As-Sahifa Al-Kamilah Al-Sajjadiyya (The Psalms of Islam)

As-Sahifa Al-Kamilah Al-Sajjadiyya (The Psalms of Islam)10%

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Publisher: Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Category: Supplications and Ziyarat

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As-Sahifa Al-Kamilah Al-Sajjadiyya (The Psalms of Islam)

As-Sahifa Al-Kamilah Al-Sajjadiyya (The Psalms of Islam)

Author:
Publisher: Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


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41) His Supplication in Asking for Covering and Protection

(41) وَ كَانَ مِنْ دُعَائِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ فِي طَلَبِ السِّتْرِ وَ الْوِقَايَةِ

1. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ أَفْرِشْنِي مِهَادَ كَرَامَتِكَ ،

وَ أَوْرِدْنِي مَشَارِعَ رَحْمَتِكَ ،

وَ أَحْلِلْنِي بُحْبُوحَةَ جَنَّتِكَ ،

وَ لَا تَسُمْنِي بِالرَّدِّ عَنْكَ ،

وَ لَا تَحْرِمْنِي بِالْخَيْبَةِ مِنْكَ .

2. وَ لَا تُقَاصَّنِي بِمَا اجْتَرَحْتُ

وَ لَا تُنَاقِشْنِي بِمَا اكْتَسَبْتُ ،

وَ لَا تُبْرِزْ مَكْتُومِي ،

وَ لَا تَكْشِفْ مَسْتُورِي ،

وَ لَا تَحْمِلْ عَلَى مِيزَانِ الْإِنْصَافِ عَمَلِي ،

وَ لَا تُعْلِنْ عَلَى عُيُونِ الْمَلَإِ خَبَرِي

3. أَخْفِ عَنْهُمْ مَا يَكونُ نَشْرُهُ عَلَيَّ عَاراً ،

وَ اطْوِ عَنْهُمْ مَا يُلْحِقُنِي عِنْدَكَ شَنَاراً

4. شَرِّفْ دَرَجَتِي بِرِضْوَانِكَ ،

وَ أَكْمِلْ كَرَامَتِي بِغُفْرَانِكَ ،

وَ انْظِمْنِي فِي أَصْحَابِ الْيَمِينِ ،

وَ وَجِّهْنِي فِي مَسَالِكِ الْآمِنِينَ ،

وَ اجْعَلْنِي فِي فَوْجِ الْفَائِزِينَ ،

وَ اعْمُرْ بِي مَجَالِسَ الصَّالِحِينَ ،

آمِينَ رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ .

1- O God,

bless Muhammad and his Household,

spread for me the bed of Thy honour,

bring me to the wateringholes of Thy mercy,

set me down in the midst of Thy Garden,

stamp me not with rejection by Thee,

deprive me not through disappointment by Thee,

2- settle not accounts with me for what I have committed,

make no reckoning with me for what I have earned,

display not what I have hidden,

expose not what I have covered over,

weigh not my works on the scales of fairness,

and make not my tidings known to the eyes of the crowd!

3- Conceal from them everything whose unfolding would shame me

and roll up before them all which would join me to disgrace with Thee!

4- Ennoble my degree through Thy good pleasure,

perfect my honour through Thy forgiveness,

rank me among the companions of the right hand,

direct me to the roads of the secure,

place me in the throng of the triumphant,

and through me let the sessions of the righteous thrive!1

Amen, Lord of the worlds!

Footnote

1. Reference to several Qur'anic names for the people of paradise. The Companions of the Right Hand are mentioned in 56:27, 38, 90, 91, and 74:39; the Secure in 27:89, 34:37, etc.; the Triumphant in 9:20, 23:111, 59:20; the Righteous in 2:130, 12:101, etc.

42) His Supplication upon Completing a Reading of the Qur'an

(42) وَ كَانَ مِنْ دُعَائِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عِنْدَ خَتْمِ الْقُرْآنِ

1. اللَّهُمَّ إِنَّكَ أَعَنْتَنِي عَلَى خَتْمِ كِتَابِكَ

الَّذِي أَنْزَلْتَهُ نُوراً ،

وَ جَعَلْتَهُ مُهَيْمِناً عَلَى كُلِّ كِتَابٍ أَنْزَلْتَهُ ،

وَ فَضَّلْتَهُ عَلَى كُلِّ حَدِيثٍ قَصَصْتَهُ .

2. وَ فُرْقَاناً فَرَقْتَ بِهِ

بَيْنَ حَلَالِكَ وَ حَرَامِكَ ،

وَ قُرْآناً أَعْرَبْتَ بِهِ عَنْ شَرَائِعِ أَحْكَامِكَ

وَ كِتَاباً فَصَّلْتَهُ لِعِبَادِكَ تَفْصِيلًا ،

وَ وَحْياً أَنْزَلْتَهُ

عَلَى نَبِيِّكَ مُحَمَّدٍ صَلَوَاتُكَ عَلَيْهِ وَ آلِهِ تَنْزِيلًا .

3. وَ جَعَلْتَهُ

نُوراً نَهْتَدِي

مِنْ ظُلَمِ الضَّلَالَةِ وَ الْجَهَالَةِ بِاتِّبَاعِهِ ،

وَ شِفَاءً لِمَنْ أَنْصَتَ

بِفَهَمِ التَّصْدِيقِ إِلَى اسْتِمَاعِهِ ،

وَ مِيزَانَ قِسْطٍ لَا يَحِيفُ عَنِ الْحَقِّ لِسَانُهُ ،

وَ نُورَ هُدًى لَا يَطْفَأُ عَنِ الشَّاهِدِينَ بُرْهَانُهُ ،

وَ عَلَمَ نَجَاةٍ

لَا يَضِلُّ مَنْ أَمَّ قَصْدَ سُنَّتِهِ ،

وَ لا تَنَالُ أَيْدِي الْهَلَكَاتِ

مَنْ تَعَلَّقَ بِعُرْوَةِ عِصْمَتِهِ .

4. اللَّهُمَّ

فَإِذْ أَفَدْتَنَا الْمَعُونَةَ عَلَى تِلَاوَتِهِ ،

وَ سَهَّلْتَ جَوَاسِيَ أَلْسِنَتِنَا بِحُسْنِ عِبَارَتِهِ ،

فَاجْعَلْنَا مِمَّنْ يَرْعَاهُ حَقَّ رِعَايَتِهِ ،

وَ يَدِينُ لَكَ بِاعْتِقَادِ التَّسْلِيمِ

لِمُحْكَمِ آيَاتِهِ ،

وَ يَفْزَعُ إِلَى الْإِقْرَارِ بِمُتَشَابِهِهِ ،

وَ مُوضَحَاتِ بَيِّنَاتِهِ .

5. اللَّهُمَّ إِنَّكَ أَنْزَلْتَهُ عَلَى نَبِيِّكَ مُحَمَّدٍ

صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَ آلِهِ مُجْمَلًا ،

وَ أَلْهَمْتَهُ عِلْمَ عَجَائِبِهِ مُكَمَّلًا ،

وَ وَرَّثْتَنَا عِلْمَهُ مُفَسَّراً ،

وَ فَضَّلْتَنَا عَلَى مَنْ جَهِلَ عِلْمَهُ ،

وَ قَوَّيْتَنَا عَلَيْهِ

لِتَرْفَعَنَا فَوْقَ مَنْ لَمْ يُطِقْ حَمْلَهُ .

6. اللَّهُمَّ فَكَمَا جَعَلْتَ قُلُوبَنَا لَهُ حَمَلَةً ،

وَ عَرَّفْتَنَا بِرَحْمَتِكَ شَرَفَهُ وَ فَضْلَهُ ،

فَصَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ الْخَطِيبِ بِهِ ،

وَ عَلَى آلِهِ الْخُزَّانِ لَهُ ،

وَ اجْعَلْنَا مِمَّنْ يَعْتَرِفُ بِأَنَّهُ مِنْ عِنْدِكَ

حَتَّى لَا يُعَارِضَنَا الشَّكُّ فِي تَصْدِيقِهِ ،

وَ لَا يَخْتَلِجَنَا الزَّيْغُ عَنْ قَصْدِ طَرِيقِهِ .

7. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ اجْعَلْنَا مِمَّنْ يَعْتَصِمُ بِحَبْلِهِ ،

وَ يَأْوِي مِنَ الْمُتَشَابِهَاتِ إِلَى حِرْزِ مَعْقِلِهِ ،

وَ يَسْكُنُ فِي ظِلِّ جَنَاحِهِ ،

وَ يَهْتَدِي بِضَوْءِ صَبَاحِهِ ،

وَ يَقْتَدِي بِتَبَلُّجِ أَسْفَارِهِ ،

وَ يَسْتَصْبِحُ بِمِصْبَاحِهِ ،

وَ لَا يَلْتَمِسُ الْهُدَى فِي غَيْرِهِ .

8. اللَّهُمَّ وَ كَمَا نَصَبْتَ بِهِ مُحَمَّداً

عَلَماً لِلدَّلَالَةِ عَلَيْكَ ،

وَ أَنْهَجْتَ بِآلِهِ سُبُلَ الرِّضَا إِلَيْكَ ،

فَصَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ اجْعَلِ الْقُرْآنَ وَسِيلَةً لَنَا إِلَى أَشْرَفِ مَنَازِلِ الْكَرَامَةِ ،

وَ سُلَّماً نَعْرُجُ فِيهِ إِلَى مَحَلِّ السَّلَامَةِ ،

وَ سَبَباً نُجْزَى بِهِ

النَّجَاةَ فِي عَرْصَةِ الْقِيَامَةِ ،

وَ ذَرِيعَةً نَقْدَمُ بِهَا

عَلَى نَعِيمِ دَارِ الْمُقَامَةِ .

9. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ احْطُطْ بِالْقُرْآنِ عَنَّا ثِقْلَ الْأَوْزَارِ ،

وَ هَبْ لَنَا حُسْنَ شَمَائِلِ الْأَبْرَارِ ،

وَ اقْفُ بِنَا آثَارَ الَّذِينَ قَامُوا لَكَ بِهِ

آنَاءَ اللَّيْلِ وَ أَطْرَافَ النَّهَارِ

حَتَّى تُطَهِّرَنَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَنَسٍ بِتَطْهِيرِهِ ،

وَ تَقْفُوَ بِنَا آثَارَ الَّذِينَ اسْتَضَاءُوا بِنُورِهِ ،

وَ لَمْ يُلْهِهِمُ الْأَمَلُ عَنِ الْعَمَلِ

فَيَقْطَعَهُمْ بِخُدَعِ غُرُورِهِ .

10. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ اجْعَلِ الْقُرْآنَ لَنَا

فِي ظُلَمِ اللَّيَالِي مُونِساً ،

وَ مِنْ نَزَغَاتِ الشَّيْطَانِ وَ خَطَرَاتِ الْوَسَاوِسِ حَارِساً ،

وَ لِأَقْدَامِنَا عَنْ نَقْلِهَا إِلَى الْمَعَاصِي حَابِساً ،

وَ لِأَلْسِنَتِنَا عَنِ الْخَوْضِ فِي الْبَاطِلِ مِنْ غَيْرِ مَا آفَةٍ مُخْرِساً ،

وَ لِجَوَارِحِنَا عَنِ اقْتِرَافِ الْآثَامِ زَاجِراً ،

وَ لِمَا طَوَتِ الْغَفْلَةُ عَنَّا مِنْ تَصَفُّحِ الِاعْتِبَارِ نَاشِراً ،

حَتَّى تُوصِلَ إِلَى قُلُوبِنَا فَهْمَ عَجَائِبِهِ ،

وَ زَوَاجِرَ أَمْثَالِهِ

الَّتِي ضَعُفَتِ الْجِبَالُ الرَّوَاسِي عَلَى صَلَابَتِهَا

عَنِ احْتِمَالِهِ .

11. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ أَدِمْ بِالْقُرْآنِ صَلَاحَ ظَاهِرِنَا ،

وَ احْجُبْ بِهِ خَطَرَاتِ الْوَسَاوِسِ

عَنْ صِحَّةِ ضَمَائِرِنَا ،

وَ اغْسِلْ بِهِ دَرَنَ قُلُوبِنَا وَ عَلَائِقَ أَوْزَارِنَا ،

وَ اجْمَعْ بِهِ مُنْتَشَرَ أُمُورِنَا ،

وَ أَرْوِ بِهِ فِي مَوْقِفِ الْعَرْضِ عَلَيْكَ ظَمَأَ هَوَاجِرِنَا ،

وَ اكْسُنَا بِهِ حُلَلَ الْأَمَانِ

يَوْمَ الْفَزَعِ الْأَكْبَرِ فِي نُشُورِنَا .

12. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ اجْبُرْ بِالْقُرْآنِ خَلَّتَنَا مِنْ عَدَمِ الْإِمْلَاقِ ،

وَ سُقْ إِلَيْنَا بِهِ رَغَدَ الْعَيْشِ

وَ خِصْبَ سَعَةِ الْأَرْزَاقِ ،

وَ جَنِّبْنَا بِهِ الضَّرَائِبَ الْمَذْمُومَةَ وَ مَدَانِيَ الْأَخْلَاقِ ،

وَ اعْصِمْنَا بِهِ مِنْ هُوَّةِ الْكُفْرِ وَ دَوَاعِي النِّفَاقِ

حَتَّى يَكُونَ لَنَا فِي الْقِيَامَةِ

إِلَى رِضْوَانِكَ وَ جِنَانِكَ قَائِداً ،

وَ لَنَا فِي الدُّنْيَا عَنْ سُخْطِكَ وَ تَعَدِّي حُدُودِكَ ذَائِداً ،

وَ لِمَا عِنْدَكَ

بِتَحْلِيلِ حَلَالِهِ وَ تَحْرِيمِ حَرَامِهِ شَاهِداً .

13. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ هَوِّنْ بِالْقُرْآنِ عِنْدَ الْمَوْتِ عَلَى أَنْفُسِنَا

كَرْبَ السِّيَاقِ ،

وَ جَهْدَ الْأَنِينِ ،

وَ تَرَادُفَ الْحَشَارِجِ إِذَا بَلَغَتِ النُّفُوسُ التَّرَاقِيَ ،

وَ قِيلَ مَنْ رَاقٍ

وَ تَجَلَّى مَلَكُ الْمَوْتِ لِقَبْضِهَا مِنْ حُجُبِ الْغُيُوبِ ،

وَ رَمَاهَا عَنْ قَوْسِ الْمَنَايَا بِأَسْهُمِ وَحْشَةِ الْفِرَاقِ ،

وَ دَافَ لَهَا مِنْ ذُعَافِ الْمَوْتِ

كَأْساً مَسْمُومَةَ الْمَذَاقِ ،

وَ دَنَا مِنَّا إِلَى الْآخِرَةِ رَحِيلٌ وَ انْطِلَاقٌ ،

وَ صَارَتِ الْأَعْمَالُ قَلَائِدَ فِي الْأَعْنَاقِ ،

وَ كَانَتِ الْقُبُورُ هِيَ الْمَأْوَى

إِلَى مِيقَاتِ يَوْمِ التَّلَاقِ .

14. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ بَارِكْ لَنَا فِي حُلُولِ دَارِ الْبِلَى ،

وَ طُولِ الْمُقَامَةِ بَيْنَ أَطْبَاقِ الثَّرَى ،

وَ اجْعَلِ الْقُبُورَ بَعْدَ فِرَاقِ الدُّنْيَا خَيْرَ مَنَازِلِنَا ،

وَ افْسَحْ لَنَا بِرَحْمَتِكَ فِي ضِيقِ مَلَاحِدِنَا ،

وَ لَا تَفْضَحْنَا فِي حَاضِرِي الْقِيَامَةِ

بِمُوبِقَاتِ آثَامِنَا .

15. وَ ارْحَمْ بِالْقُرْآنِ

فِي مَوْقِفِ الْعَرْضِ عَلَيْكَ ذُلَّ مَقَامِنَا ،

وَ ثَبِّتْ بِهِ عِنْدَ اضْطِرَابِ جِسْرِ جَهَنَّمَ

يَوْمَ الْمَجَازِ عَلَيْهَا زَلَلَ أَقْدَامِنَا ،

وَ نَوِّرْ بِهِ قَبْلَ الْبَعْثِ سُدَفَ قُبُورِنَا ،

وَ نَجِّنَا بِهِ مِنْ كُلِّ كَرْبٍ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ

وَ شَدَائِدِ أَهْوَالِ يَوْمِ الطَّامَّةِ

16. وَ بَيِّضْ وُجُوهَنَا

يَوْمَ تَسْوَدُّ وُجُوهُ الظَّلَمَةِ

فِي يَوْمِ الْحَسْرَةِ وَ النَّدَامَةِ ،

وَ اجْعَلْ لَنَا فِي صُدُورِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وُدّاً ،

وَ لَا تَجْعَلِ الْحَيَاةَ عَلَيْنَا نَكَداً .

17. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ عَبْدِكَ وَ رَسُولِكَ

كَمَا بَلَّغَ رِسَالَتَكَ ،

وَ صَدَعَ بِأَمْرِكَ ،

وَ نَصَحَ لِعِبَادِكَ .

18. اللَّهُمَّ اجْعَلْ نَبِيَّنَا

صَلَوَاتُكَ عَلَيْهِ وَ عَلَى آلِهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ

أَقْرَبَ الْنَّبِيِّينَ مِنْكَ مَجْلِساً ،

وَ أَمْكَنَهُمْ مِنْكَ شَفَاعَةً ،

وَ أَجَلَّهُمْ عِنْدَكَ قَدْراً ،

وَ أَوْجَهَهُمْ عِنْدَكَ جَاهاً .

19. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ ،

وَ شَرِّفْ بُنْيَانَهُ ، وَ عَظِّمْ بُرْهَانَهُ ،

وَ ثَقِّلْ مِيزَانَهُ ، وَ تَقَبَّلْ شَفَاعَتَهُ ،

وَ قَرِّبْ وَسِيلَتَهُ ،

وَ بَيِّضْ وَجْهَهُ ، وَ أَتِمَّ نُورَهُ ، وَ ارْفَعْ دَرَجَتَهُ

20. وَ أَحْيِنَا عَلَى سُنَّتِهِ ،

وَ تَوَفَّنَا عَلَى مِلَّتِهِ

وَ خُذْ بِنَا مِنْهَاجَهُ ، وَ اسْلُكْ بِنَا سَبِيلَهُ ،

وَ اجْعَلْنَا مِنْ أَهْلِ طَاعَتِهِ ،

وَ احْشُرْنَا فِي زُمْرَتِهِ ، وَ أَوْرِدْنَا حَوْضَهُ ، وَ اسْقِنَا بِكَأْسِهِ

21. وَ صَلِّ اللَّهُمَّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

صَلَاةً تُبَلِّغُهُ بِهَا

أَفْضَلَ مَا يَأْمُلُ مِنْ خَيْرِكَ وَ فَضْلِكَ وَ كَرَامَتِكَ ،

إِنَّكَ ذُو رَحْمَةٍ وَاسِعَةٍ ، وَ فَضْلٍ كَرِيمٍ .

22. اللَّهُمَّ اجْزِهِ بِمَا بَلَّغَ مِنْ رِسَالَاتِكَ ،

وَ أَدَّى مِنْ آيَاتِكَ ،

وَ نَصَحَ لِعِبَادِكَ ،

وَ جَاهَدَ فِي سَبِيلِكَ ،

أَفْضَلَ مَا جَزَيْتَ أَحَداً مِنْ مَلَائِكَتِكَ الْمُقَرَّبِينَ ،

وَ أَنْبِيَائِكَ الْمُرْسَلِينَ الْمُصْطَفَيْنَ ،

وَ السَّلَامُ عَلَيْهِ وَ عَلَى آلِهِ الطَّيِّبِينَ الطَّاهِرِينَ وَ رَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ وَ بَرَكَاتُهُ .

1- O God,

Thou hast helped me complete Thy Book,

which Thou sent down as a light1

and appointed as a guardian over every book Thou hast sent down,2

preferring it over every narrative which Thou hast recounted,3

2- a separator, through which Thou hast separated

Thy lawful from Thy unlawful,4

a Qur'an, through which Thou hast made plain

the approaches to Thy ordinances,5

a book, which Thou hast distinguished very distinctly for Thy servants,6

a revelation, which Thou hast sent down,

a sending down, upon Thy prophet Muhammad7

(Thy blessings be upon him and his Household).

3- Thou appointed it

a light through following which we may be guided

from the shadows of error and ignorance,8

a healing for him who turns ear toward hearing it with the understanding of attestation,9

a just balance whose tongue does not incline away from truth,10

a light of guidance whose proof is not extinguished before the witnesses,11

and a guidepost of deliverance, so that

he who repairs straightway to its prescription

will not go astray

and he who clings to its preservation's handhold

will not be touched by the hands of disasters.

4- O God,

since Thou hast given us help to recite it

and made smooth the roughness of our tongues

through the beauty of its expression,

place us among those who

observe it as it should be observed,

serve Thee by adhering in submission

to the firm text of its verses,

and seek refuge in admitting both its ambiguous parts

and the elucidations of its clear signs!

5- O God, Thou sent it down upon Thy prophet Muhammad

(God bless him and his household) in summary form,

Thou inspired him with the science of its wonders to complement it,

Thou made us the heirs of its knowledge as interpreters,12

Thou made us to surpass him who is ignorant of its knowledge,

and Thou gave us strength over it

to raise us above those not able to carry it.

6- O God, just as Thou hast appointed our hearts

as its carriers

and made known to us through Thy mercy

its nobility and excellence,

so also bless Muhammad, its preacher,

and his Household, its guardians,

and place us among those who confess that it has come from Thee,

lest doubt about attesting to it assail us,

or deviation from its straightforward path shake us!

7- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household

and make us one of those who hold fast to its cord,

seek haven from its ambiguities in its fortified stronghold,

rest in the shadow of its wing,

find guidance in the brightness of its morning,

follow the shining of its disclosure,

acquire light from its lamp,

and beg not guidance from any other!

8- O God, just as through it Thou hast set up Muhammad

as a guidepost to point to Thee

and through his Household Thou hast made clear Thy good pleasure's roads to Thee,

so also bless Muhammad and his Household

and make the Qur'an our mediation to the noblest stations of Thy honour,

a ladder by which we may climb

to the place of safety,

a cause for our being repaid

with deliverance at the Plain of Resurrection,

and a means whereby we may reach

the bliss of the House of Permanence!

9- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household,

lessen for us through the Qur'an the weight of heavy sins,

give to us the excellent qualities of the pious,

and make us follow the tracks of those who stood before Thee

in the watches of the night and the ends of the day,13

such that Thou purifiest us from every defilement through its purification

and makest us to follow the tracks of those

who have taken illumination from its light

and whom expectation has not distracted from works,

cutting them off through its delusions' deceptions!

10- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household

and appoint the Qur'an

for us an intimate in the shadows of nights

and a guardian against the instigations of Satan

and confusing thoughts,

for our feet an obstruction from passing to acts of disobedience,

for our tongues a silencer without blight

preventing a plunge into falsehood,

for our limbs a restrainer from committing sins,

and for the scrutiny of heedfulness

rolled up in heedlessness an unroller,

such that Thou attachest to our hearts

the understanding of the Qur'an's wonders

and its restraining similitudes

which immovable mountains in all their solidity

were too weak to carry!14

11- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household

and through the Qur'an make permanent the rightness of our outward selves,

veil the ideas of confusing thoughts

from the soundness of our innermost minds,

wash away the dirt of our hearts and the ties of our heavy sins,

gather our scattered affairs,

quench the thirst of our burning heat in the standing place of the presentation to Thee,

and clothe us in the robes of security

on the Day of the Greatest Terror at our uprising!15

12- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household

and through the Qur'an redress our lack - our destitution in poverty -

drive toward us the comforts of life

and an abundance of plentiful provisions,

turn aside blameworthy character traits

and base moral qualities,

and preserve us from the pit of unbelief

and the motives for hypocrisy,

such that the Qur'an may be

for us at the resurrection a leader

to Thy good pleasure and Thy gardens,

for us in this world a protector against Thy displeasure and transgressing Thy bounds

and for what is with Thee a witness

by its declaring lawful the lawful

and its declaring unlawful the unlawful!

13- O God, bless Muhammad and his Household

and through the Qur'an make easy for our souls at death

the distress of the driving,16

the effort of the moaning,

and the succession of the rattling, when souls reach the throats

and it is said, 'Where is the enchanter?';17

when the angel of death discloses himself to seize them from behind the veils of unseen things,

letting loose at them from the bow of destinies

the arrows of the terror of lonesome separation,

and mixing for them from sudden death

a cup poisoned to the taste;

and when departure and release for the hereafter come close to us,

works become collars around the necks,18

and the graves become the haven

until the appointed time of the Day of Encounter!

14-O God, bless Muhammad and his Household,

make blessed for us the arrival at the house of decay

and the drawn out residence between the layers of the earth,

appoint the graves, after separation from this world, the best of our waystations,

make roomy for us through Thy mercy the narrowness of our tombs,

and disgrace us not among those present at the Resurrection through our ruinous sins!

15- Through the Qur'an

have mercy upon the lowliness of our station at the standing place of presentation to Thee,

make firm the slips of our feet during the shaking of the bridge across hell on the day of passage over it,

illuminate the darkness of our graves before the Uprising,

and deliver us from every distress on the Day of Resurrection

and from the hardships of terrors on the Day of Disaster!

16- Whiten our faces on the day when the faces of wrongdoers are blackened19

during the Day of Regret and Remorse,

appoint love for us in the breasts of the faithful,

and make not life for us troublesome!

17- O God, bless Muhammad, Thy servant and Thy messenger,

just as He delivered Thy message,

executed Thy command,

and counselled Thy servants!

18- O God, on the Day of Resurrection make our Prophet

(Thy blessings be upon him and his Household)

the nearest of the prophets to Thee in seat,

the ablest of them before Thee with intercession,

the greatest of them with Thee in measure,

and the most eminent of them with Thee in rank!

19- O God, bless Muhammad and the Household of Muhammad,

ennoble his edifice, magnify his proof,

make weighty his balance, accept his intercession,

bring near his mediation,20

whiten his face, complete his light, and raise his degree!

20- Make us live according to his Sunna,

make us die in his creed,

take us on his road, make us travel his path,

place us among the people who obey him,

muster us in his band, lead us to up his pool,21

and give us to drink of his cup!

21- And bless Muhammad and his Household,

with a blessing through which Thou wilt take him

to the most excellent of Thy good, Thy bounty, and Thy generosity for which he hopes!

Thou art Possessor of boundless mercy

and generous bounty.

22- O God, repay him for Thy messages which he delivered,

Thy signs which he passed on,

the good counsel he gave to Thy servants,

and the struggle he undertook in Thy way,

with the best Thou hast repaid any of Thy angels brought nigh

and Thy prophets sent out and chosen!

And upon him and his Household,

the good, the pure,

be peace, God's mercy, and His blessings!

Footnotes

1. Allusion to 4:174: We have sent down to you a manifest light.

2. Allusion to 5:48: We have sent down to thee the Book with the truth, confirming the Book that was before it, and guarding over it.

3. There are allusions here to several Qur'anic verses, including 4:174, 5:48, and 39:23.

4. The Qur'an calls itself a 'separator' in 2:185, 3:4, and 25:1.

5. Allusion to the title given to itself by the Qur'an: 'the Arabic recitation' (12:2, 20:113, et al.). To 'make plain' (i'rab) also means to 'express in Arabic'.

6. Cf. 41:3: A book whose signs have been distinguished as an Arabic Qur'an for a people having knowledge.

7. Cf. 76:23: Surely We have sent down the Qur'an on thee, a sending down.

8. Cf. 14:1: A book We have sent down to thee that thou mayest bring forth mankind from the shadows to the light by the leave of their Lord; cf. also 57:9, 65:11.

9. For the name 'healing', cf. 10:57 and 17:82.

10. Cf. 57:25.

11. According to Sayyid ''Alikhan, by 'witnesses' the Imam means either those who bear witness to God's Unity and to the prophets, since the Qur'an is their greatest proof, or the Prophet and his Household, who are (according to the Shi'ite interpretation) the witnesses referred to in the verse:

Thus We appointed you a midmost nation that you might be witnesses to the people, and that the Messenger might be a witness to you (2:143).

12. Here the prayer's specific reference to the Imam's own situation leads the commentators to suggest altering the text when it is recited. Sayyid ''Alikhan suggests that one should make the following changes: warrathtana -> warrathta awsiya'ahu; faddaltana -> faddaltahum; qawwaytana -> qawwaytahum; tarfa'ana -> tarfa'ahum. The meaning would then be: 'Thou madest his executors the heirs of its knowledge as interpreters, Thou preferred them over him who is ignorant of its knowledge, and Thou gavest them strength to lift them above...'.

13. Allusion to 20:130: Proclaim thy Lord's praise.... in the watches of the night, and at the ends of the day.

14. Allusion to 59:21: If We had sent down the Qur'an upon a mountain, thou wouldst have seen it humbled, split asunder out of the fear of God.

15. Allusion to two Qur'anic verses:

They shall be secure from terror on that day (27:89);

The Greatest Terror shall not grieve them (21:103).

16. Allusion to:

As though they were being driven into death with their eyes open (8:6)

and:

And death's agony comes in truth.... And every soul will come, with it a driver and a witness. (50:21)

17. 75:26-27

18. Allusion to 17:13: And every man - We have fastened to him the bird of omen upon his neck.

19. Cf. 1.14 and 3:106.

20. The 'mediation' is mentioned in 5:35: O you who have faith, fear God and seek the mediation to Him.

'Mediation' may mean simply the means of access to God, defined in terms of any work of obedience or pious act. But most commentators point out the verse's connection to a well-known saying of the Prophet concerning 'mediation' as the highest station of Paradise, and this in turn is normally defined as the permission God will give to the Prophet at the Resurrection to intercede for his community.

The Prophet said: 'When you hear the muezzin, repeat what he says, then call down blessings upon me. If someone calls down a blessing upon me, God will call down ten upon him.

Then ask that I be given the mediation, for it is a station in the Garden suited only for one of God's servants, and I hope to be that one. If anyone asks that I be given the mediation, my intercession for him will become lawful' (Muslim, Salat 11; Tirmidhi, Manaqib I; Abu Dawud, Salat 36; Ahmad II, 168, 265; III 83). Padwick discusses the connection between mediation and intercession in Muslim Devotions, Ch. 2, 'The Prayer of Mediation' (the relationship between the two can be seen in the present work in 65.4-5, 66.3-4, 78.1). On the mediation of the Imams, see note 217.

21. Allusion to the 'Pool of Abundance' in Paradise, which, according to several hadith, is the meaning of the 'Abundance' which God gave to the Prophet as mentioned in 108:1.

43) His Supplication when he Looked at the New Crescent Moon

(43) وَ كَانَ مِنْ دُعَائِهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِذَا نَظَرَ إِلَى الْهِلَالِ

1. أَيُّهَا الْخَلْقُ الْمُطِيعُ ،

الدَّائِبُ السَّرِيعُ ،

الْمُتَرَدِّدُ فِي مَنَازِلِ التَّقْدِيرِ ،

الْمُتَصَرِّفُ فِي فَلَكِ التَّدْبِيرِ .

2. آمَنْتُ بِمَنْ نَوَّرَ بِكَ الظُّلَمَ ،

وَ أَوْضَحَ بِكَ الْبُهَمَ ،

وَ جَعَلَكَ آيَةً مِنْ آيَاتِ مُلْكِهِ ،

وَ عَلَامَةً مِنْ عَلَامَاتِ سُلْطَانِهِ ،

وَ امْتَهَنَكَ بِالزِّيَادَةِ وَ النُّقْصَانِ ،

وَ الطُّلُوعِ وَ الْأُفُولِ ، وَ الْإِنَارَةِ وَ الْكُسُوفِ ،

فِي كُلِّ ذَلِكَ أَنْتَ لَهُ مُطِيعٌ ، وَ إِلَى إِرَادَتِهِ سَرِيعٌ

3. سُبْحَانَهُ مَا أَعْجَبَ مَا دَبَّرَ فِي أَمْرِكَ

وَ أَلْطَفَ مَا صَنَعَ فِي شَأْنِكَ

جَعَلَكَ مِفْتَاحَ شَهْرٍ حَادِثٍ لِأَمْرٍ حَادِثٍ

4. فَأَسْأَلُ اللَّهَ رَبِّي وَ رَبَّكَ ،

وَ خَالِقِي وَ خَالِقَكَ ،

وَ مُقَدِّرِي وَ مُقَدِّرَكَ ،

وَ مُصَوِّرِي وَ مُصَوِّرَكَ

أَنْ يُصَلِّيَ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ أَنْ يَجْعَلَكَ هِلَالَ بَرَكَةٍ لَا تَمْحَقُهَا الْأَيَّامُ ،

وَ طَهَارَةٍ لَا تُدَنِّسُهَا الْآثَامُ

5. هِلَالَ أَمْنٍ مِنَ الْآفَاتِ ، وَ سَلَامَةٍ مِنَ السَّيِّئَاتِ ،

هِلَالَ سَعْدٍ لَا نَحْسَ فِيهِ ،

وَ يُمْنٍ لَا نَكَدَ مَعَهُ ، وَ يُسْرٍ لَا يُمَازِجُهُ عُسْرٌ ،

وَ خَيْرٍ لَا يَشُوبُهُ شَرٌّ ،

هِلَالَ أَمْنٍ وَ إِيمَانٍ وَ نِعْمَةٍ وَ إِحْسَانٍ وَ سَلَامَةٍ وَ إِسْلَامٍ .

6. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ ،

وَ اجْعَلْنَا مِنْ أَرْضَى مَنْ طَلَعَ عَلَيْهِ ،

وَ أَزْكَى مَنْ نَظَرَ إِلَيْهِ ،

وَ أَسْعَدَ مَنْ تَعَبَّدَ لَكَ فِيهِ ،

وَ وَفِّقْنَا فِيهِ لِلتَّوْبَةِ ،

وَ اعْصِمْنَا فِيهِ مِنَ الْحَوْبَةِ ،

وَ احْفَظْنَا فِيهِ مِنْ مُبَاشَرَةِ مَعْصِيَتِكَ

7. وَ أَوْزِعْنَا فِيهِ شُكْرَ نِعْمَتِكَ ،

وَ أَلْبِسْنَا فِيهِ جُنَنَ الْعَافِيَةِ ،

وَ أَتْمِمْ عَلَيْنَا بِاسْتِكْمَالِ طَاعَتِكَ فِيهِ الْمِنَّةَ ،

إِنَّكَ الْمَنَّانُ الْحَمِيدُ ،

وَ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ الطَّيِّبِينَ الطَّاهِرِينَ .

1- O obedient creature,

speedy and untiring,

frequenter of the mansions of determination,1

moving about in the sphere of governance!

2- I have faith in Him who lights up darknesses through thee,

illuminates jet-black shadows by thee,

appointed thee one of the signs of His kingdom

and one of the marks of His authority,

and humbled thee through increase and decrease,

rising and setting, illumination and eclipse.

In all of this thou art obedient to Him,

prompt toward His will.

3- Glory be to Him!

How wonderful is what He has arranged in thy situation!

How subtle what He has made for thy task!

He has made thee the key to a new month

for a new situation.

4- So I ask God, my Lord and thy Lord,

my Creator and thy Creator,

my Determiner and thy Determiner,

my Form-giver and thy Form-giver,

that He bless Muhammad and his Household

and appoint thee a crescent of blessings not effaced by days

and of purity not defiled by sins;

5- a crescent of security from blights and of safety from evil deeds;

a crescent of auspiciousness containing no misfortune,

of prosperity accompanied by no adversity, of ease not mixed with difficulty,

of good unstained by evil;

a crescent of security and faith,

favour and good-doing, safety and submission!

6- O God,

bless Muhammad and his Household,

place us among the most satisfied of those over whom the crescent has risen,

the purest of those who have looked upon it,

the most fortunate of those who have worshipped Thee under it;

give us the success during [the new month] to repent,

preserve us within it from misdeeds,

guard us therein from pursuing disobedience to Thee,

7- allot to us within it thanksgiving for Thy favour,

clothe us during it in the shields of well-being,

and complete for us Thy kindness

by perfecting therein obedience to Thee!

Surely Thou art All-kind, Praiseworthy.

And bless Muhammad and his Household, the good, the pure.

Footnote

1. Allusion to 36:39: And the moon - We have determined it by mansions, till it returns like an aged palm-bough.

CHAPTER 2:THE COMMANDS (AL-AWĀMIR)

By command is meant wish (in the sense that one wants something to be done: alţalab) which, in turn, means to express will (al-irāda) and desire through speech, writing, pointing, or the like; whether by such terms as “I command you” or by an imperative. Thus, the sheer will and desire without being expressed in some way is not called wish. However, any wish is not called command, but a specific one, that is, wish of superior from inferior. Hence, superiority is considered in the command, whether the superior demonstrates his superiority or not, and whether he uses an imperative (or uses the verb “command”) or not - the only point is that he should somehow express his wish. On the other hand, wish of the one who is not superior, whether he is inferior or coequal, is not a command, even though he pretends superiority or uses an imperative.

Appearance of the Command

The important point, however, is the denotation of the command, which is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. There are a variety of opinions in this connection the most important of which being obligation (al-wudjūb), preference (al-istiĥbāb), and the common point between obligation and preference. The truth, however, is that the command is apparent in the obligation - not conventionally, but because of judgment of the intellect. It is intellect’s judgment that when the Lord commands us we must obey Him and must be provoked in order to fulfill our duty as servants, unless He declares that His command is not a matter of must and we are free not to do it. Thus, this appearance is not a literal appearance and this denotation is not a lingual one, for the imperative is neither literally nor figuratively used in the concept of obligation, since obligation is something out of the reality of its object of denotation and also it is not among its qualities or states.

Concerning appearance of the command, however, there remain two secondary discussions:

1. Should a declarative sentence be used as configuration, it denotes obligation exactly as the imperative does, for the criterion, which is the intellect’s judgment to obey the Lord’s provoking, exists in both of them - no matter in what way that provoking is declared. An example of this is the case where the holy Imām was asked about occurrence of a problem in the prayers and he said, “He repeats his prayers.” One may even say that indication of obligation is definitely emphasized in this kind, for it is assumed that the duty-bound will surely do it.

2. When a command is preceded by an actual or an assumed prohibition, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether it is apparent in the obligation, permissibility, or merely permission, i.e., removal of prohibition without dealing with any of the five-fold burdensome precepts, or it returns to its previous precept before the prohibition.

The justifiable opinion is the third one, for we said earlier that indication of obligation by the command is because of intellect’s necessitation of being provoked where there is no permission to relinquish. Nonetheless, there is no provoking here; it is just permission to do and nothing more. For instance, when the Almighty God says, “…Do not profane God’s Way marks [when you are in pilgrim sanctity]… but when you have quit your pilgrim sanctity, then hunt,” (5:1-2) it clearly does not mean that hunting is mandatory, but rather permitted.

Of course, if there is contextual evidence that such a command is issued to provoke the duty-bound to perform something, or with the intention of allowing him to do it, it will definitely denote obligation and permissibility respectively, and cannot be a matter of dispute. Wherever there is a dispute, it is about a case where no contextual evidence exists.

Varieties of Mandatory Acts

Mandatory acts are of some varieties some of which being as follows:

Absolute (al-Muţlaq) and Conditional (al-Mashrūţ)

Should a mandatory act be compared with something external, it can only be of the two following kinds:

1. If its obligation is dependent upon that thing and that thing is considered in the obligation of the mandatory act as a condition, such as pilgrimage to Mecca (al-ĥadjdj) with regard to financial capability (al-istiţā‘a), it is called “conditional mandatory act,” since its obligation is conditional upon actualization of that external thing; and that is why the pilgrimage will not become mandatory unless financial capability is actualized.

2. If its obligation is not dependent upon actualization of that thing, such as the pilgrimage with regard to travelling to Mecca - even though its actualization is dependent upon the latter - it is called “absolute mandatory act,” since its obligation is unconditional upon that external thing.

The example of pilgrimage indicates that the absolute and conditional are relative, since one mandatory act is absolute with regard to one thing and conditional with regard to another.

It should also be known that all mandatory acts are conditional with regard to general conditions of burden, i.e., puberty, power, and intellect. Hence, the minor, impotent, and insane have no burden in the actuality.

Suspended (al-Mu‘allaq) and Definite (al-Munadjdjaz)

Doubtless when condition of the conditional mandatory act is realized its obligation becomes actual, like the absolute mandatory act, and the burden is actually directed to the duty-bound. However, actuality of the burden is conceivable in two ways:

1. If actuality of the obligation and the mandatory act is simultaneous, in the sense that the time of mandatory act is the very time of the obligation, the mandatory act is called “definite” (al-munadjdjaz); such as the prayers when its time comes, since its obligation is actual and the mandatory act, i.e., the prayers, is also actual.

2. If actuality of the obligation is prior to that of the mandatory act and therefore the time of mandatory act is later than that of obligation, it is called “suspended” (al-mu‘allaq), since the act and not its obligation is suspended until a time not realized yet. An example of this is the pilgrimage, since when the financial capability is actualized the obligation of the pilgrimage becomes actual - as it is said - while the mandatory act is suspended until coming of the time of the ritual. Here, when the financial capability is actualized the pilgrimage becomes mandatory, and that is why it is mandatory for the duty-bound to provide all preliminaries to become able to perform it in its specific, limited time.

In this connection, there are two disputes among Uşūlīs:

First, whether al-wādjib al-mu‘allaq is possible. Some believe in its possibility, while the majority of Uşūlīs hold that it is impossible - a discussion beyond the level of an introductory work.

Secondly, whether appearance of the conditional sentence in such an example as “when the specified time comes perform the prayers” is that the condition is a condition for “the obligation” and hence the prayers will not become mandatory except when the time has come, or it is a condition for “the mandatory act” and hence the mandatory act itself is suspended until coming of the time while the obligation is actual and absolute. If the first, the mandatory act will be a conditional one and none of the preliminaries would be mandatory before actualization of the condition; and if the second, the mandatory act will be an absolute one in which the obligation is actual before actualization of the condition, and hence if one knows that the condition will become actualized later on one should provide all preliminaries. This dispute needs a detailed consideration to be observed in the respective discussion.

Determinate (al-Ta‘yīnī) and Optional (al-Takhyīrī)

The determinate mandatory act is the one which is determinately wished and has no horizontal parallel in the position of obedience, such as prayers and fasting in Ramađān. To Add “horizontal” is necessary because there are some determinate mandatory acts that have some vertical parallels, such as ablution which has the vertical parallel, i.e., dry ablution (al-tayammum), since the latter is lawful only when the former is not possible.

The optional mandatory act is the one which is not determinately wished and has a horizontal parallel. In other words, what is wished is whether this one or another, in such a way that the duty-bound is free to choose each of them.

An example of this kind is the penance when one does not observe fasting in Ramađān deliberately, sine he must either fast sixty days, or feed sixty needy people, or free a slave.

Individual (al-‘Aynī) and Collective (al-Kifā’ī)

The individual mandatory act is the one which is obligatory for every dutybound and cannot be substituted by obedience on the part of others, such as the prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and so forth.

The collective mandatory act is the one in which what is desired is merely actualization of the act, no matter who has done it, such as burying a dead person, purifying the mosque, and the like. Hence, that affair is obligatory for all, but should it be done by some it is considered done and others will be exempted. However, if it is eschewed by all and left undone all will be punished, but in the case of being done by some only those who have participated will be rewarded.

Extended (al-Muwassa‘) and Constricted (al-Muđayyaq)

Considering the time, the mandatory act is divided into of specified time (al-muwaqqat) and of unspecified time (ghayr al-muwaqqat). The one of specified time, in turn, is divided into extended and constricted; and the one of unspecified time into urgent (fawrī) and non-urgent (ghayr fawrī).

The mandatory act of unspecified time is the one in which no specific time is considered juristically, though no act can be done without a time as its vessel, such as belated performing of the prayers, purification of the mosque, and the like. This kind, as was said, is in turn divided into the urgent which cannot be delayed from the first possible time, such as returning a greeting, and nonurgent which can be delayed, such as belated performing of the prayers, burial prayers, paying the fifth (al-khums) and so on.

The mandatory act of specified time is the one in which a specific time is considered juristically, such as the prayers, the pilgrimage, fasting, and the like.

The relation between this kind and its specified time can logically be conceived only in three ways: when its performing takes more time than its specified time, when both times are equal, and when the former is less than the latter.

The first is impossible, since it is charging with the impossible. The second is doubtlessly possible and has occurred in the Sharī‘a as well, and that is the one called constricted, such as fasting whose specified time precisely covers its time of performing. And the third is the one which is called extended, since the dutybound is free to perform it in the first, middle, or the last part of the time; such as daily prayers which cannot be left undone in the whole time but must be done once in its specified time.

Every Muslim knows that some mandatory acts of specified time, such as prayers, fasting, and the like, must be performed belatedly if they are not performed in their specified time. However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether such performing is principally a matter of must, in the sense that the very command to the mandatory act of specified time denotes that it must be belatedly performed if it is not performed in its specified time and hence obligation of belated performing is proved by the very proof of original performing, or it is not so and obligation of the belated performing needs a proof other than that of the original performing itself - the dispute being addressed by Uşūlīs as whether the belated performing follows the timely one or not (hal yatba‘ al-qađā’ al-adā’?).

There are three opinions in this connection: the belated performing absolutely following the timely, the former absolutely not following the latter, and distinguishing between the case where the proof of time appointing is mentioned in the proof of the mandatory act itself and the case where it is mentioned separately. According to the third opinion, in the first case the belated performing does not follow the timely one while in the second case it does.

It seems that the origin of the dispute is the disagreement among Uşūlīs whether what is understood from the time appointing is unity of the desired, or its multiplicity; i.e., whether there is one desired affair in the mandatory act of specified time and it is the act qualified by the time as it is qualified or there are two desired affairs, i.e., the act itself and its being done in a specific time.

If the first, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time there would remain no wish for the act itself and hence a new command to perform the act out of its time must be assumed; and if the second, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time only one desired affair is not obeyed, i.e., the one demanding its being in the specified time, while the wish for the act itself is still enduring - and that is why some have held the third opinion.

The justifiable opinion is the second one, i.e., the belated absolutely not following the timely; for the appearance of qualification is that the proviso is a pillar in the desired. Thus, if the Lord says, “Fast on Friday,” only one desired for one purpose is understood, and it is particularly fasting on that day; it is not understood that fasting per se is one desired and its being on Friday is another one. The case is the same with the separate proof of time appointing.

For instance, if the Lord says, “Fast,” and then He says, “Observe the fasting on Friday,” the absolute should be predicated upon the qualified - as is the rule in such cases. Predication of the absolute upon the qualified means confining the very first desired to the proviso; such qualification revealing that what was really meant by the absolute from the very beginning was just the qualified, and thereby both proofs become one due to taking both of them altogether.

It does not mean that the qualified is a desired affair other than the absolute, otherwise it would mean that the absolute has remained absolute; and this is not predication and taking two proofs altogether (djam‘ bayn al-dalīlayn), but rather keeping each of them separately (akhdh bi'l dalīlayn).

Religiously (al-Ta‘abbudī) and Instrumental (al-Tawaşşulī)

In the Islamic holy Sharī‘a, there are obligations that are not considered sound and their commands are not obeyed unless they are performed with the intention of proximity to God, such as the prayers, fasting, and the like.

Such obligations are called religiously obligations (al-ta‘abbudiyyāt). On the other hand, there are other obligations whose commands are obeyed merely by being performed without having any divine intention, such as saving a drowning person, burying a dead person, purifying cloths and body for the prayers, and the like. Such obligations are called instrumental obligations (al-tawaşşuliyyāt).

Varieties of Mandatory Acts and the Absoluteness of the Mode (al-Şīgha)

When a command is issued, if there is a contextual evidence determining which variety of command is intended, e.g., extended or constricted, determinate or optional, etc., it is obviously clear that one must definitely obey the command in the way it is specified. However, if there is no such evidence, where the command is absolute and lacks any contextual evidence, what should the duty-bound do?

Should he treat it as extended, or constricted; determinate, or optional, and so forth? Does absoluteness of the imperative necessitate that the command should be individual, or collective; determinate, or optional; extended, or constricted; suspended, or definite; and finally religiously, or instrumental?

The general criterion for such recognition is to find which variety is in need of more depiction; that is the one which must be dismissed, since it is the one which needs contextual evidence - something missing as was assumed. For instance, when the Lord commands, “Perform the prayers,” it can be considered collective only if He adds in His command “unless others should have done it.” This is an additional proviso which He has not added, while He could do so. Hence, from this lack of depiction we can logically conclude that He had not wished that proviso, and thereby we treat that command as being individual. Thus, absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be individual, determinate, extended, and definite; since these varieties are not in need of more depiction.

The case with the religiously and instrumental, however, is not that simple; it is somehow complicated if one specific meaning of intention of proximity to God is taken into consideration. It is clearly known that the intention of proximity to God can be actualized in some different ways. One is to intend that the commanded act is essentially liked and desired by the Lord. Another is to intend merely the Lord’s pleasure. Should such meanings of intention of proximity to God be meant, there would be no doubt that absoluteness of the imperative would necessitate that the command should be treated as instrumental if there were no contextual evidence, for what is in need of more depiction is the religiously mandatory act inasmuch as its command is supposed to include an additional proviso, i.e., being performed with the intention of proximity to God - something missing. In such case, the duty-bound can refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that proviso.

However, one kind of intention of proximity to God is that of “obeying the commandment.” Since it is impossible to consider this proviso in the commanded act, whose reason will be explained below, should this meaning of intention of proximity to God be considered one could not refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate this proviso and conclude that since the Lord has not uttered that proviso He has not considered it in His commandment.

For this non-utterance may have two reasons: He has not wished it, or He has wished it but He has not uttered it because of impossibility of that utterance. That is why one cannot conclude in such case that absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be instrumental. Rather, since consideration of that impossibility is probable in that non-utterance, the intellect judges that one must perform the act with that proviso in order to make sure that he has obeyed the Lord’s command as such; and should that act be done without that proviso, the intellect would judge that the dutybound has not performed his divinely duty as he was supposed to and deserves punishment in the hereafter. The principal rule in such cases is that when one definitely knows that the Lord has commanded something, since one is sure that such a command has been issued, one must obey the command in such a way that one could definitely be certain of observing the Lord’s command -

whatever the case may be in the actuality - and this necessitates observing all probable provisos.

In order to explain that impossibility, we should mention that there are two kinds of division with regard to the mandatory acts: primary, and secondary.

Primary Divisions. Such divisions are those which are considered in a mandatory act per se apart from consideration of attachment of anything to it. For instance, prayers can be divided in itself, without consideration that a command is directed to it, into “with ablution and without it,” “with sūra and without it,” and so forth. In such divisions, the mandatory act can be of one of the following three states with regard to any proviso:

1. If the mandatory act is conditional upon that thing, it is called “conditionedby-something” (bi-sharţ shay’); such as ablution, sūra, rukū‘, sadjda, and other conditions of the prayers.

2. If the mandatory act is conditional upon non-existence of that thing, it is called “negatively conditioned” (bi-sharţ lā); such as speaking, laughing, and other things which interrupt the prayers.

3. If the mandatory act is absolute with regard to that thing being conditional neither upon its existence nor its non-existence, it is called “unconditioned” (lā bi-sharţ); such as the prayers with regard to qunūt (special prayer in the second rak‘a before rukū‘), color of the clothes worn, and so on.

Now, if the proof declaring obligation of something denotes that it is conditional upon existence or non-existence of something else, it must doubtlessly be followed in the way it is declared. However, if a condition is probable but neither positively nor negatively is mentioned in the proof, one may refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that probable condition - if all “premises of wisdom” which allow one to refer to that principle are actualized, as will be explained in chapter 6 - and thereby discover that the speaker has really wished the absolute from the very beginning, which means that the mandatory act is not taken in relation to the proviso except in the unconditioned mode. In short, there is no problem with referring to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate probability of qualification in the primary divisions.

Secondary Divisions. From another view, mandatory act, if it is really commanded, is divided into what is externally done for the purpose of its command and what is done not for the purpose of its command, and the like. Such divisions are called secondary divisions as they are additional to the precept when a real obligation is assumed; for before actualization of a precept performing of the commanded for the purpose of its command is nonsensical, since it is assumed that it is not commanded in that state so that one can intend its command. Thus, in such divisions, qualification of the commanded act is impossible, for intending obedience of the command is subject to the existence of the command; how could it be plausible that the command is qualified by it, then? This necessitates that the command should be subject to intending the command while intending the command has been subject to the existence of the command, necessitating that the precedent should be subsequent and the subsequent be precedent - something impossible, since it is either selfcontradiction or vicious circle. Now, should qualification be impossible, absoluteness would be impossible too; since contrariety of qualification and absoluteness is that of possession and privation; hence, absoluteness cannot be assumed except in a case that can be qualified. Thus, where qualification is impossible, one cannot infer from non-qualification that the absolute is willed; and this results, with regard to the topic in question, that the absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the mandatory act should be treated as being religiously.

On the other hand, there is a way to conclude that even in the secondary divisions, in which qualification is impossible, absoluteness of the imperative principally necessitates that the mandatory act should be instrumental; and that is the “absoluteness of the position (iţlāq al-maqām).” Although mentioning the condition in the command itself is impossible in such divisions, should one who commands wish that condition, one is not supposed to be heedless to that and should follow another way to attain one’s purpose - even though by issuing two commands: one for the act itself without the proviso, and another for the proviso. These two commands are in fact one, for they are issued for one purpose and the second is a depiction for the first. Hence, should the second command not be obeyed, the first would not be considered obeyed if done without the proviso. Therefore, the second command joined to the first is common with the qualification in the result, even though it is terminologically not called qualification. Now, where the Lord commands something and He is in the position of depiction but He does not command for the second time that such command should be performed with the intention of obedience, it will be discovered that the intention of obedience has no role in His purpose; otherwise, He would have expounded it by another command. Therefore, the principle in mandatory acts is being instrumental except where it is proved by a proof that they are religiously.

Promptitude (al-Fawr) or Belatedness (al-Tarākhī)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness, both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for, as mentioned earlier, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, it could be performed either promptly or belatedly.

Once (al-Marra) or Repetition (al-Takrār)

There is another dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se denotes conventionally once or repetition, and the justifiable opinion is the same with the previous problem. For, as was said there, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and nothing else. Of course, obedience to the command necessitates bringing about at least one instance of the nature of the act, for not doing that is equivalent to disobedience.

However, the absoluteness of the mode necessitates that performing the mandatory act once is enough; for the Lord's desire can only be considered as one of the three following probabilities:

1. The desired is sheer existence of the thing without any proviso or condition, in the sense that He wishes that His desired should not remain non-existent but rather come out from darkness of nonexistence into the light of existence - even though through one single instance. In such case, the desired would necessarily be actualized and obeyed by the first existent and doing the mandatory act more would merely be a vain performance; its example being daily prayers.

2. The desired is one existence with the proviso of unity, i.e., it is conditional upon not being more than the first existence. In such case, should the duty-bound perform it twice, he has absolutely not obeyed the command; its example being the inaugural takbīr (saying “God is the greatest”) of daily prayers, since the second nullifies the first and becomes null itself.

3. The desired is the repeated existence; either conditional upon repetition, i.e., the desired being the whole as a whole and hence obedience not being actualized by doing the mandatory act once such as rak‘as of one prayers, or unconditioned with regard to its repetition, i.e., the desired being each of existences, such as fasting in days of Ramađān inasmuch as each day has its specific obedience.

Doubtless the two later facets are in need of more depiction. Thus, should the Lord, who is in the position of depiction, command in an absolute way and do not qualify His command to any of those two facets, it would be discovered that He has wished the first facet. Hence, the obedience, as was said earlier, would be actualized by the first existence and the second one would be considered neither disobedience nor obedience.

To Command Something Twice

If an act is commanded twice, this can be considered in two ways:

1. The second command is issued when the first one is already obeyed. In such case, it must doubtlessly be obeyed again.

2. The second command is issued when the first one has not been obeyed yet. In such case, one may doubt whether one must perform it twice or one performing would be enough. Should the second command be initiation (ta’sīs) of another obligation, it must be performed twice; but should it be an emphasis (ta’kīd) of the first, one performing would be enough. In order to find out the justifiable opinion, it should be noted that this assumption is of four states:

2.1. Both commands are unconditional, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the prayers” and again He says, “Perform the prayers”. Here, the second command should be predicated to the emphasis, for directing two commands to one thing without existence of any distinctiveness is impossible. Had the second been initiation and not emphasis, the speaker would have been supposed to qualify its object even though by such a statement as “for the next time.” Thus, from non-qualification on the one hand and the appearance that the object in both of them is one on the other, the command in the second becomes apparent in the emphasis -

although appearance of a speech per se is principally initiation and not emphasis.

2.2. Both commands are conditional upon one proviso, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform minor ablution for the new prayers if you have not performed it for the previous one” and then He repeats the same words. In this case, the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the same reason expounded in the previous state.

2.3. One command is conditional while the other is not, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution (al-ghusl),” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse.” The desired in this case is also one and the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the commanded act is apparently one and this prevents directing two commands to it - though here absoluteness of the absolute command, i.e., the unconditional, is predicated to the qualification through which the second qualifies absoluteness of the first and reveals what was intended by it.

2.4. One command is conditional upon one proviso and the other upon another, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse,” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have touched a dead body.” In this case, the second is apparently predicated to the initiation, for the appearance is that the desired in either of them is different from the other. It is very unlikely that the desired in both of them would be one.

There are two other probabilities here: emphasis (ta’kīd), and intervention (tadākhul). Emphasis is nonsense here. As for the intervention, in the sense that one could content oneself with doing the commanded act once, although it is possible, it contradicts primary principles; that is why one can refer to it only where there is a specific proof revealing that. (The problem of tadākhul would be discussed in chapter 4 in detail.)

Denotation of “Command to Command”

Should the Lord command one of His servants to command another servant to do something, would it be a command to that act so that it would be mandatory for the second to do it? The case can be conceived in two ways:

1. The first commanded person is considered as an agent to deliver the Lord’s command to the second one. Doubtless the act is mandatory for the second in this case, and all commands of prophets to duty-bounds are of this kind.

2. The second commanded person is not considered as an agent but rather he is commanded to direct the command to the second person independently for himself, such as the ĥadīth in which the holy Imām says, “Command your children to perform the prayers when they are seven years old.” It is this kind that is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. The case would be the same where it is not clear of which kind that command is.

The justifiable opinion is that the command to command is apparent in its obligation upon the second person. In order to explain this more, notice that the command to command not as an agent can be issued in two ways:

2.1. The Lord’s purpose is performing of the act by the second commanded person and His command to command is a way to the actualization of His purpose. It is obviously clear that in such case His command to command is a command to the act itself.

2.2. The purpose of one who commands is merely issuance of the command by the commanded person, e.g., where a king commands his son to command his servant to do something while his purpose is not actualization of the act but rather to accustom his son to issue commands.

It is clear that in such case the command is actually not directed to the second person and he would not be considered disobedient should he not perform the act.

Now, should there be a contextual evidence designating one of those two states, one would doubtlessly be supposed to consider it. However, if there is no such contextual evidence, appearance of commands is that they are ways for actualization of the act. Add to this that commands in the second way have no room in religiously commandments.

CHAPTER 3: THE PROHIBITIONS (AL-NAWĀHĪ)

By prohibition is meant wish of the superior from the inferior to eschew and not to do an act, whether by such terms as “I prohibit you” or by any other mode; or, to be more precise, the superior’s dissuading and forbidding the inferior from doing an act whose requisite being wish of eschewing and not doing that act.

The prohibition is like the command in denoting necessity and obligation intellectually and not conventionally, precisely as we said and proved in the previous chapter. The only difference is that the purpose in the command is obligation of doing while in the prohibition is that of eschewing. Therefore, the prohibition is apparent in the unlawfulness as the command was apparent in the obligation.

It should be noted that by “act” in the definition of prohibition is meant what is conveyed by the infinitive, even though it may not be an existential affair. Thus, “Do not leave the prayers” is a prohibition while “Eschew drinking wine” is a command - though they mean “Perform the prayers” and “Do not drink wine” respectively.

The Desired in the Prohibition

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs specifically in the discussion of the prohibition over this issue whether the desired in the prohibition is merely not to do (nafs an lā taf‘al) or continence (kaff al-nafs). The difference between the two is that the former is a sheer non-existential affair while the latter is an existential one inasmuch as continence is a psychic act.

The justifiable opinion is the first. What caused some to believe in the second is that they thought that “to eschew,” whose meaning is to keep nonexistence of the prohibited act as it is, is not possible for the duty-bound, since it is pre-eternal, out of reach of power, and cannot become an object of wish.

However, it is quite plausible that the continence, which is a psychic act, would become an object of wish in the prohibition. The answer to this illusion is that impossibility of non-existence in the pre-eternity does not contradict its possibility in the continuity, for the power for existence implicates the power for non-existence. One can even say that the power for non-existence is based on the nature of the power for existence; otherwise, should non-existence be impossible in the continuity the existence would not be possible at all, since the free, powerful agent is the one who performs the act if he wishes and does not perform the act if he does not wish.

However, the truth is that such discussion is basically nonsense, for, as was said earlier, “wish” is not the meaning of prohibition so that it may be discussed whether the desired is eschewal or continence. The wish for eschewing is an implication of the prohibition; the meaning of prohibition is forbidding and dissuading - yea, to forbid an act implicates logically the wish for its eschewing.

Thus, the prohibition is basically directed to the act itself and there is no room for doubting whether the wish in the prohibition is for eschewal or continence.

Denotation of the Prohibition as to Permanence (al-Dawām) and Repetition (al-Takrār)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - what is prohibited is the sheer nature of the act.

However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the command will be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.

CHAPTER 2:THE COMMANDS (AL-AWĀMIR)

By command is meant wish (in the sense that one wants something to be done: alţalab) which, in turn, means to express will (al-irāda) and desire through speech, writing, pointing, or the like; whether by such terms as “I command you” or by an imperative. Thus, the sheer will and desire without being expressed in some way is not called wish. However, any wish is not called command, but a specific one, that is, wish of superior from inferior. Hence, superiority is considered in the command, whether the superior demonstrates his superiority or not, and whether he uses an imperative (or uses the verb “command”) or not - the only point is that he should somehow express his wish. On the other hand, wish of the one who is not superior, whether he is inferior or coequal, is not a command, even though he pretends superiority or uses an imperative.

Appearance of the Command

The important point, however, is the denotation of the command, which is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. There are a variety of opinions in this connection the most important of which being obligation (al-wudjūb), preference (al-istiĥbāb), and the common point between obligation and preference. The truth, however, is that the command is apparent in the obligation - not conventionally, but because of judgment of the intellect. It is intellect’s judgment that when the Lord commands us we must obey Him and must be provoked in order to fulfill our duty as servants, unless He declares that His command is not a matter of must and we are free not to do it. Thus, this appearance is not a literal appearance and this denotation is not a lingual one, for the imperative is neither literally nor figuratively used in the concept of obligation, since obligation is something out of the reality of its object of denotation and also it is not among its qualities or states.

Concerning appearance of the command, however, there remain two secondary discussions:

1. Should a declarative sentence be used as configuration, it denotes obligation exactly as the imperative does, for the criterion, which is the intellect’s judgment to obey the Lord’s provoking, exists in both of them - no matter in what way that provoking is declared. An example of this is the case where the holy Imām was asked about occurrence of a problem in the prayers and he said, “He repeats his prayers.” One may even say that indication of obligation is definitely emphasized in this kind, for it is assumed that the duty-bound will surely do it.

2. When a command is preceded by an actual or an assumed prohibition, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether it is apparent in the obligation, permissibility, or merely permission, i.e., removal of prohibition without dealing with any of the five-fold burdensome precepts, or it returns to its previous precept before the prohibition.

The justifiable opinion is the third one, for we said earlier that indication of obligation by the command is because of intellect’s necessitation of being provoked where there is no permission to relinquish. Nonetheless, there is no provoking here; it is just permission to do and nothing more. For instance, when the Almighty God says, “…Do not profane God’s Way marks [when you are in pilgrim sanctity]… but when you have quit your pilgrim sanctity, then hunt,” (5:1-2) it clearly does not mean that hunting is mandatory, but rather permitted.

Of course, if there is contextual evidence that such a command is issued to provoke the duty-bound to perform something, or with the intention of allowing him to do it, it will definitely denote obligation and permissibility respectively, and cannot be a matter of dispute. Wherever there is a dispute, it is about a case where no contextual evidence exists.

Varieties of Mandatory Acts

Mandatory acts are of some varieties some of which being as follows:

Absolute (al-Muţlaq) and Conditional (al-Mashrūţ)

Should a mandatory act be compared with something external, it can only be of the two following kinds:

1. If its obligation is dependent upon that thing and that thing is considered in the obligation of the mandatory act as a condition, such as pilgrimage to Mecca (al-ĥadjdj) with regard to financial capability (al-istiţā‘a), it is called “conditional mandatory act,” since its obligation is conditional upon actualization of that external thing; and that is why the pilgrimage will not become mandatory unless financial capability is actualized.

2. If its obligation is not dependent upon actualization of that thing, such as the pilgrimage with regard to travelling to Mecca - even though its actualization is dependent upon the latter - it is called “absolute mandatory act,” since its obligation is unconditional upon that external thing.

The example of pilgrimage indicates that the absolute and conditional are relative, since one mandatory act is absolute with regard to one thing and conditional with regard to another.

It should also be known that all mandatory acts are conditional with regard to general conditions of burden, i.e., puberty, power, and intellect. Hence, the minor, impotent, and insane have no burden in the actuality.

Suspended (al-Mu‘allaq) and Definite (al-Munadjdjaz)

Doubtless when condition of the conditional mandatory act is realized its obligation becomes actual, like the absolute mandatory act, and the burden is actually directed to the duty-bound. However, actuality of the burden is conceivable in two ways:

1. If actuality of the obligation and the mandatory act is simultaneous, in the sense that the time of mandatory act is the very time of the obligation, the mandatory act is called “definite” (al-munadjdjaz); such as the prayers when its time comes, since its obligation is actual and the mandatory act, i.e., the prayers, is also actual.

2. If actuality of the obligation is prior to that of the mandatory act and therefore the time of mandatory act is later than that of obligation, it is called “suspended” (al-mu‘allaq), since the act and not its obligation is suspended until a time not realized yet. An example of this is the pilgrimage, since when the financial capability is actualized the obligation of the pilgrimage becomes actual - as it is said - while the mandatory act is suspended until coming of the time of the ritual. Here, when the financial capability is actualized the pilgrimage becomes mandatory, and that is why it is mandatory for the duty-bound to provide all preliminaries to become able to perform it in its specific, limited time.

In this connection, there are two disputes among Uşūlīs:

First, whether al-wādjib al-mu‘allaq is possible. Some believe in its possibility, while the majority of Uşūlīs hold that it is impossible - a discussion beyond the level of an introductory work.

Secondly, whether appearance of the conditional sentence in such an example as “when the specified time comes perform the prayers” is that the condition is a condition for “the obligation” and hence the prayers will not become mandatory except when the time has come, or it is a condition for “the mandatory act” and hence the mandatory act itself is suspended until coming of the time while the obligation is actual and absolute. If the first, the mandatory act will be a conditional one and none of the preliminaries would be mandatory before actualization of the condition; and if the second, the mandatory act will be an absolute one in which the obligation is actual before actualization of the condition, and hence if one knows that the condition will become actualized later on one should provide all preliminaries. This dispute needs a detailed consideration to be observed in the respective discussion.

Determinate (al-Ta‘yīnī) and Optional (al-Takhyīrī)

The determinate mandatory act is the one which is determinately wished and has no horizontal parallel in the position of obedience, such as prayers and fasting in Ramađān. To Add “horizontal” is necessary because there are some determinate mandatory acts that have some vertical parallels, such as ablution which has the vertical parallel, i.e., dry ablution (al-tayammum), since the latter is lawful only when the former is not possible.

The optional mandatory act is the one which is not determinately wished and has a horizontal parallel. In other words, what is wished is whether this one or another, in such a way that the duty-bound is free to choose each of them.

An example of this kind is the penance when one does not observe fasting in Ramađān deliberately, sine he must either fast sixty days, or feed sixty needy people, or free a slave.

Individual (al-‘Aynī) and Collective (al-Kifā’ī)

The individual mandatory act is the one which is obligatory for every dutybound and cannot be substituted by obedience on the part of others, such as the prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and so forth.

The collective mandatory act is the one in which what is desired is merely actualization of the act, no matter who has done it, such as burying a dead person, purifying the mosque, and the like. Hence, that affair is obligatory for all, but should it be done by some it is considered done and others will be exempted. However, if it is eschewed by all and left undone all will be punished, but in the case of being done by some only those who have participated will be rewarded.

Extended (al-Muwassa‘) and Constricted (al-Muđayyaq)

Considering the time, the mandatory act is divided into of specified time (al-muwaqqat) and of unspecified time (ghayr al-muwaqqat). The one of specified time, in turn, is divided into extended and constricted; and the one of unspecified time into urgent (fawrī) and non-urgent (ghayr fawrī).

The mandatory act of unspecified time is the one in which no specific time is considered juristically, though no act can be done without a time as its vessel, such as belated performing of the prayers, purification of the mosque, and the like. This kind, as was said, is in turn divided into the urgent which cannot be delayed from the first possible time, such as returning a greeting, and nonurgent which can be delayed, such as belated performing of the prayers, burial prayers, paying the fifth (al-khums) and so on.

The mandatory act of specified time is the one in which a specific time is considered juristically, such as the prayers, the pilgrimage, fasting, and the like.

The relation between this kind and its specified time can logically be conceived only in three ways: when its performing takes more time than its specified time, when both times are equal, and when the former is less than the latter.

The first is impossible, since it is charging with the impossible. The second is doubtlessly possible and has occurred in the Sharī‘a as well, and that is the one called constricted, such as fasting whose specified time precisely covers its time of performing. And the third is the one which is called extended, since the dutybound is free to perform it in the first, middle, or the last part of the time; such as daily prayers which cannot be left undone in the whole time but must be done once in its specified time.

Every Muslim knows that some mandatory acts of specified time, such as prayers, fasting, and the like, must be performed belatedly if they are not performed in their specified time. However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether such performing is principally a matter of must, in the sense that the very command to the mandatory act of specified time denotes that it must be belatedly performed if it is not performed in its specified time and hence obligation of belated performing is proved by the very proof of original performing, or it is not so and obligation of the belated performing needs a proof other than that of the original performing itself - the dispute being addressed by Uşūlīs as whether the belated performing follows the timely one or not (hal yatba‘ al-qađā’ al-adā’?).

There are three opinions in this connection: the belated performing absolutely following the timely, the former absolutely not following the latter, and distinguishing between the case where the proof of time appointing is mentioned in the proof of the mandatory act itself and the case where it is mentioned separately. According to the third opinion, in the first case the belated performing does not follow the timely one while in the second case it does.

It seems that the origin of the dispute is the disagreement among Uşūlīs whether what is understood from the time appointing is unity of the desired, or its multiplicity; i.e., whether there is one desired affair in the mandatory act of specified time and it is the act qualified by the time as it is qualified or there are two desired affairs, i.e., the act itself and its being done in a specific time.

If the first, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time there would remain no wish for the act itself and hence a new command to perform the act out of its time must be assumed; and if the second, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time only one desired affair is not obeyed, i.e., the one demanding its being in the specified time, while the wish for the act itself is still enduring - and that is why some have held the third opinion.

The justifiable opinion is the second one, i.e., the belated absolutely not following the timely; for the appearance of qualification is that the proviso is a pillar in the desired. Thus, if the Lord says, “Fast on Friday,” only one desired for one purpose is understood, and it is particularly fasting on that day; it is not understood that fasting per se is one desired and its being on Friday is another one. The case is the same with the separate proof of time appointing.

For instance, if the Lord says, “Fast,” and then He says, “Observe the fasting on Friday,” the absolute should be predicated upon the qualified - as is the rule in such cases. Predication of the absolute upon the qualified means confining the very first desired to the proviso; such qualification revealing that what was really meant by the absolute from the very beginning was just the qualified, and thereby both proofs become one due to taking both of them altogether.

It does not mean that the qualified is a desired affair other than the absolute, otherwise it would mean that the absolute has remained absolute; and this is not predication and taking two proofs altogether (djam‘ bayn al-dalīlayn), but rather keeping each of them separately (akhdh bi'l dalīlayn).

Religiously (al-Ta‘abbudī) and Instrumental (al-Tawaşşulī)

In the Islamic holy Sharī‘a, there are obligations that are not considered sound and their commands are not obeyed unless they are performed with the intention of proximity to God, such as the prayers, fasting, and the like.

Such obligations are called religiously obligations (al-ta‘abbudiyyāt). On the other hand, there are other obligations whose commands are obeyed merely by being performed without having any divine intention, such as saving a drowning person, burying a dead person, purifying cloths and body for the prayers, and the like. Such obligations are called instrumental obligations (al-tawaşşuliyyāt).

Varieties of Mandatory Acts and the Absoluteness of the Mode (al-Şīgha)

When a command is issued, if there is a contextual evidence determining which variety of command is intended, e.g., extended or constricted, determinate or optional, etc., it is obviously clear that one must definitely obey the command in the way it is specified. However, if there is no such evidence, where the command is absolute and lacks any contextual evidence, what should the duty-bound do?

Should he treat it as extended, or constricted; determinate, or optional, and so forth? Does absoluteness of the imperative necessitate that the command should be individual, or collective; determinate, or optional; extended, or constricted; suspended, or definite; and finally religiously, or instrumental?

The general criterion for such recognition is to find which variety is in need of more depiction; that is the one which must be dismissed, since it is the one which needs contextual evidence - something missing as was assumed. For instance, when the Lord commands, “Perform the prayers,” it can be considered collective only if He adds in His command “unless others should have done it.” This is an additional proviso which He has not added, while He could do so. Hence, from this lack of depiction we can logically conclude that He had not wished that proviso, and thereby we treat that command as being individual. Thus, absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be individual, determinate, extended, and definite; since these varieties are not in need of more depiction.

The case with the religiously and instrumental, however, is not that simple; it is somehow complicated if one specific meaning of intention of proximity to God is taken into consideration. It is clearly known that the intention of proximity to God can be actualized in some different ways. One is to intend that the commanded act is essentially liked and desired by the Lord. Another is to intend merely the Lord’s pleasure. Should such meanings of intention of proximity to God be meant, there would be no doubt that absoluteness of the imperative would necessitate that the command should be treated as instrumental if there were no contextual evidence, for what is in need of more depiction is the religiously mandatory act inasmuch as its command is supposed to include an additional proviso, i.e., being performed with the intention of proximity to God - something missing. In such case, the duty-bound can refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that proviso.

However, one kind of intention of proximity to God is that of “obeying the commandment.” Since it is impossible to consider this proviso in the commanded act, whose reason will be explained below, should this meaning of intention of proximity to God be considered one could not refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate this proviso and conclude that since the Lord has not uttered that proviso He has not considered it in His commandment.

For this non-utterance may have two reasons: He has not wished it, or He has wished it but He has not uttered it because of impossibility of that utterance. That is why one cannot conclude in such case that absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be instrumental. Rather, since consideration of that impossibility is probable in that non-utterance, the intellect judges that one must perform the act with that proviso in order to make sure that he has obeyed the Lord’s command as such; and should that act be done without that proviso, the intellect would judge that the dutybound has not performed his divinely duty as he was supposed to and deserves punishment in the hereafter. The principal rule in such cases is that when one definitely knows that the Lord has commanded something, since one is sure that such a command has been issued, one must obey the command in such a way that one could definitely be certain of observing the Lord’s command -

whatever the case may be in the actuality - and this necessitates observing all probable provisos.

In order to explain that impossibility, we should mention that there are two kinds of division with regard to the mandatory acts: primary, and secondary.

Primary Divisions. Such divisions are those which are considered in a mandatory act per se apart from consideration of attachment of anything to it. For instance, prayers can be divided in itself, without consideration that a command is directed to it, into “with ablution and without it,” “with sūra and without it,” and so forth. In such divisions, the mandatory act can be of one of the following three states with regard to any proviso:

1. If the mandatory act is conditional upon that thing, it is called “conditionedby-something” (bi-sharţ shay’); such as ablution, sūra, rukū‘, sadjda, and other conditions of the prayers.

2. If the mandatory act is conditional upon non-existence of that thing, it is called “negatively conditioned” (bi-sharţ lā); such as speaking, laughing, and other things which interrupt the prayers.

3. If the mandatory act is absolute with regard to that thing being conditional neither upon its existence nor its non-existence, it is called “unconditioned” (lā bi-sharţ); such as the prayers with regard to qunūt (special prayer in the second rak‘a before rukū‘), color of the clothes worn, and so on.

Now, if the proof declaring obligation of something denotes that it is conditional upon existence or non-existence of something else, it must doubtlessly be followed in the way it is declared. However, if a condition is probable but neither positively nor negatively is mentioned in the proof, one may refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that probable condition - if all “premises of wisdom” which allow one to refer to that principle are actualized, as will be explained in chapter 6 - and thereby discover that the speaker has really wished the absolute from the very beginning, which means that the mandatory act is not taken in relation to the proviso except in the unconditioned mode. In short, there is no problem with referring to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate probability of qualification in the primary divisions.

Secondary Divisions. From another view, mandatory act, if it is really commanded, is divided into what is externally done for the purpose of its command and what is done not for the purpose of its command, and the like. Such divisions are called secondary divisions as they are additional to the precept when a real obligation is assumed; for before actualization of a precept performing of the commanded for the purpose of its command is nonsensical, since it is assumed that it is not commanded in that state so that one can intend its command. Thus, in such divisions, qualification of the commanded act is impossible, for intending obedience of the command is subject to the existence of the command; how could it be plausible that the command is qualified by it, then? This necessitates that the command should be subject to intending the command while intending the command has been subject to the existence of the command, necessitating that the precedent should be subsequent and the subsequent be precedent - something impossible, since it is either selfcontradiction or vicious circle. Now, should qualification be impossible, absoluteness would be impossible too; since contrariety of qualification and absoluteness is that of possession and privation; hence, absoluteness cannot be assumed except in a case that can be qualified. Thus, where qualification is impossible, one cannot infer from non-qualification that the absolute is willed; and this results, with regard to the topic in question, that the absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the mandatory act should be treated as being religiously.

On the other hand, there is a way to conclude that even in the secondary divisions, in which qualification is impossible, absoluteness of the imperative principally necessitates that the mandatory act should be instrumental; and that is the “absoluteness of the position (iţlāq al-maqām).” Although mentioning the condition in the command itself is impossible in such divisions, should one who commands wish that condition, one is not supposed to be heedless to that and should follow another way to attain one’s purpose - even though by issuing two commands: one for the act itself without the proviso, and another for the proviso. These two commands are in fact one, for they are issued for one purpose and the second is a depiction for the first. Hence, should the second command not be obeyed, the first would not be considered obeyed if done without the proviso. Therefore, the second command joined to the first is common with the qualification in the result, even though it is terminologically not called qualification. Now, where the Lord commands something and He is in the position of depiction but He does not command for the second time that such command should be performed with the intention of obedience, it will be discovered that the intention of obedience has no role in His purpose; otherwise, He would have expounded it by another command. Therefore, the principle in mandatory acts is being instrumental except where it is proved by a proof that they are religiously.

Promptitude (al-Fawr) or Belatedness (al-Tarākhī)

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness, both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.

The justifiable is the last opinion; for, as mentioned earlier, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, it could be performed either promptly or belatedly.

Once (al-Marra) or Repetition (al-Takrār)

There is another dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se denotes conventionally once or repetition, and the justifiable opinion is the same with the previous problem. For, as was said there, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and nothing else. Of course, obedience to the command necessitates bringing about at least one instance of the nature of the act, for not doing that is equivalent to disobedience.

However, the absoluteness of the mode necessitates that performing the mandatory act once is enough; for the Lord's desire can only be considered as one of the three following probabilities:

1. The desired is sheer existence of the thing without any proviso or condition, in the sense that He wishes that His desired should not remain non-existent but rather come out from darkness of nonexistence into the light of existence - even though through one single instance. In such case, the desired would necessarily be actualized and obeyed by the first existent and doing the mandatory act more would merely be a vain performance; its example being daily prayers.

2. The desired is one existence with the proviso of unity, i.e., it is conditional upon not being more than the first existence. In such case, should the duty-bound perform it twice, he has absolutely not obeyed the command; its example being the inaugural takbīr (saying “God is the greatest”) of daily prayers, since the second nullifies the first and becomes null itself.

3. The desired is the repeated existence; either conditional upon repetition, i.e., the desired being the whole as a whole and hence obedience not being actualized by doing the mandatory act once such as rak‘as of one prayers, or unconditioned with regard to its repetition, i.e., the desired being each of existences, such as fasting in days of Ramađān inasmuch as each day has its specific obedience.

Doubtless the two later facets are in need of more depiction. Thus, should the Lord, who is in the position of depiction, command in an absolute way and do not qualify His command to any of those two facets, it would be discovered that He has wished the first facet. Hence, the obedience, as was said earlier, would be actualized by the first existence and the second one would be considered neither disobedience nor obedience.

To Command Something Twice

If an act is commanded twice, this can be considered in two ways:

1. The second command is issued when the first one is already obeyed. In such case, it must doubtlessly be obeyed again.

2. The second command is issued when the first one has not been obeyed yet. In such case, one may doubt whether one must perform it twice or one performing would be enough. Should the second command be initiation (ta’sīs) of another obligation, it must be performed twice; but should it be an emphasis (ta’kīd) of the first, one performing would be enough. In order to find out the justifiable opinion, it should be noted that this assumption is of four states:

2.1. Both commands are unconditional, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the prayers” and again He says, “Perform the prayers”. Here, the second command should be predicated to the emphasis, for directing two commands to one thing without existence of any distinctiveness is impossible. Had the second been initiation and not emphasis, the speaker would have been supposed to qualify its object even though by such a statement as “for the next time.” Thus, from non-qualification on the one hand and the appearance that the object in both of them is one on the other, the command in the second becomes apparent in the emphasis -

although appearance of a speech per se is principally initiation and not emphasis.

2.2. Both commands are conditional upon one proviso, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform minor ablution for the new prayers if you have not performed it for the previous one” and then He repeats the same words. In this case, the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the same reason expounded in the previous state.

2.3. One command is conditional while the other is not, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution (al-ghusl),” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse.” The desired in this case is also one and the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the commanded act is apparently one and this prevents directing two commands to it - though here absoluteness of the absolute command, i.e., the unconditional, is predicated to the qualification through which the second qualifies absoluteness of the first and reveals what was intended by it.

2.4. One command is conditional upon one proviso and the other upon another, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse,” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have touched a dead body.” In this case, the second is apparently predicated to the initiation, for the appearance is that the desired in either of them is different from the other. It is very unlikely that the desired in both of them would be one.

There are two other probabilities here: emphasis (ta’kīd), and intervention (tadākhul). Emphasis is nonsense here. As for the intervention, in the sense that one could content oneself with doing the commanded act once, although it is possible, it contradicts primary principles; that is why one can refer to it only where there is a specific proof revealing that. (The problem of tadākhul would be discussed in chapter 4 in detail.)

Denotation of “Command to Command”

Should the Lord command one of His servants to command another servant to do something, would it be a command to that act so that it would be mandatory for the second to do it? The case can be conceived in two ways:

1. The first commanded person is considered as an agent to deliver the Lord’s command to the second one. Doubtless the act is mandatory for the second in this case, and all commands of prophets to duty-bounds are of this kind.

2. The second commanded person is not considered as an agent but rather he is commanded to direct the command to the second person independently for himself, such as the ĥadīth in which the holy Imām says, “Command your children to perform the prayers when they are seven years old.” It is this kind that is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. The case would be the same where it is not clear of which kind that command is.

The justifiable opinion is that the command to command is apparent in its obligation upon the second person. In order to explain this more, notice that the command to command not as an agent can be issued in two ways:

2.1. The Lord’s purpose is performing of the act by the second commanded person and His command to command is a way to the actualization of His purpose. It is obviously clear that in such case His command to command is a command to the act itself.

2.2. The purpose of one who commands is merely issuance of the command by the commanded person, e.g., where a king commands his son to command his servant to do something while his purpose is not actualization of the act but rather to accustom his son to issue commands.

It is clear that in such case the command is actually not directed to the second person and he would not be considered disobedient should he not perform the act.

Now, should there be a contextual evidence designating one of those two states, one would doubtlessly be supposed to consider it. However, if there is no such contextual evidence, appearance of commands is that they are ways for actualization of the act. Add to this that commands in the second way have no room in religiously commandments.

CHAPTER 3: THE PROHIBITIONS (AL-NAWĀHĪ)

By prohibition is meant wish of the superior from the inferior to eschew and not to do an act, whether by such terms as “I prohibit you” or by any other mode; or, to be more precise, the superior’s dissuading and forbidding the inferior from doing an act whose requisite being wish of eschewing and not doing that act.

The prohibition is like the command in denoting necessity and obligation intellectually and not conventionally, precisely as we said and proved in the previous chapter. The only difference is that the purpose in the command is obligation of doing while in the prohibition is that of eschewing. Therefore, the prohibition is apparent in the unlawfulness as the command was apparent in the obligation.

It should be noted that by “act” in the definition of prohibition is meant what is conveyed by the infinitive, even though it may not be an existential affair. Thus, “Do not leave the prayers” is a prohibition while “Eschew drinking wine” is a command - though they mean “Perform the prayers” and “Do not drink wine” respectively.

The Desired in the Prohibition

There is a dispute among Uşūlīs specifically in the discussion of the prohibition over this issue whether the desired in the prohibition is merely not to do (nafs an lā taf‘al) or continence (kaff al-nafs). The difference between the two is that the former is a sheer non-existential affair while the latter is an existential one inasmuch as continence is a psychic act.

The justifiable opinion is the first. What caused some to believe in the second is that they thought that “to eschew,” whose meaning is to keep nonexistence of the prohibited act as it is, is not possible for the duty-bound, since it is pre-eternal, out of reach of power, and cannot become an object of wish.

However, it is quite plausible that the continence, which is a psychic act, would become an object of wish in the prohibition. The answer to this illusion is that impossibility of non-existence in the pre-eternity does not contradict its possibility in the continuity, for the power for existence implicates the power for non-existence. One can even say that the power for non-existence is based on the nature of the power for existence; otherwise, should non-existence be impossible in the continuity the existence would not be possible at all, since the free, powerful agent is the one who performs the act if he wishes and does not perform the act if he does not wish.

However, the truth is that such discussion is basically nonsense, for, as was said earlier, “wish” is not the meaning of prohibition so that it may be discussed whether the desired is eschewal or continence. The wish for eschewing is an implication of the prohibition; the meaning of prohibition is forbidding and dissuading - yea, to forbid an act implicates logically the wish for its eschewing.

Thus, the prohibition is basically directed to the act itself and there is no room for doubting whether the wish in the prohibition is for eschewal or continence.

Denotation of the Prohibition as to Permanence (al-Dawām) and Repetition (al-Takrār)

Like the dispute over the command, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether prohibition indicates once or repetition by the prohibition. The justifiable opinion is the same with the case of command; hence, the prohibition denotes neither repetition nor once - what is prohibited is the sheer nature of the act.

However, there is a rational difference between those two in the position of obedience, for the prohibition is obeyed by eschewing the actualization of the nature of the act and that would be realized only when all instances of the act are left, since if the duty-bound do the act even once he will not be considered an obedient servant. On the other hand, obedience to the command will be actualized by bringing about the first existence of instances of the nature of the act; the nature of obedience is not dependent upon more than doing the commanded act once. That difference is not due to the convention and denotation of those two, but rather is the rational necessity of the nature of prohibition and command.


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