Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Lesson Nineteen: The Value of Knowledge

Return to the Original Problem

We know that the original problem of epistemology is whether man is able to discover the truth and obtain information about reality. If so, how? What is the criterion by which one can recognize the truth from incorrect thoughts which are contrary to reality? In other words, the main fundamental discussions of epistemology include the problem of ‘the value of knowledge’, and other problems are considered to be introductory or supplementary.

Since there are several kinds of knowledge, it is natural that the problem of the value of knowledge should also have different dimensions. But what is of special importance for philosophy is the evaluation of intellectual knowledge and the proof of the ability of the intellect to solve the problems of epistemology and other branches of philosophy.

We first explained the general types of knowledge, and we came to the conclusion that one sort of human knowledge is without intermediary and is knowledge by presence. In other words, it is finding reality itself. In this kind of knowledge error is impossible. But with regard to the fact that this knowledge by itself does not meet the scientific needs of man we discussed acquired knowledge and its types. We also made clear the role of the senses and the intellect in them.

Now it is time to return to the original problem and explain the value of acquired knowledge. As acquired knowledge, in the sense of the actual discovery of reality, is the same as affirmations and propositions, naturally, the evaluation of acquired knowledge is accomplished in their area. If ideas are mentioned it will be indirectly and as the components of propositions.

What is Truth?

A fundamental problem about the value of knowledge is how to prove that human knowledge corresponds to reality. This difficulty appears in case there is an intermediary between the knower and the known. Because of that, the knower is the one to whom knowledge is attributed, and the known is the one to which being known is attributed. In other words, knowledge is other than that which is known, but in case there is no intermediary, and the knower finds the objective existence of the known, naturally such questions will not arise.

Therefore, knowledge which is capable of truth—that is, which corresponds to reality—and is capable of error—that is, which differs from reality—that very knowledge is acquired knowledge. And if truth is attributed to knowledge by presence, this is in the sense of a denial of the possibility of its being in error.

Meanwhile, the definition of truth, which is discussed under the topic of the value of knowledge, is known, that is, it is the correspondence of the form of knowledge with the reality which it describes. However, there may be other definitions of truth, such as the definition of the pragmatists, “Truth is a thought which is useful in the practical life of man,” or the definition of the relativists, “Truth is knowledge which is appropriate to a healthy perceptual apparatus,” or a third definition, which says, “Truth is that upon

which all people agree,” or a fourth definition, which says, “Truth is knowledge which can be proved by sensory experience.” All of these are besides the point of the discussion, and avoid answering the original problem about the value of knowledge. They can be considered as signs of the inability of the definers to solve this problem. Supposing that some of them are correctly justified, or they are considered as the definitions necessary for specific cases (even if the definition itself is not correct), that is, they are considered as specific signs of some truth, or they indicate some specific terminology, but in any case, it must be noted that none of these justifications are able to solve our original problem. The question about the truth in the sense of knowledge which corresponds to reality is left unanswered, and requires a correct and clarifying answer.

Criteria for the Recognition of the Truth

The rationalists hold that the standard for recognizing the truth is ‘the nature of the intellect’ (fiṭrat-e ‘aql ). The propositions which are inferred correctly from self-evident propositions and which are really components of them are considered to be truth, while sensory and experiential propositions are considered valid to the extent that they are proved by the aid of intellectual arguments. However, we do not see any explanation given by them of the correspondence of self-evident propositions and innate propositions (fiṭriyyāt ) with realities, except the one mentioned by Descartes, who resorted to the wisdom and honesty of God with respect to innate thoughts. The weakness of this is clear as was mentioned in the seventeenth lesson.

There is no doubt at all that the intellect, after imagining the subject and predicate of self-evident propositions, automatically and without need for experience, definitively judges their unity. Those who have raised doubts about this proposition either have not correctly imagined the subject and predicate or are affected with a kind of illness or scruples. But our discussion pertains to the following: whether this so-called innate kind of understanding is requisite of the way in which man’s intellect has been created, so that it would be possible for the intellect of another existent (for example, the intellect of a jinn) to understand the very same propositions but in another form, or if man’s intellect were created in another way would it understand matters in a different form, or whether these understandings correspond perfectly to reality and are representatives of things in themselves, and any other existent which also had an intellect would understand the same forms.

Plainly, what it means for intellectual knowledge to have real value and to be true is the latter, but its mere innateness (assuming that it is here interpreted in the correct way) does not prove the matter.

On the other hand, empiricists hold that the standard for the truth of knowledge is capability of being proved by means of experience, and some of them have added that it must be proved by practical experience. However, it is clear that first of all this standard is only applicable to sensory things and cases which are susceptible to practical experience. Matters of logic and pure mathematics cannot be evaluated by this standard. Secondly, the results of sensory and practical experience must be

understood by means of acquired knowledge. Exactly the same question will be repeated regarding what guarantees the correctness of acquired knowledge, and by what standard can its truth be distinguished.

Inquiry into a Problem

The main point of difficulty regarding acquired knowledge is how it can be determined when there is correspondence, while it is this very form of cognition and acquired knowledge that serves as the means of our relation to the external world!

Therefore, the key to this problem must be sought where we are able to have an overview of both the form of understanding and that which is concomitant with it and we can understand their correspondence by presence and without any other intermediary. Those are propositions of inner sense, which on the one hand we find by presence concomitant with cognition, for example, the very state of fear, and on the other hand, we perceive the mental form related to it directly. Therefore, the propositions, “I am”, or “I am afraid”, or “I doubt”, are completely indubitable. So, these propositions (propositions of inner sense) are the first propositions whose value is one hundred percent proven, and there is no way for them to be in error. To be sure, we must take care that these propositions are not mixed with mental interpretations, as was mentioned in lesson thirteen.

We find such an overview in the propositions of logic, which describe other mental forms and concepts. For although both the description and the object described are found in two levels of the mind, both levels are present to the self (i.e., the I who understands). For example, this proposition, “The concept of man is a universal concept” is a proposition which describes the features of ‘the concept of man’, a concept which is present in the mind. We are able to distinguish these features by mental experience, that is without using sensory organs or the intermediary of any other perceptual form. We understand that this concept does not describe a specific individual, but is applicable to numerous individuals. So, the proposition “The concept of man is a universal concept” is true.

By this means the way is open for the recognition of two groups of propositions, but these are not sufficient for the cognition of all acquired knowledge. If we are able to obtain a guarantee of the correctness of primary self-evident propositions we would be completely successful, for in their rays we can recognize and evaluate theoretical propositions such as the sensory and experiential propositions.

For the sake of this task we must pay careful attention to the whatnesses of these propositions. On the one hand, we must examine the concepts employed in them and consider what kind of concepts they are, and how they are obtained. On the other hand, we must look at the relations among them and consider how the intellect is able to judge the unity of their subjects and predicates.

The first aspect has been made clear in lesson seventeen. We know that these propositions are formed of philosophical concepts, concepts which terminate in presentational knowledge. That is, the first group of philosophical concepts, such as ‘need’ and ‘independence’ and then ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are abstracted from direct knowledge and inner sense. We find

their correspondence with the source of their abstraction by presence. Some philosophical concepts also reduce to them.

The second aspect, that is the qualities of judgment of unity between their subjects and predicates becomes clear with comparison between the subjects and predicates of these propositions with each other. The means that all of these propositions are analytical, the concept of whose predicates is obtained from the analysis of the concept of their subjects. For example, in this proposition, “Every effect requires a cause”, when we analyze the concept of effect we arrive at the conclusion that an effect is an existent whose existence is based on another existent, that is, it needs another existent, which is called the cause. Therefore the concept of need for a cause is implicit in the concept of effect. Their unity is found by mental experience. To the contrary, in the proposition “Every existent requires a cause,” because from the analysis of the concept of ‘existent’ the concept of ‘requires a cause’ is not obtained, we cannot consider it a self-evident proposition. But it is also not a true speculative proposition.

In this way it becomes clear that primary self-evidence also terminates in knowledge by presence, and so they find the way to the guarantee of their truth.

A problem may be raised, that if what we find by presentational knowledge is a specific effect, how can we generalize judgments regarding it to every effect and consider such a universal judgment to be self-evident?

The answer is that although we abstract the concept of effect from a specific phenomenon, like that of our own will, it is not for that reason a specific essence, and, for example, to be considered from among the kinds of qualities of the soul, but it is because its existence is related to the existence of another. So, everywhere this quality is found this judgment is also established. Of course, the confirmation of this quality for other cases requires intellectual proof. For this reason this proposition by itself cannot establish the requirement of material phenomena for a cause, unless an intellectual proof of their existential relationship can be provided. God willing, we will explain their proofs in the lesson on cause and effect. With the same proposition we also can judge that everywhere there is an existential relationship, the terms and relation can be established, and so, the existence of the cause.

In conclusion, the secret of the infallibility of primary self-evident propositions is their dependence on knowledge by presence.

The Criteria of Truth and Falsity of Propositions

With our explanation about the standard of truth it became clear that self-evident propositions, such as primary self-evident propositions and propositions of inner sense have the value of certainty. The secret of their infallibility is that the correspondence between the knowledge and the object of the knowledge is proved through presentational knowledge. Propositions which are not self-evident are to be evaluated by logical standards, that is, if a proposition is obtained according to the logical rules of inference, it is true; otherwise it will be incorrect. Of course, it must be noted that the incorrectness of a reason does not always signify the incorrectness of the conclusion, for it is possible to prove something which is correct by using

reasons which are incorrect. Therefore, the invalidity of an argument only provides a reason for lack of confidence in the conclusion, not a reason for its actual error.

It is possible that a doubt may be raised here. According to the definition of truth as knowledge which corresponds to reality, truth and error are to be found only with regard to propositions which may be compared to reality in the external world. Metaphysical propositions, however, do not have an external reality to which they could correspond. Hence, they cannot be considered as true or false, but it must be said that they are absurd and meaningless.

This doubt arises from the assumption that external objective reality is equivalent to material reality. In order to remove this doubt it is to be noted that, first of all, external objective reality is not limited to material reality, but also includes the abstract; furthermore, it will be proven in the appropriate place that the abstract participates in reality to a greater extent than does the material. Secondly, the reality which is meant is that to which propositions must correspond, the absolute referent of propositions; and by the external world is meant that which is beyond the concepts about them, even if that reality and referent is in the mind, or is psychological; and as we have explained, purely logical propositions describe other mental things. The relationship between the level of the mind which is the place of the referents of these propositions and the level from which they are viewed is like the relationship between that which is outside the mind and the mind.

Therefore, the general criterion of the truth and falsity of propositions is their correspondence or lack of correspondence with the concepts beyond them, that is, the recognition of the truth and falsity of propositions of the empirical sciences is the comparison of them with the material reality to which they are related, for example, in order to discover the truth of the proposition, “Iron expands when heated”, we heat iron in the external world, and observe the difference in its size, but logical propositions must be evaluated by means of other mental concepts which are related to them. In order to recognize the truth or falsity of philosophical propositions, one must consider the relation between the mind and its object, that is, their being correct is that their objective referents, whether material or abstract, must be such that the mind abstracts the concepts related to them. This evaluation is accomplished directly in the case of propositions of inner sense, and for other propositions it is accomplished with one or more intermediaries, as was explained.

The Case Itself (Nafs al-Amr)

We come across this expression in the language of most philosophers, that a certain matter corresponds to “the case itself”. Among these are ‘true propositions’ some of which do not have any instances for their subjects in the external world. If supposing an instance to be existent, the predicate applies to it, such a proposition will be true. It is said that the criterion of truth for these propositions is their correspondence with the case itself, for not all their instances exist in the external world, so that we may evaluate the correspondence between the purport of the propositions with them, and say that they correspond to the external world.

Likewise with regard to propositions which are formed of secondary intelligibles, such as logical propositions and propositions which apply to judgments about nonexistent objects or impossible objects, it is said that the criterion for their truth is their correspondence to a thing in itself.

With regard to the meaning of this expression, there are several accounts which are either very artificial, such as the saying of some philosophers that the word ‘amr ’ (case) is the world of the abstract, or they do not solve the problem, such as the saying that what is meant by ‘nafs al-amr ’ is the thing itself, for the question is left unanswered that at last for the evaluation of these propositions, with what are they to be evaluated?

With the explanation of the truth and falsity of propositions it became clear that the meaning ofnafs al-amr is something other than external reality, rather it is a container for the intellectual demonstration of reference which differs in various cases. In some cases it is a specific level of the mind, such as with regard to logical propositions. In other cases it is the assumption of an external demonstration, such as the referent of the proposition of the impossibility of the unity of contradictories. In cases in which there is an accidental relation in the external world, such as when it is said, “The cause of the absence of the effect is the absence of the cause,” it is established that the relation of causality in truth is between the existence of the cause and the existence of the effect, and accidentally it is also related to their absence.

Lesson Twenty: The Evaluation of Ethical and Legal Propositions

Features of Ethical and Legal Knowledge

Knowledge of ethics and law, sometimes called ‘evaluative knowledge’, has features which can be divided into two general groups. One group of features is related to specific imaginative concepts, from which legal and ethical terms are formed. This was discussed in Lesson Fifteen. The other group of features concerns the shape and form of evaluative terms. Legal and ethical knowledge may thus be explained in two ways: one is in the form of prescriptions and commands and prohibitions, as is seen in may verses of the Noble Qur’ān; and the other is in descriptive form, the from of propositions which have the logical forms of subjects and predicates or antecedent and consequent, which is employed in other verses and narrations.

We know that prescriptive expressions are not propositions and do not have truth values, so one should not ask whether they are true or false. If one does ask this question, the answer is neither one nor the other, but it is simply prescriptive. Indeed, with respect to commands and prohibitions, it may be said that they potentially indicate the desirability of the object commanded for the one who commands, or the undesirability of the object of prohibition for the one who prohibits, and because of this potential indication, they may be said to be true or false. If the object of command is really desired by the one who commands and the object of prohibitions is really detested by the one who issues the prohibition, the prescriptive expressions, according to what they potentially indicate, are true, and otherwise they are false.

Some Western thinkers have imagined that the consistency of ethical and legal rules is based on command, prohibition, obligation and warning, in other words, that their essence is prescriptive. Therefore, ethical and legal knowledge is not considered to have truth value. Naturally, they believe that there is no standard for their truth or falsity, and that no criterion for recognizing their truth or error can be produced.

This idea is wrong. Without a doubt, ethical and legal rules can be expressed in the form of descriptive expressions and logical propositions without prescriptive meaning. In reality, to try to fit ethical and legal knowledge into the framework of prescriptive expressions is either to consider them to be a sort of mental diversion or to be solely for the sake of meeting certain educational goals.

The Criterion for the Truth and Falsity of Evaluative Propositions

Ethical and legal propositions are explained in two ways: the first way is by describing the application of specific rules in a certain system. For example, it is said, “Lying for the purpose of reconciliation is permitted in Islam,” or “Cutting the hand of a thief in Islam is obligatory,” and when a jurist or Muslim judge explains such precepts he does not need mention the

ethical or legal system of Islam. Hence, the expression “according to Islam” is not usually employed.

The criterion for the truth and falsity of such propositions is their correspondence or non-correspondence to ethical and legal references and sources. The way of knowing them is to refer to sources related to the appropriate system. For example, the way of knowing the ethical and legal precepts of Islam is to refer to the Qur’ān and sunnah.

The second way to describe their real application and the ‘case itself’ of their purport is with regard to the universal principles of ethics and law, including natural law, without paying attention to whether it is valid or not in a specific system of values or accepted by a given society. Consider for example the following ethical propositions: “Justice is good,” or “One ought not to be cruel to anyone,” and such legal propositions as, “Every human has a right to life,” and “No one must be killed undeservingly.”

There are a variety of views about this subject, and especially in Western ethical and legal philosophy, it has become an arena of conflict.

A Review of the Most Famous Opinions

The most famous opinions on this matter are the following:

A. Some of the Western philosophers of ethics and law basically deny the fundamental and proven principles, especially the positivists, who consider discussion of them to be vain and meaningless, as they are metaphysical and unscientific thoughts.

Of course, as much is to be expected from the sympathizers of this school of so-called positivists, whose eyes are glued to the senses. With regard to other thinkers who have occasionally raised this kind of issue, it must be said that the origin of this idea is the change in legal and ethical values in different societies at different times, which has led them to believe in the relativity of ethics and law, and has led them to doubt or deny basic evaluative principles. The roots of such ideas may be found in explanations of the relativity of ethics and law.

B. Another group of philosophers considers evaluative propositions to express social values arising from the needs of people and their inner emotions, which change as they change; hence, they hold that ethical propositions are outside the realm of rational discussion based on certain, eternal and necessary principles. On this basis, the criteria for the truth and falsity of these propositions would be these same needs and inclinations which are the causes of their validity.

In reply, it must be said that undoubtedly all practical wisdom is related to the voluntary behavior of man, behavior originating from a kind of desire and inner inclination directed toward a specific goal and destination. On this basis, specific non-whatish concepts occur, and propositions are formed from them. The role of practical wisdom, however, is to lead man as he is confronted with a choice among diverse desires and inclinations to the basic and lofty human goal, and it leads him toward happiness and desired perfection. Such a way does not often correspond with the desires of most people, who are bound to their animal desires, to worldly fleeting material pleasures. Rather it forces them to adjust their instinctual animal desires and to close their eyes to material worldly pleasures.

Therefore, if by people’s needs and inclinations we mean just individual and group needs, which are actually always in conflict and interfere with each other, and cause corruption and the decay of society, then this is something opposed to the basic goals of ethics and law. If the meaning is the specific needs and lofty human inclinations which are latent in most people and are unactualized and dominated by animal desires and tendencies, this is not incompatible with constancy, eternity, universality and necessity. These kinds of propositions need not be dispelled from the realm of demonstrative knowledge. As the evaluative concepts, which are usually subjects of this kind of proposition, implicitly contain a sort of figure of speech, this does not mean that they are without any intellectual basis, as was shown in Lesson Fifteen.

C. The third view is that the principles of ethics and law stem from self-evident propositions of practical reason, and like the self-evident propositions of theoretical reason, they arise from the nature of the intellect, and are without need of proof or argument. The criterion for their truth and falsity is agreement and opposition to human conscience.

The roots of this view lie in the thoughts of the ancient Greek philosophers, and most Eastern and Western philosophers have accepted it. Among them, Kant has emphasized it. Of all the views, it is the most dignified one, and the one closest to the truth. But at the same time, it is open to subtle objections, some of which will be indicated.

1. On the surface, this view asserts the multiplicity of intellects and the separation of their percepts, which may be denied.

2. The difficulty which is related to innateness of percepts of the theoretical intellect also applies to this view.

3. The principles of ethics and law are imagined in this view to be without need of reasoning and justification. Even the most universal of them, the good of justice and the evil of injustice, are in need of proof, as will be indicated.

Inquiry about a Problem

In order to make the truth clear regarding this question, several brief introductory remarks will be mentioned. Their detailed explanation will be left for the philosophy of ethics and law.

1. Ethical and legal propositions are related to the voluntary behavior of man, behavior which is the means to obtain desired goals. Their value derives from the fact that they are means and instruments to those desired goals.

2. The goals man attempts to achieve are either to secure natural worldly needs, and satisfying animal desires, or for securing social welfare and the prevention of corruption and anarchy, or for the achievement of eternal felicity and spiritual perfection. The natural and animal goals are not the source of values for the primary movement toward them. Of themselves, they have no relation to ethics and law. However, social interests, whether or not they conflict with individual interests and pleasures, are one of the sources from which value arises. Another source from which value arises is the view toward eternal happiness, for the sake of which one must cover one’s eyes from some material and worldly desires. Above all, as motivation

for behavior, is the desire to reach human perfection, which, in the view of Islam, is to be close to God the Most High. Therefore, it can be said that value in all cases arises from putting aside one’s desires for the sake of reaching higher desires.

3. Regarding the law, different goals have been presented, the most universal and most inclusive of which is securing social interests, which has various branches. On the other hand, different ideals have been mentioned for ethics. Above all of them is the extreme perfection of being in the shadow of those close to God the Most High. If this goal is the motivation of man’s behavior, either individually or socially, it will have ethical value. Therefore, behavior regarding the law can also be included under the umbrella of ethics, on the condition that the motivation be ethical.

4. The mentioned goals have two aspects. One is their desirability for man such that it causes man to close his eyes to base desires. On this view, these goals are related to the innate desires of man to achieve happiness and perfection. This aspect is psychological. It is subordinate to scientific and perceptual principles and knowledge. The other aspect is ontological (takwīnī ), which is completely objective and independent of individual inclinations, desires, recognition and knowledge. If an action is considered in relation to its desired goal, from the point of view of its desirability, the concept of value may be abstracted from it. If it is considered with respect to its ontological relation, with the consequences which result from it, the concepts of obligation and permissibility are obtained from it. In philosophical language, such obligation is interpreted as relative necessity (ḍarurat bil-qiyās ).

Now, with regard to this introduction, we can come to the conclusion that the criterion of truth and falsity and correctness and error in ethical and legal propositions is their effect in achieving the desired goals. The effect which is not subordinate to one’s inclinations, desires, tastes and opinion. Like other causal relations, it arises from the reality of the case itself. Of course, in recognizing the ultimate goal, and the intermediate goals, it is possible to make mistakes, so that, for example, someone on the basis of his materialistic outlook will limit man’s goal to worldly luxuries. Likewise, it is possible to make mistakes in recognition of the ways in which a man achieves real goals. But none of these mistakes are harmful to the causal relation between voluntary actions and their results, nor do they cause their exclusion from the realm of intellectual discussions and rational arguments. The errors of philosophers do not imply a denial of intellectual realities independent from opinion and thought. Controversies among scientists about the rules of experimental knowledge do not mean that there is no such knowledge to be gained.

In conclusion, the principles of ethics and law are philosophical propositions that can be proven by intellectual arguments, although the intellect of the common man in its subdivisions and particularities is deficient and is unable to deduce a judgment for every particular proposition from the universal principles because of the complexity of the formulas, the abundance of factors and variables, and due to lack of proficiency. In these cases, there is no alternative but to rely on revelation.

Therefore, it cannot be said that ethical and legal propositions depend on the inclinations, desires, tastes and opinions of individuals or groups, and hence that definitive and universal principles are not acceptable; nor can it be said that ethical and legal propositions depend on the needs and changing conditions of the time and place, and that rational proofs do not apply to them but only to universal, eternal and necessary propositions. It is also wrong to claim that these propositions pertain to an intellect other than the theoretical intellect, and that therefore reasoning about them with philosophical premises related to the theoretical intellect is incorrect.

Answer to an Objection

An objection may be raised here on the grounds that this view contradicts the opinion of all the logicians, an opinion which is also accepted by the Islamic philosophers. In logic, it is mentioned that a dialectical argument (jadal ) is composed of indemonstrable indisputable premises, but on the contrary, a proof (burhān ) is composed of certain premises, and an example of an indemonstrable premise is, “Truth is good,” which is an ethical proposition.

In response, it must be stated that the greatest logicians of Islam, Ibn Sīnā and Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, have suggested that these propositions in this universal and absolute form, are considered indemonstrable, and may only be employed in dialectical arguments, not in proofs. They have hidden and special restrictions which are obtained from the relation between and actions and its desired result. Hence, it is not correct to tell the truth when it leads to someone’s murder. Therefore, if this kind of proposition in this absolute and universal form is applied in a syllogism on the basis of its general acceptance, the proposition will be dialectical. However, it is possible that this same proposition may be transformed into a certain proposition by taking into account rational standards, subtle relations and hidden restrictions. For such propositions proofs may be constructed, and their conclusions may be used in other proofs.

Relativism in Ethics and Law

As was mentioned, most value propositions, especially legal propositions, have exceptions, and even the goodness of truth telling is not universal. One the other hand, sometimes a single subject really may be the locus of two topics to which conflicting judgments apply. In case the criteria utilized for them are equal, one is free to use either. In case the importance of one of the criteria is preferred over another, one ought to defer to the more important criterion. In practice, the other is then mooted. Likewise, it is seen that some legal judgments have temporal restrictions, and after a while they are abrogated. Attention to this point has brought about the idea of the absolute relativity of the value propositions, and the idea that they do not apply generally to all individuals at all times. Schools of thought with positivistic inclinations also consider differences in value systems in different societies and times to provide reason for relativism with respect to all value propositions.

But the truth is that this kind of relativism can be found in the laws of the empirical sciences, and the universality of empirical laws is based on the

satisfaction of conditions and the nonexistence of obstacles. From a philosophical point of view, these restrictions are due to the complexity of the causes of phenomena. With the lack of one of the conditions, the effect is also annulled.

Therefore, if the causes of ethical and legal judgments are precisely determined, and the conditions and restrictions of their subjects are completely accounted for, we will see that ethical and legal principles, in the limits of these standards and final causes, are general and absolute. In this respect, they are no different from the other scientific laws.

It must be mentioned that in this discussion other focus has been on the universal principles of ethics and law; but some particularities, such as traffic regulations and the like, fall outside the scope of this discussion.

The Difference between Legal and Ethical Propositions

Now that we have come to the end of this discussions, we had better mention the difference between legal and ethical propositions. Of course, there are numerous differences between these two groups of propositions which must be discussed in legal and ethical philosophy. Here we simply point out one of these differences which is more important and basic, the difference in their goals.

As we know, the basic goal of the law is the social happiness of the people in worldly life, which is determined by legal rules with the guarantee of government enforcement. However, the ultimate goal of ethics is eternal happiness and spiritual perfection, and its compass is wider than that of social conditions. Hence, legal and ethical subjects overlap. A proposition, insofar as it is related to the social happiness of man supported by government is legal, and insofar as it effects the eternal happiness and spiritual perfection of man, it is ethical, such as the existence of repayment of loans and the prohibition against treason. In such cases, if the observance of the rule is only motivated by fear of governmental punishment, it has no ethical value, even if it is in agreement with legal regulations. If the deed is motivated by a higher goal, which is an ethical goal, it will also be ethical.

It must be mentioned that these differences accord with a view which is accepted in ethics, and there are also other views, for information about which one must refer to books on ethics and the philosophy of law.

Part III: Ontology

TWO: THE PROPHET’S PLAN TO AVOID THE IFFERENCE:

1) ASAMA DELEGATION:

The Prophet became sick and the sickness told upon his life. He knew that the nation was at the verge of a precipice. His presence had kept them safe. The moment he dies: a movement they dash; a slip would send them headlong down into the sea where the waves raise and fall in a typhoon of treachery hailing from a man soon of mischief. The Arabs will confound their own good; teeth will be grinded to bite the members of his House and his people. The leaping opportunities will lull those who embrace them to launch revenges. On the other hand, the hypocrites will seek ambush in the midst of Muslims telling them what their hearts do not hold. All this harassing episodes came to his sight in much as the incident of rolling goglets at the tortile passage was also quite recent to him.22 Moreover and above all, Aswad al-Anasi and Musailama had set foot in the arena of prophet hood; and enmity with the real Prophet had lent lustre to a simulacrum. All this was much enough to occupy the mind that was now mindful of the talons of death.

The Prophet’s condition got worsening and the mischief extending as the negritude of a night. The clouds shall soon deplete their contents on the town.23

Yet, at the threshold of death that great mind charts out the best. He sends his army, thick, to a land remote. The command of the army he vests to a youth of teenage by name Asama Bin Zaid. All the magnates of MUHAJAREEN and ANSAAR (emigrants and helpers) including Abubaker,24 Omar Bin Khattab, Abdul Rehman Ibn Ouf, Abu Obaida, Sa’ad Bin Abi Waqqas, Aseed Bin Hazeer and Basheer-Ibn Sa’ad were enjoined to join the army under the command of that young Asama to fight in the land of BALKHA with the people of Obny who had defeated the Muslim army on a previous occasion and killed Zaid, the commander, father of Asama.

The Prophet pushed the army to move and cursed the delinquents. But those who spurned the suzerainty of a teenager as the yoke of his command fell heavy upon their old necks procrastinated. Their procrastination provoked the anger of the Prophet. Therefore he told them: “You are crossing his command as you did the command of his father before while God was in concord with the command and now his son is a perfect match to command.”

This incident raises astonishment in the thoughts; if rumination is solicited the result relaxes the curiosity:

First: A great army of Islam that day and in that delicate Situation emanating from the illness of the Prophet, and more delicate the mission -- to go to the war of the ardent enemies of Islam away from the Islamic capital under the command of a youth whose age did not go beyond twenty springs -- neither experience supported him nor military knowledge aided him; nor such a duty ever called his performance before; as to move either to return back with the pride of victory or remain in that outlandish fields slain and killed.

Second: yet, this boy is commissioned; and the shaikhs of Muslims -- the chiefs of tribes, the Companions of the Prophet and those who were commanders before are ordered to report their duty to this young man.25

Third: The Muslims delayed to join while the Prophet hasted. They still delayed and upon them heaped the curses of the Prophet. They prolonged the delay up to fourteen days. The young commander remained camped at JURE away from Madina by three and quarter miles awaiting his army to join him.

Neither shame withheld them nor did the fear of God. They went in their disobedience to the Prophet. They knew they were giving anger to the Prophet and receiving from him his curses; yet, they remained insurgents to him. Curse from a Divine man like the Prophet of God told nothing on their belief because now that man was nearing his death. Why at all they revolted?

Fourth: Their rejection to undergo the command of a youth did not make them to fear the anger of the Prophet. If they were true Muslims, had they believed in the Prophet; they had no right to deny obedience to him as long as the belief says that his action and his utterance is based on God’s revelation to him; and this belief takes away the choice from them.

Fifth: The Prophet knew his end has approached and thereby approached the darkness of the night. But, he was sending army away from the capital and by that sweeping Madina from the presence of the chiefs of Muhajareen and Ansaar and the men who had a say in the disputes.

All this shows that he held a point of a greater importance in his conspectuity. To search into the viewpoint of the Prophet we can make out the following conclusions which the Prophet should have had desired as long as he held the secrets of God known to him by revelation.

First: The measure is the efficiency in governing the things --, and not the fame nor the age. This he wanted to bring home to Muslims. Therefore, he told emphatically about the efficiency of Asama.

If we consider that Ali Bin Abi Taleb was nearing to take over the responsibility of the affairs of the Muslims, and let us suppose there was not text to have had specified him; yet, the case of Asama serves a pilot or a prelude to acquaint the people with the criterion of capability regardless of age for the leadership. That day age of Ali had not gone beyond thirty. We do not see any other interpretation to the riddle of Asama’s expedition.

Second: He wanted to make the ground clear for Ali by dispatching all those who had grinded their teeth for the caliphate. He seemed to be sure of the setback in the way as it is evident by his remark: “My household members shall be the victims after my death.” Hence, we see he enjoined to go in Asama’s army every that one who had lengthened his neck to hart a look of greed at the fast approaching vacancy. Exemption of Ali from this army supports us in our inference. Likewise all those who were the party (Shia) of Ali were exempted.

Besides, we reach the same conclusion if we were to interpret the reason of those who delayed in reporting their presence to the Commander, Asama; and their spreading the rumor of the Prophet’s death. What is evident is their own guilt -- which kept them from disclosing their real errand. They just took refuge in an excuse that the commander was an inexperienced youth. Beyond this we detectanother guilt . They did purport that they understood better than the Prophet whose wisdom was catered on Divine Revelation. There is no excuse but a fact -- established bythemselves -- that they openly disobeyed the Prophet and to him they remained stubborn.

The Prophet realized that his statements which he gave concerning the one to succeed him were not enough to put into practice as they refrained from joining the army under Asama’s command; or, the greed would have returned them back had they proceeded.

Third: The argument that a youth of teenage is not fit for the responsibility of a battle, then how could it fit even a greater responsibility of governing the affairs of all the Muslims; is only a lame endeavor to obfuscate the fact for the people.

The gist that can be deduced from this planned expedition of Asama is to clear the way for Ali in accordance with the circumstances surrounding them because the Prophet did know as per the signs he had noticed that they would concoct a plot. So, he exerted his efforts to send them away while exempted Ali and his associates from the obligation. They disobeyed him. He was nearing his death. The situation for the Muslims was serious. He cursed them. And a curse of the Prophet is a curse, today and tomorrow too, as it was yesterday. As the time is cycling, its echo is heard.

As long as the time exists, this too exists that being a young or being an old is not the canon; it is the obligation charted by the Prophet and laid down on the obedience; some turned stubborn-but they only purchased the Prophet’s curse and the obligation was not obliterated. Obedience to it runs as the time does.

Insufficient years in the age of the commander were sufficient enough to cause the uneasiness among them; is in itself a good excuse, but it coasts neither conviction nor cogency as much as it serves to hang a curtain over a subterraneous trait which the Prophet had already discovered. If the reason was this, then why did they implement the Asama’s expedition under the same command of a teenager as soon as the issue of caliphate was settled in the favor of Abu Baker? Omar himself addressed this very teenager as ‘AMEER’ (chief)

throughout his life because of his superiority in that expedition which was a success too.

Another strange excuse that we hear is not less astonishing. It was not a disobedience that they delayed. It was sympathy for the prophet because of his oiling condition. Had they obeyed the prophet it would have had been a greater and a befitting sympathy to a dying man rather than to disappoint him and make him angry which was so painful to him that he cursed.

A good in its exuberance and abundance would have hailed had they been good enough to obey their Prophet. The course of history would have changed.

“If the people of the towns had but believed and feared (God),We should indeed have opened out to them blessings from the sky and earth; but they lied, and we punished them for what they were attaining.” (7:94) The events that followed, the difference that flooded sweeping the unity of Muslims, the blood that flowed in the erine and ferly wars, the power that became feeble, and the fatal blows on the religious sanctity; all this is because of that -- the open disobedience to the Prophet!

What a great havoc and a great calamity the Prophet tried to protect the nation from; but to a dying man there is no command, and to whom no command -- no obedience too.

B-- A Paper and a Pen:

The Prophet witnessed their disobedience. To go to the pulpit, his sickness failed him. This was the first time in his life at Madina that his orders were denied to his face. He saw his own inability to execute his orders, which he was so insistent upon. Therefore, he should resort to some other means to implement the need. He was not yet dead and disobedience had made its phase. So, how could they be expected to obey afterwards? To write down was the best alternative; and he resorted to. That would be a fixed text nothing to be doubted nor forgotten. They will not be misguided, as there will be no deviation from the right path because thereexists writing. This he wanted to do.

It was Thursday. His condition got worse. In the house men were present among them Omar Bin Khattab. “Provide me so that to write a treatise for you. You will never go astray later on.” The Prophet told the men.

What a great opportunity! An eternal security from getting astray!How advantageous an offer it was; not only to those who were present but to the posterity. A bounty it was. Curiosity suggests that they should have hasted to give him a paper and a pen so as to make eternal what he wishes to write. But, alas, it was not so!

Oman Bin Khattab impeded the compliance. He said:” the pain has overpowered the Prophet of God.” According to some narration he said: “This man is talking nonsense. You have Quran. The Book of God is enough to us.” A debate took place among the men. Somesided the suggestion of Omar that the man was talking nonsense….

So, now what the Prophet should do? Sickness him; and in his presence such an opinion about him was expressed to his very face. But the belief says this: “He never speaks of his own unless it is a Revelation.” Then, what blame this is upon the Prophet that he was talking which carried no sense?

God forbid from such a conjecture. The division of opinion took its root and the root took deeper and deeper to this day of ours. He did not see any other alternative but to hint attheir own error. He said: “Go away. You should not quarrel in the presence of the Prophet.” This he said so as to register his displeasure upon their behavior -- an evidence of their disobedience, throughout the ages.

In fact, it is a calamity -- one among the greatest, because of the rejection to guidance. Ibn Abbas, the ink of the nation, used to say: “It is a calamity that he (Omar) hindered him from writing the treatise he wanted to write.”

Let one ruminate what was the point in Omar’s objection? Had he written what harm it could have done to Omar? The Prophet wanted to leave a written instruction for the nation’s guidance. So, he rejects that guidance not only to himself but for the whole nation. Another question arises. Did Omar really believe that the Prophet of God was talking without a meaning or a sense? To carry such a belief one should be ignorant of the Prophet’s status as well as Quran too. If we proceed a little further and come to Abu Baker, this very same Omar did not say that he (Abu baker) was talking nonsense when he wanted to make the will about the caliphate although occasionally he was going into coma while dictating the will which later Othman completed by inserting Omar’s name fearing his death before the completion of letter. The status of Abu Baker is not that of the Prophet. But he, although in coma, spoke the sense? What a tyranny to Mohammed?

It is quite obvious that Omar did know what the Prophet wanted to commit to the paper. It was the appointment of Ali to succeed him because on previous occasion, at GHADEER, the Prophet had declared: “Two heavy things, Book of God and his progeny” and had classified “Both will not separate from each other till they come to him at the fountain”26 , and had added “You will never go astray if you adhere to them both.” So, when the Prophet said while asking for pen and paper “After that you will never go astray”27 , it served a good hint for Omar to know the Prophet’s mind. Omar said: “Book of God is enough for us” which purports that among the two, one is enough -- no need for the other. Why he chose one and rejected the other at a time the Prophet was talking nonsense (according to his own declaration). When Omar understood the message and was mindful what to accept and what to reject; then the Prophet had not uttered any nonsense. It was far from politeness to accuse the Prophet of such a thing and that too to his face.

Indeed, it is neither easy nor simple; it is a matter of courage, and courage against whom? Against the Prophet of God the Almighty!!! There was only one to show it, to do it, departing from every canon upon which relations, those of human or those of social are based and formed. And that one was only Omar Bin Khattab. He stymied the letter from being written. He ceased the opportunity at an opportune time and went a great deal to install Abu Baker as caliph of the Prophet who spoke ‘nonsense.’ We shall see that this man (Omar)

denies the death of the Prophet. His stand at the SAQIFA and his struggle for Abu Baker, all that we shall see would show his intentions. Had not there been Omar, no ground would have been gained for Abu Baker.28 Sword of Zubair he broke; a blow at the chest of MIQDAD he hit; Sa’ad Bin Ebada he kicked and it was to him he said: “Kill him, he is mischievous”; the nose of AL-HABAB BIN ALMUNDHIR he broke; whoever took refuge in the house of Fatimah, daughter of the Prophet, he threatened; and finally he came out of SAQIFA with a cane of palm tree29 in his hand roaming about calling the people to yield to the sovereignty of Abubaker. So, what else and what more he could have done? He did all what all could have not done.

No one can deny the disinclination of Omar Bin Khattab towards Ali Bin Abi Taleb and Omar’s being watchful against Ali with regards succeeding the Prophet. Likewise his party that was composed of Abu Baker, Abi Obaida, Salem Moula Hazifa, Ma’az Bin Jabal and their associates.Same to Ali who clearly indicated his disagreement with them in all stations and situations. He did not yield to Abubaker as long as Fatima was alive. After her death he lost his backbone and remained with no alternative but to accept. Throughout the period which stretched from Abu Baker and ended by the end of Othman, he never took any part in any of the battles while he was the pivot like one that is to a hand mill. Ali had told this to Omar that he (Omar) supported Abubaker only because to rotate the succession to himself. He once told Omar: “Milk it for you while keeping tied the other half to him today in order that he could return it to you tomorrow.”30 So it happened. Abubaker nominated Omar to succeed him.

The meanders of their minds finally became manifested in open expression. How they disdained Ali could be judged from a conversation between Omar and Ibn Abbas which we insert here as it is narrated by Ibn Abbas:31

Omar to Ibn Abbas: “Do you know what kept your people from you after Mohammed?”

Ibn Abbas: “If I don’t know, you would inform me.”

Omar: “They hated to see the prophet hood and the caliphate combined at you. So they (Quraish) took to boast upon you by choosing the caliphate. They succeeded and hit the target.”

Ibn Abbas: “If you permit me and don’t get angry I’ll speak.” Omar: “Answer!” “Speak”

Ibn Abbas: “As for your saying-Quraish succeeded and hit the target, had they chosen for themselves as God had chosen for them, it would have had been good to them that could not be rejected nor felt jealousy upon. As for your saying that they hated to see the prophethood and caliphate combined with us, God has described the people who hate: “That they hated what God sent down; and He spoiled their deeds.”

Omar: “Oh, by God, words about you had been reaching me, but I hated to make you run away because of your position which I don’t want to lower down.”

Ibn Abbas: “What’s that? If that was true, why should my position come down? If it was a lie, it discloses the self.”

Omar: “I am informed that you say: ‘We have taken it by tyranny and jealousy.”

Ibn Abbas: “As for tyranny, it is evident even to an ignorant and to him who has endured it. As for jealousy, Satan felt it towards Adam and we are the children of him who was the butt of jealousy.”

Omar: “Ali, your hearts, O son of Hashim, are full with neither jealousy neither enmity goes nor the veil.”

Ibn Abbas: “Wait; don’t say so. Our hearts are those which God has purified and removed error there from-either that of jealousy or that of deceit. The Prophet’s heart was from Bani Hashim.” Omar: “Go away.”

We narrated the conversation in detail because it discloses to us.

1- The effusion of malice rankled on both the sides and the sparks that ignite the flames.

2- The deliberation on their part to hinder the thing from the household members of the Prophet based on the sentiments of rancor and their fear that the caliphate in addition to the prophet hood if stored in the Prophet’s house it would be the factor for their ostentation and arrogance. According to Ibn Abbas such a fear was due to their jealousy and this was the tyranny.

3- The ‘Imamate’ is God’s choice, which He appropriated in the members of His Prophet’s House. It can not have bearing upon the pleasure or displeasure of Quraish.

4- Their tyranny in depriving the Prophet’ Household members of their right, this is a fact all know.

In the answers of Iban Abbas we see these two things are stressed upon in spite of his reservation to eschew Omar’s wrath from which ultimately he could not remain safe. The answer of Omar “Go away”, at which ends the conversation, shows the inability on the part of Omar to answer.

History can not deny nor could conceal the motive that pushed Omar to say that the Prophet was talking nonsense and to declare that only the Book of God would suffice the people. All this was to keep the thing from Ali.

Indeed, there are lame excuses. Some put forward such as that the very issue itself was not an obligatory one; and, therefore, it did not tantamount to disobedience. Of course, such an excuse is good enough for rejection alone because there is nothing more obligatory than the guidance of people. The prophet said: “After that you shall never go astray.” Opinion was not solicited. Omar gave his opinion and imposed it, which made the Prophet angry to the extent that he ordered them to go away. Still, it was not disobedience; then what else it was? “Pain has overcome him,” “Nonsense”; these words could hardly be said to an ordinary man particularly in his illness. To behave far from politeness towards the Prophet could never have become possible unless disobedience to him should have had been a deliberate determination. The words of Omar are quite clear: “The Book of God is enough to us” which mean acceptance of one and rejection of the other. To poke nose into the orders of the Prophet so as to adjust our own pleasure can not be classified in any word other than that of disobedience.

Anyway, the circumstances that surround the whole episode, the expedition of Asama and the insurgency to proceed in that expedition, the Prophet’s orders to give him a pen and paper so that “to not go astray”, and the insistence of Omar upon the Book of God alone; we can deduce from all these that the Prophet wanted to classify or specify or make it known who was to succeed him and that ‘who’ was Ali son of Abi Taleb. But the Prophet was not obeyed. The caliphate became the spot of difference among the Muslims and misguidance as well. Had the Prophet been obeyed and had he written; then there was no room for doubt or for difference except to depart from Islam it.

Here one possibility seems quite likely to have had occurred in the Prophet’s mind and which should have had kept him from giving an indication by spoken words and that is his fear of an open insurgency out of their stubbornness and turning against Islam altogether. So, he avoided a greater calamity. Therefore, we see Ali too remained silent as his motive too was the same. These words of Ali in his speech of ‘SHQ SHAQIA’ give us a clue: “I got up to discern between the two things, to capture with a broken hand or to remain quiet in a pit’s darkness; Ii found the patience more prudent than the two…” His stand with the caliphate shall in the fourth chapter.

TWO: THE PROPHET’S PLAN TO AVOID THE IFFERENCE:

1) ASAMA DELEGATION:

The Prophet became sick and the sickness told upon his life. He knew that the nation was at the verge of a precipice. His presence had kept them safe. The moment he dies: a movement they dash; a slip would send them headlong down into the sea where the waves raise and fall in a typhoon of treachery hailing from a man soon of mischief. The Arabs will confound their own good; teeth will be grinded to bite the members of his House and his people. The leaping opportunities will lull those who embrace them to launch revenges. On the other hand, the hypocrites will seek ambush in the midst of Muslims telling them what their hearts do not hold. All this harassing episodes came to his sight in much as the incident of rolling goglets at the tortile passage was also quite recent to him.22 Moreover and above all, Aswad al-Anasi and Musailama had set foot in the arena of prophet hood; and enmity with the real Prophet had lent lustre to a simulacrum. All this was much enough to occupy the mind that was now mindful of the talons of death.

The Prophet’s condition got worsening and the mischief extending as the negritude of a night. The clouds shall soon deplete their contents on the town.23

Yet, at the threshold of death that great mind charts out the best. He sends his army, thick, to a land remote. The command of the army he vests to a youth of teenage by name Asama Bin Zaid. All the magnates of MUHAJAREEN and ANSAAR (emigrants and helpers) including Abubaker,24 Omar Bin Khattab, Abdul Rehman Ibn Ouf, Abu Obaida, Sa’ad Bin Abi Waqqas, Aseed Bin Hazeer and Basheer-Ibn Sa’ad were enjoined to join the army under the command of that young Asama to fight in the land of BALKHA with the people of Obny who had defeated the Muslim army on a previous occasion and killed Zaid, the commander, father of Asama.

The Prophet pushed the army to move and cursed the delinquents. But those who spurned the suzerainty of a teenager as the yoke of his command fell heavy upon their old necks procrastinated. Their procrastination provoked the anger of the Prophet. Therefore he told them: “You are crossing his command as you did the command of his father before while God was in concord with the command and now his son is a perfect match to command.”

This incident raises astonishment in the thoughts; if rumination is solicited the result relaxes the curiosity:

First: A great army of Islam that day and in that delicate Situation emanating from the illness of the Prophet, and more delicate the mission -- to go to the war of the ardent enemies of Islam away from the Islamic capital under the command of a youth whose age did not go beyond twenty springs -- neither experience supported him nor military knowledge aided him; nor such a duty ever called his performance before; as to move either to return back with the pride of victory or remain in that outlandish fields slain and killed.

Second: yet, this boy is commissioned; and the shaikhs of Muslims -- the chiefs of tribes, the Companions of the Prophet and those who were commanders before are ordered to report their duty to this young man.25

Third: The Muslims delayed to join while the Prophet hasted. They still delayed and upon them heaped the curses of the Prophet. They prolonged the delay up to fourteen days. The young commander remained camped at JURE away from Madina by three and quarter miles awaiting his army to join him.

Neither shame withheld them nor did the fear of God. They went in their disobedience to the Prophet. They knew they were giving anger to the Prophet and receiving from him his curses; yet, they remained insurgents to him. Curse from a Divine man like the Prophet of God told nothing on their belief because now that man was nearing his death. Why at all they revolted?

Fourth: Their rejection to undergo the command of a youth did not make them to fear the anger of the Prophet. If they were true Muslims, had they believed in the Prophet; they had no right to deny obedience to him as long as the belief says that his action and his utterance is based on God’s revelation to him; and this belief takes away the choice from them.

Fifth: The Prophet knew his end has approached and thereby approached the darkness of the night. But, he was sending army away from the capital and by that sweeping Madina from the presence of the chiefs of Muhajareen and Ansaar and the men who had a say in the disputes.

All this shows that he held a point of a greater importance in his conspectuity. To search into the viewpoint of the Prophet we can make out the following conclusions which the Prophet should have had desired as long as he held the secrets of God known to him by revelation.

First: The measure is the efficiency in governing the things --, and not the fame nor the age. This he wanted to bring home to Muslims. Therefore, he told emphatically about the efficiency of Asama.

If we consider that Ali Bin Abi Taleb was nearing to take over the responsibility of the affairs of the Muslims, and let us suppose there was not text to have had specified him; yet, the case of Asama serves a pilot or a prelude to acquaint the people with the criterion of capability regardless of age for the leadership. That day age of Ali had not gone beyond thirty. We do not see any other interpretation to the riddle of Asama’s expedition.

Second: He wanted to make the ground clear for Ali by dispatching all those who had grinded their teeth for the caliphate. He seemed to be sure of the setback in the way as it is evident by his remark: “My household members shall be the victims after my death.” Hence, we see he enjoined to go in Asama’s army every that one who had lengthened his neck to hart a look of greed at the fast approaching vacancy. Exemption of Ali from this army supports us in our inference. Likewise all those who were the party (Shia) of Ali were exempted.

Besides, we reach the same conclusion if we were to interpret the reason of those who delayed in reporting their presence to the Commander, Asama; and their spreading the rumor of the Prophet’s death. What is evident is their own guilt -- which kept them from disclosing their real errand. They just took refuge in an excuse that the commander was an inexperienced youth. Beyond this we detectanother guilt . They did purport that they understood better than the Prophet whose wisdom was catered on Divine Revelation. There is no excuse but a fact -- established bythemselves -- that they openly disobeyed the Prophet and to him they remained stubborn.

The Prophet realized that his statements which he gave concerning the one to succeed him were not enough to put into practice as they refrained from joining the army under Asama’s command; or, the greed would have returned them back had they proceeded.

Third: The argument that a youth of teenage is not fit for the responsibility of a battle, then how could it fit even a greater responsibility of governing the affairs of all the Muslims; is only a lame endeavor to obfuscate the fact for the people.

The gist that can be deduced from this planned expedition of Asama is to clear the way for Ali in accordance with the circumstances surrounding them because the Prophet did know as per the signs he had noticed that they would concoct a plot. So, he exerted his efforts to send them away while exempted Ali and his associates from the obligation. They disobeyed him. He was nearing his death. The situation for the Muslims was serious. He cursed them. And a curse of the Prophet is a curse, today and tomorrow too, as it was yesterday. As the time is cycling, its echo is heard.

As long as the time exists, this too exists that being a young or being an old is not the canon; it is the obligation charted by the Prophet and laid down on the obedience; some turned stubborn-but they only purchased the Prophet’s curse and the obligation was not obliterated. Obedience to it runs as the time does.

Insufficient years in the age of the commander were sufficient enough to cause the uneasiness among them; is in itself a good excuse, but it coasts neither conviction nor cogency as much as it serves to hang a curtain over a subterraneous trait which the Prophet had already discovered. If the reason was this, then why did they implement the Asama’s expedition under the same command of a teenager as soon as the issue of caliphate was settled in the favor of Abu Baker? Omar himself addressed this very teenager as ‘AMEER’ (chief)

throughout his life because of his superiority in that expedition which was a success too.

Another strange excuse that we hear is not less astonishing. It was not a disobedience that they delayed. It was sympathy for the prophet because of his oiling condition. Had they obeyed the prophet it would have had been a greater and a befitting sympathy to a dying man rather than to disappoint him and make him angry which was so painful to him that he cursed.

A good in its exuberance and abundance would have hailed had they been good enough to obey their Prophet. The course of history would have changed.

“If the people of the towns had but believed and feared (God),We should indeed have opened out to them blessings from the sky and earth; but they lied, and we punished them for what they were attaining.” (7:94) The events that followed, the difference that flooded sweeping the unity of Muslims, the blood that flowed in the erine and ferly wars, the power that became feeble, and the fatal blows on the religious sanctity; all this is because of that -- the open disobedience to the Prophet!

What a great havoc and a great calamity the Prophet tried to protect the nation from; but to a dying man there is no command, and to whom no command -- no obedience too.

B-- A Paper and a Pen:

The Prophet witnessed their disobedience. To go to the pulpit, his sickness failed him. This was the first time in his life at Madina that his orders were denied to his face. He saw his own inability to execute his orders, which he was so insistent upon. Therefore, he should resort to some other means to implement the need. He was not yet dead and disobedience had made its phase. So, how could they be expected to obey afterwards? To write down was the best alternative; and he resorted to. That would be a fixed text nothing to be doubted nor forgotten. They will not be misguided, as there will be no deviation from the right path because thereexists writing. This he wanted to do.

It was Thursday. His condition got worse. In the house men were present among them Omar Bin Khattab. “Provide me so that to write a treatise for you. You will never go astray later on.” The Prophet told the men.

What a great opportunity! An eternal security from getting astray!How advantageous an offer it was; not only to those who were present but to the posterity. A bounty it was. Curiosity suggests that they should have hasted to give him a paper and a pen so as to make eternal what he wishes to write. But, alas, it was not so!

Oman Bin Khattab impeded the compliance. He said:” the pain has overpowered the Prophet of God.” According to some narration he said: “This man is talking nonsense. You have Quran. The Book of God is enough to us.” A debate took place among the men. Somesided the suggestion of Omar that the man was talking nonsense….

So, now what the Prophet should do? Sickness him; and in his presence such an opinion about him was expressed to his very face. But the belief says this: “He never speaks of his own unless it is a Revelation.” Then, what blame this is upon the Prophet that he was talking which carried no sense?

God forbid from such a conjecture. The division of opinion took its root and the root took deeper and deeper to this day of ours. He did not see any other alternative but to hint attheir own error. He said: “Go away. You should not quarrel in the presence of the Prophet.” This he said so as to register his displeasure upon their behavior -- an evidence of their disobedience, throughout the ages.

In fact, it is a calamity -- one among the greatest, because of the rejection to guidance. Ibn Abbas, the ink of the nation, used to say: “It is a calamity that he (Omar) hindered him from writing the treatise he wanted to write.”

Let one ruminate what was the point in Omar’s objection? Had he written what harm it could have done to Omar? The Prophet wanted to leave a written instruction for the nation’s guidance. So, he rejects that guidance not only to himself but for the whole nation. Another question arises. Did Omar really believe that the Prophet of God was talking without a meaning or a sense? To carry such a belief one should be ignorant of the Prophet’s status as well as Quran too. If we proceed a little further and come to Abu Baker, this very same Omar did not say that he (Abu baker) was talking nonsense when he wanted to make the will about the caliphate although occasionally he was going into coma while dictating the will which later Othman completed by inserting Omar’s name fearing his death before the completion of letter. The status of Abu Baker is not that of the Prophet. But he, although in coma, spoke the sense? What a tyranny to Mohammed?

It is quite obvious that Omar did know what the Prophet wanted to commit to the paper. It was the appointment of Ali to succeed him because on previous occasion, at GHADEER, the Prophet had declared: “Two heavy things, Book of God and his progeny” and had classified “Both will not separate from each other till they come to him at the fountain”26 , and had added “You will never go astray if you adhere to them both.” So, when the Prophet said while asking for pen and paper “After that you will never go astray”27 , it served a good hint for Omar to know the Prophet’s mind. Omar said: “Book of God is enough for us” which purports that among the two, one is enough -- no need for the other. Why he chose one and rejected the other at a time the Prophet was talking nonsense (according to his own declaration). When Omar understood the message and was mindful what to accept and what to reject; then the Prophet had not uttered any nonsense. It was far from politeness to accuse the Prophet of such a thing and that too to his face.

Indeed, it is neither easy nor simple; it is a matter of courage, and courage against whom? Against the Prophet of God the Almighty!!! There was only one to show it, to do it, departing from every canon upon which relations, those of human or those of social are based and formed. And that one was only Omar Bin Khattab. He stymied the letter from being written. He ceased the opportunity at an opportune time and went a great deal to install Abu Baker as caliph of the Prophet who spoke ‘nonsense.’ We shall see that this man (Omar)

denies the death of the Prophet. His stand at the SAQIFA and his struggle for Abu Baker, all that we shall see would show his intentions. Had not there been Omar, no ground would have been gained for Abu Baker.28 Sword of Zubair he broke; a blow at the chest of MIQDAD he hit; Sa’ad Bin Ebada he kicked and it was to him he said: “Kill him, he is mischievous”; the nose of AL-HABAB BIN ALMUNDHIR he broke; whoever took refuge in the house of Fatimah, daughter of the Prophet, he threatened; and finally he came out of SAQIFA with a cane of palm tree29 in his hand roaming about calling the people to yield to the sovereignty of Abubaker. So, what else and what more he could have done? He did all what all could have not done.

No one can deny the disinclination of Omar Bin Khattab towards Ali Bin Abi Taleb and Omar’s being watchful against Ali with regards succeeding the Prophet. Likewise his party that was composed of Abu Baker, Abi Obaida, Salem Moula Hazifa, Ma’az Bin Jabal and their associates.Same to Ali who clearly indicated his disagreement with them in all stations and situations. He did not yield to Abubaker as long as Fatima was alive. After her death he lost his backbone and remained with no alternative but to accept. Throughout the period which stretched from Abu Baker and ended by the end of Othman, he never took any part in any of the battles while he was the pivot like one that is to a hand mill. Ali had told this to Omar that he (Omar) supported Abubaker only because to rotate the succession to himself. He once told Omar: “Milk it for you while keeping tied the other half to him today in order that he could return it to you tomorrow.”30 So it happened. Abubaker nominated Omar to succeed him.

The meanders of their minds finally became manifested in open expression. How they disdained Ali could be judged from a conversation between Omar and Ibn Abbas which we insert here as it is narrated by Ibn Abbas:31

Omar to Ibn Abbas: “Do you know what kept your people from you after Mohammed?”

Ibn Abbas: “If I don’t know, you would inform me.”

Omar: “They hated to see the prophet hood and the caliphate combined at you. So they (Quraish) took to boast upon you by choosing the caliphate. They succeeded and hit the target.”

Ibn Abbas: “If you permit me and don’t get angry I’ll speak.” Omar: “Answer!” “Speak”

Ibn Abbas: “As for your saying-Quraish succeeded and hit the target, had they chosen for themselves as God had chosen for them, it would have had been good to them that could not be rejected nor felt jealousy upon. As for your saying that they hated to see the prophethood and caliphate combined with us, God has described the people who hate: “That they hated what God sent down; and He spoiled their deeds.”

Omar: “Oh, by God, words about you had been reaching me, but I hated to make you run away because of your position which I don’t want to lower down.”

Ibn Abbas: “What’s that? If that was true, why should my position come down? If it was a lie, it discloses the self.”

Omar: “I am informed that you say: ‘We have taken it by tyranny and jealousy.”

Ibn Abbas: “As for tyranny, it is evident even to an ignorant and to him who has endured it. As for jealousy, Satan felt it towards Adam and we are the children of him who was the butt of jealousy.”

Omar: “Ali, your hearts, O son of Hashim, are full with neither jealousy neither enmity goes nor the veil.”

Ibn Abbas: “Wait; don’t say so. Our hearts are those which God has purified and removed error there from-either that of jealousy or that of deceit. The Prophet’s heart was from Bani Hashim.” Omar: “Go away.”

We narrated the conversation in detail because it discloses to us.

1- The effusion of malice rankled on both the sides and the sparks that ignite the flames.

2- The deliberation on their part to hinder the thing from the household members of the Prophet based on the sentiments of rancor and their fear that the caliphate in addition to the prophet hood if stored in the Prophet’s house it would be the factor for their ostentation and arrogance. According to Ibn Abbas such a fear was due to their jealousy and this was the tyranny.

3- The ‘Imamate’ is God’s choice, which He appropriated in the members of His Prophet’s House. It can not have bearing upon the pleasure or displeasure of Quraish.

4- Their tyranny in depriving the Prophet’ Household members of their right, this is a fact all know.

In the answers of Iban Abbas we see these two things are stressed upon in spite of his reservation to eschew Omar’s wrath from which ultimately he could not remain safe. The answer of Omar “Go away”, at which ends the conversation, shows the inability on the part of Omar to answer.

History can not deny nor could conceal the motive that pushed Omar to say that the Prophet was talking nonsense and to declare that only the Book of God would suffice the people. All this was to keep the thing from Ali.

Indeed, there are lame excuses. Some put forward such as that the very issue itself was not an obligatory one; and, therefore, it did not tantamount to disobedience. Of course, such an excuse is good enough for rejection alone because there is nothing more obligatory than the guidance of people. The prophet said: “After that you shall never go astray.” Opinion was not solicited. Omar gave his opinion and imposed it, which made the Prophet angry to the extent that he ordered them to go away. Still, it was not disobedience; then what else it was? “Pain has overcome him,” “Nonsense”; these words could hardly be said to an ordinary man particularly in his illness. To behave far from politeness towards the Prophet could never have become possible unless disobedience to him should have had been a deliberate determination. The words of Omar are quite clear: “The Book of God is enough to us” which mean acceptance of one and rejection of the other. To poke nose into the orders of the Prophet so as to adjust our own pleasure can not be classified in any word other than that of disobedience.

Anyway, the circumstances that surround the whole episode, the expedition of Asama and the insurgency to proceed in that expedition, the Prophet’s orders to give him a pen and paper so that “to not go astray”, and the insistence of Omar upon the Book of God alone; we can deduce from all these that the Prophet wanted to classify or specify or make it known who was to succeed him and that ‘who’ was Ali son of Abi Taleb. But the Prophet was not obeyed. The caliphate became the spot of difference among the Muslims and misguidance as well. Had the Prophet been obeyed and had he written; then there was no room for doubt or for difference except to depart from Islam it.

Here one possibility seems quite likely to have had occurred in the Prophet’s mind and which should have had kept him from giving an indication by spoken words and that is his fear of an open insurgency out of their stubbornness and turning against Islam altogether. So, he avoided a greater calamity. Therefore, we see Ali too remained silent as his motive too was the same. These words of Ali in his speech of ‘SHQ SHAQIA’ give us a clue: “I got up to discern between the two things, to capture with a broken hand or to remain quiet in a pit’s darkness; Ii found the patience more prudent than the two…” His stand with the caliphate shall in the fourth chapter.