Faith and Reason

Faith and Reason16%

Faith and Reason Author:
: The Porch of Wisdom Cultural Institution
Translator: A Group of Muslim Scholars
Publisher: The Islamic Education Board of the World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities
Category: General Books

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Faith and Reason

Faith and Reason

Author:
Publisher: The Islamic Education Board of the World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Question 6: Nearness to Allah

Question: What is nearness to Allah (awj)? How many different kinds of nearness are there? How can we gain nearness to Allah (awj)?

In lexicographical terms, “qurb” means the nearness of one thing to another. This can be in space or time. Because of this it is said that something from a spatial point of view is near another thing. Or it is said that yesterday is, from a temporal point of view, closer to today than two days before yesterday. In another common usage, “qurb” means being the centre of attention of someone and to hold a special place near them.

Brief Answer

In lexicographical terms, “qurb” means the nearness of one thing to another. This can be in space or time. Of course in commonplace usage, “qurb” also applies to being the centre of attention and to holding a special place near someone.

In philosophical terms there are three types of nearness: spatio-temporal, essential (i.e. pertaining to quiddity), and existential. Spatio-temporal nearness however is particular to the different parts of the material world. Since Allah (awj) is not matter, this type of nearness does not apply in regards to Him.

Essential nearness, or nearness in quiddity, is like the nearness person a and person b have as humans, as they possess the same quiddity-being of the same species. Allah (awj), however, is unlimited and therefore without quiddity. Without quiddity, this sense of nearness will not pertain to Allah (awj) either.

Since Allah (awj) bestows existence to all beings and separation between a complete cause and its effect is impossible considering the fact that an effect is a mere link and relation to its cause, we can conclude that the nearness of Allah (awj) to His creation is existential nearness.

Allah’s (awj) nearness to things

There are four groups of verses regarding Allah’s (awj) nearness to us:

a. Verses stating His nearness to us in principle;

b. Verses holding that He is nearer to us than any other being;

c. Verses saying that He is nearer to man than his jugular vein;

d. Verses saying that He is nearer to man than man himself.

In explaining the fourth group of verses, we must say that man, like all other contingent beings, is a hollow being-empty of any and all aspects of independent existence. Thus, Allah’s (awj) existential encompassment and comprehension lies between man and himself.

Nearness to Allah (awj) in philosophical terms

It is clear that Allah (awj) is not in any particular place, so that there could be a direction to get near Him by moving in that direction. Nearness to Allah (awj) is achieved through man strengthening his existential aspect to the extent that he begins to self-consciously manifest the Divine Attributes. In the movement towards salvation, the more man’s existential perfects increase, the more the levels of nearness to Allah (awj) increase.

Nearness to Allah (awj) in light of the Islamic tradition

Since Allah (awj) is close to everything, man must try to approach Allah (awj) through righteous deeds. These deeds are divided into two categories: compulsory and advisory. Deeds holding a key position in the first category are understanding and sincerity in actions, while the rest, including humility, good morals, and generosity, fall under the category of advisory deeds.

Detailed Answer

Types of nearness in philosophical terms

In philosophical terms there are three types of nearness: spatio-temporal, essential (i.e. pertaining to quiddity), and existential. Nearness and distance are things whose existence depends on two things. A and B should both exist in order for us to say that A is near B or is far from it. In the metaphysical realm in which immaterial beings exist that are free from motion and time, spatial and temporal nearness cannot apply. This is especially true in regards to the Reality of all realities and the unlimited existence “He is an absolute to whom we cannot point (spatially or temporally or otherwise) nor can He enter our imagination.”1

Since Allah (awj) is free from quiddity2 , He can not share a quiddity with anything else nor be near to anything in this respect. This is because quiddity here means genus and differentia (when quiddity is opposed to existence). But Allah (awj) admits of no delimitation or definition such that another quiddity be near or far from Him. “He who points to Him has limited Him and he who limits Him counts Him.”3

Two things that are partners in or share one quiddity are like one another. Zayd and ‘Amr for instance share the quiddity of Man. Allah (awj) however is above and beyond having a like or an opposite.

In regards to connection in existential terms we can say that: Because Allah (awj) is the source of all existence and because the separation of the cause from the effect is impossible, therefore nearness can be envisioned as nearness in existential terms (although it must be noted that to speak in terms of cause and effects does not adequately convey the relationship here, since all things “other-than-God” are but so many manifestations of His one existence),

“And when my servants ask you concerning me, tell them I am near.” 4

Things are, in their essence5 , pure relations to Allah (awj). Until the cause is understood, the effect cannot be understood. Therefore the nearness Allah (awj) has to creatures is an existential nearness. There can be no existence except that Allah (awj) is its cause, and any effect stands by means of its cause. Therefore there cannot be a form of nearness nearer than this nearness.

Allah’s (awj) nearness to things

In regards to the nearness of Allah (awj) to things, the verses of the Qur`an can be divided into four categories.

a. One group state His nearness per se: that Allah (awj) is near us:

“Verily I am near, I answer the caller.” 6

b. A second group of verses state that He is relatively nearer to man than others:

“We are nearer to him than you but you do not see.” 7

c. Another type of verse indicates that He is closer to man than his jugular vein:

“Verily we created man and we know what his soul whispers. And We are closer to him than his jugular vein.” 8

d. A fourth group state that Allah (awj) is closer to man than man himself, like the following verse:

“O you who believe, answer Allah and the Prophet when they call you to what will give you life. Know that Allah stands between man and his heart.” 9

Discussions about the first three groups are not very difficult but the fourth group cannot be solved so easily. How can Allah (awj) be closer to man than himself? Because of this, some commentaries, in line with some traditions have explained this as the intermediation of Allah’s (awj) power. They say that the meaning of the verse is that sometimes man decides to do something, then Allah (awj) makes him regret it and does not allow him to continue with his plan.10

This is an intermediate meaning, one step removed from the apparent meaning, but if we have a rational proof that supports the apparent meaning of the verse, then we have no reason for foregoing the apparent meaning of the verse (that God comes between man and himself). Man is not whole (samad), rather he is like other possible beings “empty”; as Kulayni has related in a tradition, “Verily Allah created man empty.”11

Now that man is empty, the comprehensiveness of the existence of Allah (awj) comes between man and himself. Therefore, Allah (awj) is near everything. If Allah (awj) is near, He is near with all of His attributes. This is because the essential attributes12 of Allah (awj) are one with His essence. Now, if His essential attributes are present, then His attributes of action will also be active following His essential attributes.

The way to get closer to Allah (awj) in a philosophical view

One of the fundamental questions that can be asked in this regard is, “How can we become closer to Allah (awj)?”-that Being, the light of whose existence has illuminated the Heavens and the Earth, an illumination that is the same as creation and the eternal creative act. From what direction should we approach Him and in what direction should we seek to become near to Him? It is clear that Allah (awj) does not have a direction, hence the journey along the path to Allah (awj) actually takes place within the very being of the wayfarer.

In the process of perfecting his essence, when the wayfarer travels from creation to the Real and travels from the material intellect13 to the active intellect, he communes with the Names and attributes of Allah (awj). In other words he attains his felicity. The depth and faculties of his existence are strengthened and he becomes one of Allah’s (awj) great signs or manifestations. He thus attains the state of sanctity and Divine vicegerency. This spiritual state can be called “nearness to Allah (awj).”

Nearness to Allah from the view point of Qur`an and Hadith

Because Allah (awj) encompasses all things14 , it does not make sense that He be distant from something. Therefore, the nearness of Allah (awj) to His

servant is true in all cases and situations. Conversely, it is not always the case that man is always close to Allah and it is a state that man must strive to obtain. Therefore if man wants to become closer to Allah (awj) and to strengthen this relationship, he should obtain the nearness to Allah (awj) by means of good actions and obedience to Allah (awj) as Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Baqir (ع) has said, “Nearness to Allah can only be found through obedience to Him.”15   In doing this, he enters the beginning of spiritual vicegerency or the succour of Allah (awj).

It has been related that “Prayer is the nearness of every pious person”16 and concerning the religious tax it has been related that “the zakat (has been made) with the prayers a means of nearness.”17   These are things that bring one close to Allah (awj).

When this nearness is achieved, man becomes the friend of Allah (awj) and Allah (awj) becomes the friend of man. Verses such as the following clearly point to this two-way friendship:

“If you love Allah, follow me. It will make Allah love you...” 18

Performing all those actions that in principle bring you close to Allah (awj) is the means to Allah’s (awj) nearness provided that man performs them for Allah (awj). In other words, these actions must not only be good in themselves, but they must be carried out in the best way and with the proper intentions (i.e. goodness of both act and agent is required).

As to the acts, they are of two kinds: obligatory and recommended. Just as reaching heaven has obligations and recommended acts, so too reaching the highest degrees of humanity (that in itself is a type of heaven) has its obligations and recommended actions. Understanding and sincerity both have great bearing in this regard and can be considered mutually necessary to the extent that when understanding increases sincerity also increases.

On the other hand, the Qur`an considers actions to be a means of reaching understanding19 . Of course, the understanding and certain knowledge thus obtained is not the certainty with respect to Allah (awj), since the former certainty is the cause of worship and not, as in the case of the latter certainty, the highest effect and product of worship. The latter certainty is the certainty of Allah (awj) and the knowledge of Him in all His unlimited attributes.

The remainder of the moral methods that lead to nearness can be considered as recommended. As Imam Ja’far b. Muhammad as-Sadiq (ع) has said, “Amongst the things that Allah revealed to prophet Dawud was this, ‘O Dawud, just as humble people are the nearest people to Allah, the proud ones are the farthest people from Allah.”20

It is clear, however, that humility and good morals or kindness are recommended or secondary acts in obtaining nearness to Allah (awj) whereas the primary principle remains understanding and the worship of Allah (awj). In the words of the Noble Prophet (ص) “O Abu Dharr, worship Allah as if you see Him, for if you do not see Him, He sees you.”21 In other words, your knowledge and understanding should be “presential” or intuitive and direct knowledge.

Notes

1. Nahj al-Balaghah, Sermon 186:

وَلاَ صَمَدَهُ مَنْ أَشَارَ إِلَيْهِ وَ تَوَهََّمَهُ.

2. Quiddity is defined as “the limits of existence,” thus special only to contingent beings {i.e. dependant beings}. Allah (awj) on the other hand, being a necessary being, has no limit, thus defying quiddity.

3. Nahjul Balaghah, Sermon 1:

مَنْ أَشَارَ إِلَيْهِ فَقَدْ حَدَّهُ وَ مَنْ حَدَّهُ فَقَدْ عَدَّهُ.

4. Surat al-Baqarah (2), Verse 186:

 وَإِذَا سَأَلَكَ عِبَادِي عَنِّي فَإِنِّي قَرِيبٌ

5. That is to say, all contingent beings are dependent and lack any sort of independence. All they have is for their existence is a “shadow” existence. A shadow has no existence of itself. All of its existence depends on the object having the shadow. All existents “other-than-God” are but as shadows of that perfect Being. Of course, the similitude in question here is the dependence of the shadow on the object. Other characteristics of the example, such as the object being material, are not meant.

6. Surat al-Baqarah (2), Verse 186:

 ...فَإِنِّي قَرِيبٌ أُجِيبُ دَعْوَةَ الدَّاعِ إِذَا دَعَانِ...

7. Surat al-Waqi’ah (56), Verse 85:

 وَ نَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْكُمْ وَلٌكِنْ لاَّ تُبْصِرُونَ

8. Surat Qaf (50), Verse 16:

 وَ نَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيهِ مِنْ حَبْلِ الْوَرِيدِ

9. Surat al-Anfal (8), Verse 24:

 يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اسْـتَجِيبُوا لِلٌّهِ وَلِلرَّسُولِ إِذَا دَعَاكُمْ لِمَا يُحْيِيْكُمْ وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللٌّهَ يَحُولُ بَيْنَ الْمَرْءِ وَقَلْبِهِ...

10. Majma’ al-Bayan, vol. 4, pg. 452

11. al-Kafi, vol. 6, pg. 286:

إِنَّ اللٌّهَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ خَلَقَ ابْنَ آدَمَ أَجْوَفَ.

12. Allah (awj) attributes are of two kinds. Essential Attributes (or Entitative Attributes). Attributes for whose derivation and conceptualization, bringing to mind Allah’s (awj) essence is enough; attributes like knowledge, power, life, etc. Action-Related Attributes (or Operative Attributes). Attributes for whose derivation, bringing to mind Allah’s (awj) essence is not enough. We need to bring to mind His essence in its modality of action and operation within creation; attributes like creativeness, forgivingness, bestowing sustenance, etc.

13. Philosophers divide the intellect into four levels. Material or Passive Intellect (passive intellect or nous pateticos). In this stage, the intellect is at a potential state of understanding. Intellect by Proficiency. In this stage, the intellect understands the self-evident concepts and judgments. Active or Agent Intellect (intellectus agens or nous poietikos). The stage when the intellect understands concepts or judgments needing speculative reasoning through self-evident concepts and judgments. Acquired Intellect. This is the stage when the intellect understands all self-evident concepts and judgments and those needing speculative reasoning corresponding to the metaphysical and physical worlds in such manner that it keeps them present and is actually attentive of them.

14. Surat al-Fussilat (41), Verse 54:

 أَلاَ إِنَّهُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُحِيطُ

15. al-Kafi, vol. 2, pg. 74:

يَا جَابِرُ! وَاللٌّهِ مَا يَتَقَرَّبُ إِلـى اللٌّهِ تَبَارَكَ وَتَعَالـى إِلاَّ بِالطَّاعَةِ.

16. Man La Yahdhuruhu al-Faqih, vol. 1, pg. 210:

الصَّلوٌةُ قُرْبَانُ كُلِّ تَقِيٍّ.

17. Nahjul Balaghah, Sermon 199:

ثُمَّ إِنَّ الزَّكَاةَ جُعِلَتْ مَعَ الصَّلاَةِ قُرْبَاناً.

18. Surat Ali-’Imran (3), Verse 31:

 قُلْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِـبُّونَ اللٌّهَفَاتَّبِعُونِي يُحْـبِبْكُمُ اللٌّهُ...

19. Surat al-Hijr (15), Verse 99:

 وَاعْـبُدْ رَبَّكَ حَتَّى يَأْتِيَكَ الْيَقِينُ

20. Muntakhab Mizan al-Hikmah, no.5212:

يَا دَاوُدَ! كَمَا أَنَّ أَقْرَبَ النَّاسِ مِنَ اللٌّهِ الْمُتَوَاضِعُونَ كَذٌلِكَ أَبْعَدُ النَّاسِ مِنَ اللٌّهِ الْمُتَكَبِّرُونَ.

21. Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 77, pg. 74:

يَا أَبَا ذَرَّ! اعْـبُدِ اللٌّهَ كَأَنَّكَ تَرَاهُ فَإِنْ كُنْتَ لاَ تَرَاهُ فَإِنَّهُ يَرَاكَ.

Question 7: Friends of Allah not having Fear

Question: The Qur`an mentions the fact that there is no fear or sadness for the friends of Allah (Surat Yunus (10), Verse 62). If this is the case, then why do we read the following prayer in the Du’a of Friday (addressing Imam al-Zaman (ع)): “Peace be upon you O Pure one who is afraid!”

Brief Answer

Fear is of two types: praiseworthy and blameworthy. Blameworthy fear, like fearing for ones’ life or fearing people and creatures is meaningless for the friends of Allah (awj). This is why Imam Ja’far b. Muhammad as-Sadiq (ع) has been narrated to have said “A believer fears no one other than Allah.” As the Noble Qur`an says “It is only Satan who frightens his followers. Do not fear him but fear Me if you believe.” Praiseworthy fear is fearing the majesty and greatness of Allah (awj). In this regard, the Noble Prophet (ص) has been narrated to have said “He who knows his Lord more, fears Him more.”

Praiseworthy fear is attributed to high-ranking wayfarers which is caused by feeling the greatness and majesty of the Lord and the manifestation of His attributes. This fear is a spiritual delight and doesn’t conflict with the verse “Know that the friends of Allah have no fear, nor are they sad.” What’s more, this type of fear is one of the perfections that the perfected individuals obtain. This is why we address the Twelfth Imam (ع) as so: “Peace be upon you O Pure One who fears the greatness of Allah Almighty.”

Detailed Answer

There are two kinds of fear: good and bad. The bad fear does not pertain to the saints and the friends of Allah (awj). This is the fear of people, the enemy, etc. In short it is the fear of creatures.

It has been related from Abu Dharr that he said, “The Noble Prophet advised me saying ‘In the path of Allah, do not fear any one who mocks you or discourages you.”1 Also, it has been related from Imam Ja’far b. Muhammad as-Sadiq (ع) that he said, “The believers fear no one but Allah.”2 As the Qur`an has said,

‘This is the Devil that scares his friends by means of his rumours. If you have faith, fear Me, do not fear them.” 3

The good fear, which is praiseworthy, is the fear of the greatness of Allah (awj). As Imam ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (ع) has said, “Fear is the clothing of those who know Allah.”4 And as the Prophet of Allah (ص) has said, “Whoever amongst you knows Allah more, fears Him more.”5

It is because of this that the great Prophet has said, “My fear of Allah is more than any of you.”6

The fruit of this fear is the fact that man takes refuge with Allah (awj) as Imam ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (ع) has said, “If you fear creatures, you flee from them but if you fear Allah you take refuge in Him.”7

As the great ‘Arif, Khwaja ‘Abdullah Ansari, has said, “The way-station of humility gives birth to that of fear. Allah says, ‘He who fears the station of his Lord

[…Then surly the garden is the abode].8

Fear is the bastion of faith, the elixir of piety, and the weapon of the believer. Fear is of three types: the first is fleeting, the second is living, the third is overpowering. The fear that is fleeting comes into the heart and quickly leaves. That is a fear which if it does not exist, there is no faith. Whoever has more faith, has more fear. Another is the living fear. That fear prevents the slave from sins. It shortens the hopes of man. The third is the fear that overwhealms. It brings the reality of fear and opens the door to ethical behaviour. It is the fear of the artifice and ruse [of Allah]. It prevents man from being negligent of his guilt and becoming complacent. The signs which show that a man has fallen for a ruse and stratagem are ten things: worship without sweetness accompanying it; continuing to sin without repentance; closing the door of prayer; knowledge without action; wisdom without intention and will; talking without limits and controls; closing the door of humility; associating with bad people; and above all of these are giving faith to a servant without discrimination and leaving a servant to fend for himself. This is the fear of those who repent.

The reality of fear is that the spiritual wayfarer, because he has given up hope of reaching his goal or because he expects a bad thing to happen in the future, looses his composure.

According to the elevation of the stature of a wayfarer, fear can be divided into three parts:

The fear of common people: This is the fear of the punishment of Allah (awj). They fear the anger of their Lord. Allah (awj) says,

“They fear the day when the hearts and eyes are perplexed and confused.” 9

The fear of the mediocre: This is the fear of the Divine guile and artifice. Those who have hearts that tastes the presence of Allah (awj) and who continuously watch over their souls are punished with this type of fear. They always fear the fact that the grace of Allah (awj) could end for them and that the sweetness of Allah’s (awj) presence could vanish. Those who have set foot in this way-station have themselves become subject to Divine Guile since they have left “the Giver” for His “gifts.” Allah (awj) says,

“And for he who fears His Lord, there are two Gardens.” 10

The fear of great souls who have living hearts: That means the acknowledgement of the greatness of Allah (awj). While witnessing the Beauty of Allah (awj), they also get a taste of His power. His beauty has showed itself to them with ultimate coyness and His honour has manifested itself with the show of self-sufficiency. Therefore the situation of the special friends of Allah (awj) differs from that of other people. The fear that occurs from witnessing the greatness of Allah (awj), and the manifestations of the

Names of Allah (awj) unto their hearts, increases every moment. They are drowned in such spiritual pleasures. This fear doesn’t contradict the verse of the Qur`an that states:

“Know that the friends of God have no fear nor are they sad.” 11

Because of this we say to Imam al-Zaman (ع), “Peace be upon you O Pure One who fears the greatness of Allah, Almighty.”12

Notes

1. Bihar al-Anwar, vol.71 pg. 360:

وَ أَوْصَانِي أَنْ لاَ أَخَافَ فِي اللٌّهِ لَوْمَةَ لاَئِمٍ.

2. Mizan al-Hikmah, no. 5258:

إِنَّ الْمُؤْمِنَ وَلِيُّ اللٌّهِ وَ لاَ يَخَافُ غَيَرَهُ.

3. Surat Ali-’Imran (3), Verse 175:

 إِنَّــمَا ذٌلِكُمُ الشَّيْطَانُ يُخَوِّفُ أَوْلِيَآءَهُ فَلاَ تَخَافُوهُمْ وَخَافُونِي إِنْ كُنْـتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ

4. Mizan al-Hikmah, no. 5178:

اَلْخَوْفُ جِلْبَابُ الْعَارِفِينَ.

5. Mizan al-Hikmah, no. 5195:

مَنْ کَانَ بِاللٌّهِ أَعْرَفَ کَانَ مِنَ اللٌّهِ أَخْوَفَ.

6. Mi’raj al-Sa’adah

7. Muntakhab Mizan al-Hikmah, no. 2000:

إِذَا خِفْتَ الْخَالِقَ فَرَرْتَ إِلَيْهِ إِذَا خِفْتَ الْمَخْلُوقَ فَرَرْتَ مِنْهُ.

8. Surat al-Nazi’at (79), Verse 40-41:

 وَأَمَّا مَنْ خَافَ مَقَامَ رَبِّهِ وَنَهَى النَّفْسَ عَنِ الْهَوَى. فَإِنَّ الْجَنَّةَ هِيَ الْمَأْوَى

9. Surat al-Nur (24), Verse 37:

 يَخَافُونَ يَوْماً تَتَقَلَّبُ فِيهِ الْقُلُوبُ وَالأَبْصَارُ

10. Surat al-Rahman (55), Verse 46:

 وَلِمَنْ خَافَ مَقَامَ رَبِّهِ جَنَّتَانِ

11. Surat Yunus (10), Verse 62:

 أَلاَ إِنَّ أَوْلِيَآءَ اللٌّهِ لاَ خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلاَ هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ

12. Mafatih al-Jinan, Ziyarat of Imam al-Mahdi ( ع) on Fridays:

أَلسَّلاَمُ عَلَيْکَ أَيُّهَا الْمُهَذَّبُ الْخَائِفُ...

Question 8: Allah, Love or Fear?

Question: Should the remembrance of Allah (awj) evoke fear or love?

Brief Answer

The co-existence of fear and hope, and in some cases love, in respect to Allah (awj), should not be a source of confusion as this phenomenon permeates all relationships of love to varying degrees. However, because of its over-conspicuousness, we are blind to it. It must be noted that even as routine a matter as walking is the result of fear, hope, and love, for without hope we will not embark on walking, and without walking, we will not reach out destination, and without fear we will not exercise caution and thus will be hurt, and again will fail to reach our destination. This issue becomes all the more clear when using automobiles, electrical appliances, incendiaries, etc. for we take pleasure in using them, but if our usage is not contained and tempered by fear and caution, using them might end in our destruction.

Therefore, it is correct to say that one must fear Allah (awj), love Him, and have hope in Him all at the same time. For loving Him and having hope in Him will bring about harmony on the one hand, and will on the other hand, compel us to take action, struggle, and push forth in our endeavour to acquire the elements that will secure His satisfaction and ultimately lead to being blessed by His effusions, graces, and bounties in this world and the hereafter. His fear will evoke humility and servility; it will strengthen the spirit of obedience and preclude us from committing sins that might otherwise incur Allah’s (awj) wrath and chastisement.

This coexistence of fear and hope in this world-the world of cultivation and striving which calls for being vigilant, for guarding the fruit [of our endeavours] so that we may benefit from them in the hereafter wherein there will be no need for caution as it is not the abode for cultivation and striving but that of harvesting-for ordinary people will lead to a serenity in the hereafter which will be free of any trace of fear and anguish. Fear alone will entail despondency, spiritlessness and depression. Hope and love alone will result in being deceived by our base spirits, in boldness toward Allah (awj) and sin. Thus neither of the results of fear or hope is desirable when taken individually and without being harnessed by the other.

Detailed Answer

Fear, hope, and love are wijdani phenomena [i.e. they are experienced directly and intuitively and as such their comprehension does not rely on mental concepts or sensational experience] and thus are without need of being defined. The human being experiences fear when faced with certain issues, such as:

a. When his life, property, reputation, etc. are endangered;

b. When overwhelmed by the grandeur of something or somebody;

c. When he feels clueless regarding the outcome and repercussions of an action or his fate. Although, it must be noted that it is possible that in certain cases all these factors be present.

Likewise, the feeling of love and affection is evoked in response to certain factors, such as:

a. Finding certain attractive and beautiful aspects in the beloved such that one’s attraction to the beloved is the entailment of one’s fondness of the beauties that the beloved manifests. Traditional poets detest this love as being “in pursuit of the veneer” and thus he who nurtures this love is condemned to disrepute.

However, this is not a universal truth. If the beauties found in the beloved are passing, ephemeral, and superficial, the poet is correct. But, if the beauties and perfections that the beloved possesses are of the nature of moral values or if those beauties and perfections are existential and real ones, the resulting love would not be merely “pursuit of the veneer” and disreputable; rather its upshot would be harmony.

b. The feeling of dependence on and need of the object of affection such that one intends to exploit that object of affection in pursuing one’s aspirations. In this type of relationship, one is attracted to the object of affection for one’s own sake and not for the object’s sake.

c. The love that swells in one’s heart as the result of feeling indebted to one’s patron. In this relationship, the lover is attracted to the beloved as the result of the bounties and benevolence he has received from the beloved and as such is beholden to the beloved.

d. The beloved seeks the love of the lover and strives to captivate him in order to minister to the lover and to succour him. It is possible that more than one of the above categories be involved in one case of love.

If we examine the matter closely, we will notice that in all our actions and reactions fear, love, and hope are combined to various degrees. Although in some cases one of these factors might be the dominant and there is not always an equal balance, their coexistence is inevitable. However, this is one of the issues that is obscure to us due to its conspicuousness.

Hope and love impel us to action both in our daily activities and in the risky tasks we undertake. Fear on the other hand restrains us so as to exercise caution, to assess the repercussions of our actions and to prepare the adequate preliminaries. Had we been only equipped with love, we would be reckless, which would have entailed our early destruction. And had fear been unrivalled, we would never undertake any action even such mundane things as drinking and eating, for there is always the risk of a drop of water or a bite of food going down the wrong pipe, causing suffocation.

Therefore, there should be no confusion as to the coexistence of fear, hope, and love regarding Allah (awj). And if there is, it is only another sign of our obliviousness to self-knowledge and our psychic states.

To explain this further: The existence of fear, hope, and love with regard to Allah (awj) in different people is proportionate to their knowledge of Allah (awj) and His Attributes of Beauty and of Majesty, their knowledge of the true religion, their past conduct, and their assurance or lack of assurance regarding their future.

Those who are captivated by the magnificence and grandeur of the Truth or have in the past sinned and have dishonoured the Divine presence-in their case, fear overshadows love and hope. But on the other side of the spectrum are those who are entranced by Divine Beauty and Mercy. They have

experienced the Divine graces and favours and have in the past been cautious of their conduct and have honoured the Divine presence and in instances where they did slip and commit sin, found the door back to Allah’s (awj) favour and forgiveness, seized it, and thus made a genuine repentance. In their case, love and hope overpower fear.

But finally there are those who are midway between the two previously mentioned positions. That is, they are not sure of their prior deeds being accepted and are thus afraid of their future and the possibility of not being delivered from Divine punishment and chastisement but at the same time hold hope in Allah’s (awj) forgiveness and generosity. In other words, their fear on the one hand and their hope and love on the other strike a balance [and so neither side weighs heavier].

The important point is that in most cases, fear and love arise from one’s innate self-interest and instinct of self-preservation. That is, most believers love Allah (awj) and have hope in Him due to their fear of Divine chastisement in the hereafter and the possibility of being deprived of Divine effusions, bounties, heavenly joys-the beautiful houris and the marvellous castles. But those who are enthralled by the beauty and perfection of Allah (awj) or are in awe of His magnificence, invincibility, and grandeur, or are affected by both, account only for a small number of the believers. Thus, with the exception of the prophets and the Imams (ع), those who have been able to achieve the latter stage have been very few.

Imam ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (ع) defines these three groups in his legacy of wisdom as follows: “One group worships Allah in hope of boons and benevolence - such is the worship of businessmen; another group worships him out of fear - such is the worship of slaves; and yet another group worships Allah out of gratitude - such is the worship of those who are free of themselves and of self-worship.”1

It is for this reason that some prominent scholars state that one of the fundamentals of Islamic pedagogy is love. The Noble Qur`an, the great source of Islamic morals, introduces love as the fulcrum of moral virtues. Imam Ja’far b. Muhammad as-Sadiq (ع) says, “Allah the Immaculate disciplined and trained his Prophet through love.”2

The topics of warning (takhwif) and encouragement (tashwiq) permeate the Qur`an and the narrations of the Ahlul Bayt (ع). However, these two principles are the final stage for the weak believers, but as for the intermediate believers, they constitute the means and the preliminary stage. The believer starts the journey, being spurred forth by warning and encouragement but gradually the compelling force transforms to love.

Hence one need not be confused regarding the coexistence of fear and love in relation to Allah (awj). This coexistence of fear and hope is necessary for the spiritual training, elevation and development of the human being. For fear prevents us from sinning, from bringing destruction to ourselves, and from incurring Divine wrath and chastisement, which in turn leads to greater humility and firmer obedience to Allah (awj). Love, on the

other hand, compels one to undertake the obligatory rituals and the supererogatory prayers with enthusiasm and to hasten in achieving the means to Divine grace, mercy, and bounties.

In short, the fruit of the marriage of fear and hope in the human being are hastening to do good, to implant in oneself the moral virtues, and to avoid evil and sin, which constitute the ultimate goal of human creation intended by Allah (awj); that is, to paint ourselves with the colour of the Divine, attaining the station of Divine viceroyalty, reclining in the bounties of the hereafter, and to rid ourselves of all anxiety and anguish. And this has been expressed time and again in the Qur`an.3

Fear alone [uncoupled with hope and love] will entail gloominess, depression, hopelessness, neglect of repentance, and sinking into the whirlpool of sin, being overwhelmed with the misfortunes of this world and the hereafter, etc.

Love alone leads to impudence and shamelessness in committing sins with the false hope of repentance in the latter years of life, and unwarranted expectance of Divine grace and mercy, while one should not expect to benefit from Divine grace and mercy when one is neglectful of attaining those means which secure His grace and mercy.

It is in allusion to this point that Imam Husayn b. ‘Ali (ع) cries in his ‘Arafah Supplication saying, “May the eye of he who does not behold You watching over him be blind. And he to whom You have not apportioned some love will lose his asset of existence.”4

It is in the hereafter that we will reap the fruit of fear and love. There will be the abode of chastisement for those who did not respect this blessing or who lost hope in redemption, drowning in the whirlpool of sin, or whom were deceived and thus failed to prepare provisions for their eternal life. There will be the abode of blessing and peace, free of all forms of anxiety and fear for those who succeeded in keeping the balance of fear and hope, those who refrained from sin and prepared sufficient provisions of good deeds for their eternal life.

For further reading on this topic refer to books of ethics, the chapters on fear and hope, love, and friendship. The following are a few suggestions:

1. Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli, The Levels of Ethics in the Qur`an

2. Imam Khomeini, An Exposition of Forty Hadith

3. Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, Ethics in the Qur`an

Notes

1. Nahj al-Balaghah, short saying #237:

قَالَ ( ع): إِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللٌّهَ رَغْبَةً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ التُّجَّارِ، وَإِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللٌّهَ رَهْبَةً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ الْعَبِيدِ، وَإِنَّ قَوْماً عَبَدُوا اللٌّهَ شُكْراً فَتِلْكَ عِبَادَةُ الأَحْرَارِ

2. Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 17 pg. 3:

أَبِي إِسْحَاقَ النَّحْوِي قَالَ: دَخَلْتُ عَلى أَبِي عَبْدِ اللٌّهِ ( ع) فَسَمِعْتُهُ يَقُولُ: إِنَّ اللٌّهَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ أَدَّبَ نَبِيَّهُ عَلى مَحَبَّتِهِ.

3. Surat al-Baqarah (2), Verse 62:

 إِنَّ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَالَّذِينَ هَادُوا وَالنَّصَارَى وَالصَّابِئِينَ مَنْ آمَنَ بِاللٌّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الآخِرِ وَعَمِلَ صَالِحًا فَلَهُمْ أَجْرُهُمْ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ وَلاَ خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلاَ هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ

4. Mafatih al-Jinan, Imam Husayn’s ( ع) supplication on the day of ‘Arafah:

عَمِيَتْ عَيْنٌ لاَ تَرَاكَ عَلَيْهَا رَقِيْبًا، وَخَسِرَتْ صَفْقَةُ عَبْدٍ لَمْ تَجْعَلْ لَهُ مِنْ حُبِّكَ نَصِيباً...

3 Wahhabism in a British context

3.1 Biographical analysis of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab

In order to understand the generally accepted definition of Wahhabism, the endeavours of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab need to be put into context. Even if Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were to be regarded as the source of all Islamist activities, there is enough in his biography to disregard his influence on Muslims around the world.

Wahhabism is widely reported to have originated in eighteenth century Saudi Arabia as a purist Islamic movement which eventually dominated the various tribes and minority groups in the Najd area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in the town of Uyainah in 1702 or 1703 (Allen, 2007:42), was its founder. His early years were characterised by being a devoted student of religion (Allen, 2007:48) who at the age of ten could recite the whole Qur’an from memory. His father was a judge who followed the Hanbali School of jurisprudence and was descended from a long line of respected jurists who were also Hanbalis. One of the key influences on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would appear to have been Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim ibn Sayf (d. unknown), an admirer of Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) theology. Ibn Sayf introduced him to a teacher ofhadith called Muhammad Hayat of Sindh (d. unknown) who was a follower of the Shafi’i School of jurisprudence and a Naqshbandi Sufi.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was already showing hard-line and intolerant tendencies in his twenties, apparently as a reaction to Sufism and there was an uncomfortable encounter with his father and his uncle who was also a religious teacher. He believed that Sufism’s teaching of tolerance towards people in general had weakened the militant streak in Arabs of the Najd region and this allowed colonialist powers to gain a foothold. He also came up against the scholars of the day with his puritanical approach to Islam. The scholars of his then dwelling place, Uyainah, denounced him as a schismatic, branded him a heretic and ordered him to leave the town. He went to live with his father who had moved to Huraymila but his views were not accepted there either. He thereafter kept his views to himself until his father’s death in 1740. After that he took over as judge and began to ‘act and pronounce judgement in accordance with his new teachings.’ (Allen, 2007:51). The populace turned on him and he fled Huraymila and sought refuge back in Uyainah.

Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263−1328) influence on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was through his teacher Ibn Sayf. The former’s purist movement was as a result of the Mongol invasion in which thousands of Muslims were slaughtered at the hands of Hulaku Khan (d. 1265). Ibn Taymiyya’s desire to purify Islam was intended to pull the Muslim world out of its despair by returning it to the original teachings of Islam. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, although apparently one in a line of Islamist revivers, regarded Muslims whom he saw as apostates as the enemy of the religion.

Following his initial rejection by contemporary scholars, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab made a comeback through marriage ties to the ancestors of the current Saudi regime and it is this tactic throughout his remaining life that enabled him to stay at the centre of the political scene and establish his power in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Saud of the Aal Saud (Family of Saud) established close ties with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744 and declared himself as Amir with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as Imam. This Imam-Amir coalition was to form the basis of the ruling administration in the Kingdom today. It was an approach which was successful in oppressing minority groups such as Shiites and Sufis. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab successfully merged Islam and politics in the form of a holyjihad . In return for allegiance he promised Paradise.

Both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab allowedjihad against one’s (unjust) rulers even though both belonged to the Hanbali School offiqh and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) prohibited this.

The intolerance of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is shown in the attacks on the graves of prominent personalities of Islam’s history in 1802. Imam Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud’s eldest son, Saud ibn Saud, attacked the sacred shrine of the Shiites in which Husayn, grandson of the Prophet and son of Imam Ali is buried. Allen quotes Lieutenant Francis Warden as saying that they ‘pillaged…and plundered the Tomb of Hossein…slaying in the course of the day, with…cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants.’ (Allen, 2007:63). The Turkish government could take criticism as having failed to protect the tombs and the people that visited them, however, the trend of militancy shown by the followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was clear. Therefore Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’sjihad is a unique phenomenon in Islamic history and should be treated as such.

The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad in which the lesser jihad is compared and contrasted with the greater jihad highlights the inherent risk of jihadis turning off in periods of peace. [12] The Prophet explained how the jihad al-nafs (combat with the self) is superior to the jihad against a foe because the inner enemy is unseen, unexpected and requires self-appraisal which is harder on the ego ( nafs ) than appraising other people. Furthermore, the diversion of the Companions’ attention to themselves is a way of shutting down the frame of mind in which one is mentally prepared to kill or be killed. The original Wahhabi movement fell foul of this flaw and it is seen how the warring tendency within the Najdi tribe has not changed until this day. This tendency to wage war appears to have continued to this day with Arabs often being accused of promoting a ‘culture of violence’ [13] even in today’s society in which humanity prides itself in its civilised manners. This to an extent explains why the Taliban have continued in their quest for jihad after being supported by the United States against Russia during the 1980s.

Despite the Saudi administration’s bloody beginnings, it has endured as an ally to the West, supplying it with oil for the best part of a century along with opportunities for a growing number of expatriates.[14] Despite this, a cost cannot be put on the calamitous effect that the apparent oppression has had on the now minority groups within the Kingdom. In more recent years, it is reported that there is somewhat of a tolerance-through-ignorance policy in operation where the Kingdom chooses to turn a blind eye towards minority groups because it struggles to embrace them openly[15]

The current state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia belies Delong-Bas’ (2004:17) portrayal of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a pacifist: how is it possible that Saudi Arabia, where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings are venerated, is accused of oppression towards women and other minority Muslims in the name of Islam? Muslim women were not allowed until recent times to drive cars on their own under the ruling ofsad al-dharai . [16]

Some of the issues in the state of Arab society in the Najd area today with regard to women’s rights and the rights of minority Muslims may well be as a result of scholars selectively following the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. If it is possible for this to occur with the original sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) then it is also possible for it to occur with the works of someone such as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Though so-called radical groups within Britain display a desire to purify Islam and for military and political dominance, any link with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is untenable. Though, given that he is regarded highly, he must accept some culpability.

Allen’s (2007) depiction of a link between purist movements in the Najd area, the Indian sub-continent, Ikhwan reformers of Egypt and Afghan tribes is based on the relationship that Shah Waliullah (d. 1762), a key influential figure of purist movements within the Indian sub-continent, had with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: they both studied with the same teachers in Madina and possibly even attended the same lectures together and discussed the same topics. He further claims a link between so-called Wahhabi groups and Deobandi[17] and Ahl-i-Hadith[18] preachers in the Indian sub-continent stretching back to the eighteenth century. This is also untenable because his writing contradicts itself when he goes on to say how the Ahl-i-Hadith of India refuted this link when they petitioned the Government of India to stop using the term ‘Wahhabi’ in relation to them and the group also denied any links with Wahhabism.

The circumstances regarding each instance of radical behaviour are different, whether it was in the case of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or Britons. In order to understand who the Wahhabis of Britain could be, an understanding of the main Islamist groups is needed.

3.2 Islamist groups of Britain

Anti-Wahhabists attempt and often fail to demonstrate clearly that there is a political link between acts of violence in the name of Islam and the influence of the Saudi administration. The Saudi government being Arab and the apparent 9/11 suicide bombers coming from Saudi Arabia is a very convenient correlation. The 7/7 attacks in London, however, began to challenge the Wahhabi-Saudi link. Modern literature has begun now to focus on what influences people of Britain. The difficulty in literature on this subject is in being able to identify clearly who in Britain are the candidates for the label of ‘Wahhabi’.

3.2.1 The Salafiyyah

The Salafiyyah could be regarded as similar to Ahl-i-hadith in their Islamic outlook. The Salafiyyah movement is often deemed to be closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab due to the obvious reverence that they afford him by studying his famousKitab al-Tawhid , commentated on many times over by various Saudi shaykhs and selling on Salafi websites and in their bookshops. However, alongside Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s books one can at times also find Natana Delong-Bas’ book entitledWahhabi Islam [19] which portrays Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a positive manner and as someone who did not actively promote any form of violence.

Geaves (2000: 54) writes how the origins of what is labelled as the Salafiyyah movement in the UK are based on the teachings of Egyptian reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). Strangely, Abduh was in favour of legal reform within the Muslim world and used rationality in the application ofmaslaha [20] to reform law. Three examples of controversial decrees of his are allowing Muslims to accept interest and dividends, to eat meat prepared by non-Muslims in foreign lands and to allow Muslims to wear non-traditional dress.[21] These views are liberal as compared to the likes of Rashid Rida. Though the Salafiyyah may be regarded as purist Muslims, in Britain their focus is on the teachings of Islam and they are not reliably known to be involved in Islamic political activism.

Geaves (2000:57) explains that according to Joffe (1998) the Salafi movement’s activities in attempting to purify Islam ‘coincided with socio-political and economic developments in the Middle East which paralleled the reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the Transformation of Egypt in the 1920s.’ Modern Salafis greatly identify themselves with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; however, their identity is complicated because their scholars are also known to denounce terrorism,[22] although terrorists would also identify with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Terrorism or ‘extremist’ Islam therefore does not have a clear-cut face within the Salafi community. Geaves (2000:57) points out that ’[t]he main thrust of the attack was not directed at the West, but at the need to purify Islam from the teachings and practices of the Sufi tariqas’ − implying that although some of the initiatives of the Salafis may have been identical to the Wahhabis, that religious militancy has not necessarily translated into extremism or violence.

The writings of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) are often deemed to be an influence on the modern terrorist;[23] however, similarly to Ibn Taymiyyah, the context of Qutb’s writing was his reaction to colonialism within Egypt whereas within Britain, the immigrants from South Asia and the first and second generation Muslims are here by choice. Therefore, the link between Middle Eastern reformers and British Muslims is not reliable. Furthermore, Qutb’s intellectual ancestor was Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and as described above he espoused a more accommodating view of Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims. Abduh had been in favour oftalfīq . [24] Abduh himself was not averse to Sufism, having been involved in it during his life. He had always retained a respect for it.[25] The two approaches of Abduh and Qutb at times are in some ways different: Abduh’s desire to evolve Islamic law in a constantly changing world was not seen in the same way within the writing of Qutb who espoused a move away from thejahiliyyah (ignorance) of western societies and a return to original Islamic principles. Qutb’s writings should therefore be taken with some caution.

The mix of ideologies that were evolving in the Middle East during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have also appeared within Britain and often manifest themselves in fiery speeches delivered by impassioned imams at Friday prayers and other Muslim festivities such as the two Eid prayers and the twenty-seventh night of Ramadan and arguably also in the above mentioned suicide attack.[26]

3.2.2 Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahl-i-hadith

These groups originated in the Indian sub-continent. None of them accepts the label of ‘Wahhabi’ which they regard as a term that describes a zealot or excessively purist Muslim. The relationship between Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-i-hadith[27] is rarely amicable.

Barelvis[28] usually label the Deobandis, Ahl-i-hadith, Salafi and others who generally do not carry out themawlid or birthday celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad,urs (anniversary of death) of a dead Shaykh as Wahhabi. [29] Deobandis and Barelvis send blessings on the Prophet Muhammad regularly and Geaves’s (2000:54) statement that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab banned such practises distances both these groups from Wahhabism.

This also challenges the impression that Geaves gives about the Deobandis being ‘Wahhabi-lites’.Deobandis use the term ‘Wahhabi’ to refer to the Ahl-i-hadith or Salafis whom they consider to be purists to a greater degree than themselves. The clearest manifestation of potential Wahhabi or radical tendencies among the Deobandis (and in some mosques populated by Arabs) is at the time for Jumuah prayer when the imams often decide to curse and even pray for destruction of the enemies of the Muslims. Such rhetoric is quite common within the mosques of Britain and is often the result of issues inherited from the Indian sub-continent. These issues are often, in a Qutbian way, ones which themawlawi s [30] display out of their zeal for freedom. From field research conducted as part of this dissertation, it is apparent that the most striking part of these sermons is that they are often in Arabic and the congregation being of Urdu, Hindi or Punjabi speaking backgrounds have little or no idea of what the imam is saying.

Barelvis are greatly influenced by Sufism and some purist Deobandi groups are also deeply influenced by it: the Husseini group of Lahore is one example and Shaykh al-Hadith Sufi Sarwar preachestasawwuf to other scholars and students from the University of al-Jamiah al-Ashrafiyyah. [31] This is indicative of the osmosis of Sufi thought into a number of other ‘purist’ Muslim groups and its appeal to a wide audience. This also challenges Geaves’ (2000:56) notion that ‘the reformed Sufi influence in the (Deobandi) movement does seem to have gone into decline after the advent of Muhammad Wahhab’s movement in Arabia with its strong anti-Sufi rhetoric’.

In terms oftaqlid , Barelvis and Deobandis are ardentmuqallid s (followers) of the Hanafi School which is rejected by the Salafis who regard Abu Hanifah as a misguided Imam of theahl al-ray . [32]

From a Salafi perspective, Deobandis and Barelvis are innovators in theD in (religion) and regard them as having close links with Sufis; for that reason, they could not be Wahhabis. Deobandi and Barelvi practises such as raising the hands for supplication in congregation after each prayer are reminiscent of the Sufis; Salafis consider thesebidah s (innovations) along with others such as the use ofmisbaha rosary beads fordhikr (divine remembrance) which often resemble the practices of Sufis as well as different religions.

The Salafis could be regarded superficially as the British equivalent of the Ahl-i-hadith, however, they dissociate themselves from the term ‘Wahhabi’, but this is not because they reject being called a follower of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab but at the incorrect use of al-Wahhab, one of Allah’s ninety names and of the incorrect use of the name of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

There would appear to be great influence in the Deobandi theology of Mawdudi and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) but a general lack of understanding as to who Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was.

In today’s UK, there is little difference apparent between the Sufism-oriented Barelvis and Deobandis, apart from when one enters the mosque in which the former have more influence, one sees ‘Ya Muhammad’ (O Muhammad) on the wall and usually at the entrance. This is indicative of the teachings of Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) who espoused that the Prophet Muhammad was alwayshazir (present) andnazir (watching). This is indicative of the theological difference between Barelvis and others who would regard this notion asshirk [33] .

The internal strife and competition between Deobandis and Barelvis can be said to have preoccupied these communities in Britain for the latter part of the twentieth century in their efforts to establish their own mosques within Muslim communities; the mosques of one group are not known to invite openly the worshippers of another group. The Salafis are especially looked upon suspiciously because they do not want to hold either study circles in any of the other two main groups’ mosques nor enthusiastically attend prayers there. When they do, they often sit in an isolated position and on discussion with some of them it has become apparent that they would only be willing to take over the running of the mosques completely but not be willing to engage or integrate into their communities.

3.2.3 Al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir

The Deobandis, Barelvis and Salafis do not openly admit any type of political agenda. Al-Muhajiroun, deemed to be in support of radical Islamic thought and also militant, do have a political agenda. Omar Bakri Mohammed, who was the founder and worldwide leader of this group, openly declared the suicide bombers in the Israeli Café of Mike’s Bar as ‘heroes’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005:6). He displays a sense of pan-Islamism and supports the founding of an Islamic caliphate in Muslim lands. This group does not appear to have perpetrated violence in Britain as yet, though this may simply be intentional in order to maintain a presence in Britain by keeping it out of bounds.

Geaves identifies Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) which is known for its desire to establish an Islamic state (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) even in Britain as having the potential to ignite the fire of extremism or jihadist sentiments. Bakri joined this group in 1977. This group had been banned and severely suppressed in Saudi Arabia (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) where Bakri had difficulty in recruiting people, hence, making it difficult to associate this group with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or the Saudi administration. After being cast out of HT, Bakri continued work under the banner of al-Muhajiroun and over time it emerged as a group in its own right.

This desire to establish an Islamic caliphate for the implementation of Sharia is not extreme or jihadist nor does it pose a threat to British society or the British public. The comments from the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2008 that Sharia was inevitable in the UK[34] coupled with the emergence of Sharia law courts in Britain which are under the control of Dr. Shoaib Hasan,[35] who has no links with these groups, show that there is an untenable link made between the requirement to establish an Islamic way of life and the political activities of HT and al-Muhajiroun.

3.3 Summary

Given the cultural (and to a great extent, ideological and religious) gap between immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and the second generation Muslims, it can be said that British Muslims have not necessarily inherited the issues that their parents brought with them from the sub-continent. Contrary to common belief, the first-generation Muslims are not greatly influenced by Wahhabism, nor are they clearly linked to extremist or terrorist activities. This leaves a question hanging over the militant activities of groups such as al-Muhajiroun, HT, and others which supportjihadi or militant activities. Scholarly literature and media reports accuse militant groups of extremist activities but fail to pin-point how they influence the youth or analyse the factors that are contributing to underlying issues faced by Muslim youth in Britain.

The objective of establishing the success or failure of Wahhabism as an ideology is not possible because of the difficulties surrounding the definition of Wahhabism, as well as the erroneous link between the desire to live Islamically with the political agenda of some fringe groups that are labelled as Wahhabi by both writers on this topic as well as the media. Nevertheless, Britain is faced with a rise of extremist behaviour and in order to deal with it, a solution is required. Sufism is often discussed within the media and within political circles as being the cure and given that the British government recently supported the establishment of the Muslim Sufi Council of Britain. Given the sparse material on this topic, it needs to be discussed in some detail.

4 Sufism: an alternative perspective for British Muslims

4.1 The Wahhabi–Sufi rivalry

The second objective of this dissertation is to establish how Sufism as an alternative paradigm addresses the issues of Britain’s youth. There are underlying issues within Islamic theology whose contention goes back to the formative period within the early centuries of Islam. Geaves (2000:56) alludes to this point wherein questions about the nature of Allah, his non-corporeality, his anthropomorphism, his attributes and an understanding of what he desires, often become a bone of contention. This has been at the heart of the Sufi−non-Sufi divide: how far is Islam willing to accommodate hermeneutical interpretations of Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions? What exactly constitutesshirk ? How much freedom is allowed within religion to express one’s love for Allah? How literal is literal: does every verse within the Quran have an inner meaning and outer meaning or is there such thing as an outer meaning at all? Throughout these debates and attacks, Sufism has remained the one approach that has clearly stood the test of time and survived everywhere in the Muslim world working with all kinds of cultures. Ibn Arabi, a past Sufi master, even addressed the issue of equality between the sexes where traditional scholars often struggled to clear Islam’s name.[36] Sufism is greatly responsible for the spread of Islam in the Indian sub-continent and saw the flow of Sufism from the Khwajagan of Afghanistan[37] to India and back again in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has survived purist movements and political turmoil in Arab countries and even the theological turmoil of the early centuries of Islam. The scholars of Islamicfiqh and Sufism claim that it goes back to the Adam himself (Geaves, 2000).

The focus on the oppression of Sufism by Muslim purists has recently come to the fore, accelerated by the search of the British Government for a solution to the rise in Islamic extremism in Britain recently manifesting in suicide bomb attacks. This has also brought to the public eye the tireless efforts of the Haqqani Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani who campaigned in the pre−9/11 days to raise awareness of the pending attacks. This has provided the backdrop to allow the Shaykh to bring out the Sufi voice and ‘officially’ enter Sufism into mainstream Islam in Britain. His celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in number 10 Downing Street has done a great deal to raise the profile of Sufism within Britain. His flourishing relationship with royalty[38] seen in his hosting of a Sufi event in Manchester on 4th February 2010 is another indication of harmonious relationships that Sufism can bring to the table. Despite the seeming division in the Muslim community caused by the polarisation into either non-Sufi and Sufi, there appears to be a benefit in that the moderate Muslim has a potential representative in the form of Sufism. This is also indicated by Geaves (2000:59) who has written about the potential of Sufism to counter the extremist tendencies as he analyses the writings of Sufi Shaykhs such as Kabbani (1998).

The immanent danger that needs addressing is the possibility of hard-line or extremist rhetoric that has already infiltrated Britain’s mosques remaining there. The Friday sermons of anger aimed at perceived enemies of Islam are indications that there are some remnants of the reaction to the colonialism of Muslim lands imported into Britain. This voice is increasingly becoming dated as British Muslims struggle to form an identity for themselves.

Geaves (interview conducted by this author, 2010) explains that there has been a fair amount of opportunism exhibited by Sufi groups in the wake of the issues of recent years especially after the 9/11 and 7/7 incidents. Sufis capitalised on the opportunity saying that Sufism would never support the violent actions of such radical groups. Furthermore, given that Sufis have also historically been involved in military conflicts, it cannot be simply said that Sufism is an apolitical, non-militant group of mystics.

4.2 Sufism: conclusion

The question as to whether or not Sufism is an alternative paradigm is a complex one on many levels. There is a plethora of writings on Sufism stretching back centuries: the scholarly writings on this subject have, as previously mentioned, traversed centuries, cultures, peoples, eras, languages and an array of other variable factors in society. The extant writings of the likes of Idries Shah (d. 1996) have been a companion to the British people from the mid-twentieth century until today. Book stores proliferate with both original writings in Arabic and Persian as well as interpretations in English by Orientalists, Westerners, Sufis and non-Sufis. Many writers such as Annemarie Schimmel (d. 2003) have given the best parts of their lives to the study of Sufism, taking up residency in centres of Sufi culture[39] and Islamic scholars to this day search to define the inner kernel of Islam through the Sufi way. Sufism’s roots are seen by some to emerge from the Hadith of Jibril narrated in theForty Ahadith [40] of Abu Zakaria Muhi al-Din Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (d. 1278) in which Jibril (the Angel Gabriel) comes to the Prophet Muhammad and asks him an array of questions, one of which is aboutIhsan to which the Prophet replies that it is to worship Allah as though one sees him and if one cannot see him then one should realise that Allah sees him. The clear message of this hadith is that Sufism is greatly experiential and it aims to bring one closer to Allah.

This section of the dissertation could not possibly hope to cover the vast amount of books on Sufism or the wide range of its topics. Given the lack of in-depth literature available on the possibility of Sufism being the alternative paradigm to extremism, it leads one to the following conclusions.

Some prominent Sufis in Britain such as Shaykh al-Kabbani have a good relationship with the British ruling administration and this will be viewed by politically-oriented Islamists as a political tool which politicians can use according to their whims and non-Islamic objectives if required. This will always be a point of contention and sticking point for supporting Sufism as an alternative perspective given that some such groups are receiving funding from the British government.[41]

Sufism promotes certain non-Orthodox activities such as the veneration of saints, which even non-extremist groups such as Deobandis can critically argue against using Islamic sources. Sufism would need to be able to accommodate such differences of opinion otherwise Sufis will fail to engage with other Islamic elements within British society.

Many Sufi Muslims uphold the British monarchy as divinely ordained rulers whereas there are anti-royalists even in Britain, given the monarchy’s German descent. This notion had its origin in the Banu Umayyad caliphate where the oppressive rulers espoused the view that Allah had supported their rule through predestination. This again is a contentious point which goes back to the heart of Islamic theology and the days of the Qadarite-Jabbarite debates.[42] The issue is where one draws the line between accepting a ruling establishment on the grounds that they are divinely ordained and opposing them on their oppressive policies. It has further ramifications for British citizens because of the pledge to the British monarchy and the British state which is expected from each citizen.[43] Despite the passing of centuries this point is still contentious and not likely to be resolved by simply promoting Sufi values.

Sufism is not necessarily averse to political involvement even by military means. Even a Sufi could interpret a political situation to justify the taking up of arms and possibly fighting for a bad cause. The Janissary Turkish troops were closely linked to Haji Bektashi Veli (d. 1270) and often called ‘Sons of Haji Bektash’[44] a well-known Sufi of the thirteenth century who came to Anatolia from Khorasan settling in the small village of Suluca Karahoyuk (Nasr, 1997:359). The Bektashi way became central to the Janissary corps because every man who joined them had to take an oath of loyalty to Haji Bektash Wali, thus this would in effect make them hismurid (follower).

Othman Dan Fodio (d. 1817) of the Qadiriyyah Order in West Africa launched ajihad to reform his followers and formed the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria[45] . Thisjihad was also instrumental in inspiring later Sufi leaders to form new states in Fouta Jallon in 1725, Fouta Toro in 1776 and Masina in 1810.

Is the relationship between prominent Sufis like Shaykh al-Kabbani and the ruling administration reciprocated in the same way by his counterparts? The whole-hearted backing by the British government of Sufis in the early twenty-first century does not appear to be as forthcoming now with some reports that the government is not considering Sufism as the only strand of the Muslim community with which it is willing to engage. This gives the impression that Sufis of Britain have not managed to maintain their once flourishing ties with the British ruling establishment. Furthermore, the recent function arranged by Shaykh al-Kabbani to which he invited Prince Charles has only been noted as a musical festival on his ‘official website’ as opposed to being promoted as an effort to spread Islam through love.[46] It would be too late for a personality such as Haqqani to preach an apolitical perspective because of the support he has already given to the likes of Prince Charles and solidarity shown to the British Government. To a typically non-Sufi group such as the Salafis Haqqani probably is regarded as a sell-out. Furthermore, even within Sufis, there are some such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who have espoused a general divide between rulers andwalis .[47] The implication is that there are some Sufis who would not regard Haqqani’s affiliation with royalty and ruling powers as legitimate and this could result in realignment with more extreme groups.

Sufism cannot therefore necessarily be deemed as an apolitical strand of Islam. Nasr (1997:163) writes that one of the prominent characteristics of the Naqshbanditariqa was the way in which it never hesitated in being critical of or confrontational towards political powers. He goes on to quote Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi as saying that ‘[t]he King is the soul and the people the body. If the King goes astray, the people will follow suit.’ Given that this strand of Sufism is traced back to either Abu Bakr or to Imam Ali, it is inevitable that there are political ties with the Naqshbandis and that they would even be willing to engage in combat for the right cause. The other Sufitariqas on the other hand may have had a slightly different approach in that their policy was ‘As you are, so shall be your rulers.’ (Nasr, 1997:163) which implies a focus on oneself rather than others, nevertheless, armed conflict cannot be ruled out of the Sufi theology.

The inference is that whereas a so-called Wahhabist Muslim was willing to fight against the British Government and its citizens in favour of the Afghan Taliban, the Naqshbandi Sufi might be willing to take the side of the British Government against the Afghan Taliban and this is a problematic situation for any Muslim if they were required to fight against a fellow Muslim even if given approval by their government. The well-known Prophetichadith is often quoted in this regard which states that if two Muslims fight amongst each other both of them are destined to hell-fire (Sunan Abi Dawud).[48]

Given the Naqshbandiyya principle of opposing one’s rulers if need be, there is no guarantee that even British Sufis can be stopped from joining forces with militant andjihadi groups in Afghanistan and other such places. The result is that militancy could possibly begin to occur even within the Sufi community of Britain. The Muslim world may well see the formation of ‘pro-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis and ‘anti-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis splitting the Muslim community even further.

It can be seen that the answer to the increase in radical Islam within Britain is therefore not necessarily Sufism; on the contrary, the over-promotion of Sufism to British Muslims could result in a total split within the Muslim community on more levels than simply a religious one: there would now be a theological and a political split.

The answer must therefore be sought from identifying the underlying reasons why the British youth are finding that they need to express themselves in such devastating ways. This is achieved in the next section through case studies and field research.

3 Wahhabism in a British context

3.1 Biographical analysis of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab

In order to understand the generally accepted definition of Wahhabism, the endeavours of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab need to be put into context. Even if Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were to be regarded as the source of all Islamist activities, there is enough in his biography to disregard his influence on Muslims around the world.

Wahhabism is widely reported to have originated in eighteenth century Saudi Arabia as a purist Islamic movement which eventually dominated the various tribes and minority groups in the Najd area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in the town of Uyainah in 1702 or 1703 (Allen, 2007:42), was its founder. His early years were characterised by being a devoted student of religion (Allen, 2007:48) who at the age of ten could recite the whole Qur’an from memory. His father was a judge who followed the Hanbali School of jurisprudence and was descended from a long line of respected jurists who were also Hanbalis. One of the key influences on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab would appear to have been Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim ibn Sayf (d. unknown), an admirer of Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) theology. Ibn Sayf introduced him to a teacher ofhadith called Muhammad Hayat of Sindh (d. unknown) who was a follower of the Shafi’i School of jurisprudence and a Naqshbandi Sufi.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was already showing hard-line and intolerant tendencies in his twenties, apparently as a reaction to Sufism and there was an uncomfortable encounter with his father and his uncle who was also a religious teacher. He believed that Sufism’s teaching of tolerance towards people in general had weakened the militant streak in Arabs of the Najd region and this allowed colonialist powers to gain a foothold. He also came up against the scholars of the day with his puritanical approach to Islam. The scholars of his then dwelling place, Uyainah, denounced him as a schismatic, branded him a heretic and ordered him to leave the town. He went to live with his father who had moved to Huraymila but his views were not accepted there either. He thereafter kept his views to himself until his father’s death in 1740. After that he took over as judge and began to ‘act and pronounce judgement in accordance with his new teachings.’ (Allen, 2007:51). The populace turned on him and he fled Huraymila and sought refuge back in Uyainah.

Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263−1328) influence on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was through his teacher Ibn Sayf. The former’s purist movement was as a result of the Mongol invasion in which thousands of Muslims were slaughtered at the hands of Hulaku Khan (d. 1265). Ibn Taymiyya’s desire to purify Islam was intended to pull the Muslim world out of its despair by returning it to the original teachings of Islam. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, although apparently one in a line of Islamist revivers, regarded Muslims whom he saw as apostates as the enemy of the religion.

Following his initial rejection by contemporary scholars, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab made a comeback through marriage ties to the ancestors of the current Saudi regime and it is this tactic throughout his remaining life that enabled him to stay at the centre of the political scene and establish his power in Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Saud of the Aal Saud (Family of Saud) established close ties with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744 and declared himself as Amir with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as Imam. This Imam-Amir coalition was to form the basis of the ruling administration in the Kingdom today. It was an approach which was successful in oppressing minority groups such as Shiites and Sufis. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab successfully merged Islam and politics in the form of a holyjihad . In return for allegiance he promised Paradise.

Both Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab allowedjihad against one’s (unjust) rulers even though both belonged to the Hanbali School offiqh and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) prohibited this.

The intolerance of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is shown in the attacks on the graves of prominent personalities of Islam’s history in 1802. Imam Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud’s eldest son, Saud ibn Saud, attacked the sacred shrine of the Shiites in which Husayn, grandson of the Prophet and son of Imam Ali is buried. Allen quotes Lieutenant Francis Warden as saying that they ‘pillaged…and plundered the Tomb of Hossein…slaying in the course of the day, with…cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants.’ (Allen, 2007:63). The Turkish government could take criticism as having failed to protect the tombs and the people that visited them, however, the trend of militancy shown by the followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was clear. Therefore Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’sjihad is a unique phenomenon in Islamic history and should be treated as such.

The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad in which the lesser jihad is compared and contrasted with the greater jihad highlights the inherent risk of jihadis turning off in periods of peace. [12] The Prophet explained how the jihad al-nafs (combat with the self) is superior to the jihad against a foe because the inner enemy is unseen, unexpected and requires self-appraisal which is harder on the ego ( nafs ) than appraising other people. Furthermore, the diversion of the Companions’ attention to themselves is a way of shutting down the frame of mind in which one is mentally prepared to kill or be killed. The original Wahhabi movement fell foul of this flaw and it is seen how the warring tendency within the Najdi tribe has not changed until this day. This tendency to wage war appears to have continued to this day with Arabs often being accused of promoting a ‘culture of violence’ [13] even in today’s society in which humanity prides itself in its civilised manners. This to an extent explains why the Taliban have continued in their quest for jihad after being supported by the United States against Russia during the 1980s.

Despite the Saudi administration’s bloody beginnings, it has endured as an ally to the West, supplying it with oil for the best part of a century along with opportunities for a growing number of expatriates.[14] Despite this, a cost cannot be put on the calamitous effect that the apparent oppression has had on the now minority groups within the Kingdom. In more recent years, it is reported that there is somewhat of a tolerance-through-ignorance policy in operation where the Kingdom chooses to turn a blind eye towards minority groups because it struggles to embrace them openly[15]

The current state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia belies Delong-Bas’ (2004:17) portrayal of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a pacifist: how is it possible that Saudi Arabia, where Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings are venerated, is accused of oppression towards women and other minority Muslims in the name of Islam? Muslim women were not allowed until recent times to drive cars on their own under the ruling ofsad al-dharai . [16]

Some of the issues in the state of Arab society in the Najd area today with regard to women’s rights and the rights of minority Muslims may well be as a result of scholars selectively following the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. If it is possible for this to occur with the original sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) then it is also possible for it to occur with the works of someone such as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Though so-called radical groups within Britain display a desire to purify Islam and for military and political dominance, any link with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is untenable. Though, given that he is regarded highly, he must accept some culpability.

Allen’s (2007) depiction of a link between purist movements in the Najd area, the Indian sub-continent, Ikhwan reformers of Egypt and Afghan tribes is based on the relationship that Shah Waliullah (d. 1762), a key influential figure of purist movements within the Indian sub-continent, had with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: they both studied with the same teachers in Madina and possibly even attended the same lectures together and discussed the same topics. He further claims a link between so-called Wahhabi groups and Deobandi[17] and Ahl-i-Hadith[18] preachers in the Indian sub-continent stretching back to the eighteenth century. This is also untenable because his writing contradicts itself when he goes on to say how the Ahl-i-Hadith of India refuted this link when they petitioned the Government of India to stop using the term ‘Wahhabi’ in relation to them and the group also denied any links with Wahhabism.

The circumstances regarding each instance of radical behaviour are different, whether it was in the case of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or Britons. In order to understand who the Wahhabis of Britain could be, an understanding of the main Islamist groups is needed.

3.2 Islamist groups of Britain

Anti-Wahhabists attempt and often fail to demonstrate clearly that there is a political link between acts of violence in the name of Islam and the influence of the Saudi administration. The Saudi government being Arab and the apparent 9/11 suicide bombers coming from Saudi Arabia is a very convenient correlation. The 7/7 attacks in London, however, began to challenge the Wahhabi-Saudi link. Modern literature has begun now to focus on what influences people of Britain. The difficulty in literature on this subject is in being able to identify clearly who in Britain are the candidates for the label of ‘Wahhabi’.

3.2.1 The Salafiyyah

The Salafiyyah could be regarded as similar to Ahl-i-hadith in their Islamic outlook. The Salafiyyah movement is often deemed to be closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab due to the obvious reverence that they afford him by studying his famousKitab al-Tawhid , commentated on many times over by various Saudi shaykhs and selling on Salafi websites and in their bookshops. However, alongside Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s books one can at times also find Natana Delong-Bas’ book entitledWahhabi Islam [19] which portrays Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in a positive manner and as someone who did not actively promote any form of violence.

Geaves (2000: 54) writes how the origins of what is labelled as the Salafiyyah movement in the UK are based on the teachings of Egyptian reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). Strangely, Abduh was in favour of legal reform within the Muslim world and used rationality in the application ofmaslaha [20] to reform law. Three examples of controversial decrees of his are allowing Muslims to accept interest and dividends, to eat meat prepared by non-Muslims in foreign lands and to allow Muslims to wear non-traditional dress.[21] These views are liberal as compared to the likes of Rashid Rida. Though the Salafiyyah may be regarded as purist Muslims, in Britain their focus is on the teachings of Islam and they are not reliably known to be involved in Islamic political activism.

Geaves (2000:57) explains that according to Joffe (1998) the Salafi movement’s activities in attempting to purify Islam ‘coincided with socio-political and economic developments in the Middle East which paralleled the reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the Transformation of Egypt in the 1920s.’ Modern Salafis greatly identify themselves with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; however, their identity is complicated because their scholars are also known to denounce terrorism,[22] although terrorists would also identify with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Terrorism or ‘extremist’ Islam therefore does not have a clear-cut face within the Salafi community. Geaves (2000:57) points out that ’[t]he main thrust of the attack was not directed at the West, but at the need to purify Islam from the teachings and practices of the Sufi tariqas’ − implying that although some of the initiatives of the Salafis may have been identical to the Wahhabis, that religious militancy has not necessarily translated into extremism or violence.

The writings of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) are often deemed to be an influence on the modern terrorist;[23] however, similarly to Ibn Taymiyyah, the context of Qutb’s writing was his reaction to colonialism within Egypt whereas within Britain, the immigrants from South Asia and the first and second generation Muslims are here by choice. Therefore, the link between Middle Eastern reformers and British Muslims is not reliable. Furthermore, Qutb’s intellectual ancestor was Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and as described above he espoused a more accommodating view of Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims. Abduh had been in favour oftalfīq . [24] Abduh himself was not averse to Sufism, having been involved in it during his life. He had always retained a respect for it.[25] The two approaches of Abduh and Qutb at times are in some ways different: Abduh’s desire to evolve Islamic law in a constantly changing world was not seen in the same way within the writing of Qutb who espoused a move away from thejahiliyyah (ignorance) of western societies and a return to original Islamic principles. Qutb’s writings should therefore be taken with some caution.

The mix of ideologies that were evolving in the Middle East during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have also appeared within Britain and often manifest themselves in fiery speeches delivered by impassioned imams at Friday prayers and other Muslim festivities such as the two Eid prayers and the twenty-seventh night of Ramadan and arguably also in the above mentioned suicide attack.[26]

3.2.2 Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahl-i-hadith

These groups originated in the Indian sub-continent. None of them accepts the label of ‘Wahhabi’ which they regard as a term that describes a zealot or excessively purist Muslim. The relationship between Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-i-hadith[27] is rarely amicable.

Barelvis[28] usually label the Deobandis, Ahl-i-hadith, Salafi and others who generally do not carry out themawlid or birthday celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad,urs (anniversary of death) of a dead Shaykh as Wahhabi. [29] Deobandis and Barelvis send blessings on the Prophet Muhammad regularly and Geaves’s (2000:54) statement that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab banned such practises distances both these groups from Wahhabism.

This also challenges the impression that Geaves gives about the Deobandis being ‘Wahhabi-lites’.Deobandis use the term ‘Wahhabi’ to refer to the Ahl-i-hadith or Salafis whom they consider to be purists to a greater degree than themselves. The clearest manifestation of potential Wahhabi or radical tendencies among the Deobandis (and in some mosques populated by Arabs) is at the time for Jumuah prayer when the imams often decide to curse and even pray for destruction of the enemies of the Muslims. Such rhetoric is quite common within the mosques of Britain and is often the result of issues inherited from the Indian sub-continent. These issues are often, in a Qutbian way, ones which themawlawi s [30] display out of their zeal for freedom. From field research conducted as part of this dissertation, it is apparent that the most striking part of these sermons is that they are often in Arabic and the congregation being of Urdu, Hindi or Punjabi speaking backgrounds have little or no idea of what the imam is saying.

Barelvis are greatly influenced by Sufism and some purist Deobandi groups are also deeply influenced by it: the Husseini group of Lahore is one example and Shaykh al-Hadith Sufi Sarwar preachestasawwuf to other scholars and students from the University of al-Jamiah al-Ashrafiyyah. [31] This is indicative of the osmosis of Sufi thought into a number of other ‘purist’ Muslim groups and its appeal to a wide audience. This also challenges Geaves’ (2000:56) notion that ‘the reformed Sufi influence in the (Deobandi) movement does seem to have gone into decline after the advent of Muhammad Wahhab’s movement in Arabia with its strong anti-Sufi rhetoric’.

In terms oftaqlid , Barelvis and Deobandis are ardentmuqallid s (followers) of the Hanafi School which is rejected by the Salafis who regard Abu Hanifah as a misguided Imam of theahl al-ray . [32]

From a Salafi perspective, Deobandis and Barelvis are innovators in theD in (religion) and regard them as having close links with Sufis; for that reason, they could not be Wahhabis. Deobandi and Barelvi practises such as raising the hands for supplication in congregation after each prayer are reminiscent of the Sufis; Salafis consider thesebidah s (innovations) along with others such as the use ofmisbaha rosary beads fordhikr (divine remembrance) which often resemble the practices of Sufis as well as different religions.

The Salafis could be regarded superficially as the British equivalent of the Ahl-i-hadith, however, they dissociate themselves from the term ‘Wahhabi’, but this is not because they reject being called a follower of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab but at the incorrect use of al-Wahhab, one of Allah’s ninety names and of the incorrect use of the name of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

There would appear to be great influence in the Deobandi theology of Mawdudi and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) but a general lack of understanding as to who Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was.

In today’s UK, there is little difference apparent between the Sufism-oriented Barelvis and Deobandis, apart from when one enters the mosque in which the former have more influence, one sees ‘Ya Muhammad’ (O Muhammad) on the wall and usually at the entrance. This is indicative of the teachings of Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) who espoused that the Prophet Muhammad was alwayshazir (present) andnazir (watching). This is indicative of the theological difference between Barelvis and others who would regard this notion asshirk [33] .

The internal strife and competition between Deobandis and Barelvis can be said to have preoccupied these communities in Britain for the latter part of the twentieth century in their efforts to establish their own mosques within Muslim communities; the mosques of one group are not known to invite openly the worshippers of another group. The Salafis are especially looked upon suspiciously because they do not want to hold either study circles in any of the other two main groups’ mosques nor enthusiastically attend prayers there. When they do, they often sit in an isolated position and on discussion with some of them it has become apparent that they would only be willing to take over the running of the mosques completely but not be willing to engage or integrate into their communities.

3.2.3 Al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir

The Deobandis, Barelvis and Salafis do not openly admit any type of political agenda. Al-Muhajiroun, deemed to be in support of radical Islamic thought and also militant, do have a political agenda. Omar Bakri Mohammed, who was the founder and worldwide leader of this group, openly declared the suicide bombers in the Israeli Café of Mike’s Bar as ‘heroes’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005:6). He displays a sense of pan-Islamism and supports the founding of an Islamic caliphate in Muslim lands. This group does not appear to have perpetrated violence in Britain as yet, though this may simply be intentional in order to maintain a presence in Britain by keeping it out of bounds.

Geaves identifies Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) which is known for its desire to establish an Islamic state (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) even in Britain as having the potential to ignite the fire of extremism or jihadist sentiments. Bakri joined this group in 1977. This group had been banned and severely suppressed in Saudi Arabia (Wiktorowicz, 2005:7) where Bakri had difficulty in recruiting people, hence, making it difficult to associate this group with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or the Saudi administration. After being cast out of HT, Bakri continued work under the banner of al-Muhajiroun and over time it emerged as a group in its own right.

This desire to establish an Islamic caliphate for the implementation of Sharia is not extreme or jihadist nor does it pose a threat to British society or the British public. The comments from the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2008 that Sharia was inevitable in the UK[34] coupled with the emergence of Sharia law courts in Britain which are under the control of Dr. Shoaib Hasan,[35] who has no links with these groups, show that there is an untenable link made between the requirement to establish an Islamic way of life and the political activities of HT and al-Muhajiroun.

3.3 Summary

Given the cultural (and to a great extent, ideological and religious) gap between immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and the second generation Muslims, it can be said that British Muslims have not necessarily inherited the issues that their parents brought with them from the sub-continent. Contrary to common belief, the first-generation Muslims are not greatly influenced by Wahhabism, nor are they clearly linked to extremist or terrorist activities. This leaves a question hanging over the militant activities of groups such as al-Muhajiroun, HT, and others which supportjihadi or militant activities. Scholarly literature and media reports accuse militant groups of extremist activities but fail to pin-point how they influence the youth or analyse the factors that are contributing to underlying issues faced by Muslim youth in Britain.

The objective of establishing the success or failure of Wahhabism as an ideology is not possible because of the difficulties surrounding the definition of Wahhabism, as well as the erroneous link between the desire to live Islamically with the political agenda of some fringe groups that are labelled as Wahhabi by both writers on this topic as well as the media. Nevertheless, Britain is faced with a rise of extremist behaviour and in order to deal with it, a solution is required. Sufism is often discussed within the media and within political circles as being the cure and given that the British government recently supported the establishment of the Muslim Sufi Council of Britain. Given the sparse material on this topic, it needs to be discussed in some detail.

4 Sufism: an alternative perspective for British Muslims

4.1 The Wahhabi–Sufi rivalry

The second objective of this dissertation is to establish how Sufism as an alternative paradigm addresses the issues of Britain’s youth. There are underlying issues within Islamic theology whose contention goes back to the formative period within the early centuries of Islam. Geaves (2000:56) alludes to this point wherein questions about the nature of Allah, his non-corporeality, his anthropomorphism, his attributes and an understanding of what he desires, often become a bone of contention. This has been at the heart of the Sufi−non-Sufi divide: how far is Islam willing to accommodate hermeneutical interpretations of Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions? What exactly constitutesshirk ? How much freedom is allowed within religion to express one’s love for Allah? How literal is literal: does every verse within the Quran have an inner meaning and outer meaning or is there such thing as an outer meaning at all? Throughout these debates and attacks, Sufism has remained the one approach that has clearly stood the test of time and survived everywhere in the Muslim world working with all kinds of cultures. Ibn Arabi, a past Sufi master, even addressed the issue of equality between the sexes where traditional scholars often struggled to clear Islam’s name.[36] Sufism is greatly responsible for the spread of Islam in the Indian sub-continent and saw the flow of Sufism from the Khwajagan of Afghanistan[37] to India and back again in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has survived purist movements and political turmoil in Arab countries and even the theological turmoil of the early centuries of Islam. The scholars of Islamicfiqh and Sufism claim that it goes back to the Adam himself (Geaves, 2000).

The focus on the oppression of Sufism by Muslim purists has recently come to the fore, accelerated by the search of the British Government for a solution to the rise in Islamic extremism in Britain recently manifesting in suicide bomb attacks. This has also brought to the public eye the tireless efforts of the Haqqani Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani who campaigned in the pre−9/11 days to raise awareness of the pending attacks. This has provided the backdrop to allow the Shaykh to bring out the Sufi voice and ‘officially’ enter Sufism into mainstream Islam in Britain. His celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in number 10 Downing Street has done a great deal to raise the profile of Sufism within Britain. His flourishing relationship with royalty[38] seen in his hosting of a Sufi event in Manchester on 4th February 2010 is another indication of harmonious relationships that Sufism can bring to the table. Despite the seeming division in the Muslim community caused by the polarisation into either non-Sufi and Sufi, there appears to be a benefit in that the moderate Muslim has a potential representative in the form of Sufism. This is also indicated by Geaves (2000:59) who has written about the potential of Sufism to counter the extremist tendencies as he analyses the writings of Sufi Shaykhs such as Kabbani (1998).

The immanent danger that needs addressing is the possibility of hard-line or extremist rhetoric that has already infiltrated Britain’s mosques remaining there. The Friday sermons of anger aimed at perceived enemies of Islam are indications that there are some remnants of the reaction to the colonialism of Muslim lands imported into Britain. This voice is increasingly becoming dated as British Muslims struggle to form an identity for themselves.

Geaves (interview conducted by this author, 2010) explains that there has been a fair amount of opportunism exhibited by Sufi groups in the wake of the issues of recent years especially after the 9/11 and 7/7 incidents. Sufis capitalised on the opportunity saying that Sufism would never support the violent actions of such radical groups. Furthermore, given that Sufis have also historically been involved in military conflicts, it cannot be simply said that Sufism is an apolitical, non-militant group of mystics.

4.2 Sufism: conclusion

The question as to whether or not Sufism is an alternative paradigm is a complex one on many levels. There is a plethora of writings on Sufism stretching back centuries: the scholarly writings on this subject have, as previously mentioned, traversed centuries, cultures, peoples, eras, languages and an array of other variable factors in society. The extant writings of the likes of Idries Shah (d. 1996) have been a companion to the British people from the mid-twentieth century until today. Book stores proliferate with both original writings in Arabic and Persian as well as interpretations in English by Orientalists, Westerners, Sufis and non-Sufis. Many writers such as Annemarie Schimmel (d. 2003) have given the best parts of their lives to the study of Sufism, taking up residency in centres of Sufi culture[39] and Islamic scholars to this day search to define the inner kernel of Islam through the Sufi way. Sufism’s roots are seen by some to emerge from the Hadith of Jibril narrated in theForty Ahadith [40] of Abu Zakaria Muhi al-Din Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (d. 1278) in which Jibril (the Angel Gabriel) comes to the Prophet Muhammad and asks him an array of questions, one of which is aboutIhsan to which the Prophet replies that it is to worship Allah as though one sees him and if one cannot see him then one should realise that Allah sees him. The clear message of this hadith is that Sufism is greatly experiential and it aims to bring one closer to Allah.

This section of the dissertation could not possibly hope to cover the vast amount of books on Sufism or the wide range of its topics. Given the lack of in-depth literature available on the possibility of Sufism being the alternative paradigm to extremism, it leads one to the following conclusions.

Some prominent Sufis in Britain such as Shaykh al-Kabbani have a good relationship with the British ruling administration and this will be viewed by politically-oriented Islamists as a political tool which politicians can use according to their whims and non-Islamic objectives if required. This will always be a point of contention and sticking point for supporting Sufism as an alternative perspective given that some such groups are receiving funding from the British government.[41]

Sufism promotes certain non-Orthodox activities such as the veneration of saints, which even non-extremist groups such as Deobandis can critically argue against using Islamic sources. Sufism would need to be able to accommodate such differences of opinion otherwise Sufis will fail to engage with other Islamic elements within British society.

Many Sufi Muslims uphold the British monarchy as divinely ordained rulers whereas there are anti-royalists even in Britain, given the monarchy’s German descent. This notion had its origin in the Banu Umayyad caliphate where the oppressive rulers espoused the view that Allah had supported their rule through predestination. This again is a contentious point which goes back to the heart of Islamic theology and the days of the Qadarite-Jabbarite debates.[42] The issue is where one draws the line between accepting a ruling establishment on the grounds that they are divinely ordained and opposing them on their oppressive policies. It has further ramifications for British citizens because of the pledge to the British monarchy and the British state which is expected from each citizen.[43] Despite the passing of centuries this point is still contentious and not likely to be resolved by simply promoting Sufi values.

Sufism is not necessarily averse to political involvement even by military means. Even a Sufi could interpret a political situation to justify the taking up of arms and possibly fighting for a bad cause. The Janissary Turkish troops were closely linked to Haji Bektashi Veli (d. 1270) and often called ‘Sons of Haji Bektash’[44] a well-known Sufi of the thirteenth century who came to Anatolia from Khorasan settling in the small village of Suluca Karahoyuk (Nasr, 1997:359). The Bektashi way became central to the Janissary corps because every man who joined them had to take an oath of loyalty to Haji Bektash Wali, thus this would in effect make them hismurid (follower).

Othman Dan Fodio (d. 1817) of the Qadiriyyah Order in West Africa launched ajihad to reform his followers and formed the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria[45] . Thisjihad was also instrumental in inspiring later Sufi leaders to form new states in Fouta Jallon in 1725, Fouta Toro in 1776 and Masina in 1810.

Is the relationship between prominent Sufis like Shaykh al-Kabbani and the ruling administration reciprocated in the same way by his counterparts? The whole-hearted backing by the British government of Sufis in the early twenty-first century does not appear to be as forthcoming now with some reports that the government is not considering Sufism as the only strand of the Muslim community with which it is willing to engage. This gives the impression that Sufis of Britain have not managed to maintain their once flourishing ties with the British ruling establishment. Furthermore, the recent function arranged by Shaykh al-Kabbani to which he invited Prince Charles has only been noted as a musical festival on his ‘official website’ as opposed to being promoted as an effort to spread Islam through love.[46] It would be too late for a personality such as Haqqani to preach an apolitical perspective because of the support he has already given to the likes of Prince Charles and solidarity shown to the British Government. To a typically non-Sufi group such as the Salafis Haqqani probably is regarded as a sell-out. Furthermore, even within Sufis, there are some such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who have espoused a general divide between rulers andwalis .[47] The implication is that there are some Sufis who would not regard Haqqani’s affiliation with royalty and ruling powers as legitimate and this could result in realignment with more extreme groups.

Sufism cannot therefore necessarily be deemed as an apolitical strand of Islam. Nasr (1997:163) writes that one of the prominent characteristics of the Naqshbanditariqa was the way in which it never hesitated in being critical of or confrontational towards political powers. He goes on to quote Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi as saying that ‘[t]he King is the soul and the people the body. If the King goes astray, the people will follow suit.’ Given that this strand of Sufism is traced back to either Abu Bakr or to Imam Ali, it is inevitable that there are political ties with the Naqshbandis and that they would even be willing to engage in combat for the right cause. The other Sufitariqas on the other hand may have had a slightly different approach in that their policy was ‘As you are, so shall be your rulers.’ (Nasr, 1997:163) which implies a focus on oneself rather than others, nevertheless, armed conflict cannot be ruled out of the Sufi theology.

The inference is that whereas a so-called Wahhabist Muslim was willing to fight against the British Government and its citizens in favour of the Afghan Taliban, the Naqshbandi Sufi might be willing to take the side of the British Government against the Afghan Taliban and this is a problematic situation for any Muslim if they were required to fight against a fellow Muslim even if given approval by their government. The well-known Prophetichadith is often quoted in this regard which states that if two Muslims fight amongst each other both of them are destined to hell-fire (Sunan Abi Dawud).[48]

Given the Naqshbandiyya principle of opposing one’s rulers if need be, there is no guarantee that even British Sufis can be stopped from joining forces with militant andjihadi groups in Afghanistan and other such places. The result is that militancy could possibly begin to occur even within the Sufi community of Britain. The Muslim world may well see the formation of ‘pro-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis and ‘anti-War on Terror’ Naqshbandis splitting the Muslim community even further.

It can be seen that the answer to the increase in radical Islam within Britain is therefore not necessarily Sufism; on the contrary, the over-promotion of Sufism to British Muslims could result in a total split within the Muslim community on more levels than simply a religious one: there would now be a theological and a political split.

The answer must therefore be sought from identifying the underlying reasons why the British youth are finding that they need to express themselves in such devastating ways. This is achieved in the next section through case studies and field research.


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