The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]

The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]0%

The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic] Author:
Translator: Hassan Allahyari
Publisher: Ansariyan Publications – Qum
Category: Imam al-Mahdi
ISBN: 978 964 438 478 3

The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]

Author: Allamah Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi
Translator: Hassan Allahyari
Publisher: Ansariyan Publications – Qum
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ISBN: 978 964 438 478 3
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The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]
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The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]

The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]

Author:
Publisher: Ansariyan Publications – Qum
ISBN: 978 964 438 478 3
English

Supplement

However, since his obedience is obligatory in the present, and we do not find obedience to him to be stipulated with any condition or a specific time, it follows that he must be existent, so the legitimate excuse of the Divinely ordained duties is removed and such duties become fair. The response to the example of the master and his slave is the same.

Because he ordered his servant to approach him at present, not to buy. And when he approaches him and he requires him to buy, he must give him the money. That is why we said that Allah, the Exalted, has set obligations for all who will come until the Day of Judgment, and it is not necessary that they should be existent and without legitimate excuses, for He has not set obligations over them now; when He creates them and removes their excuses with respect to the duties by granting them power and instruments and setting proofs, then the duties will encompass them. Thus, his fallacy loses its tenability by this elaboration.

Besides, if the Imam bears the Divine duty of establishing the order and carrying the burdens of Imamate, how is it possible that he be nonexistent? Would any sane person see it fair to commission someone nonexistent with acts and duties? Bear in mind that these duties of his are not stipulated to our empowerment of him at all, but rather, our obligation of empowering and strengthening him is secondary to him carrying these duties, as explained earlier and as it is very clear.

Furthermore, they are asked, Did not the Messenger of Allah (a.s) hide in the Mount of Abu Ta-lib for three years, where no one was able to reach him? Did he not hide in the Cave for three days? Why do not you apply the analogy there as well that Allah should discontinue his existence for that period, while keeping the duties over public for whom He sent him as a lutf? If they say that he hid after he called the people to his message and manifested his Prophethood, and when they threatened him he went into hiding; we will respond that likewise the Imam did not go into hiding but after his forefathers manifested his position and his qualities and guided the people to him, and when his father al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali (a.s) feared for his life, he hid him. Therefore, both situations are identical.

Moreover, we demand them to give us an answer in the following case: Allah discerns from the condition of a person that it is in the best of his interest that He sends a particular prophet to him who will inform him of what is good for him, and He knows that should He send the said apostle, this person will kill him.

If He prohibits him from killing the apostle through coercion, it will be disadvantageous for him and others. Is it fair that this person should be bound by the Divinely ordained duties while an apostle has not been sent to him, or should he not be bound by these duties? If they say that he should not be bound, we ask them, why not if it entails for him the possibility of knowing what is best for him by empowering the apostle to deliver to him the message? And if you say he must be bound to the Divinely ordained duties and the prophet is not sent to him, we will ask you, How is it possible to bind him by these duties when he the necessary lutf has not been conferred to him?”

فلما كانت طاعته واجبة في الحال ولم نقف على شرطه ولا وقت منتظر وجب أن يكون موجودا لتنـزاح العلة في التكليف ويحسن. والجواب عن مثال السيد مع غلامه مثل ذلك لانه إنما كلفه الدنو منه لا الشراء فإذا دنا منه وكلفه الشراء وجب عليه إعطاء الثمن ولهذا قلنا إن الله تعالى كلف من يأتي إلى يوم القيامة ولا يجب أن يكونوا موجودين مزاحي العلة لانه لم يكلفهم الآن فإذا أوجدهم وأزاح علتهم في التكليف بالقدرة والآلة ونصب الادلة حينئذ تناولهم التكليف، فسقط بذلك هذه المغالطة. على أن الامام إذا كان مكلفا للقيام بالامر وتحمل أعباء الإمامة كيف يجوز أن يكون معدوما وهل يصح تكليف المعدوم عند عاقل، وليس لتكليفه ذلك تعلق بتمكيننا أصلا، بل وجوب التمكين علينا فرع على تحمله على ما مضى القول فيه وهذا واضح. ثم يقال لهم: أليس النبي (ص) اختفى في الشعب ثلاث سنين لم يصل إليه أحد واختفى في الغار ثلاثة أيام ولم يجز قياساً على ذلك أن يعدمه الله تلك المدة مع بقاء التكليف على الخلق الذين بعثه لطفا لهم، ومتى قالوا: إنما اختفى بعدما دعا إلى نفسه وأظهر نبوته فلما أخافوه استتر قلنا: وكذلك الامام لم يستتر إلا وقد أظهر آباؤه موضعه وصفته، ودلوا عليه، ثم لما خاف عليه أبو الحسن بن علي(ع) أخفاه وستره فالامر إذا سواء. ثم يقال لهم: خبرونا لو علم الله من حال شخص أن من مصلحته أن يبعث الله إليه نبيا معينا يؤدي إليه مصالحه وعلم أنه لو بعثه لقتله هذا الشخص ولو منع من قتله قهرا كان فيه مفسدة له أو لغيره هل يحسن أن يكلف هذا الشخص ولا يبعث إليه ذلك النبي أو لا يكلف فان قالوا: لا يكلف قلنا وما المانع منه، وله طريق إلى معرفة مصالحه بأن يمكن النبي من الاداء إليه وإن قلتم يكلفه ولا يبعث إليه قلنا وكيف يجوز أن يكلفه ولم يفعل به ما هو لطف له مقدور

If they should say he has done that by his own choice, we will say that he has not done anything. Only Allah knew that he will not allow the apostle and knowing this does not justify that he should be bound by duties, which he does not know. If this should be fair then it is fair that anyone should be bound by duties he does not know when Allah knows that he will not consider them. An absurd supposition. Therefore, it must be said that Allah will send the apostle to this person and will require this person to submit to the apostle, so he may not have any legitimate excuse, and then He will protect His apostle through means which do not violate free-will, or renders him such that he is unable to kill the apostle, in which case he will not be able to reach him through his own actions. This is our very identical situation with the Imam during the occultation.

Should it be suggested that He must inform him through someone other than the apostle that it is in the best of his interest that the apostle has been sent to him, so he may know it is his own wrongdoing, our reply will be that on parallel grounds, Allah has informed us through the tongue of His Messenger and the Imams his forefathers, peace be unto them, the Hujja’s position and He has obliged us to obey him. And if we do not know what we should, it is our own guilt, hence the equivalence of the two situations.

As for the proof of the second principle, which is that it is the feature of the Imam that his infallibility must be ascertained, it is that the reason for which we need the Imam is our fallibility, for if the public were infallible, they would never need an imam. It is when they are fallible that they need him. This leads one to infer that the reason for the need to the Imam is fallibility, as we say that the reason for the need to an action to its efficient cause is its hudu-th[12] , on the virtue of the fact that an entity that can have hudu-th, it needs to an efficient cause in its hudu-th, and an entity that cannot have hudu-th, it never needs an efficient cause.

This leads us to the inference that every muhdath needs a muhdith. On parallel grounds, the need of every fallible to an imam must be acknowledged, or the rule of causality will be violated. Should the Imam be a fallible, this reason for the need to an Imam will exist in him and his need for another Imam will be just as dire. And the same argument applies to his Imam, leading to the conclusion of infinite number of Imams or to an infallible imam, which is our purpose. We have established this argument in our books, therefore, we will not prolong the inquiry by raising further questions and answering them, as the purpose of this book is different from other books and this much suffices.

As for the third principle - the truth is exclusive to this Ummah - it is a common grounds agreed upon by us and our adversaries, even if we may disagree in its reason.

فان قالوا: اتي في ذلك من قبل نفسه، قلنا هو لم يفعل شيئا وإنما علم أنه لا يمكنه، وبالعلم لا يحسن تكليفه مع ارتفاع اللطف، ولو جاز ذلك لجاز أن يكلف مالا دليل عليه إذا علم أنه لا ينظر فيه، وذلك باطل. ولابد أن يقال: إنه يبعث إلى ذلك الشخص ويوجب عليه الانقياد له، ليكون مزيحا لعلته فإما أن يمنع منه بما لا ينافي التكليف أو يجعله بحيث لا يتمكن من قتله، فيكون قد اتي من قبل نفسه في عدم الوصول إليه، وهذه حالنا مع الامام في حال الغيبة سواء. فان قال: لابد أن يعلمه أن له مصلحة في بعثة هذا الشخص إليه على لسان غيره، ليعلم أنه قد اتي من قبل نفسه قلنا: وكذلك أعلمنا الله على لسان نبيه والائمة من آبائه (ع) موضعه، وأوجب علينا طاعته، فإذا لم يظهر لنا علمنا أنا اتينا من قبل نفوسنا فاستوى الامران. وأما الذي يدل على الاصل الثاني وهو أن من شأن الامام أن يكون مقطوعا على عصمته، فهو أن العلة التي لاجلها احتجنا إلى الامام ارتفاع العصمة بدلالة أن الخلق متى كانوا معصومين لم يحتاجوا إلى إمام وإذا خلوا من كونهم معصومين احتاجوا إليه، علمنا عند ذلك أن علة الحاجة هي ارتفاع العصمة، كما نقوله في علة حاجة الفعل إلى فاعل أنها الحدوث بدلالة أن ما يصح حدوثه يحتاج إلى فاعل في حدوثه، وما لا يصح حدوثه يستغني عن الفاعل. وحكمنا بذلك أن كل محدث يحتاج إلى محدث، فمثل ذلك يجب الحكم بحاجة كل من ليس بمعصوم إلى إمام وإلا انتقضت العلة فلو كان الامام غير معصوم، لكانت عل الحاجة فيه قائمة، واحتاج إلى إمام أخر، والكلام في إمامته كالكلام فيه فيؤدي إلى إيجاب أئمة لا نهاية لهم أو الانتهاء إلى معصوم وهو المراد. وهذه الطريقة قد أحكمناها في كتبنا فلا نطول بالاسولة عليها لان الغرض بهذا الكتاب غير ذلك وفي هذا القدر كفاية. وأما الاصل الثالث وهو أن الحق لا يخرج عن الأمة فهو متفق عليه بيننا وبين خصومنا وإن اختلفنا في علة ذلك

Because the proof of the validity of consensus of the Ummah in our belief is the fact that no age can remain without an infallible Imam, who cannot possibly do a wrong, based on our proofs, therefore, the truth does not leave this Ummah, for the infallible entity is amongst us; and according to our adversary, on the virtue of the arguments they mention, which conclude that consensus is a binding proof. Therefore, there is no need to occupy ourselves with proving this principle.

Having established these principles, the Imamate of the Patron of the Age (a.s) is proved; because everyone who believes that the Imam must be infallible, is certain that he is the Imam. There is no one who believes in the Imam’s infallibility and questions his Imamate, except parties that irrefutable proofs demonstrate the invalidity of their creed, such as al-Kisa-niyya, al-Na-wu-siyya, and al-Wa-qifa. When we disprove their claims, the Imamate of our Master is demonstrated.

The arguments that prove the invalidity of the creed of al-Kisa-niyya, who believe in the Imamate of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyya, are many. One of them is that if he were an Imam, with ascertained infallibility, there must be explicit statements by the Messenger of Allah (a.s) and the Prince of the Believers Imam ‘Ali Ibn Abi Ta-lib (a.s) about him, because infallibility can only be determined through the word of another infallible entity. However, the Kisa-niyya do not claim an explicit tradition with this regard.

Instead, they rely on weak instances which have led them to confusion but are far from being explicit words, such as that the Prince of the Believers granted him the standard on the battle of the Camel in Basra, and such as his saying, “You are truly my son,” while al-Hasan and al-Husain (a.s) were also his sons. These instances do not establish his Imamate in any way, and rather, indicate his excellence and high position. Besides, the Shi-‘a narrate that a conversation took place between him and ‘Ali Ibn al-Husain (a.s) with respect to him being worthy of Imamate and they both invoked a rock to issue a verdict and the rock testified on the Imamate of ‘Ali Ibn al-Husain (a.s). This humbled Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyya and he submitted the position to his nephew and professed belief in his Imamate.

This narration is quite reputable before the Ima-miyya. Secondly, the Shi-‘a have narrated inordinate number (mutawa-tir) of traditions from his father and his grandfather explicitly naming ‘Ali Ibn al-Husain for Imamate. These traditions are present in our books and we will not lengthen the book by bringing them here.

Thirdly, there are the narrations recorded from the Messenger of Allah (a.s) by the commonality as well as the Chosen Congregation carrying explicit words with regard to the Twelve Imams and anyone who believes in their Imamate is certain of the demise of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyya and the continuation of Imamate to the Patron of the Age (a.s). Fourthly, this sect has died away. Not in our time, nor before us for a very lengthy time, a believer of this creed has existed. If it were a true faith, their extinction would not have been possible.

Query: How can their extinction be known and why is it not possible that in faraway lands, such as islands in the seas and sides of the earth, there may be nations believing in this word, just as it is possible that there may be people believing in the word of al-Hasan that someone who commits a major sin is a hypocrite.

لان عندنا أن الزمان لا يخلو من إمام معصوم لا يجوز عليه الغلط على ما قلناه، فإذا الحق لا يخرج عن الأمة لكون المعصوم فيهم وعند المخالف لقيام أدلة يذكرونها دلت على أن الاجماع حجة فلا وجه للتشاغل بذلك. فإذا ثبتت هذه الاصول ثبت إمامة صاحب الزمان (ع) لان كل من يقطع على ثبوت العصمة للامام قطع على أنه الامام، وليس فيهم من يقطع على عصمة الامام ويخالف في إمامته إلا قوم دل الدليل على بطلان قولهم كالكيسانية والناووسية والواقفة فإذا أفسدنا أقوال هؤلاء ثبت إمامته (ع). أقول: وأما الذي يدل على فساد قول الكيسانية القائلين بإمامة محمد بن الحنفية فأشياء: منها: أنه لو كان إماما مقطوعا على عصمته لوجب أن يكون منصوصا عليه نصا صريحا، لان العصمة لاتعلم إلا بالنص، وهم لا يدعون نصا صريحا وإنما يتعلقون بامور ضعيفة دخلت عليهم فيها شبهة لا يدل على النص نحو إعطاء أمير المؤمنين إياه الراية يوم البصرة، وقوله له: " أنت ابني حقا " مع كون الحسن والحسين(ع) ابنيه وليس في ذلك دلالة على إمامته على وجه، وإنما يدل على فضله ومنـزلته، على أن الشيعة تروي أنه جرى بينه وبين علي بن الحسين (ع) كلام في استحقاق الإمامة فتحاكما إلى الحجر فشهد الحجر لعلي بن الحسين (ع) بالإمامة فكان ذلك معجزا له فسلم له الامر وقال بامامته، والخبر بذلك مشهور عند الامامية. ومنها: تواتر الشيعة الامامية بالنص عليه من أبيه وجده وهي موجودة في كتبهم في أخبار لا نطول بذكره الكتاب. ومنها: الاخبار الواردة عن النبي (ص) من جهة الخاصة والعامة بالنص على الاثني عشر، وكل من قال بامامتهم قطع على وفات محمد بن الحنفية، وسياقة الإمامة إلى صاحب الزمان (ع). ومنها: انقراض هذه الفرقة فانه لم يبق في الدنيا في وقتنا ولا قبله بزمان طويل قائل يقول به، ولو كان ذلك حقا لما جاز انقراضهم. فإن قيل: كيف يعلم انقراضهم وهلا جاز أن يكون في بعض البلاد البعيدة وجزائر البحر وأطراف الأرض أقوام يقولون بهذا القول، كما يجوز أن يكون في أطراف الأرض من يقول بمذهب الحسن في أن مرتكب الكبيرة منافق

Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the followers of this path no longer exist. It would have been possible if Muslims were few in the world with scant number of scholars, whereas Islam has spread and scholars are in abundant numbers. So how can that be known?”

Answer: This assertion leads to the impossibility of discerning the consensus of the Ummah on any principle or idea, as it is always convenient to say that perchance there is someone in some remote periphery of the earth who disagrees with this. It follows that there might be in faraway parts of the earth who says that cold does not violate fasting and that it is permissible for someone fasting to eat until sunrise. For the first was the view of Abu Talha al-Ansa-ri and the second that of Hudhaifa and al-A‘mash.

Likewise, there are many other rulings of jurisprudence on which the companions and the ta-bi‘i-n disagreed, and then later on the disagreements disappeared and the Ummah united on a different view. Therefore, it is worthy to doubt that and mistrust any consensus on any question that has previously been the subject of disagreement. This is argument of a person who says that consensus cannot be discerned and as this question is not exclusive to our subject, there is no reason we should go into its details here.

We know that the Ansa-r demanded caliphate and the Muha-jiru-n turned them away and then Ansa-r submitted to the idea of the Muha-jiru-n, according to the adversary. If someone should argue that Caliphate is possible for the Ansa-r, for a disagreement has occurred on this matter, and perchance there is someone in the peripheries of the earth who believes in this, whatever the adversary says in response to him, is our very identical answer here as well.

If they argue that consensus is a valid proof before you only when the infallible is included, from where do you know his word is included amongst the words of the Ummah; we will answer that as Imam is one of the scholars of the Ummah, his word must be included amongst the words of the scholars, for he cannot be a loner and manifesting infidelity, because that is not permissible for him. Therefore, his view has to be one of the views, even if we may not know which one is the Imam’s. When we consider the views of the Ummah and find some scholars disagreeing, if we know them and their birth and place, we will not honor their views, for we know the Imam is not one of them. And if we doubt a scholar’s ancestry, the question will not be of consensus.

Therefore, we consider the views of the scholars of the Ummah, and do not find anyone amongst them advancing this idea, which is the faith of the Kisa-niyya or the Wa-qifa. And if by supposition we find one or two instances, we know their place and their birth, and do not heed to their word and consider the views of the remainders, amongst whom we are certain that the Infallible is present. Therefore, this problem is solved by this explication and its weakness is demonstrated.

As for those who profess to the Imamate of Ja‘far Ibn Muhammad, namely, the Na-wu-siyya, and believe that he is alive and has not died and he is the Mahdi, the argument against them is clear, for we know Ja‘far Ibn Muhammad died just as his father and grandfather died and the Prince of the Believers was killed and the Messenger (a.s) passed away.

فلا يمكن ادعاء انقراض هذه الفرقة، وإنما كان يمكن العلم لو لكان المسلمون فيهم قلة والعلماء محصورين فأما وقد انتشر الاسلام وكثر العلماء فمن أين يعلم ذلك؟. قلنا: هذا يؤدي إلى أن لا يمكن العلم باجماع الأمة على قول ولا مذهب بأن يقال لعل في أطراف الأرض من يخالف ذلك ويلزم أن يجوز أن يكون في أطراف الأرض من يقول: إن البرد لا ينقض الصوم وأنه يجوز للصائم أن يأكل إلى طلوع الشمس لان الاول كان مذهب أبي طلحة الانصاري والثاني مذهب حذيفة والاعمش وكذلك مسائل كثيرة من الفقه كان الخلف فيها واقعا بين الصحابة والتابعين ثم زال الخلف فيما بعد واجتمع أهل الاعصار على خلافه فينبغي أن يشك في ذلك ولا يثق بالاجماع على مسألة سبق الخلاف فيها، وهذا طعن من يقول إن الاجماع لا يمكن معرفته ولا التوصل إليه والكلام في ذلك لا يختص بهذه المسألة فلا وجه لا يراده ههنا. ثم إنا نعلم أن الانصار طلبت الامرة ودفعهم المهاجرون عنها ثم رجعت الانصار إلى قول المهاجرين على قول المخالف فلو أن قائلا قال: يجوز عقد الإمامة لمن كان من الانصار الان الخلاف سبق فيه ولعل في أطراف الأرض من يقول به فما كان يكون جوابهم فيه؟ فأي شئ قالوه فهو جوابنا بعينه. فان قيل: إن كان الاجماع عندكم إنما يكون حجة لكون المعصوم فيه فمن أين تعلمون دخول قوله في جملة أقوال الأمة؟ قلنا المعصوم إذا كان من جملة علماء الأمة فلابد أن يكون قوله موجودا في جملة أقوال العلماء لانه لا يجوز أن يكون منفردا مظهرا للكفر فان ذلك لا يجوز عليه فإذا لابد أن يكون قوله في جملة الاقوال وإن شككنا في أنه الامام. فإذا اعتبرنا أقوال الأمة ووجدنا بعض العلماء يخالف فيه فان كنا نعرفه ونعرف مولده ومنشأه لم نعتد بقوله، لعلمنا أنه ليس بامام وإن شككنا في نسبه لم تكن المسألة إجماعا. فعلى هذا أقوال العلماء من الأمة اعتبرناها فلم نجد فيهم قائلا بهذا المذهب الذي هو مذهب الكيسانية أو الواقفة وإن وجدنا فرضا واحدا أو اثنين فانا نعلم منشأه ومولده فلا يعتد بقوله واعتبرنا أقوال الباقين الذين نقطع على كون المعصوم فيهم فسقطت هذه الشبهة على هذا التحرير وبان وهنها. فأما القائلون بامامة جعفر بن محمد من الناووسية وأنه حي لم يمت وأنه المهدي فالكلام عليهم ظاهر لانا نعلم موت جعفر بن محمد كما نعلم موت أبيه وجده وقتل علي (ع) وموت النبي (ص).

If dispute should be allowed in the case of Ja‘far Ibn Muhammad, all these instances should be open to dispute, leading to the belief of the Ghula-th and the Mufawwidha, who denied the murder of the Prince of the Believers and that of al-Husain, peace be with them all. All pure sophistry.

As for the reason of the invalidity of the path of the Wa-qifa, who stop at the Imamate of Abu al-Hasan Musa- (a.s) and say that he is the Mahdi: Their assertion is invalid because his death was manifest and well known and widely reported, as the deaths of his father, grandfather, and his other forefathers before him were witnessed and reportedly widely.

If we doubt in his death, we will not have any merits of distinction from the Na-wu-siyya, Kisa-niyya, the Ghula-th, and the Mufawwidha, who disputed the deaths of his forefathers, peace be with them all. Besides, his death was widely witnessed, more so than the death of anyone of his forefathers, because it was very so more visible. They called the judges and the witnesses and a proclamation was made in Baghdad over the bridge and it was declared, “He is the person the Ra-fidha believe is ever-alive and immortal, and has died now through a natural death.” And the other similar acts of publicity of his death are facts that cannot be disputed.

‘Alla-mah al-Majlisi says, The Sheikh of the Congregation (a.s) then records great number of traditions, which we have narrated on his authority in the chapter of the demise of al-Ka-dhim (a.s) of Biha-r al-Anwa-r. Then the Sheikh of the Congregation continues,

The demise of the Holy Seventh Imam is more evident than to need the relation of a tradition about it, for an adversary on this matter is a person who rejects the obvious. Such doubts legitimize doubts in the death of anyone of his holy forefathers, peace be with them all, and others, rendering the death of anyone dubious. Notwithstanding that it is well-known that he bequeathed his son ‘Ali (a.s) after him and referred his affairs to him after his death. Narrations with this regard are more than to be accounted for.

‘Allamah al-Majlisi says, Then the revered Sheikh of the Congregation mentions some of the traditions which I have registered in the section pertinent to the Imamate of the Eighth Hujja (a.s). Then he says,

Query: It was mentioned in your discourse that we know the death of Musa- Ibn Ja‘far just as we know the death of his father and grandfather. This justifies the following critique: We know that al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali al-‘Askari did not have a son, just as we know he did not have ten sons, just as we know that the Messenger of Allah (a.s) did not have a son who outlived him.

If you should say that if we knew the former of the two the same way as we know the second, it would be impossible to have a disagreement on the former, just as it is impossible to have a disagreement on the second; your adversary can say that if we knew the death of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyya and Ja‘far Ibn Muhammad and Musa- Ibn Ja‘far in the same manner we know the death of Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali Ibn al-Husain al-Ba-qir, there would not be any dispute in the former just as it is not possible to have a difference on the latter.

فلو جاز الخلاف فيه لجاز الخلاف في جميع ذلك ويؤدي إلى قول الغلاة والمفوضة الذين جحدوا قتل علي والحسين(ع) وذلك سفسطة. وأما الذي يدل على فساد مذهب الواقفة الذين وقفوا في إمامة أبي الحسن موسى (ع) وقالوا: إنه المهدي. فقولهم باطل بما ظهر من موته، واشتهر واستفاض كما اشتهر موت أبيه وجده ومن تقدمه من آبائه (ع) ولو شككنا لم ننفصل من الناووسية والكيسانية والغلاة والمفوضة الذين خالفوا في موت من تقدم من آبائه (ع). على أن موته اشتهر ما لم يشتهر موت أحد من آبائه (ع) لانه اظهروا حضر القضاة والشهود ونودي عليه ببغداد على الجسر وقيل هذا الذي تزعم الرافضة أنه حي لا يموت، مات حتف أنفه، وما جرى هذا المجرى لا يمكن الخلاف فيه. أقول: ثم ذكر في ذلك أخبارا كثيرة روينا عنه في باب وفات الكاظم (ع) ثم قال: فموته (ع) أشهر من أن يحتاج إلى ذكر الرواية به لان المخالف في ذلك يدفع الضرورات والشك في ذلك يؤدي إلى الشك في موت كل واحد من آبائه (ع) وغيرهم، فلا يوثق بموت أحد. على أن المشهور عنه (ع) أنه أوصى إلى ابنه علي (ع) وأسند إليه أمره بعد موته والاخبار بذلك أكثر من أن تحصى. أقول: ثم ذكر بعض الاخبار التي أوردتها في باب النص عليه صلوات الله عليه ثم قال: فان قيل: قد مضى في كلامكم أنا نعلم موت موسى بن جعفر كما نعلم موت أبيه وجده فعليكم لقائل أن يقول إنا نعلم أنه لم يكن للحسن بن علي ابن كما نعلم أنه لم يكن له عشرة بنين وكما نعلم أنه لم يكن للنبي (ص) ابن من صلبه عاش بعد موته، فان قلتم لو علمنا أحدهما كما نعلم الآخر لما جاز أن يقع فيه خلاف كما لا يجوز أن يقع الخلاف في الآخر قيل: لمخالفكم أن يقول ولو علمنا موت محمد بن الحنفية وجعفر بن محمد وموسى بن جعفر كما نعلم موت محمد بن علي بن الحسين لما وقع الخلاف في أحدهما كما لم يجز أن يقع في الآخر

Answer: To prove the negation of the birth of an offspring is impossible in any situation. It is not possible to claim that someone who is not known to have an offspring does not have an offspring. Such claims are made through likelihoods and conjectures and circumstances indicating that if he had an offspring, it would have been known and its news would have spread. However, many a time, prudence indicates that men of wisdom and letters hide their offspring for various considerations.

Many kings hide their offspring for their fear and compassion for their progeny. This has been observed often in the routines of Persian emperors and kings of the antiquity and their stories are famous. People sire sons from their concubines or from their wives they have married secretly, so they reject and ignore their progeny, fearing enmity with their other wives and children.

This is also not uncommon amongst the people. Some people marry a woman of low social prominence and class, while they are coming from the upper echelon and when they father a son from such a woman, they consider it a challenge to their distinction to attribute the son to himself so they deny their relationship altogether, and some of them pity and offer the boy some of their wealth. Sometimes a man of a low stature marries a woman coming from a noble family, many a time because of her infatuation in him and without her family knowing, either because her guardian does not exist as many jurists allow that, or the ruler has taken over her affairs and marries her to him.

When a son is born for him, though the boy is healthy, she disowns the son because of her pride or because of her fear from her guardians or elders. Many other reasons are conceivable, which we will not mention to avoid lengthening the discourse. Therefore, it is not possible to negate fatherhood altogether. We can know that only when all the aspects are immaculate and it is known there is no encumbrance from declaring fatherhood - only then the negation of fatherhood can be known.

Our knowledge that the Messenger of Allah (a.s) did not have a son who outlived him is due to our knowledge of his infallibility and his Prophethood, and that if he had a son he would have made it known, because there was no fear in making it public. Moreover, we know through the consensus of the Ummah that he did not have a son who lived after him.

The same cannot be claimed with respect to the offspring of al-Hasan (a.s) because al-Hasan (a.s) was interdicted and was practically a prisoner. There was much worry and concern and fear for the offspring, as it had been a known and famed article of the Shi-‘a faith that the Twelfth Hujja is going to be the Establisher (Qa-'im) of the Order for the termination of the governments. Therefore, he was inevitably wanted. Also he feared from his family members like Ja‘far his brother, who was eying the inheritance and the wealth with greed. Thus, he hid his son and doubts with respect to his birth were caused.

It is not warranted to analogize the negation of having a son to the subject of knowing the death of a person. Because when someone dies, the deceased is seen and known, and his death is known through the circumstances and other evidences that compel anyone who sees them into conviction and when he informs someone who has not seen the deceased personally, he would be compelled to conviction as well.

قلنا: نفي ولادة الأولاد من الباب الذي لا يصح أن يعلم صدوره في موضع من المواضع ولا يمكن أحدا أن يدعي فيمن لم يظهر له ولد أن يعلم أنه لا ولد له وإنما يرجع في ذلك إلى غالب الظن والامارة بأنه لو كان له ولد لظهر وعرف خبره لان العقلاء قد يدعوهم الدواعي إلى كتمان أولادهم لاغراض مختلفة. فمن الملوك من يخفيه خوفا عليه وإشفاقا وقد وجد في ذلك كثير في عادة الاكاسرة والملوك الاول وأخبارهم معروفة. وفي الناس من يولد له ولد من بعض سراياه أو ممن تزوج به سرا فيرمي به ويجحده خوفا من وقوع الخصومة مع زوجته وأولاده الباقين وذلك أيضا يوجد كثيرا في العادة. وفي الناس من يتزوج بامرأة دنيئة في المنـزلة والشرف وهو من ذوي الاقدار والمنازل فيولد له، فيأنف من إلحاقه به فيجحده أصلا وفيهم من يتحرج فيعطيه شيئا من ماله. وفي الناس من يكون من أدونهم نسبا فيتزوج بامرأة ذات شرف ومنـزلة لهوى منها فيه بغير علم من أهلها إما بأن يزوجه نفسها بغير ولي على مذهب كثير من الفقهاء أو تولى أمرها الحاكم فيزوجها على ظاهر الحال فيولد له فيكون الولد صحيحا وتنتفي منه أنفة وخوفا من أوليائها وأهلها! وغير ذلك من الاسباب التي لانطول بذكرها، فلا يمكن ادعاء نفي الولادة جملة، وإنما نعلم ما نعلمه إذا كانت الاحوال سليمة ويعلم أنه لا مانع من ذلك فحينئذ يعلم انتفاؤه. فأما علمنا بأنه لم يكن للنبي (ص) ابن عاش بعده فانما علمناه لما علمنا عصمته ونبوته ولو كان له ولد لأظهره لأنه لا مخافة عليه في إظهاره وعلمنا أيضا باجماع الأمة على أنه لم يكن له ابن عاش بعده، ومثل ذلك لا يمكن أن يدعى العلم به في ابن الحسن (ع) لأن الحسن (ع) كان كالمحجور عليه، وفي حكم المحبوس، وكان الولد يخاف عليه، لما علم وانتشر من مذهبهم أن الثاني عشر هو القائم بالامر لإزالة الدول فهو مطلوب لا محالة. وخاف أيضا من أهله كجعفر أخيه الذي طمع في الميراث والاموال فلذلك أخفاه ووقعت الشبهة في ولادته ومثل ذلك لا يمكن ادعاء العلم به في موت من علم موته لان الميت مشاهد معلوم يعرف بشاهد الحال موته، وبالامارات الدالة عليه يضطر من رآه إلى ذلك، فإذا أخبر من لم يشاهده علمه واضطر إليه، وجرى الفرق بين الموضعين

The parallel analogy of the two situations is like the edict of the jurists that witnesses can only testify to prove rights, not to negate them, because negation is not subject to observation unless it is based on an affirmation. Therefore, the difference of the two situations is clear.

Query: The merit is the same between the two scenes, for in the case of death, many a time it is observed that the man is dying, just as midwives witness the birth of a child. However, not everyone witnesses the death of another man, just as not everyone witnesses the birth of a child. The best a man may know about the death of another person whom he has not seen die is to be his neighbor, know of his malady, visit him during his unwell period, then learn of his worsening condition, and then hear wailing from his house, while there has been no other sick person there. Then he sees the family of the sick neighbor sit in mourning and observes marks of grief and loss on their faces. Then his inheritance is distributed and long times pass while no reason can be thought off that his family would proclaim his death while he is alive. The same is true with respect to birth, since women witness the pregnancy and talk about it. Specially, if she is the honor of a nobleman, people will discuss the condition of such a person.

And if he courts a concubine, his visits to her will not remain a secret. And when the child is born, people of the house will exude gaiety and jubilation. People will congratulate them if the family is a prominent one and the news will spread. And according to the prominence of the family, people will know that such and such has sired a baby, specially so when it is known that there is no objective in expressing that a baby has been born for him or not. So when we consider this, the ordinary behavior is the same in both cases. And if Allah should desire to supercede the ordinary behavior, He can do it in either one of the two. It is possible that He may disallow through certain encumbrances the pregnant woman to be seen and that her delivery not to be attended but by a few who are as trustworthy as themselves in safeguarding their secret. It is equally possible that a man should become sick and visitors visit him and when his malady worsens and his death is expected and hope is lost in his life, Allah transfers him to a mountain top and place in his stead a dead person who looks like him.

Then through encumbrances He disallows him to be viewed except by trusted individuals. Then the corpse is buried and his funeral is attended by all those who expected his death and had lost hope in his life, all thinking that the one who is buried is the one who was sick. Many a time, it is possible that a man’s pulse and breathing ceases, and then Allah breaks the ordinary norms and takes him away from the people, while he is alive. Because a living individual needs pulse and breathing in order to exhale burning gases from around the heart through inhaling cool clean air, to cleanse the heart. It is possible that Allah creates coolness in the air surrounding the heart so it may work in the place of the cool air that enters through respiration and it is possible that He arranges that none of it may burn, for the heat that is produced therein is killed by the coolness.

Answer: First we say that no one who believes in the occultation takes recourse to such superstitions, unless he is deprived of proofs and unable to refute a strong doubt.

مثل ما يقول الفقهاء من أن البينة إنما يمكن أن يقوم على إثبات الحقوق لا على نفيها لان النفي لا تقوم عليه بينة إلا إذا كان تحته إثبات فباق الفرق بين الموضعين لذلك. فان قيل: العادة تسوى بين الموضعين لان (في) الموت قد يشاهد الرجل يحتضر كما يشاهد القوابل الولادة، وليس كل أحد يشاهد احتضار غيره كما أنه ليس كل أحد يشاهد ولادة غيره ولكن أظهر ما يمكن في علم الانسان بموت غيره إذا لم يكن يشاهده أن يكون جاره ويعلم بمرضه ويتردد في عيادته ثم يعلم بشدة مرضه ثم يسمع الواعية من داره ولا يكون في الدار مريض غيره، ويجلس أهله للعزاء وآثار الحزن والجزع عليهم ظاهرة ثم يقسم ميراثه ثم يتمادى الزمان ولا يشاهد ولا يعلم لاهله غرض في إظهار موته وهو حي. فهذه سبيل الولادة لان النساء يشاهدن الحمل ويتحدثن بذلك سيما إذا كانت حرمة رجل نبيه يتحدث الناس بأحواله مثله وإذا استسر بجارية لم يخف تردده إليها ثم إذا ولد المولود ظهر البشر والسرور في أهل الدار وهنأهم الناس إذا كان المهنأ جليل القدر وانتشر ذلك وتحدث على حسب جلالة قدره فيعلم الناس أنه قد ولد له مولود سيما إذا علم أنه لا غرض في أن يظهر أنه ولد له ولد ولم يولد له. فمتى اعتبرنا العادة وجدناها في الموضعين على سواء وإن نقض الله العادة فيمكن في أحدهما مثل ما يمكن في الآخر فانه قد يجوز أن يمنع الله ببعض الشواغل عن مشاهدة الحامل وعن أن يحضر ولادتها إلا عدد يؤمن مثلهم على كتمان أمره ثم ينقله الله من مكان الولادة إلى قلة جبل أو برية لا أحد فيها ولا يطلع على ذلك إلا من لا يظهره على المأمون مثله. وكما يجوز ذلك فانه يجوز أن يمرض الانسان ويتردد إليه عواده فإذا اشتد وتوقع موته، وكان يؤيس من حياته، نقله الله إلى قلة جبل وصير مكانه شخصا ميتا يشبهه كثيرا من الشبهه ثم يمنع بالشواغل وغيرها من مشاهدته إلا بمن يوثق به ثم يدفن الشخص ويحضر جنازته من كان يتوقع موته ولا يرجو حياته فيتوهم أن المدفون هو ذاك العليل. وقد يسكن نبض الانسان وتنفسه وينقض الله العادة ويغيبه عنهم وهو حي لان الحي منا إنما يحتاج إليهما لاخراج البخارات المحترقة مما حول القلب بادخال هواء بارد صاف ليروح عن القلب وقد يمكن أن يفعل الله من البرودة في الهواء المطيفة بالقلب ما يجري مجرى هواء بارد يدخلها بالتنفس، فيكون الهواء المحدق بالقلب أبدا باردا ولا يحترق منه شئ لان الحرارة التي تحصل فيه يقوم بالبرودة. والجواب أنا نقول: أولا أنه لا يلتجئ من يتكلم في الغيبة إلى مثل هذه الخرافات إلا من كان مفلساً من الحجة، عاجزاً عن إيراد شبهة قوية