CHAPTER 2:THE COMMANDS (AL-AWĀMIR)
By command is meant wish (in the sense that one wants something to be done: alţalab) which, in turn, means to express will (al-irāda) and desire through speech, writing, pointing, or the like; whether by such terms as “I command you” or by an imperative. Thus, the sheer will and desire without being expressed in some way is not called wish. However, any wish is not called command, but a specific one, that is, wish of superior from inferior. Hence, superiority is considered in the command, whether the superior demonstrates his superiority or not, and whether he uses an imperative (or uses the verb “command”) or not - the only point is that he should somehow express his wish. On the other hand, wish of the one who is not superior, whether he is inferior or coequal, is not a command, even though he pretends superiority or uses an imperative.
Appearance of the Command
The important point, however, is the denotation of the command, which is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. There are a variety of opinions in this connection the most important of which being obligation (al-wudjūb), preference (al-istiĥbāb), and the common point between obligation and preference. The truth, however, is that the command is apparent in the obligation - not conventionally, but because of judgment of the intellect. It is intellect’s judgment that when the Lord commands us we must obey Him and must be provoked in order to fulfill our duty as servants, unless He declares that His command is not a matter of must and we are free not to do it. Thus, this appearance is not a literal appearance and this denotation is not a lingual one, for the imperative is neither literally nor figuratively used in the concept of obligation, since obligation is something out of the reality of its object of denotation and also it is not among its qualities or states.
Concerning appearance of the command, however, there remain two secondary discussions:
1. Should a declarative sentence be used as configuration, it denotes obligation exactly as the imperative does, for the criterion, which is the intellect’s judgment to obey the Lord’s provoking, exists in both of them - no matter in what way that provoking is declared. An example of this is the case where the holy Imām was asked about occurrence of a problem in the prayers and he said, “He repeats his prayers.” One may even say that indication of obligation is definitely emphasized in this kind, for it is assumed that the duty-bound will surely do it.
2. When a command is preceded by an actual or an assumed prohibition, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether it is apparent in the obligation, permissibility, or merely permission, i.e., removal of prohibition without dealing with any of the five-fold burdensome precepts, or it returns to its previous precept before the prohibition.
The justifiable opinion is the third one, for we said earlier that indication of obligation by the command is because of intellect’s necessitation of being provoked where there is no permission to relinquish. Nonetheless, there is no provoking here; it is just permission to do and nothing more. For instance, when the Almighty God says, “…Do not profane God’s Way marks [when you are in pilgrim sanctity]… but when you have quit your pilgrim sanctity, then hunt,” (5:1-2) it clearly does not mean that hunting is mandatory, but rather permitted.
Of course, if there is contextual evidence that such a command is issued to provoke the duty-bound to perform something, or with the intention of allowing him to do it, it will definitely denote obligation and permissibility respectively, and cannot be a matter of dispute. Wherever there is a dispute, it is about a case where no contextual evidence exists.
Varieties of Mandatory Acts
Mandatory acts are of some varieties some of which being as follows:
Absolute (al-Muţlaq) and Conditional (al-Mashrūţ)
Should a mandatory act be compared with something external, it can only be of the two following kinds:
1. If its obligation is dependent upon that thing and that thing is considered in the obligation of the mandatory act as a condition, such as pilgrimage to Mecca (al-ĥadjdj) with regard to financial capability (al-istiţā‘a), it is called “conditional mandatory act,” since its obligation is conditional upon actualization of that external thing; and that is why the pilgrimage will not become mandatory unless financial capability is actualized.
2. If its obligation is not dependent upon actualization of that thing, such as the pilgrimage with regard to travelling to Mecca - even though its actualization is dependent upon the latter - it is called “absolute mandatory act,” since its obligation is unconditional upon that external thing.
The example of pilgrimage indicates that the absolute and conditional are relative, since one mandatory act is absolute with regard to one thing and conditional with regard to another.
It should also be known that all mandatory acts are conditional with regard to general conditions of burden, i.e., puberty, power, and intellect. Hence, the minor, impotent, and insane have no burden in the actuality.
Suspended (al-Mu‘allaq) and Definite (al-Munadjdjaz)
Doubtless when condition of the conditional mandatory act is realized its obligation becomes actual, like the absolute mandatory act, and the burden is actually directed to the duty-bound. However, actuality of the burden is conceivable in two ways:
1. If actuality of the obligation and the mandatory act is simultaneous, in the sense that the time of mandatory act is the very time of the obligation, the mandatory act is called “definite” (al-munadjdjaz); such as the prayers when its time comes, since its obligation is actual and the mandatory act, i.e., the prayers, is also actual.
2. If actuality of the obligation is prior to that of the mandatory act and therefore the time of mandatory act is later than that of obligation, it is called “suspended” (al-mu‘allaq), since the act and not its obligation is suspended until a time not realized yet. An example of this is the pilgrimage, since when the financial capability is actualized the obligation of the pilgrimage becomes actual - as it is said - while the mandatory act is suspended until coming of the time of the ritual. Here, when the financial capability is actualized the pilgrimage becomes mandatory, and that is why it is mandatory for the duty-bound to provide all preliminaries to become able to perform it in its specific, limited time.
In this connection, there are two disputes among Uşūlīs:
First, whether al-wādjib al-mu‘allaq is possible. Some believe in its possibility, while the majority of Uşūlīs hold that it is impossible - a discussion beyond the level of an introductory work.
Secondly, whether appearance of the conditional sentence in such an example as “when the specified time comes perform the prayers” is that the condition is a condition for “the obligation” and hence the prayers will not become mandatory except when the time has come, or it is a condition for “the mandatory act” and hence the mandatory act itself is suspended until coming of the time while the obligation is actual and absolute. If the first, the mandatory act will be a conditional one and none of the preliminaries would be mandatory before actualization of the condition; and if the second, the mandatory act will be an absolute one in which the obligation is actual before actualization of the condition, and hence if one knows that the condition will become actualized later on one should provide all preliminaries. This dispute needs a detailed consideration to be observed in the respective discussion.
Determinate (al-Ta‘yīnī) and Optional (al-Takhyīrī)
The determinate mandatory act is the one which is determinately wished and has no horizontal parallel in the position of obedience, such as prayers and fasting in Ramađān. To Add “horizontal” is necessary because there are some determinate mandatory acts that have some vertical parallels, such as ablution which has the vertical parallel, i.e., dry ablution (al-tayammum), since the latter is lawful only when the former is not possible.
The optional mandatory act is the one which is not determinately wished and has a horizontal parallel. In other words, what is wished is whether this one or another, in such a way that the duty-bound is free to choose each of them.
An example of this kind is the penance when one does not observe fasting in Ramađān deliberately, sine he must either fast sixty days, or feed sixty needy people, or free a slave.
Individual (al-‘Aynī) and Collective (al-Kifā’ī)
The individual mandatory act is the one which is obligatory for every dutybound and cannot be substituted by obedience on the part of others, such as the prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and so forth.
The collective mandatory act is the one in which what is desired is merely actualization of the act, no matter who has done it, such as burying a dead person, purifying the mosque, and the like. Hence, that affair is obligatory for all, but should it be done by some it is considered done and others will be exempted. However, if it is eschewed by all and left undone all will be punished, but in the case of being done by some only those who have participated will be rewarded.
Extended (al-Muwassa‘) and Constricted (al-Muđayyaq)
Considering the time, the mandatory act is divided into of specified time (al-muwaqqat) and of unspecified time (ghayr al-muwaqqat). The one of specified time, in turn, is divided into extended and constricted; and the one of unspecified time into urgent (fawrī) and non-urgent (ghayr fawrī).
The mandatory act of unspecified time is the one in which no specific time is considered juristically, though no act can be done without a time as its vessel, such as belated performing of the prayers, purification of the mosque, and the like. This kind, as was said, is in turn divided into the urgent which cannot be delayed from the first possible time, such as returning a greeting, and nonurgent which can be delayed, such as belated performing of the prayers, burial prayers, paying the fifth (al-khums) and so on.
The mandatory act of specified time is the one in which a specific time is considered juristically, such as the prayers, the pilgrimage, fasting, and the like.
The relation between this kind and its specified time can logically be conceived only in three ways: when its performing takes more time than its specified time, when both times are equal, and when the former is less than the latter.
The first is impossible, since it is charging with the impossible. The second is doubtlessly possible and has occurred in the Sharī‘a as well, and that is the one called constricted, such as fasting whose specified time precisely covers its time of performing. And the third is the one which is called extended, since the dutybound is free to perform it in the first, middle, or the last part of the time; such as daily prayers which cannot be left undone in the whole time but must be done once in its specified time.
Every Muslim knows that some mandatory acts of specified time, such as prayers, fasting, and the like, must be performed belatedly if they are not performed in their specified time. However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether such performing is principally a matter of must, in the sense that the very command to the mandatory act of specified time denotes that it must be belatedly performed if it is not performed in its specified time and hence obligation of belated performing is proved by the very proof of original performing, or it is not so and obligation of the belated performing needs a proof other than that of the original performing itself - the dispute being addressed by Uşūlīs as whether the belated performing follows the timely one or not (hal yatba‘ al-qađā’ al-adā’?).
There are three opinions in this connection: the belated performing absolutely following the timely, the former absolutely not following the latter, and distinguishing between the case where the proof of time appointing is mentioned in the proof of the mandatory act itself and the case where it is mentioned separately. According to the third opinion, in the first case the belated performing does not follow the timely one while in the second case it does.
It seems that the origin of the dispute is the disagreement among Uşūlīs whether what is understood from the time appointing is unity of the desired, or its multiplicity; i.e., whether there is one desired affair in the mandatory act of specified time and it is the act qualified by the time as it is qualified or there are two desired affairs, i.e., the act itself and its being done in a specific time.
If the first, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time there would remain no wish for the act itself and hence a new command to perform the act out of its time must be assumed; and if the second, when the command is not obeyed in its specified time only one desired affair is not obeyed, i.e., the one demanding its being in the specified time, while the wish for the act itself is still enduring - and that is why some have held the third opinion.
The justifiable opinion is the second one, i.e., the belated absolutely not following the timely; for the appearance of qualification is that the proviso is a pillar in the desired. Thus, if the Lord says, “Fast on Friday,” only one desired for one purpose is understood, and it is particularly fasting on that day; it is not understood that fasting per se is one desired and its being on Friday is another one. The case is the same with the separate proof of time appointing.
For instance, if the Lord says, “Fast,” and then He says, “Observe the fasting on Friday,” the absolute should be predicated upon the qualified - as is the rule in such cases. Predication of the absolute upon the qualified means confining the very first desired to the proviso; such qualification revealing that what was really meant by the absolute from the very beginning was just the qualified, and thereby both proofs become one due to taking both of them altogether.
It does not mean that the qualified is a desired affair other than the absolute, otherwise it would mean that the absolute has remained absolute; and this is not predication and taking two proofs altogether (djam‘ bayn al-dalīlayn), but rather keeping each of them separately (akhdh bi'l dalīlayn).
Religiously (al-Ta‘abbudī) and Instrumental (al-Tawaşşulī)
In the Islamic holy Sharī‘a, there are obligations that are not considered sound and their commands are not obeyed unless they are performed with the intention of proximity to God, such as the prayers, fasting, and the like.
Such obligations are called religiously obligations (al-ta‘abbudiyyāt). On the other hand, there are other obligations whose commands are obeyed merely by being performed without having any divine intention, such as saving a drowning person, burying a dead person, purifying cloths and body for the prayers, and the like. Such obligations are called instrumental obligations (al-tawaşşuliyyāt).
Varieties of Mandatory Acts and the Absoluteness of the Mode (al-Şīgha)
When a command is issued, if there is a contextual evidence determining which variety of command is intended, e.g., extended or constricted, determinate or optional, etc., it is obviously clear that one must definitely obey the command in the way it is specified. However, if there is no such evidence, where the command is absolute and lacks any contextual evidence, what should the duty-bound do?
Should he treat it as extended, or constricted; determinate, or optional, and so forth? Does absoluteness of the imperative necessitate that the command should be individual, or collective; determinate, or optional; extended, or constricted; suspended, or definite; and finally religiously, or instrumental?
The general criterion for such recognition is to find which variety is in need of more depiction; that is the one which must be dismissed, since it is the one which needs contextual evidence - something missing as was assumed. For instance, when the Lord commands, “Perform the prayers,” it can be considered collective only if He adds in His command “unless others should have done it.” This is an additional proviso which He has not added, while He could do so. Hence, from this lack of depiction we can logically conclude that He had not wished that proviso, and thereby we treat that command as being individual. Thus, absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be individual, determinate, extended, and definite; since these varieties are not in need of more depiction.
The case with the religiously and instrumental, however, is not that simple; it is somehow complicated if one specific meaning of intention of proximity to God is taken into consideration. It is clearly known that the intention of proximity to God can be actualized in some different ways. One is to intend that the commanded act is essentially liked and desired by the Lord. Another is to intend merely the Lord’s pleasure. Should such meanings of intention of proximity to God be meant, there would be no doubt that absoluteness of the imperative would necessitate that the command should be treated as instrumental if there were no contextual evidence, for what is in need of more depiction is the religiously mandatory act inasmuch as its command is supposed to include an additional proviso, i.e., being performed with the intention of proximity to God - something missing. In such case, the duty-bound can refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that proviso.
However, one kind of intention of proximity to God is that of “obeying the commandment.” Since it is impossible to consider this proviso in the commanded act, whose reason will be explained below, should this meaning of intention of proximity to God be considered one could not refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate this proviso and conclude that since the Lord has not uttered that proviso He has not considered it in His commandment.
For this non-utterance may have two reasons: He has not wished it, or He has wished it but He has not uttered it because of impossibility of that utterance. That is why one cannot conclude in such case that absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the command should be instrumental. Rather, since consideration of that impossibility is probable in that non-utterance, the intellect judges that one must perform the act with that proviso in order to make sure that he has obeyed the Lord’s command as such; and should that act be done without that proviso, the intellect would judge that the dutybound has not performed his divinely duty as he was supposed to and deserves punishment in the hereafter. The principal rule in such cases is that when one definitely knows that the Lord has commanded something, since one is sure that such a command has been issued, one must obey the command in such a way that one could definitely be certain of observing the Lord’s command -
whatever the case may be in the actuality - and this necessitates observing all probable provisos.
In order to explain that impossibility, we should mention that there are two kinds of division with regard to the mandatory acts: primary, and secondary.
Primary Divisions. Such divisions are those which are considered in a mandatory act per se apart from consideration of attachment of anything to it. For instance, prayers can be divided in itself, without consideration that a command is directed to it, into “with ablution and without it,” “with sūra and without it,” and so forth. In such divisions, the mandatory act can be of one of the following three states with regard to any proviso:
1. If the mandatory act is conditional upon that thing, it is called “conditionedby-something” (bi-sharţ shay’); such as ablution, sūra, rukū‘, sadjda, and other conditions of the prayers.
2. If the mandatory act is conditional upon non-existence of that thing, it is called “negatively conditioned” (bi-sharţ lā); such as speaking, laughing, and other things which interrupt the prayers.
3. If the mandatory act is absolute with regard to that thing being conditional neither upon its existence nor its non-existence, it is called “unconditioned” (lā bi-sharţ); such as the prayers with regard to qunūt (special prayer in the second rak‘a before rukū‘), color of the clothes worn, and so on.
Now, if the proof declaring obligation of something denotes that it is conditional upon existence or non-existence of something else, it must doubtlessly be followed in the way it is declared. However, if a condition is probable but neither positively nor negatively is mentioned in the proof, one may refer to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate that probable condition - if all “premises of wisdom” which allow one to refer to that principle are actualized, as will be explained in chapter 6 - and thereby discover that the speaker has really wished the absolute from the very beginning, which means that the mandatory act is not taken in relation to the proviso except in the unconditioned mode. In short, there is no problem with referring to the principle of absoluteness in order to negate probability of qualification in the primary divisions.
Secondary Divisions. From another view, mandatory act, if it is really commanded, is divided into what is externally done for the purpose of its command and what is done not for the purpose of its command, and the like. Such divisions are called secondary divisions as they are additional to the precept when a real obligation is assumed; for before actualization of a precept performing of the commanded for the purpose of its command is nonsensical, since it is assumed that it is not commanded in that state so that one can intend its command. Thus, in such divisions, qualification of the commanded act is impossible, for intending obedience of the command is subject to the existence of the command; how could it be plausible that the command is qualified by it, then? This necessitates that the command should be subject to intending the command while intending the command has been subject to the existence of the command, necessitating that the precedent should be subsequent and the subsequent be precedent - something impossible, since it is either selfcontradiction or vicious circle. Now, should qualification be impossible, absoluteness would be impossible too; since contrariety of qualification and absoluteness is that of possession and privation; hence, absoluteness cannot be assumed except in a case that can be qualified. Thus, where qualification is impossible, one cannot infer from non-qualification that the absolute is willed; and this results, with regard to the topic in question, that the absoluteness of the imperative necessitates that the mandatory act should be treated as being religiously.
On the other hand, there is a way to conclude that even in the secondary divisions, in which qualification is impossible, absoluteness of the imperative principally necessitates that the mandatory act should be instrumental; and that is the “absoluteness of the position (iţlāq al-maqām).” Although mentioning the condition in the command itself is impossible in such divisions, should one who commands wish that condition, one is not supposed to be heedless to that and should follow another way to attain one’s purpose - even though by issuing two commands: one for the act itself without the proviso, and another for the proviso. These two commands are in fact one, for they are issued for one purpose and the second is a depiction for the first. Hence, should the second command not be obeyed, the first would not be considered obeyed if done without the proviso. Therefore, the second command joined to the first is common with the qualification in the result, even though it is terminologically not called qualification. Now, where the Lord commands something and He is in the position of depiction but He does not command for the second time that such command should be performed with the intention of obedience, it will be discovered that the intention of obedience has no role in His purpose; otherwise, He would have expounded it by another command. Therefore, the principle in mandatory acts is being instrumental except where it is proved by a proof that they are religiously.
Promptitude (al-Fawr) or Belatedness (al-Tarākhī)
There is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se conventionally denotes promptitude, belatedness, both of them as homonymous, or none of them but rather it is the contextual evidence that designates any of them.
The justifiable is the last opinion; for, as mentioned earlier, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and hence has no indication of any of the promptitude or belatedness. Thus, should an imperative be void of any evidence, it could be performed either promptly or belatedly.
Once (al-Marra) or Repetition (al-Takrār)
There is another dispute among Uşūlīs whether the imperative per se denotes conventionally once or repetition, and the justifiable opinion is the same with the previous problem. For, as was said there, the imperative denotes merely the wishful relation and nothing else. Of course, obedience to the command necessitates bringing about at least one instance of the nature of the act, for not doing that is equivalent to disobedience.
However, the absoluteness of the mode necessitates that performing the mandatory act once is enough; for the Lord's desire can only be considered as one of the three following probabilities:
1. The desired is sheer existence of the thing without any proviso or condition, in the sense that He wishes that His desired should not remain non-existent but rather come out from darkness of nonexistence into the light of existence - even though through one single instance. In such case, the desired would necessarily be actualized and obeyed by the first existent and doing the mandatory act more would merely be a vain performance; its example being daily prayers.
2. The desired is one existence with the proviso of unity, i.e., it is conditional upon not being more than the first existence. In such case, should the duty-bound perform it twice, he has absolutely not obeyed the command; its example being the inaugural takbīr (saying “God is the greatest”) of daily prayers, since the second nullifies the first and becomes null itself.
3. The desired is the repeated existence; either conditional upon repetition, i.e., the desired being the whole as a whole and hence obedience not being actualized by doing the mandatory act once such as rak‘as of one prayers, or unconditioned with regard to its repetition, i.e., the desired being each of existences, such as fasting in days of Ramađān inasmuch as each day has its specific obedience.
Doubtless the two later facets are in need of more depiction. Thus, should the Lord, who is in the position of depiction, command in an absolute way and do not qualify His command to any of those two facets, it would be discovered that He has wished the first facet. Hence, the obedience, as was said earlier, would be actualized by the first existence and the second one would be considered neither disobedience nor obedience.
To Command Something Twice
If an act is commanded twice, this can be considered in two ways:
1. The second command is issued when the first one is already obeyed. In such case, it must doubtlessly be obeyed again.
2. The second command is issued when the first one has not been obeyed yet. In such case, one may doubt whether one must perform it twice or one performing would be enough. Should the second command be initiation (ta’sīs) of another obligation, it must be performed twice; but should it be an emphasis (ta’kīd) of the first, one performing would be enough. In order to find out the justifiable opinion, it should be noted that this assumption is of four states:
2.1. Both commands are unconditional, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the prayers” and again He says, “Perform the prayers”. Here, the second command should be predicated to the emphasis, for directing two commands to one thing without existence of any distinctiveness is impossible. Had the second been initiation and not emphasis, the speaker would have been supposed to qualify its object even though by such a statement as “for the next time.” Thus, from non-qualification on the one hand and the appearance that the object in both of them is one on the other, the command in the second becomes apparent in the emphasis -
although appearance of a speech per se is principally initiation and not emphasis.
2.2. Both commands are conditional upon one proviso, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform minor ablution for the new prayers if you have not performed it for the previous one” and then He repeats the same words. In this case, the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the same reason expounded in the previous state.
2.3. One command is conditional while the other is not, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution (al-ghusl),” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse.” The desired in this case is also one and the second is predicated to the emphasis, for the commanded act is apparently one and this prevents directing two commands to it - though here absoluteness of the absolute command, i.e., the unconditional, is predicated to the qualification through which the second qualifies absoluteness of the first and reveals what was intended by it.
2.4. One command is conditional upon one proviso and the other upon another, e.g., the Lord says, “Perform the major ablution if you have had sexual intercourse,” and then He says, “Perform the major ablution if you have touched a dead body.” In this case, the second is apparently predicated to the initiation, for the appearance is that the desired in either of them is different from the other. It is very unlikely that the desired in both of them would be one.
There are two other probabilities here: emphasis (ta’kīd), and intervention (tadākhul). Emphasis is nonsense here. As for the intervention, in the sense that one could content oneself with doing the commanded act once, although it is possible, it contradicts primary principles; that is why one can refer to it only where there is a specific proof revealing that. (The problem of tadākhul would be discussed in chapter 4 in detail.)
Denotation of “Command to Command”
Should the Lord command one of His servants to command another servant to do something, would it be a command to that act so that it would be mandatory for the second to do it? The case can be conceived in two ways:
1. The first commanded person is considered as an agent to deliver the Lord’s command to the second one. Doubtless the act is mandatory for the second in this case, and all commands of prophets to duty-bounds are of this kind.
2. The second commanded person is not considered as an agent but rather he is commanded to direct the command to the second person independently for himself, such as the ĥadīth in which the holy Imām says, “Command your children to perform the prayers when they are seven years old.” It is this kind that is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. The case would be the same where it is not clear of which kind that command is.
The justifiable opinion is that the command to command is apparent in its obligation upon the second person. In order to explain this more, notice that the command to command not as an agent can be issued in two ways:
2.1. The Lord’s purpose is performing of the act by the second commanded person and His command to command is a way to the actualization of His purpose. It is obviously clear that in such case His command to command is a command to the act itself.
2.2. The purpose of one who commands is merely issuance of the command by the commanded person, e.g., where a king commands his son to command his servant to do something while his purpose is not actualization of the act but rather to accustom his son to issue commands.
It is clear that in such case the command is actually not directed to the second person and he would not be considered disobedient should he not perform the act.
Now, should there be a contextual evidence designating one of those two states, one would doubtlessly be supposed to consider it. However, if there is no such contextual evidence, appearance of commands is that they are ways for actualization of the act. Add to this that commands in the second way have no room in religiously commandments.
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Author: Muhammad Jawad Fadlullah
