Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Legal Comparability and Cultural Identity: The Case of Legal Reasoning in Jewish and Islamic Traditions

Joseph E. David*

Table of Contents

1. Introduction. 4

1.1 Fruits and Religions 4

1.2 Provoked Comparison. 4

1.3 Making Jewish and Islamic Laws Comparable 6

2. Legal Reasoning: Structure and Theology  8

2.1 The Qiyas (Legal Analogy) 9

2.2 Epistemology and Legal Theology. 9

2.3 Orientating the Sacred Place 10

3. Rabbinic Attitudes towards Legal Reasoning  12

3.1 Holistic Jurisprudence and the Intelligibility of the Divine Law. 13

3.2 Against the Dual-Stratum Paradigm. 14

4. Legal Reasoning and Judicial Error 16

4.1 The Talmudic Typology of Judicial Errors, Sherira b. Hanina and Moses Maimonides 17

5. Concluding Reflections: Comparability and Identity  20

Notes 23

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1. Introduction

1.1 Fruits and Religions

Comparative studies of cultures, religions or praxis involve much more than applying a method. They are not just about confronting similarities and underlining differences. Behind such projects is the belief that a comparative perspective would provide both a better understanding of the compared systems and contribute knowledge that would not otherwise be attained. Nevertheless, the nature of the ‘additional knowledge,’ and the extent to which such knowledge is a unique outcome of the comparative study, are still to be explained. Furthermore, comparative projects also run the risk of being held hostage to biased paradigms, simplistic preconceptions, preoccupations with self-understanding and even unconscious commitments to a political agenda. A comparativist should be alert to hidden traps along the way and anticipate stumbling across them throughout her study.

A comparativist should also be simultaneously mindful of both the inducements of the project and the comparability[1] of the subject matters. In the context of comparing legal systems, those problems commence with two inquiries: (1) what curiosities and premises are motivating the comparison; and (2) what type of justifications, preconditions, constraints and limitations apply to such a comparison?A fortiori , if we accept the conventional jurisprudential assumption that the law, as a unique social-political phenomenon, has universal characteristics, then comparing legal systems, either diachronically or synchronically, is like comparing fruits.[2] The following discussion will address these questions by referring to the foundations of legal reasoning in both Jewish and Islamic jurisprudential thought. Following our study, we will offer some general reflections on the relatedness of Jewish and Islamic legal systems and their comparability.

1.2 Provoked Comparison

The comparison of Jewish and Islamic legal traditions has attracted scholars since the very early stages of Oriental studies in Western academies.[3] The Jewish-Islamic comparative perspective has also played a major role in various areas of Islamic studies and consequently shaped the leading scholarly paradigms. Nevertheless, only recently have scholars began to demonstrate sensitivity to the methodologies of these comparative studies.

The intellectual motives that have typically guided such comparative projects can be classified into three distinct categories. The first seeks to discover or locate influences; the order of influence, or other consequential exchanges such as the borrowings or adoptions of ideas between the two legal systems. Underlying the exploration of influences, however, are often aspirations to claim originality or to demonstrate how later ideas and praxis were derived from earlier sources. Such a comparative approach, even when undertakenbona fide , is not free of suspicion concerning its objectivity, viz, that it serves agendas that celebrate the originality and thus the superiority of the source over its descendants. In the case of Islamic studies, such a conception has often been adopted by those who view of the formative period of Islam as best understood by reference to Jewish, Christian and other environmental influences upon the Prophet Muhammad and his believers.[4] Such a conception is explicitly evident in the work that is considered the cornerstone of modern Oriental scholarship – A. Geiger’s (1810-1874)Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen? This pioneering study, and many others like it, illustrates the prevalence of the vocabulary of ‘influence’ and ‘borrowing’ in supporting political and ideological efforts to reinvent the image of Jews and their civic conditions in modern Europe.[5] However, tracing the influences of the Jewish legal tradition on the Islamic one is not always asymmetrical. Alongside the efforts to situate Islam as a daughter-religion[6] against the Judeo-Christian backdrop, many studies concerning early medieval Rabbinic literature are motivated by a desire to demonstrate the considerable impact of Islamic law and legal thinking on Jewish legal literature, either Rabbinic or Karaite, of that period.[7] Generally speaking, the ideological motives for exploring influences and for seeking original sources were obviously related to the 19th century philological zeitgeist, the diachronic focus on historical developments and the endeavor to reconstruct the ‘original’, either the text or the author’s intention.[8]

A second motive is related to the nostalgic image of the scholastic environment in which Jewish thinkers and jurists jointly collaborated with their Islamic counterparts. Inspired by the historical image of the ‘Golden Age’ in which medieval Jewish learning centers in Iraq, Iran, the Maghreb and Andalusia were highly respected and coexisted peacefully under Islamic regimes, the aim of such a perspective is to reaffirm such dignified historical realities and perhaps even encourage similar visions in the present time.[9] Pastoral accounts of this type are very common in descriptions of medieval philosophy and mysticism, in which those subjects are portrayed as identity-blinded disciplines with the capacity to transcend divisive elements and religious borders. Affected by the spirit of the European Enlightenment, these disciplines were taken as a common foundation for universal reflections of a higher order and as a means to bridge the particularities of each religion. The extent to which such collaborations truly took place, or rather have been projected by modern scholars, should be examined in relation to each case independently. Against this background, the discussion below indicates that collaborative milieus shared legal, as well as theologico-legal perceptions. As we shall see, alongside the kindred theological principles underlying both legal systems, Jewish and Islamic jurists often felt they were participating in the very same projects. Hence, the distinctive positive contents of the two legal systems did not stop them from developing unified conceptual language and similar self-understanding. However, this perspective implicitly presumes a political vision as well. By highlighting images of collaboration and shared knowledge, the relatedness and common ground between both communities are stressed by ignoring the hierarchical relations as an essential component.[10]

Contrary to the previous motives, the third aim is to increase sensitivity towards essential differences within the compared legal systems and to underline the peculiarities of each. As such, comparison serves as a methodological tool by which particular features of each legal system are revealed. The comparative perspective makes it easier to observe latent and marginal features. A better understanding of both legal systems is achievable through a conceptual analysis of their notions, institutions and practical solutions. While the previous motives focused on the common ground between the two systems, the current comparative perspective, sometimes described as ‘new comparativism’,[11] seeks to develop self-understanding and to increase awareness of their essential variations. Such a perspective is indifferent as to whether an actual encounter between the traditions occurred. The comparative method is likely to be an imaginary set-up by which a certain legal system is more clearly reflected. In that respect a comparative perspective might be evaluated as a kind of thought experiment.

In fact, referring to actual encounters and common ground is entirely justified when addressing medieval Jewish and Islamic jurisprudential thought. Moreover, since actual interactions between Jews and Muslims took place on various stages, both deliberately and unconsciously, it would be wrong to avoid descriptions of influence or borrowing. Even a strong commitment to a critical postcolonial approach should nota priori avoid the vocabulary of influence. Such a restriction would artificially limit the investigational scope and thus be unjustified.

Against the above approaches, our following analysis will refer to jurisprudential consciousness as the object of our comparative study and as its source of justification (henceforth: comparative jurisprudence). We will concentrate on the conscious ideas, principles, concepts, beliefs and reasoning that underlie the legal institutions and doctrines. More precisely, we will examine the jurists’ self-understanding and the ways it reflects the relationship between Jewish and Islamic legal systems.[12]

The comparative jurisprudence approach not only favors jurisprudence as an appropriate lens for comparing legal systems, but also defines jurisprudence with a focus on consciousness – i.e. on the agent’s internal point of view. In contrast with the common conceptions of law, by either naturalists or positivists, it proposes to consider the perceptions of the law as relevant factors. In terms of historical observations of Jewish and Islamic legal traditions, the organizing questions would go beyond influences or borrowing to inquire how the jurists, judges or law-makers understood their engagements with the corresponding legal system.[13]

1.3 Making Jewish and Islamic Laws Comparable

Many of the comparative studies of Jewish-Islamic legal traditions are largely led by curiosity about influences and borrowings, and are not necessarily troubled by wider questions of comparability. In fact, the comparison of Jewish and Islamic legal systems can be justified on various grounds – historical and jurisprudential on the one hand, and perceptional on the other hand.

Historically, the existence of medieval Jewry under Islamic political and cultural domination provided cultural and intellectual encounters and interactions of scholars of both milieus.[14] The sharing of a common language, cultural codes and habits naturally served as a vehicle for exchanges of legal doctrines, institutions and perceptions. In that respect, a comparison of both legal systems is anticipated on factual grounds and part of the effort to explore past realities. From a jurisprudential point of view, the comparability of Jewish and Islamic legal systems is justifiable because of similar theological and structural apparatuses. In a way, both legal systems are committed to ‘religious legalism.’ In contrast with antinomian religiosity, often ascribed to the theology of St. Paul, both Jewish and Islamic mainstreams are law-centered religions, i.e. religions that acknowledge the subordination to the law as the most meaningful expressions of religious life.[15] Hence in both theology was essentially intertwined in legal theory.[16] Consequently, the implementation of the divine/earthly distinction within a legal system, according to which the law as the articulation of divine imperatives is also subject to human manipulation, invited a dualist conceptualization of the law. Therefore, both systems are structured in various dualistic fashions, either as a dual stratum (vertical dualism) or as a bipolar scheme (horizontal dualism), which provides coherent meaning to the seemingly oxymoronic idea of ‘divine law subject to human reasoning.’

Against the historical and jurisprudential understandings for comparing Jewish and Islamic laws, their comparability could also be reasoned in reference to the self-understanding of the jurists who acted within these legal systems. Indeed, throughout the ninth to the twelfth centuries, Jewish jurists were largely inspired by Islamic jurists, their literature, doctrines and institutions. The extent to which this inspiration was acknowledged or covered by their rhetoric is an interesting question that has much to do with the aim of presenting the Jewish legal legacy as ancient and purely transmitted. But even when the analogies to Islamic law are not emphasized, the Jewish references to a similar legal vocabulary indicate the acknowledgment in a comparative perspective. Therefore, the comparability of Jewish and Islamic law systems also rests on the comparative consciousness of the Jewish jurists when they reflected on their own system.

2. Legal Reasoning: Structure and Theology

It follows that Islamic Law everywhere strives to go back to direct the pronouncements of the founder, thus veritably developing a strictly historical method, while both Talmudic and Canon Law seek to make their points by means, not of historical fact-finding, but of logical deduction (logischer Ableitung). For deduction is subconsciously determined by the goal of the deduction, that is to say the present, and therefore it gives contemporary power over the past. Investigation, on the other hand, makes the present dependent on the past. Even in this seemingly pure world of law, then, one can still recognize the difference between the commandment to love and the obedience to law.

Franz Rosenzweig[17]

Interestingly, Rosenzweig observes legal reasoning as a typological differentiator between the three monotheistic legal systems – Islamic, Talmudic[18] and Canon law. He portrays two types of confronting legal theories: on the one hand, Islamic law is based onnostalgic jurisprudence , is highly committed to historical facts,[19] and accordingly celebrates obedience to law as the supreme value. On the other hand, Talmudic and Canon law, as future-oriented systems, are based ondeductive reasoning , much less constrained by the law and hence emphasize the virtue of love as the ultimate divine commandment. Rozenzweig’s observations are, however, peculiar and incompatible with common scholarly accounts on both Jewish and Islamic legal systems. First, against the view of mainstream Rabbinic theology as legalist by nature, he describes Jewish law in Christian and antinomian terms as an expression of the ultimate commandment to love. Second, and perhaps even more irreconcilable with our usual understanding, is his presentation of Islamic law in opposition to the use of deductive reasoning. While one can deny viewing Jewish law as based on a future-oriented jurisprudence, it is much more difficult to agree with Rosenzweig’s observation that Islamic law is not deductive. In fact, his position is a total denial of the fourth root Sunni jurisprudence, which is the jurist’s independent reasoning –qiyas orijtihād . Being freed from Judeo-Christian idealism,[20] we will focus on the significance of legal reasoning in medieval Rabbinic jurisprudence through a comparison to its role in Islamic jurisprudence.

Generally, Rabbinic jurisprudence in the Middle Ages may be examined in reference to three axes. The first one pertains to the relationship between Talmudic and post-Talmudic reflections on legal concepts. One focus of post-Talmudic efforts was to reconcile and harmonize Talmudic and post-Talmudic rulings. The second axis illustrates the complex relationships between a rationalism that celebrates human reasoning as an essential component of any legal activity, and traditionalism, which insists on taking the law as an outcome of divine revelation and therefore opposes reliance on human reasoning in legal matters. The third axis is the Rabbinate-Karaite[21] polemic, which reached its climax in the first half of the tenth century.

There is some evidence to support the view that legal reasoning was indeed a controversial topic in the Rabbinate-Karaite polemics,[22] though our analysis suggests a revision of this view and hence its moderation. On the other hand, legal reasoning was at the heart of the rationalist-traditionalist tension, to which Jewish legal historians have paid very little attention.[23]

2.1 The Qiyas (Legal Analogy)

The Arabic termqiyas (قياس) in its legal sense can refer, in various contexts, to any of the three legal concepts – judicial analogy, general deduction or syllogism.[24] Legalqiyas is at times considered the archetype of all forms of legal argumentation.[25] In particular, it indicates the various types of argumentations that legal scholars use in their independent reasoning –ijtihād (اجتهاد‎),[26] and for this reason it occupied a central place in theuṣūl al-fiqh literature.[27] Following Shafi’ī’s[28] discussion,qiyas revolve around the fundamental typology of (1) cause-basedqiyas and (2) resemblance-basedqiyas . Cause-basedqiyas is a means for extending an existing norm to cases which where is no explicit instruction or precedent in the known law. Accordingly, the expansion of the law is based on an existing causal component (cause, reason or meaning) shared by both the existing law and the new case.[29] Resemblance-based qiyas, on the other hand, is based on the isomorphic resemblance of the two cases.[30] These two types ofqiyas thus illustrate distinct associations between an existing law and a new case: while in cause-basedqiyas a shared element associates the two cases, in resemblance-basedqiyas the isomorphic likeness allows their association. That is, cause-basedqiyas connects the two cases by means of a third factor - the underlying cause, while resemblance-basedqiyas connects the two to one another intrinsically.

2.2 Epistemology and Legal Theology

There are two people in the same state and under the same king, living two lives and under two jurisdictions, clergy and laity, spiritual and carnal, sacerdotium and regnum.

Stephen of Tournai [31]

The identification of the law with the ‘Word of God’ is indeed a central principle for both Judaism and Islam. Consequently, a great degree of correlation between legal propositions and theological principles is anticipated. From the very outset, Medieval Jewish and Islamic laws emphasized the transparent relationship between the positive contents of the law and the perception of God as the ultimate legislator. Thus, in many respects, knowing the law and applying it correctly are equivalent to the reception of divine revelation. As such, legal epistemology is reliant upon its theological assumptions, so that the epistemological prepositions are mixed together with the theological claims about the nature of God and His relation to the believers. This aspect singles out the uniqueness of these legal systems in that the source of legitimacy in Jewish and Islamic laws is epistemological rather than institutional. Due to the association of legal theology and epistemology, many of the debates about legal reasoning are associated with theological discussions about the nature of human reasoning from a theological point of view: is legal reasoning essentially no more than an interpreting faculty, or is it, alternatively, an autonomous source of knowledge?[32] To illustrate the dependency of epistemology on theology and its implications on the theoretical structure of the law, we shall refer to a metaphor that is commonly mentioned in Islamic jurisprudential discussion to support legal reasoning.

2.3 Orientating the Sacred Place

The example commonly brought to justify legal reasoning and the multiplicity of opinions among jurists is the dilemma of finding the direction of prayer – theqiblah – for believers who cannot visually locate Mecca.[33] While the obligation of facing Mecca applies to every Muslim believer with no temporal or spatial limitations, performing this duty might involve certain practical difficulties when Mecca is beyond the believer’s sight. In that case, the worshipper must make a special effort and use his own judgmental faculties in order to determine the correct direction.[34] The traveler who seeks the direction of Mecca needs available signs by which he can find the proper direction.[35] In that respect, these circumstances exemplify both the epistemological problem and its solution. Determining the correct direction illustrates the ascertainment of the right answer, and the traveler’s predicament is analogous to the confusions that may beset the jurist who seeks the right answer for the case that confronts her. This metaphor concretizes the idea that, since the objective law is not always known to the believers, the place at which certainty ends is the point of departure for the jurist’s independent reasoning. Legal reasoning in this sense is not the jurist’s privilege, but rather a mandatory religious duty under conditions of insufficient knowledge. From this metaphor we can derive the following presumptive approaches, which are not entirely epistemological principles or theological postulations; they present a combined matrix in which the epistemological dimension is an inherent component of legal theology.

1. Metaphysical realism: The first approach relates to the metaphysical dimension of legal norms. It assumes that legal answers are characterized by ‘strong objectivity.’[36] In other words, it asserts that the metaphysical existence of a legal norm is independent of human ability to conceive it. According to this principle, every legal question has a definite answer; there is a relevant answer for every possible normative state of affairs. A specific case for which there is seemingly no existing law is nothing but a cognitive blindness and not a limitation of the law itself.[37] The incorporation of realist metaphysics within the context of revealed law implies that the divine law reflects God’s concern with every possible set of earthly circumstances. For that reason, the religious value of the law is not exhausted by the subordination to the word of God, but primarily in the fact that through the law God reveals his concrete intentions about the world. As such, legal knowledge that uncovers God’s will is of no lesser value than theological knowledge that reveals God’s nature and his guiding principles.[38]

2. Incomplete revelation and limited legal knowledge: Despite the above, the law known through revelation does not include the rulings for all possible circumstances. Hence, this entails the distinction between the law known by revelation, i.e. the law inscribed in theQur’ān or revealed in theSunna (henceforth: therevealed law ), and the law derived from it (henceforth: thederivative law ). This distinction acknowledges the structured limitation of legal knowledge. Therefore, the part of the law that is not known by revelation is concealed and hidden from human eyes, just as the holy mosque and the city of Mecca are indiscernible to the remote traveler. Legal knowledge therefore is first obtained through revelation and thence derived by legal reasoning (ijtihād ), interpretation (tawil ), and analogy (qiyas ). Similarly, this premise makes it clear that legal reasoning expresses the religious virtue of human efforts in discovering the implicit word of God.

3. Gnostic gist: [39] The third approach is related to the previous two. It asserts that notwithstanding the incompleteness of revelation and the restrictions of legal knowledge, God in His goodness would not leave his believers in doubt and confusion. To this end, He conceals within the revealed law hints and traces without which the believers cannot discover the correct legal answers. This theological stance reemphasizes the juxtaposition of epistemology and theology.[40] It concretizes the idea that God’s grace is translated to epistemological and methodological aid.[41] Thus, the theoretical justification of legal reasoning is in fact a combination of skeptical epistemology and gnostic theology. Legal reasoning is therefore no more than a structured component of the Divine law that is designed to include human reasoning as an interpretative tool.

These three approaches illustrate that religious legalism is inherently linked to a dual-stratum structure or the division of the entire body of law into two categories: (1) the law known through explicit revelation; and (2) the implicit, derivative law known through the jurists’ intellectual efforts that captures the dialectic notion of divine law in human hands. Legal norms of the first category are transparent and knowable to the entire community of believers, certain, and therefore indisputable. Conversely, propositions of the second category are subject to a wide range of interpretations. Therefore they are not only disputable but epistemologically at best only plausible. The dual-stratum structure also projects far-reaching sociological implications. It decisively supports the privileged status of the legal experts. In terms of sociological theory, such a structure provides the preconditions for the necessity of clerical expertise. Put differently, this structure represents the endeavor to reserve legal exegesis for an exclusive group of experts.

3. Rabbinic Attitudes towards Legal Reasoning

Generally, Jewish medieval jurists did embrace legal reasoning as a legitimate means in applying religious legal norms. In what follows we will first describe rabbinic criticism of legal reasoning and then the rabbinic embracement of legal reasoning. Among Jewish medieval thinkers, only two are known to us as opponents of the use of legal reasoning – the head of the Suraian academy in the first half of the ninth century, Sa’adya b. Yosef Gaon (882-942 CE) and the Spanish physician, poet and philosopher Yehudah Halevi (1075-1141 CE). We will portray Sa’adya’s arguments against the use of theqiyas .[42] Traditionally, scholars who have dealt with his objection to theqiyas have tended to view his stance as deriving from the heated debates he had with the Karaite and from his endeavors to defend traditionalism.[43] Sa’adya condemns the Karaite enthusiasm with theqiyas as resulting from secondary rather than from substantive considerations. [44] Accordingly, he suggests that the Karaite’s stance is caused by their mistaken response to the incompleteness of the revealed law and consequently the bound legal knowledge – “The reason that stimulated the opponents [=Karaites] to believe in intellectual capacity (al-ra’y) and analogy (qiyas), is that they found things which required knowledge whether permitted or forbidden, and which are not written in the Torah, and likewise [matters which their] quantities and qualities are inexplicit.”[45] Subsequently Sa’adya also notes the gnostic assumption: “Nevertheless, they know that it is impossible to say of the Creator, may He be exalted and praised, that he left the people perplexed. On the contrary, there is no doubt that He placed before them that which could lead them to their quest.”[46] Yet it is still doubtful whether these quotations reflect Sa’adya’s principled objection toqiyas . Unlike the above polemic context, in a treatise dedicated to jurisprudential analysis Sa’adya expands the discussion of theqiyas , from which discussion emerges a deeper and richer picture of his objections. According to our proposed reading, his objection to application of judicial analogy derives from his rationalistic theology, and not from the debate with the Karaites.

As a rationalist, Sa’adya is also concerned with the limitations of rational methods in order to fully respect the independency of reasoning. Paradoxically then his objection to theqiyas is the result of his rationalistic insistence. The gist of this paradox is the acknowledgment of reason as a valid source of religious knowledge on the one hand, while acknowledging the fundamental identification of the law with the revealed Word of God on the other. This dialectic invites the heuristic distinction between legal norms which are acquired by reason – rational laws (Ar. ‘aqliyyāt , Heb.sikhliyot ) – and those given through revelation – revelational laws (Ar.sam’iyyāt , Heb.shimi’yot ).[47] Sa’adya limitsqiyas only to rational laws and denies its relevance for revelational laws. Hence paradoxically his keen insistence on the validity of human reasoning as source of religious knowledge ultimately reduces the applicability of rational faculties in the framework of religious law. This being so, Sa’adya’s legal theory presents a new perspective on the conceptual meaning of judicial analogy.

3.1 Holistic Jurisprudence and the Intelligibility of the Divine Law

Sa’adya’s legal theory is primarily an organic one. In this world view, in which “no things have existence except by way of combination,” the internal relations among the components of the divine law are not contingent, and in practice they determine the possible manipulations within the law. The legal theory that Sa’adya presents in the beginning of Kitāb Tahsil Ashar’i’ Asama’iyah[48] (henceforth: Kitab Tahsil ) Sa’adya describes the internal relations within the law by ontological categories - substance and accident - by which he characterizes the relationship between the general rules and particular cases.[49]

From viewing the relationship between the whole and its particulars as essential, Sa’adya derives the principle of ‘unity of knowledge’ or, in his words, “the source of wisdom is one”[50] or “the root of knowledge is one”.[51] The significance of this principle may be seen on two levels. First, knowing the substance as a whole entails knowledge of the substance’s appearances or accidents. Second, the same essential relations between the whole and its particulars also exist between the subject of knowledge and the modes of its cognition: “And that which we said regarding substance and accident also applies to the things that are apprehended by the senses. Each one of them is apprehended by the same sense by which its totality is apprehended. There is no sound which is not apprehended by the sense of hearing, nor any color that is not apprehended through the sense of sight.”[52] This being so, the relation between substance and accidents is the relation between the whole and its parts, and therefore poses a three-fold correlation between thesubjects of knowledge, thestatus of knowledge and themodes of cognition.[53] This correlation between the metaphysical core of the law and its epistemological modes leads Sa’adya to examine the justification for judicial analogy against the background of the distinction between the rational and the revelational laws.

As mentioned above, Sa’adya establishes his legal theory on the distinction between rational and revelational laws.[54] The basis of this distinction lies in the idea that the intelligibility of the rational laws is absolutely independent, whereas knowledge of the revelational laws depends on revelation. This distinction apparently touches the very heart of the Sa’adianic attitude towards legal reasoning. Thus, the negation of theqiyas is an outcome of exhausting the epistemological implications of the distinction between rational and revealed laws. In that respect, Sa’adya’s objection to the use ofqiyas with regard to revelational laws strengthens the metaphysical weight of the rational/revelational distinction. Sa’adya’s reflections upon the rational/revelational distinction suggest that its source lies in the fact that different kinds of legal knowledge apply to different kinds of laws. That is to say, the distinction is not the result of the limitations of human ability to comprehend the laws, but rather of a substantive distinctiveness of the rational laws from those that are revealed. Thus when defining the jurists’ rational activities, such as exegesis (tawil ), analogy (qiyas ), and personal preferences (istihsan ), attention should be paid to the metaphysical set-up of rational and revelational laws and its application should therefore be limited to the rational laws. Sa’adya disapprovingly portrays the application of revelational laws to new cases byijtihād orqiyas as separating the particulars from their holistic structure. Applying exegesis to the revelational laws is represented as an arbitrary method that substitutes the original study. For this reason, the multiplicity of opinions and schools do not enjoy the same legitimacy that is granted them in the dual-stratum model.

3.2 Against the Dual-Stratum Paradigm

From Sa’adya’s statements inKitab Tahsil, we know that this treatise originally contained ten arguments against the use ofqiyas .[55] Unfortunately, the extant manuscript contains only three of those ten arguments,[56] and they reflect the rhetorical transition from negatingqiyas on theoretical grounds to indicating the weaknesses of the theories that justify it. In fact, Sa’adya’s objection to legal reasoning can be understood as a criticism of the distinction between revealed and derivative laws (the dual-stratum paradigm), which should be substituted by a generic, bipolar distinction between rational and revelational laws. Below, we shall briefly summarize Sa’sdya’s arguments against the dual-stratum paradigm.

Normative Differentiation: Sa’adya argues that from the revealed/derivative distinction one needs to derive implications regarding the decisiveness of the different laws. Accordingly, the revealed/derivative distinction should entail different levels of severity vis-à-vis cases of violating the laws. That is, since derivative laws attained by analogies are no more than human attempts to discover the correct answer, it would be inappropriate to treat the violations of laws equivalently. It makes no sense to punish a person who violates a derivative-law prohibition as harshly as a person who violates a revealed-law prohibition. In particular, Sa’adya claims that, in order to be consistent with the dual-stratum paradigm, it is not justified to impose severe penalties, such as capital punishment, on violations of derivative laws, the validity of which are only probable.

Justification of Controversy: A further weakness of the dual-stratum paradigm is what might be referred to as ‘the ease of justification of controversy.’ Returning to the metaphor of seeking the right direction of prayer, multiplicity of opinions is expected and hence justified.[57] However, according to Sa’adya, ana priori justification of controversies with regard to derivative law confuses between anante factum justification and apost factum acceptance of the multiplicity of opinions. Since the derivative law is neither more nor lessthan an attempt to find the right answer, one must tolerate the differences of opinion as a necessary evil, but not as something justifiedab initio.

Master–Disciple Relations: Another argument against the dual-stratum paradigm pertains to the social structure, which is liable to be upset in its wake. Justifying judicial analogy in practice implies acceptance of the personal legal reasoning of each legal scholar in its own right.[58] Consequently, the hierarchical status of the master in relation to the disciple is likely to be upset. Sa’adya refers in that respect to the botanical metaphor of roots and branches in order to reflect the didactic relationship between mentor and student, thereby pointing out that a legal theory that justifies legal reasoning unravels the established relationships between mentor and disciple.

The analysis of Sa’adya is a response to the classical Sunni theory of legal reasoning and demonstrates the extent to which medieval Jewish jurisprudential thought naturally took part in the legal discourse of that time. His criticism of the dual-stratum paradigm is not based on Biblical verses or principles peculiar to Jewish thought, but rather on general philosophical arguments that could equally be made by an Islamic jurist. Indeed, jurisprudence for Sa’adya is a formal discipline that transcends the particular content of each religion, and therefore allows a shared terminology and conceptual vocabulary. In the discussion below, we will focus on modes of borrowing by which Jewish jurists favored Islamic jurisprudential concepts above traditional categories of Jewish law.

Introduction: Profiles of The Benevolent Companions of The Prophet (S)

Abu Dharr (r.a.)

Abu Dharr was his patronym and the given name was Jundab bin Junada. He belonged to the tribe of Bani Ghaffar of Arabia. There are recorded traditions to prove that after the Infallibles of the Prophet’s Family, the most exalted amongst the companions were Salman, Abu Dharr and Miqdad.

The traditions of the Holy Ahl-ul-Bayt bear witness that after the demise of the Holy Prophet (S), most of the companions turned apostate. But Salman, Abu Dharr and Miqdad were amongst the small group of steadfastly dedicated followers of the Prophet (S) and his family. It is another matter that many of the apostates came to the right path later on and owed allegiance to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as).

The Qualities of Salman, Abu Dharr And Miqdad

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) says that Amir’ul-Mu’mineen, ‘Ali (as), said to Salman, “O Salman! Call at the door of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, to give to you a portion of the gift that she has received from theJanna {the Heaven}.Salman went to the door and made his request. The Lady said, “Three Houris came from the Heaven and brought gifts in three containers. One Houri, whose name was Salma, said that Allah has created her for Salman, the second Houri said that she was Zara and was earmarked for Abu Dharr and the third was named Maqdooda and was created for Miqdad!”

After this conversation Lady Fatima (as) gave to Salman a portion of the gift received from the Heaven. The material was so fragrant that wherever he went with it, the people asked him what material he was carrying that similar fragrance they had never experienced in their lives. Reliable books of both the Schools have it on record that the Prophet (S) has said that there is none more truthful than Abu Dharr on the earth and under the sky!

One person expressed his doubt to Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) about this Tradition that Abu Dharr couldn’t possibly be more truthful than Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as).

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) asked the person if he was aware when and under what circumstance the Prophet (S) made this remark about Abu Dharr?

When the man replied in negative, the Imam (as) said, “Some persons went to the Prophet (S) and complained that Abu Dharr was attributing incomprehensible phenomena to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as). At this point the Holy Prophet (S) mentioned about the truthfulness of Abu Dharr”

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) also told to the person that comparisons between the Infallible and the fallible persons should not be made.

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) has also said that once, when Abu Dharr reached the presence of the Prophet (S), he found him deeply engrossed in conversation with Dahia Kalabi, another companion. Abu Dharr quietly walked away intending not to disturb the conversation. In fact it was the

Angel Gabriel in the guise of Dahia Kalabi who was visiting the Prophet (S). Gabriel expressed his surprise that Abu Dharr went away without greeting the Prophet (S).

He also mentioned that one of the supplications of Abu Dharr was a topic of discussion amongst the angels in the Heaven. When Gabriel took leave and Abu Dharr visited the Prophet (S), the Prophet (S) said, “O Abu Dharr! Why did you go away so quietly even without greeting me!”

Abu Dharr replied, “O Prophet! I found you so engrossed in conversation with Dahia Kalabi that I thought you were discussing some confidential matters and it was not discreet to disturb your talk.” The Prophet (S) asked Abu Dharr, “Recount to me the supplication which you recite regularly. The Angel Gabriel, who was with me in the guise of Dahia Kalabi, told me that Abu Dharr walked away without greeting me and also mentioned that his supplication is the matter of discussion amongst the angels in the Heaven!”

Hearing this, Abu Dharr recited the following supplication:

اَللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَسْأَلُكَ الإِيمَانَ بِكَ، وَالتَّصْدِيقَ بِنَبِيِّكَ، وَالعَافِيَةَ مِنْ جَمِيعِ البَلاَءِ، وَالشُّكْرَ عَلَى العَافِيَةِ، وَالغِنَى عَنْ شِرَارِ النَّاسِ.

“O Allah, grant me faith in you, and belief in Your Prophet, and safety from all calamities, and thankfulness for wellness, and independence from evil humans .”

A reliable tradition of the Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) mentions that after the passing away of the Prophet (S) it is obligatory on the followers of the Faith to love the Companions who steadfastly followed the religion without any dissent or innovation. Amongst these steadfast persons were Salman Farsi, Abu Dharr Ghiffari, Miqdad bin Aswad Kindi, Ammar bin Yassir, Jabir bin Abdallah Ansari, Abdallah bin Samit, Ibada bin Samit, Abu Ayoob Ansari, Hudhaifa bin al Iman, Abul Hasheem, Sahl bin Hanif, Khazeema bin Sabit, Abu Saeed Khadri etc.

Bin Babawaih narrates from Abdallah bin Abbas that one day the Prophet (S) was sitting in the Qiba Mosque with his Companions. He said, “The first person who enters the door of the Mosque will be destined for the Heaven.”Hearing this, some companions got up to leave and grasp the privilege of entering the mosque first. The Prophet added, “many persons will enter this mosque and everyone will try to preempt the others, but the one amongst them who informs about the ending of the month ofAzur? will be destined for the Heaven!”

Abu Dharr entered the Mosque along with the other persons. The Prophet (S) asked the gathering about the current month of the Roman Calendar. Abu Dharr replied that it was the end of the month ofAzur?. The Prophet (S) said that he was aware of the fact but he wished to impress on the gathering that Abu Dharr was destined for the Heaven.

The Prophet (S) further added that this Heavenly person will be banished by the people because of his profound love for my family and that he would spend the rest of his life in a desolate place and die a lonely and hapless death! The people of Iraq would give him a burial taking pity on him. These persons too will be in the Heaven that has been promised by Allah to the benevolent.

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) also said that there are ten stages of faith. He added that Salman was on the tenth stage, Abu Dharr on the ninth, and Miqdad on the eighth stage!

Abu Dharr Accepts Islam

Muhammad bin Yaqoob Kulaini narrates that Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) told to a person about the manner in which Salman and Abu Dharr accepted Islam. He further said that one day Abu Dharr was grazing his sheep in his hamlet, Marka, which is situated near Mecca. While the sheep were grazing a wolf attacked them and Abu Dharr scared it away with his staff. The wolf repeated its attempt to attack the sheep when Abu Dharr ran after it shouting, “you cruel creature! Why are you not running away!”The wolf miraculously uttered, “Am I cruel or the people of Mecca who are perpetrating cruelty after cruelty on the Prophet (S)!”

Abu Dharr, when he heard this from the dumb animal, started to walk towards Mecca. When he reached Mecca it was very hot there and he was uneasy with acute thirst. He drew some water from the spring of Zam Zam. To his surprise Abu Dharr found that the container was having milk instead of water. He drank it, quenched his thirst, and understood that this was the first miracle of the truth of Allah’s Prophet (S) that he was experiencing. When he proceeded towards the compound of the Ka’ba he found some people talking irreverently about the Prophet (S) of Allah.

At this juncture arrived a person and noticing him the group got scared and became quiet. When the person started to leave the place, Abu Dharr too followed him. Catching up with the person Abu Dharr asked, “Who are you?”He replied, “I am Abu Talib, the chief of Mecca. Have you any work with me?”Abu Dharr said, “I wish to meet the Prophet of Allah (S) to accept Islam.” Abu Talib (r.a.) said, “Tomorrow you can come with me to meet him at the same time as now.”The next day Abu Dharr reached the place at the appointed time, Abu Talib (r.a.) joined him and they both proceeded to meet the Prophet (S).

Abu Dharr (r.a.) says that Abu Talib (r.a.) took him to a house where Hamza (r.a.) was present. He greeted him and Hamza (r.a.) returned his greeting and inquired about the purpose of his visit. When Abu Dharr informed to him the purpose of his visit, Hamza (r.a.) said that there is one God,Allah, and Muhammad (S) is his Prophet. Abu Dharr rejoined bearing witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad (S) is His Messenger (la ilaha ill Allah Mohammad ur rasool Allah). Then Hamza (r.a.) took him to another house where Ja’far (r.a.) was there. He too asked Abu Dharr the same questions and was given similar replies. Then Ja’far Tayyar (r.a.) took Abu Dharr (r.a.) to the house of Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as). There too Abu Dharr (r.a.) bore witness about Allah and his Prophet (S) thrice.

Now Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) took Abu Dharr (r.a.) to the presence of the Prophet (S). He greeted the Prophet (S) who kindly asked him to sit and bear witness to the unity of Allah and that Muhammad (S) is Allah’s Prophet. Now the Prophet (S) said, “O Abu Dharr! You must immediately return to your place that your paternal cousin has expired and you are the soul inheritor of his estate. Go home and take charge of the affairs of your

estate. You must join us when we summon you.”Therefore after the migration (Hijra) Abu Dharr had the honor of meeting the Prophet (S) in Medina.

Salman Accepts Islam

Imam Muhammad Al-Baqir (as) says that some companions visited the grave of the Prophet (S) one day and were busy conversing with each other. Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) asked Salman Farsi, “O Salman! How did you accept the Faith of Islam?” Salman replied, “O Amir’ul-Mu’mineen! Since it is obligatory on me to reply to your queries, I am narrating to you the circumstances under which I accepted the Faith. I am a native of the city of Shiraz and my profession was farming. My parents used to love me very much.

One day when I visited a hermitage along with them I heard a sound as if someone was saying there is no God but Allah, ‘Isa (as) is the Spirit of Allah and Muhammad (S) is the Messenger of Allah (la ilaha il Allah ‘Isa Rooh ul Allah Muhammad Rasool Allah). These words had such profound effect on me that the love of the Prophet (S) got embedded in my entire existence. I instantly abandoned my ancestral belief of worshipping the sun. Hearing this my father got very angry on me and he incarcerated me in a deep well. I was held there for a very long time during which I used to pray to Allah for my deliverance.

One day an old person dressed in a white robe arrived and releasing me from the well took me to a hermit. I expressed to the hermit about my faith. He was very kind to me but one day he told me that he would expire on the following morning I asked him, ‘Then what should I do and where should I go to?’ The hermit mentioned to me the name of another hermit and his location. He asked me to give his reference when I met the other hermit. I therefore went there and spent quite a while with the hermit till he too expired.

After the hermit’s death I continued to live with the other inmates of the hermitage. Those people were in the habit of taking wines with the food and insisted on my partaking of it. When I refused to comply they got angry on me and sold me as a slave to a Jew. This Jew also inflicted lot of hardships on me. In the end he sold me to a lady by the name of Salimia. The lady had an orchard and I was assigned to water the trees. The lady was very satisfied and happy with my work.

One day a group of persons entered the garden. They were having a cloud hovering over their heads. In the group there was the Prophet (S), Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as), Hamza, Zaid bin Haritha, Aqeel, Abu Dharr and Miqdad. I thought that the cloud following a person is the sign of the Prophet (S). But all of them couldn’t possibly be prophets. Definitely one of them must be the Prophet (S). I was wondering about this when the Prophet (S) called me up and pushing aside his robe showed to me the Seal of prophet-hood on his back. I instantly fell on his feet but he raised me up with great affection.

Now the Prophet (S) told to Salimia that he wished to buy me from her. She asked for four hundred date palms in exchange for me and said that out of these two hundred should have yellow dates and the other two hundred

red dates. The Prophet accepted this deal and asked Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) to gather four hundred seeds of dates.

When Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) completed the task, the Prophet (S) started sowing and Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) went after him watering the planted seeds. As the Prophet (S) sowed the next seed, a full-grown plant emerged from the first laden with fruits. Now, the four hundred date palms were ready, two hundred bearing yellow and the other two hundred bearing the red fruits.

When Salimia saw that her wish had been fulfilled she came up with another condition that she wanted all the palms to bear yellow fruits. Therefore, with Allah’s wish Gabriel came and with the touch of his wings, he turned all the palms to bear yellow dates. Now Salimia had perforce to part with Salman. Then the Prophet (S) released Salman and said, “O Rozba! From this day we give you the name of Salman.”

Abu Dharr, The Oppressed

‘Ali bin Ibrahim narrates that during the battle of Tabook Abu Dharr fell behind the troops because his camel was weak and emaciated. Abu Dharr abandoned the camel and carrying his luggage on his back proceeded forward. When he reached near the group, the people informed the Prophet (S) that someone was seen approaching them from a distance. The Prophet (S) said, “This is Abu Dharr. Fetch water for him that he might be very thirsty.”

When Abu Dharr reached the group, his thirst was quenched. Abu Dharr then took out a pitcher full of water from his luggage and presented to the Prophet (S). The Prophet (S) asked, “O Abu Dharr! Despite having water with you, you preferred to remain thirsty. What is the reason for this?” Abu Dharr politely replied, “I had obtained this water from a cistern on the way. The water was very sweet and cold. I thought that I must present this water to my Master instead of consuming it myself.” The Prophet (S) replied, “O Abu Dharr! May Allah be kind to you. You must be patient in your lonely journey, lonely death, poverty and helplessness. A group of God fearing persons will perform your last rites and Allah will give you entry to the Heaven.”

Reliable histories are witness that during the Second Caliphate Abu Dharr was banished to Syria. There, Abu Dharr started publicly criticizing Emir of Syria for his actions, which were contrary to the norms of Islam. He also continued to eulogize Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) in public. In the mean time the third caliph assumed power when the Emir of Syria (Mu’awiah) wrote to him complaining about Abu Dharr. He also mentioned in his letter that Abu Dharr was critical even of the Caliph. Orders were passed that Abu Dharr be sent to the capital expressly.

In consequence the thoughtless Emir dispatched this great companion of the Prophet (S) tied on to the naked back of a camel. Abu Dharr arrived at the court of the Caliph in an emaciated condition and was the recipient of the following reprimand from the Caliph, “why O Abu Dharr! You are making false allegations against us and praising Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as)?”

Abu Dharr recited a long verse from the Holy Qur’an, the gist of which is that Allah will consign the disobedient persons to the Hell and they should also be warned that Allah is not unmindful of their deeds. The Caliph rejoined in a furious tone, “O Abu Dharr! Now you have so much courage that you are confronting me! What is the act that I have committed against the dictates of Allah and the Prophet (S)?” Abu Dharr said, “Don’t you remember one evening the two of us went to the presence of the Holy Prophet (S) when we noticed that he was very sad and pensive.

When we again went to his presence the next morning we found him very happy and pleasant. When we asked him to relate to us the reason for his changing moods, the Prophet said ‘Yesterday the treasury (Bayt al Maal) had four Dirhams. I was concerned that the amount was the share of some deserving person and it had remained undistributed. Today the amount has been given to the deserving. I am now satisfied that the amount has been disbursed.’

“O Caliph of the time! Today you are hoarding 100,000 Dirhams in theBayt al Maal and are looking for arrival of another 100,000 that you can bestow favors on your kin.” Someone said, “Abu Dharr is a liar and the Verses he has quoted are never concerning you (The Third Caliph)”. Therefore Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) was called to arbitrate. The Caliph related to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) what had transpired between the parties and asked his opinion whether Abu Dharr was telling a falsehood?

Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) said, “Have fear of Allah! I have myself heard the Prophet (S) say that there is none more truthful than Abu Dharr on the land and under the sky!”

Abu Dharr cried and said, “It is a pity that you are greedy for wealth and call me a liar. You presume that I have uttered a falsehood concerning the Prophet (S). I am a better person than all of you.” Othman asked Abu Dharr, “How do you feel that you are a better person than us?” He replied, “From the day I was separated from my Master (the Prophet) I am wearing the same robe. I have not sold my Faith for the worldly pleasures. To the contrary, you have compromised your Faith for your selfish ends. You have created innovations and squandered Allah’s bounty. You shall have to face retribution on the Day of Judgment for your acts!” Othman said tersely, “I shall ask you certain questions under oath!” Abu Dharr replied, “I shall respond to all your questions, whether under an oath or not.”

Othman took Abu Dharr into privacy and said angrily, “Look! Because you happen to be a companion of the Prophet (S) I cannot get you executed. But I can definitely banish you. Tell me which town you prefer to live in” Abu Dharr replied, “Mecca, which is the place of birth of the Holy Prophet (S)!” Othman asked, “Which is the place you don’t like?” Abu Dharr replied, “Rabdha!” Orders were then issued that Abu Dharr be exiled to Rabdha and that none should accompany him to the place.

But Muhammad Yaqub Kulaini writes that at the time of the departure of Abu Dharr from Medina, Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as), Imam Husayn (as), Imam Hasan (as), Aqeel and Ammar went for some distance with him and advised him to be patient. Imam Husayn (as) told him, “O Uncle! The

enemy wanted to deprive you of your Faith, but he didn’t succeed! But in the bargain he has lost his own Faith. Allah shall reward you in abundance!”

Abu Dharr Ghiffari reached Rabdha, and lived a lonely existence. He had neither friend nor helper. He had a few sheep in the beginning that died in time. His sons succumbed to the harsh environment of the place and his wife too died. Only one daughter remained with him.

For three long days Abu Dharr remained without any food or sustenance in the desert. He put his head on a mound of sand and expired. Only his four-year-old daughter remained. The child started crying and shouting for help when a caravan of men arrived there. The girl recalling her father’s last wish told to the new arrivals, “O travelers! The companion of the Prophet (S) has died and his body is lying for two days without a shroud and grave!”

The daughter of Abu Dharr says that she remained near the grave of her father and continued to offer prayers and fasting, as did the father. She witnessed in her dream one night that Abu Dharr was reciting the Holy Qur’an in his nightly prayers. She asked him, “O father! How has Allah treated you?” He replied, “My daughter! I have arrived in the presence of my Allah. He is happy with me and I am contented. He has given me many bounties. O daughter! Do good deeds and don’t let pride overwhelm you.”

The history of Asam Koofi records that the persons who attended the burial of Abu Dharr were Ahnaf bin Qais Tamimi, Saasa bin Sauhan Abdi, Kharja bin Salat Tamimi, Abdallah bin Muslim Tamimi, Bilal bin Malik Muzni, Jareer bin Abdallah Bijli, Aswad bin Yazid al Naqhi, Alqama bin Qais al Naqhi and Malik-il-Ashtar.

Bin Abdul Birr writes in his book,Al Istiaab, that Abu Dharr died in 31 or 32H and that Abdallah bin Masood performed his funeral prayer.

The group that attended the last rites of Abu Dharr consisted of the companions of the Holy Prophet (S). The chief of the caravan was Malik al-Ashtar. Hearing the wails of the little girl, he couldn’t control himself crying. He reached the body of Abu Dharr and recited a requiem. Malik al-Ashtar was carrying with him a shroud that he had bought for 4,000 Dirhams. He draped the shroud on the body of Abu Dharr for burial.

The gathering raised their hands towards the Heaven and said, “O Allah! This was your good creature! He was a beloved companion of your Prophet (S)! Bless him in the name of Muhammad (S) and his holy Progeny! Punish those who have inflicted hardships on this gentle soul!” The entire gathering said, “Amen!”

The Prophet’s Will Concerning Abu Dharr

Sheik Abu ‘Ali Tabarsi writes in his book,Makarim al Akhlaq, and several other reliable sources relate that when Abu Asad Deelmi went to Rabdha to meet Abu Dharr, he told him that when one early morning he entered the Prophet’s Mosques in Medina none other was present with the Prophet (S) except for a copy of the Holy Qur’an and ahamael (a miniature compilation of the Holy Book). Being alone with the Holy Prophet (S), he took courage in his hands to ask him, “O Lord of the Universe! Kindly give me such advice that it is advantageous to me in both the worlds.”

The Prophet (S) looked at him intently and said, “Abu Dharr! For us you are a member of our family! In my eyes you are a chosen creation of Allah.

Listen, and listen with care, remember and act on my advice. “O Abu Dharr! Worship Allah as if you are seeing Him! And if you cannot see Him, then definitely He sees you!’”

This tradition of the Prophet (S) is the comprehensive utterance of the Prophet (S) that might require volumes to explain and elucidate. We are trying to dwell on the subject briefly in the steps dealt with in the following chapter. My humble effort may not measure up to the comprehension of the eloquence of the Great Personality, but it is my duty to make an effort. Inshallah!

Introduction: Profiles of The Benevolent Companions of The Prophet (S)

Abu Dharr (r.a.)

Abu Dharr was his patronym and the given name was Jundab bin Junada. He belonged to the tribe of Bani Ghaffar of Arabia. There are recorded traditions to prove that after the Infallibles of the Prophet’s Family, the most exalted amongst the companions were Salman, Abu Dharr and Miqdad.

The traditions of the Holy Ahl-ul-Bayt bear witness that after the demise of the Holy Prophet (S), most of the companions turned apostate. But Salman, Abu Dharr and Miqdad were amongst the small group of steadfastly dedicated followers of the Prophet (S) and his family. It is another matter that many of the apostates came to the right path later on and owed allegiance to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as).

The Qualities of Salman, Abu Dharr And Miqdad

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) says that Amir’ul-Mu’mineen, ‘Ali (as), said to Salman, “O Salman! Call at the door of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, to give to you a portion of the gift that she has received from theJanna {the Heaven}.Salman went to the door and made his request. The Lady said, “Three Houris came from the Heaven and brought gifts in three containers. One Houri, whose name was Salma, said that Allah has created her for Salman, the second Houri said that she was Zara and was earmarked for Abu Dharr and the third was named Maqdooda and was created for Miqdad!”

After this conversation Lady Fatima (as) gave to Salman a portion of the gift received from the Heaven. The material was so fragrant that wherever he went with it, the people asked him what material he was carrying that similar fragrance they had never experienced in their lives. Reliable books of both the Schools have it on record that the Prophet (S) has said that there is none more truthful than Abu Dharr on the earth and under the sky!

One person expressed his doubt to Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) about this Tradition that Abu Dharr couldn’t possibly be more truthful than Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as).

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) asked the person if he was aware when and under what circumstance the Prophet (S) made this remark about Abu Dharr?

When the man replied in negative, the Imam (as) said, “Some persons went to the Prophet (S) and complained that Abu Dharr was attributing incomprehensible phenomena to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as). At this point the Holy Prophet (S) mentioned about the truthfulness of Abu Dharr”

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) also told to the person that comparisons between the Infallible and the fallible persons should not be made.

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) has also said that once, when Abu Dharr reached the presence of the Prophet (S), he found him deeply engrossed in conversation with Dahia Kalabi, another companion. Abu Dharr quietly walked away intending not to disturb the conversation. In fact it was the

Angel Gabriel in the guise of Dahia Kalabi who was visiting the Prophet (S). Gabriel expressed his surprise that Abu Dharr went away without greeting the Prophet (S).

He also mentioned that one of the supplications of Abu Dharr was a topic of discussion amongst the angels in the Heaven. When Gabriel took leave and Abu Dharr visited the Prophet (S), the Prophet (S) said, “O Abu Dharr! Why did you go away so quietly even without greeting me!”

Abu Dharr replied, “O Prophet! I found you so engrossed in conversation with Dahia Kalabi that I thought you were discussing some confidential matters and it was not discreet to disturb your talk.” The Prophet (S) asked Abu Dharr, “Recount to me the supplication which you recite regularly. The Angel Gabriel, who was with me in the guise of Dahia Kalabi, told me that Abu Dharr walked away without greeting me and also mentioned that his supplication is the matter of discussion amongst the angels in the Heaven!”

Hearing this, Abu Dharr recited the following supplication:

اَللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَسْأَلُكَ الإِيمَانَ بِكَ، وَالتَّصْدِيقَ بِنَبِيِّكَ، وَالعَافِيَةَ مِنْ جَمِيعِ البَلاَءِ، وَالشُّكْرَ عَلَى العَافِيَةِ، وَالغِنَى عَنْ شِرَارِ النَّاسِ.

“O Allah, grant me faith in you, and belief in Your Prophet, and safety from all calamities, and thankfulness for wellness, and independence from evil humans .”

A reliable tradition of the Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) mentions that after the passing away of the Prophet (S) it is obligatory on the followers of the Faith to love the Companions who steadfastly followed the religion without any dissent or innovation. Amongst these steadfast persons were Salman Farsi, Abu Dharr Ghiffari, Miqdad bin Aswad Kindi, Ammar bin Yassir, Jabir bin Abdallah Ansari, Abdallah bin Samit, Ibada bin Samit, Abu Ayoob Ansari, Hudhaifa bin al Iman, Abul Hasheem, Sahl bin Hanif, Khazeema bin Sabit, Abu Saeed Khadri etc.

Bin Babawaih narrates from Abdallah bin Abbas that one day the Prophet (S) was sitting in the Qiba Mosque with his Companions. He said, “The first person who enters the door of the Mosque will be destined for the Heaven.”Hearing this, some companions got up to leave and grasp the privilege of entering the mosque first. The Prophet added, “many persons will enter this mosque and everyone will try to preempt the others, but the one amongst them who informs about the ending of the month ofAzur? will be destined for the Heaven!”

Abu Dharr entered the Mosque along with the other persons. The Prophet (S) asked the gathering about the current month of the Roman Calendar. Abu Dharr replied that it was the end of the month ofAzur?. The Prophet (S) said that he was aware of the fact but he wished to impress on the gathering that Abu Dharr was destined for the Heaven.

The Prophet (S) further added that this Heavenly person will be banished by the people because of his profound love for my family and that he would spend the rest of his life in a desolate place and die a lonely and hapless death! The people of Iraq would give him a burial taking pity on him. These persons too will be in the Heaven that has been promised by Allah to the benevolent.

Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) also said that there are ten stages of faith. He added that Salman was on the tenth stage, Abu Dharr on the ninth, and Miqdad on the eighth stage!

Abu Dharr Accepts Islam

Muhammad bin Yaqoob Kulaini narrates that Imam Ja’far As-Sadiq (as) told to a person about the manner in which Salman and Abu Dharr accepted Islam. He further said that one day Abu Dharr was grazing his sheep in his hamlet, Marka, which is situated near Mecca. While the sheep were grazing a wolf attacked them and Abu Dharr scared it away with his staff. The wolf repeated its attempt to attack the sheep when Abu Dharr ran after it shouting, “you cruel creature! Why are you not running away!”The wolf miraculously uttered, “Am I cruel or the people of Mecca who are perpetrating cruelty after cruelty on the Prophet (S)!”

Abu Dharr, when he heard this from the dumb animal, started to walk towards Mecca. When he reached Mecca it was very hot there and he was uneasy with acute thirst. He drew some water from the spring of Zam Zam. To his surprise Abu Dharr found that the container was having milk instead of water. He drank it, quenched his thirst, and understood that this was the first miracle of the truth of Allah’s Prophet (S) that he was experiencing. When he proceeded towards the compound of the Ka’ba he found some people talking irreverently about the Prophet (S) of Allah.

At this juncture arrived a person and noticing him the group got scared and became quiet. When the person started to leave the place, Abu Dharr too followed him. Catching up with the person Abu Dharr asked, “Who are you?”He replied, “I am Abu Talib, the chief of Mecca. Have you any work with me?”Abu Dharr said, “I wish to meet the Prophet of Allah (S) to accept Islam.” Abu Talib (r.a.) said, “Tomorrow you can come with me to meet him at the same time as now.”The next day Abu Dharr reached the place at the appointed time, Abu Talib (r.a.) joined him and they both proceeded to meet the Prophet (S).

Abu Dharr (r.a.) says that Abu Talib (r.a.) took him to a house where Hamza (r.a.) was present. He greeted him and Hamza (r.a.) returned his greeting and inquired about the purpose of his visit. When Abu Dharr informed to him the purpose of his visit, Hamza (r.a.) said that there is one God,Allah, and Muhammad (S) is his Prophet. Abu Dharr rejoined bearing witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad (S) is His Messenger (la ilaha ill Allah Mohammad ur rasool Allah). Then Hamza (r.a.) took him to another house where Ja’far (r.a.) was there. He too asked Abu Dharr the same questions and was given similar replies. Then Ja’far Tayyar (r.a.) took Abu Dharr (r.a.) to the house of Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as). There too Abu Dharr (r.a.) bore witness about Allah and his Prophet (S) thrice.

Now Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) took Abu Dharr (r.a.) to the presence of the Prophet (S). He greeted the Prophet (S) who kindly asked him to sit and bear witness to the unity of Allah and that Muhammad (S) is Allah’s Prophet. Now the Prophet (S) said, “O Abu Dharr! You must immediately return to your place that your paternal cousin has expired and you are the soul inheritor of his estate. Go home and take charge of the affairs of your

estate. You must join us when we summon you.”Therefore after the migration (Hijra) Abu Dharr had the honor of meeting the Prophet (S) in Medina.

Salman Accepts Islam

Imam Muhammad Al-Baqir (as) says that some companions visited the grave of the Prophet (S) one day and were busy conversing with each other. Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) asked Salman Farsi, “O Salman! How did you accept the Faith of Islam?” Salman replied, “O Amir’ul-Mu’mineen! Since it is obligatory on me to reply to your queries, I am narrating to you the circumstances under which I accepted the Faith. I am a native of the city of Shiraz and my profession was farming. My parents used to love me very much.

One day when I visited a hermitage along with them I heard a sound as if someone was saying there is no God but Allah, ‘Isa (as) is the Spirit of Allah and Muhammad (S) is the Messenger of Allah (la ilaha il Allah ‘Isa Rooh ul Allah Muhammad Rasool Allah). These words had such profound effect on me that the love of the Prophet (S) got embedded in my entire existence. I instantly abandoned my ancestral belief of worshipping the sun. Hearing this my father got very angry on me and he incarcerated me in a deep well. I was held there for a very long time during which I used to pray to Allah for my deliverance.

One day an old person dressed in a white robe arrived and releasing me from the well took me to a hermit. I expressed to the hermit about my faith. He was very kind to me but one day he told me that he would expire on the following morning I asked him, ‘Then what should I do and where should I go to?’ The hermit mentioned to me the name of another hermit and his location. He asked me to give his reference when I met the other hermit. I therefore went there and spent quite a while with the hermit till he too expired.

After the hermit’s death I continued to live with the other inmates of the hermitage. Those people were in the habit of taking wines with the food and insisted on my partaking of it. When I refused to comply they got angry on me and sold me as a slave to a Jew. This Jew also inflicted lot of hardships on me. In the end he sold me to a lady by the name of Salimia. The lady had an orchard and I was assigned to water the trees. The lady was very satisfied and happy with my work.

One day a group of persons entered the garden. They were having a cloud hovering over their heads. In the group there was the Prophet (S), Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as), Hamza, Zaid bin Haritha, Aqeel, Abu Dharr and Miqdad. I thought that the cloud following a person is the sign of the Prophet (S). But all of them couldn’t possibly be prophets. Definitely one of them must be the Prophet (S). I was wondering about this when the Prophet (S) called me up and pushing aside his robe showed to me the Seal of prophet-hood on his back. I instantly fell on his feet but he raised me up with great affection.

Now the Prophet (S) told to Salimia that he wished to buy me from her. She asked for four hundred date palms in exchange for me and said that out of these two hundred should have yellow dates and the other two hundred

red dates. The Prophet accepted this deal and asked Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) to gather four hundred seeds of dates.

When Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) completed the task, the Prophet (S) started sowing and Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) went after him watering the planted seeds. As the Prophet (S) sowed the next seed, a full-grown plant emerged from the first laden with fruits. Now, the four hundred date palms were ready, two hundred bearing yellow and the other two hundred bearing the red fruits.

When Salimia saw that her wish had been fulfilled she came up with another condition that she wanted all the palms to bear yellow fruits. Therefore, with Allah’s wish Gabriel came and with the touch of his wings, he turned all the palms to bear yellow dates. Now Salimia had perforce to part with Salman. Then the Prophet (S) released Salman and said, “O Rozba! From this day we give you the name of Salman.”

Abu Dharr, The Oppressed

‘Ali bin Ibrahim narrates that during the battle of Tabook Abu Dharr fell behind the troops because his camel was weak and emaciated. Abu Dharr abandoned the camel and carrying his luggage on his back proceeded forward. When he reached near the group, the people informed the Prophet (S) that someone was seen approaching them from a distance. The Prophet (S) said, “This is Abu Dharr. Fetch water for him that he might be very thirsty.”

When Abu Dharr reached the group, his thirst was quenched. Abu Dharr then took out a pitcher full of water from his luggage and presented to the Prophet (S). The Prophet (S) asked, “O Abu Dharr! Despite having water with you, you preferred to remain thirsty. What is the reason for this?” Abu Dharr politely replied, “I had obtained this water from a cistern on the way. The water was very sweet and cold. I thought that I must present this water to my Master instead of consuming it myself.” The Prophet (S) replied, “O Abu Dharr! May Allah be kind to you. You must be patient in your lonely journey, lonely death, poverty and helplessness. A group of God fearing persons will perform your last rites and Allah will give you entry to the Heaven.”

Reliable histories are witness that during the Second Caliphate Abu Dharr was banished to Syria. There, Abu Dharr started publicly criticizing Emir of Syria for his actions, which were contrary to the norms of Islam. He also continued to eulogize Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) in public. In the mean time the third caliph assumed power when the Emir of Syria (Mu’awiah) wrote to him complaining about Abu Dharr. He also mentioned in his letter that Abu Dharr was critical even of the Caliph. Orders were passed that Abu Dharr be sent to the capital expressly.

In consequence the thoughtless Emir dispatched this great companion of the Prophet (S) tied on to the naked back of a camel. Abu Dharr arrived at the court of the Caliph in an emaciated condition and was the recipient of the following reprimand from the Caliph, “why O Abu Dharr! You are making false allegations against us and praising Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (as)?”

Abu Dharr recited a long verse from the Holy Qur’an, the gist of which is that Allah will consign the disobedient persons to the Hell and they should also be warned that Allah is not unmindful of their deeds. The Caliph rejoined in a furious tone, “O Abu Dharr! Now you have so much courage that you are confronting me! What is the act that I have committed against the dictates of Allah and the Prophet (S)?” Abu Dharr said, “Don’t you remember one evening the two of us went to the presence of the Holy Prophet (S) when we noticed that he was very sad and pensive.

When we again went to his presence the next morning we found him very happy and pleasant. When we asked him to relate to us the reason for his changing moods, the Prophet said ‘Yesterday the treasury (Bayt al Maal) had four Dirhams. I was concerned that the amount was the share of some deserving person and it had remained undistributed. Today the amount has been given to the deserving. I am now satisfied that the amount has been disbursed.’

“O Caliph of the time! Today you are hoarding 100,000 Dirhams in theBayt al Maal and are looking for arrival of another 100,000 that you can bestow favors on your kin.” Someone said, “Abu Dharr is a liar and the Verses he has quoted are never concerning you (The Third Caliph)”. Therefore Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) was called to arbitrate. The Caliph related to Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) what had transpired between the parties and asked his opinion whether Abu Dharr was telling a falsehood?

Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as) said, “Have fear of Allah! I have myself heard the Prophet (S) say that there is none more truthful than Abu Dharr on the land and under the sky!”

Abu Dharr cried and said, “It is a pity that you are greedy for wealth and call me a liar. You presume that I have uttered a falsehood concerning the Prophet (S). I am a better person than all of you.” Othman asked Abu Dharr, “How do you feel that you are a better person than us?” He replied, “From the day I was separated from my Master (the Prophet) I am wearing the same robe. I have not sold my Faith for the worldly pleasures. To the contrary, you have compromised your Faith for your selfish ends. You have created innovations and squandered Allah’s bounty. You shall have to face retribution on the Day of Judgment for your acts!” Othman said tersely, “I shall ask you certain questions under oath!” Abu Dharr replied, “I shall respond to all your questions, whether under an oath or not.”

Othman took Abu Dharr into privacy and said angrily, “Look! Because you happen to be a companion of the Prophet (S) I cannot get you executed. But I can definitely banish you. Tell me which town you prefer to live in” Abu Dharr replied, “Mecca, which is the place of birth of the Holy Prophet (S)!” Othman asked, “Which is the place you don’t like?” Abu Dharr replied, “Rabdha!” Orders were then issued that Abu Dharr be exiled to Rabdha and that none should accompany him to the place.

But Muhammad Yaqub Kulaini writes that at the time of the departure of Abu Dharr from Medina, Amir’ul-Mu’mineen ‘Ali (as), Imam Husayn (as), Imam Hasan (as), Aqeel and Ammar went for some distance with him and advised him to be patient. Imam Husayn (as) told him, “O Uncle! The

enemy wanted to deprive you of your Faith, but he didn’t succeed! But in the bargain he has lost his own Faith. Allah shall reward you in abundance!”

Abu Dharr Ghiffari reached Rabdha, and lived a lonely existence. He had neither friend nor helper. He had a few sheep in the beginning that died in time. His sons succumbed to the harsh environment of the place and his wife too died. Only one daughter remained with him.

For three long days Abu Dharr remained without any food or sustenance in the desert. He put his head on a mound of sand and expired. Only his four-year-old daughter remained. The child started crying and shouting for help when a caravan of men arrived there. The girl recalling her father’s last wish told to the new arrivals, “O travelers! The companion of the Prophet (S) has died and his body is lying for two days without a shroud and grave!”

The daughter of Abu Dharr says that she remained near the grave of her father and continued to offer prayers and fasting, as did the father. She witnessed in her dream one night that Abu Dharr was reciting the Holy Qur’an in his nightly prayers. She asked him, “O father! How has Allah treated you?” He replied, “My daughter! I have arrived in the presence of my Allah. He is happy with me and I am contented. He has given me many bounties. O daughter! Do good deeds and don’t let pride overwhelm you.”

The history of Asam Koofi records that the persons who attended the burial of Abu Dharr were Ahnaf bin Qais Tamimi, Saasa bin Sauhan Abdi, Kharja bin Salat Tamimi, Abdallah bin Muslim Tamimi, Bilal bin Malik Muzni, Jareer bin Abdallah Bijli, Aswad bin Yazid al Naqhi, Alqama bin Qais al Naqhi and Malik-il-Ashtar.

Bin Abdul Birr writes in his book,Al Istiaab, that Abu Dharr died in 31 or 32H and that Abdallah bin Masood performed his funeral prayer.

The group that attended the last rites of Abu Dharr consisted of the companions of the Holy Prophet (S). The chief of the caravan was Malik al-Ashtar. Hearing the wails of the little girl, he couldn’t control himself crying. He reached the body of Abu Dharr and recited a requiem. Malik al-Ashtar was carrying with him a shroud that he had bought for 4,000 Dirhams. He draped the shroud on the body of Abu Dharr for burial.

The gathering raised their hands towards the Heaven and said, “O Allah! This was your good creature! He was a beloved companion of your Prophet (S)! Bless him in the name of Muhammad (S) and his holy Progeny! Punish those who have inflicted hardships on this gentle soul!” The entire gathering said, “Amen!”

The Prophet’s Will Concerning Abu Dharr

Sheik Abu ‘Ali Tabarsi writes in his book,Makarim al Akhlaq, and several other reliable sources relate that when Abu Asad Deelmi went to Rabdha to meet Abu Dharr, he told him that when one early morning he entered the Prophet’s Mosques in Medina none other was present with the Prophet (S) except for a copy of the Holy Qur’an and ahamael (a miniature compilation of the Holy Book). Being alone with the Holy Prophet (S), he took courage in his hands to ask him, “O Lord of the Universe! Kindly give me such advice that it is advantageous to me in both the worlds.”

The Prophet (S) looked at him intently and said, “Abu Dharr! For us you are a member of our family! In my eyes you are a chosen creation of Allah.

Listen, and listen with care, remember and act on my advice. “O Abu Dharr! Worship Allah as if you are seeing Him! And if you cannot see Him, then definitely He sees you!’”

This tradition of the Prophet (S) is the comprehensive utterance of the Prophet (S) that might require volumes to explain and elucidate. We are trying to dwell on the subject briefly in the steps dealt with in the following chapter. My humble effort may not measure up to the comprehension of the eloquence of the Great Personality, but it is my duty to make an effort. Inshallah!