Book Review: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by Alasdair MacIntyre
Author: Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen
Publisher: Ahlul Bayt World Assembly
Category: Western Philosophy
Author: Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen
Publisher: Ahlul Bayt World Assembly
Category: Western Philosophy
www.alhassanain.org/english
Book Review: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by AlasdairMacIntyre
Authors(s): Dr. MuhammadLegenhausen
Journal: Vol.14, N.2
Publisher(s):Ahlul Bayt World Assembly
www.alhassanain.org/english
One of the most important issues in Islamic social and political thought since the nineteenth century has been the confrontation of traditional Muslim societies with European modernism, and one of the most important facets of modernism about which Muslim thinkers are concerned is that of political liberalism.MacIntyre's writings are interesting in this context because, like many Muslims, he is very strongly opposed to many aspects of modernism and liberalism for what turn out to be ultimately religious reasons.
Notice:
This version is published on behalf of www.alhassanain.org/english
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Table of Contents
Book Review: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by Alasdair MacIntyre 6
Introduction 6
After Virtue 9
Relativism 10
Liberalism 15
Religion 19
History 21
Notes 23
Book Review: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by AlasdairMacIntyre
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, 410 pp, index.
Introduction
This is an important book, a book with which Muslims, in particular, need to become acquainted. The author,
AlasdairMacIntyre , is one of the most profound and most controversial moralists and social thinkers of our time.
The book,Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Is not an easy work it requires some familiarity with various details of Western culture, in particular its moral and political philosophies.
So, rather than merely summarize the work, I will try to show why I think it is important for Muslim thinkers to read and criticize it. For thispurpose I begin with a general discussion of the work's importance in the context ofMacIntyre's other writings, and then turn to two of the major topics discussed in the work, relativism and liberalism. Finally, I offer some humble criticisms of my own, and suggestions for further research.
Of all those who have stood against the currents of modernism, AlasdairMacIntyre stands out as the philosopher who has offered the most profound critique. HisAfter Virtue , which was first published in 1981, sent shock waves through the Western intellectual world.1 He committed what for many was an unforgivable sin whenheclaimed that the project of the Enlightenment period of European thought was a failure.
This rejection of modernist thinking was focused upon moral philosophy, but it attracted the attention of a readership much wider than what could be expected for a book in ethics.
There were even articles in the popular press about the revival of Aristotelian thought initiated byMacIntyre's work, and in the article on the history of twentieth century Anglo-American Ethics in the Encyclopedia of Ethics, AlanDonagan predicts thatMacIntyre's attention to Thomistic thought will influence the philosophical work to be done in the Twenty first century.2
MacIntyre's work has also sparked controversy among political theorists and social critics, as well as professional philosophers.3 Conferences have been convened to discuss his ideas, critical studies of his work have been compiled, and several of his books and articles have been translated into foreign languages.
In the field of ethics,MacIntyre has spawned a revival of interest in Aristotelian ethics with such force that it is now generally recognized as a serious rival to the two major strands of moral philosophy that have been dominant in the West since the Enlightenment utilitarianism and Kantianism. Numerous books and articles have been written since the publication ofAfter Virtue proclaiming the advantages of an Aristotelian virtue ethics over utilitarian consequentialism and Kantian deontology.
In political theory, there has been a steady stream of writings in which liberalism is defended againstMacIntyre’s criticisms, or those criticisms are elaborated, often in the form of a communitarian theory whichMacIntyre himself has repudiated.4
In religious thought,MacIntyre's work has prompted a renewed interest in Neo-Thomism, especially as it is related to ethics and social political thought.
MacIntyre's emphasis on the importance of history has also led to heated discussions in which he has often been accused of being a relativist. It was largely in response to this sort of misunderstanding which followed the publication ofAfter Virtue thatMacIntyre was motivated to write the sequel,Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
MacIntyre's rejections of historicism and relativism in this latter work have also contributed to the depth of the discussions of these issues.
So, one reason for readingMacIntyre is because his work has been tremendously influential, even among those who disagree with his positions. Another reason would be interest in the topics he discusses: history, politics, ethics, religion, epistemology, philosophy in general and the relations among them. For Muslims, however, there are additional reasons to readMacIntyre .
One of the most important issues in Islamic social and political thought since the nineteenth century has been the confrontation of traditional Muslim societies with European modernism, and one of the most important facets of modernism about which Muslim thinkers are concerned is that of political liberalism. Muslims who argue that liberal ideals and institutions are compatible with Islam are usually classified as modernists.
At the other extreme are those who would claim that liberal and Islamic thought agree on nothing. The vast majority of Muslim intellectuals and scholars, however, fall somewhere between these extremes. The interesting discussion in contemporary Muslim social thought is not over whether modernists or conservatives hold a more defensible position, but what aspects of liberal thought may be accommodated and what aspects must be rejected.
MacIntyre's writings are interesting in this context because, like many Muslims, he is very strongly opposed to many aspects of modernism and liberalism for what turn out to be ultimately religious reasons. Furthermore, the philosophical perspective he seeks to defend, a form of Neo Thomism with a strong emphasis on Aristotle, is more similar to the philosophical perspective of traditional Islamic thought than are any of the other major tendencies to be found among contemporary Western philosophers.
Of course, there remain important differences between the attitudes of Muslims and those expressed byMacIntyre , to be discussed below, but regardless of our differences, the thought of the most profound critic of modernism and liberalism in the West should be of great interest to those who feel a need to resist the imposition of modernist and liberal thought on Muslim societies, such as those inspired by the warnings of the Grand Leader of the Islamic Revolution against the `cultural invasion.'
Muslim liberals who await a repetition of the European Enlightenment in Islamic culture would also be well advised to readMacIntyre , who has declared the Enlightenment project to be a failure and ultimately incoherent.
Perhaps if Muslim modernists would readMacIntyre they would become more critical of the claims made on behalf of liberalism, and would come to recognize the need to examine the intellectual history of their own traditions, as well as those of the West, to find the way forward. PerhapsMacIntyre's books can serve as a kind of vaccination against the infatuation with Western culture which Persians callgharbzadigi .
After Virtue
The book which initially provoked the great storm of controversy wasAfter Virtue , and in order to understand the true significance ofWhose Justice? Which Rationality? One must understand something about the earlier work.
After Virtue begins with the disquieting suggestion that moral discourse in the West has lost its meaning, that it serves as a disguise for the expression of preferences, attempts to gain power, emotionsandattitudes , but that it has ceased to have any relation to what is truly good or right.
MacIntyre pins responsibility for the collapse of Western ethics on the Enlightenment. Much of the book goes on to criticize various aspect of Enlightenment thought in Hume, Kant, the Utilitarian’s, theemotivists , and in contemporary liberal political philosophy, especially as elaborated by John Rawls.5
MacIntyre sees only two ways to pass beyond the errors of modernism and liberalism: either we must accept a Nietzschean nihilism or we must return to an Aristotelian ethics. However, the Aristotelian alternative is not a simple return to Greek or medieval systems of thought. For the Enlightenment criticisms of scholasticism to be successfully answered, the return must be to a reformed Aristotelianism consonant with modern science.
This means that the telos or end of man is not to be understood as determined by biology, rather it is to be fathomed by reflection on history, and the human practices and traditions that have evolved over the course of history. The second half ofAfter Virtue consists inMacIntyre's elaboration of this historically grounded Aristotelianism and its development as a theory of the virtues.
Relativism
Like the Nietzschean critics of the arrogance of the Enlightenment,MacIntyre accepts that there is no absolute standpoint from which we can arrive at absolute moral truths. Each of us must view the world from his own position in history and society. It is this admission that led many critics ofAfter Virtue to accuse him of relativism or historicism, and it is largely in response to this criticism thatWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Was written.
Unlike the Nietzscheans, or genealogists asMacIntyre refers6 to thoseoften called post- modernists,MacIntyre does not accept the claim that because we are bound to our finite perspectives conditioned by history and social position, we are barred from certainty or absolute truth.
Rather, he holds that man has the ability to understand rival perspectives even when one cannot be translated into the idiom of the other. On the basis of this understanding, rational evaluation and judgment can be made with regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the rival world views and ideologies.
MacIntyre extends this discussion inWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Beyond ethics, which was the focus of his attention inAfter Virtue , to the very principles of rationality, thus bringing the insights of his ethical thought to bear on epistemology.
There are two major themes developed in Whose Justice? WhichRationality?: first, there is a continuation of the critique of liberalism found inAfter Virtue coupled with an affirmation of a religious perspective and second, there is a rejection of relativism coupled with an insistence on the significance of historical considerations for the adjudication of disputes across traditions.
When two traditions of thought are so different that what is considered self-evident or obvious in one tradition is considered dubious or incomprehensible in the other, the very principles of reason come under question. In contemporary Western thought, what are often considered to be principles of reason are those which have proven indispensable to the natural sciences and mathematics.
If one wants to judge whether this view of rationality is correct or that, for example, found in the works of Muslim philosophers, one must be very careful to avoid begging the question by using the very principles in one's evaluation that are under dispute. Relativists have considered such controversies to be irresolvable.
They claim that we are stuck inside our own world views, unable to make judgments on any of them.MacIntyre distinguishes two forms of relativism, which he terms relativist andperspectivalist . The relativist claims that there can be no rationality as such, but only rationality relative to the standards of some particular tradition.
Theperspectivalist claims that the central beliefs of a tradition are not to be considered as true or false, but as providing different, complementary perspectives for envisaging the realities about which they speak to us.MacIntyre argues that both the relativist and theperspectivalist are wrong. They are wrong because they fail to admit the absolute timeless character of the truth, and would replace truth by what is often called warrantedassertibility .
Instead of truth, they hold that the best we can attain is the right or warrant to assert various statements in various circumstances. Macintyre’s solution to the problem of how to reach absolute truth from a historically limited position is that attention to history itself may reveal the superiority of one tradition over another with respect to a given topic.
To have passed through an epistemological crisis successfully enables the adherents of a tradition of enquiry to rewrite its history in a more insightful way and such a history of a particular tradition provides not only a way of identifying the continuities in virtue of which that tradition of enquiry has survived and flourished as one and the same tradition.
But also of identifying more accurately that structure of justification which underpins whatever claims to truth are made within it, claims which are more and other than claims to warranted assertibility.7 The concept of warrantedassertibility always has application only at some particular time and place in respect of standards then prevailing at some particular stage in the development of a tradition of enquiry.
And a claim that such and such iswarrantedly assertible always, therefore, has to make implicit or explicit references to such times and places. The concept of truth, however, is timeless.8
MacIntyre argues that since a tradition can fail to pull through an epistemological crisis on its own standards, the relativist is wrong if he thinks that each tradition must always vindicate itself.MacIntyre further argues that there are cases of cultural encounter in which one must come to admit the superiority of an alien culture in some regard, because it explains why the crisis occurred and does not suffer from the same defects present in one's own culture.
It is in this way that the people of Rome could come to accept Christianity, and the people of Iran, Islam.Eachpeople saw that their own traditions had reached a point of crisis, a point at which further progress could only be made by the adoption of a new religion. The relativist claims that there is no way in which a tradition can enter into rational debate with another, “But if this were so, then there could be no good reason to give one's allegiance to the standpoint of any one tradition rather to that of any other.9
To the contrary,MacIntyre claims that the question of which tradition to which one is to give one's allegiance is far from arbitrary, and the intellectual struggle of all those who have changed their minds about the correctness of an intellectual or spirit” tradition is more than ample evidence that the question, “Which side are you on?” is one which requires rational evaluation, however much other factors may come into play.
PerhapsMacIntyre is reflecting here on his own brief membership in the Communist Party and subsequent rejection of Marxism and conversion to Catholicism. One who adopts an intellectual position must always ask himself if it can adequately respond to criticism, criticism which can mount to produce what may be termed an epistemological crisis. “It is in respect of their adequacy or inadequacy in their responses to epistemological crises that traditions are vindicated or fail to be vindicated.”10
MacIntyre also argues that the position of the relativist is self-defeating. The relativist pretends to issue his challenge from a neutral ground where different traditions may be compared and truth may be proclaimed relative to each of them. But this is as much a claim to absolute truth as any other.
This argument and others similar to it which are to be found inWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Have provoked penetrating criticism. John Haldane has argued that one need not assume that there is some neutral ground from which to issue the relativist claim.11 Within an intellectual tradition, one may observe that there are other incommensurable traditions and decide that relativism best explains this.
MacIntyre accepts Haldane's point, admitting that the case against relativism inWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Needs to be amended at the same time, 'he points out that within every major intellectual tradition, various claims are presented about morals and rationality as absolutely true. The problem is then raised as to how this anti-relativistic commitment to truth can coexist with the recognition of rival intellectual traditions with their different standards of rationality and morality.
MacIntyre's solution is that common standards are to be sought, even where none exist, by dialectical interchange between the rival viewpoints. One tradition of inquiry will be in a position to uphold the truth of its claims against rivals in which those claims are not recognized when it develops the intellectual apparatus to explain the rival viewpoint, and why the disagreement has arisen, and why the rival is incorrect.
In other words, through intellectual conflict between traditions, a tradition can vindicate itself only when it can enrich its own conceptual resources sufficiently to explain the errors of its rivals. This kind of conflict and progress is only possible when there is a commitment to finding the truth.
With relativism there can be no intellectual advancement, because there is no attempt made to adjudicate among different theoretical viewpoints, and without the attempt to reach a more comprehensive position in which truth and falsity can be distinguished, traditions cannot evolve rationally, nor can they maintain their previous truth claims.
MacIntyre sees relativism as tempting those who despair of intellectual advancement, and for the sake of intellectual advancement, he sees it as a temptation that must be avoided.
MacIntyre dismisses the perspectivist position with the rebuff, “theirs is not so much a conclusion about truth as exclusion from it and thereby from rational debate.”12 Theperspectivalist , like the reductive religious pluralist, states that rival traditions provide different views of the same reality, and none can be considered absolutely true or false.
MacIntyre objects that the traditions really do conflict with one another, and the fact that they are rivals itself bears testimony to their substantive disagreements over what is true and false. The claim that there is no ultimate truth of the matter is really just a way of avoiding the work that needs to be done in order to determine exactly where and in what respects in each of the rival traditions.
The truth lies, and when the differences in the rivals is so deep that the very principles of rationality are called into question, the rivalry produces an epistemological crisis, but even here, the need and duty to provide a rational evaluation of the rivals remains.
MacIntyre contends that epistemological crisis occurs when different traditions with different languages confront one another. Those who learn to think in both languages come to the understanding that there are things in one language for which the other does not have the expressive resources, and thereby they discover a flaw in the deficient tradition.
In this way he shows how rational evaluation of different traditions is possible, although this evaluation itself must begin from within a specific tradition. His emphasis on the fact that the starting point of our inquiry is tradition-bound is comparable to a common theme among writers in the hermeneutic tradition, such as Gadamer.
The fantasy of universal standards of reason to which all rational beings must submit by virtue of being rational has been abandoned. This separatesMacIntyre from traditional writers, as Thomas McCarthy has observed,Even arguments like AlasdairMacIntyre's for the superiority of premodern traditions are not themselves traditional arguments but the traditionalistic arguments ofhyperreflexive modems.13
What distinguishesMacIntyre from others who share his sensitivity to context dependency is his robust sense of the truth. The incommensurability of competing traditions, according toMacIntyre , is not as absolute as some have imagined.
Logic retains authority, even if its principles are disputed, and what is sought is truth, and although he rejects correspondence theories of truth that would pair judgments to facts (because he considers the concept of fact to be an invention of seventeenth-century European thought), the theory of truth to which he gives his allegiance is still a correspondence theory.14
In response to a sympathetic comparison between his position and views current among certain philosophers of science,MacIntyre objects.
I had hoped that what I had said about truth in enquiry in Chapter 18 ofWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Would have made it adequately clear that I regard any attempt to eliminate the notion of truth from that of enquiry as bound to fail. It is in part for this reason that I regard the Nietzschean tradition as always in danger of lapsing into fatal incoherence.15
MacIntyre's solution to the problem of relativism is especially important for Muslims because it offers a way to break the deadlock between Muslim intellectuals who, over impressed with the intellectual traditions of the West, deny that Islam asserts any absolute truths that man is capable of grasping, and those `Mama' who insist on theself evidence of the fundamental troths of their own traditions.
Without seeing that such claims are ineffective against rival systems of thought in which there are profound
differences about what, if anything is to be considered self-evident. The solutionMacIntyre offers is one in which there is hope that the absolute truths of Islam can be rationally defended against opponents as certain, butonlyby developing the Islamic intellectual traditions to the point that they are able to explain the successes as well as the failures of their rivals.
Liberalism
MacIntyre's disappointment with liberalism is more extensive and more profound than that of other Western critics more extensive because it applies to the political theories of both the left and the right, more profound because it traces the failings of liberalism to its origins in the Enlightenment, and traces the injustice of the modern nation-state to its very essence.
As RonaldBeiner observes what makesMacIntyre unique is that for him the problem is not merely individualism or liberalism but modernity as such.Therefore he includes even Marxism within the scope of his critique.16
In some ways,MacIntyre's rejection of liberalism is similar to his rejection of relativism. Just as the relativist contradicts himself if he would proclaim the absolute truth of the proposition that there are no absolute truths, the liberal contradicts himself by proclaiming neutrality between all ideologies, when, in fact, liberalism itself is an ideology.
Liberalism is an intellectual tradition as ideological as any other, and it allows for scholarly inquiry only after initiation into accepted modes of appraisal which deny the worth of serious challenges to liberalism itself.
Just as Haldane argued that the relativist need not claim that relativism is absolutely true, independent of any tradition, defenders of liberalism have responded toMacIntyre's criticism of liberalism by admitting that liberalism is an ideology, that it is not absolutely neutral.17
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre responds that liberalism is a defective and ultimately incoherent ideology. His insight into the defects of liberalism is one which was first expressed in his first book, Marxism an Interpretation, which was written when he was onlytwenty three years old.
In the revised edition of this workMacIntyre emphasizes the need for an ideology on the scale of Christianity or Marxism that can offer an interpretation of human existence by means of which people can situate themselves in the world and direct their actions to ends that transcend their own immediate situations. He argues that liberalism is an ideology that cannot function effectively as such.
The axis about which the failure of liberalism turns is its assertion of the fact/value gap.18 Liberalism fails as an ideology because it does not permit one to discover one's own identity and appropriate ends by gaining knowledge of nature and society, or by understanding human existence in relation to al-Haqq, the Exalted.
In liberalism, all values are personal except the value of respecting personal values, and this is simply not sufficient to orient one's life. Modernism inhibits orientation because from the point of view of modern liberalism, religious traditions seem irrational.
The standards of rationality to which the religious traditions of enquiry appeal are so different from those which dominate the natural and social sciences in the West today that traditional and modernist ways of thinking have become nearly mutually incomprehensible.
Nevertheless, a tradition may come to be rationally accepted by those who live within the horizons of Western liberal culture once they come to recognize themselves as imprisoned by a set of beliefs which lack justification in precisely the same way and to the same extent as do the positions which they reject but also to understand themselves as hitherto deprived of what tradition affords, as persons in part constituted as what they are up to this point by an absence, by what is from the standpoint of traditions an impoverishment.19
The impoverishment of whichMacIntyre speaks here is one which Islam excels at eradicating. What the individual posited by liberal theory lacks is an effective ideology to provide understanding and purpose on the basis of which communities can be established.
Modern liberal thinkers imagine themselves to be independent, butMacIntyre charges that from an Aristotelian point of view they have refused to learn or have been unable to learn that “one cannot think for oneself if one thinks entirely by oneself,” and that it is only by participation in rational practice-based community that one becomes truly rational.
MacIntyre admits that this kind of recognition amounts to a sort of conversion. Individuals at the point of conversion will invite a tradition of enquiry to furnish them with a kind ofself knowledge which they have not as yet possessed by first providing them with an awareness of the specific character of their own incoherence and then accounting for the particular character of this incoherence by its metaphysical, moral, and political scheme of classification and explanation.
The catalogs of virtues and vices, the norms of conformity and deviance, the accounts of educational success and failure, the narratives of possible types of human life which each tradition has elaborated in its own terms, all the invite the individual educated into self-knowledge of his or her own incoherence to acknowledge in which of these rival modes of moral understanding he or she finds him or herself most adequately explained and accounted for.20
Not only doesMacIntvre explain how someone in a liberal society may evolve to the point of being able to convert to a religious tradition, his astute observations regarding the logic of liberal thought also helps to illuminate the West's failure to understand the current Islamic movement and its hostility towards it. The liberal's moral analysis is one which begins by abstracting the claims to be debated from their contexts in tradition, and then proceeds with an evaluation of rational justifiability which is supposed to convince any rational person.
The liberal fantasy of universal progress implies that the most rational standards are those which dominate the most recent trends of its own thought. To the extent that Muslims are unwilling to adopt the standards of modernism, they are thought to be irrational. Islamic intellectual traditions are taken to be more or less the same as what the West progressed beyond when it abandoned medieval scholasticism.
The caricature of Islam drawn by the liberal West requires neglect of the particularities of character, history, and circumstance. This makes it impossible to engage in the kind of rational dialogue which could move through argumentative evaluation to the rational acceptance or rejection of a tradition. Thus, the kind of debate which is enforced in the public forums of enquiry in modern liberal culture for the most part effectively precludes the voices of tradition outside liberalism from being heard.
Materialistic consumerism is a direct result of the liberal's pretense of neutrality. Since all the citizens of the liberal state are supposed to be free to pursue their own happiness, and since despite their differences about what ultimate happiness is, the vast majority seem to be in agreement on the idea that its pursuit is aided by ever increasing acquisition and consumption, which goes by the euphemism of economic development,
It becomes nearly self-evident that it is in the national interests of the liberal state to pursue economic development.21 MacIntyre explains that those who adhere to the standpoint dominant in peculiarly modern societies recognize that acquisitiveness is a character trait indispensable to continuous and limitless economic growth, and one of their central beliefs is that continuous and limitless economic growth is a fundamental good.
That a systematically lower standard of living ought to be preferred to a systematically higher standard of living is a thought incompatible with either the economics or the politics of peculiarly modem societies. But a community which was guided by Aristotelian norms would not only have to view acquisitiveness as a vice but would have to set strict limits to growth insofar as that is necessary to preserve or enhance a distribution of goods according to desert.22
From the Aristotelian point of view advocated byMacIntyre , the problem with the modern liberal state goes way beyond its worldliness. There is no way,MacIntyre insists, for those who rule in a modern state to avoid doing injustice.
Modern nation states which masquerade as embodiments of community are always to be resisted. The modem nation state, in whatever guise, is a dangerous and unmanageable institution, presenting itself on the one hand as a bureaucratic supplier of goods and services, which is always about to, but never actually does, give its clients value for money, and on the other as a repository of sacred values, which from time to time invites one to lay down one's life on its behalf it is like being asked to die for the telephone company. To empower even the liberal state as a bearer of values always imperils those values.23
His criticism of the liberal state is so harsh that it could be mistaken for a form of anarchism was it not for the fact that he explicitly advises his readers to cooperate with the state by paying their taxes.
What sort of politics doesMacIntyre advocate?MacIntyre suggests that the focus of the political life of an Aristotelian of the sort he lauds should be “the family, the neighborhood, the workplace, the parish, and the school, or clinic, communities within which the needs of the hungry and the homeless can be met.”24
Are we then to leave the state to “the barbarians” mentioned at the close ofAfter Virtue ?25 And what are we to do about thehungey and homeless who live outside our parish? Is it not incumbent upon a religious society to take the reins of state power out of the hands of those who are driving it to ruin, even if the nation-state of its own momentum will not readily change course?
A more realistic political Aristotelianism than the one advocated byMacIntyre would not shun the need to shoulder the burden of the modern state in full recognition of its deficiencies and in the hope that it could be transformed into something better.MacIntyre does not see this as a live option because he seems to be thinking of Europe and the U.S.
Whereas the prospects for anything better than liberal government are unpromising, because the major alternative there to liberalism is nationalism, and nationalism easily degrades into fascist rage we have witnessed in the attempt to exterminate the Muslims of Bosnia. Within Muslim societies, however, there is an alternative to both nationalism and liberalism which is not taken seriously by Western theorists?
MacIntyre's retreat to the local takes the punch out of his critique of liberalism. Liberals do not oppose local associations with substantive ideologies, values and purposes. Liberal political theory is a theory ofgovernment , not of local voluntary associations. IfMacIntyre had announced at the start of his book that his quarrel with liberalism was over how local associations are to be organized, and not about government, it would not have attracted the attention it has.
Indeed, if one were to readWhose Justice? Which Rationality? from the start with the assumption that the
critique of liberalism was not to extend to liberal theories of government, much, of whatMacIntyre says would not make any sense. Consider the passage quoted above in which limits to economic growth are advocated.
What is at issue here is how whole societies conduct their economic affairs, and no matter how large and thriving the private sector of any society is, the role of governments in directing the economic affairs of the societies they rule is undeniable. So, whatMacIntyre is objecting to is the flaws of liberal governments and of liberal theories of how governments should conduct their affairs.
Here again,MacIntyre's work should be helpful for those engaged in the development of Islamic political theory. If we acceptMacIntyre's critique of the modern form of nation state, the creation of Islamicrepublics cannot be the ultimate goal of Islamic political activity, but only an intermediary stage in a development leading to more perfectly Islamic forms of governance, culminating in the governance of the Wali al-`Asr (ajtf ), may his emergence be hastened.
Religion
Muslims share a common cause with Western critics of liberalism, such asMacIntyre and others who have launched their criticisms from a religious standpoint. By examining thiswork it may even be discovered that this sort of criticism is more appropriate from an Islamic standpoint than from a Neo-Thomist one.
The alienation expressed byMacIntyre is a social one, but there are deeper forms of alienation, which from the religious point of view have their source in distance from God. The sort of communityMacIntyre seeks is one whose rival paradigms are those of the Christian Church and the Muslim ummah. But the source of the cohesion of these communities is their harmony with the divine order.
If the methods of evaluation of rival traditions as outlined byMacIntyre are to be employed to compare Christendom and the ummah, it will be necessary to examine the ways in which the intellectual traditions within the two communities have responded and continue to formulate responses to the challenge of liberal modernism.
For his own part,MacIntyre concludes that the Thomistic synthesis of Augustinian and Aristotelian thought has been confirmed in its encounter with other traditions. But the analysis he offers is not specific to the defense of Catholicism, but rather may be used to support various forms of traditional thought against the secular liberal scientism which prevails in the West.
Indeed, a major flaw in all ofMacIntyre's writings is that it fails to pay any attention to Islam at all. WhenMacIntyre compares competing traditions of liberal, Marxist and religious thought, the term religious can always be replaced by Christian without altering the intended meaning.26
Prior to his conversion to Neo-Thomism, which occurredsome time between the writing ofAfter Virtue andwhose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre could be scathingly critical of Christianity, even if, at the very same time, appreciative of its strengths.27
The weaknesses of Christianity to which he drew attention in his first book were its dogmatism and otherworldliness its inherent tendency to disown its own revolutionary vision, to circumscribe itself within the spiritual and to accommodate itself to the status quo, even if this meant tyranny Nothing inWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Explains how these criticisms are to be answered.
Islam, on the other hand, has not disowned its revolutionary vision, nor has it had an episode comparable to Galileo’s encounter with the Inquisition. This is not to deny that terrible injustices have been and continues to be perpetrated in the name of Islam, nor that fanatical intolerance has not marred doctrinal disputes among Muslims.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the dogmas accepted by Muslims have not prevented them from accepting the natural sciences or technology, nor from the adoption of Western social institutions when it has appeared (rightly or wrongly) rational to do so. It must also be admitted that the call for justice issued by Islam, particularly in its Shia version, retains its ability to inspire revolutionaryfervour .
The hope for a just society in this world has not been abandoned by Muslims. Because it began as a political no less than spiritual movement, Muslims cannot deny that Islam demands them to seek justice in the here and now. Because of the priority of the spiritual, however, Islam is able to provide the moral basis and orientation lacking in secular ideologies.
MacIntyre's failure to answer his own criticisms of Christianity have left at least one-Muslim reader with the impression that his work provides a better defense of Islam than it does for the Christianity he himself professes.
PartThree : Definition, Basis and Characteristics of Nationalism
Definition of Nationalism
'Patriotism' is the equivalent of nationalism. In Latin, 'natio ' and 'nitus ' means 'the place of birth'. Political scientists have given different definitions of nationalism.
Carlton Hayes says:
“A nation is an independent political group with a common world-view and cultural heritage1 .”
In this definition, a common political organization and cultural unityare considered as the main factors in forming a nation.
Hans Kohn says:
“The co-existence of a special group in a single realm is the factor for forming a nation.Being brought up in a natural and geographical environment creates the greatest unit of tribal solidarity between individuals. The group which on this basis feels a joint interest andexpediency, forms a nation2 .”
Luigo says:
“A nation is a collection of individuals who are joined together by the factor of territory, blood, language,culture or history3 .”
Salo Baron describes a nation as follows4 :
“The word 'nation' is applied to a group of people who live in the same land and are joined together by common political organizations.”
Kohn says of the characteristics of nationalism5 :
“A deep feeling of attachment to a homeland and absolute loyalty to it, and a sense of sharing its destiny are the basis of nationalism, which is genuine when no other factor checks the loyalty to the homeland.”
The American Encyclopedia defines nationalism as follows:
“Loyalty and attachment to a national unity are more significant than any other attachment in the question of nationalism. Other characteristics of nationalism are pride in the achievements of one's nation, a deep belief in the distinction of one's nation and even its superiority over other nations." 6
Hayes, too, repeats, the same point and writes:
“Loyalty and attachment to the interior of the group (namely the nation and homeland) are the basis of nationalism7 .”
An analysis of the above definitions clarifies two points:
A) Giving authenticity to territory,blood or language is the basis of nationalism. Instead of basing unity on belief and ideology, nationalism bases it on language,territory and race. Homeland and nationality become the axis of patriotism. In answer to the question as to what is the main factor behind the building of a separate identity, the school of nationalism has this to say:
'Whatdistinguishes a human being from another, is not his belief, but his birth-place, homeland, language and race. Those who are within the four walls of the homeland andnation, belong to it, and those who are outside it, are aliens. National interests and expediency are the criteria of the propriety or impropriety and goodness or badness of everything and the measure for the evaluation of the individual and social conduct'. To the school of nationalism, the factors behind the formation of a nation are material in nature, like geographical frontiers, language,race and political organizations. It ison the basis of these factors that the people have a feeling of sharing a single destiny and a common past.
B) The next basic characteristic of nationalism is that all the loyaltyis centered upon the homeland. All other loyalties such as loyalty to God, religion, belief and ideologyare subordinated to loyalty to the country and nation. No loyalty should check patriotism, and when religious sentiments come in opposition with patriotic sentiments, the latter must prevail.
This is aprinciple which no nationalist can ignore. Man lives for his country and offers his life for it, and not for anything else.It is attachment to nationality that gives direction to one's individual and social postures, not attachment to religion and ideology. A human being takes pride in his national achievements and feels dependent on its cultural heritage, not on the history of religion and his faith.
A nationalist believes deeply that nation and country are superior to all others, attributing all the good things to them.
Nationalism and Secularism
According to the above view, nationalismis closely linked with secularism, in view of the necessity of separation between government and religion, and politics from creed. One of the basic principles of nationalism is a rejection of religious bonds and an acceptance of asecularistic order.
One of the main slogans of Egyptian nationalism was:
“Religion is related to God (meaning personal acts of devotion) and homeland is connected with society (i.e. social-political life). Secularism means that religion is something subjective thatmust be confined to an individual's private and family life, and religious feelings and ideas should not interfere in the socio-politico set-up, be the concern of nationalism only.So the socio-politico roots of religion should be severed from politics.
Nationalism leads directly to secularism. The belief that national unity must be based on a common land, race or language, necessitates that religion be kept apart from politics. Thus, secularism paves the way for the domination of nationalism, since according to this school of thought,religion and nationalism cannot rule at the same time in the same realm.
Secularism is the twin brother of nationalism and it changes the meaning of minorities. In a government founded on religion, the followers of other creeds and schools are regarded as minorities, but with nationalism and secularism, there are only racial,political and regional minorities. Nationalism claims that religious beliefs prevent national unity and religious minorities feel themselves alienated. The only proper basis is geographical,racial or lingual nationality. The main duty of everyone is the patriotic duty, and religious duty is subordinate to it, and confined to personal belief. The patriotic duty of everyone is to sacrifice everything, even religion, for the nation andcountry and serve and fight for them.
Basis and other characteristics of Nationalism
Nationalism considers sovereignty as a tool to protect the country and its citizens, not one for enforcing a particular ideology and system.
Economy, too,is based on national interest and welfare, not on what is legitimate or illegitimate. Culture, art,poetry and literature are the means for depicting national pride and greatness and creation of solidarity and inspiring racial sentiments.
To nationalism, the strongest factors directing individual and social life, determining intellectual and political postures, are the country and nation. AsIbn-Khaldoon says, the element behind patriotism is nationality.
Some of the other characteristics of nationalism are:
1) Belief that one should defend a compatriot against a foreigner, whether the former is in the right or not.
2) Eulogizing and almost worship of national personalities and historical heroes of one's country.
3) Revival of past traditions such as ancient idolatry. Neo-nationalism too, in this connection, relies on myths, ancient and dead customs, such as the ceremonies of the last Tuesday night of the year.
Egyptian nationalism, the most eloquentspokesman of which wasTaha Hossein , did its utmost to revive the relics of the oldpharaonic civilization.Lofti -el-Sayed , the well-known Egyptian nationalist suggested that his compatriots should havea knowledge of the old and brilliant Egyptian civilization in order to ensure the continuity of their history8 . Likewise, Iranian nationalismwas tried to relate the Iranian nation to Cyrus and Darius, not to Muhammad (S).
4) A tendency to distort historical facts to glorify one's country, and to invent stories and create models to show one's nation at its best.
5) Like oldTotemism , there are special emblems innationalism which are given sanctity. The flag, national emblem, and national anthemare considered sacred, for each of which a human being has the duty of self-sacrifice.
Nationalism as a pseudo-religion
Thus, we see that nationalism is a pseudo-religion which is its own god and its own prophet. (Ferdowsi , for example,is regarded as a prophet of Iranian nationalism). This creed has its own totems, idols, models, ceremonies and ethical rules. In fact, Westerners created acreed which they called nationalism on the basis of patriotism, which is rooted in human instincts, after which they exported it to the East.
Nationalism as an advanced tribal system
Westerners lay the foundation of nationalism on the in-group feeling,patriotism and tribal attachment. A critical examination of the school of nationalism would show it to be similar to the tribal system ofTotemism .
Unity in the tribal system was founded on a community of blood and land, with a total disregard of right and wrong, and on chastity,honesty and belief. Whoever belonged to the tribewas shown affection, and whoever did not belong to it was considered an alien.
Nationalism too, is similar in this respect. In the tribal system, wars and peacewere made for the tribe's sake. A person was proud of his membership in the tribe and very often looked with scorn upon others. The tribe was an organization under whose umbrella, the members felt secure. Nationalism also gives rise to similar sentiments.
Some elements of the tribal system ofTotemism , too, have found their way in nationalism. Every tribe had a totem in which the members felt that a spiritual power protected the tribe. Moreover, while 'homeland' is the great totem of the modern man, nationalism is as illegal and unjustifiable asTotemism . Some groups fight for the lion (emblem of Britain) and blue flag; and some fight for the eagle (German emblem) or for the red flag. WhileTotemism was the factor behind tribal unity, today the 'country' plays the same role.
Notes
1. J. H. Carlton Hayes: Essays on Nationalism, New York, 1926, p. 9.
2. Hans Kohn: The idea of Nationalism: its origin and background, New York, 1944. p. 14,
3.Luigo : Nationalism and Internationalism, New York, 1946, p. 25,.
4.Salo . W. Baron: Modern Nationalism and Religion, p. 31.
5. Hans Kohn: The Idea of Nationalism, New York, 1927, p. 15.
6. Nationalismcommotes a loyalty to the group entity, superior to all other loyalties (Encyclopaedia Americana).
7. Carlton Haves: Essays on Nationalism, p. 56.
8. Referto: “Muqaddamata -Leddera sat-ul -Fekr -ul -siasial -Arabi ”, p.101.
PartFive : Shortcomings of Nationalism
Illogical basis of Nationalism
HerbertLuthy says: “Nationalism is a creed based on a handful of dogmas that cannot be accounted for from a scientific and intellectual point of view, and have authenticity only in the mindsoft heir followers.” 1
Nationalists have been unable to explain explicitly how their principles can be applied universally, and what are thefactors which build up the independent identity of a nation and what is the distinction of a nation which naturally or psychologically sets it apart from other nations, so that these qualities cannot be found in any other nation. The works of the nationalistpropounders give us ho indication in this connection, but a show of such disharmoniousideas which are not logically acceptable.
Nationalist theoreticians rely on geographical, lingual, racial, political, economic,cultural and historical factors, and regard the territory, country, blood and history as the factors that build up a nation's separate identity.
Now we will analyze the validity and logic of each of the above factors as a so-called unifying factor and as a yardstick for measuring the independent identity of a society.
Territory and country: These words are rather conventional, than natural. A human being feels at home to be in his town,village and locality as a result of persistent suggestion from outside.
If one is to consider more than the above, why should he regard himself an Egyptian and not an Arab?And if he is a member of the Arab world, why not be an Asiatic? This is something conventional and personal, not logical. Why should a man, born in Ireland, consider his country to be Britain and not Ireland? The frontiers of many countries, especially in Africa, are imaginary demarcations. Nationalists want the people to show attachment to these crooked lines that colonial powers have drawn on the maps of Asia and Africa, and turn this affection into an ideology. They drew these lines, made them look real and forced people on this side of the line to consider themselves as belonging to that country, and those outside that line as foreigners, without giving a logical reason for it. The attachment of a person to his land is natural, not logical. When itis suggested constantly to a person that a country is his homeland, he comes to believe it, and to consider others as aliens. From a geographical viewpoint, 'homeland' is constantly changing. What Afghanistan is today,was considered Iran yesterday. Why then should an Afghan regard himself an Afghan and not an Iranian? This is only a matter of suggestion.
What other factor other than a common religion, an Iraqi Kurd has in common with an Iraqi Arab? Why should he not consider himself a citizen ofKurdestan instead of Iraq? Nationalists cannot offer a reasonable explanation.
B) Language: The German school of nationalism with HerbertLuthy (1744-1803) and Johan Fichte (1762-1814), particularly, who had been its greatest representatives in the 18th and 19th centuries considers language and history to be the most important factors behind the national identity of a people. They regard language as being especially significant in the creation of a national spirit and identity. Following them are some nationalists of the Islamic world likeNamegh Kamal of Turkey andNadim of Egypt who attach the greatest importance to language as a basis of nationality.But the fact is that the language and common history of a people have not been sufficient in themselves to kindle a national awareness.
The Americans of George Washington's time had the same language and history as those of England, and vet they segregated from Britain and became an independent nation. Switzerland has three different languages in three regions, and yet the feeling of nationality is strong there. India has over fourteen languages, andyet there is no language but English that all Indians may understand . If language is a determining factor of unity and independent national solidarity, why did hot England and North America form a single nation in spite of their common language? Why did not the Latin American countries (except Brazil) which have a common language like Spain, Brazil or Portugal become united?
We do not want to deny the role of a common language in accelerating the process of unity and solidarity, since it is evident that language is a means of direct communication, offering a nation a common literature. What we mean is that language is not the principal factor in shaping nationality, even if it speeds the process. Many nations have become nations in spite of differences in languages (like Switzerland), while there are many nations which are remote from one another in spite of a .common language.Thus language cannot be regarded as a firm basis for nationality. Nasser and other Arab nationalists tried to set up a united Arab nationon the basis of a common language but they failed. TheMaronite Christians and Muslims of Lebanon speak the same language but they have been fighting each other for the last six years, and these Christians feel closer to the Europeans than to the Muslims.
Moreover, in every country, we come across several languages, not one. Whatis called a dialect is in fact a different language. Is it easier for a Persian-speaking individual to understand the Afghani Dari or theAzari of Tabriz? The people of Arabia do not understand even ten percent of the Arabic of Libya. All these facts show that language is a weak factor and basis of nationality and any reasoning opposing this assertion will be illogical and defective.
C) History, culture and civilization: It is true that the history and culture of a people create a feeling of unity and of communal interests, but nationalists forget the fact that in the East, especially in the world of Islam, the unity of history,culture and civilization is based on belief, not on geographical factors. Culture andcivilization-wise , post-Islamic Iran is more close to Arab countries and Pakistan, than to the ancient Zoroastrian culture. Similarly, Egypt in its culture and civilization is closer to post-Islamic Iran than was thePharaonic civilization. Our history and cultureare based on ideology and belief. All the Muslims after the rise of Islam have the same history and culture. The past civilization of Iranians, Arabs, Turks,Pakistanis and Indian Muslims is nothing but an Islamic one. Nationalism tries in vain to call this civilization an Iranian or Arab civilization in order to rouse the national sentiments or unearth the decayed bones of pre-Islamic history and culturewhich has nothing to do with our present culture and civilization. That is why the relics of those civilizations cannot warm the hearts of the people in comparison with Islamic history and civilization, and lead them towards unity and victory.
Nationalists do not only try to revive the memory of the ancient civilization through exaggerations, suppositions, bombasts, self-Praise and fallaciousreasonings , but they also resort to a scorn of Islamic history and civilization in order to elevate the racial greatness of Iranians, Arabs or Turks, and, try to ignore Islam altogether.But this is wrong and prejudiced and it defeats the objective. As Dr.Shariati , the martyred teacher, has pointed out: “During the whole course of history, the Iranian race (and the Turks, Arabs and other Muslim nations) has never found a better opportunity than the brilliant Islamic centuries to show its talent and ability.”
Contrary to the nationalists, since the seventh century A.D., Iran, Turkey and the Middle East embraced Islam, so strongly that their history is the same as that of Islam, and their course has been the same with the course of Islamic history, culture and civilization. The greatness and honor of these nations lie in their share in promoting Islam and in their creation of a magnificent Islamic culture and civilization. They are the achievements of these Islamic nations whosepast history is not in any way comparable with their religion, and if Islamic countries wish to be proud of their past, they have no basis but Islam.
Moreover, the choice of history as a factor in building up a man's identity is a feeble and illogical one, since the frontiers of countries have not been the same throughout history. Afghanistan was once part of Iran. How thencan history be considered as the basis of independent nationality?
D) Race: Most nationalists regard race as afactor which determines nationality.But a careful analysis of it shows the weakness and illogicality of it, like other factors based on prejudice, illusion and superstition.
What is racism? It is a feeling of unity based on kinship. The first line of this attachment is an objective reality, namely the bond with one's father and mother. When this is extended, it reaches one's family,tribe and lastly one's race.But extending it to race, the bond becomes so remote from common ancestors that the racial root cannot be scientifically and logically proved. Has there ever existed in history a thing called the Aryan or Semitic race? Moreover, who can prove that a man is an Aryan? Forexample half of the Iranians areSayeds , who are descendants of the Prophet of Islam who was not himself an Aryan. Can those non-Sayeds claim that during these thousands of years, their bloodhas not been blended with non-Aryan blood?
Belief in the race and racial unity has no objective and scientific reality; it is only a subjective illusion on which nationalism wishes to base its social-political relations. How comical and illogical!
Thirdly, if we were to adopt blood as a basis, as racism and nationalism do, why should we not have our first ancestors, namely Adam and Eve, as the basis of humangeneration. In such a case, instead of racism, we may turn tohumanism, and instead of nationalism to internationalism. This would be a more logical and convincing idea than the question of race which cannot be proved. Even if the Aryan,Semitic and other races have a historical authenticity, if we do not stop at this point and go far back in history, all these races end In common ancestors. Then why should we not adopt this as a basis?
E) Political organization and economic factors: Some nationalistic schools consider political organization and economic factors as the basis of nationality. From apolitical angle, the Irish form part of Britain, and yet they consider themselves independent. There are many similar cases in the present and past history.
Economics has sometimes acted as a factor of unity like the union of the customs among the various German provinces between 1819 and 1952, which was a prelude to their political union.But such cases are only exceptions to the rule. Economic harmony and collaboration of various groups are not the requisites of national unity.
It is thus clear that the main foundations of nationalism are weak,invalid and illogical, even though they may help occasionally in rousing nationalistic sentiments. They are not determining and fundamental factors behind unity and solidarity. For this reason, French nationalists have been forced to claim that what causes a German, an Englishman and a Frenchman to regardthemselves respectively as belonging to Germany, England and France is only and only the individual will or desire. So long as the individual does not freely accept to be a citizen of a particular nation, a common language, race,history or geographical frontiers would be of no avail, and cannot by themselves create a feeling of attachment and national awareness.
Unity on the above basis is a prelude to differences
An effort to create unity on the above basis leads to greater differences and conflicts among human beings. A unity based on geographical boundaries, race or language cannot include all human beings. It is more like walls set up between them, separating them, and intensifying their division. Ideological boundaries can expand without force or imposition with the free acceptance of that school by individuals and nations, and intellectually it is not impossible for it to end with the unity of allmankind. But geographical nationality with lingual and racial differences obviously include all men and so, it can never sustain human unity permanently.
Nationalism creates divisionamong mankind and thus, it cannot lead to universal unity. In such a unit, the questions of minorities and aliens, too, become insoluble.But anUmmah founded on belief is an 'open unit' and it can admit people from every race, color, language and territory who accept that belief. This unity can, therefore, expand and lead to man's universalbrotherhood .
Infact the only proper, scientific and logical basis for nationality and unity is belief, ideology and school. Other factors as compared to these are insignificant.
Thus we see that none of the principles that nationalists rely on are universal and logical.But the nationality based on belief which Islam upholds has an intellectual authenticity and is justifiable. Those who have the same ideology possess the same world vision, religious belief, culture,objective and destination, form thus a singleUmmah .
So long as patriotism and nationalism exist, the danger of war and human clashescannot be removed , since national unity will dialectically lead to international dispersion and confrontation. This opposition is not soluble except through force and colonizing others. But a unity based on belief and the acceptance of that belief will remove all differences andone and all will become equal and brothers.
Nationalism defeats its own objectives
Would the country be subjected to division if we use 'religion' as a basis or 'nationality' as a basis?
The aim of nationalism is the creation of unity, but its result is the reverse and it defeats its own objective. The means adopted by nationalism to realize its objectives of creating unity is to kindle sharp sentiments of solidarity on f the basis of race,language or nationality.
But in every country, there exist racial and lingual minorities. When these minorities come to face nationalistic sentiments incited by the propaganda of the majority, they may lose their own independent identity within the majority and react. It is often seen that such propaganda directed at inciting nationalistic sentiments by the majority rouses a regional,racial or lingual nationalism among the minorities and results in the dispersion and disunion of the country.
Logically there is no reason why the majority's nationalismshould be considered right and the minority's one wrong. Why should British nationalism be regarded as right and laudable, while the Irish one, as blameworthy and condemnable. If IraqiBaathists have the right to speak of Arab nationalism all day and night, why shouldn't an Iraqi Kurd have the right to turn to Kurdish nationalism since he is not an Arab afterall. If territorial,racial and lingual prejudice is good, then it is good for both sides, and if it is bad, it is so for both. We cannot judge by two different criteria. If the nationalism of America's whites is good, why should that of its blacks be bad?
We see, then, that nationalism has no logical basis, and it defeats its own purpose, and has to establish solidarity by force. It secures what is contrary to its goal, namely division and dispersion.
Contrary to the nationalists' claim, it is not religious beliefs, but nationalisticfeelings which check unity and produce division in the country. The result of half a century of the nationalistic propaganda of Reza Khan and Muhammad Reza was rebellion inKurdestan andTurkeman Sahara.
Nationalism has at no time been able to solve the question of racial,lingual and regional minorities. On the, contrary it has intensified oppositions and made them perpetual.
As the criterion is race,language or territory, and as race and language and the like are not changeable, therefore those not belonging to a certain race or having a certain language are always regarded and live as a minority group and cannot share the sentiments of the majority. Those who through emigration or change of geographical boundaries or invasions become nationals of a country, even after many generations and centuries, feel themselves to be a segregated and alienated group, and others feel the same towards them. Armenians in Turkey, Syria and Iran, and Kurds, Scots, Irish and Americannegroes are the clearest examples of this.
Nationalism cannot solve the problem of minorities with the criteria of blood and language.But when belief is used as a basis, since it is not a property that can be inherited and something personal, it can perhaps solve the minority question, so that ultimately no minority would probably exist. Anyhow, this is not logically impossible.But the problem of minorities will always exist as a cancerous tumor in nationalistic societies. Thisis especially more felt in Islamic societies where rousing nationalistic sentiments lead to division.
In Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and most Arab countries, the religious minorities are not more than two to four percent of the population, and even this number can benefit from all the civic and human laws under the system of Islam and feel secure. The way is always open for everyone to become a full member of the IslamicUmmah .But when nationality becomes the basis, the number of racial, lingual and regional minorities increases manifold, so that the total of these minorities in some of these countries actually forms the majority of the population. If nationalityis adopted as a basis, the Kurds will turn to the Kurdish nation, and the Turks to the Turkish race. Thus, these countries would undoubtedly move towards division, and only force can keep them united. As the above countries have adopted nationality as a basis, theyhave so far been entangled with difficulties.
Is it only nationalism that can motivate people’s creativity?
Some thinkers like Harold Lasky2 believe that nationalismshould be accepted not as a reality, but as expediency. Hewrites: “In spite of the shortcomings, defects and contradictions of nationalism, the fanaticism that it creates releases people's energy and creativity.”
But Lasky and his likes only take the conditions of the West into consideration where religion lacks sufficient dynamism for rousing public zeal and sentiments. The history of the East and the Islamic world shows that religion has been more effective than nationality in activating and inspiring the Muslim people, in inciting their initiative and creativity, and rousing intense zeal in the masses.
Notes
1. Johann Herder, A Rehabilitation of Nationalism, London, 1962, p.85.
2. Harold J.Lasky : Nationalism and the Future of Civilization, London 1971, p.66.
PartSix : Dangers of Nationalism
Ego-centrism and prejudice
Among the greatest dangers of nationalism is prejudice: a violent affective state where the individual or the group, becomeego-centric , leading them to ignore reality and be harsh and inflexible in their judgments.
Nationalistic sentiments in one country usually leads to prejudice against other nations, and sociologically speaking, it encourages the 'we-group' or 'I-group' feeling and the people to love and praise their own nation and regard all those outside this 'in-group' as contemptible enemies. Self-glorification becomes the rule and no sympathy or toleranceis shown to others.
This ego-centrism, an offshoot of this unbalanced nationalism manifests itself in various ways under different conditions: Ethno-centrism, chauvinism, race-centrism, racism etc.
Superiority complex and misinterpretation of history
WalterLecquer , well-known sociologist says:
“One of the main peculiarities of nationalism is an over-estimation of one's own nation, and a depreciation of others, a lack of self-criticism, sense of responsibility and observance of fairness. Nationalism abandons realism and allows an idealistic and mythical vision to dominate society1 .”
To glorify itself, nationalism generally resorts to suppositions, exaggerations, fallaciousreasonings , scorn and inadmissible self-praise, and worst of all, it engages in the distortion of history,model-making and fable-writing. Historical facts are twisted to imaginarymyths as it fears historical and social realism.
Will Durant says:2 “The 19th century discovered nationalism and corrupted almost all historians.”
Treilschke , VonSibel ,Michellet , Martin,McCaulay , Green,Banderft andFetik were patriots first and historians later. Every nationalist considers his country as God's select realm and the whole world full of wickedness and barbarism.
Nationalism has made history so corrupt and tumultuous, that a wise man suggested that for attaining universal peace, it would be better to discard history instead of drawing up pacts of friendship and commerce.
Misinterpretation of history is one of the greatest harms of nationalism. Itmay be argued that the case is so where an extreme form of nationalism exists.But that is not the case. Any kind of nationalism by essence inclines towards self-pride and scorn of others, for so long as it does not rouse in people a false sense of pride in their nation, how can it turn national prejudice in favor of itself and against others?
Tribal prejudice or fanatical ignorance
As nationalism is based on man's animal instincts, not on belief and intelligence, therefore, tribal prejudice which is called fanatical ignorance by Islam, is its foundation and one of its peculiarities.
The accidental birth of a person in a certain country gives him the wrong baseless idea that he may scorn others and consider them as enemies. Having been born in Europe and having a white skin for example, he gives himself the right to plunder the blacks and refuse to employ towards others criteria he uses towards his own compatriots.Even a genius like Einstein is disliked by a German because he is a Jew. Taking birth in Germany or France, both a matter of accidental birth in a certain land and not one of conscious choice, is no reason to dislike other, be prejudiced and evaluate human beings with two different criteria.
Can anything be more inhuman and unreasonable that to prefer a wicked,corrupt and incompetent compatriot of the same race or language to an honest, benevolent and competent person who is born beyond one's frontiers?
A person is judgedon the basis of his race, language, country and considered a compatriot or alien, without the least consideration of his deeds, virtues or views. Human honor and good deedsare disregarded simply because one is born in a certain land. The yardstick for evaluating the individual becomes territory and blood, not action, faith, chastity or obligation.
The more popular nationalism becomes, the more intense will fanatical ignorance and racial prejudice become, and the more limited will be one's vision. A nationalist defends everything related to his country solely through intellect or reflection. He considers everything outside his country as alien and ignominious. Right and wrong become meaningless concepts.
This is fanaticalignorance which is strongly condemned in Islam, it is inherited from the inhuman tribal system, but with a more dangerous dimension.
Nationalism culminates in racism
Nationalism inevitably ends in racism and racial prejudice.In any land where it attempts to base unity on the co-existence of a particular group so as to create fanaticism and make that group an independent, separate unit, it must attribute a certain name to that group like Iranian, Turk or some other name; it must brainwash those in that group into believing that they are superior to other on the basis of their race, blood etc. Without attention to the criteria of virtue, belief and action. Eventually, other neighboring countries come to manifest similar feelings, leading to perpetual clashes,rivalry and racial hostilities.
History bears witness to the fact that nationalistic sentiments have always ended in racism. The Greeks at the height of their civilization called non-Greeks barbarians.
Aristotle said:
“It is nature's will that barbarians be the slaves of the Greeks.” TheJews who were a national unit before being a religious unit, regarded themselves as God's selected people. The Romans at the height of their civilization believed that there were only three nations on earth, the Romans, theirconfederates and the barbarians (non-Romans).
$$SUB[ Nationalism results in a desire to dominate]
5- Nationalism results in a desire to dominate and colonize seeking domination and colonization are due to three factors:
1- Strong prejudice
2- Superiority complex
3- Self-interest (and disregard of others interests)
Nationalism relies on all these three factors and that is why it eventually leads to domination and colonization. Nationalism has been the cause of clashes, aggressions, and constant rivalry between nations, causing much riot and bloodshed the world over. When a country thinks only in terms of its own interests and gives itself the right to dominate others, the result will obviously be conflicts, aggressions andcolonization . Some think that this is only true of extreme nationalism.But history has taught us that there are no such things as healthy or unhealthy nationalism, since nationalism in whatever form ultimately ends in chauvinism and racism.
Itmay be argued that if patriotism and racism do cause fanaticism and domination, religion and ideology, too, may do the same.But those who think so are ignoring an obvious reality. It is true that every school and ideology produces fanaticism and encourages one to believe that one's school is superior to others, but as thisis not based on the authenticity l of territory or blood, and since its foundation is the authenticity of intellect and reflection, its result is a scientific and theoretical contest. A belief is such that when proved ina logical manner or when it is attractive enough, people may agree to it without being forced or pressurized. A society based on belief is an open system, whereas, societies founded on nationalism and racism are closedsystems which elevate some and debase others, looking upon them as inferiors and colonial slaves.But when belief or ideology expands, all its followers become equal brothers. Nationalism in its expansion results in imperialism, andcolonization . A religious school of thought prescribes the ideal system for all human beings, whether white or black, eastern or western, all of whom can join the proposed union, whereas nationalism can expand only through subjugating weak nations. An Aryan can never become Semitic, and Turkey cannot become Iran except by becoming a colony.But Egypt, Iraq and Iran accepted Islam without becoming colonies.
Belief based on the intellect, expands without violence and through guidance and propaganda, in the same way that traders and dervishes carried Islam to the farthest parts3 of Asia and Africa.But nationalism, having solely a racial and geographical foundation, can expand only through colonization.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the savage colonialism of the West in the 19thcentury which spread over the Third World was caused by nationalistic sentiments. The calamitous World Wars and the Nagasaki and Hiroshima disasters and hundreds of otherwars which have tainted man's history with blood, are living proofs of nationalism as a dominating force.
Nationalism is a factor of expansionism and a basis of injustice and aggression. It has been the source of imperialism and it cruelly transgresses over weak nations, imposing its illegitimate ambition on others in the name of national desires and national expediencies.
Narrowing man’s mental horizon
Nationalism narrows man's mental horizon in two ways: Firstly, it discourages man to think of the wholeof mankind and of ways to help and guide the latter. It encourages him to consider his compatriots only and limit the radius of his vision within the framework of frontiers. Secondly, it encourages man to reject belief, the spirituality, the intellect, and to focus on land, blood,country and race, thereby narrowing down his mental horizon.
Nationalists are the slaves of emotions, and have no regard for the intellect and intelligence. Ideology, on the other hand, relies extensively on reflection and by creating a sense of obligation and responsibility, the intellect comes to dominate over emotions and not the other wayround as is the case with nationalism.
Notes
1. Walter Lacquer: Communism and Nationalism in “The Middle East” London, 1950, p. 8.
2. WillDurrant : The Mansions of Philosophy, p. 239.
3. Brown: The Spread of Islam.