this problemshould be pursued in Shiite books of uşūl al-fiqh.

•Idjtimā‘ al -Amr wa’l Nahy (Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition)

Uşūlīs have disputed from a long time agowhether or not conjunction of command and prohibition in one act, i.e., a single act as it has one existence which is a gathering of two designations, is possible. By conjunctionis meant accidental encounter between the commanded act and the prohibited act in one thing. This may occur only where the command is directed to a designation and the prohibition to another designation which has no relation to the first, but those designations encounter rarely in one thing - here, conjunction of the command and the prohibition occurs, i.e., they encounter one another. Such conjunction of and encounter between two designations is of two kinds: case conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al -mawridī,) and real conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-ĥaqīqī).

Case conjunction occurs where there is no one act which corresponds to both designations, but rather there are two acts which have become synchronous and simultaneous one of which corresponding to the designation of the mandatory act and the other to the designation of the prohibited act. For instance, when someone is performing the prayers and in the meantime looking at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited , looking does not correspond to designation of the prayers, the prayers do not correspond to designation of looking, and both of them do not conform to one act. Such case conjunction is neither impossible nor a matter of dispute in this discussion. Hence, should one look at a woman whom looking atis religiously prohibited while performing one’s prayers, one would be both obedient and disobedient simultaneously without one’s prayers being annulled.

Real conjunction, even though at a glance and in a conventional view, occurs where there is oneact which corresponds to both designations, such as the well-known example of performing the prayers in an expropriated space. In that example which is the matter of dispute in this discussion, designation of the prayers, which is the commanded act, has no relation to that of expropriation, which is the prohibited act, but it accidentally happens that the duty-bound gathers them by performing the prayers in an expropriated space. Here, designation of the commanded, i.e., the prayers, encounters designation of the prohibited, i.e., expropriation, in that prayers performed in an expropriated space; hence, that single act corresponds to both designations of the prayers and expropriation. Thus, that single act is included in the commanded act from oneaspect which necessitates treating the duty-bound as obedient while it is included in the prohibition from another aspect which necessitates treating him as disobedient.

Now, the matter of dispute in this discussion becomes clear: Is it possible that the command should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and also the prohibition should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and the duty-bound should be considered both obedient and disobedient in one act, or is it not possible and the gathering of the two designations is either commanded only or prohibited only, i.e., either only the command remains actual and the duty-bound is obedient alone or only the prohibition remains actual and he is disobedient alone? Both of these opinionsare held by Uşūlīs each presenting their own proofs in order to establish their claims.

A very important point to be borne in mind is that the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs over possibility or otherwise of conjunction of the command and the prohibition concerns where the duty-bound has a way out (al-mandūĥa), i.e., he is able to obey the command in another case other than the gathering; or, in other words, he has encountered the conjunction deliberately because of misuse of his free will. It is such case that is a matter of disagreement among Uşūlīs: some believe in its possibility and others in its impossibility.

Nevertheless, there is no dispute among Uşūlīs over the impossibility of conjunction where obedience to the command can be actualized exclusively through the gathering and the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction; for it is clear that in case of exclusion, the actuality of two duties becomes impossible, since obedience of both is impossible: if the duty-bound does the commanded act he has disobeyed the prohibition, and if he eschews it he has disobeyed the command. Therefore, all Uşūlīs agree that conjunction of the command and the prohibition in such case is impossible and either the command or the prohibition isactual . However, there is disagreement among Uşūlīs as to which of them is so.

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Ĥaqīqī →Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy

•al-Idjtimā ‘ al-Mawridī → Idjtimā‘ al-Amr wa’l Nahy