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Seeking the Straight Path: Reflections of A New Muslim

Seeking the Straight Path: Reflections of A New Muslim

Author:
Publisher: www.al-islam.org
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

How Can You Believe In That?

Myaudience for this book are both the Muslim and non-Muslim. The non-Muslim are likely to come across this book because of a desire to know more about Islam. From what I have written thus far, they may have learned a little about the life and path of a convert. However, they are probably seeking more than this. Islam contains many things that are controversial in the Western world and sometimes even within the Muslim community.

These things affect how Islam and Muslims are perceived by non-Muslims and, with the pervasion of Western ideas throughout the world, cause doubts to creep into the minds of some Muslims. Converts have to address these things early in their new life because they find them troubling and in need of explanation. I have accepted Islam as God’s truth, so when I find something in Islam that seems oppressive, I have a problem. I know that God is not oppressive, soeither I have an incorrect understanding of that thing and it is not truly oppressive, or else it is oppressive but it is not truly part of Islam. Now it is my job to determinewhich of those two possibilities is the case, with an open mind, reflection and study from numerous sources . I stress the need for numerous sources, and I also stress finding original sources. If you want to know about what Muslims believe, ask Muslims.

This is not the work of a religious scholar and what follows is not intended to be used as if it were. In the spirit of the title of this book, these are merely my reflections on these issues, presented so that the reader may understand how a Muslim convert has dealt with and come to understand some of the more controversial aspects of Islam. These are presented in no particular order and you may of course feel free to skip over any that are not of interest to you. If you find that you do not agree with what I have written on any topic, I hope it will not deter you from enjoying and benefiting from the rest of the book.

Marriage

Women in Marriage

Being a woman, as I thought of converting to Islam, I was greatly concerned about the status of woman in Islam. Especially after I converted, my ears were full with people telling me what a horrible mistake I had made and how I had relegated myself to a life of oppression. I had in my mind an image of what a Muslim woman was supposed to be like and I tried to make myself fit that role. I thought the Muslim woman was supposed to be submissive, quiet,unopinionated , and filling her time cooking and cleaning. I tried to be that way for awhile but it just wasn’t me and I was very unhappy.

In time, I realized that no one was demanding this behavior of me exceptmyself . As I gained exposure to other Muslim women, it dawned on me that I had it all wrong. I was trying to be the Western stereotype of a Muslim woman, but the stereotype was wrong.

Muslim men and women observe modest behavior in each other’s presence so that generally neither of themare loud and boisterous in public. But, in private, Muslim women are comfortably themselves. They have their opinions and they share them with their husbands and families, who in turn listen and respect what is said. A Muslim husband takes counsel with his wife. They work together to complete the household work. It is true that a Muslim woman defers to her husband when they cannot agree, but only if doing so does not cause her to violate her religion or rights. The Qur’an is very clear that the marriage relationship is not supposed to be one of fear or abuse, but one of comfort and love:

“And among His signs is that He created spouses from among yourselves so that you may live in tranquility with them;And He has created love and mercy between you.” (30:21)

This is a vision of the Islamic ideal, and in reality the Muslim family is much closer to this than to the stereotypical view of a wife-beating man and a woman who has no say in what happens in her life. Sadly, abusive and overbearing husbands exist among the Muslims just as they do among the Christians, Jews and everyone else. And, just as the abusive men of other faiths, they often believe they are religiously in the right.

I feel that in this century the abused Muslim woman is at a disadvantage in comparison to her Christian counterpart living in the West. In the past, any woman had little practical recourse from abuse. In this century, Western women increasingly have opportunities for help and escape without being ostracized. But the Muslim woman is likely to live in a world where it is still taboo for people to become involved in the family affairs of others in order to help the abused woman. The abused Muslim woman who leaves becomes the subject of gossip and judgment while the man often has a much easier time in maintaining his dignity and even in remarrying.

Despite this problem, I can say through comparison of every married Muslim and non-Muslim couple I have ever met that the Muslim marriages tend to be happier, more equal, and longer lasting. Since many Muslim marriages are arranged without the couple knowing each other too well before marriage, they both enter the marriage with a spirit of compromise. There does notexist the delusion of the one right man or right woman in the world. Rather, Muslims believe they can be compatible and have a successful loving marriage with a variety of different types of people.

All marriages take work. In my mind, one of the great failings of the typical Western non-Muslim marriage is that it is expected to be easy. When difficulties arise, the couple decides they must have not really found their one right mate, and so they part; and very rarely is the parting kind and equitable.

Finding a Mate

Muslim youth in the West today are enticed by the romantic images on TV. They wonder where the room is for romance in an arranged marriage. Having experienced a small bit of dating life as a non-Muslim, and then having married a Muslim, I feel I can offer perspective. Dating is not romantic, it is not fun, and it does not help in later married life. There is such great peer pressure to date that it occurs among the very young, and people only get hurt. A relationship begins, the youth may do things they regret, and a short time later they leave each other. Then, they talk about each other, spreading gossip and damaging each other’s reputations. Most of the time the relationship is largely physical and even basic friendship is missing between the two, although they can’t see that through the veil of their strong physical desires. This is true even for those who try to remain chaste.As people get older, relationships last a little longer, but the problems don’t change all that much.

Finally, the “training” is over and a couple gets married. They feel they have prepared themselves to know what kind of person is good for them through years of dating. However, they find that in marriage, their spouse is not the same person as he/she was while dating. And they find that both they and their spouses have jealousy over those previous dating relationships. The romance and true love that these people are looking for does not come automatically like on TV.

True romance comes from the commitment of the people involved and from friendship and not from magic instant sparks. They’ve been spending years looking for the ideal mate when in truth any couple who both approach a marriage with the right state of mind and have some basic compatible qualities can be ideal for each other.

Romance comes through friendship and compromise and accepting the other person with their faults included, and does not come from pre-marital sex, discarding partners for others, and expecting a near-perfect match. Dating actually diminishes romance because it desensitizes the couple to the special-ness of the husband-wife relationship. The effort spent on dating should be spent on developing yourself as the ideal Islamic spouse. You will find with patience that there are others out there doing the same as you and God willing one of them may become your life mate.

Dating, or visiting each other without escort, is not the solution. But, it is not unreasonable for someone to want to know his/her potential spouse before agreeing to marriage. Often the characteristics that a parent looks for in a potential spouse for their son or daughter do not match with the characteristics that are most important to the child. The child certainly knows something about what he or she wants and that needs to be respected. Likewise, the wisdom of the parent due to life experience is of value and should also be considered.

Especially in the West, where Muslim communities are often small and far from one another, it is unreasonable to expect the search for a spouse who possesses those certain characteristics that you require to be an easy or quick search. This is a life-decision being made, so it should be done with effort. Muslim communities have a duty to their children to open their minds and invest their time and money in developing any method of finding suitable spouses that does not violate Islamic principles. In turn, the youth have a responsibility invest their own time and effort into the process and to avoid any method that involves violation of Islamic guidelines. After all, if you want a happy and successful marriage, you must pursue it in a manner that is pleasing to Allah.

I cannot leave the topic of marriage without addressing the two most controversial topics: polygamy and temporary marriage. Polygamy as used here refers specifically topolygyny , that is, the act of a man having more than one wife, and temporary marriage is the act of taking a spouse for a fixed, finite term rather than “until death do you part.”

Polygamy

Islam makes allowance for a man to have up to four wives at a time. This is an appalling concept for many people today. The Western world holds fast to the idea that for each man there is one ideal woman and for each woman there is one ideal man. And, it comes natural for one raised in the West to view a polygamous relationship as an uneven one in which the women are treated unfairly.

Other cultures have very different views that might be worth noting here. In many cultures, in particularthose stemming from Africa, a polygamous marriage is something greatly desired. Having more than one wife for a given man provides security to the women because the man, already having a spouse, has demonstrated his ability to be a good husband.

Further, the women enjoy each other’s companionship and help in child-rearing and other duties. In many war-torn societies, the women greatly outnumber the men and those who desire companionship and help in life turn to polygamous relationships because the only other choices are to remain alone or commit sin.

The polygamous relationship meets a need that could not be met otherwise. If it were regarded with less taboo it could satisfactorily meet the needs of many people who now do not even consider it.

In practice, it is not exceedingly common for a Muslim man to have more than one wife. That is because doing so is not about his pleasure but is rather about responsibility to society. One verse in Qur’an which attests to this is as follows:

“And if ye fear that ye will not deal fairly by the orphans, marry of the women who seem good to you, two or three or four; and if ye fear that ye cannot do justice to so many then one only…. Thus it is more likely that ye will not do injustice.” (4.3)

Polygamy is presented as a means of serving the needs of orphans in this verse, not as a means of serving the needs of lustful men. The Qur’an emphasizes the need for justness in any marriage. This is a heavier burden for a man with more than one wife because he is required to meet the needs of each and treat them fairly. Each is entitled to her own home according to his means, and each is entitled to equitable possessions and time. It is not permitted that a man should ignore or neglect one wife and prefer another in treatment.

It is good to keep in mind that a Muslim woman has the right to full choice in her spouse and if she marries a man who is already married then she does it knowingly and of her own volition. If ever the case is otherwise and the woman is coerced into marriage, that marriage is void according to Islam and she has no responsibility to persist in it. The one who does not have as much choice is the first wife, for she may not be able to prohibit her husband from taking another spouse.

However, she can put into her marriage contract that if he takes another spouse she is entitled to divorce. Many women are discouraged from putting the clause in their contract because it might imply that the girl does not trust her future husband. But, if a young lady knows full well that she could not be happy in a polygamous relationship than she should see to it that such a clause appears in her contract, no matter how unlikely she considers that it would be needed.

It takes an exceptional man and woman to build a truly Islamic, happy, successful marriage and that is only compounded in the case of a polygamous marriage. There is no room in the heart of a Muslim woman in a successful polygamous relationship for jealousy. Her time with her husband is shared with other women, but if she has a good husband she has nothing to fear because he observes all his duties to her, and is kind and loving. In turn, she does and is the same for him. Many people are well served by such a relationship and it should not be looked on with such distaste. Our distaste stems from Western, rather than Islamic, views, and also from fear of oppression. However, a polygamous marriage is not in itself oppressive any more than a monogamous one.

Injustice within a marriage can be oppressive, and it is indeed not a simple matter for a polygamous man to be justto multiple wives, and that is why the Qur’an advises that the man who cannot do it justly simply should not do it.

I tried to imagine if I myself could exist happily and successfully in a polygamous relationship. I think I could if I had confidence in my spouse. If a man has an inclination toward taking another wife it is wrong to assume a bad motive. Not only in this case but in any case, a woman must not assume bad intention on the part of her husband but instead should assume good intentions unless there is proof otherwise (and the husband should do likewise for her).

The question may be asked, though, why cannot the woman take more than one husband? At first glance, it may seem unfair that it is not permitted. But, in light of what has been explained above, that taking more than one spouse is not about pleasure but is a matter of meeting social needs and taking on enormous responsibility, that question loses considerable force.

Further, if a woman has more than one husband, paternity becomes an issue, as does family authority. The most wealthy and sophisticated societies now have the technology to scientifically determine paternity, but this is not available to everyone. And while successful marriages all over the world tend to involve cooperation and counsel between husband and wife, it is also natural nearly everywhere that ultimately the husband is the final authority in the household.

When there is more than one husband, there is no longer a natural or clear household leader and discord results. And if there is more than one husband, inheritance becomes an issue as well because virtually all societies determine inheritance based on paternity.

More importantly, one must ask, what societal needs would be served in a woman having multiple husbands? While the opposite case can be seen to meet real societal needs, it is difficult to come up with a genuine need for polyandry (marriage of a woman with multiple men.)

Temporary Marriage

My last topic in marriage is perhaps the most controversial within the Muslim community, and this is the temporary marriage. Among the Muslims are some who believe that the temporary marriage is unlawful and others who believe that it is lawful and even very important.

Those who believe it is unlawful believe that the Prophet of Islam (saw), through God’s command, allowed it for a very short period and then disallowed it. Those who believe it is lawful believe that the Prophet of Islam (saw) never disallowed it but rather it was a Caliph, after the death of the Prophet (saw) at which time Islam cannot be changed, who made it illegal.

Further, those who find it lawful turn to a verse in the Qur’an in which they believe it (temporary marriage) is mentioned. They say that something which is lawful in Qur’an and not made unlawful somewhere else in the Qur’an must be permissible. The matter of dispute is in 4:24, here presented as in thePuya /Ali translation andtafsir (explanatory notes) of the Holy Qur’an:

“As to those whom you married for a fixed time (Mut’a ), give them their agreed dowries; and there is no sin for you in what you mutually agree together after what has been settled.”

The corresponding explanatory note follows:

Famastamta-tum bihi [the Arabic in the text which refers to the marriage] provides for a temporary marriage, knows asMut’a . It has been specifically made lawful by the Qur’an and the Holy Prophet, therefore this provision subsists asunrescinded .

One day, for no reason at all, and having no authority to amend a law given and practiced by the Holy Prophet, the second caliph declared from the pulpit:

‘TwoMut’as (temporary marriage and combining hajj withumra ) were in force during the time of the Holy Prophet, but now I decree both of them as unlawful; and I will punish those who practice them.’ (Tafsir Kabir ,Durr alManthur ,Kashshaf ,Mustadrak and others).

According toTirmidhi even his [the second caliph’s] son,Ibne Umar , refused to agree with his father’s action because it was made lawful by Allah and His Prophet, whose pronouncements could never be revoked by anyone after him.

Therefore theShia school of thought holds bothMut’as lawful. Aliibn abi Talib reversed the uncalled-for innovation of the second caliph, and thereafter it was never again prohibited.”

Now if we look at a different translation, we find that there is no clear mention of the marriage referred to as being temporary in nature:

“And those of whom ye seek content (by marrying them), give unto them their portions as a duty. And there is no sin for you in what you do by mutual agreement after the duty (hath been done).” (Pickthall )

Thus, for one who is not an expert inQur’anic Arabic, it is difficult to determine whether “famastamta-tum bihi ” refers to a temporary marriage. It may be easier, then, to adhere by the law according to the Islamic school that you choose to follow, but this is not a truly satisfactory answer for the convert who may have not yet chosen a school. However, it is possible to study the works of those who are more knowledgeable inQur’anic Arabic or you can try to determine the matter using the information on which nearly all Muslims agree.

That on which nearly all Muslims agree, both Sunni andShia , is that the temporary marriage was made lawful by the Prophet (saw) of Islam and was not made unlawful until after Allah (swt ) had completed and perfected Islam and the Prophet (saw) had died.

It is also largely agreed upon that anyone after the Prophet (saw) cannot make anything that was lawful, unlawful, or anything that was prohibited, allowed, except on a temporary basis stemming from urgent political need. As an example of a temporary change stemming from urgent political need, it would be acceptable for an Islamic scholar to prohibit the use of birth control temporarily to counteract an oppressor’s rule that all Muslims must not procreate. Normally, many methods of birth control are permissible for Muslims, but in an emergency when the future of the Muslim society is at stake, the scholar can rule that they should not use birth control until the situation is alleviated.

Therefore it would seem that the second caliph’s ruling cannot have any effect on the permissibility of temporary marriage today and as such the conclusion I make is that it is permissible. There are a minority of Sunnis who turn to different traditions that indicate that the Prophet (saw) himself forbadeMut’a , but those traditions contradict each other and do not stand up to close scrutiny and we are left with the same conclusion that temporary marriage is permitted. But, to address that opinion, the following is quoted from theShia Encyclopedia (available online):

Sabra al-Juhanni reported on the authority of his father that while he was with Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him), he said: O’ people, I had permitted you to contract temporary marriage with women, but Allah has forbidden it (now) until the Day of Resurrection. So he who has any (woman with this type of marriage contract) he should let her off, and do not take back anything you have given to them (as dower).

Sunni references:

Sahih Muslim, English version, v2, chapter DXLI (titled: Temporary Marriage), Tradition #3255

Sahih Muslim, Arabic version, 1980 Edition Pub.in Saudi Arabia, v2, p1025, Tradition #21, “Kitab al-Nikah ,Bab Nikah al-Mut’a

‘A side comment here is that again the word “Istimta’a ” has been used in this tradition for temporary marriage which is exactly what Quran has used.’

“In the next tradition after the above tradition inSahih Muslim, the same narrator (Sabra ) has narrated the same tradition with addition that:

“I saw Allah’s Messenger standing between the pillar and gate ofKa’ba when speaking theHadith .”

Sunni references:

Sahih Muslim, English version, v2, chapter DXLI (titled: Temporary Marriage), Tradition #3256

Sahih Muslim, Arabic version, 1980 Edition Pub.in Saudi Arabia, v2, p1025, Tradition #21, “Kitab al-Nikah ,Bab Nikah al-Mut’a

“The following tradition, however, indicates that the Prophet allowed Temporary marriage after the battle ofHunain (after 10/8 AH) which was after the conquest of Mecca:

NarratedIyas Ibn Salama on the authority of his father that Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) gave sanction for contracting temporary marriage for three nights in the year ofAutas (this was after the Battle ofHunain in 8H), and then forbade it.

{Note: The sentence inside parentheses is the Saudi translator’s footnote, and is notmine .}

Sunni references:

Sahih Muslim, English version, v2, chapter DXLI (titled: Temporary Marriage), Tradition #3251

Sahih Muslim, Arabic version, 1980 Edition Pub.in Saudi Arabia, v2, p1023, Tradition #18, “Kitab al-Nikah ,Bab Nikah al-Mut’a

“Now, let us see what the problems are: …

If the Prophet has forbidden the temporary marriage FOREVER on the Day ofKhaibar (1/7 AH), why was it practiced even after the battle ofHunain (after 10/8 AH) with the direct order of the Prophet? (See the reference above) In other words:

How is that possible that one is forbidden FOREVER and in two different points of time, on the Day ofKhaibar (1/7 AH) and on the victory Mecca (9/8 AH) FOREVER, and people were practicing it between these two instants of time and after these two instances with the order of the Prophet?

In the mentioned tradition about the battle ofHunain , it is said that the messenger of Allah (sa ) permittedMut’a after the battle ofHunain . So we cannot say people did it because they did not know it was forbidden forever. Thetraditions confirms thatMut’a was done with the direct order of the Prophet. So how can we justify these few alleged traditions that the Prophet forbade it forever before that? …

Two Sunni scholars: al-Qurtubi (in his commentary of Quran) and al-Nawawi (in his commentary ofSahih Muslim) are of the opinion that different traditions concerning the ban ofMut’a specify seven different dates!!! ….

What will be wrong if we take the opinion of Imam Ali (as), the most knowledgeable one among the companions whosaid:

Mut’a is a mercy from Allah to his servants. If it were not forUmar forbidding it, no one would commit (the sin) of fornication except the wretched (Shaqi )…”

But why would anyone want to be in a temporary marriage? What purpose does it serve? Temporary marriage is not intended as an alternative to permanent marriage, but rather, is an option for those who have needs that permanent marriage cannot meet. To claim that permanent marriage meets all needs is foolish upon close examination of society. Imam Ali (as), the 4th caliph of Islam according to the Sunnis and the first Imam (one appointed by God to succeed in leadership after the Prophet (saw) and to uphold the religion) according to theShias , is quoted on this issue as saying,

“It [temporary marriage] is permitted and absolutely allowed for the one whom Allah has not provided with the means of permanent marriage so that he may bechaste by performingMut’a [temporary marriage].”Wasail , vol. 14 pp.449-450.

In modern society, the temporary marriage may meet the needs of someone who is travelling for a long time and is in need of companionship, or someone who cannot find a permanent spouse. Additionally it may serve the needs of someone without the financial means to have a wedding and then to support his wife financially. (The requirement that he maintain his spouse according to his means and according to what she is accustomed to do not have to apply in temporary marriage.)

The elderly widows who have little realistic chance of finding another permanent spouse can more easily find temporary spouses to serve the need of companionship. Similarly, youth who are too young for the responsibilities of permanent marriage but in danger of committing sin may lawfully meet in aMut’a marriage.

This last case does not give freedom for youth to freely mingle with the opposite sex and have intercourse. A condition mitigating against this abuse is the requirement that a virgin female have permission of her father to enter any marriage relationship, includingMut’a , unless the father is found to be one who is unreasonable in that regard. It is further commonly required that a condition of the marriage be that sex shall not take place.

Mut’a is the way to avoid sin when permanent marriage is not possible. Some Muslims today commit sin prior to their marriage with the person that they are engaged to. Islam is clear that, between men and women, touching, viewing parts of each other’s bodies that should be covered, and visiting while unescorted are sins unless they are closely related or married.

Engagement is not marriage, yet couples involve themselves in this behavior that should take place only in marriage. The logical alternative to avoid sin is simply to have a temporary marriage prior to the permanent marriage so that the couple can make sure they are suited to each other.

Mut’a is often referred to as a pleasure marriage and is compared to prostitution. The man pays the woman a dowry and they enjoy each other and then move on. But, in truth,Mut’a probably more often occurs without any sex than it does solely for the purpose of sexual gratification.Mut’a , unlike permanent marriage, may have conditions put on it, including the most common one, which is that no sex shall take place.

Thus, its purpose is companionship and getting to know the other person and not just sexual pleasure.Mut’a is different than prostitution in that it is a union before God, and any children resulting will be legitimate. It is in all senses of the word a marriage. Just as in permanent marriage, the woman has a waiting period after the end of the marriage before she can take another spouse. The waiting period serves many purposes including making sure of any paternity, avoiding running into another relationship too soon, and giving the couple time to reconcile.

A woman is unlikely to be able to make a living fromMut’a , because she could legally have less than half a dozen partners in a year. In this way, it is clearly unlike prostitution. Payment of a dowry does take place inMut’a , but it is unlike prostitution because the payment is not for sex, but rather it is identical in purpose to the dowry given in permanent marriage. It is further unlike prostitution because a man is not supposed to marry one with loose morals and, according to AyatollahSistani , is forbidden to marry any non-Muslim woman in temporary marriage if he is already married to a Muslim woman. InSayyid MuhammadRizvi’s book Marriage and Morals in Islam, the temporary and need-only aspects ofMut’a are strongly emphasized:

“I cannot overemphasize the temporary nature ofMut’a . The message of Islam is quite clear: marry on a permanent basis; if that is not possible, then adopt temporary abstinence; if that is not possible, only then use theMut’a marriage.

The temporary nature ofMut’a can also be seen from the following saying of the Imams: Once ‘Ali binYaqtin , a prominentShi’ah who held a high post in Abbasid government, came to Imam ‘Aliar-Riza to ask aboutMut’a . The Imam said, “What have you to do with it because Allah has made you free from its need.” (Wasa’il , vol. 14, p. 449) He has also said, “It is permitted and absolutely allowed for the one whom Allah has not provided with the means of permanent marriage so that he may bechaste by performingMut’a . (Wasa’il , vol. 14, p. 449-450)”

Personally, I have known a handful of women involved in temporary marriage, all of whom were converts. The rumors of blatant misuse of the marriage are not to be found with those I have known, but there were problems. I think, in each case these marriages were too long. What I mean is that temporary marriage is supposed to be just that --temporary. But in all cases that I have personal knowledge of, they extended for years, often in a series of repeated temporary marriages.

Two-thirds of the time the wife was kept secret from family, friends, and/or community because of the stigma and judgment that would result. Thus, when someone unexpectedly came to the door, the wife had to hide in a back room or closet silently until the guest could be taken care of. The longer the relationship persisted, the more the woman became attached to the man and secretly hoped for permanent marriage, and some resented having to hide if they were one of the ones kept secret.

Often the men provided just enough hope of a permanent marriage that the women stuck around, but years passed and no long term commitment was made, no permanent marriage plans arose -- but another temporary marriage was offered. In public, the women frequently had to say they were unmarried because the temporary marriage was unknown. For some, the end result was a happy permanent marriage or a happy parting but that was not always the case. Ultimately, being temporary rather than permanent spouses seemed to these women to indicate a partial rejection by their husbands even if there was no other reason to believe that to be the case. The women just wanted more.

I do not wish to paint the men who choose temporary marriage even for prolonged periods in a bad light. In nearly all cases they are trying to do right and love their wives. Their dilemma often stems from the rejection they find or anticipate from their family and society because of the race or nationality of their spouse, or because they found each other without the traditional arrangement done by the family. Or often, they were initially only able to pursue a temporary marriage and not a permanent one and had to hide their marriage because of the very negative reactions and rejection they would receive from people, especially family, if it were made public. I sympathize with the desire to want both your family and your wife. In the end, these men often have to choose one or the other.

Rightfully, they should not have to choose. People should accept a man’s choice in spouse regardless of her race or nationality, especially if she is a pious woman. And people should not allow stigma to exist upon those who find the need for temporary marriage. This stigma has no place on something that was made lawful by God and the Prophet (saw) and even encouraged or mandated when sin is the likely alternative.Mut’a has a place in society and the need for it is not altogether uncommon. It is a gross error to accept fornication and adultery more easily thanMut’a .

People suffer because of the stigmas that others hold. Just as in a monogamous permanent marriage, polygamous and temporary marriages can contain abuse and bad outcomes. It is the abuse that should be stigmatized, and not the marriages themselves. In fact, stigmatizing the marriages causes abuse within them to be more likely because it makes it more likely that the marriages will be done in secret. Therefore, if you are concerned about misuse of the temporary and polygamous marriages, then let them out of the closet and into the realm of the public. One can only remove a stigma through conscious and deliberate effort within oneself.Although past damage cannot be fully repaired, future damage can be prevented if more people, perhaps starting with the reader him/herself, would be active and audible in their support of polygamous and temporary marriage and those individuals who pursue them lawfully.

The Sexes

Just the other day I saw a promo for a TV show called “Battle of the Sexes”. It caught my attention because it was filled with images of the Muslim world. Pictures of women wearing black garments that showed only their eyes went along with images of a woman being placed in a chastity belt, which also went along with images of Arab men shooting large guns. The accompanying words lead the viewer to imagine the large guns as phallic symbols. Having been Muslim for a few years now, I was disturbed by these images because they portrayed the relationship between Muslim men and Muslim women very negatively, and in my opinion, very incorrectly. Later, I watched the show to see exactly what it had to say about Islam and the sexes. As it turned out, ninety percent of the show was about the Modern West or Medieval Europe and only a small portion was about the Muslim world, although thepromo certainly lead the viewer to expect otherwise.

Why was the promo so skewed? A likely answer is that those stereotype images of Islam are attractive to viewers and thus serve as ratings-boosters. People remember those images and the associations made with them and tend to believe them. Many people who see these images are led to believe they know a lot more about the Muslim world than they do.

For example, if Saudi Arabia comes up in discussion, you can find someone who will say, “Oh, I know all about that place and how they hate Americans. Did you know that the women there have to walk ten feet behind the men?” And when you tell them that there is absolutely no truth to that claim, they do not want to believe you because you are not as authoritative as the media is. “No, I amright, I saw it on Nightline or CNN.” “I read it in the New York Times.”

It is no wonder that so few Americans ever think to pick up a translation of the Qur’an when the religion looks so bad to them. Yet, everyday, more men and women in America choose Islam. These men and women have concluded that the stereotype view of how Islam regards the sexes is inaccurate.

Islamic Modest Dress

When you picture a Muslim, you are likely to picture an Arab. You may see a long-bearded man with a white robe and a checkered headdress and a woman covered from head to toe in black so that only her eyes, if that, are visible. The prospect of dressing like that is often quite frightening to the convert. Is that what Islam really requires? And if so, why is it required?

To the person investigating Islam, the answer is initially not that easy to find. When a convert reads a translation of Qur’an, he/she finds the verses on dress hard to understand. Further, the convert findshadith and proponents of thosehadith which say a multitude of different things on the subject. Personally, I think a reliablehadith is one in which the Prophet (saw) indicated that women should cover all but their hands and face. And I think the most tellingQur’anic verses are 24:30-31.

“And tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest. That is purer for them. Lo! Allah is Aware of what they do. And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and bemodest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands….”

It is important that the men are first directed to lower their gaze and be modest. Men have a large responsibility in maintaining proper respect and treatment of women and to prevent wrongdoing. Women have a similar role, but they are further directed to display only certain parts of their bodies. Technically, even Muslim men have certain parts of their bodies they are supposed to cover, but those aren’t mentioned in these verses.

It is not totally clear to the average reader what part of a woman’s adornment is “apparent” but a logical argument could be made that those are the parts that she has reason to uncover. It is logical to have her hands uncovered because she is always using her hands to hold things and carry things. It is possible to argue the same about the face because she uses it to talk, eat and see. But for any other body part there is not much reason that it would need to be uncovered.

The next phrase gives us further indication as to what is “apparent”. It tells the women to draw their veils over their chests. So the reader must ask, what is the veil? It is something that begins above the chest area because it would otherwise not make sense to use the word “draw”. The word “draw” in that phrase indicates that something beginning at least at her shoulders if not higher is to be closed over the chest so that the chest itself does not show.

If this verse were only requiring that the chest be covered, the mention of a specific garment to cover it is unnecessary because ordinary clothes could be adequate. Since a specific garment is mentioned, we are led to believe that thatgarment itself covers more than just the chest.

Thus we conclude that the word translated as “veil” means what we typically take the word “veil” to mean: Something which covers the head. Thus, this phrase of the verse is directing the women to take their head covers and make sure their neck and chest area is also covered.

This makes even greater sense when we consider the word “adornment”. A woman’s adornment clearly would indicate her bosom, but it even more likely indicates her hair. Without a doubt, a woman’s hair is one of her greatest adornments. Women take pride and great effort in styling their hair and making it look appealing. This, along with the fact that there is no logical reason why she needs to have her hair uncovered, serves as a great indication that it is part of her adornment to be covered according to this verse.

What about the face? Numerous traditions can be found which indicate the face is to be covered, but numerous can be found to the contrary. Many of the modern scholars do not seem to think it is required, but many also say it is not a bad idea if the woman finds herself in a place where it is customary to do so or if not doing so would cause a hardship to her.

The question is “Why all this covering anyway?” The Bible makes reference to women covering their hair in church or in public and clearly indicates that the veiling is a mark of status for her. In the Bible, women cover as a sign of the male’s superiority. But in Islam, this is absolutely not the case.

Women cover simply to help ensure that they receive the respectful treatment they deserve and it has nothing to do with superiority or inferiority. Islam considers men and women as equal before God but acknowledges that being equal does not mean being the same. Men and women are different and to ignore those differences is oppressive to women. Although it is not often thought of this way, the modern world is oppressive to women in making them compete in the working world with men by acting just like men and neglecting their differences.Or, by acknowledging the differences, but using them to treat women as decorations and trophies in the workplace instead of equally deserving and capable employees.

Women in Islamic modest dress, (loose clothing that covers all but hand and face in any cultural style), are recognized as pious, business-minded women on sight. When I decided to wear the Islamic modest dress I was very surprised at what I experienced. I found people opening doors for me more than ever before, offering to help me carry parcels, and cleaning up their language around me. I realized that men talked to me differently. I never realized that even “good” guys had been looking at my body while talking to me until I put on thehijab and they suddenly were no longer doing it. They talked to me as if I were more intelligent, too.

More importantly, I felt better about myself. I had been very worried about how people would react and I found that instead of being treated worse I was being treated better than before. Up to that point, I did not fully understand the reasons forhijab , but seeing the positive results first hand, I was instantly and utterly convinced that it truly is a good thing and not oppressive at all. I knew I was safer inhijab .

If I were to walk down the worst street in New York with a friend wearing a T-shirt and jeans, my friend would be whistled at and harassed, even groped at and called names. But me, I get called “sister”, and the men lower their gazes instead of staring, and step out of my way. Many women fret over dressing a little different than their non-Muslim counterparts, but they shouldn’t. The negative reactions they anticipate are largely exaggerated and in fact, they will find increased respect from their counterparts when they are practicing as they believe.

A woman may find it unfair that she is asked to cover because some men can’t control themselves, but this is analogous to saying that it is unfair that she has to lock her house and car because some thieves can’t control themselves.Hijab in practice is not burdensome in my experience, but is rather a remover of burdens.

All Muslim scholars are unanimous that these verses refer to a covering that includes covering of hair. But if you want to find a verse that says “Women must cover the hair” you won’t find it, perhaps because the covering of hair was something already in practice among some women so that when the word translated as “veils” was used, the meaning was obvious.

Thehadith are more explicit and go into more detail by stating that a woman should cover all but hands and face. And if we look into thehadith referring to the Lady Fatimah (as), the daughter of the Prophet (saw) we find that she also covered all but hands and face, and may have on occasion covered her face also but did not all the time. She is certainly our best example of how to live and dress and act as women in this world.

Other verses in Qur’an about the woman’s Islamic modest dress are 24:60 and 33:59.

“Such elderly women as are past the prospect of marriage, there is no blame on them if they lay aside their outer garments, provided they make not a wanton display of their beauty; but it is best for them to be modest and God is One who sees and knows all things.”

“O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters and the believing women that they should cast their outer garments over their persons when abroad that is convenient that they should be known and as such not molested. And God is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.”

So the believing women are being advised to wear an outer covering beyond what they would wear in the home when they go out, and this is thehijab .

Based on 24:60, the covering of those parts mandated to be covered in 24:30-31 is not to be relaxed except in age past possibility of marriage, and then it is still better not to do so.

Mixing of the Sexes

A very close cousin to the subject of Islamic modest dress is the subject of casual mixing of the sexes. According to Islam, men and women should not interact socially, especially one-on-one. This concept seems very strict and extreme to many in the West. When I grew up, all my best friends were boys and I never had many girl friends. And now I am not supposed to have male friends? That is not entirely true. But interaction with males should be business-like.

We’ve all seen the consequences ofunbusiness -like behavior with friends of the opposite sex. Attraction at some level is a common result, and this leads to trouble in marriages. Maybe it will not always cause your spouse to be jealous or result in a fight, but it always does affect how you view your spouse or future mate. You find things in your friends that you like better than the way your spouse is. You imagine yourself with someone other than your spouse, and that is damaging even if you do not take it seriously. “Falling out of love” with your spouse is absolute nonsense. It only happens if you let it happen. Thus, if you have a class or job with members of the opposite sex, fine. You can greet them and participate in the appropriate work-related discussions or small talk but should avoid deep personal conversations.

The issue of mixing at the mosque is one that regularly comes up in the Muslim communities. Some of the men and women want to sit together rather than in different rooms or one in front of the other. In my opinion, if they want to have everyone in the same room with women on one side and men on the other, fine, but then someone should be at the door handing out Islamic dress so that everyone is properly attired.

The mosque is a place for worship and not a place for absentmindedly admiring the opposite sex. And it is impossible to say truthfully that you can have men and women together in a place, without concern for proper dress, and not have at least some thoughts about the other sex result. Therefore, let them sit side-by-side if they must, but only if they all put on proper Islamic attire before entering the room. Then, when they leave the mosque, if they take it off and choose to mingle and interact, it is their own responsibility.

I do not see any oppression or unfairness in separating sexes at the mosque. However, I do have a problem with the many mosques that provide substandard facilities for women as if they were an afterthought. This usually results when the facilities are being converted from some previous structure such as a church or home. Women should be able to easily hear what is going on, and it is preferable that they can see, too.

I have seen some communities install audiovisual systems so that the prayers and sermons were on speakers that all could hear; and they used closed circuit TV so that the women could also see the speakers. In question-and-answer sessions, properly attired women with questions could enter the back of the men’s area so that they could be called on, or another reasonable system could be devised.

Too many mosques have horrible or non-existent facilities for women and then wonder why some of their women are not knowledgeable or interested in the religion or are being misguided. Communities like the one I mentioned earlier in which the women couldn’t see or hear and many could not understand the language being used are the ones which find their next generations rejecting practice of Islam and moving away.

Most Muslim communities struggle to even have a mosque let alone have good facilities for women, but I maintain that they should not build a mosque that does not serve their women well. Similarly, Muslim communities ideally should provide facilities for both the men and women to participate in community activities such as sports. It is not fair to the Muslim girl in the West who takes swimming lessons and gymnastics lessons every year from when she is three or four to be told on her ninth birthday that she can’t do those things anymore.

It is like punishing the girl for becomingbaligh (Islamically of age to be responsible for dress, prayer, etc.), when instead it should be something she can be happy about. How nice it would be if more Muslim communities that are able should rent or build facilities and hire single-sex staff so that their men and women can enjoy swimming and other sports. Communities could develop single-sex sports leagues along with training for the manywho did not have opportunities to learn the sports earlier. I cannot stress enough the need for the Muslim women and Muslim children to be an active part of their community and to have full access to learning and recreation. It is essential to the well being and survival of Islam in the West.

Treating Women Differently in the Law

The last things I wish to discuss with regard to women in Islam are instances in which women are treated differently in Islamic law. Many of these may seem unfair at first glance but most really are not. Probably all of us have heard stories of women being punished for crimes differently than men or inheriting less and so on. There are cases when women and men alike are not treated fairly according to Islam even in countries with a predominantly Muslim population and whose laws are supposed to be based on Islam. The rest of the Muslim world owes it to the oppressed brothers and sisters and to themselves to combat these injustices when they become known.

Thankfully, most Muslim women do not face such oppression and experience an Islamic society closer to the ideal. All Muslim societies believe in the Holy Qur’an, and thus believe in the verses which talk about women inheriting less than men, not serving as equal witness with men, and being punished by their husbands. The Western reader finds these verses or hears about them and instantly thinks of oppression. But again, those men and women who choose Islam find the matters differently.

In the case of inheritance, it is actually a complex issue and there are cases in which women inherit more than men. As a general rule, the men do inherit more, but only because their financial burden is far greater than women’s are. To not give men more would actually be oppressive to them because their duties with their money are more severe. Muslim men are required to financially provide for their wives, children, elderly parents and so on.

This is regardless of whether the wife works or not. In addition he must provide his spouse with a marriage dowry. On the other hand, whatever money the wife has she can spend in any way she likes. She could spend it entirely on herself if she wanted and has no duty to spend it on anyone else. In comparison to Judeo-Christian law on inheritance and ownership of women, Islam is extremely generous.

As for women serving as witnesses, again the issue is more complex than it first seems. In some cases when witnesses are needed, either one man or two women is required. But in other cases, only the witness of a single woman will do. Since men are required to work and women are not, cases that involve business are more likely to require two women witnesses.

This could be a matter of protection for the women, because in matters of money there is the temptation of coercing the witness. Having two female witnesses helps protect either woman from coercion. Men can be coerced, too, but it is undoubtedly, in most cases, easier for a man to threaten and intimidate a woman than another man.

On the other hand, many times only a woman’s witness is accepted, as may be the case when giving testimony about female anatomy. Or it may even override a man’s testimony, as is the case when a man accuses a woman of lewd behavior and she denies it according to Qur’an 24:6-11.

Islam is a religion designed to serve all people in all times. Thus, many of its laws are built upon what is best for most people. Thus, it does not deny that some women may earn more than their husbands, or that some men may be coerced easier than some women. The laws still apply even in these cases, because applying them in these cases hurts no one. On the other hand, failure to apply the laws for those women who do not earn money or who might be coerced would be harmful.

A third case that is presented as oppressive to women is in 4:34 of the Holy Qur’an:

“Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more strength than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore, the righteous women are devoutly obedient and guard in their husband’s absence what God would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them first, next refuse to share their beds, and last beat them lightly; but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means of annoyance.”

This translation, by Yusuf Ali, ismore clear than many in getting across that the man is not given freereign to abuse his wife. This verse actually tells a lot about the Islamic family arrangement. Men are duty-bound to protect and maintain their spouses. This duty falls on them because they are generally stronger and more suited to such work. Further, they do not have the circumstances of menstruation, pregnancy, birth, and breast-feeding that many women experience.

In return for protection and maintenance, women are not required to bear children or cook or clean. They have not a single duty required of them in return, except two -- and those are simply to obey the husband in all that is reasonable and not contrary to Islam and to guard the husband’s property and their own chastity when their husband is not present. That really is not a lot to ask and it is likely that the women have got the better deal.

But, what of the last part of the versethat talks about beating women? Many translations of this verse do not convey its full meaning, and so it appears to the reader that a husband who is displeased with his wife is permitted to beat her. Truly, he cannot touch her in anger, ever. If she has done something wrong, he is to simply tell her so and let her know that he is displeased. If she persists, then he may sleep in a different bed, and if she still persists, then he may lightly hit her.

What does it mean to lightly hit? To answer that, see the answer of the Prophet (saw) who was asked the very same question. His reply indicated that she cannot be hit on the face at all and not even redness is to result. The “hitting” is supposed to be more symbolic than actually painful, and done with a feather ormiswak (kind of toothbrush). The husband has to take several steps over a period of days because he must first try the other two before coming to the third. Thus, it must be a problem of a serious and recurring nature. And, if he is upset with his wife because of her adherence to Islam, he can do nothing.

For example, he can do nothing if she wearshijab and he doesn’t like it. This verse is revealed for the case of severely wrong behavior on the part of the wife and nothing else. AyatollahSistani has indicated that this beating can be done only related to severe problems concerning sexual intimacy or her travel without his permission after all other steps have been faithfully fulfilled, and he further says that a man cannot beat his wife in a way that physically harms her or he has to pay “blood money”.

When such problems in a marriage exist, it is possible that divorce will result. Contrary to popular belief among non-Muslims, a Muslim man cannot divorce his wife simply by saying so three times in immediate succession. He says it once and then the couple must go through a considerable period in which they may separate and try to reconcile. During this time, he is still required to provide for her just as he always has. Actually, there are some circumstances in which he is not permitted to pronounce divorce atall, one of them being while his wife is menstruating.

The woman also has the right to divorce if she is facing any mistreatment by her husband by going to a legal representative. In that way, the woman pursuing divorce is nearly exactly like it is in many American states. The person wanting the divorce must file a case giving a reason for wanting the divorce, and then the case is examined by the law to determine if grounds for divorce do indeed exist. For the men, it is easier to begin the process of divorce in Islam. And, if he initiates it, a no-fault divorce is possible after efforts to reconcile fail. If a divorce results, he cannot lay any claim to his wife’s property, even that which he had given her, no matter how wealthy she may be.

In practice, it is sometimes made too difficult for the woman to obtain a divorce and too easy for the man. It is difficult for some women to obtain access to truly Islamic legal representation. When the Muslim divorce system fails, the religion is blamed. Actually, if the divorce system were managed the way Islam directs, it would never fail. There are reliablehadith that the Prophet (saw) granted divorces for reasons as simple as the wife not finding the husband physically attractive. There is no question that a divorce should be granted in cases of abuse.

Finally, I will briefly mention male and female circumcision. Circumcision for Muslim males is enjoined for cleanliness and for the same reasons it is enjoined among Christians and Jews. Some Muslims also practice female circumcision in a variety of forms. There is a lot of debate as to whether this is an Islamic or cultural practice. There is no reference to the Prophet (saw) advising circumcision of women or of its practice among his family.

There is ahadith of the Prophet (saw) that mentions female circumcision, but I am not qualified to judge its authenticity and reports I have read cast serious doubt on its authenticity. Assuming it is authentic, for the sake of argument, thishadith tells believers that if they do practice female circumcision they must only remove a very small amount of foreskin. In any case, it is clear that removal of sexual organs, sewing up the woman to ensure virginity, and performing the procedure with unsterile equipment and lack of medical training are all not approved of in Islam and rather are considered as evil practices.

Regrettably, it is not too hard to find room for improvement in the practice of Islam the world over. This includes treatment of women. However, to maintain that Islam is oppressive to women is to maintain an absolute fallacy. It is similarly erroneous to maintain that most Muslims propagate oppressive beliefs and behavior. Upon careful examination, Islam reveals itself as the most just system of living available to mankind. Further, most Muslims are sincere in seeking proper implementation of Islam rather than twisting it to satisfy personal gain.

DivisionAmong Muslims

The topic of division within Islam is a sore spot for the world of Muslims. It is easy to find Muslims polarized on this issue and acting with great emotion and vigor trying to prove their views. In the minds of these Muslims, those who adhere to a different group are in gross error and have purposely twisted the meanings of true Islam to their own ends.

It is disappointing to converts when they find that Islam is not the unified religion it first appears to be. For me, a sense of dread enveloped me when I began to encounter religious factions within Islam. It was dread, because I was still mentally exhausted from the process of conversion to Islam, and yet here I was faced with different versions of Islam to sort out. I would again have to engage myself in serious study, prayer for guidance and self-evaluation to try and determine which of the factions, if any, were truthful. The discovery of division did not raise any doubt in me about Islam itself, but it raised doubt that any one group was in possession of true Islam. I had to consider the possibility of being a Muslim without a school just as I had had to consider being a Christian without a church.

The various schools of Islam sometimes harbor bad blood toward each other. And thus, it is not unusual to find books written by a scholar from one faction viciously defaming another faction to the point of calling it non-Muslim. Similarly, members from one faction will chastise members of another faction for causing disunity, when in truth neither group seeks disunity. After all, you cannot blame someone for pursuing what he/she finds to be true, even if it is different than what you find true.

I advise all Truth-seekers to stay away from those who speak viciously of other groups and accuse them of all sorts of misguidance and wrongdoing. Avoid their interpretations of the writings from the questionable “other” group. Instead, read their writings about their own beliefs.

As I have alluded to earlier, those who would find the Truth need to investigate all groups with an open mind and fairness. They should read works about a group written by numerous scholars and members of that group. They should judge a group by its own writings and teachings rather than other groups’ interpretations of such. They should not neglect study of a group because of its reputation or small numbers. They should not hesitate to ask questions of members of each group but should not take the answer of one person as representative of all members of the group.

It is each person’s duty, Muslim or not, no matter into what religion or school they were born, to determine for themselves where truth lies. They should not be satisfied that their own religion, culture, nation, or school holds the truth without extensive verification.

“…They say, ‘We follow that wherein we found our fathers.’ What! Even though their fathers were wholly unintelligent and had no guidance?” 2:170

Personally, I found a good place to start a study of all that is within Islam to be the Internet. Although it takes some effort to find it, it is possible to find good-quality information presented by each group that explains what they believe and why they believe it. You can also find lots of information about what they believe to be wrong with the other groups, but that type of information has to be regarded very carefully.

In my own study, I began first with the largest group, the Sunnis, and ultimately was not fully satisfied with any of the Sunni schools for the same reason that I was not satisfied with Christianity. For Sunnis, after the death of the Prophet (saw), religion came to the hands of ordinary, even if well-intentioned, men and thus the major sources of Sunni law come from such men. I also was unsatisfied that four schools within Sunni Islam should be considered as equally acceptable.

As a believer in a single Absolute truth and in a God who provides the means to that Truth, I strongly hold that minor differences in law do matter and that one way must be preferable to others. I could not accept using fallible collections of traditions of the Holy Prophet (saw), each of which contain numerous contradictory traditions and traditions which come from unreliable sources, as a primary source of the religion. Just like the Bible, the numerous errors and contradictions of the Sunnihadith (tradition) collections make them unreliable as a determiner of Truth. They are not from Allah (swt ), but from men.

“If it had been from other than Allah they would have found therein much incongruity.” (4:82)

I do believe that traditions have a very important place in Islam but I feel that no collection of traditions should be regarded assahih (error-free). And I also believe that traditions from those who demonstrate themselves to be the best Muslims should be preferred over those narrated by any other individuals.

The Sunnis largely considerijtihad or the means of determining right and wrong in any new cases, to be dead. The scholars rely on centuries-old books forijtihad and, as such, do not truly have access to modern rulings about modern situations. Thus, the Sunni Muslims are left to make their own decisions on new matters that arise. So, once again, there is no way for them to satisfactorily determine right or wrong on any new problem. The quest for Absolute truth has failed.

As for other groups, I found many of them also to be unacceptable but I shall avoid discussing them in detail for the sake of brevity. The reader may wish to engage in his/her own study ofIsmailis ,Ahmadis , Nation of Islam,Qadanis ,Fatimids ,Bohras ,Wahabis andJa’faris .

After a detailed study, I chose theJa’fari school of Islam because I found that it alone met my criteria. I shall briefly discuss some of the information and factors, which led to my choice, but I do not intend thereby to provide enough information to convince anyone of its correctness (that would take more pages than this entire book). Each person has a duty to conduct their own bias-free (or as near to that as possible) and detailed study of where Truth lies.

During the lifetime of the Prophet (saw), Allah (swt ) appointed twelve successors after the prophet who would uphold the religion and prevent its corruption. The first of these successors was publicly appointed atGhadeer Khum , a short time before the death of the Prophet (saw), in front of 90,000 to 140,000 witnesses. TwoQur’anic verses were revealed on that day and the event of that day has been recorded more times and by more sources than any other.

“O Messenger! Make known that which hath been revealed unto thee from thy Lord, for if thou do not, thou will not have conveyed His message.” (5:67)

“This day have I perfected your religion for you and completedMy favor unto you, and have chosen for you as religion Al-Islam [submission to the One God].” (5:3 )

The first verse is a command to announce what the Prophet (saw) had to announce atGhadeer Khum , and the second is a statement that upon the finishing of this announcement Islam has been completed and perfected. What the Prophet (saw) said, according to the scholars of all schools of Islam, is as follows:

“O men and women! Allah is my master. I am the master of thefaithfuls . I have a clear authority over their souls, and of whoever I am the master, Ali [his cousin whose hand he was upholding while speaking] is master. O Allah! Love him who loves Ali, hate him who hates Ali.” Muslim, vol.2, p.325 and many others

Further in verse 5:55, Allah says in meaning:

“Yourmawla (master) can be only Allah; and His messenger and those who believe, who establish worship and pay the poor due while bowing down in prayer.”

It is virtually unanimous among all leading scholars of any school of thought that this verse refers to Allah, the Prophet (saw), and Ali. Ali (as) is the one for whom it has been recorded in the traditions that he gave charity (in the form of a ring he was wearing) while bowing in prayer.

The disagreement arises over the definition of the word “mawla ” because it can mean master or friend. But, in the context ofGhadeer Khum , it is clear that it means master, because it is clear that when the Prophet (saw) is speaking of Allah (swt ) and himself he means the master sense of the word. Otherwise the phrase “I have a clear authority over their souls…” would be out of place.

And it also makes no sense to stop thousands of people in the middle of a hot desert to announce that Ali (as) is a friend.After saying this atGhadeer Khum , theQur’anic verse came which announced that Islam had been completed and perfected. This also would not make any sense if he had merely said that Ali was a friend. But, it makes perfect sense if he had just announced that Ali (as) had authority over the people equal to his own authority.

Nearly all Muslim scholars believe in the concept of Imamate, i.e., the successor of the Prophet (saw) that upholds and protects the religion from corruption. The Sunnis generally hold that the first four Imams were the first four Caliphs and do not know who theremainder are . But clearly this is unacceptable, as the Prophet Muhammad (saw) said: “The person who dies and has not known the Imam of his time has died the same as one who died during the Age of Ignorance.” (Sahih Bukhari vol. 5, p. 13;Sahih Muslim vol. 6, p. 21 No. 1849; and others) Thishadith clearly indicates that all people in all times, including our time, should know our Imam.

The view that the first caliphs were imams is questionable since God did not appoint the caliphs into their positions. The first caliph was chosen in a small private election that took place while the family of the Prophet (saw) was busy with the Prophet’s burial. Others took power by being appointed by their predecessor. There is no evidence in anyQur’anic verse orhadith that the successors of the Prophet (saw) should be chosen by election or personal appointment. Rather, the evidence is to the contrary that Allah (swt ) has chosen and appointed those who would lead mankind, just as He has done throughout history.

“You will never find a change in the practice of Allah.” (35:43)

The Prophet first presented the message of Islam to his near relatives and even at that early date he introduced Ali as “my brother, my successor, and my caliph.” The Prophet again introduced Ali to the people (as successor) on numerous occasions concluding withGhadeer Khum . The appointment of Ali was therefore no secret.

This is only a very small portion of my study concerning Ali (as) that led me to believe that he was appointed successor of the Prophet (saw) and that obeying him was made compulsory. For one who demands more proof, there are many books dedicated solely to establishing that God did indeed establish Imams or guides on earth including twelve after the death of the Prophet (saw), the first of which was Imam Ali (as).

Among the leaders of Sunni schools and among the Imams of theIsmailis and so on, it is possible to find examples of sin and teachings contradicting the Qur’an. This is to be expected from ordinary men, but not from those appointed by Allah (swt ) to uphold the religion. One set of Imams, those twelve followed by theJa’fari school, are singular in their adherence to Qur’an and lack of sin.

There are reliablehadith (records of the Prophet’s (saw) words and actions) in the Sunni books that the Imams will be twelve in number. Further there are some which name them all, and they are named in accordance with theJa’fari (Shia ) belief. A few of these traditions are quoted here from Peshawar Nights:

(1) SheikhSulayman Balkhi Hanafi in hisYanabiu’l-Mawadda , ch.76, reports fromFara’idu’s-Simtain ofHamwaini , who reports fromMujahid , who reports fromIbn Abbas , that a Jew namedNa’thal came to the Holy Prophet and asked him questions aboutTawhid (Unity of Allah). The Holy Prophet answered his questions and the Jew embraced Islam. Then he said: “O Holy Prophet, every prophet had awasi (vicegerent). Our Prophet, Moses BinImran , made a will forYusha Bin Nun. Please tell me whois yourwasi ?” The Holy Prophet said:

“My vicegerent is Ali BinAbi Talib ; after him areHasan , and Husain and after them are nine Imams, who are the successive descendants of Husain.”

Na’thal asked the Holy Prophet the names of those Imams. The Holy Prophet said: “After Husain, his son, Ali, will be the Imam; after him his son, Muhammad; after him his son,Ja’far ; after him his son Musa; after him his son, Ali; after him his son, Muhammad; after him his son,Hasan ; after him his son, MuhammadMahdi will be the last Imam. There will be twelve Imams.”

In addition to the names of the nine Imams, thishadith further states that each would succeed as Imam after his father.Na’thal made further inquiries, and the Holy Prophet described the manner of death of each Imam.

ThenNa’thal said, “I bear witness that there is no god but Allah and that you are His Holy Prophet. I bear witness that these twelve holy Imams are your vicegerents after you. What you have said is exactly what is recorded in our books and in the will of Moses.”

Then the Holy Prophet said: “Paradise is for him who loves them and obeys them, and Hell is for him who is hostile to them and opposes them.”

Na’thal then recited some couplets to the effect that “May Allah, the Exalted, shower His blessings upon you, chosen Prophet and pride of theBani Hashim . Allah has guided us by means of you and the twelve holy men whom you have named. Certainly Allah has purified them and preserved them from impurity. He who loves them is successful. He who hates them is the loser.

The last of the Imams will quench the thirst of the thirsty. He is the one the people will wait for. Prophet of Allah, your progeny is a blessing for me and for all the believers. Those who turn away from them will soon be thrown into Hell.”

(2) The great scholar, SheikhSulayman Balkhi , in hisYanabiu’l-Mawadda ,ch . 76 reports fromManaqib ofKhawarizmi , who reports fromWathila BinAsqa ’ BinQarkhab , who reports Jabir Bin AbdullahAnsari ; and alsoAbu’l-Fazl Shaibani and he from Muhammad Bin Abdullah Bin IbrahimShafi’i , who reports JabirAnsari (one of the chief companions of the Prophet) as saying: “Jundal BinJunadab BinJubair , a Jew, came to the Holy Prophet and asked him aboutTawhid . After hearing his reply, the man became a Muslim. He said that on the previous night he had seen Moses in a dream telling him: ‘Embrace Islam at the hands of the last of the prophets, Muhammad, and attach yourself to the vicegerents after him.’ He thanked Allah for the blessing of Islam. He then asked the Holy Prophet to tell him the names of his vicegerents. The Holy Prophet began by saying: ‘My vicegerents are twelve in number.’

The man said that he had seen this fact in the Torah. He asked the Prophet to tell him their names, and the Prophet said: ‘The first of them is the chief of the vicegerents, the father of the Imams, Ali. Then follow his two sons -Hasan and Husain. You shall see these three. When you reach the last stage of your life, ImamZainu’l-Abidin will be born, and the last thing that you have of this world shall be milk. So cling to them so that ignorance may not mislead you.’

The man said that he had seen in the Torah and in other scriptures the names of Ali,Hasan , and Husain in their various forms. He asked the Holy Prophet to tell him the names of the other Imams.

Then the Holy Prophet named the remaining nine Imams with their epithets and added: ‘The last of them, MuhammadMahdi , will live, but disappear. He will appear later and will fill the world with justice and equity, since it will have degenerated into injustice and tyranny. Verily, Paradise is for those who show patience during the time of his occultation. Paradise is for those who are firm in their love for him. These are they whom Allah Almighty has praised in the Holy Qur’an and for whom the Holy Qur’an is a ‘guide for those who guard (against evil).Those who believe in the unseen.’ Also He says, ‘These are Allah’s party: now surely the party of Allah are the successful ones.’” (58:22)”

Still among the Muslims are those who do not believe in thesinlessness of God’s messengers and guides. They say that those messengers and guides do not commit any sin or mistake in delivering the message or guidance but in other ways may commit fault. They also interpret passages in the Qur’an to indicate sins on the part of some prophets. There are numerous evidences contrary to that view, but such a belief is also contrary to reason.

First of all, God is perfectly capable of providing messengers and guides that do not commit fault. Secondly, if ever a messenger or guide did commit fault, even outside the normal realm of his religious work, it would affect his credibility and it would corrupt his purpose. Every waking deed of the messengers and guides is watched and is under scrutiny. If one of them did commit a sin, the followers would be likely to see it. It then becomes a question of how the followers are supposed to be able to tell which of the actions and sayings of that messenger or guide they are to follow. Which actions are from God and which aren’t? “Do what I say and not what I do” is inadequate for the deliverance and protection of God’s message, and God does not do inadequate work.

TheJa’fari school alone met my standards of possessing one absolute Truth derived from a God-protected source. Those who ultimately come to a different conclusion are entitled to do so. Tolerance of those who reach varied conclusions is the only action that agrees with the behavior of the Holy Prophet (saw). Among all groups and schools of Muslims are those who behave with very poor manners toward members of other groups. They allow hate and ill will to cultivate inthemselves and justify their behavior by making a large list of grievances about the other party. I would ask those people to find any example in the demeanor of the Prophet of Islam (saw) or any prophet (sa ) that matches theirs. Even those who were the outright enemies of Islam, and rejected it although its truth was apparent to them, were never treated disrespectfully or cruelly, neither were they made the victims of aggression, neither were they abused in any way, be it with physical force or with words.

“… And let not hatred of any people seduce you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your duty.” (5:8)

Jihad

More than any other religion, Islam has the reputation of being a violent religion. Typically when some people think of Islam, they think of terrorism. News reporters have commented on events in the Middle East claiming that Muslims were acting out in a form of Holy War, or jihad. And there are people out there who believe it is their duty to fight in the name of Islam. However, news reporters are notorious for telling only part of the story. There are several instances that I can personally remember in which the news discussed how a certain group of Muslims attacked another group of people. What they forgot to mention was that group of people had attacked the Muslims a week ago. Since the Oklahoma bombing, the press has become more careful about how it reports incidents involving Muslims, but they still do not always get the story right.

I think we first need to know what jihad means. The word jihad actually refers to striving for the sake of religion and does not translate as Holy War. For example, it is a personal jihad to struggle against temptation to sin. The personal jihad is referred to as the greater jihad and is given major importance in Islam. When jihad is carried out as war, it is a struggle against those oppressing or aggressing against Muslims and is referred to as the lesser jihad.

Lending to Islam’s violent reputation, many textbooks over the years have claimed that Islam was spread by the sword. In truth, it is not permitted to wage war in Islam except against those who have aggressed against you or are oppressing you. In those cases, it becomes a duty for able men to fight until the Muslims are again free. Unlike Christianity, Islam does not always support turning the other cheek. When your lives and well being are in danger, Islam says you should courageously defend yourselves even if you would rather fearfully ignore that some of your community members are being murdered or imprisoned or losing their jobs. Turning the other cheek in such cases is to turn your eyes away from suffering and wrongdoing and excuse it.

Most of the Muslim world consists of very peaceful people. But, throughout history there have been Muslims who were active fighters. We are quick to say these Muslims are wrong, but it is helpful to see things from their perspective to understand why they feel they are justified in their actions. Many people in the Middle East believe that the West is oppressing them. Undoubtedly, the West looks out for its own interests first and has done many questionable things to Third-World countries. When it is convenient, the West takes (or borrows and then wastes) land, takes or controls money, sides with immoral countries in disputes, prevents medicine and food from reaching needy people, and kills. The West controls trade and hastens to spread its culture, at the loss of other cultures, throughout the world.

Some peoples are subject to the effect of the West’s mingling in world affairs more than others and some feel they are being treated wrongly to the point of oppression. And some of them are right. No matter what the reasons, is it not oppressive that Iraqi children under sanction have been denied nutritious food and basic medicine? Is it not oppressive that the Palestinians who had been living in their land for centuries were kicked out and not recompensed in any way? Surely if your children were dying or your home was taken from you, there would be no question that you were a subject of oppression and you would very likely want to fight.

What are these people to do? First of all, Islam is against the use of suicide tactics or cruel means such as biological warfare. Further, it forbids attacking women and children. Further, those who feel they are being oppressed may fail to see those that they have grievances against are generally societies of mostly non-aggressive individuals. The oppressors end up being a vague concept and an unclear body. For example, the West and America are both vague terms made up of a huge diversity of peoples. As a result of this problem of identifying the enemy, the terrorists have made the mistake of hating and attacking innocent people who have personally done nothing against the Muslims. That being said, it should be realized that many distant or vague reports of terrorism are more properly classified as legitimate warfare.

Actually, in the absence of the Prophet (saw) or Imam (as) sent by God, many Muslims are of the opinion that no one has the authority to declare a jihad as an act of war, anyway. There is no truly Islamic government on Earth, and thus there is no Islamic leader who clearly has the authority to declare a war. Leaders of nations can declare war against other nations, but not religious wars. Americans who hear of a religious leader ordering attacks against the United States should understand that most Muslims desire only peace and justice and are not swayed by any old call by any old religious leader.

Ritualism

The last topic I wish to discuss in this section is that of the many rituals in Islam. Why do Muslims pray a certain way, wash before prayer, fast for a whole month, face one way in prayer, and slaughter their meat in a particular way, etc.? To non-Muslims, being so concerned about minor details may seem silly. Why should God care if I wash my feet or just wipe them in preparation for prayer?

No one can deny that good habits are useful. Islamic ritual in part is designed to aid in the formation of good habits and in remembering God throughout our day-to-day lives.Following Islamic ritualistic practices leads to good hygiene and diet and balance between spiritual, physical and social aspects. The minute details may seem nit-picky, but taking care in the details of ritual shows respect for the importance of religion in all parts of life. Further, in many cases logical reasons for the details exist. In particular, careful adherence to the forms of the ritual often helps in understanding the purpose or meaning of the ritual itself.

Modern Muslims are guilty of practicing their religion too often on a purely ritualistic level. Performance of prayer without careful thought to its meaning and purpose is very nearly meaningless and purposeless. It is just an empty form of true prayer. Allah (swt ) did not prescribe rituals as a means to take up time but rather as a means of perfecting our faith and attaining nearness to Him. A lifetime can be spent in education and effort toward engaging oneself completely and properly in all acts of worship.

However, a good place to start is conscious attention to the acts being performed and their aims. For example, washing before prayer can be seen as symbolically cleansing ourselves to face the Almighty. If one learns the supplications that accompany the washing, it may add increased meaning to the act and enable the performer to concentrate more on the task at hand. If you don’t know the purpose behind a ritual it doesn’t hurt to ask someone you regard as more pious or more knowledgeable than yourself.

Concentration toward the spiritual aspects of prayer and other rituals is difficult because our thoughts of worldly affairs tend to intrude. But if we are persistent in our efforts, in time the task becomes easier and we not only enjoy the activities more but benefit from them more as well. If you don’t enjoy praying to God, this is an indication that your attention to its true meanings and purpose are lacking.

Is not our ultimate goal in Muslim life to attain nearness to God or submission to His will? In this life, prayer is an opportunity to speak with Him Whom We Are Seeking, so it should be something we look forward to and not just a duty to be completed. If the heart is tired and your attention is not prepared for the ritual, then find steps to help you become prepared and if necessary, some recommend delaying the ritual awhile (so far as that does not mean committing a sin) until you can perform it better. Hopefully, continual use of this practice will cause the tiredness of the heart to decrease and you will be more easily prepared.

CHAP. III. THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM

§ I. The Metaphysics of Rationalism - Materialism

The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, mysticism, heresy - forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so we find the epoch under consideration.

The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise of the 'Abbāsid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious fervour, leārned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the first half of the 8th century we find Wāṣil Ibn 'Atā - a Persian disciple of the famous theologian Ḥasan of Basra - starting Mu'tazilaism (Rationalism) - that most interesting movement which engaged some of the subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen metaphysical controversies of Baghdād and Basra. The famous city of Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the play-ground of various forces - Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic ideas, Manichaeism[1] - which furnished ample spiritual food to the inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the Mu'tazila thinkers, gradually[2] drifted into metaphysics with which alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history of the Mu'tazila Kalām; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu'tazila view of Islām. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are the only āspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here.

His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu'tazila eventually arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of His nature. The Mu'tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the abstract divine Principle. “God”, says Abu'l-Hudhail, “is knowing, all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His very essence (dhāt)”[3] . In order to explain the pure unity of God Joseph Al-Baṣīr[4] lays down the following five principles: -

(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident.

(2). The necessary supposition of a creator.

(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Aḥwāl) of God.

(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God.

(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes.

This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the hands of Mu'ammar and Abu Hāshim it became a mere abstract possibility about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate knowledge of God,[5] for His knowledge must be of something in Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is equally impossible. Aḥmad and Faḍl[6] - disciples of Nazzām, however, recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are two - God - the eternal principle; and the word of God - Jesus Christ - the contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth in the second alternative suggested by Mu'ammar, was reserved, as we shall see, for later Sufī thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law.

But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which their opponents - the Ash'arite - afterwards modified to fit in with their own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzām chiefly consisted in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of nature.[7] The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jāhiz to define Will in a purely negative manner.[8] Though the Rationalist thinkers did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzām taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the distinction between substance and accident.[9] Existence was regarded as a quality super-imposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. Muhammad Ibn 'Uthmān, one of the Mu'tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn ῌazm,[10] maintained that the non‑existent (atom in its pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is it said to be created. Sub-stance, then, is a collection of qualities - taste, odour, colour - which, in themselves, are nothing more than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[11] (Ṭafra). The individuality of a thing which is defined as “that of which something can be predicated”[12] is not an essential factor in its notion. The collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the perceptible plurality - the Universe.

The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up falls down on account of its own indwelling property.[13] God, says Al-'Aṭṭār of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu'tamir, did not create colour, length, breadth, taste or smell - all these are activities of bodies themselves.[14] Even the number of things in the Universe is not known to God[15] . Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir further explained the properties of bodies by what he called “Tawallud” - interaction of bodies.[16] Thus it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and theologically deists.

To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible. There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Oāsim of Balkh regards them as similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar to each other, we do not necssarily mean that they are similar in all their attributes. Abu'l-Oāsim further differs from Nazzān in advocating the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The attribute of “Baqā” (continued existence), he says, does not give to its subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Oāsim, however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, that the essence or atom (Māhiyyat) could not remain essence in a state of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It is obvious that Abu'l-Qāsim here approaches the Ash'arite theory of knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of matter.

§ II. Contemporary Movements of Thought

Side by side with the development of Mu'tazilaism we see, as is natural in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly: -

I. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as Ibn AShras and Al-Jāhiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jāhiz who inclined to deistic naturalism,[18] is that of a cultured man of the time, and not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reation against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are incapable of reflecting on articles of faith.

2. Ṣūfīism - an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first systematised by Dhu'l-Nūn, and became more and more deepened and antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the Ash’arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the following chapter.

3. The revival of authority - Isma'īlianisma movement characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity between the methods practised by the Isma'īlian missionaries and those of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa - Brethren of Purity - suggests some sort of secret relation between the two institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views - a necessary consequence of speculative activity - is apt to invoke forces which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imāmat think in the same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma īliams, while making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to all sorts of thinking.

The Ismailia movement then is one aspect of the persistent battle[19] which the intellectually

independent Persian waged against the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the Shiite religion, the Ismaīlia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan character with 'Abdulla ibn Maimūn - the probable progenitor of the Fātimid Caliphs of Egypt - who died about the same time when Al-ASh'arī, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of Imāmat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sūfīism, Manichaeism, Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived Ismā'īlian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually revealed to the initiated, by the “Leader” - the ever Incarnating Universal Reason - according to the intellectual development of the age in which he incarnated himself. In the Ismā'īlian movement, Freethought, apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge past, present and future.

The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the Ismā'īlian Church which counted among its followers some of the best heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere local and temporary character. Ismā'īlianism, in spite of its almost entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought - Bābism - is essentially Ismā'īlian in its character.

To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'ān calls “Amt.” (word of God) as distinguished from the “Khalq” (creation of God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they consided themselves to have solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his followers.

In order to find an answer to the question, “What is plurality?” the Ismaīlia refer to what they consider a netaphysical axiom - “that from one only one can proceed”. But the one which proceeds, is not something completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe - the scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality of the “Leader” who illuminates the soul in pro-portion to its experience and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process of disintegration ensues. “Particles constituting the Universe fall off from each other - those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises diversity”[20] . This is but briefly the Ism Līlian Philosophy - a mixture, as Sharastānī remarks,. of Philosophical and Manichaean ideas - which. by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods.

The Ismā'īlian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of the Qur'ān - a method which was afterwards adopted by Sūfīism. With them the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further modifications; until in the ῌurūfī sect (an offshoot of the Ismā'īlia), in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Ṣūfīism on the one hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The “Be”, maintained the Hurūfīs, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to further creation - the word externalised. “But for the ‘word' the recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since Divinity is beyond the reach of sense - perception”[21] . The ‘word', therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[22] in order to manifest the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's ‘word', in which He is immanent.[23] Every sound in the Universe is within God; every atom is singing the song of eternity;[24] all is life. Those who want to

discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek “the named” through the Name,[25] which at once conceals and reveals its subject.

§ III. Reaction against Rationalism - The Ash'arīte

Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of 'Abbās, Rationalism continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash’arī (b. 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was a pupil of Al-Jubbā'ī[26] - the representative of the younger school of Mu’tazilaism in Basra - with whom he had many controversies[27] which eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid farewell to the Mu'tazila camp. “The fact”. says Spitta, “that Al-Ash'arī was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu'tazilite speculation, the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who was orthodox as a boy and a Mu'tazila as a young man”.[28] The Mu'tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jāḥiz) tended to be absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash'arī was an attempt not only to purge Islām of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence the reaction.

The orthodox reaction led by the Ash'arite then was, in reality, nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power of acquiring[29] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Dīn Rāzī, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by Tūsī and Qutbal-Dīn, does away with the idea of “acquisition”, and openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the Qur'ān. The Mātarīdiyya - another school of anti-rationalist theology, founded by Abu Manṣūr Mātarīdī a native of Mātarīd in the environs of Samarqand - went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in opposition to the Ash'arite, that man has absolute control over his activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. Al-Ash'arīs interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate nature of reality. Bāqilānī[30] therefore, made use of some purely metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in his Theo-logical investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the Qur'ān is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with plilosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves.

God, according to the Ash'arite, is the ultimate necessary existence which “carries its attributes in its own being”;[31] and whose existence (wujūd) and essence (Māhiyyat) are identical. Besides the argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle: -

(I). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for their empirical divergence.

(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either sub-stance or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash'arite theory of knowledge. To answer the question, “What is a thing?” they subjected to a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in themselves.[32] They made no distinction of secondary and primary qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which the sub-stance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a process, Kant stopped at the idea of “Ding an sich”, but the Ash'arite endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[33] who, in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word “atom” by which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their own.

But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the Ash'arite Meta-physics, is their attitude towards the Law of Causation.[34] Just as they repudiated all the principles of optics[35] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The Ash'arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is deter-mined by God.

Any account of the Ash'arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a notice of the work of AI-Ghazālī (d. IIII A.D.) who though misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful ability anticipated Descartes[36] in his philosophical method; and, “seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic”[37] he was the first to write a systematic refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as Shahrastānī, 'Al-Rāzī and Al-Ishrāqī. The following passage indicates his attitude as a thinker: -

“From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question”[38] . He examined afterwards, all the various claimants of “Certain Knowledge” and finally found it in Ṣūfīism.

With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash’arite, rigid monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the human soul. Al-Ghazālī alone seriously took up the problem, and to this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufī pantheism and the Ash'arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, according to Al-Al-Ghazālī, perceives things. But perception as an attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnūn,[39] he explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God and the individual soul. Al-Ghāzalī, there-fore, realised the Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the ultimate nature of the soul.

He is generally included among the Ash'arite. But strictly speaking he is not an Ash'ārite; though he admitted that the Ash'arite mode of thought was excellent for the masses. “He held”, says Shiblī ('Ilmal-Kalām, p. 66.), “that the secret of faith could not be revealed; for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash'arite theology, and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish the results of his private reflection”. Such an attitude towards the Ash'arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzī, Qāḍī'Iyāḍ, and other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him as one of the “misguided”; and 'Iyāḍ went even so far as to order the destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that existed in Spain.

It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of nature. In spite of Nazzām's theory of “Atomic objectification”,[40] the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; that of the Ash'arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The God-intoxicated Ṣūfī who stands aloof from the Theological controversies of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God - a higher notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. “Wooden-legged” Rationalism, as the Ṣūfī called it, speaks its last word in the sceptic Al-Ghazāli, whose restless soul, after long and hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufīism over all the rival speculative tendencies of the time.

Al-Ghazalī's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, however, is found in his little book - Mishkātal-Anwār where he starts with the Ouranic verse, “God is the light of heavens and earth”, and instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a vigorous expounder in Al-Ishrāqī. Light, he teaches in this book, is the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: “it is attributed to manifestation which is a relation”[41] . The Universe was created out of

darkness on which God sprinkled[42] his own light, and made its different parts more or less visible according as they received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, for this reason, the Prophet is named “The Burning Lamp” in the Qur'ān.

The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishrāgī's “Philosophy of Illumination” - Hikmatal-Ishrāq.

Such is the Ash'arite philosophy.

One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual results of the Ash'arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two: -

(I). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall see presently.

(2). In the beginning of the loth century when the Ash'arite had almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Birūnī[43] (d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[44] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could have existed, but could not have been logically justified before Al-Ash'arī.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] During the 'Abbāsid Period there were many who secretly held Manichaeism opinions, See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See also Al-Mu'tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu'l-Hudhail and Ṣālih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 133

[2] The Muctazilas belonged to various nationalities, and many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wāṣil Ibn 'Atā - the reported founder of the sect - was a Persian (Browne, Lit. His., Vol. I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad period. Mu'tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. 283) that Shiite and Qādarī tenets, indeed, often went together, and the Shiite doctrine current in Persia at the present day is in many respects Mu'tazilite, while ῌasan Al-Ash'arī, the great opponent of the Mu'tazilite, is by the Shiites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the greater representatives of the Mu'tazila opinion were Shi'as by religion, e. g. Abu 'l-Hudhan (Al-Mu'tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of Al-Ash'ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn 'Asākir ed. Mehren), so that it does not seem o be quite justifiable to describe the Ath'arite mode of thought as a purely semitic movement.

[3] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 34.

[4] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu'tazilitischer Kalām - Wien 1872, p. 13.

[5] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also Steiner - Die Mutaziliten, p.59.

[6] Ibn ῌazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also Shahrāstānī:

Cureton's ed., p. 42.

[7] Steiner: Die Mu'taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p.57.

[8] Ibid. P.59.

[9] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p.38.

[10] Ibn ῌazm (ed. Cairo):Vol-V, 42.

[11] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38.

[12] Steiner: Die Mu'taziliten, p.80.

13] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38.

[14] Ibn ῌazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197.

[15] Ibid. Vol. IV, p. 194.

[16] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 44.

[17] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: “Kitābul Masā'il fil khilāf beyn al-Baṣriyyīn wal Baghdādiyyīn”.

[18] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161.

[19] Ibn Ham in his Kitāb al-Milal, looks upon the heretical sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams, pp. 10 where this learned Arab historian of Cordova is quoted at length.

[20] Sharastānī: Cureton's ed: p. 149.

[21] Jāwidān Kabfr, fol. 149a.

[22] Ibid. fol. 280a.

[23] Ibid. fol. 366b

[24] Ibid. fol. 155b.

[25] Ibid. fol. 382a.

[26] Extracts from Ibn ‘Asākir (Mehren) - Travaux de la troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes - p. 261.

[27] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash'arl, pp. 42, 43. See also Ibn Khallikān (Gottingen 1839) - Al-Jubba'l, where the story of their controversy is given.

[28] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII.

[29] Shahrastānī - ed. Cureton, p. 69.

[30] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash'aritenthums. (Huitiéme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82)

[31] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des As'aritenthums. (Huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes IIme Partie 1893, p. 113).

[32] See Macdonald's admirable account of The Ash'arite Meta-physics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulānā Shiblī, 'Ilmal Kalām pp. 60, 72.

[33] “Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being”. Höffding Vol. II, p. 516.

[34] Shiblī 'Ilmal-Kalām pp. 64, 72.

[35] Shahrastānī, ed. Cureton, p. 82.

[36] “It (Al-Ghazālī's work on the Revivication of the sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the Discourse sue la methode of Descartes, that had any translation of it existed in in the days of Descartes everyone would have cried against the plagiarism”. (Lewes's History of Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50).

[37] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. 103.

[38] Al-Munqidh p. 3.

[39] See Sir Sayyid Al}mad's criticism of A1-Ghazālf's view of the soul, Al-Nazrufī ba'di Masāili-1 Imāmi-1 humām Abu Hāmid A1-GhazālI; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra).

[40] Ibn ῌazm, Vol. V. p. 63, 64. where the author states and criticises this theory.

[41] Mishkātal-Anwar, fol. 3a.

[42] In support of this view Al-Ghazalt quotes a tradition of the prophet. Ibid. fol. 10a.

[43] He (Al-Birūnī) quotes with approval the following, as the teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot know. From this we gather what Al-Birūnī's Philosophy was: only sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146).

[44] “Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that which was presented as material for the faculties of sense-perception; and which received it from the understanding, being thus the logically elaborated perception”. (Boer's Philosophy in Islām, p. 15o).

CHAP. III. THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM

§ I. The Metaphysics of Rationalism - Materialism

The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, mysticism, heresy - forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so we find the epoch under consideration.

The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise of the 'Abbāsid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious fervour, leārned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the first half of the 8th century we find Wāṣil Ibn 'Atā - a Persian disciple of the famous theologian Ḥasan of Basra - starting Mu'tazilaism (Rationalism) - that most interesting movement which engaged some of the subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen metaphysical controversies of Baghdād and Basra. The famous city of Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the play-ground of various forces - Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic ideas, Manichaeism[1] - which furnished ample spiritual food to the inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the Mu'tazila thinkers, gradually[2] drifted into metaphysics with which alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history of the Mu'tazila Kalām; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu'tazila view of Islām. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are the only āspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here.

His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu'tazila eventually arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of His nature. The Mu'tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the abstract divine Principle. “God”, says Abu'l-Hudhail, “is knowing, all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His very essence (dhāt)”[3] . In order to explain the pure unity of God Joseph Al-Baṣīr[4] lays down the following five principles: -

(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident.

(2). The necessary supposition of a creator.

(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Aḥwāl) of God.

(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God.

(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes.

This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the hands of Mu'ammar and Abu Hāshim it became a mere abstract possibility about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate knowledge of God,[5] for His knowledge must be of something in Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is equally impossible. Aḥmad and Faḍl[6] - disciples of Nazzām, however, recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are two - God - the eternal principle; and the word of God - Jesus Christ - the contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth in the second alternative suggested by Mu'ammar, was reserved, as we shall see, for later Sufī thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law.

But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which their opponents - the Ash'arite - afterwards modified to fit in with their own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzām chiefly consisted in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of nature.[7] The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jāhiz to define Will in a purely negative manner.[8] Though the Rationalist thinkers did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzām taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the distinction between substance and accident.[9] Existence was regarded as a quality super-imposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. Muhammad Ibn 'Uthmān, one of the Mu'tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn ῌazm,[10] maintained that the non‑existent (atom in its pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is it said to be created. Sub-stance, then, is a collection of qualities - taste, odour, colour - which, in themselves, are nothing more than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[11] (Ṭafra). The individuality of a thing which is defined as “that of which something can be predicated”[12] is not an essential factor in its notion. The collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the perceptible plurality - the Universe.

The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up falls down on account of its own indwelling property.[13] God, says Al-'Aṭṭār of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu'tamir, did not create colour, length, breadth, taste or smell - all these are activities of bodies themselves.[14] Even the number of things in the Universe is not known to God[15] . Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir further explained the properties of bodies by what he called “Tawallud” - interaction of bodies.[16] Thus it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and theologically deists.

To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible. There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Oāsim of Balkh regards them as similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar to each other, we do not necssarily mean that they are similar in all their attributes. Abu'l-Oāsim further differs from Nazzān in advocating the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The attribute of “Baqā” (continued existence), he says, does not give to its subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Oāsim, however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, that the essence or atom (Māhiyyat) could not remain essence in a state of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It is obvious that Abu'l-Qāsim here approaches the Ash'arite theory of knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of matter.

§ II. Contemporary Movements of Thought

Side by side with the development of Mu'tazilaism we see, as is natural in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly: -

I. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as Ibn AShras and Al-Jāhiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jāhiz who inclined to deistic naturalism,[18] is that of a cultured man of the time, and not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reation against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are incapable of reflecting on articles of faith.

2. Ṣūfīism - an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first systematised by Dhu'l-Nūn, and became more and more deepened and antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the Ash’arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the following chapter.

3. The revival of authority - Isma'īlianisma movement characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity between the methods practised by the Isma'īlian missionaries and those of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa - Brethren of Purity - suggests some sort of secret relation between the two institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views - a necessary consequence of speculative activity - is apt to invoke forces which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imāmat think in the same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma īliams, while making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to all sorts of thinking.

The Ismailia movement then is one aspect of the persistent battle[19] which the intellectually

independent Persian waged against the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the Shiite religion, the Ismaīlia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan character with 'Abdulla ibn Maimūn - the probable progenitor of the Fātimid Caliphs of Egypt - who died about the same time when Al-ASh'arī, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of Imāmat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sūfīism, Manichaeism, Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived Ismā'īlian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually revealed to the initiated, by the “Leader” - the ever Incarnating Universal Reason - according to the intellectual development of the age in which he incarnated himself. In the Ismā'īlian movement, Freethought, apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge past, present and future.

The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the Ismā'īlian Church which counted among its followers some of the best heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere local and temporary character. Ismā'īlianism, in spite of its almost entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought - Bābism - is essentially Ismā'īlian in its character.

To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'ān calls “Amt.” (word of God) as distinguished from the “Khalq” (creation of God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they consided themselves to have solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his followers.

In order to find an answer to the question, “What is plurality?” the Ismaīlia refer to what they consider a netaphysical axiom - “that from one only one can proceed”. But the one which proceeds, is not something completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe - the scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality of the “Leader” who illuminates the soul in pro-portion to its experience and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process of disintegration ensues. “Particles constituting the Universe fall off from each other - those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises diversity”[20] . This is but briefly the Ism Līlian Philosophy - a mixture, as Sharastānī remarks,. of Philosophical and Manichaean ideas - which. by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods.

The Ismā'īlian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of the Qur'ān - a method which was afterwards adopted by Sūfīism. With them the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further modifications; until in the ῌurūfī sect (an offshoot of the Ismā'īlia), in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Ṣūfīism on the one hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The “Be”, maintained the Hurūfīs, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to further creation - the word externalised. “But for the ‘word' the recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since Divinity is beyond the reach of sense - perception”[21] . The ‘word', therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[22] in order to manifest the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's ‘word', in which He is immanent.[23] Every sound in the Universe is within God; every atom is singing the song of eternity;[24] all is life. Those who want to

discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek “the named” through the Name,[25] which at once conceals and reveals its subject.

§ III. Reaction against Rationalism - The Ash'arīte

Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of 'Abbās, Rationalism continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash’arī (b. 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was a pupil of Al-Jubbā'ī[26] - the representative of the younger school of Mu’tazilaism in Basra - with whom he had many controversies[27] which eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid farewell to the Mu'tazila camp. “The fact”. says Spitta, “that Al-Ash'arī was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu'tazilite speculation, the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who was orthodox as a boy and a Mu'tazila as a young man”.[28] The Mu'tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jāḥiz) tended to be absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash'arī was an attempt not only to purge Islām of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence the reaction.

The orthodox reaction led by the Ash'arite then was, in reality, nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power of acquiring[29] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Dīn Rāzī, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by Tūsī and Qutbal-Dīn, does away with the idea of “acquisition”, and openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the Qur'ān. The Mātarīdiyya - another school of anti-rationalist theology, founded by Abu Manṣūr Mātarīdī a native of Mātarīd in the environs of Samarqand - went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in opposition to the Ash'arite, that man has absolute control over his activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. Al-Ash'arīs interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate nature of reality. Bāqilānī[30] therefore, made use of some purely metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in his Theo-logical investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the Qur'ān is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with plilosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves.

God, according to the Ash'arite, is the ultimate necessary existence which “carries its attributes in its own being”;[31] and whose existence (wujūd) and essence (Māhiyyat) are identical. Besides the argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle: -

(I). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for their empirical divergence.

(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either sub-stance or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash'arite theory of knowledge. To answer the question, “What is a thing?” they subjected to a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in themselves.[32] They made no distinction of secondary and primary qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which the sub-stance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a process, Kant stopped at the idea of “Ding an sich”, but the Ash'arite endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[33] who, in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word “atom” by which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their own.

But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the Ash'arite Meta-physics, is their attitude towards the Law of Causation.[34] Just as they repudiated all the principles of optics[35] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The Ash'arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is deter-mined by God.

Any account of the Ash'arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a notice of the work of AI-Ghazālī (d. IIII A.D.) who though misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful ability anticipated Descartes[36] in his philosophical method; and, “seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic”[37] he was the first to write a systematic refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as Shahrastānī, 'Al-Rāzī and Al-Ishrāqī. The following passage indicates his attitude as a thinker: -

“From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question”[38] . He examined afterwards, all the various claimants of “Certain Knowledge” and finally found it in Ṣūfīism.

With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash’arite, rigid monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the human soul. Al-Ghazālī alone seriously took up the problem, and to this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufī pantheism and the Ash'arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, according to Al-Al-Ghazālī, perceives things. But perception as an attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnūn,[39] he explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God and the individual soul. Al-Ghāzalī, there-fore, realised the Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the ultimate nature of the soul.

He is generally included among the Ash'arite. But strictly speaking he is not an Ash'ārite; though he admitted that the Ash'arite mode of thought was excellent for the masses. “He held”, says Shiblī ('Ilmal-Kalām, p. 66.), “that the secret of faith could not be revealed; for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash'arite theology, and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish the results of his private reflection”. Such an attitude towards the Ash'arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzī, Qāḍī'Iyāḍ, and other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him as one of the “misguided”; and 'Iyāḍ went even so far as to order the destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that existed in Spain.

It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of nature. In spite of Nazzām's theory of “Atomic objectification”,[40] the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; that of the Ash'arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The God-intoxicated Ṣūfī who stands aloof from the Theological controversies of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God - a higher notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. “Wooden-legged” Rationalism, as the Ṣūfī called it, speaks its last word in the sceptic Al-Ghazāli, whose restless soul, after long and hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufīism over all the rival speculative tendencies of the time.

Al-Ghazalī's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, however, is found in his little book - Mishkātal-Anwār where he starts with the Ouranic verse, “God is the light of heavens and earth”, and instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a vigorous expounder in Al-Ishrāqī. Light, he teaches in this book, is the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: “it is attributed to manifestation which is a relation”[41] . The Universe was created out of

darkness on which God sprinkled[42] his own light, and made its different parts more or less visible according as they received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, for this reason, the Prophet is named “The Burning Lamp” in the Qur'ān.

The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishrāgī's “Philosophy of Illumination” - Hikmatal-Ishrāq.

Such is the Ash'arite philosophy.

One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual results of the Ash'arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two: -

(I). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall see presently.

(2). In the beginning of the loth century when the Ash'arite had almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Birūnī[43] (d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[44] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could have existed, but could not have been logically justified before Al-Ash'arī.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] During the 'Abbāsid Period there were many who secretly held Manichaeism opinions, See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See also Al-Mu'tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu'l-Hudhail and Ṣālih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 133

[2] The Muctazilas belonged to various nationalities, and many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wāṣil Ibn 'Atā - the reported founder of the sect - was a Persian (Browne, Lit. His., Vol. I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad period. Mu'tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. 283) that Shiite and Qādarī tenets, indeed, often went together, and the Shiite doctrine current in Persia at the present day is in many respects Mu'tazilite, while ῌasan Al-Ash'arī, the great opponent of the Mu'tazilite, is by the Shiites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the greater representatives of the Mu'tazila opinion were Shi'as by religion, e. g. Abu 'l-Hudhan (Al-Mu'tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of Al-Ash'ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn 'Asākir ed. Mehren), so that it does not seem o be quite justifiable to describe the Ath'arite mode of thought as a purely semitic movement.

[3] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 34.

[4] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu'tazilitischer Kalām - Wien 1872, p. 13.

[5] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also Steiner - Die Mutaziliten, p.59.

[6] Ibn ῌazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also Shahrāstānī:

Cureton's ed., p. 42.

[7] Steiner: Die Mu'taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p.57.

[8] Ibid. P.59.

[9] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p.38.

[10] Ibn ῌazm (ed. Cairo):Vol-V, 42.

[11] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38.

[12] Steiner: Die Mu'taziliten, p.80.

13] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38.

[14] Ibn ῌazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197.

[15] Ibid. Vol. IV, p. 194.

[16] Shahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 44.

[17] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: “Kitābul Masā'il fil khilāf beyn al-Baṣriyyīn wal Baghdādiyyīn”.

[18] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161.

[19] Ibn Ham in his Kitāb al-Milal, looks upon the heretical sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams, pp. 10 where this learned Arab historian of Cordova is quoted at length.

[20] Sharastānī: Cureton's ed: p. 149.

[21] Jāwidān Kabfr, fol. 149a.

[22] Ibid. fol. 280a.

[23] Ibid. fol. 366b

[24] Ibid. fol. 155b.

[25] Ibid. fol. 382a.

[26] Extracts from Ibn ‘Asākir (Mehren) - Travaux de la troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes - p. 261.

[27] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash'arl, pp. 42, 43. See also Ibn Khallikān (Gottingen 1839) - Al-Jubba'l, where the story of their controversy is given.

[28] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII.

[29] Shahrastānī - ed. Cureton, p. 69.

[30] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash'aritenthums. (Huitiéme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82)

[31] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des As'aritenthums. (Huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes IIme Partie 1893, p. 113).

[32] See Macdonald's admirable account of The Ash'arite Meta-physics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulānā Shiblī, 'Ilmal Kalām pp. 60, 72.

[33] “Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being”. Höffding Vol. II, p. 516.

[34] Shiblī 'Ilmal-Kalām pp. 64, 72.

[35] Shahrastānī, ed. Cureton, p. 82.

[36] “It (Al-Ghazālī's work on the Revivication of the sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the Discourse sue la methode of Descartes, that had any translation of it existed in in the days of Descartes everyone would have cried against the plagiarism”. (Lewes's History of Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50).

[37] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. 103.

[38] Al-Munqidh p. 3.

[39] See Sir Sayyid Al}mad's criticism of A1-Ghazālf's view of the soul, Al-Nazrufī ba'di Masāili-1 Imāmi-1 humām Abu Hāmid A1-GhazālI; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra).

[40] Ibn ῌazm, Vol. V. p. 63, 64. where the author states and criticises this theory.

[41] Mishkātal-Anwar, fol. 3a.

[42] In support of this view Al-Ghazalt quotes a tradition of the prophet. Ibid. fol. 10a.

[43] He (Al-Birūnī) quotes with approval the following, as the teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot know. From this we gather what Al-Birūnī's Philosophy was: only sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146).

[44] “Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that which was presented as material for the faculties of sense-perception; and which received it from the understanding, being thus the logically elaborated perception”. (Boer's Philosophy in Islām, p. 15o).


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