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The Purified Members of Ahlul Bayt (Part II)

Abu Huraira narrated: The Prophet (PBUH) looked toward Ali, Hasan, Husain, and Fatimah (AS), and then said: “I am in war with those who will fight you, and in peace with those who are peaceful to you.”

References:

*- Sunan al-Tirmidhi, v5, p699

*- Sunan Ibn Majah, v1, p52

*- Fadha'il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p767, Tradition #1350

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p149

*- Majma' al-Zawa'id, by al-Haythami, v9, p169

*- al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani, v3, p30, also in al-Awsat

*- Jami' al-Saghir, by al-Ibani, v2, p17

*- Tarikh, by al-Khateeb al-Baghdadi, v7, p137

*- Sawaiq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, p144

*- Dhakha'ir al-Uqba, by al-Muhib al-Tabari, p25

*- Mishkat al-Masabih, by Khatib al-Tabrizi, English Version, Tradition #6145

Content:

The other members of Ahlul Bayt Loving Ahlul Bayt The verse of Malediction (Mubahalah)

The other members of Ahlul Bayt

أبشري يا فاطمة المهدي منك ابن عساكر) عن الحسين

Reference:

*- Ziyadat al-Jaami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 6, #25 (حرف الهمزة )

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 12, #34208 (فاطمة رضي الله عنها )

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #39653 (المهدي عليه السلام )

*- Mu'ujam al-Tabarani al-Kabeer, by Imam al-Tabarani (ذكر أزواج رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم. أم سلمة. سعيد بن المسيب عن أم سلمة )

The Prophet (PBUH&HF) said: The Mahdi will be of my family, of the descendants of Fatimah (the Prophet's daughter). المهدي من عترتي، من ولد فاطمة التخريج (برموز السيوطي): (د ه ك) عن أم سلمة

التخريج (مفصلا): أبو داود وابن ماجة والحاكم في المستدرك عن أم سلمة تصحيح السيوطي: صحيح

Reference:

*- al-Jaami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 6, #9241 (فصل: في المحلى بأل من حرف الميم )

*- Sunan Abu Dawud, English version, Ch. 36, Tradition #4271 narrated by Umm Salama, the wife of the Prophet).

*- Sunan Abu Dawud, vol 2, #4284 (أول كتاب المهدي )

*- Sunan ibn Majah, vol 2, #4085 (كتاب الفتن. (34) باب خروج المهرى )

*- al-Nisa'i and al-Bayhaqi, and others as quoted in: al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch.11, p249.

*- Mustadrak al-Hakim, by Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Hakim al-Nisaboori, vol 4, #8672/380 (كتاب: الفتن، والملاحم )

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38662 (خروج المهدي )

أخبرني أبو النضر الفقيه، حدثنا عثمان بن سعيد الدارمي، حدثنا عبد الله بن صالح، أنبأ أبو المليح الرقي، حدثني زياد بن بيان، وذكر من فضله قال: سمعت علي بن نفيل يقول: سمعت سعيد بن المسيب يقول: سمعت أم سلمة تقول :

سمعت النبي -صلَّى الله عليه وسلَّم- يذكر المهدي فقال: (نعم، هو حق، وهو من بني فاطمة)

Reference:

*- Mustadrak al-Hakim, by Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Hakim al-Nisaboori, vol 4, #8671/379 (كتاب: الفتن، والملاحم )

“al-Mahdi is from our Ahlul-Bayt, no doubt Allah will enforce his appearance within a night (i.e., his coming is very unpredictable and is very sudden).”

المهدي منا أهل البيت، يصلحه الله في ليلة التخريج (برموز السيوطي): (حم ه) عن علي التخريج (مفصلا): أحمد في مسنده وابن ماجة عن علي تصحيح السيوطي: حسن

Reference:

*- al-Jaami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 6, #9243 (في المحلى بأل من حرف الميم )

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, p250.

*- Musnad ibn Hanbal, v1,p84 [Entire book:(p93,#645)]

*- Sunan ibn Majah, vol 2, #4085 (كتاب الفتن. (34) باب خروج المهرى )

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38664 (خروج المهدي )

المهدي منى: أجلى الجبهة، أقنى الأنف، يملأ الأرض قسطا وعدلا كما ملئت جورا وظلما، يملك سبع سنين التخريج (برموز السيوطي): (د ك) عن أبي سعيد التخريج (مفصلا): أبو داود والحاكم في المستدرك عن أبي سعيد تصحيح السيوطي: صحيح

Reference:

*- al-Jaami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 6, #9244 (في المحلى بأل من حرف الميم )

*- Sunan Abu Dawud, vol 2, #4285 (أول كتاب المهدي )

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38665 (خروج المهدي )

المهدي رجل من ولدي: وجهه كالكوكب الدري التخريج (برموز السيوطي): الروياني عن حذيفة التخريج (مفصلا): الروياني عن حذيفة تصحيح السيوطي: صحيح

Reference:

*- al-Jaami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 6, #9245 (في المحلى بأل من حرف الميم )

*- Mustadrak al-Hakim, by Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Hakim al-Nisaboori, vol 4, #8670/378 (كتاب: الفتن، والملاحم ), Authenticity: هذا حديث صحيح على شرط مسلم، ولم يخرجاه

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38666 (خروج المهدي ) The Messenger of Allah said: “The world will not perish until a man among the Arabs appears whose name matches my name.”

حَدَّثَنَا عُبيدُ بنُ أسباطَ بنُ مُحَمَّدٍ القرشيُّ أخبرنا أبي أخبرنا سُفيانُ الثَّوريُّ عن عاصمِ بنِ بَهدلةَ عن زِرٍّ عن عبدِ اللهِ قال: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلِيهِ وسَلَّم: (لا تَذهبُ الدُّنيا حتَّى يملِكَ العربَ رجلٌ من أهلِ بيتي يُواطئُ اسمهُ اسمي وفي البابِ عن عَليٍّ وأبي سعيدٍ وأمِّ سَلَمَةَ وأبي هُرَيرَةَ. هذا حسنٌ صحيحٌ

Reference:

*- Sunan al-Tirmidhi, vol 3, #2331 (أبوابُ الفتنِ عن رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلِيهِ وسَلَّم. 44 - بَابُ مَا جَاءَ في المهديِّ )

*- Sunan Abu Dawud, vol 2, #4282 (أول كتاب المهدي )

The Prophet (PBUH&HF) said: “Even if the entire duration of the world's existence has already been exhausted and only one day is left (before the day of judgment), Allah will expand that day to such a length of time, as to accommodate the kingdom of a person from my Ahlul-Bayt who will be called by my name. He will fill out the earth with peace and justice as it will have been full of injustice and tyranny (by then).”

حدثنا مسدد، أن عمر بن عبيد حدثهم، ح، وثنا محمد بن العلاء، ثنا أبو بكر -يعني: ابن عياش- ح، وثنا مسدد، قال: ثنا يحيى، عن سفيان، ح، وثنا أحمد بن إبراهيم، قال: ثنا عبيد الله بن موسى، أخبرنا زائدة، ح، وثنا أحمد بن إبراهيم، قال: حدّثني عبيد الله بن موسى، عن فطر، المعنى واحد كلهم عن عاصم، عن زرٍّ، عن عبد اللّه :

عن النبيِّ -صلى الله عليه وسلم- قال: “لو لم يبق من الدنيا إلا يومٌ”. قال زائدة في حديثه: “لطوَّل الله ذلك اليوم”، ثم اتفقوا: “حتى يبعث الله فيه رجلاً منِّي -أو- من أهل بيتي يواطئ اسمه اسمي، واسم أبيه اسم أبي”. زاد في حديث فطرٍ: “يملأ الأرض قسطاً وعدلاً كما ملئت ظلماً وجوراً”. وقال في حديث سفيان: “لا تذهب -أو لا تنقضي- الدنيا حتى يملك العرب رجلٌ من أهل بيتي، يواطئ اسمه اسمي”. قال أبو داود: لفظ عمر وأبي بكر بمعنى سفيان

Reference:

*- Sahih al-Tirmidhi, v2, p86, v9, pp 74-75

*- Sunan Abu Dawud, vol 2, #4282 (أول كتاب المهدي )

*- Musnad ibn Hanbal, v1,p376 [Entire book:(p307,#3571, #3572, #3573)]; v1,p430 [Entire book:(p346,#4098)]; v1,p448 [Entire book:(p359,#4279)]

*- al-Mustadrak ala al-Sahihayn, by al-Hakim, v4, p557

*- al-Jami'u al-Sagheer, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, vol 5, #7490 (باب: حرف اللام ) - Narrated by ibn Masu'ud

*- Ziyadat al-Jami'u al-Saghir wal durr al-Muntathara, by Jalaludin al-Suyuti, #4428 (حرف الياء ) - Narrated by ibn Masu'ud and Abi Hurayra

*- al-Urful Wardi, by al-Suyuti, p2

*- Mu'ujam al-Tabarani, by Imam al-Tabarani, (باب الظاء. عبد الله بن مسعود الهذلي )

*- Tahdhib al-Tahdhib, by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, v9, p144

*- Fat'h al-Bari fi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, by Ibn Hajar Asqalani, v7, p305

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, p249

*- al-Tathkirah, by al-Qurtubi, p617

*- al-Hawi, by al-Suyuti, v2, pp 165-166

*- Sharh al-Mawahib al-Ladunniyyah, by al-Zurqani, v5, p348

*- Fat'h al-Mugheeth, by al-Sakhawi, v3, p41

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38675, #38676 (خروج المهدي )

*- Iqd al-Durar Fi Akhbar al-Mahdi al-Muntadhar, v12, Ch. 1,

*- al-Bayan fi Akhbar Sahib al-Zaman, By Ganji al-Shafi'i, Ch. 12

*- al-Fusool al-Muhimmah, by Ibn Sabbagh al-Maliki, Ch. 12

*- Arjahul Matalib, by Ubaidallah Hindi al-Hanafi, p380

*- Muqaddimah, by Ibn Khaldoon, p266

*- and also in the works of Ibn Habban, Abu Nua'ym, Ibn Asakir, etc.

The Prophet (PBUH&HF) said: “We (I and my family) are members of a household that Allah (SWT) has chosen for them the life of the Hereafter over the life of this world; and the members of my household (Ahlul-Bayt) shall suffer a great affliction and they shall be forcefully expelled from their homes after my death; then there will come people from the East carrying black flags, and they will ask for some good to be given to them, but they shall be refused service; as such, they will wage war and emerge victorious, and will be offered that which they desired in the first place, but they will refuse to accept it till they pass it to a man from my family (Ahlul-Bayt) appears to fill the Earth with justice as it has been filled with corruption. So whoever reaches that (time) ought to come to them even if crawling on the ice/snow since among them is the Vice-regent of Allah (Khalifatullah) al-Mahdi.”

إنا أهل بيت اختار الله لنا الآخرة على الدنيا، وإن أهل بيتي سيلقون من بعدي بلاء وتشريدا وتطريدا، حتى؟؟ أتى قوم من قبل المشرق معهم رايات سود فيسألون الحق فلا يعطونه، فيقاتلون فينصرون فيعطون ما سألوا، فلا يقبلونه حتى يدفعوها إلى رجل من أهل بيتي، يواطيء اسمه اسمي واسم أبيه اسم أبي، فيملك الأرض فيملؤها قسطا وعدلا كما ملؤها جورا وظلما، فمن أدرك ذلك منكم أو من أعقابكم فليأتهم ولو حبوا على الثلج، فإنها رايات هدى. عن ابن مسعود ستطلع عليكم رايات سود من قبل خراسان! فأتوها ولو حبوا على الثلج، فإنه خليفة الله تعالى المهدي الديلمي - عن ثوبان

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 14, #38677, #38679 (الإكمال من خروج المهدي )

حدثنا يحيى بن عبد الباقي ثنا يوسف بن عبد الرحمن المروروذي ثنا أبو تقي عبد الحميد بن إبراهيم الحمصي ثنا معدان بن سليم الحضرمي عن عبد الرحمن بن نجيح عن أبي الزاهرية عن جبير بن نفير عن عوف بن مالك

قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم كيف أنت يا عوف إذا افترقت هذه الأمة على ثلاث وسبعين فرقة واحدة في الجنة وسائرهن في النار قلت ومتى ذاك يا رسول الله قال إذا كثرت الشرط وملكت الإماء وقعدت الحملان على المنابر واتخذوا القرآن مزامير وزخرفت المساجد ورفعت المنابر واتخذ الفيء دولا والزكاة مغرما والأمانة مغنما وتفقه في الدين لغير الله وأطاع الرجل امرأته وعق أمه وأقصى أباه ولعن آخر هذه الأمة أولها وساد القبيلة فاسقهم وكان زعيم القوم أرذلهم وأكرم الرجل اتقاء شره فيومئذ يكون ذلك ويفزع الناس يومئذ الى الشام نعصمهم من عدوهم قلت وهل يفتح الشام قال نعم وشيكا ثم تقع الفتن بعد فتحها ثم تجيء فتنة غبراء مظلمة ثم يتبع الفتن بعضها بعضا حتى يخرج رجل من أهل بيتي يقال له المهدي فإن أدركته فاتبعه وكن من المهتدين

References:

*- Majmau'u al-Zawa'id, by al-Hafidh al-Haythami, vol 7, #12435

(كتاب الفتن - أعاذنا الله منها - 77. (بابان في علامات الساعة). 2. باب ثان في أمارات الساعة)

*- Mu'ujam al-Tabarani al-Kabeer, by Imam al-Tabarani (باب الظاء. عوف بن مالك الأشجعي. جبير بن نفير الحضرمي عن عوف بن مالك )

Ibn al-Abbas narrated that the messenger of Allah said: “Whoever wishes to live and die like me, and to abide in the Garden of Eden after death, should acknowledge Ali as WALI after me, and take his WALI (i.e., Imams after him) as WALI, and should follow the Imams after me for they are my Ahlul-Bayt and were created from my clay and are gifted with the same knowledge and understanding as myself. Woe unto those who deny their virtues and those who disregard their relationship and affinity with me, for my intercession shall never reach them.

“من سره أن يحيى حياتي ويموت مماتي ويسكن جنة عدن التي غرسها ربي فليوال عليا من بعدي وليوال وليه، وليقتد بأهل بيتي من بعدي، فإنهم عترتي، خلقوا من طينتي، ورزقوا فهمي وعلمي، فويل للمكذبين بفضلهم من أمتي، القاطعين فيهم صلتي، لا أنالهم الله شفاعتي

Reference:

*- Hilyatul Awliyaa, by Abu Nu'aym, v1, pp 84,86

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p128

*- al-Jami' al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani

*- al-Isabah, by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani

*- Kanz al-Ummal, v12, #34198 (المجلد الثاني عشر >> الإكمال من الفصل الأول في فضل أهل البيت مجملا )

*- al-Manaqib, by al-Kharazmi, p34

*- Yanabi' al-Mawaddah, by al-Qundoozi al-Hanafi, p149

*- History of Ibn Asakir, v2, p95

Loving Ahlul Bayt

Quran 42:23

That is (the Bounty) whereof Allah gives Glad Tidings to His Servants who believe and do righteous deeds. Say: “No reward do I ask of you for this except the love of those near of kin (qurba).” And if any one earns any good, We shall give him an increase of good in respect thereof: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Ready to appreciate (service).

We have been ordered to love the “qurba” of the prophet. The qurba means those relatives who are the closest to Him in faith, excellence, accomplishment, in purity, and not any relative. Most muslims, if not all, agree that this qurba is Ahlul Bayt. Loving Ahlul Bayt is not only by heart. It is also by action, which involves following their path, their faith, their actions, because their path is that of their grand-father, the prophet Muhammad.

It is very logical that no one is worth following besides the prophet but those who have been purified with him a thorough purification and kept away from uncleanless, and have been loved by him the most. No muslim can deny the love of the prophet towards His daughter Fatimah (as), his cousin and brother Ali (as) and his two grandsons and sons al-Hassan and al-Hussein (as). The Ahlul Bayt are the only most reliable transmitters of the teachings of the prophet (the sunnah) and the interpreters of the quran, because of their unique virtues. After the demise of the prophet, they should have been followed. But, unfortunately, they were put on the same level as the companions of the prophet and were ignored.

Logically, who would you rather follow? The companions of the prophet who may unvoluntarily or voluntarily commit sins and make mistakes and who have fought each others after the demise of the prophet and who have desagreed among themselves regarding many Islamic laws, or the ones that have been purified and cleansed by Allah and who made it compulsory on us to love? An unbiased and rational person will pick the second choice. May Allah guide us all, inchallah.

حَدَّثَنَا عَبد اللَّهِ حَدَّثَنِي نَصرُ بنُ عَلِيٍّ الأَزدِيُّ أَخبَرَنِي عَلِيُّ بنُ جَعفَرِ بنِ مُحَمَّدِ بنِ عَلِيِّ بنِ الحُسَينِ بنِ عَلِيٍّ حَدَّثَنِي أَخِي مُوسَى بنُ جَعفَرٍ عَن أَبِيهِ جَعفَرِ بنِ مُحَمَّدٍ عَن أَبِيهِ عَن عَلِيِّ بنِ حُسَينٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنهُ عَن أَبِيهِ عَن جَدِّهِ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَخَذَ بِيَدِ حَسَنٍ وَحُسَينٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنهُمَا فَقَالَ مَن أَحَبَّنِي وَأَحَبَّ هَذَينِ وَأَبَاهُمَا وَأُمَّهُمَا كَانَ مَعِي فِي دَرَجَتِي يَومَ القِيَامَةِ

References:

*- Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, v1,p78 [entire book: p88,#576];

The verse of Malediction (Mubahalah) and related traditions Al-mubahala means the invocation of the curse of Allah upon the liar. In the 9th-10th year of Hijrah, a christian delegation of 14 priests came from Najran to meet with the prophet Muhammad to inquire about the new religion and what His opinion of Jesus was. When they arrived, the prophet asked them to rest and they would meet the next day. The next day, 3 Quranic verses (3:59-61) about Jesus were revealed. The holy prophet recited to them the verses about Jesus, but they did not accept them since the verses did not mention that Jesus was the son of Allah. The prophet recited the third verse and called them upon the challenge of invoking the curse of Allah upon the liars.

The next day, the prophet brought with Him Ali, Fatimah, al-Hassan and al-Hussein and stood on one side of the field, while the 14 christians stood on the other side. The latter saw that the prophet brought with him His closest and dearest relatives and was willing to confront the challenge with His family. As a result, the Christians were terrified and abstained from the proposed malediction (Mubahala) and submitted to a treaty with the Prophet (PBUH&HF).

The point of this story is that no one was dearest to the prophet Muhammad than Ali, Fatima and their 2 sons. No one was closer to him in morality, spirituality and piety than the Ahlul Bayt. Give me one reason why they should not be followed. Give me one reason why they are not superior to any of the companions. Many oppressors have fabricated ahadith to lower the high rank of the Ahlul Bayt and elevate the lower rank of the companions, and caused misguidance to millions of muslims.

Quran 3:59-61

The similitude of Jesus before Allah is as that of Adam; He created him from dust, then said to him: “Be”. And he was. The Truth (comes) from Allah alone; so be not of those who doubt. If any one disputes in this matter with thee, now after (full) knowledge Hath come to thee, say: “Come! let us gather together,- our sons and your sons, our women and your women, ourselves and yourselves: Then let us earnestly pray, and invoke the curse of Allah on those who lie!”

This hadith has been narrated. on the authority of Shu'ba with the same chain of transmitters. Amir b. Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas reported on the authority of his father that Muawiya b. Abi Sufyin appointed Sa'd as the Governor and said: What prevents you from abusing Abu Turab (Hadrat 'Ali), whereupon be said: It is because of three things which I remember Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) having said about him that I would not abuse him and even if I find one of those three things for me, it would be more dear to me than the red camel.

I heard Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) say about 'Ali as he left behind him in one of his campaigns (that was Tabuk). 'Ali said to him: Allah's Messenger, you leave me behind along with women and children. Thereupon Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) said to him: Aren't you satisfied with being unto me what Aaron was unto Moses but with this exception that there is no prophethood after me. And I (also) heard him say on the Day of Khaibar: I would certainly give this standard to a person who loves Allah and his Messenger and Allah and his Messenger love him too. He (the narrator) said: We have been anxiously waiting for it, when he (the Holy Prophet) said: Call 'Ali.

He was called and his eyes were inflamed. He applied saliva to his eyes and handed over the standard to him, and Allah gave him victory. (The third occasion is this) when the (following) verse was revealed:” Let us summon our children and your children.” Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) called 'Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husain and said: O Allah, they are my family.

Reference:

*- Sahih Muslim, Book 031, 5915 - Kitab Fada'il Al-Sahabah - (English version)

*- Sahih Muslim, Page 940, 2404-32, Book: Fada'il Al-Sahabah - (Arabic version)

Note how the prophet emphasizes that Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husain are His family.

حَدَّثَنَا قُتَيبَةُ بنُ سَعِيدٍ حَدَّثَنَا حَاتِمُ بنُ إِسمَاعِيلَ عَن بُكَيرِ بنِ مِسمَارٍ عَن عَامِرِ بنِ سَعدٍ عَن أَبِيهِ قَالَ سَمِعتُ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَقُولُ لَهُ وَخَلَّفَهُ فِي بَعضِ مَغَازِيهِ فَقَالَ عَلِيٌّ أَتُخَلِّفُنِي مَعَ النِّسَاءِ وَالصِّبيَانِ قَالَ يَا عَلِيُّ أَمَا تَرضَى أَن تَكُونَ مِنِّي بِمَنزِلَةِ هَارُونَ مِن مُوسَى إِلَّا أَنَّهُ لَا نُبُوَّةَ بَعدِي وَسَمِعتُهُ يَقُولُ يَومَ خَيبَرَ لَأُعطِيَنَّ الرَّايَةَ رَجُلًا يُحِبُّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَيُحِبُّهُ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ فَتَطَاوَلنَا لَهَا فَقَالَ ادعُوا لِي عَلِيًّا فَأُتِيَ بِهِ أَرمَدَ فَبَصَقَ فِي عَينِهِ وَدَفَعَ الرَّايَةَ إِلَيهِ فَفَتَحَ اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَلَمَّا نَزَلَت هَذِهِ الآيَةُ نَدعُ أَبنَاءَنَا وَأَبنَاءَكُم دَعَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيهِ وَسَلَّمَ عَلِيًّا وَفَاطِمَةَ وَحَسَنًا وَحُسَينًا فَقَالَ اللَّهُمَّ هَؤُلَاءِ أَهلِ بَیتِي

References:

*- Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, v1,p185 [entire book: p166,#1608];

You may read more about this even in the following chapter: Sourat 3 > aal-I'imran > Verse 59-61 (al-Mubahala)

The Purified Members of Ahlul Bayt (Part III)

Abu Huraira narrated: The Prophet (PBUH) looked toward Ali, Hasan, Husain, and Fatimah (AS), and then said: “I am in war with those who will fight you, and in peace with those who are peaceful to you.”

References:

*- Sunan al-Tirmidhi, v5, p699

*- Sunan Ibn Majah, v1, p52

*- Fadha'il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p767, Tradition #1350

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p149

*- Majma' al-Zawa'id, by al-Haythami, v9, p169

*- al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani, v3, p30, also in al-Awsat

*- Jami' al-Saghir, by al-Ibani, v2, p17

*- Tarikh, by al-Khateeb al-Baghdadi, v7, p137

*- Sawaiq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, p144

*- Dhakha'ir al-Uqba, by al-Muhib al-Tabari, p25

*- Mishkat al-Masabih, by Khatib al-Tabrizi, English Version, Tradition #6145

Content:

Hadith al-safinah

Hadith al-safinah The first hadith below is known as hadith al-Safinah. It is well known among the Shia'a but unknown among the Sunnis, although included in their reliable sources of hadith. This hadith is a great indication to the importance of Ahlul Bayt and is of great support to hadith al-thaqalayn (the two weighty things)

. This hadith is known to be authentic by both, madhhab Ahlul Bayt and the Sunnis. It is clear that in order to avoid going astray, we must adhere to the progeny of the prophet Muhammad, who have inherited His teachings. This hadith certainly, nullifies the hadiths that make allusion to following any companion in order to be guided, and which by the way are not considered authentic by the Shia'a. “Behold! My Ahlul-Bayt are like the Ark of Noah. Whoever embarked in it was SAVED, and whoever turned away from it was PERISHED.”إن مثل أهل بيتي فيكم مثل سفينة نوح، من ركبها نجا ومن تخلف عنها هلك

Reference:

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v2, p343, v3, pp 150-151 on the authority of Abu Dhar. al-Hakim said this tradition is authentic (Sahih).

*- Fadha'il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p786

*- Tafsir al-Kabir, by Fakhr al-Razi, under the commentary of verse 42:23, Part 27, p167

*- Tarikh al-Khulafaa and Jami' al-Saghir, by al-Suyuti

*- al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani, v3, pp 37,38

*- al-Saghir, by al-Tabarani, v2, p22

*- Hilyatul Awliyaa, by Abu Nu'aym, v4, p306

*- al-Jami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludeen al-suyuti: v2,#2442 (المجلد الثاني << [تتمة باب حرف الألف ]);

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi: v12,#34144 (المجلد الثاني عشر << الفصل الأول في فضلهم مجملا );

مثل أهل بيتي مثل سفينة نوح: من ركبها نجا، ومن تخلف عنها غرق التخريج (مفصلا): البزار عن ابن عباس، وعن ابن الزبير، الحاكم في المستدرك عن أبي ذر

Reference:

*- al-Jami'i al-Sagheer, by Jalaludeen al-suyuti: v5,#8162 (المجلد الخامس << باب: حرف الميم );

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi: v12,#34151 (المجلد الثاني عشر << الفصل الأول في فضلهم مجملا );

*- Mustadrak al-Hakim: v2,# 449/3312 (المجلد الثاني << - 27 -كتاب التفسير << -11- تفسير سورة هود );

*- Mu'ujam al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani: (باب الظاء << أحاديث عبد الله بن العباس بن عبد المطلب بن هاشم بن عبد مناف << سعيد بن جبير عن ابن عباس );

The Purified Members of Ahlul Bayt (Part IV)

Abu Huraira narrated: The Prophet (PBUH) looked toward Ali, Hasan, Husain, and Fatimah (AS), and then said: “I am in war with those who will fight you, and in peace with those who are peaceful to you.”

References:

*- Sunan al-Tirmidhi, v5, p699

*- Sunan Ibn Majah, v1, p52

*- Fadha'il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p767, Tradition #1350

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p149

*- Majma' al-Zawa'id, by al-Haythami, v9, p169

*- al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani, v3, p30, also in al-Awsat

*- Jami' al-Saghir, by al-Ibani, v2, p17

*- Tarikh, by al-Khateeb al-Baghdadi, v7, p137

*- Sawaiq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, p144

*- Dhakha'ir al-Uqba, by al-Muhib al-Tabari, p25

*- Mishkat al-Masabih, by Khatib al-Tabrizi, English Version, Tradition #6145

Content:

More virtues

أخبرني أبو بكر إسماعيل بن الفقيه بالري، حدثنا أبو حاتم محمد بن إدريس، حدثنا كثير بن يحيى، حدثنا أبو عوانة داود بن أبي عوف، عن عبد الرحمن بن أبي زياد: أنه سمع عبد الله بن الحارث بن نوفل يقول: حدثنا أبو سعيد الخدري -رضي الله تعالى عنه-: أن النبي -صلَّى الله عليه وسلَّم- دخل على فاطمة -رضي الله تعالى عنها- فقال: (أني وإياك وهذا النائم -يعني: عليا- وهما -يعني: الحسن والحسين- لفي مكان واحد يوم القيامة). هذا حديث صحيح الإسناد، ولم يخرجاه

Reference:

*- Mustadrak al-Hakim, v3,#262/4664 (المجلد الثالث << -31- كتاب معرفة الصحابة رضي الله تعالى عنهم >> ذكر إسلام أمير المؤمنين: علي -رضي الله تعالى عنه -)

The Prophet (PBUH&HF) said about Ahlul-Bayt: “Do not be ahead of them for you will perish, do not turn away from them for you will perish, and do not try to teach them since they know more than you do!”

Reference:

*- al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Suyuti, v2, p60

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, p230, quoted from al-Tabarani, also in section 2, p342

*- Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v3, p137

*- Yanabi' al-Mawaddah, by al-Qundoozi al-Hanafi, p41, and P335

*- Kanz al-Ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, v1, p168

*- Majma' al-Zawa'id, by al-Haythami, v9, p163

*- Tadhkirat al-Khawas al-Ummah, Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi al-Hanafi, pp 28-33

إني لا أجد لنبي إلا نصف عمر الذي كان قبله وإني أوشك أن أدعى فأجيب فما أنتم قائلون قالوا نصحت قال أليس تشهدون أن لا إله إلا الله وأن محمدا عبده ورسوله وأن الجنة حق وأن النار حق وأن البعث بعد الموت حق قالوا نشهد قال وأنا أشهد معكم ألا هل تسمعون فإني فرطكم على الحوض وأنتم واردون الحوض وإن عرضه أبعد ما بين صنعاء وبصرى فيه أقداح عدد النجوم من فضة فانظروا كيف تخلفوني في الثقلين قالوا وما الثقلان يا رسول الله قال كتاب الله طرفه بيد الله وطرفه بأيديكم فاستمسكوا به ولا تضلوا والآخر عترتي وأن اللطيف الخبير نبأني أنهما لن يتفرقا حتى يردا علي الحوض فسألت ذلك لهما ربي فلا تقدموهما فتهلكوا ولا تقصروا عنهما. فتهلكوا ولا تعلوهم فإنهم أعلم منكم من كنت أولى به من نفسه فعلي وليه اللهم وال من والاه وعاد من عاداه. (طب عن أبي الطفيل عن زيد بن أرقم)

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi: v1,#957 (المجلد الأول << الباب الثاني في الاعتصام بالكتاب والسنة ); The Messenger of Allah (PBUH&HF) said: “My Ahlul-Bayt are like the Gate of Repentance of the Children of Israel; whoever entered therein was forgiven.”

Reference:

*- Majma' al-Zawa'id, by al-Haythami, v9, p168

*- al-Awsat, by al-Tabarani, Tradition #18

*- Arba'in, by al-Nabahani, p216

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, pp 230,234

يقول الذهبي: له في خصائص علي. ميزان الاعتدال (2/368). ) قال: بينا أنا عند علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه في الرحبة إذ أتاه رجل فسأله عن هذه الآية {أفمن كان على بينة من ربه ويتلوه شاهد منه} فقال: ما من رجل من قريش جرت عليه المواسي إلا قد نزلت فيه طائفة من القرآن، والله والله لأن يكونوا يعلموا ما سبق لنا أهل البيت على لسان النبي الأمي صلى الله عليه وسلم أحب إلي من أن يكون لي ملء هذه الرحبة ذهبا وفضة، والله إن مثلنا في هذه الأمة كمثل سفينة نوح في قوم نوح، وإن مثلنا في هذه الأمة كمثل باب حطة في بني إسرائيل

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi: v2,#4429 (المجلد الثاني << سورة هود );

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi: v12,#34170 (المجلد الثاني عشر << الإكمال من الفصل الأول في فضل أهل البيت مجملا ); The above tradition was in connection with verses 2:58 and 7:161 of the Quran which describe the Gate of Repentance of Bani Israel. The companions of Moses who did not enter the Gate of the Repentance were lost in the desert for forty years, while those who did not enter the ark of Noah were drowned.

Quran 2:58

And remember We said: “Enter this town, and eat of the plenty therein as ye wish; but enter the gate with humility, in posture and in words, and We shall forgive you your faults and increase (the portion of) those who do good.”

Quran 7:161

And remember it was said to them: “Dwell in this town and eat therein as ye wish, but say the word of humility and enter the gate in a posture of humility: We shall forgive you your faults; We shall increase (the portion of) those who do good.” The following hadith are taken from Sunnis sources and are regarded as authentic by the Shia'a. They show the importance of Ahlul Bayt and their unmatched virtues.

It is unfortunate that the sihah themselves do not narrate much about the virtues of the progeny of the prophet Muhammad. They contain very few narrations from and about the progeny of the prophet, while most of the narrations are shared between Abu Huraira, Aisha and Abdullah ibn Umar. Is not Ali the gate of knowledge?

Did he not write during the time of the prophet all the ahadith in a book called Sahifah al-Jamia'a? What happened? The answer is simple: The oppressors accomplished their goals by dictating themselves the history and fundamemtals of Islam. They succeeded in concealing the truth, unmatched virtues and importance of the progeny of the prophet on one hand, and fabricating stories that elevated the merits of the companions, on the other hand. Fortunately, what the Sunnis sihah have missed (or avoided) is recorded in the reliable sources of the Shia'a, which by the way, are not called or labeled Sihah. The only sahih book is the Quran!

The Messenger of Allah said: “The stars are amnesty for the inhabitants of the heavens, and if the stars go away (i.e. become non-existent), the inhabitants of the heavens will be destroyed. And my Ahlul-Bayt are amnesty for the inhabitants of the earth, and if my Ahlul-Bayt go away (i.e. all die), the inhabitants of the earth will be destroyed.

Reference:

*- Fadha'il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p671, Tradition #1145

*- Dhakha'ir al-Uqba, by Muhibbuddin al-Tabari, p14

*- Manaqib Ahmad, and many more such as al-Tabarani

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, p234

*- Musnad, Abu Ya'ala, on the authority of Salama Ibn Awka' in which the wording is: “The stars are amnesty for the inhabitants of the heavens, and my Ahlul-Bayt are the amnesty for my Ummah.”

The Messenger of Allah said: “The stars help prevent the inhabitants of the earth from being drowned, and my Ahlul-Bayt are the protectors of my community against disputes (in religious matters). Therefore, whichever groups among the Arabs opposes my Ahlul-Bayt, shall be split up by dissensions and will become (a party of) Satan.”

Reference:

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p149, who said this tradition is authentic

*- al-Tabarani, quoting Ibn Abbas

*- Also in al-Manaqib Ahmad, as quoted by Muhibbuddin al-Tabari

*- al-Sawa'iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, section 1, p234

Commander of Believers, Imam Ali (AS): “I and my pure holy descendants and my virtuous household are most sober in childhood and when we grow up we are the wisest: we are the means through which Allah shall exterminate falsehood and break the teeth of blood-thirsty wolves and restore you the freedom by removing the ropes that are tied around your necks. Allah wished to commence (all things) through us, and to complete (all things) through us.”

Reference:

*- Kanz al-Ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, v6, p36

*- Aydah al-Ishkal, by Abd al-Ghani

Ibn al-Abbas narrated that the messenger of Allah said: “Whoever wishes to live and die like me, and to abide in the Garden of Eden after death, should acknowledge Ali as WALI after me, and take his WALI (i.e., Imams after him) as WALI, and should follow the Imams after me for they are my Ahlul-Bayt and were created from my clay and are gifted with the same knowledge and understanding as myself. Woe unto those who deny their virtues and those who disregard their relationship and affinity with me, for my intercession shall never reach them.”

من سره أن يحيى حياتي ويموت مماتي ويسكن جنة عدن التي غرسها ربي فليوال عليا من بعدي وليوال وليه، وليقتد بأهل بيتي من بعدي، فإنهم عترتي، خلقوا من طينتي، ورزقوا فهمي وعلمي، فويل للمكذبين بفضلهم من أمتي، القاطعين فيهم صلتي، لا أنالهم الله شفاعتي

Reference:

*- Hilyatul Awliyaa, by Abu Nu'aym, v1, pp 84,86

*- al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p128

*- al-Jami' al-Kabir, by al-Tabarani

*- al-Isabah, by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani

*- Kanz al-Ummal, v12, #34198 (المجلد الثاني عشر << الإكمال من الفصل الأول في فضل أهل البيت مجملا )

*- al-Manaqib, by al-Kharazmi, p34

*- Yanabi' al-Mawaddah, by al-Qundoozi al-Hanafi, p149

*- History of Ibn Asakir, v2, p95

من أحب أن يحيى حياتي ويموت ميتتي ويدخل الجنة التي وعدني ربي قضبانا من قضبانها غرسها بيده وهي جنة الخلد فليتول عليا وذريته من بعده فإنهم لن يخرجوكم من باب هدى ولن يدخلوكم في باب ضلالة(مطير والباوردي وابن شاهين وابن منده - عن زياد بن مطرف وهو واه) (أورده الهيثمي في مجمع الزوائد (9/108) وقال رواه الطبراني وفيه يحيى ابن يعلى الأسلمي وهو ضعيف ص)

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 11, #32960 (المجلد الحادي عشر << تتمة الإكمال من فضائل علي رضي الله عنه) من أحب أن يحيى حياتي ويموت موتي ويسكن جنة الخلد التي وعدني ربي فإن ربي عز وجل غرس قضبانها بيده فليتول علي بن أبي طالب فإنه لن يخرجكم من هدى ولن يدخلكم في ضلالة(طب، ك وتعقب وأبو نعيم في فضائل الصحابة - عن زيد بن أرقم )

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 11, #32959 (المجلد الحادي عشر << تتمة الإكمال من فضائل علي رضي الله عنه )

Tradition related on the authority of Abu Bakr, the Prophet's famous Companion and the first caliph. He said: I saw the Messenger of God pitch a tent in which he placed 'Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn. He then declared: 'O Muslims, I am at war against anyone who wars against the people of this tent, and am at peace with those who show peace toward them. I am a friend to those who befriend them. He who shows love toward them shall be one of a happy ancestry and good birth. Nor would anyone hate them except that he be of miserable ancestry and evil birth.

Reference:

*- Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-Muhibb al-Tabari, Al-Riyad al-nadira (Cairo, n.d.), II, 199

إن لكل بني أب عصبة ينتمون إليها إلا ولد فاطمة فأنا وليهم وأنا عصبتهم وهم عترتي خلقوا من طينتي، ويل للمكذبين بفضلهم، من أحبهم أحبه الله ومن أبغضهم أبغضه الله. (ك وابن عساكر - عن جابر)

Reference:

*- Kanz al-U'ummal, by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, vol 11, #34168 (لإكمال من الفصل الأول في فضل أهل البيت مجملا )

CHAPTER II: THE NEO‑PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA

With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted Zoroastrian.

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion ‑Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the‑ aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from the purely objective attitude of Pre‑Islamic Persian Philosophy to the subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it reasserted itself about the end of the 8th century, assumed a much more spiritual aspect; and, in its latter development, revivified and spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems of the Persian Neo‑Platonists who, as such, deserve very little attention in a history of purely Persian thought.

It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the Moslem east through Harrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest Greek speculation i.e. Neo‑Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what they believed to be the real philosophy of Artistotle. It is surprising that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued wrangling over what they believed to be, the real teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was absolutely necessary. So great was their, ignorance that an epitomised translation, of the Enneeads of Plotinus was accepted as āTheology of Aristotle.ā It took them centuries to arrive at. a clear conception of the two great masters of Greek thought and it is doubtful whether they ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more original than Al‑Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to window out truth from falsehood. with these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.

1. IBN MASKAWAIH[1] (d. 1030)

Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsīī[2] , Fārābī who was a Turk, and the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who true to his Persian habits of thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of Abu 'Ali Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub, commonly known as Ibn Maskawaih ‑the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan' Adaduddaula ‑one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well‑known work Al Fauz al‑Asg̱ẖar, published in Beirët.

1. The existence of the ultimate principle

Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property of motion which covers all form of change, and does not proceed from the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external source of prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is absurd.

The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and immaterial. Since transition from non‑existence to existence is a form of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated with matter, must be in motion.

2. The Knowledge of the Ultimate

All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually transformed into ' perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are completely con. ditioned by the presence of external reality. But the progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination ‑ the power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point of freedom from materiality though the concept, in so far as it is the result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot he regarded as having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the percept, The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His complete' freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him difficult.or impossible. The object of all Philosophical training is to develop the power of āideationā or contemplation on pure concepts, in order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the absolutely immaterial.

3. How the one creates the many

In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide Ibn Maskcawaih's investigations into two parts:‑

(a) That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of nothing. Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous form becomes absolutely non. existent. For if it does not become absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is contradicted by every‑day experience‑ If we transform a ball of wax into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g., circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, follows that the original form passes into absolute non‑existence, when the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that, attributes i. e. form, colour etc., come into being from pure nothing. In order to understand that the substance is also non‑eternal like the attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:

1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the diversity of which is reduced to one simple element.

2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate form.

From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.

(b) The process of creation. What is the cause of this immense diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following reasons:

1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a combination of various elements and powers. may be the cause of various actions.

2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.,

3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.

None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate cause‑God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity. who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one way out of the difficulty ‑ that the ultimate cause created only one thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here enumerates the usual Neo‑Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shiblī thus sums up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[3] :

The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border‑land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins.”

4. The Soul

In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is necessary that the spoon‑form as such should cease to exist. This property is common to all bodies, and body that lacks it cannot be regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks the fundamental property of matter. The essense of the soul consists in the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment of time. But it may be objected that the soul‑principle may be either material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.

(a) A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of these forms and states. A body which receives different colours should be, in its own nature, colourless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty‑ Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.

b) The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal identity.

Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:

1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.

2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which ‑we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not., in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.

3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.

4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.

5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense‑data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive. that two contradictories cannot exist together.

6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense‑errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the, material brought before it through the science‑channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense,. decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the. sphere of matter.

The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition‑that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.

2. AVICENNA (d. 1037)

Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called “Eastern Philosophy”, is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[4] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that Ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.

Avicenna defines “Love” as the appreciation of Beauty, and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:

1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.

2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.

3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non‑existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to asume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:

1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from fomī to form.

2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself In the vegetable kindom, it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are

(a) Assimilation.

(b) Growth.

(c) Reproduction.

These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.

3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self‑consciousness. The same force of ānatural or constitutional love,ā is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.

As a physician. however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was gating more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifest., different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:

1. Manifestation as unconscious activity

(b) Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action‑growth of temperament.

2. Manifestation as conscious activity

(a) As directed to more than one object

(b) As directed to one object ‑ The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.

In his fragment on “Nafs” (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious‑ conscious of itself through itself‑conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual Pre‑existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many, The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compound, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre‑existence, and endeavors to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.

We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo‑Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples ‑Behmenyarl. Abu'l‑Ma'mëm, of Isfahān, Ma'sumī Ab u'l‑'Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[5] ‑ who carried on their master's Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's personality that even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo‑Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Dr. Boer, in the Philosophy of Islām, gives a full. Account of the Philsophy of Al- Fārābī and Avicenna: but his account of Ibn Maskawaih' Philsosphy is restricted to the Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's Neo Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his original contribution to the thought of his country.

[2] Sarakhsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately have not reached us.

[3] Maulāna Shiblī 'Ilm al Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād).

[4] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N.A.F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894).

[5] Al‑Baihāqī; far. 28a et seqq.

CHAPTER II: THE NEO‑PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA

With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted Zoroastrian.

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion ‑Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the‑ aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from the purely objective attitude of Pre‑Islamic Persian Philosophy to the subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it reasserted itself about the end of the 8th century, assumed a much more spiritual aspect; and, in its latter development, revivified and spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems of the Persian Neo‑Platonists who, as such, deserve very little attention in a history of purely Persian thought.

It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the Moslem east through Harrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest Greek speculation i.e. Neo‑Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what they believed to be the real philosophy of Artistotle. It is surprising that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued wrangling over what they believed to be, the real teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was absolutely necessary. So great was their, ignorance that an epitomised translation, of the Enneeads of Plotinus was accepted as āTheology of Aristotle.ā It took them centuries to arrive at. a clear conception of the two great masters of Greek thought and it is doubtful whether they ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more original than Al‑Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to window out truth from falsehood. with these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.

1. IBN MASKAWAIH[1] (d. 1030)

Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsīī[2] , Fārābī who was a Turk, and the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who true to his Persian habits of thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of Abu 'Ali Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub, commonly known as Ibn Maskawaih ‑the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan' Adaduddaula ‑one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well‑known work Al Fauz al‑Asg̱ẖar, published in Beirët.

1. The existence of the ultimate principle

Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property of motion which covers all form of change, and does not proceed from the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external source of prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is absurd.

The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and immaterial. Since transition from non‑existence to existence is a form of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated with matter, must be in motion.

2. The Knowledge of the Ultimate

All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually transformed into ' perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are completely con. ditioned by the presence of external reality. But the progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination ‑ the power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point of freedom from materiality though the concept, in so far as it is the result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot he regarded as having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the percept, The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His complete' freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him difficult.or impossible. The object of all Philosophical training is to develop the power of āideationā or contemplation on pure concepts, in order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the absolutely immaterial.

3. How the one creates the many

In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide Ibn Maskcawaih's investigations into two parts:‑

(a) That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of nothing. Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous form becomes absolutely non. existent. For if it does not become absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is contradicted by every‑day experience‑ If we transform a ball of wax into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g., circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, follows that the original form passes into absolute non‑existence, when the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that, attributes i. e. form, colour etc., come into being from pure nothing. In order to understand that the substance is also non‑eternal like the attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:

1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the diversity of which is reduced to one simple element.

2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate form.

From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.

(b) The process of creation. What is the cause of this immense diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following reasons:

1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a combination of various elements and powers. may be the cause of various actions.

2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.,

3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.

None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate cause‑God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity. who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one way out of the difficulty ‑ that the ultimate cause created only one thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here enumerates the usual Neo‑Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shiblī thus sums up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[3] :

The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border‑land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins.”

4. The Soul

In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is necessary that the spoon‑form as such should cease to exist. This property is common to all bodies, and body that lacks it cannot be regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks the fundamental property of matter. The essense of the soul consists in the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment of time. But it may be objected that the soul‑principle may be either material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.

(a) A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of these forms and states. A body which receives different colours should be, in its own nature, colourless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty‑ Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.

b) The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal identity.

Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:

1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.

2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which ‑we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not., in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.

3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.

4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.

5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense‑data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive. that two contradictories cannot exist together.

6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense‑errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the, material brought before it through the science‑channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense,. decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the. sphere of matter.

The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition‑that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.

2. AVICENNA (d. 1037)

Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called “Eastern Philosophy”, is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[4] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that Ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.

Avicenna defines “Love” as the appreciation of Beauty, and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:

1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.

2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.

3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non‑existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to asume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:

1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from fomī to form.

2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself In the vegetable kindom, it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are

(a) Assimilation.

(b) Growth.

(c) Reproduction.

These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.

3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self‑consciousness. The same force of ānatural or constitutional love,ā is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.

As a physician. however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was gating more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifest., different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:

1. Manifestation as unconscious activity

(b) Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action‑growth of temperament.

2. Manifestation as conscious activity

(a) As directed to more than one object

(b) As directed to one object ‑ The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.

In his fragment on “Nafs” (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious‑ conscious of itself through itself‑conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual Pre‑existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many, The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compound, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre‑existence, and endeavors to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.

We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo‑Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples ‑Behmenyarl. Abu'l‑Ma'mëm, of Isfahān, Ma'sumī Ab u'l‑'Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[5] ‑ who carried on their master's Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's personality that even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo‑Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Dr. Boer, in the Philosophy of Islām, gives a full. Account of the Philsophy of Al- Fārābī and Avicenna: but his account of Ibn Maskawaih' Philsosphy is restricted to the Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's Neo Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his original contribution to the thought of his country.

[2] Sarakhsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately have not reached us.

[3] Maulāna Shiblī 'Ilm al Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād).

[4] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N.A.F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894).

[5] Al‑Baihāqī; far. 28a et seqq.

CHAPTER II: THE NEO‑PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA

With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted Zoroastrian.

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion ‑Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the‑ aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from the purely objective attitude of Pre‑Islamic Persian Philosophy to the subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it reasserted itself about the end of the 8th century, assumed a much more spiritual aspect; and, in its latter development, revivified and spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems of the Persian Neo‑Platonists who, as such, deserve very little attention in a history of purely Persian thought.

It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the Moslem east through Harrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest Greek speculation i.e. Neo‑Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what they believed to be the real philosophy of Artistotle. It is surprising that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued wrangling over what they believed to be, the real teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was absolutely necessary. So great was their, ignorance that an epitomised translation, of the Enneeads of Plotinus was accepted as āTheology of Aristotle.ā It took them centuries to arrive at. a clear conception of the two great masters of Greek thought and it is doubtful whether they ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more original than Al‑Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to window out truth from falsehood. with these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.

1. IBN MASKAWAIH[1] (d. 1030)

Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsīī[2] , Fārābī who was a Turk, and the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who true to his Persian habits of thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of Abu 'Ali Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub, commonly known as Ibn Maskawaih ‑the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan' Adaduddaula ‑one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well‑known work Al Fauz al‑Asg̱ẖar, published in Beirët.

1. The existence of the ultimate principle

Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property of motion which covers all form of change, and does not proceed from the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external source of prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is absurd.

The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and immaterial. Since transition from non‑existence to existence is a form of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated with matter, must be in motion.

2. The Knowledge of the Ultimate

All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually transformed into ' perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are completely con. ditioned by the presence of external reality. But the progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination ‑ the power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point of freedom from materiality though the concept, in so far as it is the result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot he regarded as having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the percept, The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His complete' freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him difficult.or impossible. The object of all Philosophical training is to develop the power of āideationā or contemplation on pure concepts, in order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the absolutely immaterial.

3. How the one creates the many

In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide Ibn Maskcawaih's investigations into two parts:‑

(a) That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of nothing. Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous form becomes absolutely non. existent. For if it does not become absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is contradicted by every‑day experience‑ If we transform a ball of wax into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g., circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, follows that the original form passes into absolute non‑existence, when the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that, attributes i. e. form, colour etc., come into being from pure nothing. In order to understand that the substance is also non‑eternal like the attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:

1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the diversity of which is reduced to one simple element.

2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate form.

From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.

(b) The process of creation. What is the cause of this immense diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following reasons:

1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a combination of various elements and powers. may be the cause of various actions.

2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.,

3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.

None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate cause‑God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity. who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one way out of the difficulty ‑ that the ultimate cause created only one thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here enumerates the usual Neo‑Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shiblī thus sums up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[3] :

The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border‑land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins.”

4. The Soul

In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is necessary that the spoon‑form as such should cease to exist. This property is common to all bodies, and body that lacks it cannot be regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks the fundamental property of matter. The essense of the soul consists in the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment of time. But it may be objected that the soul‑principle may be either material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.

(a) A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of these forms and states. A body which receives different colours should be, in its own nature, colourless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty‑ Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.

b) The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal identity.

Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:

1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.

2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which ‑we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not., in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.

3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.

4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.

5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense‑data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive. that two contradictories cannot exist together.

6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense‑errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the, material brought before it through the science‑channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense,. decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the. sphere of matter.

The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition‑that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.

2. AVICENNA (d. 1037)

Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called “Eastern Philosophy”, is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[4] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that Ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.

Avicenna defines “Love” as the appreciation of Beauty, and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:

1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.

2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.

3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non‑existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to asume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:

1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from fomī to form.

2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself In the vegetable kindom, it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are

(a) Assimilation.

(b) Growth.

(c) Reproduction.

These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.

3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self‑consciousness. The same force of ānatural or constitutional love,ā is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.

As a physician. however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was gating more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifest., different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:

1. Manifestation as unconscious activity

(b) Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action‑growth of temperament.

2. Manifestation as conscious activity

(a) As directed to more than one object

(b) As directed to one object ‑ The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.

In his fragment on “Nafs” (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious‑ conscious of itself through itself‑conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual Pre‑existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many, The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compound, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre‑existence, and endeavors to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.

We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo‑Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples ‑Behmenyarl. Abu'l‑Ma'mëm, of Isfahān, Ma'sumī Ab u'l‑'Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[5] ‑ who carried on their master's Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's personality that even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo‑Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Dr. Boer, in the Philosophy of Islām, gives a full. Account of the Philsophy of Al- Fārābī and Avicenna: but his account of Ibn Maskawaih' Philsosphy is restricted to the Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's Neo Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his original contribution to the thought of his country.

[2] Sarakhsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately have not reached us.

[3] Maulāna Shiblī 'Ilm al Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād).

[4] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N.A.F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894).

[5] Al‑Baihāqī; far. 28a et seqq.

CHAPTER II: THE NEO‑PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA

With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted Zoroastrian.

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion ‑Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the‑ aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from the purely objective attitude of Pre‑Islamic Persian Philosophy to the subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it reasserted itself about the end of the 8th century, assumed a much more spiritual aspect; and, in its latter development, revivified and spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems of the Persian Neo‑Platonists who, as such, deserve very little attention in a history of purely Persian thought.

It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the Moslem east through Harrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest Greek speculation i.e. Neo‑Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what they believed to be the real philosophy of Artistotle. It is surprising that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued wrangling over what they believed to be, the real teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was absolutely necessary. So great was their, ignorance that an epitomised translation, of the Enneeads of Plotinus was accepted as āTheology of Aristotle.ā It took them centuries to arrive at. a clear conception of the two great masters of Greek thought and it is doubtful whether they ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more original than Al‑Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to window out truth from falsehood. with these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.

1. IBN MASKAWAIH[1] (d. 1030)

Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsīī[2] , Fārābī who was a Turk, and the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who true to his Persian habits of thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of Abu 'Ali Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub, commonly known as Ibn Maskawaih ‑the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan' Adaduddaula ‑one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well‑known work Al Fauz al‑Asg̱ẖar, published in Beirët.

1. The existence of the ultimate principle

Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property of motion which covers all form of change, and does not proceed from the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external source of prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is absurd.

The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and immaterial. Since transition from non‑existence to existence is a form of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated with matter, must be in motion.

2. The Knowledge of the Ultimate

All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually transformed into ' perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are completely con. ditioned by the presence of external reality. But the progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination ‑ the power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point of freedom from materiality though the concept, in so far as it is the result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot he regarded as having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the percept, The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His complete' freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him difficult.or impossible. The object of all Philosophical training is to develop the power of āideationā or contemplation on pure concepts, in order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the absolutely immaterial.

3. How the one creates the many

In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide Ibn Maskcawaih's investigations into two parts:‑

(a) That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of nothing. Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous form becomes absolutely non. existent. For if it does not become absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is contradicted by every‑day experience‑ If we transform a ball of wax into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g., circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, follows that the original form passes into absolute non‑existence, when the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that, attributes i. e. form, colour etc., come into being from pure nothing. In order to understand that the substance is also non‑eternal like the attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:

1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the diversity of which is reduced to one simple element.

2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate form.

From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.

(b) The process of creation. What is the cause of this immense diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following reasons:

1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a combination of various elements and powers. may be the cause of various actions.

2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.,

3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.

None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate cause‑God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity. who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one way out of the difficulty ‑ that the ultimate cause created only one thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here enumerates the usual Neo‑Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shiblī thus sums up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[3] :

The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border‑land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins.”

4. The Soul

In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is necessary that the spoon‑form as such should cease to exist. This property is common to all bodies, and body that lacks it cannot be regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks the fundamental property of matter. The essense of the soul consists in the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment of time. But it may be objected that the soul‑principle may be either material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.

(a) A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of these forms and states. A body which receives different colours should be, in its own nature, colourless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty‑ Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.

b) The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal identity.

Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:

1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.

2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which ‑we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not., in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.

3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.

4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.

5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense‑data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive. that two contradictories cannot exist together.

6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense‑errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the, material brought before it through the science‑channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense,. decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the. sphere of matter.

The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition‑that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.

2. AVICENNA (d. 1037)

Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called “Eastern Philosophy”, is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[4] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that Ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.

Avicenna defines “Love” as the appreciation of Beauty, and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:

1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.

2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.

3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non‑existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to asume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:

1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from fomī to form.

2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself In the vegetable kindom, it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are

(a) Assimilation.

(b) Growth.

(c) Reproduction.

These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.

3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self‑consciousness. The same force of ānatural or constitutional love,ā is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.

As a physician. however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was gating more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifest., different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:

1. Manifestation as unconscious activity

(b) Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action‑growth of temperament.

2. Manifestation as conscious activity

(a) As directed to more than one object

(b) As directed to one object ‑ The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.

In his fragment on “Nafs” (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious‑ conscious of itself through itself‑conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual Pre‑existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many, The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compound, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre‑existence, and endeavors to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.

We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo‑Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples ‑Behmenyarl. Abu'l‑Ma'mëm, of Isfahān, Ma'sumī Ab u'l‑'Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[5] ‑ who carried on their master's Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's personality that even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo‑Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Dr. Boer, in the Philosophy of Islām, gives a full. Account of the Philsophy of Al- Fārābī and Avicenna: but his account of Ibn Maskawaih' Philsosphy is restricted to the Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's Neo Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his original contribution to the thought of his country.

[2] Sarakhsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately have not reached us.

[3] Maulāna Shiblī 'Ilm al Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād).

[4] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N.A.F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894).

[5] Al‑Baihāqī; far. 28a et seqq.

CHAPTER II: THE NEO‑PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA

With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted Zoroastrian.

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion ‑Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the‑ aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from the purely objective attitude of Pre‑Islamic Persian Philosophy to the subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it reasserted itself about the end of the 8th century, assumed a much more spiritual aspect; and, in its latter development, revivified and spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems of the Persian Neo‑Platonists who, as such, deserve very little attention in a history of purely Persian thought.

It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the Moslem east through Harrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest Greek speculation i.e. Neo‑Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what they believed to be the real philosophy of Artistotle. It is surprising that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued wrangling over what they believed to be, the real teaching of Aristotle and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was absolutely necessary. So great was their, ignorance that an epitomised translation, of the Enneeads of Plotinus was accepted as āTheology of Aristotle.ā It took them centuries to arrive at. a clear conception of the two great masters of Greek thought and it is doubtful whether they ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more original than Al‑Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to window out truth from falsehood. with these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.

1. IBN MASKAWAIH[1] (d. 1030)

Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsīī[2] , Fārābī who was a Turk, and the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who true to his Persian habits of thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of Abu 'Ali Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub, commonly known as Ibn Maskawaih ‑the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan' Adaduddaula ‑one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well‑known work Al Fauz al‑Asg̱ẖar, published in Beirët.

1. The existence of the ultimate principle

Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property of motion which covers all form of change, and does not proceed from the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external source of prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is absurd.

The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and immaterial. Since transition from non‑existence to existence is a form of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated with matter, must be in motion.

2. The Knowledge of the Ultimate

All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually transformed into ' perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are completely con. ditioned by the presence of external reality. But the progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination ‑ the power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point of freedom from materiality though the concept, in so far as it is the result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot he regarded as having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the percept, The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His complete' freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him difficult.or impossible. The object of all Philosophical training is to develop the power of āideationā or contemplation on pure concepts, in order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the absolutely immaterial.

3. How the one creates the many

In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide Ibn Maskcawaih's investigations into two parts:‑

(a) That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of nothing. Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous form becomes absolutely non. existent. For if it does not become absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is contradicted by every‑day experience‑ If we transform a ball of wax into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g., circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, follows that the original form passes into absolute non‑existence, when the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that, attributes i. e. form, colour etc., come into being from pure nothing. In order to understand that the substance is also non‑eternal like the attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:

1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the diversity of which is reduced to one simple element.

2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate form.

From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.

(b) The process of creation. What is the cause of this immense diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following reasons:

1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a combination of various elements and powers. may be the cause of various actions.

2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.,

3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.

None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate cause‑God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity. who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one way out of the difficulty ‑ that the ultimate cause created only one thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here enumerates the usual Neo‑Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shiblī thus sums up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[3] :

The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border‑land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins.”

4. The Soul

In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is necessary that the spoon‑form as such should cease to exist. This property is common to all bodies, and body that lacks it cannot be regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks the fundamental property of matter. The essense of the soul consists in the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment of time. But it may be objected that the soul‑principle may be either material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.

(a) A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of these forms and states. A body which receives different colours should be, in its own nature, colourless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty‑ Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.

b) The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal identity.

Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:

1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.

2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which ‑we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not., in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.

3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.

4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.

5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense‑data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive. that two contradictories cannot exist together.

6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense‑errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the, material brought before it through the science‑channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense,. decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the. sphere of matter.

The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition‑that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.

2. AVICENNA (d. 1037)

Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called “Eastern Philosophy”, is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[4] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that Ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.

Avicenna defines “Love” as the appreciation of Beauty, and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:

1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.

2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.

3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non‑existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to asume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:

1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from fomī to form.

2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself In the vegetable kindom, it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are

(a) Assimilation.

(b) Growth.

(c) Reproduction.

These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.

3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self‑consciousness. The same force of ānatural or constitutional love,ā is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.

As a physician. however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was gating more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifest., different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:

1. Manifestation as unconscious activity

(b) Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action‑growth of temperament.

2. Manifestation as conscious activity

(a) As directed to more than one object

(b) As directed to one object ‑ The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.

In his fragment on “Nafs” (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious‑ conscious of itself through itself‑conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual Pre‑existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many, The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compound, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre‑existence, and endeavors to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.

We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo‑Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples ‑Behmenyarl. Abu'l‑Ma'mëm, of Isfahān, Ma'sumī Ab u'l‑'Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[5] ‑ who carried on their master's Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's personality that even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo‑Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Dr. Boer, in the Philosophy of Islām, gives a full. Account of the Philsophy of Al- Fārābī and Avicenna: but his account of Ibn Maskawaih' Philsosphy is restricted to the Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's Neo Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his original contribution to the thought of his country.

[2] Sarakhsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately have not reached us.

[3] Maulāna Shiblī 'Ilm al Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād).

[4] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N.A.F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894).

[5] Al‑Baihāqī; far. 28a et seqq.