Discursive Theology Volume 1

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Discursive Theology Volume 1 Author:
Translator: Mansoor L. Limba
Publisher: Al-Mustafa International College
Category: General Books

Discursive Theology Volume 1

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Author: Dr. ‘Ali Rabbani Gulpaygani
Translator: Mansoor L. Limba
Publisher: Al-Mustafa International College
Category: visits: 19562
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Discursive Theology Volume 1

Discursive Theology Volume 1

Author:
Publisher: Al-Mustafa International College
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Lesson 16: The Divine Will and Decree

One of the Attributes of Perfection of God is that of will (irādah ) and decree (mashiyyah ), asAl-murīd (the Desirous or Willing) is considered one of the Divine Names. In the Holy Qur’an, the wordsmashiyyah ,irādah andal-murīd have not been used for God, but in many verses the phrasesshā’ Allāh ,yashā’ Allāh ,arād Allāh ,aradnā ,yurīd Allāh , andnurīd have been used.

In view of these action words, the attributes ofmashiyyah andirādah and the nounsshā’ī (decree-giver) andmurīd can be abstracted and used as the Attributes and Names of God. In addition, the usage of the said Attributes and Names can also be found in Prophetic traditions.1

Some theologians have regarded will and decree as an attribute while others have treated them as two separate attributes, and something has been transmitted regarding the dimensions of the difference between the two.2 What can be inferred from the Qur’anic usages of these two words is thatmashiyyah is only used in cosmic (takwīnī ) matters whileirādah is used in cosmic as well as legislative (tashrī‘ī ) matters. Keeping in view the totally of [relevant] verses of the Qur’an and traditions, it can be argued that with respect to God,irādah andmashiyyah refer to an attribute.

Some Views on the Essence of Will

Different views have been expressed by philosophers and theologians on the essence of will (irādah ) with respect to God and whether it is one of the Attributes of Essence or one of the Attributes of Action:

1. God’s will in relation to His Actions (cosmic will) is identical with the origination of actions and His will in relation to human actions (legislative will) is the command to execute the actions.

Shaykh al-Mufīd3 has subscribed to this view.4

‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī who has also regarded the cosmic will of God as one of His Attributes of Action has said, “The will which is attributed to God is abstracted from His Action or from the Action itself which is realized outwardly, or from the total realization of the Action.”5

2. The cosmic will of God means His knowledge that the action which is consistent with order is the best. This view is popular among the Muslim philosophers.6

3. The cosmic will of God means His knowledge that an action encompasses what is good for the human beings and all other creatures. The Mu‘tazilah and Imāmiyyah theologians who advocate this view call this knowledge asdā‘ī (motive).7

4. The will of God is an attribute separate from His knowledge, power, and Attributes of Essence, and it is among the Essential and Eternal Attributes of God. This view is acceptable to the Ashā‘irah.8

5. The will of God is an Essential Attribute distinct from other Essential Attributes, and at the same time, it is contingent (ḥādith ). Its state is either contingent in essence as claimed by the Karrāmiyyah group,9 or contingent neither in essence nor other than essence (ḥādith lā fī maḥall ) as described by Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim.10

6.Irādah is one of the Attributes of the Divine Essence, but it has negative sense; that is, the agency (fā‘iliyyah ) of God is not based on compulsion or forgetfulness (conscious and volitional).

This view has been adopted by Ḥusayn al-Najjār, a Mu‘tazilī theologian.11

7. The essence ofirādah is exaltation (ibtihāj ) and contentment (riḍā’ ), and it is divided into two, viz. essential (dhātī ) and active (fi‘lī )irādah :

The essential exaltation and contentment is the essential will while the active exaltation and contentment is the active will (irādah-ye fi‘lī ). Since God is Pure (ṣirf ) and Absolute (maḥḍ ) Being, He is essentially elated (mubtahij bi ’dh-dhāt ), and His Essence is being Self-contented (essential contentment (riḍā’ bi ’dh-dhāt equals essential will (irādah-ye dhātī )).

Meanwhile, essential exaltation and contentment necessitates exaltation and contentment in the stage of action, for “Whoever loves something loves its effects” (that is, exaltation and contentment in the stage of action equals active will (irādah-ye fi‘lī )). Muḥaqqiq al-Iṣfahānī, better known as Kampānī,12 has subscribed to this view.13

Assessment of the Views

The first view which has regardedirādah as only an Attribute of Action is consistent with some traditions transmitted from the pure Imāms (‘a ) about the Divine will and decree. We shall elaborate later.

The second and third views have consensus in interpretingirādah to mean the eternal knowledge of God. Yet, they also differ [in the detail]; in the second view,irādah is interpreted to mean knowledge of the best order while in the third view, it refers to knowledge of the exigency of the action. The second view is compatible with the criteria of discursive intellect (‘aql-e naẓarī ) while the third view is harmonious with the standards of practical intellect (‘aql-e ‘amalī ). The discussion on the excellence of order belongs to the sphere of theoretical intellect while the discussion on the exigency of an action pertains to the domain of practical intellect. We shall review these two views later.

No explanation or justification of the fourth view has ever been transmitted, and it has been put forth as a mere claim. A review of it shall be made after the following examination.

While consideringirādah an Essential Attribute of God, the fifth view has treated it as contingent (ḥādith ). It is evident that pre-existence (azaliyyah ) and contingency (ḥudūth ) cannot go hand in hand.

The sixth view is also unacceptable becauseirādah is one of the Positive Attributes (al-ṣifat al-thubūtiyyah ) and not one of the Negative Attributes (al-ṣifāt al-salbiyyah ). Therefore, it must be not identified as a Negative Attribute.

The point of strength of the seventh view is in interpretingirādah in the realms of Essence and Action. Yet, the problem with this view is in treating the concepts of exaltation (ibtihāj ) and contentment (riḍā’ ) as identical with those of will (irādah ) and decree (mashiyyah ), and interchanging the two concepts is similar to interchanging knowledge and power, which is inadmissible. In addition, traditions stipulate thatirādah is contingent and one of the Attributes of Action, and not an Attribute of Essence.

An Examination and Analysis

The criterion for proving the Positive Attributes with respect to God is that an attribute which exists from the perfections of the Being by Himself (the Absolute Being) exists in God in the most perfect and complete manner, for it is impossible for God who is the Necessary Being to have no existential perfections.

However, some attributes are perfections of a particular being and not by the Being that exists by Himself; for example, seeing by means of the faculty of sight, ability to walk [by feet], and the like (from among the perfections of the natural creatures). Such existential perfections cannot be established for God because doing so necessitates corporeality (jasmāniyyah ), movement, change and other attributes of deficiency which are concomitant with contingency (imkān ) and insufficiency.

Meanwhile, the way of knowing whether an attribute is one of the perfections of the Self-existent or one of particular existential perfections (natural creatures) is to take away contingent (imkānī ), physical (māddī ) and natural (ṭabī‘ī ) traits from it. The concept which remains after the purging is one of the Attributes of existential perfection [of the Absolute Being].

However, if the essence of the said attribute also ceases to exist after purging those traits, it follows that the said attribute is one of the perfections of a particular being and not the Self-existent. For example, knowledge in the human being has some characteristics and after purging knowledge of those characteristics, nothing remains except discovery (inkishāf ) and presence (ḥuḍūr ). That is, the reality of the known (ma‘lūm ) before itself is discovery and presence, and this is the truth of knowledge. We can establish this truth for God.

Now, if we apply this method toirādah , we will find out that no other attribute will remain except free-will (ikhtiyār ). The essence ofirādah in the human being is a mental (nafsānī ) state which is derived from knowledge and desire (shawq ). This mental state is only necessary in relation to the actions of the limbs (af‘āl-e jawāriḥī ), and not necessary with respect to inward actions (af‘āl-e jawāniḥī ) which includeirādah . That is,irādah is one of the voluntary actions of the self (nafs ) but it is not precedented by itself. Meanwhile, once an action is materialized,irādah ceases to exist whereas the attribute of free-will remains the same prior to, during, and after, an action.

From the above analysis, it can be inferred that what is one of the Attributes of Perfection for the Self-existent is the attribute ofikhtiyār and notirādah , and that which is an Essential Attribute isikhtiyār and notirādah . It is true thatirādah can be abstracted from the stage of action, just as the attributes ofrizq (sustenance) andal-rāziq (the Sustainer) are abstracted from the stage of action.

The totality of the causes and preliminaries of the action are attributed to God (relative to the agent or mover) as well as to action (cause and effect relationship). In the context of the first relationship, God is calledAl-murīd (the Willing and Desirous One) and the Divine Will is abstracted, while in the context of the second relationship, the action is God’s object of will (murād ).14

It is worth mentioning that the present discourse pertains to the derivation of the essence ofirādah from knowledge or power, and not the unity of its manifestations as the Divine Unity in the Attributes demands. For example, the concept or essence of power is not identical with the concept or essence of power, although they are the same for being among the manifestations of the Divine Essence.

The Divine Will as Described in Traditions

As we have said earlier,irādah has been regarded in the traditions (aḥādīth ) as one of the Attributes of God’s Action, thereby stipulating its being contingent (ḥādith ). Interpreting it to mean eternal knowledge is equally negated [in the traditions]. Now, we shall quote below some examples of pertinent traditions:

1. Muḥammad ibn Muslim reported that Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a ) said:

ألمَشِيَّةُ مُحْدَثَةٌ.

“The will [of God] is contingent.”15

2. In a tradition transmitted by Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā from Imām al-Kāẓim (‘a ), after stating the characteristics ofirādah in the human being and that these characteristics are impossible with regards to God, the Imām (‘a ) has said:

فَاِرادَةُ اللهِ هِيَ الْفِعلُ لا غَيْرُ ذلِكَ، يَقولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكونُ.

“The will of Allah is the action itself and nothing else. He say, ‘Be’ and it is.”16

3. ‘Āṣim ibn Ḥamīd asked Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a ), thus: “Has God been the Desirous (al-murīd ) from eternity?” The Imām (‘a ) replied:

إنَّ المُريدَ لا يَكونُ إلاّ لِمُرادٍ مَعَهُ، بَل لَّمْ يَزَلْ عالِماً قادِراً ثُمَّ أَرادَ.

“Indeed there cannot be the Desirous (al-murīd ) without the object of desire (murād ). Instead, He has been all-knowing and all-powerful from eternity and then He willed.”17

4. Bakīr ibn A‘yan asked Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a ), “Are the knowledge and will of Allah identical or distinct from each other?” The Imām (‘a ) replied:

“[His] knowledge is different from [His] will on account of which we say, ‘I will do something if Allahwills ,’ and we do not say, ‘I will do something if Allahknows .’ Thus, that we say, “If Allah wills” shows that He has not desired prior to this. Whenever He desires something to materialize, it will materialize the way He wants it, and the knowledge of Allah precedes His will.”18

5. Imām al-Riḍā (‘a ) is reported to have said:

ألْمَشِيَّةُ وَالْإرادَةُ مِنْ صِفاتِ الْأفْعالِ.

“The decree and will [of God] is among the Attributes of Actions.”19

6. In his debate with ‘Imrān the Sabian, Imām al-Riḍā (‘a) has said:

وَاعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْإِبْداعَ وَالْمَشِيَّةَ وَالْإِرادَةَ مَعْناها وَاحِدٌ وَأَسْماؤُها ثَلاثَةٌ.

“And know that origination, decree and will have the same meaning and they have three names.”20

7. In a long debate between Imām al-Riḍā (‘a ) and Sulaymān Marwazī, the renowned Mu‘tazilī theologian of Khurāsān, that took place in the court of [the ‘Abbāsid caliph] Ma‘mūn, one of the issues they disputed on was whether the will of God is one of the Attributes of Essence or the Attributes of Action and whether will is identical with knowledge or a distinct attribute. Sulaymān has considered will one of the Essential Attributes and interpreted it as knowledge (as the Mu‘tazilah do subscribe) while Imām al-Riḍā (‘a ) has regarded it as contingent and an Attribute of Action.21

Review Questions

1. Write down the difference between the will and the decree of God by considering their Qur’anic usages.

2. State the views of philosophers and theologians about the Divine will.

3. Write down the correct view about the essence of will with respect to God along with its proof.

4. What is the criterion for establishing the Positive Attributes in God?

5. What is the reply of Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a ) to the question of Bakīr ibn A‘yan about God’s will?

References

1. See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, sections on the Attributes of the Essence and Actions, and on the Divine will and decree.

2. See Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Al-Mufradāt, under the words irādah and mashiyyah.

3. Shaykh al-Mufīd: the common designation of Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Nu‘mān al-Hārithī (d. 413 AH/1022) who was a great Shī‘ah jurist (fiqh), traditionist (muḥaddith) and scholar of scholasticism (mutakallim). Notable among his disciples were Sayyid Murtaḍā ‘Alam al-Hudā, Sayyid ar-Raḍī, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and al-Najashī. Around 200 works are attributed to him, from which Kitāb al-Irshād, Ikhtiṣāṣ, Awā’il al-Maqālāt, Al-‘Amalī, and Al-Maqna‘ah can be cited. See Shaykh al-Mufīd, Kitāb al-Irshād: The Book of Guidance into the Lives of the Twelve Imāms, trans. I.K.A. Howard (London: The Muhammadi Trust, 1981), introduction, pp. xxi-xxvii; Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1978), introduction, pp. 8-45. [Trans.]

4. Shaykh al-Mufīd, Awā’il al-Maqālāt, p. 58.

5. ‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah, stage (marḥalah) 12, chap. 10.

6. Ḥakīm Sabziwārī, Sharḥ Manzūmah, farīdah 2, discussion on will (irādah); Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 6, p. 317.

7. Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī, Qawā’id al-‘Aqā’id, p. 57.

8. Sayyid Sharīf Gurgānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, vol. 8, pp. 81-87.

9. Karrāmiyyah: followers of Muḥammad ibn Karrām Sijistānī (died 255 AH). This sect has subscribed to anthromorphism and incarnation.

10. Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī, Qawā’id al-‘Aqā’id, p. 57; Sa‘d al-Dīn Taftazānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 128.

11. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Ḥusayn Najjār al-Rāzī (died 320 AH).

12. Muḥaqqiq al-Iṣfahānī or Kampānī: the author of an important and popular book entitled Nihāyat al-Dirāyah, which is a gloss to the treatise Kifāyat al-Uṣūl by Muḥaqqiq Khurāsānī.

13. Nihāyat al-Dirāyah, vol. 1, p. 116.

14. ‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah, stage 12, chap. 11; Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 6, pp. 315-316, 353 (‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s gloss to Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah).

15. Shāykh al-Ṣadūq, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, section (bāb) on the Attributes of Essence, ḥadīth 18.

16. Ibid., ḥadīth 17.

17. Ibid., ḥadīth 15.

18. Ibid., ḥadīth 16.

19. Ibid., section (bāb) on the Divine will and decree, ḥadīth 5.

20. Ibid., p. 435.

21. Ibid., pp. 445-454.

Lesson 17: The Divine Speech and Word

There is no dispute that speech (takallum ) is one of the Positive Attributes and Attributes of Perfection of God, as this point has been mentioned in Qur’anic verses and traditions (aḥādīth ). However, different views have been put forth on the meaning of God’s word (kalām ) and whether God’s word is contingent or eternal, and whether speech is one of the Attributes of Essence or Attributes of Action of God.

1. The Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Ḥanbalīs

The Ahl al-Ḥadith and Ḥanbalīs consider the word of God (kalām Allāh ) consisting of the letters and sounds (literal word). Yet, they are of the opinion thatkalām is eternal and an Attribute of God’s Essence.1 There is no doubt in the incorrectness of this view. If letters and sounds are physical things and contingent in time, how can one considerkalām which is composed by them to be eternal?

2. Justice-Oriented Theologians

The Mu‘tazilah and Imāmiyyah theologians regard the word of God as verbal (lafẓī ) and contingent (ḥādith ). On this basis, attributing speech to God is like ascribing an action to an agent (isnād-e ṣudūrī or emanative attribution) and not like attributing an accidental quality (‘arḍ ) to an object of accident (ma‘rūḍ ) (isnād-e ‘arūḍī or accidental attribution). For example,mun‘im (benefactor) means the provider of blessing (ni‘mah ) to others;rāziq (sustainer) means the bestower of sustainance (rizq ); in the same manner,mutakallim (speaker) means the originator of speech (kalām ).2

On this basis, the Holy Qur’an, as the word of God, is created and contingent. Qur’anic verses clearly indicate the word of God is contingent:

﴿ مَا يَأْتِيهِمْ مِنْ ذِكْرٍ مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ مُحْدَثٍ إِلا اسْتَمَعُوهُ وَهُمْ يَلْعَبُونَ ﴾

“There does not come to them any new reminder from their Lord but they listen to it as they play around.” 3

What is meant by ‘reminder’ (dhikr ) in this verse is the Holy Qur’an, as another verse has thus stated:

﴿ إِنَّا نَحْنُ نَزَّلْنَا الذِّكْرَ وَإِنَّا لَهُ لَحَافِظُونَ ﴾

“Indeed We have sent down the Reminder and indeed We will preserve it.” 4

The first verse implies that their Lord does not send for them a new reminder (the Qur’an) except that they listen to it, but they do not take it seriously as they are busy in amusement and entertainment. Also, the second verse talks about the revelation of the Qur’an and guarantees its preservation. Anything which is pre-existent and eternal is indestructible, let alone having in need of any protection.

And in another place, it is thus stated:

﴿ وَإِنْ أَحَدٌ مِّنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ اسْتَجَارَكَ فَأَجِرْهُ حَتَّى يَسْمَعَ كَلاَمَ اللّهِ ﴾

“If any of the polytheists seeks asylum from you, grant him asylum until he hears the Word of Allah.” 5

Characteristics such as “originated” (muḥdath ), “listening to the Reminder and Word of God,” “sending down” (nuzūl ), and “protection” (ḥifẓ ) all point to the truth that the word of God consists of letters and sounds; that is, it is a verbal speech which is created and contingent.6

3. The Ash‘arīs and Māturdīs

The Ash‘arīs and Māturdīs have classified word or speech (kalām ) into two, viz. verbal (lafẓī ) and intrinsic (nafsī ).

[Accordingly,] the Qur’an and other heveanly books which have been revealed to prophets of God are verbal word and contingent, but the verbal word is not the essence of the word (or the real word). The essence of the word or the real word is the intrinsic word (kalām-e nafsī ); that is, the truth in the self or essence of the speaker which is represented by the verbal word. The intrinsic word with respect to God is the Attribute of Essence and is Eternal.

The main disagreement with the Ash‘arīs and Mārturdīs is in proving the intrinsic word. Once it is proven, there will be no dispute that it is essential and eternal. Similarly, there will be no doubt that a verbal word cannot be without any source and that there is something in the human being which the verbal word represents. But the bone of contention is whether or not this truth is distinct from knowledge, or free-will and compulsion.

The proponents of the intrinsic word maintain that sometimes a person reports something which he knows to be the contrary or he doubts its accuracy. Therefore, that which is the origin of the verbal word cannot be knowledge.7

This argument is not complete because in the above assumption, knowledge is not assented to (taṣdīqī ) yet there is conceptual (taṣawwurī ) knowledge. That is, a person who knows the incorrectness of a subject makes a conception of it and relays this conception. The same is true with doubt.

Their other argument is that sometimes a person commands to do a certain thing or forbids it without having the will or abhorrence, as the case may be, to do so. Therefore, the verbal word in the form of command and prohibition cannot be considered originating from will or abhorrence; rather, there is something in the human being which is the intrinsic word.8

This argument is also incorrect because in the above assumption, there is no absolute will and abhorrence in relation to the action - to bid or forbid. Without any doubt, in such an assumption the Bidder or Forbidder has a motive, such as giving trial to His servant and the like. Regardless of His motive, it is His desire or abhorrence, and it is the origin of His command and prohibition.

Yet another argument of the proponents of intrinsic word (kalām-e nafsī ) is that in terms of verbal derivation, the speaker (mutakallim ) is the one from who the word or speech (kalām ) emanates and not the one who originates the word or speech, for the agent of movement creates the movement in someone than himself and yet he is not called the mover (mutaḥarrik ); rathermutaḥarrik is that which the movement emanates from. Meanwhile, since the verbal word’s emanation from God is impossible, it

must be said that beyond the verbal word is another word which is no other than the intrinsic word.9

The criticism to the above argument is that in terms of derivatives, one cannot make an analogy. For example, a person is called “killer” who is the agent of killing of another person; the beater is he who is the agent of beating another person; the helper is he who is the agent of helping another person. One can never consider killing, beating and helping accidental to the agents of those actions. It is true that the said actions originate from their respective agents, yet it is not accidental existence (qiyām-e ‘arūḍī ) but rather emanative existence (qiyām-e ṣudūrī ).

The existence of the origin of their derivatives, therefore, is sometimes in the form of emanative existence as well as accidental existence at other times. The existence of movement in the mover is an accidental existence while the existence of beating in the beater is an emanative existence. The existence of word or speech in the speaker is of the latter case.

The following holy verse is also quoted to substantiate of the “intrinsic word”:

﴿ وَيَقُولُونَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ لَوْلا يُعَذِّبُنَا اللَّهُ بِمَا نَقُولُ ﴾

“And they say to themselves, ‘Why does not Allah punish us for what we say?!’” 10

In this regard, they have also cited the couplet of Al-Akhṭāl11 below12

إنَّ الْكَلامَ لَفِي الْفُؤادِ وَإنَّما جَعَلَ اللِّسانَ عَلَى الْفُؤادِ دَليلاً

Yet, such usages are metaphorical and not real and their implication is nothing except mental conceptions and psychic perceptions, and in no way do they prove the existence “intrinsic word” as a reality distinct from conceptions and perceptions.

4. Muslim Philosophers

According to the Muslim philosophers, it is true that the wordkalām has been coined for words which denote particular meanings, but the motive or purpose for which a word is coined includes a verbal word as it conveys and points to the motive behind coining the verbal word. This point is not limited to verbal word. Sometimes, by means of signs and the like, one may convey to others his or her message or point. In conventional practice, this way of conveying message is called “speech” or “speaking”.

Meanwhile, there is no doubt that in relation to its agent, an action denotes two things. It denotes the existence of the agent as well as its qualities. On this basis, it can be said that the universe which is an Action and a creation of God expresses His existence and Attributes of Perfection. Therefore, the universe is a Word of God.

فَالْكُلُّ بِالذّاتِ لَهُ دِلالَةٌ حاكِيَةٌ جماله، جلاله

So everything essentially denotes Him,

Expressing His Beauty and Glory. 13

The Word of God in the Qur’an and the Traditions

In the Qur’an and traditions, the word of God has broad meanings. We shall only limit to the verbal word, active word and other types of speech:

1. Some verses about the verbal word have been quoted earlier. We shall quote here a Qur’anic verse about God’s interlocution with Prophet Mūsā (Moses) (‘a ):

﴿ وَكَلَّمَ اللَّهُ مُوسَى تَكْلِيمًا ﴾

“And to Moses Allah spoke directly.” 14

In other verses of the Qur’an, examples of God’s interlocution with Prophet Mūsā (‘a ) have been mentioned. It is stated in those verses that in the valley of Ṭuwā Prophet Mūsā (‘a ) heard a voice from God, and in this way, God imparted some truths to him.15

2. The Holy Qur’an has named the Holy Messiah (‘a ) “Word of Allah” (kalimat Allāh ):

﴿ إِنَّمَا الْمَسِيحُ عِيسَى ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ وَكَلِمَتُهُ ﴾

“The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only an apostle of Allah, and His Word.” 16

3. The Divine decree is also another kind of God’s word:

﴿ وَتَمَّتْ كَلِمَةُ رَبِّكَ الْحُسْنَى عَلَى بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ بِمَا صَبَرُوا ﴾

“And your Lord’s best word [of promise] was fulfilled for the Children of Israel because of their patience.” 17

4. Imām ‘Alī (‘a ) has regarded the word of God as His action, saying:

يَقُولُ لِمَنْ أَرَادَ كَوْنَهَ: »كُنْ« فَيَكُونُ لاَ بِصَوْتٍ يَقْرَعُ وَلَا بِنِدَاءٍ يُسْمَعُ وَإِنَّمَا كَلَامُهُ سُبْحَانَهُ فِعْلٌ مِنْهُ أَنْشَأَهُ وَمَثَّلَهُ.

“When He intends to create someone He says, ‘Be’ and there he is, but not through a voice that strikes [the ears] is that call heard. His speech is an act of His creation.”18

The Contingency of God’s Word

The “word” (kalām ) as God’s action - verbal or non-verbal word - is contingent. If one can conceive of a word or speaker in the Divine Essence in such a way that it is not traceable to the verbal and active word, that word shall be deemed pre-existent (qadīm ).

However, in view of the fact that the prevalent usage of “word” is the verbal one and that the same meaning is intended whenever a word is used without any exceptional context, it cannot be treated as uncreated. Be that as it may, since the wordmakhlūq (creature or created being) is sometimes used to mean artificial word or speech, some great religious personalities have not permitted the application of the wordmakhlūq to the Qur’an. For instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd has said:

أَقُولُ أَنَّ الْقُرْآنَ كَلَامُ اللهِ، وَاَنَّهُ مُحْدَثٌ كَمَا وَصْفَهُ اللهُ تَعَالىٰ وَ اَمْنَعُ مِنْ أِطْلاقِ القَولِ عَلَيهِ بِأَنّهُ مَخْلوقٌ.

“I say that the Qur’an is indeed the Word of Allah, and it is indeed contingent as Allah, the Exalted, has described it, and I do not permit the application of the word ‘created’ to it.”19

The Immaculate Imāms (‘a) and the Issue of Contingency of God’s Word

In the history of Islam, especially during the ‘Abbāsid period, the discussion or dispute concerning the contingency (ḥudūth ) or pre-existence (qadam ) of the Word of God among the various currents had reached its zenith, going beyond the level of a purely academic question and acquiring a political undertone. During that time, some individuals would be severely persecuted, imprisoned and tortured for simply believing that the Qur’an is pre-existent. For this reason, this period is also named the “Period of Inquisition” (dawrat al-maḥnah ).

The wise stance of theAhl al-Bayt Imāms (‘a ) on this issue was very instructive. On one hand, they did not consider it permissible to enter into a dispute which had political undertones and a source of discord and violence against the Muslimummah , urging their followers to refrain from it. Notwithstanding this, they would subtly express their view about the contingency of the Qur’an and the Word of God.

Rabbān ibn Ṣalt asked Imām al-Riḍā (‘a ), “What do you say about the Qur’an?” In reply, the Imām (‘a ) said:

كَلَامُ اللهِ لَا تَتَجَاوَزُوهُ وَلَا تَطْلُبُوا الهُدَى في غَيْرِهِ فَتَضِلّوا.

“It is the Word of Allah. Do not violate it and do not seek guidance from other than it for you will be misguided.”20

Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā ibn ‘Ubayd has reported that in a letter about the contingency of the Qur’an, Imām al-Jawād (‘a ) thus wrote to some of his followers in Baghdad:

وَلَيْسَ الْخَالِقُ إلَّا اللهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، وَمَا سِوَاهُ مَخْلُوقٌ، وَالْقُرْآنُ كَلَامُ اللهِ لَا تَجْعَلْ لَهُ اِسْمَاً مِنْ عِنْدَكَ فَتَكُونَ مِنَ الضّالّينَ.

“There is no creator other than Allah, the Glorious and Exalted, and anything other than Him is created, and the Qur’an is the Word of Allah. Do not coin by yourself any name for it lest you will become one of the misguided ones.”21

In this letter, the Imām (‘a ) has expressed in a subtle manner the contingency of the Qur’an while prohibiting the description of it with such modifiers as “created” and the like.

The Absence of Lie in God’s Word

Honesty in words and deeds is intrinsically good while telling a lie is intrinsically evil. And God is immune from any undesirable quality. In other words, honesty and truthfulness are among the Attributes of Perfection, and God is entitled to all the existential perfections. As such, He is truthful. In this regard, the Holy Qur’an has thus stated:

﴿ وَمَنْ أَصْدَقُ مِنَ اللَّهِ حَدِيثًا ﴾

“And who is more truthful in speech than Allah?” 22

Review Questions

1. State the point of view of the justice-oriented theologians regarding the word of God.

2. Write down the view of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Ḥanbalīs concerning the word of God along with the criticism to it.

3. State the basis of Qur’anic verses on the contingency of the word of God.

4. Write down the opinion of the Ash‘arīs and Mārtudīs about the word of God along with the criticism to it.

5. The proponents of the “instrinsic word” argue that in terms of verbal derivation, the speaker (mutakallim ) is the one from who the word or speech (kalām ) emanates and not the one who originates the word or speech. Write down the problem with this opinion.

6. State the manifestations of the word of God in the verses of the Qur’an and traditions (aḥādīth ).

7. What is the basis of God’s truthfulness?

References

1. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Uṣūl al-Dīn, p. 56; Shahristānī, Al-Milal wa ’n-Niḥal, vol. 1, p. 106.

2. Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, p. 367; Ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī, Qawā‘id al-Murād, p. 92.

3. Sūrat al-Anbiyā’ 21:2.

4. Sūrat al-Ḥijr 15:9.

5. Sūrat al-Tawbah (or Barā‘ah) 9:6.

6. Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, p. 360.

7. Sharḥ al-Mawāfiq, vol. 8, p. 94.

8. Ibid.

9. Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 147.

10. Sūrat al-Mujādilah 58:8.

11. Al-Akhṭal (Ghiyāth ibn Ghawth al-Taghlibī al-Akhṭal) (c. 640-710 CE): one of the most famous Arab poets of the Umayyad period and a Christian belonging to the tribe of Taghlib in Mesopotamia. [Trans.]

12. Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 150.

13. Ḥakīm Sabziwārī, Sharḥ al-Manzūmah. What has been said speaks of the active word and speech of God. Philosophers have also conceived of the essential word and speech for God. For further information, see Ayḍāḥ al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 585-586.

14. Sūrat al-Nisā’ 4:164.

15. Sūrat Ṭā Hā 20:11; Sūrat al-Qaṣaṣ 28:30.

16. Sūrat al-Nisā’ 4:171.

17. Sūrat al-A‘rāf 7:137.

18. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 186.

19. Awā’il al-Maqālāt, p. 53.

20. Al-Tawḥīd, section (bāb) 3, ḥadīth 2.

21. Ibid., ḥadīth 4.

22. Sūrat al-Nisā’ 4:87.