An Enlightening Commentary Into the Light of the Holy Qur'an Volume 12

An Enlightening Commentary Into the Light of the Holy Qur'an18%

An Enlightening Commentary Into the Light of the Holy Qur'an Author:
Translator: Sayyid Abbas Sadr-'ameli
Publisher: Imam Ali Foundation
Category: Quran Interpretation
ISBN: 9645691028

Volume 1 Volume 2 Volume 3 Volume 4 Volume 5 Volume 6 Volume 7 Volume 8 Volume 9 Volume 10 Volume 11 Volume 12 Volume 13 Volume 14 Volume 15 Volume 16 Volume 17 Volume 18 Volume 19 Volume 20
  • Start
  • Previous
  • 23 /
  • Next
  • End
  •  
  • Download HTML
  • Download Word
  • Download PDF
  • visits: 22253 / Download: 3958
Size Size Size
An Enlightening Commentary Into the Light of the Holy Qur'an

An Enlightening Commentary Into the Light of the Holy Qur'an Volume 12

Author:
Publisher: Imam Ali Foundation
ISBN: 9645691028
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


Notes:

The 20 Volumes of this book have been corrected and uploaded as you can go directly to any other volumes by just clicking on the volume numbers located on the left side.


1

Section 5: The Guidance Man Gets From the Working of Nature

Surah al-Furqan - Verses 45-46

أَلَمْ تَرَ إِلَى رَبِّكَ كَيْفَ مَدَّ الظِّلَّ وَلَوْ شَاء لَجَعَلَهُ سَاكِنًا ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَا الشَّمْسَ عَلَيْهِ دَلِيلًا

ثُمَّ قَبَضْنَاهُ إِلَيْنَا قَبْضًا يَسِيرًا

45. “Have you not seen (the might of) your Lord, how He extends the shadow? And if He had pleased He would certainly have made it stationary, then We have made the sun an indication of it;”

46. “Then We draw it in towards Ourselves, by an easy (gradual) contraction.”

The best way of knowing Allah for all is to ponder the phenomena of existence, which are created according to divine wisdom. The rotation of the earth around itself and around the sun is not accidental. It is wisely and prudently.

Imam Baqir (as) said:

“The purpose of the extension of shadow in the verse is the shade that is between the dawn and rising of sun.”1

Although some count the shade as the shade of night or afternoon, but with regard to the next sentence which says:

“...then We have made the sun an indication of it”,

what Imam says is accepted.

Anyway, these two noble verses mention some of the main parts of divine blessings as the secrets of monotheism and knowledge of Allah. Deliberating on these affairs helps us to be more familiar with our Creator.

It first says:

“Have you not seen (the might of) your Lord, how He extends the shadow? And if He had pleased He would certainly have made it stationary...”

Certainly, this part of the verse refers to the importance of the blessing of vast and moving shades. These shades do not stay still but they move.

Commentators have various opinions about the purpose of the shade or which shade is meant by the verse:

Some say that this spread and vast shade is that one which covers the earth between the dawn and the rising of the sun which is the most pleasant shade and hours of the day. This pale shading light begins from the dawn and at the rising of the sun, sun’s brightness replaces it.

Some have said that its purpose is all shade of night that begins from evening and ends with the rising of the sun, for we know that night is in fact the shade of the hemisphere of the earth that is in front of the sun. This shade is conical that expands in space in opposite side. That conical shade always moves. It ends in an area with the rising of the sun and it begins in another area.

Some others have also said that it is the shade of objects that forms in afternoon and it gradually expands.

Of course, if there were not the next sentences, we would understand an extensive meaning from this sentence that includes all shades, but other indications that have come later show that the first commentary is more proper, for the verse continues:

“...then We have made the sun an indication of it;”

This refers to the fact that if there was not the sun, the concept of shade would not be clear. Basically, shade is formed by rays of the sun, for shade is usually partial darkness that happens for objects. It happens when light is cast on an impassible object and in front of it a shade will be formed.

Therefore, we must not only know shade by light according to the law ‘know objects by their opposites’, but also the existence of shade is caused by light.

In the next verse, Allah says:

“Then We draw it in towards Ourselves...”

We know that when sun rises, shades are gradually taken away until noontime that there will be no shade in some areas for the sun is above every creature, and in other areas it will be in its minimum size.

Therefore, shades neither appear instantly nor are taken away instantly. This is one of the wisdoms of Allah, for if this changing of light and darkness happened immediately, it would surely be harmful for all creatures. This gradual system of changing is in a way that it has the most benefits for all creatures without having any harm.

The Arabic word /yasira/ (gradual) refers to the gradual withdrawal of shades, or it refers to this matter that special system of light and darkness is a simple and easy thing comparing with the might of Allah.

The Qur’anic word /’ilayna/ also emphasizes this divine might.

The holy verse continues saying:

“...by an easy (gradual) contraction.”

Anyway, there is no doubt that as man needs light in his life, he needs shade for modification and prevention of intense light. Continual light makes life deranged, as stable and permanent shade is fatal.

In the first case, all creatures would be burnt and in the second case all creatures would be frozen. This alternative system of light and shade makes life pleasant and possible for man.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 47

وَهُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمُ اللَّيْلَ لِبَاسًا وَالنَّوْمَ سُبَاتًا وَجَعَلَ النَّهَارَ نُشُورًا

47. “And He it is Who appointed the night for you to be a covering, and sleep as a rest, and He appointed the day a rising.”

Alternation of day and night, calmness in the night and working in the day are the signs of Allah’s lordship. Therefore, after mentioning the blessing of shades, the holy Qur’an brings up two other blessings that are very appropriate with it. In this way, a little of the secrets of the universe, which indicates the existence of the Essence of Allah, is mentioned.

It says:

“And He it is Who appointed the night for you to be a covering...”

What a beautiful and interesting sentence ‘appointed the night for you to be a covering’! This dark curtain covers not only men but also all creatures of the earth. Like garment it protects them. It wraps man like a cover that he uses at the time of sleep for creating darkness and rest.

Then, it refers to the blessing of sleep when it continues saying:

“...and sleep as a rest...”

The Arabic word /subat/ is derived from the word /sabt/ that means ‘to terminate’. Then it was used to mean to stop working for taking rest. That Saturday is called in Arabic language /yaum-us-sabt/ is because its appellation is taken from schedule of the Jews who set Saturday their holiday.

In fact, this word refers to the termination of all physical activities at the time of sleep, for we know that at the time of sleep most of the activities of body are terminated, and some other parts, such as heart and lung, lessen their usual work and continue more slowly so that tiredness will be removed and power will be back.

Well-timed and measured sleep revives all powers of body and it brings happiness and might. It is the best means for calming the nerves. On the contrary, termination of sleep for a long time is very harmful and even fatal. Therefore, one of the main tortures that torturers use is to terminate the sleep program and so to break man’s resistance very soon.

In the end of the verse, the blessing of day is mentioned.

It says:

“...and He appointed the day a rising.”

The Qur’anic word /nušūr/ is derived from the word /našr/ that means: ‘to spread’, which is the opposite of folding. This may refer to spreading of soul throughout the body when man awakes. It is like reviving after death. It may refer to men’s participation in social activities and movement for various works of life on the earth.

It is narrated that the Prophet (S) used to state this sentence every morning:

“Praise belongs to Allah Who brings us to life after death and (finally) we will return to Him.”2

Verily, the brightness of day causes movement in man bodily and spiritually, as darkness brings sleep and calmness.

In nature, the first ray of the sun brings great movement and ferment in all creatures. A resurrection happens among them and each of them follows its own program. Even plants grow when light is cast on them. When the sun sets and night comes, reveille is warbled throughout the entire universe: birds return to their nests and living creatures sleep and take rest.

Even plants go to some kind of sleep.

In the end, in the holy Qur’an, there are several things that are mentioned as garment:

Night:

“...appointed the night for you to be a covering... ”3

Spouse:

“...They are a garment for you and you are a garment for them... ”4

Piety:

“...and the raiment of piety, that is the best... ”5

Surah al-Furqan - Verses 48-49

وَهُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ الرِّيَاحَ بُشْرًا بَيْنَ يَدَيْ رَحْمَتِهِ وَأَنزَلْنَا مِنَ السَّمَاء مَاء طَهُورًا

لِنُحْيِيَ بِهِ بَلْدَةً مَّيْتًا وَنُسْقِيَهُ مِمَّا خَلَقْنَا أَنْعَامًا وَأَنَاسِيَّ كَثِيرًا

48. “And He it is Who sends the winds as heralds of glad tidings going before His Mercy (rain), and We send down pure water from the sky.”

49. “That thereby We may give life to a dead land, and We give many beasts and men that We have created to drink thereof.”

After mentioning these great blessings in the pervious holy verses, which are as the main principles of man’s life, now another important blessing is mentioned.

It says:

“And He it is Who sends the winds as heralds of glad tidings going before His Mercy (rain), and We send down pure water from the sky.”

The function of winds as herald of descending of divine blessing is not concealed to anyone, for if they did not exist, a drop of rain would never fall on dry land. It is true that the shining of the sun evaporates water of the seas and the condensing of vapors in cold layer of atmosphere forms rain clouds.

But if winds do not move these rain clouds from oceans to dry lands, once more clouds change into rain and falls on the seas.

In short, these heralds of blessing that move continually throughout the earth quench the thirst of dry lands, brings the enlivening rain, forms streams, springs, wells, and grows various kinds of plant.

Always some of these winds, that move in font of clouds and are mixed with mild moisture, create a pleasant breeze which emits the smell of rain. They are like givers of glad tidings that announce the coming of a dear traveler.

Using the Qur’anic word /riyah/ (winds) may refer to the various kinds of wind: some of them flow from the north, some flow from the south, some flow from east to west, and some flow from west to east. Consequently they spread clouds in all areas of the earth.

It is worth-considering that here the adjective ‘pure’ is attributed to ‘water’. This is overstatement, therefore, its meaning is being pure and to purify. It means that water is both essentially clean and can purify defiled things. In addition to water, there are many objects that are clean, but they can never purify a defile object.

Anyway, besides being enlivener, water can purify. If there were not water, all of our life, body and soul would be defiled and dirty. Though water cannot kill microbes, it can dissolve and wash microbes. In this way, it is an effective help to man’s health and it fights against many diseases.

Moreover, we know that for purification of soul we also perform ritual bathing and ablution. So this enlivening liquid purifies both soul and body.

However, this purifying characteristic of water is in the second rank, though it is important.

Therefore, in this noble verse, Allah adds:

“That thereby We may give life to a dead land, and We give many beasts and men that We have created to drink thereof.”

Some Points

1. In this verse, ‘many beasts and men’ are mentioned, though all of animals and men use rainwater.

This is because it wants to refer to those who dwell in desert and nomads who do not have permanent water and use rainwater directly. They perceive this important blessing more than other people do.

When a piece of cloud appears in the sky and the rain falls, pits will be filled with clean water. Then their animals drink water from them and they themselves also use that water. They will perceive life and movement in themselves and their domestic animals.

2. The Arabic word /nusqih/ is derived from the word /’isqa’/. As Raqib, in Mufradat, and other commentators say, its difference from the word /saqiya/ is in that /’isqa’/ means to prepare water and to let man to drink it whenever he likes, while the word /saqiya/ means to give someone a container of water for drinking. In other words, the word /’isqa’/ has got more extensive meaning.

3. In this verse ‘dead land’ is mentioned first and then beasts and after that men are brought up. This is because when dead lands are not enlivened by rain, beasts do not have food and when beasts are not fed, men cannot use them as food.

4. Mentioning enlivenment of water after the issue of purification may refer to their close relationship.6

5. The Qur’anic word /tahūr/ is applied to something that is both very pure and purifier.

6. The Arabic word /bilad/ means land, whether it is city or village or farm, for the verse of Surah Al-’A‘raf, No. 7, verse 58 says:

“And the good land, its vegetation comes forth (in abundance) by the leave of its Lord...”

It is clear that the growth of plant is not limited to city.

7. The Arabic word /’anasi/ is the plural form of the word /’insi/ which means man.

8. Since the meaning of the Arabic word ‘Balad’ is the same as the word ‘Baldah, instead of the word ‘Maytatan’, the word ‘Maytan’ is used to describe it.7

9. In using water, agriculture ranks first, then there is the rank of animals, and then men are the last. Therefore, in the verse, first agriculture and revivification of land, then animals and finally men are mentioned.

10. Winds have got many benefits such as fining of weather, transferring of clouds, lessening of heat, and fecundation of plants.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 50

وَلَقَدْ صَرَّفْنَاهُ بَيْنَهُمْ لِيَذَّكَّرُوا فَأَبَى أَكْثَرُ النَّاسِ إِلاَ كُفُورًا

50. “And indeed We have distributed it amongst them so that they may remember (Allah), but most of mankind are averse (to aught) save ingratitude.”

Remembrance of Divine blessings is to express gratitude for them and negligence of them is to express ingratitude and rejection for them.

In this noble verse, Allah refers to the holy Qur’an and says:

“And indeed We have distributed it amongst them so that they may remember (Allah), but most of mankind are averse (to aught) save ingratitude.”

Although many of commentators such as the deceased Tabarsi and Shiykh Tūsi in Tibyan, and ’Allamah Tabataba’i in Al-Mizan have said that the pronoun of the word ‘Sarrafnah’ refers to rain, that in this case its concept is that Allah sends drops of rain in various directions and places and divides them among people for the sake of remembrance of this great blessing of Allah, but it is right to say that this pronoun refers to the Qur’an and its verses, for this kind of structure (past tense and present continuous tense) is used 10 times in the holy Qur’an and 9 of them explicitly refer to the verses of the Qur’an.

And in many cases the Qur’anic phrase /liyazzakkarū/ (that they may remember) is placed before them and so it seems impossible that only in this holy verse this phrase has got a different meaning.

Basically the Arabic word /tasrif/, which means to change and transform, is not very consistent with sending down rainwater, while it is more consistent with the verses of the Qur’an which are presented in various forms, sometimes in the form of promise, sometimes in the form of threat of punishment, sometimes in the form of prohibition, sometimes in the form of enjoinment order, and sometimes in the form of the life story of ancient people.

Surah al-Furqan - Verses 51-52

وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَبَعَثْنَا فِي كُلِّ قَرْيَةٍ نَذِيرًا

فَلاَ تُطِعِ الْكَافِرِينَ وَجَاهِدْهُم بِهِ جِهَادًا كَبِيرًا

51. “And if We had pleased certainly We would have raised up a warner in every town.”

52. “So do not follow the infidels, and strive against them with it (the Qur’an) a strenuous strife.”

This verse somehow speaks about the Prophet (S) as the seal of prophets and about the comprehensiveness of his religion, for it implies that no prophet was appointed anywhere with him, since he can control the entire society and no body else is needed. He has such a rank and state that prophethood is closed with his existence.

It is also possible that some polytheists used this pretext along with other ones that it was better that Allah appointed a prophet in every village and city.

But, in answer to them, the Qur’an says:

“And if We had pleased certainly We would have raised up a warner in every town.”

Anyway, this verse is a reason for magnificence of the Prophet’s rank and it shows also the necessity of unity of leadership and heaviness of his duty.

For this reason, in the next holy verse, two important commandments that are the main programs of prophets are stated.

So, addressing the Prophet (S), it says:

“So do not follow the infidels...”

Do not conciliate with the deviated persons in any step you take, for conciliation with them is the malady of the call to Allah. Stand fast against them and try to reform them, but be careful not to yield to their low desires and superstitions.

The second commandment is as follows:

“...and strive against them with it (the Qur’an) a strenuous strife.”

That is, his strife must be like magnificence of his mission and the magnificence of all former prophets’ endeavour, an endeavour that includes all dimensions of people’s soul and intellect, and it includes all spiritual and materialistic aspects.

Undoubtedly the purpose of Jihad (strife), here, is only intellectual, cultural, and propagation endeavour. Its purpose is not Holy war with weapon, for this Surah is a Meccan Surah and we know that the command of armed war was not issued in Mecca.

As the deceased Tabarsi says in Majma‘ul-Bayan, this verse is a clear reason for this fact that the intellectual effort and the struggle of propagation against temptations of the deviated people and the enemies of the Truth is of the greatest Jihad (strife).

Even it is possible that the famous tradition of the Prophet (S) refers to this Jihad and the magnificence of the learned and scientists’ job in propagation of religion, when he (S) says:

“We returned from small Jihad to the greater Jihad.”

This shows the greatness of the rank of the Qur’an, too, for it is a means for the greater warfare and it is an effective weapon whose power of explanation and argumentation, deep effect and attraction is beyond men's imagination and power.

It is an effective means that is as shining as the sun, as brightening as the day, as canning as curtains of night, as motion-imparting as winds, as great as clouds, and as enlivening as drops of rain, the qualities of which were referred to in the previous verses.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 53

وَهُوَ الَّذِي مَرَجَ الْبَحْرَيْنِ هَذَا عَذْبٌ فُرَاتٌ وَهَذَا مِلْحٌ أُجَاجٌ وَجَعَلَ بَيْنَهُمَا بَرْزَخًا وَحِجْرًا مَّحْجُورًا

53. “And He it is Who had made the two seas join and flow together, one palatable and sweet, and the other salt and bitter; and between the two He has made a barrier and inviolable obstruction.”

Again this noble verse argues on Allah’s magnificence by mentioning His blessings in the system of creation. Consisting with mentioning descending of enlivening drops of rain in the previous verses, it refers to not mixing of sweet waters and salty ones, and says:

“And He it is Who had made the two seas join and flow together, one palatable and sweet, and the other salt and bitter; and between the two He has made a barrier and inviolable obstruction.”

The Qur’anic word /maraja/ is derived from the word /maraj/ that means ‘to mix or to send and to deliver free’, and here it means to set salty water and sweet water beside each other.

The Arabic word /‘aǒb/ means wholesome, pure and cool. And the word /furat/ means sweet and delicious. The Arabic word /milh/ means ‘salty’, and the word /’ujaj/ means ‘bitter and warm’. So /‘aǒb/ and /furat/ are opposite in meaning with /milh/ and /’ujaj/. The word ‘Barzakh’ means a bar and partition between two things.

But the phrase ‘Hijran Mahjura’ (inviolable obstruction), as was said in the 22nd verse of the current Surah, is an expression that was used by Arabs when they met a person whom they feared. They said it for protecting themselves.

They wanted to say, ‘excuse and protect us and be away from us!’

Anyway, this noble verse depicts one of the wonderful manifestations of Allah's might in the world of creation, how an invisible veil and an undetectable bar is set between salty and sweet seas and it does not allow them to get mixed.

Of course, today we know that this undetectable bar is ‘the density difference of sweet and salty water’ or it is so-called ‘specific gravity’ of theirs which causes them not to be mixed for a long time.

Some commentators have tried to find out where such two salty and sweet seas are located on the earth that they do not mix.

But this problem has been solved for us, for we know that all great sweet rivers that empty into seas form a sea of sweet water in seashore and send salty water back and this situation continues for a long time. For the different degree of their density, they avoid mixing with each other and say to each other: ‘Hijran Mahjura’.

It is interesting that because of flow and ebb, water of seas comes up and goes down two times a day as the result of the moon’s gravitation. This sweet water, which forms a sea, goes forth into the land at the estuary of the same rivers and, the places around there.

Since ancient times, men have taken this matter into consideration and have dug canals in such places of sea and farmed many lands irrigated by this sweet water that spreads in vast areas by means of flow and ebb.

Just now, there are millions of palm trees in the south of Iran, which are irrigated in this way. They are located very far from the sea. When rain falls less, and the water of great rivers that empties into the sea decreases, and sometimes salty water increases, local farmers get worried, for they fear that it harms their farming.

Usually this is not so. This ‘pleasant and sweet’ water which is placed besides ‘salty and warm’ water does mix with it, and this is a great capital for them.

It needs not mentioning that the existence of natural reasons in such issues does not devaluate them. What is nature? It is nothing except Allah’s will and intention that has bestowed such attributes to these creatures.

It is interesting that whenever man flies over them with airplane, it is clearly seen that these two waters have got various colours and do not get mixed. This makes man remember this Qur’anic point.

Moreover, locating this verse among the verses that are about ‘faith’ and ‘faithlessness’ may refer to this matter that sometimes in a society or city, or even in a home, there are faithful persons who are like sweet and pleasant water along with unfaithful persons who are like salty and warm water.

They have two various ideas and opinions and they have pure deeds and impure deeds, but they do not get mixed.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 54

وَهُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ مِنَ الْمَاء بَشَرًا فَجَعَلَهُ نَسَبًا وَصِهْرًا وَكَانَ رَبُّكَ قَدِيرًا

54. “And He it is Who has created man from water, then He made him related in blood and in wedlock; and your Lord is ever Powerful.”

The purpose of ‘water’ in this noble verse is the sperm of man, and the evidence of it is found in the following two verses:

“Did We not create you from a base fluid”8

“He is created from a gushing fluid.”9

Since the previous verses talked about the falling of rain as well as the locating of the salty and sweet waters besides each other, now this verse mentions the creation of man from water,

It says:

“And He it is Who has created man from water...”

Verily carving on water and shaping such a novel figure on water is the reason for omnipotence of Allah. In fact, the former verses talked about the growth of plants because of rain water, but here it speaks about a higher level that is the creation of man from water.

Therefore, commentators say that the purpose of water here is sperm from which all men are generated by Allah’s might. By sexual intercourse, man's sperm, which is floating in water, joins woman's ovum and the first blossom of man’s life, that is the first living cell of man, will be created.

If man carefully studies the various phases of forming sperm from the beginning up to the end of fetal period, he sees a lot of signs of Allah’s might and magnificence so that they will be enough to know His Pure Essence.

This commentary will be proved by the sentence that follows the verse and we will explain it.

Moreover, undoubtedly most of man’s body consists of water; therefore we can say that the main material of every man is water. Consequently, man can very scarcely resist lack of water, while he can survive many days and weeks without eating food.

Of course, it is also possible that all of these meanings are included in the concept of the verse. That is, both the first man is created from water, and all human beings are created from (seaman) water, and water is the most important material of man’s body. Water is the simplest material of the world, but how has it become the source of such wonderful creation? This is the reason for His might.

After mentioning the creation of man, the increase of generations is brought up.

It says:

“...then He made him related in blood and wedlock...”

The purpose of the Arabic word ‘Nasab’ (blood) is the relationship that is between men by way of reproductions and births, such as the relationship between father and offspring or relationship between brothers.

The purpose of the Qur’anic word /sihr/ (wedlock), which originally means ‘groom’, is the relationship that occurs through marriage between two families, such as the relation of man with the close relatives of his wife which is created in this way.

These two are what Islamic jurists say as ‘the indirect cause’ and ‘lineage’ in the subject of marriage.

In Surah An-Nisa’, No. 4, seven of the unmarriageable ones (mother, daughter, sister of mother, sister of father, daughter of brother, and daughter of sister) that are created by lineage or parentage, and four cases of the indirect cause (daughter of wife, mother of wife, wife of issue, and wife of father) are mentioned.

Of course, there are other opinions about this sentence stated by commentators, but this one is stronger and clearer, including this one: some say that the word ‘Nasab’ means ‘male offspring’ and the word /sihr/ means ‘female offspring’, for blood relationships traditionally are counted depending on fathers not mothers.

But as we said in the commentary of the 61st verse of Surah ’Al-i-‘Imran, it is a big mistake that is originated from customs and traditions that were before Islam. They thought that blood relationship has been originated only from father, and mother has no role.

But as it is specified by Islamic jurisprudence and all the Islam learned persons, all ordinances that are about lineally being unmarriageable are from both the father side and mother side.

It is interesting that there is a famous tradition which is recorded in Shi‘ite and Sunni books.

According to this tradition, this verse is sent down about the Prophet (p.b.u.li.) and Imam Ali (as), for the Prophet (S) married his daughter, Fatimah (as), off to Ali (as), therefore, Ali (as) was both the cousin of the Prophet (S) and spouse of his daughter. This is the meaning of the Qur’anic phrase ‘Nasaban Wa Sehran’ (related in blood and in wedlock).10

As we have repeatedly said, these narrations are some clear extensions of the verse and they do not prevent generality of the meaning of the verse. This verse includes any relationship that is created by the way of blood and marriage and one of its clear extensions is the bilateral relationship of Ali (as) and Prophet (S).

At the end of the verse, in order to put emphasis on the former issues, the Qur’an says:

“...And your Lord is ever Powerful.”

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 55

وَيَعْبُدُونَ مِن دُونِ اللَّهِ مَا لاَ يَنفَعُهُمْ وَلاَ يَضُرُّهُمْ وَكَانَ الْكَافِرُ عَلَى رَبِّهِ ظَهِيرًا

55. “And they worship besides Allah (things) which neither profit them nor harm them; and the infidel is a helper (of aberration) against his Lord.”

No reason and logic polytheists have got for worshipping their idols. Harm and benefit is only in the hand of Allah, not others.

Finally, in the above verse, the deviation of polytheists from the principle of monotheism, which is comparing the power of idols with Allah’s power and some of which are mentioned in the previous verses, is brought up.

The Holy Qur’an says:

“And they worship besides Allah (things) which neither profit them nor harm them...”

It is certain that benefit and harm can not be the only criterion of worshipping, but by mentioning this the Qur’an intends to say that they have no pretext for worshiping idols, for idols are some objects that have no value, no positive and negative effect.

At the end of the verse, the Qur’an adds:

“...and the infidel is a helper (of aberration) against his Lord.”

They are not alone in their deviated path and they certainly help each other. The powers which must be mobilized for the sake of Allah, are organized against Allah, His Prophet (S), and the true believers.

If we see that some of commentators have interpreted the Qur’anic word /kafir/ (disbeliever) here as ’Abū Jahl, they want to mention a clear extension, otherwise, the Arabic word /kafir/ has got extensive meaning everywhere which includes all disbelievers.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 56

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ إِلاَّ مُبَشِّرًا وَنَذِيرًا

56. “And We did not sent you but a bearer of glad tidings and a warner.”

In this short verse, both monotheism: ‘’Arsalna’ (We have sent), and prophethood: ‘Ka’ (you, O’ Muhammad!) and Resurrection (a bearer of glad tidings and a warner) are referred to.

Since the previous verses spoke about idol-worshippers’ insistence on worshipping idols that had no benefit and harm, in this holy verse the duty of the Prophet (S) to stubborn disbelievers is mentioned.

It says:

“And We did not sent you but a bearer of glad tidings and a warner.”

If they do not accept the call of the Prophet (S), there is no fault and responsibility on him; because he has done his duty that is to give good tidings and to warn, and he has called receptive persons to Allah.

This verse both specifies the duty of the Prophet (S) and sympathizes with him, and it is a kind of threat and heedlessness to these deviated persons.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 57

قُلْ مَا أَسْأَلُكُمْ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ أَجْرٍ إِلاَّ مَن شَاء أَن يَتَّخِذَ إِلَى رَبِّهِ سَبِيلًا

57. “Say: ‘I do not ask you a wage for it (my ministry) except for him who wishes to choose a way unto his Lord’.”

A successful leader is one who declares to people that he does not expect anything. Man gets the rank of sincerity when he does not want or demand any physical, positional, and verbal reward.

Thus, Allah commands the Prophet (S) to tell the people: he does not ask of them any reward for this Qur’an and conveying this heavenly religion, save that people will may choose a way unto their Lord.

The verse says:

“Say: ‘I do not ask you a wage for it (my ministry) except for him who wishes to choose a way unto his Lord’.”

It implies that the only reward and compensation of the Prophet (S) is people's guidance that has happened intentionally and willfully in them and not reluctantly and compulsorily. This is an interesting phrase that shows the maximum of kindness and benevolence of the holy Prophet (S) towards his followers, for he counts their happiness and bliss as his reward.

It is clear that guidance of the nation (Ummah) has got an extraordinarily spiritual reward for the Prophet (S), because whoever leads people to a good deed is like the one who does this deed.

There are also other possibilities about the commentary of this verse. Some say that the verse implies that the Prophet (S) does not want any reward from people, except they give some of their wealth to the poor for the sake of Allah, of course, if they will.

But the first commentary is more near to the meaning of the verse.

It is understood from what have been said above that the pronoun of the Qur’anic word /‘alayh/ (for this) refers to the Qur’an and propagation of Islam religion, for it speaks about not wanting reward and compensation for this call.

This sentence both stops the pretexts of pagans and makes clear that acceptance of this divine call is easy and simple for anybody without any trouble and expenditure.

This testifies to truthfulness of the Prophet’s call and purification of his thought and program, for false claimers do this certainly for the sake of some indirect or direct reward.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 58

وَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى الْحَيِّ الَّذِي لاَ يَمُوتُ وَسَبِّحْ بِحَمْدِهِ وَكَفَى بِهِ بِذُنُوبِ عِبَادِهِ خَبِيرًا

58. “And rely on the (Ever) living One Who dies not, and celebrate with His praise, and sufficient is He as being aware of the faults of His servants,”

The Arabic word /tawakkul/ as well as its derivatives are mentioned70 times in the Qur’an. It means to rely on Allah and to use Him as lawyer in all affairs.

In the previous verse the holy Prophet (S) was commanded to tell people he would not demand reward from them. And now this verse implies that religious leaders do not expect anything from people for their own life and they must trust Allah.

Therefore, in this verse, the main reliance of the Prophet (S) is made clear; it says:

“And rely on the (Ever) living One Who dies not...”

By having such a Trust, Sanctuary, and Guardian Who is always alive and will be alive, the Prophet (S) does not need their reward and does not fear harm, hurt, and their conspiracy. Now that this is so, ‘hymn His praise’, do glorify Him and praise Him for all His perfect Attributes.

The verse says:

“...and celebrate with His praise...”

In fact, this sentence can be counted as the etiology of the former sentence, for when He has no fault and weakness and has got all good things and is perfect, such a One is deserved to be trusted.

Then it is added: implying that he (S) should not be worried of the enemies’ conspiracies for He suffices as the Knower of His bondmen’s sins, and He reckons them when its time comes.

The verse continues saying:

“...and sufficient is He as being aware of the faults of His servants,”

Whom Must We Trust?

In the above verse, when the Prophet (S) is ordered to forget all creatures and to rely on the pure nature of Allah, He mentions some attributes for this pure nature, which are, in fact, the main qualifications of One Who can be the real and sure trust of people.

First, he must be alive, for a dead and unbeneficial creature, such as idols, cannot be someone’s trust.

Second, he must be immortal, so that, those who trust him do not get worried and irresolute about his death.

Third, he must be omniscient. He must know both all the needs of those who trust in him and the plots and plans of foes.

Forth, he must be omnipotent. He must have no weakness and disability that weakens this reliance.

Fifth, he must manage and control all affairs. And we know that these attributes are only found in the pure nature of Allah, thus, He is the only One Whom can be trusted and does not have instability in all events and disasters.

Some Traditions On Trust

1. The Prophet (S) said:

“One who wants to be the most pious person of people has to trust Allah.”11

2. Imam Sadiq (as) said:

“Fearing only Allah and not fearing other than Allah is reliance.”12

3. The Prophet (S) said:

“The best servants with Allah are those who trust Allah more and obey His commandments.”13

4. Imam Ali (as) said:

“This is sufficient for your trust that you know no one as your sustainer but Allah, the Glorious.”14

5. Imam Ali (as) said:

“Oh people! Trust and have confidence in Allah, for He will be sufficient for the affairs of those who trust (in Him).”15

6. The Prophet (S) said:

“If one trusts Allah, He provides his provisions and livelihood from some ways that he has not thought. And Allah makes the world the trust of one who pins all his hopes on the world.”16

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 59

الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى الْعَرْشِ الرَّحْمَنُ فَاسْأَلْ بِهِ خَبِيرًا

59. “(He) Who created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six Days, then He established Himself on ‘Arsh (the Throne of authority) the Beneficent (God)! Ask then (what you need) from Him Who is aware (of everything).”

This noble verse states the power of Allah in the entire universe and describes this assured trust in another way.

It says:

“(He) Who created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six Days, then He established Himself on ‘Arsh (the Throne of authority)...”

One who has such omnipotence can protect those trust Him from every danger and disaster. He both has created the world and the management, leadership and administration of it are in His authority.

Moreover, gradual creation of the world shows that Allah does not hurry in any job. If He does not punish wrongdoers very quickly, it is because He wants to give them opportunity and respite to improve them. Furthermore, someone who fears for the passage of time hurries, and this is not true about Allah, the Mighty.

In the commentary of the 54th verse of the Surah Al-’A‘raf we talked about the creation of the universe in six days and we said that the purpose of ‘days’ in such cases is periods that each of which may last millions or milliards years.

We mentioned the evidences of this matter from Arabic literature and other languages. Also we specified all these 6 periods. The Qur’anic word /‘arš/ has also been explained there.

In the end of the verse it is added:

“...the Beneficent (God)!...”

He is the One Whose encompassing mercy includes all creatures, and everyone who obeys Him, or everyone who disobeys Him, believers and disbelievers all enjoy His unconditional generosity.

Now that man has such a mighty and generous Lord, he must ask Him whatever he needs or he must ask Him Who knows everything.

The verse says:

“...Ask then (what you need) from Him Who is aware (of every thing).”

As a matter of fact this sentence is the result of the former discussion; it implies that the Prophet (S) must declare that he does not want any reward from them and they must trust Allah Who has all these attributes, that is.

He is both the Powerful, the Beneficent, and All-merciful, and All-aware, and the Omniscient. Thus man must ask Him whatever he wants.

Commentators have other opinions about this sentence and mostly they have interpreted the Qur’anic word /fas’al/ (ask), here, as to ask question or to question not to demand, and they say that the concept of this sentence is that if man wants to ask question about the creation and the power of Allah, he must ask Allah Himself, for He knows everything.

Some have not only interpreted 'ask' as ask question or to question, but also they say that the purpose of the Qur’anic word ‘Khabir’ is Gabriel or the Prophet of Islam (S), that, is if anyone has question about Allah's attributes, he must ask them.

Of course, the last commentary seems very unlikely and the commentary that is before the last one is not very consistent with the former verses. Thus, the meaning which says, to ask Allah whatever someone wants, seems more probable.

Surah al-Furqan - Verse 60

وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمُ اسْجُدُوا لِلرَّحْمَنِ قَالُوا وَمَا الرَّحْمَنُ أَنَسْجُدُ لِمَا تَأْمُرُنَا وَزَادَهُمْ نُفُورًا

60. “And when it is said to them: ‘Prostrate you to Rahman (The Beneficent Allah), they say: ‘And what is Rahman (the Beneficent Allah)? Shall we prostrate to what you bid us?’ And it increases them in aversion.”

In this verse the Arabic word /ma/ (what), which is use for inanimate and solid bodies, is repeated two times. The pagans used this word to scorn the Holy Divine Essence.

Therefore, instead of saying ‘Wa Man ir-Rahman’ (and who is the Beneficent?), they said: ‘Wa-Mar-Rahman’ (And what is the Beneficent?), and instead of saying ‘Liman Ta’muruna’ (to whom you bid us), they said ‘Lima Ta’muruna’ (to what you bid us).

Since the previous verses spoke about both the might and magnificence of Allah and His encompassing mercy, this verse implies that when they are told adore the Beneficent Allah, Whose mercy encompasses soul and body of yours, they say out of pride and conceit, or for redacting, what the Beneficent Allah is.

The verse says:

“And when it is said to them: ‘Prostrate you to Rahman (The Beneficent Allah), they say: ‘And what is Rahman (the Beneficent Allah)?...”

They said that they did not basically know Rahman and his word had no clear sense for them.

They continued saying:

“...Shall we prostrate to what you bid us?’...”

We will not submit anybody and we are not the follower of the command of this and that.

They say this statement and, consequently, their hate and their distance from Allah will be increased.

Certainly the most proper name of Allah’s names for calling people to adoration and worship in His presence is ‘Rahman’ (the Beneficent) with its extensive meaning of His mercy, but because of blind-heartedness and stubbornness they not only presented no flexibility for this invitation, but also they embarked on scorning and mocking and they mockingly said:

“...what is Rahman (the Beneficent Allah)?”

As Pharaoh said in the opposition of Moses (as):

“And what is the Lord of the Worlds?”17 ,

they did not even say: ‘and who is...?’

However, the root and the form of this word, ‘Rahman’ is Arabic, and the Prophet (S) always, at the beginning of each Surah of the Qur’an, said this name for them by the phrase:

‘Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim’ (In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful).

Therefore, their aim was nothing but mocking and pretext-seeking.

The next sentence also testifies to this fact, for they say implicitly:

‘Are we to adore whatever you (Muhammad) bid us and prostrate by your command?’

But as a matter of fact, the propagation of divine leaders only has effect on those persons whose hearts are receptive and the blind-hearted stubborn persons not only do not enjoy it, but also their hatefumess increases, for the verses of the Qur’an are like enlivening drops of rain that grows flower and meadow in gardens and grows thorn in the brackish lands.

So it is not surprisingly that it says:

“...And it increases them in aversion.”

Notes

1. Nūr uth-Thaqalayn

2. Qurtabī, Vol. 7, P. 4455

3. Surah Furqān, the verse under discussion

4. Surah Al-Baqarah, No. 2, verse 187

5. Surah Al-’A‘rāf, No. 7, verse 26

6. We have spoken in detail about the effects of water enlivenment in Surah Al-Anbiyā, No. 21, verse 30.

7. Qurtabī, the Commentary

8. Surah Al- Mursalāt, verse 20

9. Surah At-Tāriq, verse 6

10. Majma‘ ul-Bayān and Rūh ul-Ma‘ānī

11. Mishkāt ul-’Anwār, P. 50

12. Mishkāt ul-’Anwār, P. 56

13. Majmū‘ah Warram, Vol. 2, P. 123

14. Qurar-ul-Hikam, Vol. 3, P. 402

15. Kanz ul-‘Ummāl, Vol. 3, P. 703

16. Kanz ul-‘Ummāl, Vol. 3, P. 103

17. Surah Ash-Shu‘arā, No. 26, verse 23

II. Psychological Challenges to Neorealist Rationality

A. Neorealism

The dominant paradigm. Neorealism is often misleadingly portrayed as an anti-psychological theory of world politics (Waltz, 1959,1979). Neorealism could, however, just as justifiably be viewed as an unusually parsimonious psychological theory that:

(a) characterizes the environment within which states must survive as ruthlessly competitive -- a world in which the strong do what they will and the weak accept what they must (Thucydides, 400 B.C./1972). Each state is only as safe as it can make itself by its own efforts or by entering into protective alliances. Moreover, there is no value in appealing to shared norms of fairness or to the enforcement power of a "sovereign" because there are no shared norms and no world government to hold norm violators accountable;

(b) assumes that, to survive in this anarchic or self-help environment, decision-makers must act like egoistic rationalists (in clinical language, calculating psychopaths). They must be clear-sighted in appraising threats, methodical in evaluating options, and unsentimental in forming and abandoning "friendships." Altruists and fuzzy thinkers are speedily selected out of the system, thereby minimizing variation, at least in security policy, among states;

(c) makes no claims to predicting specific policy initiatives of states but does claim to explain long-term historical patterns of "balancing" among states designed to prevent the emergence of global hegemons (hence the embracing of such ideological odd couples as Churchill and Stalin in World War II or Nixon and Mao in the 1970's). Some neorealists also claim to identify the conditions under which war is especially likely (e.g., power transitions in multipolar systems in which regional hegemons are in relative decline vis-a-vis emerging challengers -- Gilpin, 1981).

Although neoliberal and social-constructivist critics denounce neorealism as theoretically simplistic and sometimes even ethically unsavory (Katzenstein, 1996; Keohane, 1984; Kratochwil, 1989; Wendt, 1992), many scholars find it useful as a crude first-order approximation of world politics. Neorealism calls our attention to the structural incentives for pursuing "balance-of-power" policies. From Thucydides to Bismarck to Kissinger, the analytical challenge has been to anticipate geopolitical threats and opportunities. The logic of the "security dilemma" implies that we should expect a high baseline of competition. In an anarchic system, each state is responsible for its own security which it attempts to achieve by building up its military capabilities, its economic infrastructure, and its alliances with other states. Often other states cannot easily differentiate defensive from offensive strategies and respond by making their own preparations, which can also be mistaken for offensive preparations, triggering further "defensive activity" and so the cycle goes.

Most neorealists and game theorists, do, however, allow for the possibility of cooperation. They expect cooperation when that response is indeed prudent--specifically, when the penalties for non-cooperation are steep (e.g., violating an arms-control agreement would motivate the other side to develop destabilizing first-strike weapons), the rewards of cooperation are high (e.g., the economic and security benefits of some form of détente), and the "shadow of the future" looms large (it does not pay to cross an adversary with whom one expects to deal over a prolonged period). Some neorealists argue that all three conditions were clearly satisfied in the American-Soviet relationship of the late 1980s. The Reagan defense build-up made clear to the Soviets that the penalties for non-cooperation were steep (sharp Western responses to the Soviet build-up of ICBMs, to SS20s in eastern Europe, and to Soviet interventions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola); the prospect of revitalizing the moribund Soviet economy by redirecting scarce resources from defense to economic restructuring enhanced the rewards of cooperation; and the shadow of the future looked ominous (it seems rash to antagonize adversaries who have decisive technological and economic advantages in long-term competition). Gorbachev, in short, did not have to be a nice guy and political psychologists who made such trait attributions succumbed to one of their own favorite biases--the "fundamental attribution error." Why invoke altruism when enlightened self-interest is up to the explanatory task? The Soviet empire -- like the Roman, Byzantine, and Venetian empires before it -- simply tried to slow its relative decline by strategically abandoning initially peripheral and then increasingly core commitments (Gilpin, 1981).

Whatever neorealism's merits as an explanation for geostrategic maneuvering over the centuries, the theory is -- from a social psychological perspective -- suffocatingly restrictive. Objections can be organized under three headings. First, sociological theorists have challenged whether international politics is truly anarchic. The mere absence of effective world government does not automatically imply that world politics is a Hobbesian war of all against all (Barkdull, 1995). A powerful case can be made that shared normative understandings -- sometimes formally enforced by international institutions -- standardize expectations within security and economic communities about who is allowed to do what to whom (Deutsch, 1957; Katzenstein, 1996; Ruggie, 1986). Second, historically-minded theorists have challenged the neorealist view of national interest as something that rational actors directly deduce from the distribution of economic-military power in the international system and their own state's location in that system. Conceptions of national interest sometimes change dramatically and are linked to social and intellectual trends that are difficult, if not impossible, to reduce to standard geostrategic computations of power (Mueller, 1989). Policies deemed essential to national security in the late 19th century -- encouraging high birth rates, colonizing foreign lands -- are widely condemned in the late 20th century. And policies widely endorsed in the late 20th century – ceding components of national sovereignty to international institutions, military intervention to save the lives of citizens of other states of negligible strategic value -- would have been regarded as extraordinarily naive a century ago. In this view, it is an error to equate security with military strength (an error famously captured by Stalin's pithy dismissal of Vatican protests: "How many divisions does the Pope have?"). Finally, cognitive theorists have challenged the notion that rationality -- high-quality cognitive functioning -- is a prerequisite for success, or even survival, in world politics. Just as one does not need to be a grandmaster to win every chess tournament (it depends on the cleverness of the competition), so one may not need to be an exemplar of rational decision-making to manage the security policies of most states most of the time (Tetlock, 1992b). It may suffice to be not too much worse than the other players.

B. Cognitivism

An emerging alternative research program. This three-pronged critique -- that neorealism exaggerates the anarchic nature of world politics, exaggerates the role of economic-military power in determining national interests, and exaggerates the urgency of the need for rationality -- makes room for psychological approaches to world politics. One implication of the critique is that if we seek explanations of why national decision-makers do what they do, we will have to supplement the insights of macro theories (which locate nation-states in the international power matrix) with micro assumptions about decision-makers' cognitive representations of the policy environment, their goals in that environment, and their perceptions of the normative and domestic political constraints on policy options.

The recent end of the Cold War provides a deeply instructive example. It is disconcertingly easy to generate post hoc geostrategic rationalizations for virtually anything the Soviet leadership might have chosen to do in the mid-1980's (Lebow, 1995). One could counter the earlier argument that the conciliatory Gorbachevian policies were dictated by systemic imperatives by invoking the same imperatives to explain the opposite outcome: namely, the emergence of a militantly neo-Stalinist leadership committed to holding on to superpower status by reasserting discipline on the domestic front and by devoting massive resources to defense programs? Indeed, some influential observers read the situation exactly this way in the mid-1980's (Pipes, 1986). Systemic theories do not answer the pressing policy question: Why did the Soviet leadership jump one way rather than the other?

From a cognitive perspective, the key failing of neorealism is its inability to specify how creatures of bounded rationality will cope with the causal ambiguity inherent in complex historical flows of events. The feedback that decision makers receive from their policies is often delayed and subject to widely varying interpretations. What appears prudent to one ideological faction at one time may appear foolish to other factions at other times. Consider two examples:

a) In the 1950s and 1960s, mostly conservative supporters of covert action cited the coup sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency against Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh as a good example of how to advance U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere; after the fundamentalist Islamic revolution of the late 1970s, mostly liberal opponents of covert action argued for a reappraisal;

b) In the 1970s, Soviet policy in the Third World seemed to bear fruit, with pro-Soviet governments sprouting up in such diverse locations as Indochina, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. Conservatives in Western countries warned that the Soviets were on the march and blamed the lackadaisical liberal policies of the Carter administration. By the late 1980's, however, these recently acquired geostrategic assets looked like liabilities. Conservatives claimed credit for wearing the Soviets down whereas liberals argued that the threat had existed largely in vivid anti-communist imaginations.

If this analysis is correct--if what counts as a rewarding or punishing consequence in the international environment depends on the ideological assumptions of the beholder--it is no longer adequate to "black-box" the policy-making process and limit the study of world politics to covariations between systemic input and policy outcomes. It becomes necessary to study how policy makers think about the international system. The cognitive research program in world politics rests on a pair of simple functionalist premises:

a) world politics is not only complex but also deeply ambiguous. Whenever people draw lessons from history, they rely -- implicitly or explicitly -- on speculative reconstructions of what would have happened in possible worlds of their own mental creation;

b) people--limited capacity information processors that we are--frequently resort to simplifying strategies to deal with this otherwise overwhelming complexity and uncertainty.

Policy makers, like ordinary mortals, see the world through a glass darkly--through the simplified images that they create of the international scene. Policy makers may act rationally, but only within the context of their simplified subjective representations of reality (the classic principle of bounded rationality--Simon, 1957).

To understand foreign policy, cognitivists focus on these simplified mental representations of reality that decision makers use to interpret events and choose among courses of action (Axelrod, 1976; Cottam, 1986; Jervis, 1976; George, 1969, 1980; Herrmann 1982; Holsti, 1989; Hudson, 1991; Larson, 1994; Sylvan et al., 1990; Thorson & Sylvan, 1992; Vertzberger,1990 ) . Although there is considerable disagreement on how to represent these representations (proposals include all the usual theoretical suspects: schemata, scripts, images, operational codes, belief systems, ontologies, problem representations, and associative networks), there is consensus on a key point: foreign policy belief systems have enormous cognitive utility. Belief systems provide ready answers to fundamental questions about the political world. What are the basic objectives of other states? What should our own objectives be? Can conflict be avoided and, if so, how? If not, what form is the conflict likely to take? Belief systems also facilitate decision making by providing frameworks for filling in missing counterfactual data points (if we had not done x, then disaster), for generating conditional forecasts (if we do x, then success), and for assessing the significance of the projected consequences of policies (we should count this outcome as failure and this one as success). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, belief systems often permit us to predict policy choices with a specificity that can rarely be achieved by purely systemic theories (cf. Blum, 1993; George, 1983; Herrmann, 1995; Rosati, 1984; Shimko, 1992; Tetlock, 1985; Walker, 1977; Wallace, Suedfeld, & Thachuk, 1993).

There is, however, a price to be paid for the cognitive and political benefits of a stable, internally consistent world view. Policy makers often oversimplify. Evidence has accumulated that the price of cognitive economy in world politics is--as in other domains of life--susceptibility to error and bias. The next sections consider this litany of potential errors and biases, paying special attention to those that have received sustained research attention in political contexts. The discussion then examines how motivational and social processes may amplify or attenuate hypothesized cognitive shortcomings, again with special reference to processes likely to be engaged in political contexts such as coping strategies in response to stress, time pressure and accountability demands from diverse constituencies.

(1) The Fundamental Attribution Error. People often prefer internal, dispositional explanations for others' conduct, even when plausible situational accounts exist (Gilbert and Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). This judgmental tendency can interact dangerously with key properties of the international environment. Consider the much discussed security dilemma (Jervis, 1976, 1978). To protect themselves in an anarchic environment, states must seek security either through costly defense programs of their own or by entering into entangling alliances that oblige others to defend them. Assessing intentions in such an environment is often hard. There is usually no easy way to distinguish between defensive states that are responding to the competitive logic of the situation and expansionist states. If everyone assumes the worst, the stage is set for conflict-spiral-driven arms races that no one wanted (Downs, 1991; Kramer, 1988). The fundamental attribution error exacerbates matters by lowering the perceptual threshold for attributing hostile intentions to other states. This tendency--in conjunction with the security dilemma--can lead to an inordinate number of "Type I errors" in which decision-makers exaggerate the hostile intentions of defensively motivated powers. The security dilemma compels even peaceful states to arm; the fundamental attribution error then leads observers to draw incorrect dispositional inferences. The actor-observer divergence in attributions--the tendency for actors to see their conduct as more responsive to the situation and less reflective of dispositions than do observers (Jones & Nisbett,1971)-- can further exacerbate matters. So too can ego-defensive motives (Heradstveit & Bonham, 1996). Both sets of processes encourage leaders to attribute their own military spending to justifiable situational pressures (Jervis, 1976). These self-attributions can contribute to a self-righteous spiral of hostility in which policy makers know that they arm for defensive reasons, assume that others also know this, and then conclude that others who do not share this perception must be building their military capabilities because they have aggressive designs (cf. Swann, Pelham, & Roberts, 1987). At best, the result is a lot of unnecessary defense spending; at worst, needless bloodshed (White, 1984).

The fundamental attribution error may encourage a second form of misperception in the international arena: the tendency to perceive governments as unitary causal agents rather than as complex amalgams of bureaucratic and political subsystems, each pursuing its own missions and goals (Jervis, 1976; Vertzberger, 1990). Retrospective reconstructions of the Cuban missile crisis have revealed numerous junctures at which American and Soviet forces could easily have come into violent contact with each other, not as a result of following some carefully choreographed master plan plotted by top leaders, but rather as a result of local commanders executing standard operating procedures (Blight, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 1995). The organizational analog of the fundamental attribution error is insensitivity to the numerous points of slippage between the official policies of collectivities and the policies that are actually implemented at the ground level.

Claims about the fundamental attribution error in world politics should however be subject to rigorous normative and empirical scrutiny. On the normative side, skeptics can challenge the presumption of "error". Deterrence theorists might note that setting a low threshold for making dispositional attributions can be adaptive. One may make more Type I errors (false alarms of malevolent intent) but fewer Type II errors (missing the threats posed by predatory powers such as Hitler’s Germany). And theorists of international institutions might note the value of pressuring states to observe the rules of the transnational trading and security regimes that they join. One way of exerting such pressure is to communicate little tolerance for justifications and excuses for norm violations, thereby increasing the reputation costs of such conduct. A balanced appraisal of the fundamental attribution “error” hinges on our probability estimates of each logically possible type of error (false alarms and misses) as well as on the political value we place on avoiding each error -- all in all, a classic signal detection problem. On the empirical side, skeptics can challenge the presumption of "fundamental" by pointing to Confucianist or, more generally, collectivist cultures in which sensitivity to contextual constraints on conduct is common (Morris & Peng, 1994). Skeptics can also raise endless definitional questions about what exactly qualifies as a "dispositional" explanation when we shift from an interpersonal to an international level of analysis and the number of causal entities expands exponentially. The domestic political system of one's adversary might be coded either as a situational constraint on leadership policy or as a reflection of the deepest dispositional aspirations of a "people".

(2) Overconfidence. Experimental work often reveals that people are excessively confident in their factual judgments and predictions, especially for difficlut problems (Einhorn & Hogarth 1981; Fischhoff, 1991). In the foreign policy realm, such overconfidence can lead decision makers to: 1) dismiss opposing views out of hand; 2) overestimate their ability to detect subtle clues to the other side's intentions; 3) assimilate incoming information to their existing beliefs. Overconfident decision makers in defender states are likely to misapply deterrence strategies--either by failing to respond to potential challenges because they are certain that no attack will occur (e.g., Israel in 1973) or by issuing gratuitous threats because they are certain that there will be an attack, even when no attack is actually planned (Levy, 1983). Overconfident aggressors are prone to exaggerate the likelihood that defenders will yield to challenges (Lebow, 1981). In addition, overconfidence can produce flawed policies when decision makers assess military and economic capabilities. For instance, the mistaken belief that one is militarily superior to a rival may generate risky policies that can lead to costly wars that no one wanted (Levy, 1983). By contrast, a mistaken belief that one is inferior to a rival can exacerbate conflict in either of two ways: (1) such beliefs generate unnecessary arms races as the weaker side tries to catch up. The rival perceives this effort as a bid for superiority, matches it, and sets the stage for an action/reaction pattern of conflict spiral; (2) the weaker state will be too quick to yield to a rival's demands (Levy, 1989). At best, such capitulation produces a diplomatic defeat; at worst, it leads aggressors to up the ante and ultimately produces wars that might have been avoided with firmer initial policies (a widely held view of Chamberlain's appeasement policy of 1938).

In a comprehensive study of intelligence failures prior to major wars, the historian Ernest May (1984, p. 542) concluded "if just one exhortation were to be pulled from this body of experience, it would be, to borrow Oliver Cromwell's words to the Scottish Kirk: “I beseech you in the bowels of Christ think it possible you may be mistaken.” This ironic call for cognitive humility (considering the source) is echoed in the contemporary literature on "de-biasing," with its emphasis on encouraging self-critical thought and imagining that the opposite of what one expected occurred (Lord et al., 1984; Tetlock and Kim, 1987). Of course, such advice can be taken too far. There is the mirror-image risk of paralysis in which self-critical thinkers dilute justifiably confident judgments by heeding irrelevant or specious arguments (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989a) -- an especially severe threat to good judgment in environments in which the signal-to-noise ratio is unfavorable and other parties are trying to confuse or deceive the perceiver.

(3) Metaphors and Analogical Reasoning. People try to understand novel problems by reaching for familiar concepts. Frequently, these concepts take the form of metaphors and analogies that illuminate some aspects of the problem but obscure other aspects.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors pervade all forms of discourse. Discourse on deterrence is no exception. Metaphorical preferences are correlated closely with policy preferences. Consider the "ladder of escalation" and the "slippery slope" (Jervis, 1989). The former metaphor implies that just as we can easily climb up and down a ladder one step at a time, so we can control the escalation and de-escalation of conventional or even nuclear conflicts (Kahn, 1965); the latter metaphor implies that once in a conflict, leaders can easily lose control and slide helplessly into war (Schelling, 1966). In Cold War days, adherents of the "ladder" metaphor supported a war-fighting doctrine that stressed cultivating counterforce capabilities; although they did not relish the prospect, they believed that nuclear war could, in principle, be controlled. By contrast, "slippery slopers" endorsed MAD--both as a policy and as strategic reality--and they feared that, once initiated, conflicts would inevitably escalate to all-out war. They argued that nuclear powers need to avoid crises. Managing them once they break out is too risky. As President Kennedy reportedly remarked after the Cuban Missile crisis, "One can't have too many of these" (Blight, 1990).

Containment and deterrence theorists -- who put special emphasis on reputation (Mercer, 1996) -- have long been attracted to contagion and domino metaphors that imply that failure to stand firm in one sphere will undermine one's credibility in other spheres (Kissinger, 1993). In the early 19th century, Metternich believed that revolution was contagious and required quarantine-like measures; in the late 1960s, Brezhnev took a similar view of Dubcek’s reforms in Czechoslovakia; at roughly the same time, the Johnson and Nixon administrations used the domino metaphor to justify American involvement in Vietnam.

Metaphorical modes of thought continue to influence and to justify policy in the post-Cold War world. Some writers invoke communitarian metaphors and claim that international relationsis undergoing an irreversible transformation that will soon invalidate rationales for weapons of mass destruction. "A community of states united by common interests, values, and perspectives is emerging because of technology and economics. Among the modernist states belonging to that community, new norms of behavior are replacing the old dictates of realpolitik: they reject not only the use of weapons of mass destruction, but even the use of military force to settle their disputes" (Blechman and Fisher, 1994, p. 97). By contrast, other writers such as Christopher Layne (1993) believe that nothing fundamental has changed and rely on the social Darwinist metaphors of self-help and survival of the fittest. We have merely moved from a bipolar system to a multipolar one ("with a brief unipolar moment" in which the United States enjoyed global dominance at the end of the 20th century). Indeed, it is only a matter of time before the major non-nuclear powers--Japan and Germany--acquire nuclear weapons now that they no longer depend on extended deterrence protection from the United States.

People also give meaning to new situations by drawing on historical precedents and analogies (Gilovich, 1981; May, 1973; Jervis, 1976; Neustadt and May, 1986; Verzberger, 1986). Although a reasonable response by creatures with limited mental resources to a demanding environment, this cognitive strategy can be seriously abused. One mistake is to dwell on the most obvious precedent -- a pivotal event early in one's career (Barber, 1985; Goldgeier, 1994) or perhaps the most recent crisis or war (Jervis, 1976; Reiter, 1996) -- rather than survey a diverse set of precedents. Consider, for instance, the potpourri of Third World conflicts that American observers in the elite press compared to Vietnam between 1975 and 1995: Lebanon, Israel's Vietnam; Eritrea, Ethiopia's Vietnam; Chad, Libya's Vietnam; Angola, Cuba's Vietnam; Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Vietnam; Bosnia, the European Community's Vietnam; Nicaragua, potentially a new American Vietnam, and, of course, Kampuchea, Vietnam's Vietnam. To be sure, there are points of similarity, but the differences are also marked and often slighted (Tetlock, et al., 1991).

Khong (1991) reports arguably the most systematic study of analogical reasoning in foreign policy. Drawing on process-tracing of high-level deliberations in the early 1960's, he documents how American policy in Vietnam was shaped by the perceived similarity of the Vietnamese conflict to the Korean war. Once again, a Communist army from the north had attacked a pro-western regime in the south. This diagnosis led to a series of prescriptions and predictions. The United States should resist the aggression with American troops and could expect victory, albeit with considerable bloodshed. A side-constraint lesson drawn from the Korean conflict was that the United States should avoid provoking Chinese entry into the Vietnam war and hence should practice "graduated escalation."

This example illustrates a second pitfall in analogical foreign policy reasoning: the tendency to neglect differences between the present situation and the politically preferred precedent. Not only in public but also in private, policy makers rarely engage in balanced comparative assessments of historical cases (Neustadt and May, 1986). From a psychological viewpoint, this result is not surprising. Laboratory research suggests that people often overweight hypothesis-confirmatory information (Klayman & Ha, 1987). To re-invoke the Vietnam example, American policy makers concentrated on the superficial similarities between the Vietnamese and Korean conflicts while George Ball--virtually alone within Johnson's inner circle--noted the differences (e.g., the conventional versus guerrilla natures of the conflicts, the degree to which the United States could count on international support). Whereas doves complained about this analogical mismatching, hawks complained about the analogical mismatching that led decision makers to exaggerate the likelihood of Chinese intervention. China had less strategic motivation and ability to intervene in the Vietnam War in 1965 than it had to intervene in the Korean War of 1950, preoccupied as Beijing was in the mid to late 1960s by the internal turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the external threat of the Soviet Union which had recently announced the Brezhnev Doctrine (claiming a Soviet right to intervene in socialist states that strayed from the Soviet line). From this standpoint, the U.S. could have struck deep into North Vietnam, with negligible risk of triggering Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Vietnam (toward whom the Chinese were ambivalent on both cultural and political grounds).

A third mistake is to permit preconceptions to drive the conclusions one draws from history. In the United States, for instance, hawks and doves drew sharply divergent lessons from the Vietnam war (Holsti and Rosenau, 1979). Prominent lessons for hawks were that the Soviet Union is expansionist and that the United States should avoid graduated escalation and honor alliance commitments. Prominent lessons for doves were that the United States should avoid guerrilla wars, that the press is more truthful than the administration, and that civilian leaders should be wary of military advice. No lesson appeared on both the hawk and dove lists! Sharply divergent lessons are not confined to democracies, as a content analysis of Soviet analyses of the Vietnam war revealed (Zimmerman and Axelrod, 1981). Different constituencies in the Soviet Union drew self serving and largely incompatible lessons from the American defeat in Asia. "Americanists" in foreign policy institutes believed that Vietnam demonstrated the need to promote détente while restraining wars of national liberation; the military press believed that the war demonstrated the implacable hostility of Western imperialism, the need to strengthen Soviet armed forces, and the feasibility and desirability of seeking further gains in the Third World. In summary, although policy makers often use analogies poorly, virtually no one would argue that they should ignore history; rather, the challenge is to employ historical analogies in a more nuanced, self-critical, and multidimensional manner (Neustadt and May, 1986).

(4) Belief Perseverance. Foreign policy beliefs often resist change (George, 1980). Cognitive mechanisms such as selective attention to confirming evidence, denial, source derogation, and biased assimilation of contradictory evidence buffer beliefs from refutation (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Although foreign belief systems take many forms (for detailed typologies, see Herrmann and Fischerkeller,1995; Holsti,1977), the most widely studied is the inherent bad faith model of one's opponent (Holsti,1967;Silverstein ,1989; Stuart and Starr, 1981; Blanton, 1996). A state is believed to be implacably hostile: contrary indicators, that in another context might be regarded as probative, are ignored, dismissed as propaganda ploys, or interpreted as signs of weakness. For example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tenaciously held to an inherent bad faith model of the Soviet Union (Holsti, 1967) and many Israelis believed that the PLO was implacably hostile (Kelman, 1983) and some still do even after the peace accord. Although such images are occasionally on the mark, they can produce missed opportunities for conflict resolution (Spillman & Spillman, 1991). More generally, belief perseverance can prevent policy makers from shifting from less to more successful strategies. In World War I, for example, military strategists continued to launch infantry charges despite enormous losses, leading to the wry observation that men may die easily, but beliefs do not (Art and Waltz, 1983, p. 13).

Some scholars hold belief perseverance to be a powerful moderator of deterrence success or failure (Jervis, 1983, p. 24). Aggressors can get away with blatantly offensive preparations and still surprise their targets as long as the target believes that an attack is unlikely (Heuer, 1981). An example is Israel's failure to respond to numerous intelligence warnings prior to the Yom Kippur War. Israeli leaders believed that the Arabs would not attack, given Arab military inferiority, and dismissed contradictory evidence that some later acknowledged to be probative (Stein, 1985). Conversely, a nation that does not plan to attack, yet is believed to harbor such plans, will find it difficult to convince the opponent of its peaceful intentions.

It is easy, however, to overstate the applicability of the belief perseverance hypothesis to world politics. Policymakers do sometimes change their minds (Bonham, Shapiro, & Trumble, 1979; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994). The key questions are: Who changes? Under what conditions? And what forms does change take? Converging evidence from archival studies of political elites and experimental studies of judgment and choice suggest at least four possible answers: (a) when policy-makers do change their minds, they are generally constrained by the classic cognitive-consistency principle of least resistance which means that they show a marked preference for changing cognitions that are minimally connected to other cognitions (McGuire, 1985). Policy-makers should thus abandon beliefs about appropriate tactics before giving up on an entire strategy and abandon strategies before questioning fundamental assumptions about other states and the international system (Breslauer, 1991; Legvold, 1991; Spiegel, 1991; Tetlock, 1991); (b) timely belief change is more likely in competitive markets (Smith, 1994; Soros, 1990) that provide quick, unequivocal feedback and opportunities for repeated play on fundamentally similar problems so that base rates of experience can accumulate, thereby reducing reliance on theory-driven speculation about what would have happened if one had chosen differently. Policy-makers should thus learn more quickly in currency and bond markets than, say, in the realm of nuclear deterrence (who knows what lessons should be drawn from the nonoccurrence of a unique event such as nuclear war?); (c) timely belief change is more likely when decision-makers are accountable for bottom-line outcome indicators and have freedom to improvise solutions than when decision-makers are accountable to complex procedural-bureaucratic norms that limit latitude to improvise (Wilson, 1989); (d) timely belief change is more likely when decision-makers -- for either dispositional or situational reasons -- display self-critical styles of thinking that suggest an open-mindedness to contradictory evidence (Kruglanski, 1996; Tetlock, 1992a).

Applying these generalizations to world politics is not, however, always straightforward. For example, it is hard to determine whether certain decision-makers were truly more open-minded or were always more ambivalent toward the attitude object (Stein, 1994). For instance, was Gorbachev a faster learner than his rival, Yegor Ligachev, about the inadequacies of the Soviet system or was he less committed all along to the fundamental correctness of the Soviet system? It is often even harder to gauge whether policymakers are being good Bayesians who are adjusting in a timely fashion to “diagnostic” evidence? One observer's decisive clue concerning the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy in 1983 might have led another observer to conclude "disinformation campaign" and a third observer to conclude "interesting but only moderately probative." The problem here is not just the opacity of the underlying reality; one's threshold for belief adjustment hinges on the political importance that one attaches to the twin errors of underestimating and overestimating Soviet potential. For instance, one might see the evidence as significant but opt for only minor belief system revision because one judges the error of overestimation (excessive defense spending) as the more serious. Defensible normative evaluations of belief persistence and change must ultimately rest on game-theoretic assumptions about the reliability and validity of the evidence (what does the other side want us to believe and could they have shaped the evidence before us to achieve that goal?) and signal-detection assumptions about the relative importance of avoiding Type I versus Type II errors (which mistake do we dread more?).

(5) Avoidance of value trade-offs. For an array of cognitive, emotional and social reasons, politicians find value trade-offs unpleasant and frequently define issues in ways that bypass the need for such judgments (Steinbruner, 1974; Jervis, 1976; Tetlock, 1986b). Trade-off avoidance can, however, be dangerous. Operationalizing a policy of deterrence, for example, raises trade-offs that one ignores at one's peril. On the one hand, there is a need to resist exploitation and deter aggression. On the other hand, prudent policy makers should avoid exacerbating the worst-case fears of adversaries. The first value calls for deterrence; the second calls for reassurance. National leaders also confront a conflict between their desire to avoid the devastation of all-out war and their desire to deter challengers and avoid even limited military skirmishes. Jervis (1984, p. 49) referred to this dilemma as the "great trade-off" of the nuclear age: "states may be able to increase the chance of peace only by increasing the chance that war, if it comes, will be total. To decrease the probability of enormous destruction may increase the probability of aggression and limited wars."

There may also be higher-order geopolitical trade-offs. Gilpin (1981) and Kennedy (1987) have noted how great powers over the centuries have consistently mismanaged the three-pronged trade-off among defense spending, productive investment, and consumer spending. Although policy makers must allocate resources for defense to deter adversaries and for consumption to satisfy basic needs, too much of either type of spending can cut seriously into the long-term investment required for sustained economic growth.

Research suggests that policy makers often avoid trade-offs in a host of ways:(a) holding out hope that a dominant option (one superior on all important values) can be found; (b) resorting to dissonance reduction tactics such as bolstering (Festinger,1964) and belief system overkill (Jervis,1976) that create the psychological illusion that one’s preferred policy is superior on all relevant values to all possible alternatives; (c) engaging in the decision-deferral tactics of buckpassing and procrastination that diffuse responsibility or delay the day of reckoning ( Janis and Mann,1977;Tetlock & Boettger, 1994); (d) relying on lexicographic decision rules -- such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) -- that initially eliminate options that fail to pass some threshold on the most important value and then screen options on less important values (Mintz, 1993; Payne et al., 1992). Whichever avoidance strategy they adopt, policy makers who fail to acknowledge the trade-off structure of their environment may get into serious trouble: in somecases by provoking conflict spirals when they overemphasize deterrence; in other cases by inviting attacks when they over-emphasize reassurance. Similarly, policy makers can err by over-protecting their short term security through heavy defense spending and foreign adventures while compromising their long-term security by neglecting investment needs and consumer demands (Kennedy, 1987). This imperial overstretch argument is widely viewed as at least a partial explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union (its advocates including Mikhail Gorbachev--Lebow and Stein, 1994).

It would be a mistake to imply that policy makers are oblivious to trade-offs. Although complex trade-off reasoning is rare in public speeches, policy makers may know more than they let be known. Acknowledging trade-offs can be embarrassing. In addition, some policy makers display an awareness of trade-offs even in public pronouncements. Content analysis of the political rhetoric of Gorbachev and his political allies revealed considerable sensitivity to the multi-faceted trade-offs that had to be made by the Soviet Union if it were to survive, in Gorbachev's words, into the next century in a manner befitting a great power (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989a). Of course, as Gorbachev's career illustrates, holding a complex view of the trade-off structure of one's environment is no guarantee that one will traverse the terrain successfully.

It would also be a mistake to imply that trade-off avoidance invariably leads to disaster. It may sometimes be prudent to wait. An expanding economy or evolving international scene may eliminate the need for trade-offs that sensible people once considered unavoidable. Passing the buck may be an effective way to diffuse blame for policies that inevitably impose losses on constituencies that politicians cannot afford to antagonize. And simple lexicographic decision rules may yield decisions in many environments that are almost as good as those yielded by much more exhaustive, but also exhausting, utility-maximization algorithms.

(6) Framing effects. Prospect theory asserts that choice is influenced by how a decision problem is "framed" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When a problem entails high probability of gain, people tend to be risk-averse; when it entails high probability of loss, people tend to be risk-seeking. This prediction has been supported in numerous experiments (Bazerman, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) as well as in case studies of foreign policy decisions (Farnham, 1992; Levy, 1992).

Framing effects can create severe impediments in international negotiations (Bazerman, 1986; Jervis, 1989). When negotiators view their own concessions as losses and concessions by the opponent as gains, the subjective value of the former will greatly outweigh the subjective value of the latter. Both sides will therefore perceive a "fair" deal to be one in which the opponent makes many more concessions--hardly conducive to reaching agreements. “Reactive devaluation” makes matter even worse. When both sides distrust each other, concessions by the other side are often minimized for the simple (not inherently invalid) reason that the other side made them (Ross & Griffin, 1991). For instance, in 1981, President Reagan unveiled his zero-option proposal calling for the Soviet dismantling of hundreds of intermediate-range missiles (SS-20s) in eastern Europe while the United States would refrain from deploying new missiles in western Europe. The Kremlin categorically rejected this proposal. In 1986, however, the new Soviet leadership embraced the original zero-option plan and agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides. Gorbachev's concessions stunned many Western observers, who now assumed that the zero-option must favor the Soviets because of their conventional superiority and urged the United States to wiggle out of the potential agreement.

As prospect theory has emerged as the leading alternative to expected utility theory for explaining for decision making under risk, its influence has proliferated throughout international relations. Levy (1992) notes a host of real-world observations on bargaining, deterrence and the causes of war that are consistent with the spirit of prospect theory: 1) it is easier to defend the status quo than to defend a recent gain; 2) forcing a party to do something ("compellence") is more difficult than preventing a party from doing something (deterrence); 3) conflict is more likely when a state believes that it will suffer losses if it does not fight; 4) superpower intervention will be more likely if the client state is suffering; 5) intervention for the sake of a client's gain is not as likely as intervention to prevent loss; 6) states motivated by fear of loss are especially likely to engage in risky escalation.

Although prospect theory fits these observations nicely, much has been lost in the translation from the laboratory literature (in which researchers can manipulate the framing and likelihood of outcomes) to historical accounts of world politics (Boettcher, 1995). One critical issue for non-tautological applications of prospect theory is "renormalization"--the process of adjusting the reference point after a loss or gain has occurred. Jervis (1992a) speculates that decision makers renormalize much more quickly for gains (what they have recently acquired quickly becomes part of their endowment) than for losses (they may grieve for centuries over their setbacks, nurturing irredentist dreams of revenge and reconquest). The need remains, however, for reliable and valid research methods -- such as content analysis of group discussions (Levi & Whyte, 1996) -- for determining whether a specific actor at a specific historical juncture is in a loss or gain frame of mind. An equally critical issue concerns how the risk preferences of individuals are amplified or attenuated by group processes such as diffusion of responsibility, persuasive arguments, cultural norms, and political competition for power (Vertzberger, 1995). This argument reminds us of the need to be vigilant to the ever-shifting dimensions of value on which people may be risk-averse or risk-seeking. Normally cautious military leaders may suddenly become recklessly obdurate when issues of honor and identity are at stake. Saddam Hussein, just prior to the annihilation of his armies in Kuwait, is reported to have invoked an old Arab aphorism that “it is better to be a rooster for a day than a chicken for all eternity” (Post, 1992).

C. Are Psychologists Biased to Detect Bias?

The preceding section has but skimmed the surface of the voluminous literature on cognitive shortcomings. Although most research has taken place in laboratory settings, accumulating case-study and content analysis evidence indicates that policy makers are not immune to these effects. Researchers have emphasized the role that these cognitive processes can play in creating conflicts that might have been avoided had decision makers seen the situation more accurately. It is worth noting, however, that these same judgmental biases can attenuate as well as exacerbate conflicts. Much depends on the geopolitical circumstances. The fundamental attribution error can alert us quickly to the presence of predatory powers; simplistic analogies are sometimes apt; belief perseverance can prevent us from abandoning veridical assessments in response to "disinformation" campaigns; and high-risk policies sometimes yield big pay-offs. Indeed, efforts to eliminate these “biases” through institutional checks and balances are likely to be resisted by skeptics who argue that these cognitive tendencies are often functional. Consider overconfidence. Some psychologists have made a strong case that when this “judgmental bias” takes the form of infectious “can-do” optimism, it promotes occupational success and mental health (Seligman, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988). And this argument strikes a resonant chord within the policy community. To paraphrase Dean Acheson's response to Richard Neustadt (both of whom advised John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis): "I know your advice, Professor. You think the President needs to be warned. But you're wrong. The President needs to be given confidence." This anecdote illustrates the dramatically different normative theories of decision making that may guide policy elites from different historical periods, cultural backgrounds, and ideological traditions. Advice that strikes some academic observers as obviously sound will strike some policy elites as equally obviously flawed. Decision analysts face an uphill battle in convincing skeptics that the benefits of their prescriptions outweigh the costs. Whether or not they acknowledge it, policy makers must decide how to decide (Payne et al., 1992) by balancing the estimated benefits of complex, self-critical analysis against the psychological and political costs. What increments in predictive accuracy and decision quality is it reasonable to expect from seeking out additional evidence and weighing counterarguments? Some observers see enormous potential improvement (e.g., Janis, 1989); others suspect that policy makers are already shrewd cognitive managers skilled at identifying when they have reached the point of diminishing analytical returns (e.g. Suedfeld, 1992b). These strong prescriptive conclusions rest, however, on weak evidentiary foundations. We know remarkably little about the actual relations between styles of reasoning and judgmental accuracy in the political arena (Tetlock, 1992b).

D. Motivational processes

Neorealist assumptions of rationality can be challenged not only on “cold” cognitive grounds, but also on “hot” motivational grounds (Lebow & Stein, 1993). Decision-making, perhaps especially in crises, may be more driven by wishful thinking, self-justification, and the ebb and flow of human emotions than it is by dispassionate calculations of power. It is unwise, however, to dichotomize these theoretical options. Far from being mutually exclusive, cognitive and motivational processes are closely intertwined. Cognitive appraisals activate motives that, in turn, shape perceptions of the world. This sub-section organizes work on motivational bias into two categories: (a) generic processes of stress, anger, indignation, and coping hypothesized to apply to all human beings whenever the necessary activating conditions are satisfied; (b) individual differences in goals, motives, and orientations to the world hypothesized to generalize across a variety of contexts.

(1) Disruptive-Stress and Crisis Decision-Making. Policy-makers rarely have a lot of time to consider alternative courses of action. They frequently work under stressful conditions in which they must process large amounts of inconsistent information under severe time pressure, always with the knowledge that miscalculations may have serious consequences for both their own careers and vital national interests( C. Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1972, 1989). This combination of an imperative demand for crucial decisions to be made quickly, with massive information overload, is a form of psychological stress likely to reduce the information processing capacity of the individuals involved (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977).

Both experimental and content analysis studies of archival records offer suggestive support for this hypothesis. The laboratory literature has repeatedly documented that stress -- beyond a hypothetical optimum -- impairs complex information processing (for examples see Gilbert, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Streufert & Streufert, 1978; Svenson & Maules, 1994). Impairment can take many forms, including a lessened likelihood of accurately discriminating among unfamiliar stimuli, an increased likelihood of relying on simple heuristics, rigid reliance on old, now inappropriate, problem-solving strategies, reduced search for new information, and intolerance for inconsistent evidence (Janis & Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).

Archival studies reinforce these pessimistic conclusions, most notably, the work of Suedfeld and colleagues on declining integrative complexity in response to international tension (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Maoz & Shayer, 1992; Raphael, 1982; Suedfeld, 1992). These downward shifts are especially pronounced in crises that culminate in war. It is tempting here to tell a causal story in which crisis-induced stress impairs the capacity to identify viable integratively complex compromises, thereby contributing to the violent outcome. It is, however, wise to resist temptation in this case -- at least until two issues are resolved. First, falling integrative complexity may be a sign not of simplification and rigidification of mental representations but rather of a quite deliberate and self-conscious hardening of bargaining positions. Policy-makers may decide to lower their integrative complexity (closing loopholes, eliminating qualifications, denying trade-offs, and disengaging from empathic role-taking) as a means of communicating firmness of resolve to adversaries (Tetlock, 1985). Here, we need more studies that trace shifts in cognitive and integrative complexity in both private (intragovernmental) and public (intergovernmental) documents (Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld, 1995; Levi & Tetlock, 1980; Walker & Watson, 1994). Second, there are numerous exceptions to the generalization that high stress produces cognitive simplification. Individual decision makers and decision making groups have sometimes risen to the challenge and responded to intensely stressful circumstances in a complex and nuanced fashion (Brecher, 1993). For instance, during the Entebbe crisis (Maoz, 1981), and the Middle East crisis of 1967 (Stein and Tanter, 1980), Israeli policy makers performed effectively under great stress. They considered numerous options, assessed the consequences of these options in a probabilistic manner, traded off values, and demonstrated an openness to new information.

The theoretical challenge isidentify when crisis-induced stress does and does not promote simplification of thought. One approach is to look for quantitative moderator variables such as intensity of stress that fit the rather complex and nonlinear pattern of cognitive performance data (Streufert & Streufert, 1978). Another approach is to look for qualitative moderator variables that activate simple or complex coping strategies. For instance, the Janis and Mann conflict model predicts simplification and rigidification of thought (“defensive avoidance”) only when decision makers confront a genuine dilemma in which they must choose between two equally unpleasant alternatives and are pessimistic about finding a more palatable alternative in the time available. Under these conditions, decision makers are predicted to choose and bolster one of the options, focusing on its strengths and the other options’ weaknesses (thereby spreading the alternatives). By contrast, when decision makers are more optimistic about finding an acceptable solution in the available time, but still perceive serious risks (and hence are under considerable stress), they will shift into vigilant patterns of information processing in which they balance conflicting risks in a reasonably dispassionate and thoughtful way.

In a programmatic effort to apply the Janis and Mann (1977) model, Lebow (1981) and Lebow and Stein (1987, 1994) have focused on crises in which policies of deterrence apparently failed. Specifically, they propose that “aggressive” challengers to the status quo are often caught in decisional dilemmas likely to activate defensive avoidance and bias their assessments of risk. For instance, Argentina’s leaders felt that they had to do something dramatic to deflect domestic unrest in 1982, relied on the classic Shakespearian tactic of “busying giddy minds with foreign quarrels” and invaded the Falklands, and then convinced themselves that Britain would protest but ultimately acquiesce. In a similar vein, in 1962, Soviet leaders reacted to an apparently otherwise intractable strategic problem -- vast American superiority in ICBM’s -- by placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba and then convincing themselves that the United States would accept the fait accompli. In Lebow and Stein’s view, efforts to deter policy-makers engaging in defensive avoidance are often counter-productive, fueling the feelings of insecurity and desperation that inspired the original challenge.

(2) Justice Motive and Moral Outrage. Welch (1993) challenged the core motivational axioms of neorealism by proposing thatmost Great Power decisions to go to war over the last 150 years have been driven not by security and power goals but rather by a concern for "justice". To activate the justice motive, one must convince oneself that the other side threatens something -- territory, resources, status -- to which one is entitled (cf. Lerner, 1977). The resulting reaction is not cold, rational and calculating, but rather emotional, self-righteous, moralistic, and simplistic. Outrage triggered by perceived threats to entitlements provides the psychological momentum for dehumanizing adversaries, deactivating the normative constraints on killing them, and taking big risks to achieve ambitious objectives.

Welch carefully tries to show that the justice motive is not just a rhetorical ploy for arousing the masses by demonstrating its influence on private deliberations as well as on public posturing. The inferential problems, however, run deeper than the familiar "do-leaders-really-believe-what-they-are-saying?" debate. Welch assigns causal primacy to moral sentiments and that requires demonstrating that those sentiments are not epiphenomenal rationalizations -- perhaps sincerely believed but all the same driven by the material interests at stake. Proponents of prospect theory might be tempted to treat Welch’s examples of the justice motive as special cases of loss aversion. And cognitive dissonance theory warns us not to underestimate the human capacity for self-deception and self-justification. One of social psychology's more frustrating contributions to world politics may be to highlight the futility of many debates on the reducibility of ideas to interests. The line between moral entitlement and material interest may seem logically sharp but in practice it is often psychologically blurry.

(3) Biomedical Constraints. Policy-makers are human beings (despite occasional attempts by propagandists to obscure that fact) and, as such, subject to the scourges of the flesh. There is now much evidence that cerebral-vascular and neurological illnesses have impaired policy judgment at several junctures in modern diplomatic history (Park, 1986; Post and Robbins, 1993). One can make a good case, for example, that the origins and course of World War II cannot be understood without knowledge of the health of key players at critical choice points. It is well documented that: (a) Paul von Hindenburg, Hitler’s predecessor as Chancellor of Germany, showed serious signs of senility before passing the torch to his tyrannical successor (at a time when resistance was still an option); (b) Ramsay MacDonald (British Prime Minister) and Jozef Pilsudski (Polish head of state) showed palpable signs of mental fatigue in the early 1930's -- exactly when assertive British and Polish action might have nipped the Nazi regime in the bud; (c) During the latter part of World War II, Hitler showed symptoms of Parkinson’s disease and suffered serious side-effects from the dubious concoctions of drugs that his doctors prescribed; (d) Between 1943 and 1945, Franklin Roosevelt suffered from atherosclerosis and acute hypertension as well as from a clouding of consciousness known as “encephalopathy”.

Claims of biomedical causation do, however, sometimes prove controversial. Consider the debate concerning Woodrow Wilson’s rigidity in the wake of World War I when he needed to be tactically flexible in piecing together the Congressional support for American entry into the League of Nations. Whereas George and George (1981) offer a neo-Adlerian interpretation that depicts Wilson as a victim of narcissistic personality disorder in which threats to an idealized self-image, especially from people resembling authority figures from the past, trigger rigid ego-defensive reactions, neurologists trace the same combination of traits -- stubbornness, overconfidence, suspiciousness -- to the hypertension and cerebral-vascular disease that ultimately led to Wilson’s devastating stroke and death (Weinstein et al., 1978).

(3) Personality and policy preferences. From a neorealist perspective, foreign policy is constrained by the logic of power within the international system. Individual differences among political elites are thus largely inconsequential--virtually everyone who matters will agree on what constitutes the "rational" response. Although some crises do produce such unanimity (e.g., the American response to the attack on Pearl Harbor), in most cases large differences of opinion arise. By combining laboratory and archival studies, researchers have built a rather convincing case for some systematic personality influences on foreign policy (Etheredge, 1980; Greenstein, 1975; M. Hermann, 1977, 1987; Runyan, 1988; Tetlock, 1981a; Walker, 1983; Winter, 1992).

(I) Interpersonal Generalization. This hypothesis depicts foreign policy preferences as extensions of how people act toward others in their everyday lives. In archival analyses of disagreements among American policy makers between 1898 and 1984, Etheredge (1980) and Shephard (1988) found that policy preferences were closely linked to personality variables. Working from biographical data on the personal relationships of political leaders, coders rated leaders on interpersonal dominance (strong need to have their way and tendency to respond angrily when thwarted) and extroversion (strong need to be in the company of others). As predicted, dominant leaders were more likely to resort to force than their less dominant colleagues and extroverted leaders advocated more conciliatory policies than their more introverted colleagues. Laboratory work suggests causal pathways for these effects, including perceptual mediators (dominant people see high-pressure tactics as more efficacious) and motivational mediators (dominant people try to maximize their relative gains over others (like neorealists) whereas less dominant people try to maximize either absolute gains (like neoclassical economists) or joint gains (like communitarian team players)). (See Bem and Funder, 1978; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Sternberg and Soriano, 1984).

(ii) Motivational Imagery. In a programmatic series of studies, Winter (1993) has adapted the content analysis systems for assessing motivational imagery in the semi-projective Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to analyze the private and public statements of world leaders. He has also proposed a psychodynamic conflict-spiral model which posits that combinations of high power motivation and low affiliation motivation encourage resort to force in international relations. Winter (1993) tested this prediction against archival materials drawn from three centuries of British history, from British-German communications prior to World War I, and from American-Soviet communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In each case, Winter observed the predicted correlations between motives and war versus peace. In another study, Peterson, Winter, and Doty (1994) linked motivational theory to processes of misperception hypothesized to occur in conflict spirals (cf. Kelman & Bloom, 1973). In this integrative model, international conflicts escalate to violence when three conditions are satisfied: a) there are high levels of power motivation in the leadership of both countries; b) each side exaggerates the power imagery in communications from the other side; c) each side expresses more power motivation in response to its exaggerated perceptions of the power motivation of the other side. In ingenious laboratory simulations, Peterson et al. used letters exchanged in an actual crisis as stimulus materials and showed that subjects with high power motivation were especially likely to see high power motivation in communications from the other side and to recommend the use of force.

The motive-imagery explanation is parsimonious. The same content analytic method yields similar relationships across experimental and archival settings. But the interpretive difficulty is the same as that encountered in integrative complexity research: the possibility of spurious multi-method convergence. Political statements cannot be taken as face-value reflections of intrapsychic processes. Leaders use political statements both to express internalized beliefs and goals as well as to influence the impressions that others form of how leaders think. There are already good reasons for supposing that people can strategically raise and lower their integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1981a, 1992a) and it would be surprising if motivational imagery were not also responsive to shifts in impression management goals.

(iii) Computerized content-analytic programs. In contrast to the complex semantic and pragmatic judgments required in integrative-complexity and motive-imagery coding, Hermann (1980, 1987) has developed computerized methods of text analysis that rely on individual word and co-occurrence counts and are designed to assess an extensive array of belief system and interpersonal style variables studied in the personality literature (including nationalism, trust, cognitive complexity, locus of control and achievement, affiliation, and power motives). Although we know less than we need to know about the interrelations among content analytic measures of similar theoretical constructs (but see Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, and Walker, 1991) we have learned a good deal about the political and behavioral correlates of Hermann’s indicators. For instance, nationalism/ethnocentrism and distrust of others are two well-replicated components of authoritarianism and, within samples of national leaders, tend to be linked to hostility and negative affect toward other nations and an unwillingness to come to their aid. Hermann’s measure of cognitive complexity tends to be linked to expressing positive affect toward other states and to receiving positive responses from them. These two results are strikingly compatible with Tetlock’s (1981b) work on isolationism and (1985) work on American and Soviet foreign policy rhetoric. As with Winter’s, Suedfeld's and Tetlock’s work, there is, however, the troublesome difficulty of disentangling intrapsychic from impression management explanations. Are we measuring underlying psychological processes or public posturing?

E. Placing Psychological Processes

In Political Context. Thus far, we have been content to identify cognitive and motivational processes and to ask (a)how well do the hypothesized processes hold up in this or that politicalcontext?; (b) what political consequences flow from the operation of the hypothesized processes?; (c) does the cumulative weight of multi-method evidence give us strong grounds for doubting rational-actor models of world politics?

Policy-makers do not, however, function in a social vacuum. Most national security decisions are collective products, the result of intensive interactions among small groups, each of which represents a major bureaucratic, economic, or political constituency to whom decision-makers feel accountable in varying ways and degrees. Considerations such as “Could I justify this proposal or agreement to group x or y?” loom large in biographical, autobiographical and historical accounts of governmental decision-making. Indeed, the major function of thought in political contexts is arguably the anticipatory testing of political accounts for alternative courses of actions: If “we” did this, what would “they” say? How could we reply? Who would emerge from the resulting symbolic exchange in a more favorable light? (Cf. Farnham, 1990; Kramer, 1995; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1992a).

The key question now becomes how cognitive and motivational properties of individual decision-makers interact with the matrix of political accountability relationships within which those decision-makers live and work. The literature points to a panoply of possibilities. Certain types of political accountability magnify shortcomings of individual judgement; other types check these shortcomings. There is plenty of room for argument, however, over whether any given accountability arrangement falls in the former or latter category (where, for example, should we place democratic accountability?) And, once again, there is vigorous disagreement over exactly what counts as "improvement" in the quality of judgement and choice. (For more detailed taxonomies of foreign policy-making systems, see Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Hermann & Preston, 1994; t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1995.)

1. Accountability demands likely to amplify deviations from rational-actor standards. The experimental literature suggests at least three sets of conditions (often satisfied in foreign policy settings) in which pressures to justify one’s decisions will interfere with high-quality decision-making: (a) one is accountable to an important constituency whose judgment is deeply flawed; (b) one feels insulated from accountability to out-groups but is highly motivated to please a homogeneous and self-satisfied in-group (as in “groupthink”); (c) one is accountable for difficult-to-reverse decisions that cast doubt on one’s competence or morality.

(I) The perils of foolish audiences. Decision-makers sometimes experience intense pressure to subordinate their own preferences to those of the constituency to whom they must answer (because their jobs, sometimes even their lives, depend on doing so). Insofar as decision-makers find themselves accountable to a fickle, superficial or impulsive constituency, the result will often be a decision considerably worse than the one they would have made on their own.

This process can occur in dictatorships or in democracies. In dictatorships, the argument reminds us that enormous power might be centralized in pathological personalities (Hitlers, Stalins, Saddam Husseins,...)whose judgment no senior advisor dares to challenge. In democracies, the argument reminds us that leaders are ultimately accountable to public opinion which, in the foreign policy domain, has historically been characterized as ill-informed, volatile and incoherent. Half a century ago, Gabriel Almond warned that the net effect of public opinion was to increase “irrationality” (1950, p. 239). And George Kennan (1951, p. 59) saw democratic accountability and rational foreign policy as inherently incompatible, comparing democracies to a "dinosaur with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath -- in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.”

Although more recent analyses cast some doubt on this view of public opinion in general (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Sniderman et al., 1996) and of foreign policy attitudes in particular (Holsti, 1992; Russett, 1990), (but see Zaller, 1991), there is still a strong case against tight democratic oversight of foreign policy (Kissinger, 1993). This elitist position -- “let the professionals get on with the job” -- carries, however, its own risks. Lack of accountability can lead to lack of responsiveness to the legitimate concerns of now-excluded constituencies. For every example that the elitists can invoke (e.g., F.D.R. was far more alert to the Nazi threat than was the isolationist public in the 1930's), the proponents of democratic accountability can offer a counter example (e.g., the “best and the brightest” of the Kennedy-Johnson administration had to mobilize an apathetic public to support American intervention in Vietnam in the 1960's). The proponents of democratic accountability can also point to a remarkably robust statistical generalization: democracies virtually never go to war against each other (Russett, 1996), although they are no less prone to war with dictatorships. The mechanisms--psychological and institutional--underlying this "democratic-peace effect" remain controversial but the finding should give pause to those who argue that elites, left to their own devices, are best equipped to run foreign policy.

The foregoing analysis points to good arguments for both loose and tight democratic oversight of foreign policy. The deeper challenge is how to manage the inevitable trade-off between the demands of short-run accountability (maximize immediate public approval) and long-run accountability (craft foreign policies that may be unpopular now but yield benefits over several decades). This “accountability dilemma" (March and Olson, 1995) was the subject of intense debate two centuries ago (Burke 1774/1965)-- debate that continues to rage today (especially in domains thought too esoteric for public comprehension like monetary and foreign policy) and will probably rage two centuries hence.

(ii) The perils of oligarchy. With the noteworthy exceptions of totalitarian states that centralize extraordinary authority in one person whose will is law (Bullock, 1991), accountability in the political world rarely reaches the zero point. Accountability can, however, become intellectually incestuous when policy makers expect to answer only to like-minded colleagues and constituencies. This concentration of accountability to an in-group is a defining feature of groupthink (Janis, 1982). The combination of opinionated leadership, insulation from external critics, and intolerance of dissent often appears sufficient to amplify already dangerous tendencies in individual judgment. Groupthink decision-makers are more prone to jump to premature conclusions, to dismiss contradictory evidence, to deny trade-offs, to bolster preferred options, to suppress dissent within the group and to display excessive optimism. According to Janis, the result is often the undertaking of ill-conceived foreign policy projects that lead to disastrous consequences such as provoking Chinese intervention in the Korean war, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Janis contrasted these “fiascoes” with cases such as the Marshall Plan and Cuban Missile Crisis in which policy-making groups adopted a much more self-critical and thoughtful style of decision-making and which led to far more satisfactory outcomes (given the values of the decision-makers).

Janis’s case studies represent the best-known effort to apply work on group dynamics to elite political settings. The groupthink model does, however, have serious limitations (t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1995). First, the evidence -- from case studies to experiments -- is mixed. Close inspection of case studies underscores the ambiguity of many diagnoses of “groupthink” in foreign policy contexts. For example, comparing Berman’s (1982) and Janis’s (1982) accounts of Johnson’s decision to intervene in Vietnam, one almost needs to be a mindreader to determine whether: (a) a manipulative Johnson had made up his mind in advance and used group deliberations merely to justify a predetermined policy; (b) an uncertain Johnson leaned heavily upon a cliquish advisory group for cognitive and emotional support. Equally mixed is the content analytic and Q-sort evidence (Tetlock, 1979; Tetlock et al., 1992; Walker & Watson, 1994). These studies have supported some aspects of the model (increased rigidity and self-righteousness in hypothesized cases of groupthink) but not others (there is little evidence that cohesiveness alone or in interaction with other antecedents contributes to defective decision-making). And laboratory studies have been even less supportive of the hypothesized necessary and sufficient conditions for defective decision-making (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Turner et al., 1993) -- although defenders of the model can always invoke the external-validity argument that experimental manipulations pale next to their dramatic real-life counterparts.

Second, the groupthink model oversimplifies process-outcome linkages in world politics and probably other spheres of life (t’Hart, 1994; Tetlock et al., 1992). It is easy to identify cases in which concurrence-seeking has been associated with outcomes that most observers now applaud (e.g., Churchill’s suppression of dissent in cabinet meetings in 1940-41 when some members of the British government favored a negotiated peace with Hitler) and cases in which vigilant decision-making has been associated with outcomes that left group members bitterly disappointed (e.g., Carter encouraged rather vigorous debate over the wisdom of the hostage-rescue mission in Iran in 1980). The correlation between quality of process and of outcome was perfectly positive in Janis’ (1982) case studies but is likely to be much lower in more comprehensive samplings of decision-making episodes (Bovens & t’Hart, 1996). We need contingency theories that identify: (a) the distinctive patterns of group decision-making that lead, under specified circumstances, to political success or failure (Stern & Sundelius, 1995; Vertzberger, 1995); (b) the diverse organizational and societal functions that leadership groups serve. Groups do not just exist to solve external problems; they provide symbolic arenas in which, among other things, bureaucratic and political conflicts can be expressed, support for shared values can be reaffirmed and potentially divisive trade-offs can be concealed (t’Hart, 1995). As with cognitive biases, patterns of group decision-making judged maladaptive within a functionalist framework that stresses scientific problem-solving appear quite reasonable from functionalist perspectives that stress other imperatives such as the needs for quick, decisive action, forging a united front and mobilizing external support.

(iii) The perils of backing people into a corner. The timing of accountability can be critical in political decision-making. Experimental work suggests (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw, 1980; Tetlock, 1992a), and case studies tend to confirm, that policy makers who are accountable for decisions that they cannot easily reverse often concentrate mental effort on justifying these earlier commitments rather than finding optimal courses of action given current constraints. These exercises in retrospective rationality -- whether viewed as dissonance reduction or impression management -- will tend to be especially intense to the degree that earlier decisions cast doubt on decision-makers’ integrity or ability.

Situations of this sort -- military quagmires such as Vietnams and Afghanistans or financial quagmires such as unpromising World Bank projects with large sunk costs -- are common in political life. Indeed, the primary job of opposition parties in democracies is to find fault with the government and to refute the justifications and excuses that the government offers in its defense. The psychodynamics of justification become politically consequential when they extend beyond verbal sparring at press conferences and bias policy appraisals. After all, if one convinces oneself and perhaps others that a bad decision worked out pretty well, it starts to seem reasonable to channel even more resources into the same cause. Such sincerity can be deadly when decision-makers must choose among courses of action in international confrontations under the watchful eyes of domestic political audiences (Fearon, 1994).

2. Accountability demands likely to motivate self-critical thought. The experimental literature also identifies two sets of conditions (often satisfied in foreign policy settings) in which justification pressures will encourage high-quality decision-making: (a) one is not locked into any prior attitudinal commitments and one is accountable to an external constituency whose judgement one respects and whose own views are unknown; (b) one is accountable to multiple constituencies that make contradictory but not hopelessly irreconcilable demands.

(I) The benefits of normative ambiguity. In many institutions, there is a powerful temptation to curry the favor of those to whom one must answer. The right answer becomes whatever protects one’s political identity. This incentive structure can encourage a certain superficiality and rigidity of thought. One possible corrective -- proposed by George (1972) and Janis (1982) -- is to create ambiguity within the organization concerning the nature of the right answer. The rationale is straightforward: ambiguity will motivate information search. People will try to anticipate a wider range of objections that a wider range of critics might raise to their policy proposals. Moreover, insofar as people do not feel “frozen” into previous public commitments, people will not simply attempt to refute potential objections; they will attempt to incorporate those “reasonable” objections into their own cognitive structure, resulting in a richer, dialectically complex, representation of the problem (Tetlock, 1992a). From this perspective, wise leaders keep subordinates guessing about what the “right answer” is.

(ii) The benefits of political pluralism. A long and illustrious tradition upholds the cognitive benefits of political pluralism (Dahl, 1989; George, 1980; Mill, 1857/1960). Political elites can be compelled to be more tolerant and open-minded than they otherwise would have been by holding them accountable to many constituencies whose voices cannot be easily silenced. There is considerable experimental evidence to support this view (Nemeth and Staw, 1989; Tetlock, 1992a) -- although paralysis in the form of chronic buckpassing and procrastination is always a danger (Janis & Mann, 1977; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994).

Accountability cross-pressure is arguably the defining feature of life for international negotiators who must cope with “two-level games” (Evans et al., 1992; Putnam, 1988) that require simultaneously satisfying international adversaries as well as domestic constituencies, including government bureaucracies, interest groups, legislative factions, and the general public. Negotiators who rely on the simple “acceptability” heuristic will generally fail in this environment either because they put too much weight on reaching agreement with other powers (and lose credibility with domestic constituencies) or because they concede too much veto power to domestic audiences (and lose necessary bargaining flexibility with other powers). Drawing on Pruitt’s (1981) model of negotiation behavior, decision-makers who are subject to high role or value conflict -- who want to achieve positive outcomes for both sides -- are most likely to search vigilantly for viable integrative agreements that fall within the “win-sets” of both domestic constituencies and international negotiating partners. There is a reasonable chance, moreover, that their search will be successful, permitting agreements that hitherto seemed impossible because observers had fallen prey to the “fixed-pie” fallacy and concluded that positive-sum conflicts were zero-sum (Thompson, 1990). To take two recent momentous examples, most experts in 1988 thought a negotiated, peaceful transition to multiracial democracy in South Africa or an Israeli - P.L.O. peace treaty was either improbable or impossible in the next 10 years (Tetlock, 1992b). Unusually integratively complex leadership of the key political movements may well have played a key role in confuting the expert consensus (cf. Kelman, 1983). But the rewards of searching for integratively complex agreements will be meager when the intersection of win-sets is the null set. Instead of being short-listed for Nobel peace prizes, some integratively complex compromisers -- those who tried to reconcile American democracy and slavery in the 1850's or British security and Nazism in the 1930's -- find themselves denounced in the historical docket as unprincipled appeasers (Tetlock et al., 1994; Tetlock & Tyler, 1996).

F. Reprise

he literature gives us many reasons for suspecting that the policy process deviates, sometimes dramatically, from the rational actor baseline. One could, however, make a social psychological case that rationality is not a bad first-order approximation of decision-making in world politics. The argument would stress the elaborate procedures employed in many states to screen out “irrational decision-makers”, the intricate checks and balances designed to minimize the influence of deviant decision-makers who get through the screening mechanisms, the intense accountability pressures on decision-makers to make choices in a rigorous, security-maximizing fashion, and the magnitude of the decision-making stakes and the capacity of people to shift into more vigilant modes of thinking in response to situational incentives (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). On balance though, the case for error and bias is still stronger than the case for pure rationality. Some biases and errors appear to be rooted in fundamental associative laws of memory (e.g., priming of analogies and metaphors) and psychophysical laws of perception (e.g., status quo as reference point) where individual differences are weak and incentive effects are negligible (Arkes, 1991; Camerer, 1995). Nonetheless, the choice is not either/or, and the literature itself may be biased in favor of ferreting out bloopers that enhance the prestige of psychological critics who enjoy the benefits of hindsight. As a discipline, we need to be at least as self-critical as we urge others to be.

II. Psychological Challenges to Neorealist Rationality

A. Neorealism

The dominant paradigm. Neorealism is often misleadingly portrayed as an anti-psychological theory of world politics (Waltz, 1959,1979). Neorealism could, however, just as justifiably be viewed as an unusually parsimonious psychological theory that:

(a) characterizes the environment within which states must survive as ruthlessly competitive -- a world in which the strong do what they will and the weak accept what they must (Thucydides, 400 B.C./1972). Each state is only as safe as it can make itself by its own efforts or by entering into protective alliances. Moreover, there is no value in appealing to shared norms of fairness or to the enforcement power of a "sovereign" because there are no shared norms and no world government to hold norm violators accountable;

(b) assumes that, to survive in this anarchic or self-help environment, decision-makers must act like egoistic rationalists (in clinical language, calculating psychopaths). They must be clear-sighted in appraising threats, methodical in evaluating options, and unsentimental in forming and abandoning "friendships." Altruists and fuzzy thinkers are speedily selected out of the system, thereby minimizing variation, at least in security policy, among states;

(c) makes no claims to predicting specific policy initiatives of states but does claim to explain long-term historical patterns of "balancing" among states designed to prevent the emergence of global hegemons (hence the embracing of such ideological odd couples as Churchill and Stalin in World War II or Nixon and Mao in the 1970's). Some neorealists also claim to identify the conditions under which war is especially likely (e.g., power transitions in multipolar systems in which regional hegemons are in relative decline vis-a-vis emerging challengers -- Gilpin, 1981).

Although neoliberal and social-constructivist critics denounce neorealism as theoretically simplistic and sometimes even ethically unsavory (Katzenstein, 1996; Keohane, 1984; Kratochwil, 1989; Wendt, 1992), many scholars find it useful as a crude first-order approximation of world politics. Neorealism calls our attention to the structural incentives for pursuing "balance-of-power" policies. From Thucydides to Bismarck to Kissinger, the analytical challenge has been to anticipate geopolitical threats and opportunities. The logic of the "security dilemma" implies that we should expect a high baseline of competition. In an anarchic system, each state is responsible for its own security which it attempts to achieve by building up its military capabilities, its economic infrastructure, and its alliances with other states. Often other states cannot easily differentiate defensive from offensive strategies and respond by making their own preparations, which can also be mistaken for offensive preparations, triggering further "defensive activity" and so the cycle goes.

Most neorealists and game theorists, do, however, allow for the possibility of cooperation. They expect cooperation when that response is indeed prudent--specifically, when the penalties for non-cooperation are steep (e.g., violating an arms-control agreement would motivate the other side to develop destabilizing first-strike weapons), the rewards of cooperation are high (e.g., the economic and security benefits of some form of détente), and the "shadow of the future" looms large (it does not pay to cross an adversary with whom one expects to deal over a prolonged period). Some neorealists argue that all three conditions were clearly satisfied in the American-Soviet relationship of the late 1980s. The Reagan defense build-up made clear to the Soviets that the penalties for non-cooperation were steep (sharp Western responses to the Soviet build-up of ICBMs, to SS20s in eastern Europe, and to Soviet interventions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola); the prospect of revitalizing the moribund Soviet economy by redirecting scarce resources from defense to economic restructuring enhanced the rewards of cooperation; and the shadow of the future looked ominous (it seems rash to antagonize adversaries who have decisive technological and economic advantages in long-term competition). Gorbachev, in short, did not have to be a nice guy and political psychologists who made such trait attributions succumbed to one of their own favorite biases--the "fundamental attribution error." Why invoke altruism when enlightened self-interest is up to the explanatory task? The Soviet empire -- like the Roman, Byzantine, and Venetian empires before it -- simply tried to slow its relative decline by strategically abandoning initially peripheral and then increasingly core commitments (Gilpin, 1981).

Whatever neorealism's merits as an explanation for geostrategic maneuvering over the centuries, the theory is -- from a social psychological perspective -- suffocatingly restrictive. Objections can be organized under three headings. First, sociological theorists have challenged whether international politics is truly anarchic. The mere absence of effective world government does not automatically imply that world politics is a Hobbesian war of all against all (Barkdull, 1995). A powerful case can be made that shared normative understandings -- sometimes formally enforced by international institutions -- standardize expectations within security and economic communities about who is allowed to do what to whom (Deutsch, 1957; Katzenstein, 1996; Ruggie, 1986). Second, historically-minded theorists have challenged the neorealist view of national interest as something that rational actors directly deduce from the distribution of economic-military power in the international system and their own state's location in that system. Conceptions of national interest sometimes change dramatically and are linked to social and intellectual trends that are difficult, if not impossible, to reduce to standard geostrategic computations of power (Mueller, 1989). Policies deemed essential to national security in the late 19th century -- encouraging high birth rates, colonizing foreign lands -- are widely condemned in the late 20th century. And policies widely endorsed in the late 20th century – ceding components of national sovereignty to international institutions, military intervention to save the lives of citizens of other states of negligible strategic value -- would have been regarded as extraordinarily naive a century ago. In this view, it is an error to equate security with military strength (an error famously captured by Stalin's pithy dismissal of Vatican protests: "How many divisions does the Pope have?"). Finally, cognitive theorists have challenged the notion that rationality -- high-quality cognitive functioning -- is a prerequisite for success, or even survival, in world politics. Just as one does not need to be a grandmaster to win every chess tournament (it depends on the cleverness of the competition), so one may not need to be an exemplar of rational decision-making to manage the security policies of most states most of the time (Tetlock, 1992b). It may suffice to be not too much worse than the other players.

B. Cognitivism

An emerging alternative research program. This three-pronged critique -- that neorealism exaggerates the anarchic nature of world politics, exaggerates the role of economic-military power in determining national interests, and exaggerates the urgency of the need for rationality -- makes room for psychological approaches to world politics. One implication of the critique is that if we seek explanations of why national decision-makers do what they do, we will have to supplement the insights of macro theories (which locate nation-states in the international power matrix) with micro assumptions about decision-makers' cognitive representations of the policy environment, their goals in that environment, and their perceptions of the normative and domestic political constraints on policy options.

The recent end of the Cold War provides a deeply instructive example. It is disconcertingly easy to generate post hoc geostrategic rationalizations for virtually anything the Soviet leadership might have chosen to do in the mid-1980's (Lebow, 1995). One could counter the earlier argument that the conciliatory Gorbachevian policies were dictated by systemic imperatives by invoking the same imperatives to explain the opposite outcome: namely, the emergence of a militantly neo-Stalinist leadership committed to holding on to superpower status by reasserting discipline on the domestic front and by devoting massive resources to defense programs? Indeed, some influential observers read the situation exactly this way in the mid-1980's (Pipes, 1986). Systemic theories do not answer the pressing policy question: Why did the Soviet leadership jump one way rather than the other?

From a cognitive perspective, the key failing of neorealism is its inability to specify how creatures of bounded rationality will cope with the causal ambiguity inherent in complex historical flows of events. The feedback that decision makers receive from their policies is often delayed and subject to widely varying interpretations. What appears prudent to one ideological faction at one time may appear foolish to other factions at other times. Consider two examples:

a) In the 1950s and 1960s, mostly conservative supporters of covert action cited the coup sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency against Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh as a good example of how to advance U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere; after the fundamentalist Islamic revolution of the late 1970s, mostly liberal opponents of covert action argued for a reappraisal;

b) In the 1970s, Soviet policy in the Third World seemed to bear fruit, with pro-Soviet governments sprouting up in such diverse locations as Indochina, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. Conservatives in Western countries warned that the Soviets were on the march and blamed the lackadaisical liberal policies of the Carter administration. By the late 1980's, however, these recently acquired geostrategic assets looked like liabilities. Conservatives claimed credit for wearing the Soviets down whereas liberals argued that the threat had existed largely in vivid anti-communist imaginations.

If this analysis is correct--if what counts as a rewarding or punishing consequence in the international environment depends on the ideological assumptions of the beholder--it is no longer adequate to "black-box" the policy-making process and limit the study of world politics to covariations between systemic input and policy outcomes. It becomes necessary to study how policy makers think about the international system. The cognitive research program in world politics rests on a pair of simple functionalist premises:

a) world politics is not only complex but also deeply ambiguous. Whenever people draw lessons from history, they rely -- implicitly or explicitly -- on speculative reconstructions of what would have happened in possible worlds of their own mental creation;

b) people--limited capacity information processors that we are--frequently resort to simplifying strategies to deal with this otherwise overwhelming complexity and uncertainty.

Policy makers, like ordinary mortals, see the world through a glass darkly--through the simplified images that they create of the international scene. Policy makers may act rationally, but only within the context of their simplified subjective representations of reality (the classic principle of bounded rationality--Simon, 1957).

To understand foreign policy, cognitivists focus on these simplified mental representations of reality that decision makers use to interpret events and choose among courses of action (Axelrod, 1976; Cottam, 1986; Jervis, 1976; George, 1969, 1980; Herrmann 1982; Holsti, 1989; Hudson, 1991; Larson, 1994; Sylvan et al., 1990; Thorson & Sylvan, 1992; Vertzberger,1990 ) . Although there is considerable disagreement on how to represent these representations (proposals include all the usual theoretical suspects: schemata, scripts, images, operational codes, belief systems, ontologies, problem representations, and associative networks), there is consensus on a key point: foreign policy belief systems have enormous cognitive utility. Belief systems provide ready answers to fundamental questions about the political world. What are the basic objectives of other states? What should our own objectives be? Can conflict be avoided and, if so, how? If not, what form is the conflict likely to take? Belief systems also facilitate decision making by providing frameworks for filling in missing counterfactual data points (if we had not done x, then disaster), for generating conditional forecasts (if we do x, then success), and for assessing the significance of the projected consequences of policies (we should count this outcome as failure and this one as success). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, belief systems often permit us to predict policy choices with a specificity that can rarely be achieved by purely systemic theories (cf. Blum, 1993; George, 1983; Herrmann, 1995; Rosati, 1984; Shimko, 1992; Tetlock, 1985; Walker, 1977; Wallace, Suedfeld, & Thachuk, 1993).

There is, however, a price to be paid for the cognitive and political benefits of a stable, internally consistent world view. Policy makers often oversimplify. Evidence has accumulated that the price of cognitive economy in world politics is--as in other domains of life--susceptibility to error and bias. The next sections consider this litany of potential errors and biases, paying special attention to those that have received sustained research attention in political contexts. The discussion then examines how motivational and social processes may amplify or attenuate hypothesized cognitive shortcomings, again with special reference to processes likely to be engaged in political contexts such as coping strategies in response to stress, time pressure and accountability demands from diverse constituencies.

(1) The Fundamental Attribution Error. People often prefer internal, dispositional explanations for others' conduct, even when plausible situational accounts exist (Gilbert and Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). This judgmental tendency can interact dangerously with key properties of the international environment. Consider the much discussed security dilemma (Jervis, 1976, 1978). To protect themselves in an anarchic environment, states must seek security either through costly defense programs of their own or by entering into entangling alliances that oblige others to defend them. Assessing intentions in such an environment is often hard. There is usually no easy way to distinguish between defensive states that are responding to the competitive logic of the situation and expansionist states. If everyone assumes the worst, the stage is set for conflict-spiral-driven arms races that no one wanted (Downs, 1991; Kramer, 1988). The fundamental attribution error exacerbates matters by lowering the perceptual threshold for attributing hostile intentions to other states. This tendency--in conjunction with the security dilemma--can lead to an inordinate number of "Type I errors" in which decision-makers exaggerate the hostile intentions of defensively motivated powers. The security dilemma compels even peaceful states to arm; the fundamental attribution error then leads observers to draw incorrect dispositional inferences. The actor-observer divergence in attributions--the tendency for actors to see their conduct as more responsive to the situation and less reflective of dispositions than do observers (Jones & Nisbett,1971)-- can further exacerbate matters. So too can ego-defensive motives (Heradstveit & Bonham, 1996). Both sets of processes encourage leaders to attribute their own military spending to justifiable situational pressures (Jervis, 1976). These self-attributions can contribute to a self-righteous spiral of hostility in which policy makers know that they arm for defensive reasons, assume that others also know this, and then conclude that others who do not share this perception must be building their military capabilities because they have aggressive designs (cf. Swann, Pelham, & Roberts, 1987). At best, the result is a lot of unnecessary defense spending; at worst, needless bloodshed (White, 1984).

The fundamental attribution error may encourage a second form of misperception in the international arena: the tendency to perceive governments as unitary causal agents rather than as complex amalgams of bureaucratic and political subsystems, each pursuing its own missions and goals (Jervis, 1976; Vertzberger, 1990). Retrospective reconstructions of the Cuban missile crisis have revealed numerous junctures at which American and Soviet forces could easily have come into violent contact with each other, not as a result of following some carefully choreographed master plan plotted by top leaders, but rather as a result of local commanders executing standard operating procedures (Blight, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 1995). The organizational analog of the fundamental attribution error is insensitivity to the numerous points of slippage between the official policies of collectivities and the policies that are actually implemented at the ground level.

Claims about the fundamental attribution error in world politics should however be subject to rigorous normative and empirical scrutiny. On the normative side, skeptics can challenge the presumption of "error". Deterrence theorists might note that setting a low threshold for making dispositional attributions can be adaptive. One may make more Type I errors (false alarms of malevolent intent) but fewer Type II errors (missing the threats posed by predatory powers such as Hitler’s Germany). And theorists of international institutions might note the value of pressuring states to observe the rules of the transnational trading and security regimes that they join. One way of exerting such pressure is to communicate little tolerance for justifications and excuses for norm violations, thereby increasing the reputation costs of such conduct. A balanced appraisal of the fundamental attribution “error” hinges on our probability estimates of each logically possible type of error (false alarms and misses) as well as on the political value we place on avoiding each error -- all in all, a classic signal detection problem. On the empirical side, skeptics can challenge the presumption of "fundamental" by pointing to Confucianist or, more generally, collectivist cultures in which sensitivity to contextual constraints on conduct is common (Morris & Peng, 1994). Skeptics can also raise endless definitional questions about what exactly qualifies as a "dispositional" explanation when we shift from an interpersonal to an international level of analysis and the number of causal entities expands exponentially. The domestic political system of one's adversary might be coded either as a situational constraint on leadership policy or as a reflection of the deepest dispositional aspirations of a "people".

(2) Overconfidence. Experimental work often reveals that people are excessively confident in their factual judgments and predictions, especially for difficlut problems (Einhorn & Hogarth 1981; Fischhoff, 1991). In the foreign policy realm, such overconfidence can lead decision makers to: 1) dismiss opposing views out of hand; 2) overestimate their ability to detect subtle clues to the other side's intentions; 3) assimilate incoming information to their existing beliefs. Overconfident decision makers in defender states are likely to misapply deterrence strategies--either by failing to respond to potential challenges because they are certain that no attack will occur (e.g., Israel in 1973) or by issuing gratuitous threats because they are certain that there will be an attack, even when no attack is actually planned (Levy, 1983). Overconfident aggressors are prone to exaggerate the likelihood that defenders will yield to challenges (Lebow, 1981). In addition, overconfidence can produce flawed policies when decision makers assess military and economic capabilities. For instance, the mistaken belief that one is militarily superior to a rival may generate risky policies that can lead to costly wars that no one wanted (Levy, 1983). By contrast, a mistaken belief that one is inferior to a rival can exacerbate conflict in either of two ways: (1) such beliefs generate unnecessary arms races as the weaker side tries to catch up. The rival perceives this effort as a bid for superiority, matches it, and sets the stage for an action/reaction pattern of conflict spiral; (2) the weaker state will be too quick to yield to a rival's demands (Levy, 1989). At best, such capitulation produces a diplomatic defeat; at worst, it leads aggressors to up the ante and ultimately produces wars that might have been avoided with firmer initial policies (a widely held view of Chamberlain's appeasement policy of 1938).

In a comprehensive study of intelligence failures prior to major wars, the historian Ernest May (1984, p. 542) concluded "if just one exhortation were to be pulled from this body of experience, it would be, to borrow Oliver Cromwell's words to the Scottish Kirk: “I beseech you in the bowels of Christ think it possible you may be mistaken.” This ironic call for cognitive humility (considering the source) is echoed in the contemporary literature on "de-biasing," with its emphasis on encouraging self-critical thought and imagining that the opposite of what one expected occurred (Lord et al., 1984; Tetlock and Kim, 1987). Of course, such advice can be taken too far. There is the mirror-image risk of paralysis in which self-critical thinkers dilute justifiably confident judgments by heeding irrelevant or specious arguments (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989a) -- an especially severe threat to good judgment in environments in which the signal-to-noise ratio is unfavorable and other parties are trying to confuse or deceive the perceiver.

(3) Metaphors and Analogical Reasoning. People try to understand novel problems by reaching for familiar concepts. Frequently, these concepts take the form of metaphors and analogies that illuminate some aspects of the problem but obscure other aspects.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors pervade all forms of discourse. Discourse on deterrence is no exception. Metaphorical preferences are correlated closely with policy preferences. Consider the "ladder of escalation" and the "slippery slope" (Jervis, 1989). The former metaphor implies that just as we can easily climb up and down a ladder one step at a time, so we can control the escalation and de-escalation of conventional or even nuclear conflicts (Kahn, 1965); the latter metaphor implies that once in a conflict, leaders can easily lose control and slide helplessly into war (Schelling, 1966). In Cold War days, adherents of the "ladder" metaphor supported a war-fighting doctrine that stressed cultivating counterforce capabilities; although they did not relish the prospect, they believed that nuclear war could, in principle, be controlled. By contrast, "slippery slopers" endorsed MAD--both as a policy and as strategic reality--and they feared that, once initiated, conflicts would inevitably escalate to all-out war. They argued that nuclear powers need to avoid crises. Managing them once they break out is too risky. As President Kennedy reportedly remarked after the Cuban Missile crisis, "One can't have too many of these" (Blight, 1990).

Containment and deterrence theorists -- who put special emphasis on reputation (Mercer, 1996) -- have long been attracted to contagion and domino metaphors that imply that failure to stand firm in one sphere will undermine one's credibility in other spheres (Kissinger, 1993). In the early 19th century, Metternich believed that revolution was contagious and required quarantine-like measures; in the late 1960s, Brezhnev took a similar view of Dubcek’s reforms in Czechoslovakia; at roughly the same time, the Johnson and Nixon administrations used the domino metaphor to justify American involvement in Vietnam.

Metaphorical modes of thought continue to influence and to justify policy in the post-Cold War world. Some writers invoke communitarian metaphors and claim that international relationsis undergoing an irreversible transformation that will soon invalidate rationales for weapons of mass destruction. "A community of states united by common interests, values, and perspectives is emerging because of technology and economics. Among the modernist states belonging to that community, new norms of behavior are replacing the old dictates of realpolitik: they reject not only the use of weapons of mass destruction, but even the use of military force to settle their disputes" (Blechman and Fisher, 1994, p. 97). By contrast, other writers such as Christopher Layne (1993) believe that nothing fundamental has changed and rely on the social Darwinist metaphors of self-help and survival of the fittest. We have merely moved from a bipolar system to a multipolar one ("with a brief unipolar moment" in which the United States enjoyed global dominance at the end of the 20th century). Indeed, it is only a matter of time before the major non-nuclear powers--Japan and Germany--acquire nuclear weapons now that they no longer depend on extended deterrence protection from the United States.

People also give meaning to new situations by drawing on historical precedents and analogies (Gilovich, 1981; May, 1973; Jervis, 1976; Neustadt and May, 1986; Verzberger, 1986). Although a reasonable response by creatures with limited mental resources to a demanding environment, this cognitive strategy can be seriously abused. One mistake is to dwell on the most obvious precedent -- a pivotal event early in one's career (Barber, 1985; Goldgeier, 1994) or perhaps the most recent crisis or war (Jervis, 1976; Reiter, 1996) -- rather than survey a diverse set of precedents. Consider, for instance, the potpourri of Third World conflicts that American observers in the elite press compared to Vietnam between 1975 and 1995: Lebanon, Israel's Vietnam; Eritrea, Ethiopia's Vietnam; Chad, Libya's Vietnam; Angola, Cuba's Vietnam; Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Vietnam; Bosnia, the European Community's Vietnam; Nicaragua, potentially a new American Vietnam, and, of course, Kampuchea, Vietnam's Vietnam. To be sure, there are points of similarity, but the differences are also marked and often slighted (Tetlock, et al., 1991).

Khong (1991) reports arguably the most systematic study of analogical reasoning in foreign policy. Drawing on process-tracing of high-level deliberations in the early 1960's, he documents how American policy in Vietnam was shaped by the perceived similarity of the Vietnamese conflict to the Korean war. Once again, a Communist army from the north had attacked a pro-western regime in the south. This diagnosis led to a series of prescriptions and predictions. The United States should resist the aggression with American troops and could expect victory, albeit with considerable bloodshed. A side-constraint lesson drawn from the Korean conflict was that the United States should avoid provoking Chinese entry into the Vietnam war and hence should practice "graduated escalation."

This example illustrates a second pitfall in analogical foreign policy reasoning: the tendency to neglect differences between the present situation and the politically preferred precedent. Not only in public but also in private, policy makers rarely engage in balanced comparative assessments of historical cases (Neustadt and May, 1986). From a psychological viewpoint, this result is not surprising. Laboratory research suggests that people often overweight hypothesis-confirmatory information (Klayman & Ha, 1987). To re-invoke the Vietnam example, American policy makers concentrated on the superficial similarities between the Vietnamese and Korean conflicts while George Ball--virtually alone within Johnson's inner circle--noted the differences (e.g., the conventional versus guerrilla natures of the conflicts, the degree to which the United States could count on international support). Whereas doves complained about this analogical mismatching, hawks complained about the analogical mismatching that led decision makers to exaggerate the likelihood of Chinese intervention. China had less strategic motivation and ability to intervene in the Vietnam War in 1965 than it had to intervene in the Korean War of 1950, preoccupied as Beijing was in the mid to late 1960s by the internal turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the external threat of the Soviet Union which had recently announced the Brezhnev Doctrine (claiming a Soviet right to intervene in socialist states that strayed from the Soviet line). From this standpoint, the U.S. could have struck deep into North Vietnam, with negligible risk of triggering Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Vietnam (toward whom the Chinese were ambivalent on both cultural and political grounds).

A third mistake is to permit preconceptions to drive the conclusions one draws from history. In the United States, for instance, hawks and doves drew sharply divergent lessons from the Vietnam war (Holsti and Rosenau, 1979). Prominent lessons for hawks were that the Soviet Union is expansionist and that the United States should avoid graduated escalation and honor alliance commitments. Prominent lessons for doves were that the United States should avoid guerrilla wars, that the press is more truthful than the administration, and that civilian leaders should be wary of military advice. No lesson appeared on both the hawk and dove lists! Sharply divergent lessons are not confined to democracies, as a content analysis of Soviet analyses of the Vietnam war revealed (Zimmerman and Axelrod, 1981). Different constituencies in the Soviet Union drew self serving and largely incompatible lessons from the American defeat in Asia. "Americanists" in foreign policy institutes believed that Vietnam demonstrated the need to promote détente while restraining wars of national liberation; the military press believed that the war demonstrated the implacable hostility of Western imperialism, the need to strengthen Soviet armed forces, and the feasibility and desirability of seeking further gains in the Third World. In summary, although policy makers often use analogies poorly, virtually no one would argue that they should ignore history; rather, the challenge is to employ historical analogies in a more nuanced, self-critical, and multidimensional manner (Neustadt and May, 1986).

(4) Belief Perseverance. Foreign policy beliefs often resist change (George, 1980). Cognitive mechanisms such as selective attention to confirming evidence, denial, source derogation, and biased assimilation of contradictory evidence buffer beliefs from refutation (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Although foreign belief systems take many forms (for detailed typologies, see Herrmann and Fischerkeller,1995; Holsti,1977), the most widely studied is the inherent bad faith model of one's opponent (Holsti,1967;Silverstein ,1989; Stuart and Starr, 1981; Blanton, 1996). A state is believed to be implacably hostile: contrary indicators, that in another context might be regarded as probative, are ignored, dismissed as propaganda ploys, or interpreted as signs of weakness. For example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tenaciously held to an inherent bad faith model of the Soviet Union (Holsti, 1967) and many Israelis believed that the PLO was implacably hostile (Kelman, 1983) and some still do even after the peace accord. Although such images are occasionally on the mark, they can produce missed opportunities for conflict resolution (Spillman & Spillman, 1991). More generally, belief perseverance can prevent policy makers from shifting from less to more successful strategies. In World War I, for example, military strategists continued to launch infantry charges despite enormous losses, leading to the wry observation that men may die easily, but beliefs do not (Art and Waltz, 1983, p. 13).

Some scholars hold belief perseverance to be a powerful moderator of deterrence success or failure (Jervis, 1983, p. 24). Aggressors can get away with blatantly offensive preparations and still surprise their targets as long as the target believes that an attack is unlikely (Heuer, 1981). An example is Israel's failure to respond to numerous intelligence warnings prior to the Yom Kippur War. Israeli leaders believed that the Arabs would not attack, given Arab military inferiority, and dismissed contradictory evidence that some later acknowledged to be probative (Stein, 1985). Conversely, a nation that does not plan to attack, yet is believed to harbor such plans, will find it difficult to convince the opponent of its peaceful intentions.

It is easy, however, to overstate the applicability of the belief perseverance hypothesis to world politics. Policymakers do sometimes change their minds (Bonham, Shapiro, & Trumble, 1979; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994). The key questions are: Who changes? Under what conditions? And what forms does change take? Converging evidence from archival studies of political elites and experimental studies of judgment and choice suggest at least four possible answers: (a) when policy-makers do change their minds, they are generally constrained by the classic cognitive-consistency principle of least resistance which means that they show a marked preference for changing cognitions that are minimally connected to other cognitions (McGuire, 1985). Policy-makers should thus abandon beliefs about appropriate tactics before giving up on an entire strategy and abandon strategies before questioning fundamental assumptions about other states and the international system (Breslauer, 1991; Legvold, 1991; Spiegel, 1991; Tetlock, 1991); (b) timely belief change is more likely in competitive markets (Smith, 1994; Soros, 1990) that provide quick, unequivocal feedback and opportunities for repeated play on fundamentally similar problems so that base rates of experience can accumulate, thereby reducing reliance on theory-driven speculation about what would have happened if one had chosen differently. Policy-makers should thus learn more quickly in currency and bond markets than, say, in the realm of nuclear deterrence (who knows what lessons should be drawn from the nonoccurrence of a unique event such as nuclear war?); (c) timely belief change is more likely when decision-makers are accountable for bottom-line outcome indicators and have freedom to improvise solutions than when decision-makers are accountable to complex procedural-bureaucratic norms that limit latitude to improvise (Wilson, 1989); (d) timely belief change is more likely when decision-makers -- for either dispositional or situational reasons -- display self-critical styles of thinking that suggest an open-mindedness to contradictory evidence (Kruglanski, 1996; Tetlock, 1992a).

Applying these generalizations to world politics is not, however, always straightforward. For example, it is hard to determine whether certain decision-makers were truly more open-minded or were always more ambivalent toward the attitude object (Stein, 1994). For instance, was Gorbachev a faster learner than his rival, Yegor Ligachev, about the inadequacies of the Soviet system or was he less committed all along to the fundamental correctness of the Soviet system? It is often even harder to gauge whether policymakers are being good Bayesians who are adjusting in a timely fashion to “diagnostic” evidence? One observer's decisive clue concerning the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy in 1983 might have led another observer to conclude "disinformation campaign" and a third observer to conclude "interesting but only moderately probative." The problem here is not just the opacity of the underlying reality; one's threshold for belief adjustment hinges on the political importance that one attaches to the twin errors of underestimating and overestimating Soviet potential. For instance, one might see the evidence as significant but opt for only minor belief system revision because one judges the error of overestimation (excessive defense spending) as the more serious. Defensible normative evaluations of belief persistence and change must ultimately rest on game-theoretic assumptions about the reliability and validity of the evidence (what does the other side want us to believe and could they have shaped the evidence before us to achieve that goal?) and signal-detection assumptions about the relative importance of avoiding Type I versus Type II errors (which mistake do we dread more?).

(5) Avoidance of value trade-offs. For an array of cognitive, emotional and social reasons, politicians find value trade-offs unpleasant and frequently define issues in ways that bypass the need for such judgments (Steinbruner, 1974; Jervis, 1976; Tetlock, 1986b). Trade-off avoidance can, however, be dangerous. Operationalizing a policy of deterrence, for example, raises trade-offs that one ignores at one's peril. On the one hand, there is a need to resist exploitation and deter aggression. On the other hand, prudent policy makers should avoid exacerbating the worst-case fears of adversaries. The first value calls for deterrence; the second calls for reassurance. National leaders also confront a conflict between their desire to avoid the devastation of all-out war and their desire to deter challengers and avoid even limited military skirmishes. Jervis (1984, p. 49) referred to this dilemma as the "great trade-off" of the nuclear age: "states may be able to increase the chance of peace only by increasing the chance that war, if it comes, will be total. To decrease the probability of enormous destruction may increase the probability of aggression and limited wars."

There may also be higher-order geopolitical trade-offs. Gilpin (1981) and Kennedy (1987) have noted how great powers over the centuries have consistently mismanaged the three-pronged trade-off among defense spending, productive investment, and consumer spending. Although policy makers must allocate resources for defense to deter adversaries and for consumption to satisfy basic needs, too much of either type of spending can cut seriously into the long-term investment required for sustained economic growth.

Research suggests that policy makers often avoid trade-offs in a host of ways:(a) holding out hope that a dominant option (one superior on all important values) can be found; (b) resorting to dissonance reduction tactics such as bolstering (Festinger,1964) and belief system overkill (Jervis,1976) that create the psychological illusion that one’s preferred policy is superior on all relevant values to all possible alternatives; (c) engaging in the decision-deferral tactics of buckpassing and procrastination that diffuse responsibility or delay the day of reckoning ( Janis and Mann,1977;Tetlock & Boettger, 1994); (d) relying on lexicographic decision rules -- such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) -- that initially eliminate options that fail to pass some threshold on the most important value and then screen options on less important values (Mintz, 1993; Payne et al., 1992). Whichever avoidance strategy they adopt, policy makers who fail to acknowledge the trade-off structure of their environment may get into serious trouble: in somecases by provoking conflict spirals when they overemphasize deterrence; in other cases by inviting attacks when they over-emphasize reassurance. Similarly, policy makers can err by over-protecting their short term security through heavy defense spending and foreign adventures while compromising their long-term security by neglecting investment needs and consumer demands (Kennedy, 1987). This imperial overstretch argument is widely viewed as at least a partial explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union (its advocates including Mikhail Gorbachev--Lebow and Stein, 1994).

It would be a mistake to imply that policy makers are oblivious to trade-offs. Although complex trade-off reasoning is rare in public speeches, policy makers may know more than they let be known. Acknowledging trade-offs can be embarrassing. In addition, some policy makers display an awareness of trade-offs even in public pronouncements. Content analysis of the political rhetoric of Gorbachev and his political allies revealed considerable sensitivity to the multi-faceted trade-offs that had to be made by the Soviet Union if it were to survive, in Gorbachev's words, into the next century in a manner befitting a great power (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989a). Of course, as Gorbachev's career illustrates, holding a complex view of the trade-off structure of one's environment is no guarantee that one will traverse the terrain successfully.

It would also be a mistake to imply that trade-off avoidance invariably leads to disaster. It may sometimes be prudent to wait. An expanding economy or evolving international scene may eliminate the need for trade-offs that sensible people once considered unavoidable. Passing the buck may be an effective way to diffuse blame for policies that inevitably impose losses on constituencies that politicians cannot afford to antagonize. And simple lexicographic decision rules may yield decisions in many environments that are almost as good as those yielded by much more exhaustive, but also exhausting, utility-maximization algorithms.

(6) Framing effects. Prospect theory asserts that choice is influenced by how a decision problem is "framed" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When a problem entails high probability of gain, people tend to be risk-averse; when it entails high probability of loss, people tend to be risk-seeking. This prediction has been supported in numerous experiments (Bazerman, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) as well as in case studies of foreign policy decisions (Farnham, 1992; Levy, 1992).

Framing effects can create severe impediments in international negotiations (Bazerman, 1986; Jervis, 1989). When negotiators view their own concessions as losses and concessions by the opponent as gains, the subjective value of the former will greatly outweigh the subjective value of the latter. Both sides will therefore perceive a "fair" deal to be one in which the opponent makes many more concessions--hardly conducive to reaching agreements. “Reactive devaluation” makes matter even worse. When both sides distrust each other, concessions by the other side are often minimized for the simple (not inherently invalid) reason that the other side made them (Ross & Griffin, 1991). For instance, in 1981, President Reagan unveiled his zero-option proposal calling for the Soviet dismantling of hundreds of intermediate-range missiles (SS-20s) in eastern Europe while the United States would refrain from deploying new missiles in western Europe. The Kremlin categorically rejected this proposal. In 1986, however, the new Soviet leadership embraced the original zero-option plan and agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides. Gorbachev's concessions stunned many Western observers, who now assumed that the zero-option must favor the Soviets because of their conventional superiority and urged the United States to wiggle out of the potential agreement.

As prospect theory has emerged as the leading alternative to expected utility theory for explaining for decision making under risk, its influence has proliferated throughout international relations. Levy (1992) notes a host of real-world observations on bargaining, deterrence and the causes of war that are consistent with the spirit of prospect theory: 1) it is easier to defend the status quo than to defend a recent gain; 2) forcing a party to do something ("compellence") is more difficult than preventing a party from doing something (deterrence); 3) conflict is more likely when a state believes that it will suffer losses if it does not fight; 4) superpower intervention will be more likely if the client state is suffering; 5) intervention for the sake of a client's gain is not as likely as intervention to prevent loss; 6) states motivated by fear of loss are especially likely to engage in risky escalation.

Although prospect theory fits these observations nicely, much has been lost in the translation from the laboratory literature (in which researchers can manipulate the framing and likelihood of outcomes) to historical accounts of world politics (Boettcher, 1995). One critical issue for non-tautological applications of prospect theory is "renormalization"--the process of adjusting the reference point after a loss or gain has occurred. Jervis (1992a) speculates that decision makers renormalize much more quickly for gains (what they have recently acquired quickly becomes part of their endowment) than for losses (they may grieve for centuries over their setbacks, nurturing irredentist dreams of revenge and reconquest). The need remains, however, for reliable and valid research methods -- such as content analysis of group discussions (Levi & Whyte, 1996) -- for determining whether a specific actor at a specific historical juncture is in a loss or gain frame of mind. An equally critical issue concerns how the risk preferences of individuals are amplified or attenuated by group processes such as diffusion of responsibility, persuasive arguments, cultural norms, and political competition for power (Vertzberger, 1995). This argument reminds us of the need to be vigilant to the ever-shifting dimensions of value on which people may be risk-averse or risk-seeking. Normally cautious military leaders may suddenly become recklessly obdurate when issues of honor and identity are at stake. Saddam Hussein, just prior to the annihilation of his armies in Kuwait, is reported to have invoked an old Arab aphorism that “it is better to be a rooster for a day than a chicken for all eternity” (Post, 1992).

C. Are Psychologists Biased to Detect Bias?

The preceding section has but skimmed the surface of the voluminous literature on cognitive shortcomings. Although most research has taken place in laboratory settings, accumulating case-study and content analysis evidence indicates that policy makers are not immune to these effects. Researchers have emphasized the role that these cognitive processes can play in creating conflicts that might have been avoided had decision makers seen the situation more accurately. It is worth noting, however, that these same judgmental biases can attenuate as well as exacerbate conflicts. Much depends on the geopolitical circumstances. The fundamental attribution error can alert us quickly to the presence of predatory powers; simplistic analogies are sometimes apt; belief perseverance can prevent us from abandoning veridical assessments in response to "disinformation" campaigns; and high-risk policies sometimes yield big pay-offs. Indeed, efforts to eliminate these “biases” through institutional checks and balances are likely to be resisted by skeptics who argue that these cognitive tendencies are often functional. Consider overconfidence. Some psychologists have made a strong case that when this “judgmental bias” takes the form of infectious “can-do” optimism, it promotes occupational success and mental health (Seligman, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988). And this argument strikes a resonant chord within the policy community. To paraphrase Dean Acheson's response to Richard Neustadt (both of whom advised John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis): "I know your advice, Professor. You think the President needs to be warned. But you're wrong. The President needs to be given confidence." This anecdote illustrates the dramatically different normative theories of decision making that may guide policy elites from different historical periods, cultural backgrounds, and ideological traditions. Advice that strikes some academic observers as obviously sound will strike some policy elites as equally obviously flawed. Decision analysts face an uphill battle in convincing skeptics that the benefits of their prescriptions outweigh the costs. Whether or not they acknowledge it, policy makers must decide how to decide (Payne et al., 1992) by balancing the estimated benefits of complex, self-critical analysis against the psychological and political costs. What increments in predictive accuracy and decision quality is it reasonable to expect from seeking out additional evidence and weighing counterarguments? Some observers see enormous potential improvement (e.g., Janis, 1989); others suspect that policy makers are already shrewd cognitive managers skilled at identifying when they have reached the point of diminishing analytical returns (e.g. Suedfeld, 1992b). These strong prescriptive conclusions rest, however, on weak evidentiary foundations. We know remarkably little about the actual relations between styles of reasoning and judgmental accuracy in the political arena (Tetlock, 1992b).

D. Motivational processes

Neorealist assumptions of rationality can be challenged not only on “cold” cognitive grounds, but also on “hot” motivational grounds (Lebow & Stein, 1993). Decision-making, perhaps especially in crises, may be more driven by wishful thinking, self-justification, and the ebb and flow of human emotions than it is by dispassionate calculations of power. It is unwise, however, to dichotomize these theoretical options. Far from being mutually exclusive, cognitive and motivational processes are closely intertwined. Cognitive appraisals activate motives that, in turn, shape perceptions of the world. This sub-section organizes work on motivational bias into two categories: (a) generic processes of stress, anger, indignation, and coping hypothesized to apply to all human beings whenever the necessary activating conditions are satisfied; (b) individual differences in goals, motives, and orientations to the world hypothesized to generalize across a variety of contexts.

(1) Disruptive-Stress and Crisis Decision-Making. Policy-makers rarely have a lot of time to consider alternative courses of action. They frequently work under stressful conditions in which they must process large amounts of inconsistent information under severe time pressure, always with the knowledge that miscalculations may have serious consequences for both their own careers and vital national interests( C. Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1972, 1989). This combination of an imperative demand for crucial decisions to be made quickly, with massive information overload, is a form of psychological stress likely to reduce the information processing capacity of the individuals involved (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977).

Both experimental and content analysis studies of archival records offer suggestive support for this hypothesis. The laboratory literature has repeatedly documented that stress -- beyond a hypothetical optimum -- impairs complex information processing (for examples see Gilbert, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Streufert & Streufert, 1978; Svenson & Maules, 1994). Impairment can take many forms, including a lessened likelihood of accurately discriminating among unfamiliar stimuli, an increased likelihood of relying on simple heuristics, rigid reliance on old, now inappropriate, problem-solving strategies, reduced search for new information, and intolerance for inconsistent evidence (Janis & Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).

Archival studies reinforce these pessimistic conclusions, most notably, the work of Suedfeld and colleagues on declining integrative complexity in response to international tension (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Maoz & Shayer, 1992; Raphael, 1982; Suedfeld, 1992). These downward shifts are especially pronounced in crises that culminate in war. It is tempting here to tell a causal story in which crisis-induced stress impairs the capacity to identify viable integratively complex compromises, thereby contributing to the violent outcome. It is, however, wise to resist temptation in this case -- at least until two issues are resolved. First, falling integrative complexity may be a sign not of simplification and rigidification of mental representations but rather of a quite deliberate and self-conscious hardening of bargaining positions. Policy-makers may decide to lower their integrative complexity (closing loopholes, eliminating qualifications, denying trade-offs, and disengaging from empathic role-taking) as a means of communicating firmness of resolve to adversaries (Tetlock, 1985). Here, we need more studies that trace shifts in cognitive and integrative complexity in both private (intragovernmental) and public (intergovernmental) documents (Guttieri, Wallace, & Suedfeld, 1995; Levi & Tetlock, 1980; Walker & Watson, 1994). Second, there are numerous exceptions to the generalization that high stress produces cognitive simplification. Individual decision makers and decision making groups have sometimes risen to the challenge and responded to intensely stressful circumstances in a complex and nuanced fashion (Brecher, 1993). For instance, during the Entebbe crisis (Maoz, 1981), and the Middle East crisis of 1967 (Stein and Tanter, 1980), Israeli policy makers performed effectively under great stress. They considered numerous options, assessed the consequences of these options in a probabilistic manner, traded off values, and demonstrated an openness to new information.

The theoretical challenge isidentify when crisis-induced stress does and does not promote simplification of thought. One approach is to look for quantitative moderator variables such as intensity of stress that fit the rather complex and nonlinear pattern of cognitive performance data (Streufert & Streufert, 1978). Another approach is to look for qualitative moderator variables that activate simple or complex coping strategies. For instance, the Janis and Mann conflict model predicts simplification and rigidification of thought (“defensive avoidance”) only when decision makers confront a genuine dilemma in which they must choose between two equally unpleasant alternatives and are pessimistic about finding a more palatable alternative in the time available. Under these conditions, decision makers are predicted to choose and bolster one of the options, focusing on its strengths and the other options’ weaknesses (thereby spreading the alternatives). By contrast, when decision makers are more optimistic about finding an acceptable solution in the available time, but still perceive serious risks (and hence are under considerable stress), they will shift into vigilant patterns of information processing in which they balance conflicting risks in a reasonably dispassionate and thoughtful way.

In a programmatic effort to apply the Janis and Mann (1977) model, Lebow (1981) and Lebow and Stein (1987, 1994) have focused on crises in which policies of deterrence apparently failed. Specifically, they propose that “aggressive” challengers to the status quo are often caught in decisional dilemmas likely to activate defensive avoidance and bias their assessments of risk. For instance, Argentina’s leaders felt that they had to do something dramatic to deflect domestic unrest in 1982, relied on the classic Shakespearian tactic of “busying giddy minds with foreign quarrels” and invaded the Falklands, and then convinced themselves that Britain would protest but ultimately acquiesce. In a similar vein, in 1962, Soviet leaders reacted to an apparently otherwise intractable strategic problem -- vast American superiority in ICBM’s -- by placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba and then convincing themselves that the United States would accept the fait accompli. In Lebow and Stein’s view, efforts to deter policy-makers engaging in defensive avoidance are often counter-productive, fueling the feelings of insecurity and desperation that inspired the original challenge.

(2) Justice Motive and Moral Outrage. Welch (1993) challenged the core motivational axioms of neorealism by proposing thatmost Great Power decisions to go to war over the last 150 years have been driven not by security and power goals but rather by a concern for "justice". To activate the justice motive, one must convince oneself that the other side threatens something -- territory, resources, status -- to which one is entitled (cf. Lerner, 1977). The resulting reaction is not cold, rational and calculating, but rather emotional, self-righteous, moralistic, and simplistic. Outrage triggered by perceived threats to entitlements provides the psychological momentum for dehumanizing adversaries, deactivating the normative constraints on killing them, and taking big risks to achieve ambitious objectives.

Welch carefully tries to show that the justice motive is not just a rhetorical ploy for arousing the masses by demonstrating its influence on private deliberations as well as on public posturing. The inferential problems, however, run deeper than the familiar "do-leaders-really-believe-what-they-are-saying?" debate. Welch assigns causal primacy to moral sentiments and that requires demonstrating that those sentiments are not epiphenomenal rationalizations -- perhaps sincerely believed but all the same driven by the material interests at stake. Proponents of prospect theory might be tempted to treat Welch’s examples of the justice motive as special cases of loss aversion. And cognitive dissonance theory warns us not to underestimate the human capacity for self-deception and self-justification. One of social psychology's more frustrating contributions to world politics may be to highlight the futility of many debates on the reducibility of ideas to interests. The line between moral entitlement and material interest may seem logically sharp but in practice it is often psychologically blurry.

(3) Biomedical Constraints. Policy-makers are human beings (despite occasional attempts by propagandists to obscure that fact) and, as such, subject to the scourges of the flesh. There is now much evidence that cerebral-vascular and neurological illnesses have impaired policy judgment at several junctures in modern diplomatic history (Park, 1986; Post and Robbins, 1993). One can make a good case, for example, that the origins and course of World War II cannot be understood without knowledge of the health of key players at critical choice points. It is well documented that: (a) Paul von Hindenburg, Hitler’s predecessor as Chancellor of Germany, showed serious signs of senility before passing the torch to his tyrannical successor (at a time when resistance was still an option); (b) Ramsay MacDonald (British Prime Minister) and Jozef Pilsudski (Polish head of state) showed palpable signs of mental fatigue in the early 1930's -- exactly when assertive British and Polish action might have nipped the Nazi regime in the bud; (c) During the latter part of World War II, Hitler showed symptoms of Parkinson’s disease and suffered serious side-effects from the dubious concoctions of drugs that his doctors prescribed; (d) Between 1943 and 1945, Franklin Roosevelt suffered from atherosclerosis and acute hypertension as well as from a clouding of consciousness known as “encephalopathy”.

Claims of biomedical causation do, however, sometimes prove controversial. Consider the debate concerning Woodrow Wilson’s rigidity in the wake of World War I when he needed to be tactically flexible in piecing together the Congressional support for American entry into the League of Nations. Whereas George and George (1981) offer a neo-Adlerian interpretation that depicts Wilson as a victim of narcissistic personality disorder in which threats to an idealized self-image, especially from people resembling authority figures from the past, trigger rigid ego-defensive reactions, neurologists trace the same combination of traits -- stubbornness, overconfidence, suspiciousness -- to the hypertension and cerebral-vascular disease that ultimately led to Wilson’s devastating stroke and death (Weinstein et al., 1978).

(3) Personality and policy preferences. From a neorealist perspective, foreign policy is constrained by the logic of power within the international system. Individual differences among political elites are thus largely inconsequential--virtually everyone who matters will agree on what constitutes the "rational" response. Although some crises do produce such unanimity (e.g., the American response to the attack on Pearl Harbor), in most cases large differences of opinion arise. By combining laboratory and archival studies, researchers have built a rather convincing case for some systematic personality influences on foreign policy (Etheredge, 1980; Greenstein, 1975; M. Hermann, 1977, 1987; Runyan, 1988; Tetlock, 1981a; Walker, 1983; Winter, 1992).

(I) Interpersonal Generalization. This hypothesis depicts foreign policy preferences as extensions of how people act toward others in their everyday lives. In archival analyses of disagreements among American policy makers between 1898 and 1984, Etheredge (1980) and Shephard (1988) found that policy preferences were closely linked to personality variables. Working from biographical data on the personal relationships of political leaders, coders rated leaders on interpersonal dominance (strong need to have their way and tendency to respond angrily when thwarted) and extroversion (strong need to be in the company of others). As predicted, dominant leaders were more likely to resort to force than their less dominant colleagues and extroverted leaders advocated more conciliatory policies than their more introverted colleagues. Laboratory work suggests causal pathways for these effects, including perceptual mediators (dominant people see high-pressure tactics as more efficacious) and motivational mediators (dominant people try to maximize their relative gains over others (like neorealists) whereas less dominant people try to maximize either absolute gains (like neoclassical economists) or joint gains (like communitarian team players)). (See Bem and Funder, 1978; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Sternberg and Soriano, 1984).

(ii) Motivational Imagery. In a programmatic series of studies, Winter (1993) has adapted the content analysis systems for assessing motivational imagery in the semi-projective Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to analyze the private and public statements of world leaders. He has also proposed a psychodynamic conflict-spiral model which posits that combinations of high power motivation and low affiliation motivation encourage resort to force in international relations. Winter (1993) tested this prediction against archival materials drawn from three centuries of British history, from British-German communications prior to World War I, and from American-Soviet communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In each case, Winter observed the predicted correlations between motives and war versus peace. In another study, Peterson, Winter, and Doty (1994) linked motivational theory to processes of misperception hypothesized to occur in conflict spirals (cf. Kelman & Bloom, 1973). In this integrative model, international conflicts escalate to violence when three conditions are satisfied: a) there are high levels of power motivation in the leadership of both countries; b) each side exaggerates the power imagery in communications from the other side; c) each side expresses more power motivation in response to its exaggerated perceptions of the power motivation of the other side. In ingenious laboratory simulations, Peterson et al. used letters exchanged in an actual crisis as stimulus materials and showed that subjects with high power motivation were especially likely to see high power motivation in communications from the other side and to recommend the use of force.

The motive-imagery explanation is parsimonious. The same content analytic method yields similar relationships across experimental and archival settings. But the interpretive difficulty is the same as that encountered in integrative complexity research: the possibility of spurious multi-method convergence. Political statements cannot be taken as face-value reflections of intrapsychic processes. Leaders use political statements both to express internalized beliefs and goals as well as to influence the impressions that others form of how leaders think. There are already good reasons for supposing that people can strategically raise and lower their integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1981a, 1992a) and it would be surprising if motivational imagery were not also responsive to shifts in impression management goals.

(iii) Computerized content-analytic programs. In contrast to the complex semantic and pragmatic judgments required in integrative-complexity and motive-imagery coding, Hermann (1980, 1987) has developed computerized methods of text analysis that rely on individual word and co-occurrence counts and are designed to assess an extensive array of belief system and interpersonal style variables studied in the personality literature (including nationalism, trust, cognitive complexity, locus of control and achievement, affiliation, and power motives). Although we know less than we need to know about the interrelations among content analytic measures of similar theoretical constructs (but see Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, and Walker, 1991) we have learned a good deal about the political and behavioral correlates of Hermann’s indicators. For instance, nationalism/ethnocentrism and distrust of others are two well-replicated components of authoritarianism and, within samples of national leaders, tend to be linked to hostility and negative affect toward other nations and an unwillingness to come to their aid. Hermann’s measure of cognitive complexity tends to be linked to expressing positive affect toward other states and to receiving positive responses from them. These two results are strikingly compatible with Tetlock’s (1981b) work on isolationism and (1985) work on American and Soviet foreign policy rhetoric. As with Winter’s, Suedfeld's and Tetlock’s work, there is, however, the troublesome difficulty of disentangling intrapsychic from impression management explanations. Are we measuring underlying psychological processes or public posturing?

E. Placing Psychological Processes

In Political Context. Thus far, we have been content to identify cognitive and motivational processes and to ask (a)how well do the hypothesized processes hold up in this or that politicalcontext?; (b) what political consequences flow from the operation of the hypothesized processes?; (c) does the cumulative weight of multi-method evidence give us strong grounds for doubting rational-actor models of world politics?

Policy-makers do not, however, function in a social vacuum. Most national security decisions are collective products, the result of intensive interactions among small groups, each of which represents a major bureaucratic, economic, or political constituency to whom decision-makers feel accountable in varying ways and degrees. Considerations such as “Could I justify this proposal or agreement to group x or y?” loom large in biographical, autobiographical and historical accounts of governmental decision-making. Indeed, the major function of thought in political contexts is arguably the anticipatory testing of political accounts for alternative courses of actions: If “we” did this, what would “they” say? How could we reply? Who would emerge from the resulting symbolic exchange in a more favorable light? (Cf. Farnham, 1990; Kramer, 1995; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1992a).

The key question now becomes how cognitive and motivational properties of individual decision-makers interact with the matrix of political accountability relationships within which those decision-makers live and work. The literature points to a panoply of possibilities. Certain types of political accountability magnify shortcomings of individual judgement; other types check these shortcomings. There is plenty of room for argument, however, over whether any given accountability arrangement falls in the former or latter category (where, for example, should we place democratic accountability?) And, once again, there is vigorous disagreement over exactly what counts as "improvement" in the quality of judgement and choice. (For more detailed taxonomies of foreign policy-making systems, see Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Hermann & Preston, 1994; t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1995.)

1. Accountability demands likely to amplify deviations from rational-actor standards. The experimental literature suggests at least three sets of conditions (often satisfied in foreign policy settings) in which pressures to justify one’s decisions will interfere with high-quality decision-making: (a) one is accountable to an important constituency whose judgment is deeply flawed; (b) one feels insulated from accountability to out-groups but is highly motivated to please a homogeneous and self-satisfied in-group (as in “groupthink”); (c) one is accountable for difficult-to-reverse decisions that cast doubt on one’s competence or morality.

(I) The perils of foolish audiences. Decision-makers sometimes experience intense pressure to subordinate their own preferences to those of the constituency to whom they must answer (because their jobs, sometimes even their lives, depend on doing so). Insofar as decision-makers find themselves accountable to a fickle, superficial or impulsive constituency, the result will often be a decision considerably worse than the one they would have made on their own.

This process can occur in dictatorships or in democracies. In dictatorships, the argument reminds us that enormous power might be centralized in pathological personalities (Hitlers, Stalins, Saddam Husseins,...)whose judgment no senior advisor dares to challenge. In democracies, the argument reminds us that leaders are ultimately accountable to public opinion which, in the foreign policy domain, has historically been characterized as ill-informed, volatile and incoherent. Half a century ago, Gabriel Almond warned that the net effect of public opinion was to increase “irrationality” (1950, p. 239). And George Kennan (1951, p. 59) saw democratic accountability and rational foreign policy as inherently incompatible, comparing democracies to a "dinosaur with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath -- in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.”

Although more recent analyses cast some doubt on this view of public opinion in general (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Sniderman et al., 1996) and of foreign policy attitudes in particular (Holsti, 1992; Russett, 1990), (but see Zaller, 1991), there is still a strong case against tight democratic oversight of foreign policy (Kissinger, 1993). This elitist position -- “let the professionals get on with the job” -- carries, however, its own risks. Lack of accountability can lead to lack of responsiveness to the legitimate concerns of now-excluded constituencies. For every example that the elitists can invoke (e.g., F.D.R. was far more alert to the Nazi threat than was the isolationist public in the 1930's), the proponents of democratic accountability can offer a counter example (e.g., the “best and the brightest” of the Kennedy-Johnson administration had to mobilize an apathetic public to support American intervention in Vietnam in the 1960's). The proponents of democratic accountability can also point to a remarkably robust statistical generalization: democracies virtually never go to war against each other (Russett, 1996), although they are no less prone to war with dictatorships. The mechanisms--psychological and institutional--underlying this "democratic-peace effect" remain controversial but the finding should give pause to those who argue that elites, left to their own devices, are best equipped to run foreign policy.

The foregoing analysis points to good arguments for both loose and tight democratic oversight of foreign policy. The deeper challenge is how to manage the inevitable trade-off between the demands of short-run accountability (maximize immediate public approval) and long-run accountability (craft foreign policies that may be unpopular now but yield benefits over several decades). This “accountability dilemma" (March and Olson, 1995) was the subject of intense debate two centuries ago (Burke 1774/1965)-- debate that continues to rage today (especially in domains thought too esoteric for public comprehension like monetary and foreign policy) and will probably rage two centuries hence.

(ii) The perils of oligarchy. With the noteworthy exceptions of totalitarian states that centralize extraordinary authority in one person whose will is law (Bullock, 1991), accountability in the political world rarely reaches the zero point. Accountability can, however, become intellectually incestuous when policy makers expect to answer only to like-minded colleagues and constituencies. This concentration of accountability to an in-group is a defining feature of groupthink (Janis, 1982). The combination of opinionated leadership, insulation from external critics, and intolerance of dissent often appears sufficient to amplify already dangerous tendencies in individual judgment. Groupthink decision-makers are more prone to jump to premature conclusions, to dismiss contradictory evidence, to deny trade-offs, to bolster preferred options, to suppress dissent within the group and to display excessive optimism. According to Janis, the result is often the undertaking of ill-conceived foreign policy projects that lead to disastrous consequences such as provoking Chinese intervention in the Korean war, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Janis contrasted these “fiascoes” with cases such as the Marshall Plan and Cuban Missile Crisis in which policy-making groups adopted a much more self-critical and thoughtful style of decision-making and which led to far more satisfactory outcomes (given the values of the decision-makers).

Janis’s case studies represent the best-known effort to apply work on group dynamics to elite political settings. The groupthink model does, however, have serious limitations (t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1995). First, the evidence -- from case studies to experiments -- is mixed. Close inspection of case studies underscores the ambiguity of many diagnoses of “groupthink” in foreign policy contexts. For example, comparing Berman’s (1982) and Janis’s (1982) accounts of Johnson’s decision to intervene in Vietnam, one almost needs to be a mindreader to determine whether: (a) a manipulative Johnson had made up his mind in advance and used group deliberations merely to justify a predetermined policy; (b) an uncertain Johnson leaned heavily upon a cliquish advisory group for cognitive and emotional support. Equally mixed is the content analytic and Q-sort evidence (Tetlock, 1979; Tetlock et al., 1992; Walker & Watson, 1994). These studies have supported some aspects of the model (increased rigidity and self-righteousness in hypothesized cases of groupthink) but not others (there is little evidence that cohesiveness alone or in interaction with other antecedents contributes to defective decision-making). And laboratory studies have been even less supportive of the hypothesized necessary and sufficient conditions for defective decision-making (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Turner et al., 1993) -- although defenders of the model can always invoke the external-validity argument that experimental manipulations pale next to their dramatic real-life counterparts.

Second, the groupthink model oversimplifies process-outcome linkages in world politics and probably other spheres of life (t’Hart, 1994; Tetlock et al., 1992). It is easy to identify cases in which concurrence-seeking has been associated with outcomes that most observers now applaud (e.g., Churchill’s suppression of dissent in cabinet meetings in 1940-41 when some members of the British government favored a negotiated peace with Hitler) and cases in which vigilant decision-making has been associated with outcomes that left group members bitterly disappointed (e.g., Carter encouraged rather vigorous debate over the wisdom of the hostage-rescue mission in Iran in 1980). The correlation between quality of process and of outcome was perfectly positive in Janis’ (1982) case studies but is likely to be much lower in more comprehensive samplings of decision-making episodes (Bovens & t’Hart, 1996). We need contingency theories that identify: (a) the distinctive patterns of group decision-making that lead, under specified circumstances, to political success or failure (Stern & Sundelius, 1995; Vertzberger, 1995); (b) the diverse organizational and societal functions that leadership groups serve. Groups do not just exist to solve external problems; they provide symbolic arenas in which, among other things, bureaucratic and political conflicts can be expressed, support for shared values can be reaffirmed and potentially divisive trade-offs can be concealed (t’Hart, 1995). As with cognitive biases, patterns of group decision-making judged maladaptive within a functionalist framework that stresses scientific problem-solving appear quite reasonable from functionalist perspectives that stress other imperatives such as the needs for quick, decisive action, forging a united front and mobilizing external support.

(iii) The perils of backing people into a corner. The timing of accountability can be critical in political decision-making. Experimental work suggests (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw, 1980; Tetlock, 1992a), and case studies tend to confirm, that policy makers who are accountable for decisions that they cannot easily reverse often concentrate mental effort on justifying these earlier commitments rather than finding optimal courses of action given current constraints. These exercises in retrospective rationality -- whether viewed as dissonance reduction or impression management -- will tend to be especially intense to the degree that earlier decisions cast doubt on decision-makers’ integrity or ability.

Situations of this sort -- military quagmires such as Vietnams and Afghanistans or financial quagmires such as unpromising World Bank projects with large sunk costs -- are common in political life. Indeed, the primary job of opposition parties in democracies is to find fault with the government and to refute the justifications and excuses that the government offers in its defense. The psychodynamics of justification become politically consequential when they extend beyond verbal sparring at press conferences and bias policy appraisals. After all, if one convinces oneself and perhaps others that a bad decision worked out pretty well, it starts to seem reasonable to channel even more resources into the same cause. Such sincerity can be deadly when decision-makers must choose among courses of action in international confrontations under the watchful eyes of domestic political audiences (Fearon, 1994).

2. Accountability demands likely to motivate self-critical thought. The experimental literature also identifies two sets of conditions (often satisfied in foreign policy settings) in which justification pressures will encourage high-quality decision-making: (a) one is not locked into any prior attitudinal commitments and one is accountable to an external constituency whose judgement one respects and whose own views are unknown; (b) one is accountable to multiple constituencies that make contradictory but not hopelessly irreconcilable demands.

(I) The benefits of normative ambiguity. In many institutions, there is a powerful temptation to curry the favor of those to whom one must answer. The right answer becomes whatever protects one’s political identity. This incentive structure can encourage a certain superficiality and rigidity of thought. One possible corrective -- proposed by George (1972) and Janis (1982) -- is to create ambiguity within the organization concerning the nature of the right answer. The rationale is straightforward: ambiguity will motivate information search. People will try to anticipate a wider range of objections that a wider range of critics might raise to their policy proposals. Moreover, insofar as people do not feel “frozen” into previous public commitments, people will not simply attempt to refute potential objections; they will attempt to incorporate those “reasonable” objections into their own cognitive structure, resulting in a richer, dialectically complex, representation of the problem (Tetlock, 1992a). From this perspective, wise leaders keep subordinates guessing about what the “right answer” is.

(ii) The benefits of political pluralism. A long and illustrious tradition upholds the cognitive benefits of political pluralism (Dahl, 1989; George, 1980; Mill, 1857/1960). Political elites can be compelled to be more tolerant and open-minded than they otherwise would have been by holding them accountable to many constituencies whose voices cannot be easily silenced. There is considerable experimental evidence to support this view (Nemeth and Staw, 1989; Tetlock, 1992a) -- although paralysis in the form of chronic buckpassing and procrastination is always a danger (Janis & Mann, 1977; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994).

Accountability cross-pressure is arguably the defining feature of life for international negotiators who must cope with “two-level games” (Evans et al., 1992; Putnam, 1988) that require simultaneously satisfying international adversaries as well as domestic constituencies, including government bureaucracies, interest groups, legislative factions, and the general public. Negotiators who rely on the simple “acceptability” heuristic will generally fail in this environment either because they put too much weight on reaching agreement with other powers (and lose credibility with domestic constituencies) or because they concede too much veto power to domestic audiences (and lose necessary bargaining flexibility with other powers). Drawing on Pruitt’s (1981) model of negotiation behavior, decision-makers who are subject to high role or value conflict -- who want to achieve positive outcomes for both sides -- are most likely to search vigilantly for viable integrative agreements that fall within the “win-sets” of both domestic constituencies and international negotiating partners. There is a reasonable chance, moreover, that their search will be successful, permitting agreements that hitherto seemed impossible because observers had fallen prey to the “fixed-pie” fallacy and concluded that positive-sum conflicts were zero-sum (Thompson, 1990). To take two recent momentous examples, most experts in 1988 thought a negotiated, peaceful transition to multiracial democracy in South Africa or an Israeli - P.L.O. peace treaty was either improbable or impossible in the next 10 years (Tetlock, 1992b). Unusually integratively complex leadership of the key political movements may well have played a key role in confuting the expert consensus (cf. Kelman, 1983). But the rewards of searching for integratively complex agreements will be meager when the intersection of win-sets is the null set. Instead of being short-listed for Nobel peace prizes, some integratively complex compromisers -- those who tried to reconcile American democracy and slavery in the 1850's or British security and Nazism in the 1930's -- find themselves denounced in the historical docket as unprincipled appeasers (Tetlock et al., 1994; Tetlock & Tyler, 1996).

F. Reprise

he literature gives us many reasons for suspecting that the policy process deviates, sometimes dramatically, from the rational actor baseline. One could, however, make a social psychological case that rationality is not a bad first-order approximation of decision-making in world politics. The argument would stress the elaborate procedures employed in many states to screen out “irrational decision-makers”, the intricate checks and balances designed to minimize the influence of deviant decision-makers who get through the screening mechanisms, the intense accountability pressures on decision-makers to make choices in a rigorous, security-maximizing fashion, and the magnitude of the decision-making stakes and the capacity of people to shift into more vigilant modes of thinking in response to situational incentives (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). On balance though, the case for error and bias is still stronger than the case for pure rationality. Some biases and errors appear to be rooted in fundamental associative laws of memory (e.g., priming of analogies and metaphors) and psychophysical laws of perception (e.g., status quo as reference point) where individual differences are weak and incentive effects are negligible (Arkes, 1991; Camerer, 1995). Nonetheless, the choice is not either/or, and the literature itself may be biased in favor of ferreting out bloopers that enhance the prestige of psychological critics who enjoy the benefits of hindsight. As a discipline, we need to be at least as self-critical as we urge others to be.


5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16