Bidayah al-Hikmah (Arabic-English) [The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics]{Edited}

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Bidayah al-Hikmah (Arabic-English) [The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics]{Edited}

Bidayah al-Hikmah (Arabic-English) [The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics]{Edited}

Author:
Publisher: www.zainabzilullah.wordpress.com
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


Notice

We have taken this book from the www.zainabzilullah.wordpress.com, but regretfully she did not mention the translator's name. We compared its 5th Chapter's first page with the translation of Ali Quli Qarai, there was little difference, so we don't not know yet exactly whether it is translated by own or someone other. Meanwhile we have added some topics and numbers of Units on the first pages of every Chapter.

1.1. THE SELF-EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE

The concept of ‘existence’ is a self-evident one and needs no mediating terms. Hence it has no explanatory terms (mu’arrif ) in the form of a definition (hadd ) or description (rasm ), because its meaning is more obvious than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as “Existence is what subsists in reality,” or “Existence is that which allows of predication” are explications of the word, not true definitions.

Moreover, as will be explained later, existence has neither any genus (jins ), nor differentia (fasl ), nor any proprium (khassah ) in the sense of one of the five universals (al-kulliyyat al-khams ). As all explanatory terms are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.

الفصل الثاني في أن مفهوم الوجود مشترك معنوي

يحمل الوجود على موضوعاته بمعنى واحد اشتراكا معنويا.

و من الدليل عليه أنا نقسم الوجود إلى أقسامه المختلفة كتقسيمه إلى وجود الواجب و وجود الممكن و تقسيم وجود الممكن إلى وجود الجوهر و وجود العرض ثم وجود الجوهر إلى أقسامه و وجود العرض إلى أقسامه و من المعلوم أن التقسيم يتوقف في صحته على وحدة المقسم و وجوده في الأقسام.

و من الدليل عليه أنا ربما أثبتنا وجود شي‏ء ثم ترددنا في خصوصية ذاته كما لو أثبتنا للعالم صانعا ثم ترددنا في كونه واجبا أو ممكنا و في كونه ذا ماهية أو غير ذي ماهية و كما لو أثبتنا للإنسان نفسا ثم شككنا في كونها مجردة أو مادية و جوهرا أو عرضا مع بقاء العلم بوجوده على ما كان فلو لم يكن للوجود معنى واحد بل كان مشتركا لفظيا متعددا معناه بتعدد موضوعاته لتغير معناه بتغير موضوعاته بحسب الاعتقاد بالضرورة.

و من الدليل عليه أن العدم يناقض الوجود و له معنى واحد إذ لا تمايز في العدم فللوجود الذي هو نقيضه معنى واحد و إلا ارتفع النقيضان و هو محال.

و القائلون باشتراكه اللفظي بين الأشياء أو بين الواجب و الممكن إنما ذهبوا إليه حذرا من لزوم السنخية بين العلة و المعلول مطلقا أو بين الواجب و الممكن و رد بأنه يستلزم تعطيل العقول عن المعرفة فإنا إذا قلنا الواجب موجود فإن كان المفهوم منه المعنى الذي يفهم من وجود الممكن لزم الاشتراك المعنوي و إن كان المفهوم منه ما يقابله و هو مصداق نقيضه كان نفيا لوجوده تعالى عن ذلك و إن لم يفهم منه شي‏ء كان تعطيلا للعقل عن المعرفة و هو خلاف ما نجده من أنفسنا بالضرورة

1.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS UNIVOCAL

Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense, i.e., univocally (ishtirak ma’nawi ).

A proof of it is that we divide existence into its different categories, such as the existence of the Necessary Being (wujud al-wajib ) and the existence of the contingent being (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of the contingent is divided into that of substance (wujud al-jawhar) and that of accident (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of substance and the existence of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is being divided and on its presence in all its divisions.

Another proof of it is that after positing the existence of something, at times we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may have doubts as to whether the creator is a necessary (wajib ) or a contingent (mumkin ) being, or as to whether or not he is characterized with quiddity (mahiyyah). Or, for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (nafs ), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (maddi ) or immaterial (mujarrad ), a substance (jawhar) or an accident (‘arad). Hence, if ‘existence’ were not univocal in the different instances and were it an equivocal or homonymous term with disparate meanings (mushtarak lafzi ), its meaning would necessarily vary from one subject of which it is predicated to another.

Another proof is that non-existence (‘adam ) is the contradictory of existence (wujud ): non-existence is univocal, because there, are no distinctions (tamayuz ) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, is also univocal, for otherwise it would imply a violation of the law of contradiction, which is impossible.

Those who have held that ‘existence’ is equivocal in relation to different existents, i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity (sinkhiyyah ) between cause and effect, or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents. However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect’s cognitive faculties. To elaborate, if in the statement, ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ we understand ‘existence’ to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that ‘existence’ is univocal (mushtarak ma’nawi ). If what is understood in the former statement [by ‘existence’] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ would amount to the negation of Its existence.

Finally, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect’s cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.

الفصل الثالث في أن الوجود زائد على الماهية عارض لها

بمعنى أن المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر فللعقل أن يجرد الماهية و هي ما يقال في جواب ما هو عن الوجود فيعتبرها وحدها فيعقلها ثم يصفها بالوجود و هو معنى العروض فليس الوجود عينا للماهية و لا جزءا لها.

و الدليل عليه أن الوجود يصح سلبه عن الماهية و لو كان عينا أو جزءا لها لم يصح ذلك لاستحالة سلب عين الشي‏ء و جزئه عنه.

و أيضا حمل الوجود على الماهية يحتاج إلى دليل فليس عينا و لا جزءا لها لأن ذات الشي‏ء و ذاتياته بينة الثبوت له لا تحتاج فيه إلى دليل

و أيضا الماهية متساوية النسبة في نفسها إلى الوجود و العدم و لو كان الوجود عينا أو جزءا لها استحالت نسبتها إلى العدم الذي هو نقيضه

1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY

A thing’s existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense, that each of them [i.e. ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’] signifies something not understandable from the other. From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [‘urud , i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it.

A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity. Had it been identical with quiddity, or a part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with it or a part of it.

Also, a proof is required if existence is to be predicated of a quiddity; therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it, because a thing’s essence (dhat ) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and differentia] are self-evident and do not stand in need of a proof.

Moreover, quiddity is in itself indifferent (mutasawiyat al-nisbah , lit. ‘equally related’) to existence and non-existence. Were existence identical with quiddity or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute to it non-existence, which is its contradictory.

الفصل الرابع في أصالة الوجود و اعتبارية الماهية

إنا لا نرتاب في أن هناك أمورا واقعية ذات آثار واقعية ليست بوهم الواهم ثم ننتزع من كل من هذه الأمور المشهودة لنا في عين أنه واحد في الخارج مفهومين اثنين كل منهما غير الآخر مفهوما و إن اتحدا مصداقا و هما الوجود و الماهية كالإنسان الذي في الخارج المنتزع عنه أنه إنسان و أنه موجود.

و قد اختلف الحكماء في الأصيل منهما فذهب المشاءون إلى أصالة الوجود و نسب إلى الإشراقيين القول بأصالة الماهية و أما القول بأصالتهما معا فلم يذهب إليه أحد منهم لاستلزام ذلك كون كل شي‏ء شيئين اثنين و هو خلاف الضرورة.

و الحق ما ذهب إليه المشاءون من أصالة الوجود.

و البرهان عليه أن الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي متساوية النسبة إلى الوجود و العدم فلو لم يكن خروجها من حد الاستواء إلى مستوى الوجود بحيث تترتب عليها الآثار بواسطة الوجود كان ذلك منها انقلابا و هو محال بالضرورة فالوجود هو المخرج لها عن حد الاستواء فهو الأصيل.

و ما قيل إن الماهية بنسبة مكتسبة من الجاعل تخرج من حد الاستواء إلى مرحلة الأصالة فتترتب عليها الآثار مندفع بأنها إن تفاوتت حالها بعد الانتساب فما به التفاوت هو الوجود الأصيل و إن سمي نسبة إلى الجاعل و إن لم تتفاوت و مع ذلك حمل عليها أنها موجودة و ترتبت عليها الآثار كان من الانقلاب كما تقدم

برهان آخر الماهيات مثار الكثرة و الاختلاف بالذات فلو لم يكن الوجود أصيلا لم تتحقق وحدة حقيقية و لا اتحاد بين ماهيتين فلم يتحقق الحمل الذي هو الاتحاد في الوجود و الضرورة تقضي بخلافه فالوجود هو الأصيل الموجود بالذات و الماهية موجودة به.

برهان آخر الماهية توجد بوجود خارجي فتترتب عليها آثارها و توجد بعينها بوجود ذهني كما سيأتي فلا يترتب عليها شي‏ء من تلك الآثار فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل و كانت الأصالة للماهية و هي محفوظة في الوجودين لم يكن فرق بينهما و التالي باطل فالمقدم مثله.

برهان آخر الماهية من حيث هي تستوي نسبتها إلى التقدم و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف و القوة و الفعل لكن الأمور الموجودة في الخارج مختلفة في هذه الأوصاف فبعضها متقدم أو قوي كالعلة و بعضها بخلاف ذلك كالمعلول و بعضها بالقوة و بعضها بالفعل فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل كان اختلاف هذه الصفات مستندة إليها و هي متساوية النسبة إلى الجميع هذا خلف و هناك حجج أخرى مذكورة في المطولات.

و للقائلين بأصالة الماهية و اعتبارية الوجود حجج مدخولة كقولهم لو كان الوجود أصيلا كان موجودا في الخارج فله وجود و لوجوده وجود فيتسلسل و هو محال.

و أجيب عنه بأن الوجود موجود لكن بنفس ذاته لا بوجود آخر فلا يذهب الأمر إلى غير النهاية

و يظهر مما تقدم ضعف قول آخر في المسألة منسوب إلى المحقق الدواني و هو أصالة الوجود في الواجب تعالى و أصالة الماهية في الممكنات و عليه فإطلاق الموجود على الواجب بمعنى أنه نفس الوجود و على الماهيات بمعنى أنها منتسبة إلى الوجود كاللابن و التامر بمعنى المنتسب إلى اللبن و التمر هذا و أما على المذهب المختار فالوجود موجود بذاته و الماهية موجودة بالعرض.

1.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF EXISTENCE

We have no doubt that there are real things out there in external reality possessing certain real properties (athar), and that they are not illusory. In regard to each of the things that we observe -  which is a single reality in the external world - we form two concepts different from one another, though they pertain to a single thing. These two concepts are ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity.’ For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his/her quiddity as a ‘human being’ and that he/she exists.

The philosophers (hukama) have differed as to which of the two concepts is fundamental (asil). The Peripatetics (al-Mashsha’un) hold existence to be fundamentally real (asalat al-wujud). The belief in the fundamentality of quiddity (asalat al-mahiyyah) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (al-Ishraqiyyun). The view that both of them may be regarded as fundamentally real is one which no one has held, for that would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible.

The Peripatetics are right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. A proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or stands in equal relation to] existence and non-existence, and were it capable by itself of emerging from this state of indifference [or neutrality] and assuming existence along with its properties (athar), that would amount to a violation of the law of identity (inqilab; lit. ‘mutation’), which is impossible. Hence it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real.

As to that which some have said, that quiddity emerges from its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in the state of quiddity after its relation with the Maker amounts to existence, though it should be called ‘a relation with the Maker.’ And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a violation of the law of identity, as mentioned.

Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and diversity. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity, nor any union between two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence, there would be no predication, which signifies unity in existence [as in a proposition of the type, ‘A is B’], and logical necessity requires the contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it.

Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the properties (athar) expected of it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (wujud dhihni) (which will be dealt with later on), it does not possess any of these properties. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity  -  which is there in both modes of being - real, there would be no difference between these two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent must also be such.

Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta’khkhur), strength (shiddah) and weakness (da’f), actuality (fi’l) and potentiality (quwwah). However, things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of

them are prior and strong, such as the cause (‘illah), and some are the opposite of that, such as the effect (ma’lul). Some of them have actuality and some of them possess potentiality. Were existence not fundamentally real, the difference in respect to these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent in relation to all of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here and they are mentioned in detailed works.

Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity arid consider existence to be derivative (i’tibari), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, ‘If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from which it follows that it has an existence, and that existence again has another existence, and so on ad infinitum. This involves an infinite regress, which is inadmissible.’

The answer to such an argument is that existence does indeed exist; but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress.

In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to Dawwani, also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence with respect to the Necessary Being, and to quiddity with respect to contingent beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Necessary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have only a relation with being, such as the relation between the ‘milkman’ (labin) and ‘milk’ (laban) and the ‘date seller’ (tamir) and ‘dates’ (tamr). However, in accordance with the doctrine endorsed by us, existence exists by itself (bi dhatih) and quiddity exists accidentally (bi al-‘arad).

الفصل الخامس في أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة

اختلف القائلون بأصالة الوجود فذهب بعضهم إلى أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة و هو المنسوب إلى الفهلويين من حكماء الفرس فالوجود عندهم لكونه ظاهرا بذاته مظهرا لغيره من الماهيات كالنور الحسي الذي هو ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره من الأجسام الكثيفة للأبصار.

فكما أن النور الحسي نوع واحد حقيقته أنه ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره و هذا المعنى متحقق في جميع مراتب الأشعة و الأظلة على كثرتها و اختلافها فالنور الشديد شديد في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الضعيف و النور الضعيف ضعيف في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الشديد فليست شدة الشديد منه جزءا مقوما للنورية حتى يخرج الضعيف منه و لا عرضا خارجا عن الحقيقة و ليس ضعف الضعيف قادحا في نوريته و لا أنه مركب من النور و الظلمة لكونها أمرا عدميا بل شدة الشديد في أصل النورية و كذا ضعف الضعيف فللنور عرض عريض باعتبار مراتبه المختلفة بالشدة و الضعف و لكل مرتبة عرض عريض باعتبار القوابل المختلفة من الأجسام الكثيفة.

كذلك الوجود حقيقة واحدة ذات مراتب مختلفة متمايزة بالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و غير ذلك فيرجع ما به الامتياز فيها إلى ما به الاشتراك و ما به الاختلاف إلى ما به الاتحاد فليست خصوصية شي‏ء من المراتب جزءا مقوما للوجود لبساطته كما سيجي‏ء و لا أمرا خارجا عنه لأن أصالة الوجود تبطل ما هو غيره الخارج عنه بل الخصوصية في كل مرتبة مقومة لنفس المرتبة بمعنى ما ليس بخارج منها.

و لها كثرة طولية باعتبار المراتب المختلفة الآخذة من أضعف المراتب و هي التي لا فعلية لها إلا عدم الفعلية و هي المادة الأولى الواقعة في أفق العدم ثم تتصاعد المراتب إلى أن تنتهي إلى المرتبة الواجبة لذاتها و هي التي لا حد لها إلا عدم الحد و لها كثرة عرضية باعتبار تخصصها بالماهيات المختلفة التي هي مثار الكثرة.

و ذهب قوم من المشاءين إلى كون الوجود حقائق متباينة بتمام ذواتها أما كونه حقائق متباينة فلاختلاف آثارها و أما كونها متباينة بتمام الذوات فلبساطتها و على هذا يكون مفهوم الوجود المحمول عليها عرضيا خارجا عنها لازما لها.

و الحق أنه حقيقة واحدة مشككة أما كونها حقيقة واحدة فلأنه لو لم تكن كذلك لكانت حقائق مختلفة متباينة بتمام الذوات و لازمه كون مفهوم الوجود و هو مفهوم واحد كما تقدم منتزعا من مصاديق متباينة بما هي متباينة و هو محال بيان الاستحالة أن المفهوم و المصداق واحد ذاتا و إنما الفارق كون الوجود ذهنيا أو خارجيا فلو انتزع الواحد بما هو واحد من الكثير بما هو كثير كان الواحد بما هو واحد كثيرا بما هو كثير و هو محال

و أيضا لو انتزع المفهوم الواحد بما هو واحد من المصاديق الكثيرة بما هي كثيرة فإما أن تعتبر في صدقه خصوصية هذا المصداق لم يصدق على ذلك المصداق و إن اعتبر فيه خصوصية ذاك لم يصدق على هذا و إن اعتبر فيه الخصوصيتان معا لم يصدق على شي‏ء منهما و إن لم يعتبر شي‏ء من الخصوصيتين بل انتزع من القدر المشترك بينهما لم يكن منتزعا من الكثير بما هو كثير بل بما هو واحد كالكلي المنتزع من الجهة المشتركة بين الأفراد الصادق على الجميع هذا خلف.

و أما أن حقيقته مشككة فلما يظهر من الكمالات الحقيقية المختلفة التي هي صفات متفاضلة غير خارجة عن الحقيقة الواحدة كالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و القوة و الفعل و غير ذلك فهي حقيقة واحدة متكثرة في ذاتها يرجع فيها كل ما به الامتياز إلى ما به الاشتراك و بالعكس و هذا هو التشكيك.

1.5. EXISTENCE IS ONE GRADATIONAL REALITY

The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single gradational reality (haqiqah mushakkakah wahidah). This view is ascribed to the Fahlaviyyun, philosophers of [ancient] Iran. Existence, according to them, is self-manifesting and makes other things - i.e. quiddities - manifest. It may be likened to sensible light, which is self-manifesting and makes other things, such as opaque bodies, manifest to vision.

Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and manifests things other than itself. This feature applies to all the different grades of light and shade with their multiplicity and diversity. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light, and a weak light shares its luminous nature with a strong one. The strength of a strong light is neither the constituting differentia (juz muqawwim) of its luminous nature, so as to negate the luminous character of weak light, nor is it an accident extraneous to its reality. The weakness of a weak light neither negates its luminous nature, nor is it a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so does the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivity of opaque bodies [as in reflection and refraction].

Similarly, existence is one reality with various degrees differentiated by intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is exactly that which is common to them, and that which makes them different is exactly that which makes them one. Hence the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence, by virtue of the simplicity (basatah) of existence  - as will be explained later on - nor is it anything extraneous to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes that there should be anything other than it or external to it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not something other than it.

The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (tuli) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees  - represented by prime matter, which exists on the verge of non-existence -  where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality. From there it rises in degrees to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (‘aradi) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity.

A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence consists of entities essentially disparate  - disparate in their entirety -  from each other (haqa’iq mutabayinah bi tamami dhawatiha). They are disparate because their properties are disparate. The disparity is essential and complete, by virtue of the simplicity of their essences. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes, of necessity, something accidental and extrinsic to them (for, were it intrinsic to them, it would be a constituent, and this contradicts simplicity).

The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Were it not one reality, entities would have been disparate from one another with the totality of their essences (dhawat). That would entail that the concept of existence, which is a single concept, as said, has been abstracted from disparate things qua disparate things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of disparity lies in existence being mental or external. Were something which is one, qua one, capable of being abstracted from that which is many, qua many, one qua one would be the same as many qua many, which is impossible.

Also, suppose that a single concept were abstracted from a multiplicity of referents qua disparate things. If the concept represented a certain characteristic of one referent, it would not be predicable of a second referent. If the concept represented some characteristic of the second referent, it would not correspond to the first referent. If the characteristics of both the referents were represented in it, it would not correspond to either of the referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept were to represent that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been possible from different things qua different things, but from their unifying aspect, such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption.

As to existence being a gradational reality, since it manifests various real perfections that make up the distinctive attributes that are not extraneous” to the single reality of existence, such as intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc., existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, wherein all that makes existents differ refers to what is common to them, and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (tashkik).

الفصل السادس في ما يتخصص به الوجود

تخصص الوجود بوجوه ثلاثة :

أحدها تخصص حقيقته الواحدة الأصلية بنفس ذاتها القائمة بذاتها

و ثانيها تخصصها بخصوصيات مراتبها غير الخارجة عن المراتب

و ثالثها تخصص الوجود بإضافته إلى الماهيات المختلفة الذوات و عروضه لها فيختلف باختلافها بالعرض.

و عروض الوجود للماهية و ثبوته لها ليس من قبيل العروض المقولي الذي يتوقف فيه ثبوت العارض على ثبوت المعروض قبله فإن حقيقة ثبوت الوجود للماهية هي ثبوت الماهية به لأن ذلك هو مقتضى أصالته و اعتباريتها و إنما العقل لمكان أنسه بالماهيات يفترض الماهية موضوعه و يحمل الوجود عليها و هو في الحقيقة من عكس الحمل.

و بذلك يندفع الإشكال المعروف في حمل الوجود على الماهية من أن قاعدة الفرعية أعني أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء فرع ثبوت المثبت له توجب ثبوتا للمثبت له قبل ثبوت الثابت فثبوت الوجود للماهية يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية قبله فإن كان ثبوتها عين ثبوته لها لزم تقدم الشي‏ء على نفسه و إن كان غيره توقف ثبوته لها على ثبوت آخر لها و هلم جرا فيتسلسل.

و قد اضطر هذا الإشكال بعضهم إلى القول بأن القاعدة مخصصة بثبوت الوجود للماهية و بعضهم إلى تبديل الفرعية بالاستلزام فقال الحق أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء مستلزم لثبوت المثبت له و لو بهذا الثابت و ثبوت الوجود للماهية مستلزم لثبوت الماهية بنفس هذا الوجود فلا إشكال.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود لا تحقق له و لا ثبوت في ذهن و لا في خارج و للموجود معنى بسيط يعبر عنه بالفارسية ب هست و الاشتقاق صوري فلا ثبوت له حتى يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود ليس له إلا المعنى المطلق و هو معنى الوجود العام و الحصص و هو المعنى العام مضافا إلى ماهية ماهية بحيث يكون التقييد داخلا و القيد خارجا و أما الفرد و هو مجموع المقيد و التقييد و القيد فليس له ثبوت.

و شي‏ء من هذه الأجوبة على فسادها لا يغني طائلا و الحق في الجواب ما تقدم من أن القاعدة إنما تجري في ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء لا في ثبوت الشي‏ء و بعبارة أخرى مجرى القاعدة هو الهلية المركبة دون الهلية البسيطة كما في ما نحن فيه

1.6. THAT WHICH PARTICULARIZES EXISTENCE

Existence is particularized in three aspects:

(1) as a single fundamental reality in itself, which is self-subsistent [unlike quiddity]; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not extraneous to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence pertains and which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference.

The manner in which existence pertains to quiddity and gives it subsistence (thubut) is not the kind peculiar to categories [like accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subsistence of a quality depends on the prior subsistence of its subject. That is because the meaning of existence of quiddity is its subsistence through existence. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the derivative (i’tibari) character of quiddity. It is the intellect which, by virtue of its familiarity with quiddities, supposes quiddity to be the subject to which predicates existence. However, the matter is the inverse of this predication in concrete reality.

This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in relation to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (qaidat al-far’iyyah), the subsistence (thubut) of some quality (q) of a thing (A) is subordinate to that thing’s subsistence, which makes it necessary that the thing of which the property is posited subsist prior to the quality posited of it. Hence the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior subsistence of quiddity. For should the subsistence of quiddity be the same as the subsistence of existence, that would imply something being prior to itself; and should it be different, the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on another subsistence of quiddity, and so on. This results in an infinite regress.

This objection has forced some philosophers to admit an exception to the rule in the case of subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity. Some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance. They state: ‘The truth is that the subsistence of one thing [quality] in relation to another [subject] is concomitant with the subsistence of the subject, though it be through the subsistence of the former. The subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity is concomitant with the subsistence of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.”

Some of them have been compelled by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. ‘Being’ has a simple meaning represented in Farsi by the word hast (‘is’). This derivation [of a substantive from a verb] is merely verbal, and existence has no subsistence at all so as to depend on the subsistence of quiddity.

Some others have been led to hold that ‘existence’ has nothing but a general meaning, signifying existence in general and its parts, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the conditioning is internal while the condition is external. The individual, which is the totality of the conditioned, the conditioning, and the condition, has no subsistence.

These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid, like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested by the foregoing discussion, that the Rule of Subordination applies to the subsistence of a thing in relation to another thing (thubutu shay’in li shay), not to a thing’s subsistence (thubutu al-shay’). In other words, the rule applies to composite propositions [e.g., ‘A has the quality q’], not to simple propositions [e.g., ‘A exists’], as is the matter in the present case.

الفصل السابع في أحكام الوجود السلبية

منها أن الوجود لا غير له و ذلك لأن انحصار الأصالة في حقيقته يستلزم بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له أجنبيا عنه بطلانا ذاتيا.

و منها أنه لا ثاني له لأن أصالة حقيقته الواحدة و بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له ينفى عنه كل خليط داخل فيه أو منضم إليه فهو صرف في نفسه و صرف الشي‏ء لا يتثنى و لا يتكرر فكل ما فرض له ثانيا عاد أولا و إلا امتاز عنه بشي‏ء غيره داخل فيه أو خارج عنه و المفروض انتفاؤه هذا خلف.

و منها أنه ليس جوهرا و لا عرضا أما أنه ليس جوهرا فلأن الجوهر ماهية إذا وجدت في الخارج وجدت لا في الموضوع و الوجود ليس من سنخ الماهية و أما أنه ليس بعرض فلأن العرض متقوم الوجود بالموضوع و الوجود متقوم بنفس ذاته و كل شي‏ء متقوم به.

و منها أنه ليس جزءا لشي‏ء لأن الجزء الآخر المفروض غيره و الوجود لا غير له.

و ما قيل إن كل ممكن زوج تركيبي من ماهية و وجود فاعتبار عقلي ناظر إلى الملازمة بين الوجود الإمكاني و الماهية لا أنه تركيب من جزءين أصيلين.

و منها أنه لا جزء له لأن الجزء إما جزء عقلي كالجنس و الفصل و إما جزء خارجي كالمادة و الصورة و إما جزء مقداري كأجزاء الخط و السطح و الجسم التعليمي و ليس للوجود شي‏ء من هذه الأجزاء.

أما الجزء العقلي فلأنه لو كان للوجود جنس و فصل فجنسه إما الوجود فيكون فصله المقسم مقوما لأن الفصل بالنسبة إلى الجنس يفيد تحصل ذاته لا أصل ذاته و تحصل الوجود هو ذاته هذا خلف و إما غير الوجود و لا غير للوجود.

و أما الجزء الخارجي و هو المادة و الصورة فلأن المادة و الصورة هما الجنس و الفصل مأخوذين بشرط لا فانتفاء الجنس و الفصل يوجب انتفاءهما.

و أما الجزء المقداري فلأن المقدار من عوارض الجسم و الجسم مركب من المادة و الصورة و إذ لا مادة و لا صورة للوجود فلا جسم له و إذ لا جسم له فلا مقدار له

و مما تقدم يظهر أنه ليس نوعا لأن تحصل النوع بالتشخص الفردي و الوجود متحصل بنفس ذاته‏

1.7. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE

One of the properties of existence is that it has no ‘other.’ Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, this necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alienated from it or besides it.

Another of these properties is that it has no second, for the oneness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything else that may be supposed, precludes its possessing any ingredient within it or appended to it. It is absolute (sirf), and a thing in its absoluteness does not yield to duplication or repetition. Any second that may be assumed for it would be either identical with the first, or differ from it due to something intrinsic or extrinsic that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other.

Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is a quiddity that does not require a subject to subsist in external reality, while existence is not of the order of quiddity. As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it.

Another of these properties is that existence is not a part of anything, because the other supposed part will be something other than existence, while existence has no other.

As to the statement that ‘every contingent existent (mumkin) is a duality composed of quiddity and existence’ [which apparently implies that existence is a part of something], that is merely one of the intellect’s constructs (i’tibar ‘aqli) representing the necessary relation between contingent existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a compound made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality.

Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (i) conceptual, such as genus and differentia; (ii) external, such as matter and form; or (iii) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these parts.

As to the absence of conceptual constituents in existence, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something else. If the genus were existence, its differentia, which divides the genus, would constitute it, for the differentia in relation to the genus actualizes the genus [through species]; it does not constitute the essence of the genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other.

As to external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia in regard to existence necessarily implies the negation of these also.

As to quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither bodiness, nor, as consequence, magnitude.

From what has been said, it become evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by individuation, and existence is actualized by itself.

الفصل الثامن في معنى نفس الأمر

قد ظهر مما تقدم أن لحقيقة الوجود ثبوتا و تحققا بنفسه بل الوجود عين الثبوت و التحقق و أن للماهيات و هي التي تقال في جواب ما هو و توجد تارة بوجود خارجي فتظهر آثارها و تارة بوجود ذهني فلا تترتب عليها الآثار ثبوتا و تحققا بالوجود لا بنفس ذاتها و إن كانا متحدين في الخارج و أن المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية و هي التي لم تنتزع من الخارج و إنما اعتبرها العقل بنوع من التعمل لضرورة تضطره إلى ذلك كمفاهيم الوجود و الوحدة و العلية و نحو ذلك أيضا لها نحو ثبوت بثبوت مصاديقها المحكية بها و إن لم تكن هذه المفاهيم مأخوذة في مصاديقها أخذ الماهية في أفرادها و في حدود مصاديقها.

و هذا الثبوت العام الشامل لثبوت الوجود و الماهية و المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية هو المسمى بنفس الأمر التي يعتبر صدق القضايا بمطابقتها فيقال إن كذا كذا في نفس الأمر.

توضيح ذلك أن من القضايا ما موضوعها خارجي بحكم خارجي كقولنا الواجب تعالى موجود و قولنا خرج من في البلد و قولنا” الإنسان ضاحك بالقوة “ صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للوجود العيني.

و منها ما موضوعها ذهني بحكم ذهني أو خارجي مأخوذ بحكم ذهني كقولنا الكلي إما ذاتي أو عرضي و الإنسان نوع و صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للذهن لكون موطن ثبوتها هو الذهن و كلا القسمين صادقان بمطابقتهما لنفس الأمر فالثبوت النفس الأمري أعم مطلقا من كل من الثبوت الذهني و الخارجي.

و قيل إن نفس الأمر عقل مجرد فيه صور المعقولات عامة و التصديقات الصادقة في القضايا الذهنية و الخارجية تطابق ما عنده من الصور المعقولة.

و فيه أنا ننقل الكلام إلى ما عنده من الصور العلمية فهي تصديقات تحتاج في صدقها إلى ثبوت لمضامينها خارج عنها تطابقه.

CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

This chapter interprets the history of the development of applied anthropology as it is currently practiced in the United States, with some reference to developments in other countries. The sequence of development is divided into five periods, which are defined on the basis of interpretations of the different kinds of practice done by applied anthropologists. In addition, the chapter also comments upon changes that are occurring in contemporary applied anthropology. This chapter is based upon the review of materials in the Applied Anthropology Documentation Project, as well as such published sources as Eddy and Partridge ( 1978b), Goldschmidt ( 1979), Spicer ( 1977), Mead ( 1977), and van Willigen ( 1991).

Awareness of history does much to reduce the antipathy that exists between theoretical and applied anthropologists. Historic awareness teaches a number of important points, perhaps most important among them, that the theoretical realm is historically based on application. While this is increasingly recognized, many continue to view theoretical anthropology, inappropriately, as the genitor. The fundamental reason for this is that applied anthropology tends not to be published in traditional formats and therefore exists primarily as "fugitive literature" ( Clark and van Willigen 1981). Thus, while we are continually made aware of the historic development of theoretical anthropology through the literature, the historic development of applied anthropology and its relationship to the formation of the discipline is muted by the lack of documentation. This problem is especially acute in the earliest phases of the history of the field. While some of the experiences from the past are no longer applicable in new contexts, many current activities would benefit from knowledge of the past. To paraphrase a comment made by Karl Heider in a discussion of the history of the ethnographic film, those who don't understand the history of applied anthropology will be lucky enough to repeat it ( Heider 1976). George Foster expresses clearly the importance of understanding history: "Current forms and place of applied anthropology within the broad discipline can be fully appreciated only with knowledge of the several stages of its development" ( 1969:181).

This chapter attempts to define the "several stages."From my perspective, there are five stages:

the predisciplinary stage, the applied ethnology stage, the federal service stage, the role-extension, valueexplicit stage, and the policy research stage. The scheme as presented is additive. That is, general patterns of practice that emerged in earlier periods are continued in subsequent stages. The discussion of each stage includes the identification of the rationalization for the dating of the stage, a discussion of the primary patterns of practice with some examples, and a discussion of those external factors that seem to be relevant for the formation of the key patterns of practice. In reading this chapter it is important to keep in mind that the discipline is also changing. Especially significant among these changes is the radical change in the scale of the discipline.

THE PREDISCIPLINARY STAGE (Pre-1860)

If we consider early historic sources that deal with cultural interrelationships, we find recognition of the usefulness of cross-cultural data to solve problems identified in an administrative or policy context. This is most common in contexts of expansive political and economic systems. In the case of early recorders of cross-cultural description, such as Herodotus (circa 485-325 B.C.), or Lafitau ( 1671-1746), their basic motivation was to provide information for some practical purpose. Virtually all proto-anthropology of the predisciplinary stage was representative of a kind of applied work. Most frequently, as in the case of Herodotus, the research was done to gather data about potential enemies or colonial subjects. In the case of Lafitau, the purpose was to inform plans for trade and marketing expansion. Later, it is possible to find examples of proto-anthropology being used to provide research data to support certain philosophical or theological positions. Although Thomas Aquinas ( 1225-74) wrote about kinship and incest rules, he was attempting to support current church marriage laws ( Honigmann 1976:2).

There are very early cases where cross-culturally informed administrators used their knowledge to facilitate better "culture contact." During the Middle Ages, Pope Gregory urged his missionaries to the Irish to link Catholic saints' days to pagan Irish ceremonies and to convert animal sacrifices to forms more appropriate for newly converted Catholics (Honigmann 1976:45). Later, the most typical activities of the period included individuals appointed to carry out basic cultural research to assist in the administration of an area. A very early example of this is Francis Buchanan's appointment in 1807 by the East India Company to study life and culture in Bengal ( Sachchidananda 1972). With increasing cross-cultural contact in the colonial period, more and more concern over the welfare of native populations developed. This can be observed in the establishment of such organizations as the Aborigines Protection Society, founded in London in 1838; Keith 1917; Reining 1962). The society was concerned with both research and social service for native populations.

In the predisciplinary stage it is possible to point to a number of examples of social reformers, ministers, and administrators who were able to make use of cultural knowledge in order to carry out the tasks at hand. This includes such documented cases as the work of Hinrich Rink, who served as an administrator for the Danish Government of Greenland. Rink, trained as a natural historian, contributed to the early development of self-determination among Greenland natives in the 1860s ( Nellemann 1969).

There are a number of North American examples of early usages. Perhaps the earliest documented is the ethnological work of the Jesuit priest, Father Joseph Lafitau. Posted to New France as a missionary, Lafitau set about to document life in the Northeast. This resulted in the publication ofCustoms of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times ( 1724). While this is framed as a theoretical work, he did engage in various practical studies. One such inquiry was his quest for ginseng, a medicinal herb in the woodlands bordering the St. Lawrence. Introduced from Asia to Europe by a fellow Jesuit, ginseng became much sought after in European markets. Lafitau attempted to find the plant in North America. To do this he sought the help of Mohawk herbalists, whom he interviewed about native plant knowledge and other topics. This inquiry seemed to lead him to more general research, which contributed to his compendium on customs. He did find ginseng and became well known for this ( Lafitau 1724; Fenton and Moore 1974).

An interesting example from the United States is the work of Henry R. Schoolcraft, one of the founders of the American Ethnological Society. Schoolcraft was retained by the United States Congress to compileInformation Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States ( Schoolcraft 1852- 1857). This imposing six-volume set is nothing if not a policy research report. It was prepared with the explicit purpose of providing reliable information upon which to base United States Indian policy. Schoolcraft started his career as an American Indian specialist as an administrator. His professional identity as an ethnologist emerged with the development of the discipline; his career paralleled changes that occurred within applied anthropology. The missionary work of William Duncan among various Northwest Indian groups serves as an example of the impact of a cross-culturally informed change agent. Working in the 1860s, Duncan made significant efforts in the area of social reform ( Barnett 1942).

In this period there were some examples of the development of ethnologically informed training programs for colonial officers. Great Britain started such programs in 1806, and the Netherlands offered such programs by 1819. There is no evidence for such developments in the United States.

To summarize, contemporary anthropologists have rather little to learn about the methodology of application from the predisciplinary stage. Documentation is poor, and therefore it is difficult to develop a sense of the nature of the approaches used. The one important lesson to be learned is that anthropology in its prototypical stage had an important applied component. This contradicts the idea that applied anthropology somehow grew out of general anthropology. Later it becomes clear that the foundation of general anthropology is application and practice. The most objective view would suggest that the proto-anthropologists, for the most part, did their general interest work on the basis of what were applied research assignments. This stage ends with the emergence of anthropology as a distinct discipline. Here we use 1860 as a starting point, following Voget's view of the history of the discipline ( 1975:115).

THE APPLIED ETHNOLOGY STAGE (1860-1930)

With the emergence of anthropology as a distinct discipline, the basic style of applied work typical of the next seventy years is manifested. Typically, the applied anthropologists of this stage worked as training or research specialists in support of government or private foundation-supported administrative programs. For the most part, these efforts supported the establishment of direct administrative control over native populations in internal and external colonial settings. Later in the stage, applied anthropologists carried out the same pattern of activity in the context of development programs. It is important to emphasize that the anthropologist's role tended to be limited to providing data for policy making and problem solving. Very rarely were anthropologists involved as administrators or change agents. There were a number of administrators that became anthropologists, however.

The ethnology phase is very long, and is marked by significant changes in anthropology itself. This stage covers the transition from the dominance of classical evolution theory to the structural-functionalism and historical anthropology of the 1920s. The other significant process that occurred between the beginning and end of this period was the institutionalization of the discipline. That is, the basic infrastructure of a scientific discipline was formed. Professional associations were organized, degree programs were established, academic departments were formed as a body of knowledge grew and accumulated.

A fundamentally important fact that is not acknowledged in the literature on the history of anthropology is that applied anthropology served as the foundation for the development of much disciplinary infrastructure. This can be seen in four contexts. The earliest learned societies in anthropology developed out of associations that were primarily concerned with application and social reform ( Reining 1962, Keith 1917). The first organizations that hired anthropologists in the United States were policy research organizations (Powell 1881, Hinsley 1976). The first academic department of anthropology at Oxford University was established on the basis of a justification to train colonial administrators, that is as a kind of applied anthropology training program ( Fortes 1953). The first use of the term applied anthropology occurred in a description of the program at Oxford ( Read 1906). The first professional code of ethics in anthropology was developed by an applied anthropology organization (Mead, Chapple, and Brown 1949).

While the effects of application on the discipline were significant, the basic approaches to using anthropological knowledge remained the same throughout the period. For the most part, anthropologists carried out their research activities using an explicitly "value-free" approach. In fact, anthropologists writing in support of limiting anthropology to the style characteristic of this era often argued that their utility would be dramatically impaired if they did not approach their research from a "value-free" perspective. This was also done in conjunction with issues relating to role extension. Anthropologists argued that the anthropologistqua anthropologist cannot legitimately engage in roles other than the core consultant's role. This view was argued repeatedly and effectively until rather late in this particular period in the development of applied anthropology. The essence of this position is simply that when the anthropologist extends her role beyond that of researcher-consultant-instructor she is no longer an anthropologist, she is acting as some other kind of specialist. Others held that involvement beyond the core role required that the value-free position often stressed had to be relinquished.

An early manifestation of anthropology in the United States took the form of the Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE). The BAE is known to us today as a basic research institute. It was, in fact, created as a policy research arm of the federal government. The bureau's first Annual Report notes that it was founded to "produce results that would be of practical value in the administration of Indian affairs" ( Powell 1881). The label used to describe this stage, "applied ethnology," was coined by James Mooney for a discussion of the BAE's commitment to policy research in the 1902 Annual Report ( Hinsley 1976). Mooney's claims for political relevance were not hollow: his classic account of the Ghost Dance Religion is described by Anthony Wallace as an early policy study done in anthropology ( Mooney 1896; Wallace 1976).

The creation of the BAE antedates the organization of the first academic anthropology department in the United States, at Clark University, by a number of years. The bureau served as a model for the social research foundation of some American colonial administration experiences. A similar organization was established by the American government, in the Philippines, in 1906, which was directed by Albert E. Jenks ( Kennard and MacGregor 1953). According to Hinsley, the Bureau of American Ethnology's involvement in policy studies lasted only until Charles C. Royce's study of Indian land cessions was published in 1899 ( Hinsley 1979).

There are examples of privately sponsored research from this period. One such example is the work of the Women's Anthropological Society of Washington. This organization supported research into the apparently deplorable housing conditions of Washington, D.C. As an outcome of this research an organization was established to improve the quality of housing to the poor. This research was done in 1896 ( Schensul and Schensul 1978).

Franz Boas, although not usually thought of as an applied anthropologist, completed some important policy research. Most noteworthy is his research sponsored by the United States Immigration Commission. He documented morphological changes in the substantial United States immigrant population. The research contradicted a number of racist ideas concerning the impact of immigration on the American population. Boas was, of course, a committed antiracist. This research was published in 1910. Also related to the issue of United States immigration was the work of Albert Jenks at the University of Minnesota. He established an Americanization training course for immigrants in conjunction with the existing anthropology curriculum ( Jenks 1921).

As early as 1864, ethnological studies were included in the colonial service training program of the Netherlands ( Held 1953; Kennedy 1944). Such training was developed for the Union of South Africa in 1905 ( Forde 1953), AngloEgyptian Sudan in 1908 ( Myres 1928), Belgian territories in 1920 ( Nicaise 1960), and Australian-mandated New Guinea in 1925. This type of training was not emphasized in the United States. As colonial administrative experience increased there seemed to be more interest in ethnological training.

The British also made early and intensive use of anthropologists as government staff or contract research consultants. Anthropologists or anthropologically trained administrators provided research products ranging from short-term trouble-shooting to long-term basic research. Such individuals were hired by the foreign office, colonial office, and India office, as well as the military.

During the applied ethnology period there was significant growth and development in applied anthropology. This growth occurred in certain sectors, but was, with few exceptions, limited to research or instructional activities. These developments occurred most dramatically in the United States, Great Britain, Mexico, and the Netherlands. Most typically the activities consisted of the following: first, a number of anthropologists were involved in instruction of government personnel for administrative positions in cross-cultural settings. Second, there are a number of examples of short-term troubleshooting research in which the anthropologist provided cultural data to an administration to solve a problem that had developed precipitously; in some locales, the anthropologist-on-staff seemed to be retained for this purpose. Third, anthropologists were also hired to carry out research in various problem areas at the request of administrators. These activities included national and regional ethnographic surveys, singleculture focused ethnographies, and topic-specialized single-culture ethnographies.

During this era, applied activities made a significant and often overlooked contribution to the anthropological literature. The typical output of anthropologists during this period were research reports. If we consider the output of anthropologists hired to do problem-oriented research for the government or other sponsoring agencies, it becomes apparent that much of the distinguished ethnographic literature produced in the first half of the twentieth century was a product of applied efforts. This is particularly apparent in African and Pacific ethnography done by British social anthropologists, and North and South American ethnography done by anthropologists from the United States and Mexico.

In summary, during the applied ethnology stage the policy research and administrative training needs of governments were an important stimulus both for early applied work and for the establishment of much organizational infrastructure for the basic discipline. Most applied anthropologists functioned in roles confined to research and teaching. The effects of applied anthropology on the basic discipline consisted largely of stimulating research in new areas and topics. And importantly, the potential for application was used as a justification for the establishment of many of the important academic programs.

THE FEDERAL SERVICE STAGE (1930-1945)

With the coming of the Great Depression and the New Deal, the number of anthropologists employed in application grew dramatically in the United States. This related to an apparent increased need for information on the part of government, as well as a need to provide jobs for anthropologists. It is important to note that the annual production of anthropologists was still quite small. At the same time the academic job market was very limited until World War II. The intensification of anthropological employment in applied work reached a climax with the war. This period is named for the dominant kind of employment.

During the period of federal service, anthropologists came to work in an increasingly large number of problem areas and political contexts. Further, it is apparent that the work of anthropologists improved in quality and appropriateness. In terms of problem orientation the research seemed initially to focus on general ethnography. Later, the research typical of applied anthropologists came to include education, nutrition, culture contact, migration, land tenure, and various other topics. This pattern is particularly characteristic of the development in British colonial territories, but can be applied to describe the development of applied anthropology in the United States as well. Foster suggests at least one difference between the subdiscipline as it was practiced by its British and American practitioners: "the interest of Britain's applied anthropologists in the social aspects of technological development has been relatively modest as compared to that of the Americans" ( 1969:194).

In the United States a number of applied research organizations were created during this period. One of the first of these groups was the Applied Anthropology Unit established in the Office of Indian Affairs. The purpose of the unit was to review the prospects of certain American Indian tribes to develop self-governance organizations in response to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Research topics included settlement patterns, education policy, and prospects for economic development ( Collier 1936; Mekeel 1944; Rodnick 1936; Thompson 1956). The researchers produced a number of reports that had very little impact on the policy-making process. The Applied Anthropology Unit was created by John Collier, who had been appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. Collier's advocacy of the utility of anthropology is widely viewed as crucial to the rapid expansion of federal employment of anthropologists.

At approximately the same time, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) received the services of a group of anthropologists employed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This program, referred to as the Technical Cooperation Bureau of Indian Affairs, carried out projects relating to economic and resource development on various Indian reservations ( Kennard and MacGregor 1953). This group worked in conjunction with various physical scientists, such as geologists, hydrologists, agronomists, and soil conservationists, and produced various studies on the sociocultural aspects of environmental problems. Similar use of anthropologists occurred in the large-scale research project carried out by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the Rio Grande Basin of the United States ( Provinse 1942; Kimball and Provinse 1942). Analysis was directed at Native American, Mexican-American, and Anglo-American residents of the Southwest. Research focused on the cultural factors that had influenced land use.

Involvement of anthropologists in the study of policy questions among rural American communities increased from this point well into the war years. This took a variety of forms. For example, some anthropologists participated in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Life Studies, which produced a series of six community studies that focused on community potential for change. Perhaps most interesting among the policy research done by anthropologists in rural America was that of Walter Goldschmidt, who was involved in a number of studies for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. These included a study of war mobilization in a rural California county and a study of the political economy of agribusiness in the San Joaquin valley of California. The second study produced a classic account of economic exploitation and led to Goldschmidt's vilification by vested interests in California's agribusiness ( 1947).

During the mid- 1930s early use of anthropology in the context of nursing occurred with the work of Esther Lucille Brown. In addition, pioneering work in educational policy studies were carried out in American Indian education in the form of the Pine Ridge and Sherman-California vocational education surveys.

In 1941, the Indian Personality and Administration Research Project was established. For the most part this was a policy-focused basic research project, which resulted in a number of useful studies of American Indian reservation life, including Papago ( Joseph, Spicer, and Chesky 1949), Hopi ( Thompson and Joseph 1944), Navajo ( Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946; Leighton and Leighton 1944), Sioux ( MacGregor 1946), and Zuni ( Leighton and Adair 1946). One aspect of this project made use of action research methodology, which exemplifies the primary change associated with this stage. Action research was developed outside of anthropology, largely by psychologist Kurt Lewin. Laura Thompson applied this technique to stimulate change in Hopi administration. Thompson's description of the technique is cited below:

Action research is normally distinguished by the following characteristics:

it stems from an urgent practical problem, a felt need on the part of a group, and is generally solicited voluntarily by the potential users of the findings;

it involves both scientists and the user-volunteers as participants in a cooperative effort--namely, the solving of the practical problem; and the scientists involved normally function both as scientisttechnicians and as integrative or "democratic" leaders in Kurt Lewin's sense of the term. That is, they endeavor to stimulate, draw out, and foster the talents and leadership qualities of the members of the participant group and to minimize their own roles except as catalysts of group potentialities. In their role as integrative leaders, the staff scientists train and supervise the work of the volunteer user-participant. ( Thompson 1950:34)

Also indicative of the expansion into new research areas during this period was the work of the anthropologists associated with the Committee on Human Relations in Industry at the University of Chicago. Included among the anthropologists associated with the committee were W. Lloyd Warner and Burleigh B. Gardner. This period saw major advancements in what came to be called the scientific study of management. The most significant project was the classic Western Electric, Hawthorn Works study of the relationships between working conditions and productivity. This area of work developed very rapidly for a period of time.

The National Research Council established at least two research committees that were to have significant impacts on policy research done by anthropologists in this period. These included the Committee on Food Habits, which included Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Rhoda Metraux, among others. This group was to obtain scientific information on nutritional levels of the American population. Also established was the Committee for National Morale, consisting of Gregory Bateson, Elliot Chapple, and Margaret Mead, among others. This committee was to determine how anthropology and psychology could be applied to the improvement of national morale during the war. This stage in the development of applied anthropology started in the national crisis caused by the Great Depression and concluded in the crisis of war. The intensification of involvement in application caused by World War II is astounding. Mead ( 1977) estimates that over 95 percent of American anthropologists were involved with work in support of the war effort during the 1940s. By way of contrast, the war in Vietnam had very much the opposite effect on anthropologists. In 1941, the American Anthropological Association passed a resolution placing the "specialized skill and knowledge of its members, at the disposal of the country for the successful prosecution of the war" ( American Anthropological Association 1942:42). This effort seemed to increase the self-awareness of applied anthropologists, as well as their concentration in Washington and other places. Perhaps the most well-known war effort involvements by American anthropologists are the activities on behalf of the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority was responsible for managing the internment camps established early in the war to incarcerate Japanese-Americans. The use of social scientists grew out of the experiences of the one camp that was under the administrative responsibility of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. At that time the BIA was directed by John Collier. In response to the problems that developed at the other camps, social science programs were developed at all War Relocation Authority facilities ( Arensberg 1942; Kimball 1946; Leighton et al. 1943; Spicer 1946a, 1946b). The anthropologists who served in the camps served as liaisons between inmates and camp administration, and as researchers. This involvement by anthropologists is frequently characterized as unethical, being viewed by some as supportive of an illegal and inhumane government program. If one reads their writings or discusses this involvement with them it is clear that they viewed themselves as ameliorators of a potentially much worse situation. One should read Rosemary Wax's chilling account of her experiences as a community analyst in a camp to get some feeling for the problem ( Wax 1971).

In addition to the War Relocation Authority, anthropologists were involved in a variety of other programs. The Far Eastern Civil Affairs Training School was established to prepare administrators for areas that were being recaptured from the Japanese by the Allies. This operation, established at the University of Chicago, was headed by anthropologist Fred Eggan ( Embree 1949). The Foreign Morale Analysis Division was created within the Office of War Information. Using various data sources, this organization reported intelligence on the Japanese and other adversaries to the Departments of War, State, and Navy. Some of the information was collected from internment camp inmates. BenedictThe Chrysanthemum and the Sword ( 1946) was a by-product of this operation.

During the war the Smithsonian Institution initiated a number of activities that had significant applied research components. The Institute of Social Anthropology of the Smithsonian, established in 1943, engaged in both basic and applied research projects. The applied activities included very early use of anthropological research to plan and evaluate health programs. The applied aspect of the Institute of Social Anthropology's research program developed under the leadership of George M. Foster. Contemporary applied medical anthropology was, to a large extent, shaped by the program of the Institute of Social Anthropology.

Also of interest are the various war-related compilation and publication programs. These include the Civil Affairs Handbooks published by the Chief of Naval Operations on Japanese-held Pacific territories, and the Handbook of South American Indians published as part of a program to promote relations with Latin America. In addition to the efforts mentioned here, there were activities related to the immediate postwar period. These included research into the effects of the nuclear attack on Japanese cities ( Leighton 1949), and studies of occupation problems ( Bennett 1951; Gladwin 1950; Embree 1946; Hall 1949; Rodnick 1948).

It is quite clear that applied anthropology grew dramatically during this period and that the major cause was employment opportunities with the federal government relating to the depression and war. One of the products of this expansion was the organization of the Society for Applied Anthropology. Spicer refers to this as "one of the most important events in the development of anthropology in the twentieth century" ( 1976:335). Now over fifty years old, the society has gone through considerable change and development through the years. In its early phases the society seemed most concerned with bringing together social scientists and administrators, reporting cases where anthropological knowledge had been usefully applied, and advocating the idea that there existed an applicable body of anthropological theory ( Spicer 1976:336). An important component of the program of the Society for Applied Anthropology was the publication of the journalApplied Anthropology , which was subsequently namedHuman Organization .

The Society for Applied Anthropology developed around local interest groups in Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and then subsequently expanded to a national membership. The changes in the Society for Applied Anthropology will be discussed in conjunction with the next two periods in the history of American applied anthropology. In the early days of the society's existence most activities of the organization were directed at creating a professional identity for applied anthropologists.

This period saw major changes in applied anthropology. These included dramatic intensification of involvement of anthropologists in application and the development of a more definite professional identity through the creation of the Society for Applied Anthropology and its publications. For the most part, applied anthropology roles were still limited to policy researcher and trainer, the roles that dominated both the applied ethnology and predisciplinary stages. There are some examples of pioneering assumption of change-producing, action-involved roles, which are a striking feature of the next phase, the value-explicit, roleextension phase.

THE ROLE EXTENSION, VALUE-EXPLICIT STAGE (1945-1970)

The historic course of the development of applied anthropology up to 1945 is characterized by relatively little change in the applied anthropologist's operational strategy. From the initial professionalization of the discipline, around the middle of the nineteenth century, there was little deviation from the core applied anthropology role, which might best be labeled "instructor-researcher-consultant." The history of the field up to 1945 is characterized by continued elaboration of this theme.

The basic pattern of the applied ethnology stage became elaborated as it became more widely accepted by both anthropological producers and administrative consumers. It is inappropriate to suggest that the acceptance of applied anthro- pology was complete or even extensive. It became more and more useful, more and more important, but one senses a certain reluctance to participate in applied roles. A cadre of applied anthropologists did not develop as such, but a group of anthropologists did exist who oscillated between academic and applied appointments. Further, much employment was in service to colonial regimes ( Asad 1973). This may have related to the historic tendency to switch back to academic careers.

In any case, the radical critique of applied anthropology derived a great deal of its impact from an analysis of the anthropologists who served in these capacities (for example, Horowitz 1967; Gough 1968; Berreman 1969; Hymes 1974; Moore 1971). We are faced with an evaluation dilemma, however, for even an unsympathetic review of these efforts reveals that most anthropologists were struggling to increase the fairness and humaneness of various domestic and international colonial systems. To be sure, the anthropological perspective was more ameliorative than revolutionary, and given the power relations extant, it would seem fair to assume that the most positive impact of anthropology on colonialism could be achieved within the system. As history became reconstructed in the postcolonial period, these anthropologists took the brunt of various aggressive criticisms.

The shift in applied anthropology practice that occurred in this stage can be best understood in terms of three basic changes. First, the range of legitimate roles for applied anthropologists expanded beyond the researcher-instructor-consultant core. With role extension came increases in the intensity of participation, that is, the number of aspects of a particular applied problem with which the anthropologist dealt. Anthropologists became more directly involved in implementation and intervention. Instead of merely providing information and an occasional recommendation, anthropologists began to take responsibility for problem solution. Anthropologists were no longer merely monitors and predictors of change but came actually to work as agents of change. In addition, other new roles were explored.

The second major shift occurred in terms of the extent to which anthropologists confronted their own values, directly and explicitly. The "value-free" or, more accurately, the value-implicit approach, came to be more openly questioned. Some anthropologists came to recognize the value-explicit approach as legitimate, after substantial debate. This means that certain anthropologists came to feel that social scientists cannot separate their work from real-world values, and that to do so creates a dangerous illusion of true objectivity. The value-explicit stance implied a willingness on the part of anthropologists openly to define goals and values for clients and client communities. This, of course, led to intense debates concerning ethics for cultural anthropologists of all types. It also led anthropologists to increased political exposure.

The third shift came as a corollary to role extension and value-explicitness. That is, applied anthropology was increasingly action-involved. This means, as suggested above, that the users of the new patterns came to be directly engaged in change-producing behavior. Their contacts with the dramatis personae of the real world were transformed. No longer was their activity limited to the basic researcher-instructor-consultant role. but was extended to include a much wider array of action-involved roles. This change did not result in a single new approach, but a multiplicity of new approaches for applying anthropological knowledge. In addition to the retained and still important activities characteristic of the earlier stages, at least five new value-explicit, role-extended, and actioninvolved approaches to applications began to emerge during this period. These approaches are: action anthropology, research and development anthropology, community development, community advocacy anthropology, and culture brokerage. Cultural brokerage actually appeared early in the next period, as specified in the historic scheme reported here.

Action Anthropology. Perhaps the first action-involved, value-explicit approach to be developed within anthropology was action anthropology, which grew out of a University of Chicago field school organized by Sol Tax among the Mesquakie residents near Tama, Iowa. The action orientation was not part of the original intent, but emerged because of the sentiments of the participating students. The Fox Project, as it was called, consisted of a dual program of action and research that addressed a complex of ideas associated with self-determination and some more generalized research goals.

Some of the key concepts of the approach are community self-determination and the idea of what might best be called interactive planning. This last idea is rooted in the work of John Dewey and is manifested in a tendency to stress an ambiguous distinction between means and ends, and to reduce the linearity of social planning. The primary proposition is that means and ends are interdependent, and are determined through an oscillating interaction between problems inherent in a situation and various development alternatives. Additionally, goal specification tends to be very general and open-ended. The Fox Project was initiated in 1948 ( Gearing, Netting, and Peattie 1960). The action anthropology approach was used in a wide variety of settings.

Research and Development Anthropology. The research and development approach was first attempted in the well-known Vicos Project. Like action anthropology, the research and development process has both scientific and development goals. Defined technically, research and development anthropology is a means of bringing about increases in the net amount and breadth of distribution of certain basic human values through research-based participant intervention in a community. The writings of Allan Holmberg, the primary initiator, are good sources for understanding the transition toward a value-explicit anthropology. Holmberg and his associates assumed that value-free social science was unobtainable, and that the research inevitably influenced the community. He argued that this tendency was better dealt with if it was made explicit and used for the betterment of the society, as well as for scientific advancement.

The goal of research and development anthropology is the wider sharing of the content of basic value categories. The value categories conceptualized in research and development anthropology are power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, skill, well-being, affection, and rectitude. The conceptualization benefited from the contribution of the political scientist, Harold Lasswell. The specific content of the approach involved identifying baseline data relevant to the specific value categories, and then devising an action response that was calculated to increase the amount and breadth of distribution of the valued content. The Vicos Project took place in highland Peru, and was initiated in 1952 ( Dobyns, Doughty, and Lasswell 1971). The approach has been used in a variety of other settings.

Community Development. The community development approach was developed outside of anthropology in the context of British colonial administration, and the social work and agricultural extension disciplines in the United States. It is listed here because a number of anthropologists used and contributed to the approach. A widely used definition of the approach is contained in manuals produced by the International Cooperation Administration (a predecessor of the Agency for International Development):

Community Development is a process of social action in which the people of a community organize themselves for planning and action; define their common and individual needs and problems; make group and individual plans to meet their needs and problems; execute the plans with a maximum of reliance upon community resources; supplement these resources when necessary with services and materials from government and nongovernmental agencies outside the community ( 1955:1)

Projects using this approach often speak of concepts like felt needs, self-help, and self-determination.

The most visible contributions of anthropologists to this approach are various textbooks, which includeCooperation in Change ( Goodenough 1963), andCommunity Development: An Interpretation ( Brokensha and Hodge 1969). In addition to this, anthropologists have made use of the approach directly ( van Willigen 1971, 1973, 1977; Willard 1977).

Community Advocacy Anthropology. Action research, action anthropology, and research and development anthropology represent the first generation of value-explicit applied anthropology approaches. In addition to these approaches, various advocacy anthropology approaches developed in the early 1970s. These were supplemented by an approach called cultural brokerage around the same period. Generally, the advocacy approaches are characterized by a closer administrative relationship between the community and the anthropologist. In some cases, the anthropologist is actually hired by the local community. While this is not strictly true of the case example we are using for this type of anthropology, the relationship between the community and the anthropologists was quite close. It was developed by Stephen Schensul for use in a Latino barrio of Chicago. In this case, the anthropologist worked primarily as a research technician in support of indigenous community leadership. Goals of the sponsoring organization were addressed to a limited extent. The anthropologist also provided technical assistance in training for research and proposal writing.
While the community advocacy role is diverse, it is somewhat more focused upon research done in support of community-defined goals. The anthropologist, although involved in the action, does not serve as a direct change agent, but as an auxiliary to community leaders. The anthropologist does not work through intervening agencies, but instead has a direct relationship with the community. The relationship is collaborative, drawing upon the anthropologist's research skills and the organizational skills of the community's leadership. Typically, the anthropologist's activities include evaluation of community-based programs, whether they are sponsored or managed by people from within or outside the community; needs assessments in anticipation of proposal writing and program design; proposal writing and a wide variety of generalized inputs of a less formal nature. The Chicago project was initiated in 1968 ( Schensul 1973).

Cultural Brokerage. Cultural brokerage is an approach to using anthropological knowledge developed by Hazel H. Weidman ( Weidman 1973). It is based on a conception of role defined originally by Eric Wolf to account for persons who serve as links between two cultural systems ( 1956). While Wolf conceptualized the role in the context of the naturally occurring roles that exist between peasant communities and the national system, Weidman applied the term to structures created to make health care delivery more appropriate to an ethnically diverse clientele.

Stimulated by research findings of the Miami Health Ecology Project, Weidman created a position for culture brokers in the Community Health Program of the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Miami. These individuals were social scientists who were familiar with the various ethnic groups found in the "catchment area" of a large county hospital. Within this area, it was possible to find Cubans, Puerto Ricans, blacks, Haitians, and Bahamians, as well as whites. While the cultural brokerage role is quite diverse, its primary goal is the establishment of links between the politically dominant structures of the community and the less powerful, in a way that restructures the relationship in terms of equality.

The commitment to egalitarian intercultural relations in cultural brokerage is manifested in other elements in its conceptual structure. The most important of these conceptual elements are coculture and culture mediation. Coculture is the label used for the components of a culturally pluralistic system. It is a conceptual substitute for subculture.

The development of intervention techniques within anthropology is the most striking characteristic of this particular stage of the development of applied anthropology. Parallel with this new development is the continuation of the basic pattern of research for various administrative authorities that was characteristic of the applied ethnology stage. Much of this research received its stimulus in the early years of the role-extension, value-explicit stage from the forces put in place by World War II. These forces were substantial.

While intervention strategies were developed and used within anthropology, the most important factors that shaped applied anthropology were simple eco-nomic ones. During this phase there was a tremendous expansion of the academic job market. According to Spicer, "It became a world of academic positions far in excess of persons trained to fill them" ( 1976:337). This caused a "retreat into the academic world" of substantial proportions. While economic factors associated with the expansiveness of the academic job market were important, the tendency not to take federal employment was enhanced by objections many anthropologists had toward the war the government was waging in Vietnam.

A variety of research projects motivated by basic policy questions led anthropologists to study a variety of new research areas, including native land rights ( Goldschmidt and Haas 1946), government policy toward native political organization ( Gluckman 1943, 1955), ethnohistory ( Stewart 1961), health care ( Leighton and Leighton 1944), land tenure ( Allen, Gluckman, Peters, and Trapnell 1948), urban life ( Beaglehole and Beaglehole 1946), migrant labor ( Schapera 1947), relocation ( Kiste 1974; Mason 1950, 1958), water resources development ( Cushman and MacGregor 1949, Padfield and Smith 1968), health care delivery ( Kimball 1952, Kimball and Pearsall 1954), disasters ( Spillius 1957), health development ( Foster 1953), racial discrimination ( Southern Regional Council 1961), and others.

New roles activated by anthropologists include: expert witness ( Lurie 1955; MacGregor 1955; Kluger 1976; Stewart 1961; Dobyns 1978), evaluator ( Aiyappan 1948; Sasaki 1960; Sasaki and Adair 1952; Foster 1953; Honigmann 1953; Dupree 1956a, 1956b, 1958, Lantis and Hadaway 1957; Ingersoll 1968, 1969; Halpern 1972; Mathur 1977; Elwin 1977; Messing 1965, 1964; Pearsall and Kern 1967; Cain 1968; Sorenson and Berg 1967; Jacobsen 1973), planner ( Peattie 1968, 1969a, 1969b; Peterson 1970, 1972, 1978), as well as roles associated with various clinical functions ( Landy 1961; Aberle 1950).

Anthropologists invested more effort in the documentation of sound practices for themselves and others. A number of manuals and texts published in this period were intended to provide guidance to development administrators, public health officials, and change agents. These includedHuman Problems in Technological Change ( Spicer 1952),Cultural Patterns and Technological Change ( Mead 1955),Health, Culture and Community: Case Studies of Public Reactions to Health Programs ( Paul 1955),Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change ( Foster 1962),Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach to Community Development ( Goodenough 1963), andApplied Anthropology ( Foster 1969).

An important event during this period was the development of an ethics statement by the Society for Applied Anthropology. The statement, written in 1949, was the first within the discipline. This effort has continued to the present day. Interestingly, the statement was developed in reaction to a specific basic research project rather than problems associated with application. The American Anthropological Association did not consider development of an ethics statement for about twenty years.

In summary, the role extension stage saw anthropologists designing and implementing strategies for social change. Alongside this development anthropologists increased the array of new research-based roles. Although the social change strategies developed within anthropology during this stage appear to remain useful, their application has been infrequent in the latest stage of the development of applied anthropology. The development of strategies for social change within the discipline seems to be most common in the United States and Mexico. Perhaps the most important change that shaped applied anthropology during this period was the tremendous expansion of the academic job market.

THE POLICY RESEARCH STAGE (1970 TO THE PRESENT)

The policy research stage is characterized by the emergence of what Angrosino calls the "new applied anthropology" ( 1976). Expressed simply, this means an increased emphasis on policy research of various kinds done outside of academic employment. The typical pattern of the value-explicit, role-extension period, where the applied anthropologist would take temporary assignments of an applied nature while working as an academic, has been replaced by more employment by consulting firms or as a direct-hire staff member of the agency. This kind of employment results in a dramatic increase in new kinds of research.

This stage appears to be more clearly a return to the pattern of the federal service period than an outgrowth of the role-extension period. It is different in a fundamental way, however. During the federal service period applied anthropologists returned to academia once the employment pressure was off. It appears unlikely that the large numbers of anthropologists entering the job market as practicing anthropologists now will take academic jobs in the future. They will not return because there will not be jobs for them, their salary expectations can not be met, and they just do not want to. It is for this reason that this period is unique.

Applied anthropology of this stage is more clearly a product of external factors. There are two primary external factors: the dramatically shrinking academic job market ( D'Andrade, Hammel, Adkins, and McDaniel 1975; Cartter 1974; Balderston and Radner 1971), and (at least in the United States) the creation of a wide array of policy research functions mandated by federal regulation and statute.

The effect of the shrinking academic job market is substantial and increasing. An early estimate predicted that two-thirds of new Ph.D.s produced in anthropology would find employment outside of academia ( D'Andrade, Hammel, Adkins , and McDaniel 1975). Recent research on employment summarized by Elizabeth Briody shows that the percentage of each annual cohort of Ph.D.s that enters employment outside academia is increasing ( Briody 1988:77). An American Anthropological Association survey indicated that in the 1989-90 cohort of Ph.D.s 59 percent were employed outside of academic departments, although most anthropologists still work in academic positions ( American Anthropological Association 1991:1).

Coupled with this big push factor are the pulling effects of legistalively mandated policy research opportunities. To some unspecified degree, the so-called surplus of Ph.D.s is absorbed by other opportunities created by the expansion in policy research. Some of the legislation relevant to this problem is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Foreign Assistance Act as amended in 1973, and the Community Development Act of 1974. In addition to employment directly related to these policy research needs, a very large array of new types of employment was accepted by anthropologists. Some of this employment involved research, much of it involved assuming other roles. The effects of these pull factors varied considerably. Levels of funding have varied substantially through the years with changing economic conditions, changing political styles, and periodic disillusionment with the utility of policy research.

A confounding factor in employment choice is the political attitude of anthropologists formed by their experiences in the era of the Vietnamese War. For some, employment in United States government agencies with overseas programs was unacceptable for ideological reasons, no matter how hard the push or attractive the pull. This, so it seems, has changed significantly as the job situation has worsened and agency programs have changed.

The changes in anthropology associated with the increase in nonacademic employment are substantial. These can be addressed in terms of three general categories: academic content, publication and information dissemination, and social organization, as well as some general changes in style.

Academic program content. The most obvious effect has been the creation of academic programs that are specifically focused upon preparation for nonacademic careers ( Kushner 1978:23; Trotter 1988; Hyland and Kirkpatrick 1989). Increasingly, these programs are coming to be focused upon more specific policy areas rather than having a general orientation toward applied anthropology ( van Willigen 1988). These programs tend to make wider use of internships and practica in their instructional strategy ( Hyland et al. 1988; Wolfe, Chambers, and Smith 1981). The number of programs that have application as a focus have increased dramatically ( van Willigen 1985; Hyland and Kirkpatrick 1989). It is conceivable that in the future a professional society will develop standards for certification and accreditation.

Publication and information dissemination. The most noteworthy change in publication and information dissemination has been the creation of the publicationPracticing Anthropology .Practicing Anthropology publishes articles that report the experiences of anthropologists in various kinds of nonacademic employment. Currently its readership is over two thousand. In addition, the Applied Anthropology Documentation Project at the University of Kentucky has resulted in the establishment of a collection of the written products of applied anthropologists ( Clark and van Willigen 1981; van Willigen 1981a, 1991). A similar collection of Canadian applied anthropological work, sponsored by the Society for Applied Anthropology in Canada has been organized at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, by Wayne Warry. The increased interest in application has influenced the publication policies of the major journals.Human Organization shows some tendency to return to the publication of application case study materials that dominated its pages in the first decade of publication.American Anthropologist publishes book reviews of technical reports that are applied in nature, and a limited number of articles based on practice. The National Association for the Practice of Anthropology publishes a bulletin series that features materials on application.

Social Organization

The most significant change caused by increases in nonacademic employment have been the creation of a large number of local practitioner organizations ( LPOs). The first of these was the Society of Professional Anthropologists (SOPA), established in Tucson, Arizona in 1974 ( Bennett 1988; Bainton 1975). Although now disbanded, SOPA served as a model for others. Among the organizations currently operating are those in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Tampa, Tallahassee, Ann Arbor, and Memphis. In addition the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology serves a regional consituency in the high plains. These groups are quite variable in size and current levels of activity. The Washington Association of Professional Anthropologists (WAPA) and the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology (HPSFAA) are clearly the most active. WAPA publishes a newsletter and directory and regularly holds workshops at national association meetings on topics like "Seeking Federal Employment." HPSFAA has a lively annual meeting and a regular publication. Most importantly, the LPOs serve as a mechanism for effective networking in the profession.

At the national level there has been considerable organizational development that has benefited American applied anthropologists. Most important is the National Association for the Practice of Anthropology, organized as a unit of the American Anthropological Association to replace the Society for Applied Anthropology. SfAA and NAPA are currently engaged in various cooperative activities. Canadian anthropologists benefit from the activities of the Society for Applied Anthropology in Canada, organized in 1981 (Price 1987).

Both the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology have used academically employed and nonacademically employed slates for their elections for some time. Other adaptations have included changing the mix of the national meeting programs so as to increase activities relevant for nonacademically employed anthropologists, and to decrease the part of the program designed for scholarly purposes. Innovations in this area include workshops for gaining skills in various policy research areas, such as social impact assessment and program evaluation. NAPA has provided considerable creative leadership in this regard.

The American Anthropological Association has issued a number of publications that address practical or applied issues. These include publications on the structure of training programs, produced with the Society for Applied Anthropology ( Leacock, Gonzalez, and Kushner 1974), the development of training programs ( Trotter 1988), approaches to practice ( Goldschmidt 1979), practicing anthropologists ( Chatelain and Cimino 1981), and employment ( Bernard and Sibley 1975). Also published were a series of training manuals in applied anthropology on various topics including development anthropology ( Partridge 1984), medical anthropology ( Hill 1984), policy ethnography ( van Willigen and DeWalt 1985), and nutritional anthropology ( Quandt and Ritenbaugh 1986).

Another potentially significant development has been the modification of ethics statements by the national organizations. The Society for Applied Anthropology approved a new version of their ethics statement in 1983. The committee was charged with adjusting the existing statement to the conditions faced by practicing anthropologists. With this in mind, the committee developed a statement that recognized the "legitimate proprietary" interests of clients in terms of the dissemination of research data, the need for truthful reporting of qualifications, and the need for continuing education to maintain skills, as well as other issues ( Committee on Ethics, Society for Applied Anthropology 1983). NAPA also recently issued an ethics statement.

As in the two previous stages, the anthropologists working in application are exploring new areas of research. The growth of new areas of inquiry is dramatic. Some examples of the new developments are research into forestry ( Collins and Painter 1986; Murray 1987), drug rehabilitation ( Weppner 1973; Marshall 1979), human waste disposal ( Elmendorf and Buckles 1978), welfare program reform ( Trend 1978), broadcast media ( Eiselein and Marshall 1976), social services in boomtowns ( Uhlman 1977a, 1977b), educational evaluation ( Wax and Breunig 1973; Fitzsimmons 1975; Burns 1975; Clinton 1975), commodity marketing ( Lample and Herbert 1988), housing needs and effects ( Wulff 1972; Weaver and Downing 1975; Kerri 1977), commodity-focused agricultural research ( Werge 1977), wildlife management ( Brownrigg 1986), radioactive waste storage siting ( Stoffle, Evans, and Jensen 1987), energy extraction ( Softestad 1990), rural industrial development ( Grinstead 1976), office management ( Weaver et al. 1971), employment training ( Wolfe and Dean 1974; Naylor 1976), market development ( Zilverberg and Courtney 1984), corrections ( Alexander and Chapman 1982), building and landscape design ( Esber 1987; Low and Simon 1984), fisheries ( Stoffle, Jensen, and Rasch 1981; Johnson and Griffith 1985; McCay and Creed 1990), recreational planning ( Wulff 1976; Scott et al. 1982), and the effects of power generation ( Callaway, Levy, and Henderson 1976). There are, of course, others.

At a somewhat more general level, one can cite development in the areas of social impact assessment and program evaluation. Anthropologists have been involved in some of the pioneering efforts that attempted to predict, for the benefit of planners, some of the social costs and benefits of various kinds of development projects. In domestic settings, we find anthropologists engaged in team research that has developed social impact assessment manuals and standards ( Maruyama 1973; Vlachos 1975). Anthropologists have been involved in direct assessment of project effects ( Nugent et al. 1978; Jacobs, Schleicher, and Ontiveros 1974; Millsap 1978; Jacobs 1977; Parker and King 1987; Preister 1987; Stoffie, Evans, and Jensen 1987; McGuire and Worden 1984; Van Tassell and Michaelson 1977; Dixon 1978), and field testing of social impact assessment methodologies ( Clinton 1978).

Although the legislative mandate was substantially different, anthropologists have also been engaged in social impact assessment work in the context of international development. These efforts include the development of manuals for impact assessment methodology (Harza Engineering Company 1980), baseline studies to inform development planning (Werge 1977; Maloney, Aziz, and Sarker 1980; Brown 1980; Scaglion 1981; Green 1982; Reeves and Frankenberger 1981; DeWalt and DeWalt 1982), development of regional development plans (Brokensha, Horowitz, and Scudder 1977), needs assessments (Mason 1979; Practical Concepts, Inc. 1980), social soundness analysis ( U. S. Agency for International Development 1975; Cochrane 1979; McPherson 1978), project evaluations ( Blustain 1982; Brown 1980; Pillsbury 1986; Williams 1980, 1981), and analysis of program planning documents ( Ingersoll, Sullivan, and Lenkerd 1981; Hoben 1980; Britan 1980; Collins and Painter 1986). In addition, there has been basic research into various aspects of development such as decentralization in development ( Ralston, Anderson, and Colson 1981), indigenous voluntary associations ( Miller 1980), and women in development ( Elmendorf and Isely 1981).

The involvement of anthropologists in the evaluation of various domestic social action programs is quite common. Evaluation studies occur in a wide variety of areas, including American Indian education ( Fuchs and Havighurst 1970), housing development ( Kerri 1977), American Indian tribal governance ( Weaver et al. 1971), employment training programs ( Wolfe and Dean 1974), rural education ( Everhart 1975), welfare reform ( Trend 1978), alternative energy source development ( Roberts 1978), innovative education programs ( Wilson 1977; Fetterman 1987), alcohol abuse curtailment projects ( Marshall 1979), and minority employment ( Buehler 1981).

The dramatic increase in policy research efforts of various types is not associated with an increase in the use of social intervention techniques, which this chapter describes as characteristic of the pattern of application in the previous stage. There are examples of the use of action anthropology ( Schlesier 1974; Stull 1979), research and development anthropology ( Turner 1974; Wulff 1977), and various advocacy research approaches. The approaches based on cultural brokerage models developed by Hazel H. Weidman earlier in this stage are still in use. There are two factors that seem to have caused the reduction of this type of application: the radical critique of much of applied anthropology, and the increasing political sophistication of many of the traditional client groups of anthropologists.

A factor that will influence the future of anthropology is the changing circumstances of employment. First, the academic to nonacademic mix has changed. The nonacademic realm is quite variable within itself. The conditions of employment affect both motivation and opportunity to publish, tendency to participate in anthropological learned societies, extent of interdisciplinary orientation, and the training of future anthropologists. Working in a governmental organization is different than working in the private sector. There are significant differences between profit and nonprofit organizations in the private sector. The biggest differences may occur where the anthropologist owns the firm. Academic employment is also changing in many of the same ways. There seems to be a stronger commitment to consulting and, of course, many nonacademically employed anthropologists have to compete with the academics. Some academics take on research commitments in the policy area so as to provide students with marketable work experiences.

SUMMARY

What is called applied anthropology has grown dramatically since the inception of anthropology as a discipline. In its growth, applied anthropology has manifested an array of tendencies. First, the applied and theoretical aspects of the discipline developed in parallel, application potentials being used as a rationale for the development of academic programs and theoretical research programs.

The effect of applied anthropology on theoretical anthropology was often masked because of the nature of publication in applied anthropology and its relative lack of prestige. Second, a major effect of applied anthropology on theoretical anthropology has been the stimulus of interest in new research topics and populations. This effect too has been masked. Third, the development of applied anthropology is best thought of in terms of an additive expansion of research context, topics, and techniques. While there have been intervention techniques developed within anthropology, today these are infrequently applied. Fourth, applied anthropology should be thought of as primarily a product of important external forces rather than a consistent pattern of internally generated change. Mostly, the external forces have been manifested in employment and funded research opportunities brought about by the needs of colonial governance, war, and foreign policy. More recently, a major external factor has been the nature of the academic job market, and to a limited extent an increase in policy research opportunities mandated by federal law.

The nature of the academic job market has resulted in the creation of a large cadre of anthropologists employed outside of academic contexts. The changes wrought by this significant demographic shift are being felt in the discipline now. It is anticipated that other more significant changes will occur in the discipline as the number of nonacademically employed increases to majority, and beyond. Those employed in nonacademic settings will continue to occupy roles that relate in some way to policy research rather than intervention.

FURTHER READING

Eddy Elizabeth M., and William L. Partridge, eds. 1987.Applied Anthropology in America . New York: Columbia University Press. Contains a number of chapters useful for understanding the history of applied anthropology.

van John Willigen. 1991.Anthropology in Use: A Source Book on Anthropological Practice . Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Contains brief descriptions of over five hundred cases of the use of anthropology to solve practical problems. It is an excellent source for research paper topics.

Ethics

As one prepares to assume an occupational role as an applied anthropologist, one becomes increasingly concerned with standards of performance and behavior in that role. This connotes a concern for the quality of the services produced as a result of one's action, as well as concern for how and under what circumstances one produces these services. Such standards of performance and behavior are the substance of ethics. The essential core of the ethics of applied anthropology is the nature of the potential and manifested impact on the people involved.

In his important discussion of ethical issues, Joseph G. Jorgensen distinguishes between the anthropologist and various other "information seekers" whom persons confront. As he notes, "our situation is unlike that of the priest, the lawyer, or the physician, whose help isrequested by the client and whose right to privileged communication is deemed necessary (by law, in the United States) if he is to serve his clients. In contrast, as anthropologists we ask for the help of our subjects and weoffer confidentiality as aninducement to informants for their cooperation" ( Jorgensen 1971:327).

In light of this, then, the applied anthropologist by implication would have a status distinct from the research anthropologist in terms of various ethical considerations. First, because we may have change as a goal as well as scientific understanding, we must be especially concerned about the impact of our efforts on the populations with whom we work. Second, because we may be working for an agency that is from outside or is marginal to the community, we may be forced to deal with an especially complex set of ethical concerns. Applied anthropologists typically face more complex ethical situations than other anthropologists. Though the termethics connotes an absolute standard of behavior, applied anthropologists, like other human scientists both pure and applied, must, to be realistic, deal with the concept relativistically. That is to say, ethical standards are difficult enough to specify, let alone apply consistently. In each of the applied anthropologist's constituencies we find different kinds of ethical requirements. That is, different ethical issues are raised in the case of the applied anthropologist's relations with research subjects, project sponsors, or fellow anthropologists. The somewhat different requirements of these relationships are sometimes in conflict.

ETHICAL ISSUES

This is a complex period in the history of anthropology. The discipline has achieved a very high level of theoretical and methodological complexity. New areas of inquiry emerge with surprising frequency. Further change is brought about by the growth of applied activities. All this change creates new challenges and an increased concern for ethical issues. The debate has continued through the years, reaching a peak during the war in Vietnam. The tensions of that period were exacerbated by a series of ill-conceived and unethical research projects.

The debate is not limited to the recent past, but has substantial time depth. As early as 1919, Franz Boas raised concerns in a letter to theNation in which he accused four anthropologists of serving as spies under the guise of their researcher role. Boas wrote: "A person, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist" ( Boas 1919, in Weaver 1973:51).

From the time of Boas to the present, the debate continues with only a trace of its intensity revealed in published articles, letters to the editor, resolutions passed at national meetings, American Anthropological Association ethics committee reports, and the ethics codes published by the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology.

The primary issue in the ethical debate is the potential negative effect that the activities of the anthropologist may have on a community or a specific person. There are many important issues, but this is the core of anthropology's ethical concerns. This is something that an anthropologist should understand. We are inextricably linked to the communities we work with, and therefore, our actions can be continually ramified, and may have serious unanticipated effects.

Cora Du Bois relates an incident that exemplifies this potential in a frightening way. Du Bois had carried out her well-known study,The People of Alor , in an area of what is now Indonesia, which came to be occupied by the Japanese during World War II. It was reported to Du Bois after the war that persons she had studied had innocently mentioned that they wished the Americans would win the war, because they were good people. The Alorese in question had never heard of America prior to Du Bois's field work. She reports that the Japanese heard that certain Alorese were stating that America would win the conflict. The Japanese military government rounded up the persons in question and publicly beheaded them as an example to the populace. As Du Bois notes, "There is no end to the intricate chain of responsibility and guilt that the pursuit of even the most arcane social research involves. 'No man is an island'" ( Du Bois 1944, in Weaver 1973:32). However unusual this horrifying case is, it dramatically emphasizes the potential for unexpected harm our science has. Let us here engage in a discussion of some of the issues identified in the literature on anthropological research ethics.

PRIVACY

The fieldwork process is based largely on overcoming the boundaries that exist between the personality of the researcher and that of the informant. We call this breakdown of protective boundaries "rapport building." Through the building of rapport, we erode the informants' tendency to protect their private personalities. It is possible, even probable, that with the development of rapport, informants provide information that could be damaging to them, if not properly protected.

Why do people give us information? Many do so because they value the goals of science. However, in many cases the goals of science are irrelevant or unknown to them and they may be responding for a whole range of other masons. These might include their own standards of hospitality, their perceptions of the anthropologist's power, and their own need for recognition and attention. The importance of this last aspect is very clearly indicated in Joseph CasagrandeIn the Company of Man ( 1960). This volume contains descriptions of important informants written by anthropologists. These sketches are quite revealing because of the rather heavy reliance these anthropologists place on the isolated and often disaffected members of a community. The Casagrande volume depicts anthropologists' informants as very young, very old, very marginal, and very powerful, but rarely very "typical." This raises methodological issues as well as ethical ones.

In any case, we must be wary of any tendency to use whatever power and prestige the anthropologist might have to produce positive responses in informants. Clearly, it is possible to use our relative power to obtain data. One might even argue that "rapport-building skills" are in fact the most insidious deception.

We often give our research subjects assurances about anonymity, yet our capacity to protect the information is not absolute, although one might argue that it is reasonably assured. We do not have the legal right to claim that our information is privileged. Anthropologists' legal status is not unlike that of journalists, whose data and data sources can be subpoenaed. Yet the ethical standards of the discipline, and more recently the legal requirements of federally funded research, seem to suggest that absolute control is possible. These conditions cause us to work as if we had absolute control over access to our data. In applied research settings, control of the use of data may be in the hands of the sponsor rather than the researcher. We value our research and its products. It is possible to build substantial justification for the continuation of such research efforts. The question is, however, what costs must individual research subjects bear in order for the research to go on? The respondent's costs include loss of opportunity, loss of control of data, as well as any physical risks.

CONSENT

Perhaps the paramount issue in the ethical debate is the issue of consent. Our discipline should expect that its practitioners carry out their activities with the permission of research subjects. That is to say, the anthropologist must ask the question, "May I do this?" Further, the informant must know the circumstances in which the question is asked. It is only with adequate knowledge that the subject can give permission in a way that is ethically meaningful. Sufficient knowledge is a relative concept to be sure, but nevertheless, would include an understanding of the purposes of the research activity; the identity of the funding agency and its goals; the final disposition of the data; and the potential impact the data would have on the individual. Further, the informant must understand that his or her participation is voluntary. Such are the components of what is referred to as "informed consent."

Informed consent is the foundation of ethical research. Much impetus for formalizing ethical issues, such as informed consent, has come from the medical research area. This impetus is derived from the real and immediate risk of much medical research that uses human subjects. Further, many of the most abusive human-subject research projects have been carried out by medical researchers. The abuses of medical research and other disciplines have led to increasing public concern. Associated with this concern is an increased government involvement in the ethical dimension of large-scale federally funded research projects. Most individual research projects that are considered for federal funding must be evaluated in terms of key ethical issues such as informed consent.

In spite of this concern, there is still a significant amount of ambiguity concerning these issues. Let us present here a widely applied definition of informed consent. This definition of informed consent was provided by the Board of Regents of the State of New York in 1966. It provides clear guidelines for medical investigators, though it could also be used for anthropologists.

No consent is valid unless it is made by a person with legal and mental capacity to make it, and is based on a disclosure of all material facts. Any facts which might influence the giving and with-holding of consent is material. A patient has the right to know he is being asked to volunteer and to refuse to participate in an experiment for any mason, intelligent or otherwise, well-informed or prejudiced. A physician has no right to withhold from a prospective volunteer any fact which he knows may influence the decision. It is the volunteer's decision to make, and the physician may not take it away from him by the manner in which he asks the question or explains or fails to explain the circumstances. ( Langer 1966:664)

Though informed consent is rather easy to specify as a requirement, it is sometimes very difficult to achieve. Part of our task in establishing the conditions of informed consent is to convey the implications of our research when we may not fully understand these implications. The type of research populations we, as anthropologists, deal with tend not to be in the position to recognize adequately the implications of our research. As Jorgensen notes,

Because our research is usually conducted among illiterate or semiliterate [people] who have scant knowledge of the uses to which data can be put, we are doubly obligated to spell out our intentions and not to exploit their naivete. The extent to which we must explain our intentions will vary with the problems we address and the knowledge possessed by the host population. Our host populations, in particular, will vary greatly in their understandings of the implications of the ways in which research conducted among them could damage their own interests. I am not suggesting that it will be easy to apprise them of everything they ought to know, nor to make them immediately understand all they ought to know. The anthropologist himself is often naive about the implications of his own research. ( Jorgensen 1971:328)

The fact that anthropologists tend to use inductive research designs also causes a certain amount of difficulty in legitimately achieving the goal of informed consent. Anthropologists create strictly deductive research designs infrequently. With such designs, the ultimate range and breadth of a research project can be more easily determined. In the field, topics grow and change.

A question is raised by these changes: how and under what circumstances does consent have to be obtained again? Does consent to carry out one aspect of the research imply that consent is given for other aspects of the study? Oftentimes, the researcher begins his or her project with uncontroversial topics, and then slowly changes focus to the more controversial ones, for the very reason that if the latter topics had been broached during the initial stages of the research project, the anthropologist would have been run off. This represents a difficult problem. There are those that suggest that "consent should be requested for the research ends that are anticipated" ( Jorgensen, 1971:328). This may be difficult in certain social contexts. The goal of informed consent implies that the research activities are carried out without deceit and misrepresentation. Jorgensen writes:

I accept the premise that anthropologists, by the very nature of their dedication to free and open inquiry and the pursuit of truth, cannot condone deceit in research. If the anthropologist seeks truth, exposes falsehood, feels an ethical obligation to others of his profession not to compromise them or make their own legitimate research suspect, and feels he has a right and a duty to honor the obligations he has made to his informants in requesting their help in giving him information about which they are protective, he cannot assume a masquerade at all. ( 1971:329)

UTILITY

As suggested above, anthropologists' research means that certain costs will accrue to the research subject and thereby to the subject community. In most cases it would seem that the loss of time to the informant is inconsequential. Most humans have sufficient leisure to allow some interaction with a social scientist. Further, it seems in most cases the research efforts of anthropologists will tend not to harm informants if the data is properly protected. Yet there are cases where the work of the anthropologist has caused harm.

The most important idea here is that information can be used to control people, that is, knowledge is power. That phrase has become meaningless because we rarely take time to examine the mechanism by which knowledge is used to control people. Just how anthropological data plays into the hands of an exploitative, multinational corporation, an oppressive, totalitarian organization, or a secret intelligence agency is not clear. It is difficult to find out, given that it is not even clear how more '"righteous" organizations make use of such data. The implications of the potential for harm, however, are so serious that we must develop our position in terms of thepotential for harm rather than the real probabilities. When we do this, we are confronted with a number of serious problems.

In most cases in pure anthropological research, the costs of research accrue to the researched, whereas most of the benefits accrue to the researcher. At least it seems improbable that given the normal research process in anthropology, research subjects will receive any significant benefit from the enterprise. These communities are rarely equipped to use such data; the topics selected by the researcher are often irrelevant to the information needs of the community, and the researcher rarely provides information to the community.

This kind of research might be construed as the ultimate kind of anthropological self-indulgence, if it were not so common. The Dutch applied anthropologist Gerrit Huizer refers to this self-indulgent anthropology as hobbyism ( 1975:64). He notes:

It seems as if the most immediate purpose of the research is the satisfaction of a rather arbitrary curiosity (or urge for knowledge) of the social researcher. The satisfaction of this urge according to the rules of the game of scientific effort and the passing on of the knowledge gained to others determines the career and promotion of the research worker. (1975:64)

The remedy for this problem is the active and conscientious consideration of the interests of the research population in the research design process. Huizer notes, however.

That the research could possibly serve the interests of the people investigated or even remedy their distress, hardly occurs to most social scientists. Such a thing might occur by chance, but generally the interference with the realities under investigation is seen as disturbing or dangerous for the scientific quality of the research. ( 1975:65)

Huizer advocates a close identification between anthropologist and research subjects so that the interests of the subject population may be protected.

The best treatment for this problem is the direct negotiation of the content and goals of the research design between researcher and community. The negotiation may result in modifications of the research procedure so that objectionable procedures may be removed. But, more importantly, the project can be modified to help meet the information needs of the subject community. It may simply be required that the research design remain unchanged but that reporting requirements be changed so as to improve the community's access to the research results. Other alternatives might mean "piggybacking" community research needs on the researchers' topic, selecting a community-defined topic as the primary focus of the project, or providing another kind of service in lieu of research.

The point is that the utility of a project to the community is a relevant ethical dimension that can be addressed. In applied research these issues may be simplified in the sense that the research design and goals are determined by, or through, negotiation with the client community. The question remains, however, who is the client community and who are its representatives? Oftentimes applied anthropologists must work on research problems for clients who, although they serve a community, are not truly representative of the community. Ethical issues must be dealt with most carefully in this situation. The anthropologists must consider the impact of their behavior when they are acting as agents of service organizations, development agencies, or political action groups. In cases where the client group is part of the community, the extent of representativeness must also be considered. It is not always clear to what extent subgroups, such as the "leadership" elite, are representative of the total community.

COMMUNICATION

There is a great deal of tension in anthropology concerning the ethics of publication. This multidinwnsional problem is particularly relevant to the ethical concerns of the applied anthropologist. As applied anthropologists, we are faced with complying with diverse standards of information dissemination. As scientists, we are obliged to communicate results so that others may share in our contribution to knowledge. The research process is thought to end only with effective communication of research results. The assumption is that there is "an immortal open record of research results where all scientists are able to present their results for the benefit and scrutiny of their scientific peers" ( Price 1964:655).

Though it seems that applied anthropologists tend not to emphasize the publication of their applied results, like most scientists they are motivated to get things on the record for a wide variety of rather intense motivations. These motivations include the lure of immortality in print, the publish-or-perish tenure struggle for those who are employed in academic jobs, and the need for non-academically employed anthropologists to establish some academic credentials so as to maintain the possibility for academic employment, if they so choose. Publication by practicing anthropologists can serve to increase personal influence in the domain of application.

The potential applied anthropology author faces a number of problems. First, few journals are actually geared up to publish materials that have applied relevance. Applied research results sometimes have limited appeal for the general social science audience. Oftentimes the components of an applied project that see the light of publication are not the parts that were significant in accomplishing the goals of the project. What often gets published are those components that have an academic cast to them. There is not even a consistent tendency to document or archive materials produced in the course of applied anthropologists' activities. These deficiences of information exchange seem to limit the cumulative improvement of applied anthropology.

This is by no means the most crucial issue applied anthropologists face in the realm of publication and the communication of information. The primary issue is the extent to which the applied anthropologist can make information public. Our employers often have some control over the disposition of the research results. As Price notes, the problem also occurs in the realm of physical science:

Historically, there has been a very interesting contrast between the literature ethics of basic science and those of technology. In basic science, the motivation is always for the most complete publication that will ensure the payoff, of recognition of the contribution of the individual scientist and his reward by eponymic fame, Nobel prizes or similar honors or at least by appreciation. In technological research and development, with profit or military ascendancy substituted so largely for honor, the effort is toward publication only as an epiphenomenon, not as an end product. ( Price 1964:655)

All researchers are enjoined ethically to control the release of collected data. For example, it is absolutely necessary to maintain the anonymity of our research subjects. No matter what our relationship is with a client, we must maintain the privacy of the informant. Our job is not to collect data about individuals for other individuals. But even if we are capable of maintaining the anonymity of informants, serious ethical problems remain. The most difficult kinds of ethical problems are caused by research in which the anthropologist, in a clandestine manner, researches a community on behalf of another group or agency. The researcher may mask his researcher role, his real questions, or any working relationships that he might have with a third party.

SOME RECENT PROBLEM CASES

Although there have been sad occurrences of unethical behavior by anthropologists throughout the history of the discipline, the most questionable activities have occurred in the recent period. The two most frequently cited are the so-called Project Camelot initiated in Latin America, and the various sponsored research activities carried out in Northern Thailand.

Project Camelot. Project Camelot was initiated in 1964 under the sponsorship of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the United States Army ( Horowitz 1967:4). It was the largest grant for social science research up until that time. A citation from the prospectus of the project mailed to a number of well-known scientists provides an excellent summary of the project's intent.

Project Camelot is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are: first, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence, those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things ( Horowitz 1967:4-5)

The project was ultimately to encompass studies in a large number of countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe. Initially, the activities were to start in Chile.

The response to Camelot was substantial in the involved disciplines, the countries of study, and in the American political arena. In spite of the stir it caused in anthropology, there was only one anthropologist involved, and he served a short-term consultant. The project died a quick death and resulted in substantial interpretive literature ( Horowitz 1967; Sjoberg 1967). It is difficult to identify the most important criticism in this literature, and there is some criticism of its objectivity ( Beals 1969).

Many persons objected to the use of social science to maintain the social order in countries where there are such clearly identifiable oppressed classes. Although couched in social science jargon, the project was perceived as having a conservative bias. For example, "The use of hygienic language disguises the antirevolutionary assumptions under a cloud of powder puff declarations" ( Sjoberg 1967:48). The most strenuous objections concerned participating in research that had such strong political implications. The basic question became, should social scientists be involved in research that would facilitate interference in the affairs of other nations?

Belshaw notes: "Within the American Anthropological Association, the reaction was immediate and sharp. Resolutions were passed condemning 'clandestine' research and research dealing with 'counterinsurgency'" ( Belshaw 1976:261). More important, the reaction included a major study of the problem of ethics, which formed the basis for Ralph L. Beals's study entitledPolitics of Social Research ( 1969). These efforts led to the creation of the American Anthropological Association's Committee on Ethics, which reviews cases of alleged unethical behavior brought before it.

Thailand Project. A project that had more severe implications in anthropology was the so-called Thailand Project. The exposure of this project caused a great controversy among anthropologists worldwide.

Northern Thailand is occupied by various hill tribes. These people have little political or economic leverage in the national affairs of Thailand. They have been depicted as the minority suppressed by the politically dominant lowland majority. These groups were relatively isolated, although connected to the outside world through the opium trade. Opium poppies were the ma or cash crop. Pressure from the international community of nations on the Thai government to control the opium traffic increased.

Government officials came to realize that policy makers had little information with which to develop a plan for dealing with the northern people ( Belshaw 1976:264). The significance of the region increased dramatically as the Vietnam War expanded. These factors encouraged a prodigious increase in the amount of research carried out. In the early 1960s, Western social scientists "flooded" the area ( Jones 1971:347), and the Hill Tribes Research Centre was established ( Belshaw 1976:265). The relationship that existed between the hill people and the flat landers was unequal. The low landers "tend to look down on the hill people, call them by derogatory names, etc." ( Jones 1971:347). These high groups were viewed as good candidates for subversive activities and had not demonstrated loyalty to the Thai government.

Jones raises the most basic question:

Did the anthropologists who rushed into the area to do basic descriptive studies consider these political facts? It is safe to say that most of us did not. Was it an accident that the strategic and political concerns about the hill areas and the questionable loyalty of the hill people to Thailand coincided with the growing anthropological concern about the lack of knowledge of the area? Was it also an accident that, about that same time, a considerable amount of money became available for basic research on this "little known area?" The situation which developed led to a decade of concentrated research on hill people to the almost total neglect of valley culture and society. ( 1971:348)

As the apparent strategic significance of the region increased, the amount of research fund sources increased. Scholars could make use of funds from agencies of the American government such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. Research carried out on the basis of "cleaner" money, for the most part, ended up in the hands of ARPA anyway.

ARPA's goals were clearly directed at counterinsurgency ( Jones 1971:348). They were interested in maintaining the status quo, and saw the utility of basic descriptive cultural data. To these ends they supported the data collection process.

ARPA wanted basic information on culture and society in Thailand, and was willing to pay to have the research done. Since most of us who have conducted basic research in Thailand have in fact contributed to that end, we might as well have taken ARPA's money. The question of ethics and responsibility may have little to do with the source of funding and much more with the social and political context within which the data are produced. ( Jones 1971:348)

The presence of anthropologists in Thailand was brought under attack in 1970 by the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam for doing what they referred to as "counterinsurgency research." This too resulted in a major crisis in the discipline, which seems to have intensified interest in various ethical concerns. It is clear that the conflicts generated during the Vietnam era concerning ethics contributed a great deal to the understanding of our responsibilities. The process that these discussions developed was very painful and disturbing. In retrospect, many respected scholars were unfairly accused, yet the increase in understanding may have been worth it.

GUIDES TO ETHICAL PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

For our purposes the most useful statements on ethical practice for application are the statements of the Society for Applied Anthropology and the National Association for the Practice of Anthropology. These statements were written with reference to the work circumstances of the applied or practicing anthropologist.

The statement of the Society for Applied Anthropology is quoted below. This statement is intended as a guide. Approved in 1983, the statement applies to the membership of the society, although it can serve as a guide to others ( Committee on Ethics, Society for Applied Anthropology 1983).

Statement on Professional and Ethical Responsibilities, Society for Applied Anthropology. This statement it a guide to professional behavior for the members of the Society for Applied Anthropology. As members or fellows of the Society we shall act in ways that are consistent with the responsibilities stated below irrespective of the specific circumstances of our employment.

This statement is the fourth version of the society's ethics statement. It was modified in response to concern about the increase in the number of anthropologists employed in applied roles outside of universities. Ibis statement is not associated with a system of certification or licensing. Because of this, the society's Ethics Committee is not equipped with sanctions against unethical behavior.

The first paragraph states the basic components of ethical research practice-voluntary participation, informed consent, and confidentiality. This is supplemented with a reference to risk:

ARPA wanted basic information on culture and society in Thailand, and was willing to pay to have the research done. Since most of us who have conducted basic research in Thailand have in fact contributed to that end, we might as well have taken ARPA's money. The question of ethics and responsibility may have little to do with the source of funding and much more with the social and political context within which the data are produced. ( Jones 1971:348)

The presence of anthropologists in Thailand was brought under attack in 1970 by the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam for doing what they referred to as "counterinsurgency research." This too resulted in a major crisis in the discipline, which seems to have intensified interest in various ethical concerns. It is clear that the conflicts generated during the Vietnam era concerning ethics contributed a great deal to the understanding of our responsibilities. The process that these discussions developed was very painful and disturbing. In retrospect, many respected scholars were unfairly accused, yet the increase in understanding may have been worth it.

1.) To the people we study we owe disclosure of our research goals, methods, and sponsorship. The participation of people in our research activities shall only be on a voluntary and informed basis. We shall provide a means throughout our research activities and in subsequent publications to maintain the confidentiality of those we study. The people we study must be made aware of the likely limits of confidentiality and must not be promised a greater degree of confidentiality than can be realistically expected under current legal circumstances in our respective nations. We shall, within the limits of our knowledge, disclose any significant risk to those we study that may result from our activities.

One point must be emphasized: disclosure of sponsorship is especially important in research that has a practical effect. Individuals who are asked to give consent must be made aware of sponsorship so that they can better calculate their own interest in reference to the goals of the sponsoring organization.

The paragraph contains reference to the fact that in the United States the promise of confidentiality from a researcher will not protect against a legal subpoena. Researchers are not legally protected as are physicians. We are more like journalists in this regard. Risk is primarily viewed in terms of the physical or psychological risk associated with a research procedure as applied on an individual basis. The risks that are generated by social science research tend to be psychological, political, and economic. These risks should be disclosed.

The statement's second paragraph is clearly keyed to social survival:

2.) To the communities ultimately affected by our actions we owe respect for their dignity, integrity, and worth. We recognize that human survival is contingent upon the continued existence of a diversity of human communities, and guide our professional activities accordingly. We will avoid taking or recommending action on behalf of a sponsor which is harmful to the interests of a community.

The view taken here is that cultural diversity is adaptive and the destruction of it reduces the species' potential to survive. Thus, the scheme is not based upon a relativistic conception of what is right or fair, but on a fundamental view of what behaviors relate to and support survival of the species. The last reference to community interests is particularly important to the action-taking anthropologist. The statement means that in a basic sense, even though employed by an organization, a basic overriding responsibility toward communities exists.

The third paragraph addresses the area that produces the most difficulty in ethics--relationships with colleagues:

3.) To our social science colleagues we have the responsibility to not engage in actions that impede their reasonable professional activities. Among other things this means that, while respecting the needs, responsibilities, and legitimate proprietary interests of our sponsors we should not impede the flow of information about research outcomes and professional practice techniques. We shall accurately report the contributions of colleagues to our work. We shall not condone falsification or distortion by others. We should not prejudice communities or agencies against a colleague for reasons of personal gain.

While the entire research community benefits from the free flow of information, sponsoring organizations may have legitimate needs that may result in restrictions on the flow of information. We should not engage in unfair competition with a colleague.

People who train applied anthropologists have the obligation to remain up-todate in their skills:

4.) To our students, interns, or trainees we owe nondiscriminatory access to our training services. We shall provide training which is informed, accurate, and relevant to the needs of the larger society. We recognize the need for continuing education so as to maintain our skill and knowledge at a high level. Our training should inform students as to their ethical responsibilities. Student contributions to our professional activities, including both research and publication, should be adequately recognized.

Further, persons offering training in applied anthropology need to consider continually the needs of society in terms of the training that they offer.

The fifth paragraph points to one of the important uses of ethics statements, the protection of the employee from requests for unethical practice:

5.) To our employers and other sponsors we owe accurate reporting of our qualifications and competent, efficient, and timely performance of the work we undertake for them. We shall establish a clear understanding with each employer or other sponsor as to the nature of our professional responsibilities. We shall report our research and other activities accurately. We have the obligation to attempt to prevent distortion or suppression of research results or policy recommendations by concerned agencies.

The best protection is up-front discussion of the constraints. This may serve a means for supporting the applied anthropologist in cases where the agency that employs him or her is suppressing or distorting research results.

The ethics statement concludes:

6.) To society as a whole we owe the benefit of our special knowledge and skills in interpreting sociocultural systems. We should communicate our understanding of human life to the society at large.

Restated in simple terms, we need to communicate to the public anthropological knowledge that will be useful to them and provide positive influences on their lives.

SUMMARY

The ethical concerns of applied anthropologists are complicated by the fact that their work is intended to have a practical effect. Ethics for action are closely related to ethics for research, because our action and policy products are rooted in research. The foundation of ethical research practice can be conveyed in a few words: confidentiality, voluntary consent, and risk disclosure. Action and policy must, for ethical reasons, be initiated in reference to community interests as well as the interests of sponsoring agencies. At this point applied anthropologists must be self-policing from the standpoint of ethics, because the discipline does not have a mechanism for certification of individuals or accreditation of training programs.

Ethics need not be considered as a constraint, but as a guide to effective practice. That is, through ethical practice more effective action and policies can be developed. Why is this so? The primary reason is that relationships between researchers and those researched are made more regular and predictable. Further, the long-term potential of these relationships is enhanced. Thus, we all have a stake in ethical practice. It is important that each applied anthropologist share in the responsibility.

FURTHER READING

Beals Ralph L. 1969.Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry into the Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists . Chicago: Aldine Publishing.

This thorough and objective discussion of ethical issues, especially as they relate to government contract research, was based on Beals's work for the American Anthropological Association.

Rynkiewich Michael A., and James P. Spradley. 1976.Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork . New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Collection of real cases that would be useful for class discussion.


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