Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Social Sciences and Religion:

What Relationship?

By: Mustapha Achoui

International conference organized by:

The association of Muslim Social Scientists

Vergenia (USA) 25-27 October, 1996

Table of Contents

Introduction: 3

The nature of the relationship between the social sciences and philosophy. 5

1) Philosophy's status within the Islamic civilisation framework. 5

The classification of knowledge in Islamic thought. 8

The relationship between social sciences and religious sciences. 12

Introduction:

When we mention psychology today, the first thing that comes to the mind of a great deal of Muslims, particularly those who are not specialized in the field, is 'Freud'; from then on a succession of ideas leads to the fact that this 'Freud' was born a Jew, and is furthermore, an atheist who wrote books against religion. As for sociology, when it is mentioned, it is instantly associated with Durkheim and Marx, and the fact that they were also Jewish, atheist, and against religion, is also recollected.

This kind of relationship between certain branches of the social sciences and religion, which is so palpably engraved in the minds of our intellectuals and Muslim thinkers, explains the reason why some of these thinkers, and some of the Muslim scholars ( ulema ) have taken a negative stand, if not an opposing one, vis-a-vis the social sciences; especially towards psychology and sociology. Undeniably, quite a number of psychologists and sociologists are in fact atheists, and have indeed made religion the object of their criticism, disrespect, and have assigned themselves the task of refuting all that appertains to religion, whether it be institutions or thought. Whereas some have extended their negative position towards religion, and have disputed its origin, function and the role it plays in society altogether. We will exhibit some of these views in the forthcoming pages

However much this may be true, we should not brand all psychologists, sociologists and social scientists as being atheistic, irreligious and determined to fight religion; neither should this state of affairs, in my opinion, allow us to not  distinguish between the social sciences on the one hand, with the subject matters and methodologies pertaining to them; and the thinkers on the other hand, as people with their own tendencies, beliefs, ideologies, and even desires and caprices. So, the aim of this study is confined to the nature of the relationship between the social sciences and religion, within the framework of Islamic thought, and also in Western thought. It takes into account the intellectual changes that have taken place in the West and in the Muslim world throughout the course of history, especially in those aspects related to the progress of the sciences, and their subsequent attempts at separating themselves from philosophy and religion. It also looks at the intellectual changes that began in the nineteenth century and reached their peak in the twentieth. During this process we will look closely at the high status enjoyed by the social sciences, and the role they have played in society, especially in the West.

To delineate the core of this relationship (i.e.. between the social sciences and religion) I envisage the following questions to be relevant to our topic:

1) What relationship is there between the social sciences and philosophy in the context of Islamic civilization?

2) What relationship is there between the social sciences and the Islamic  sciences?

3) What type of relationships do the social sciences and religion enjoy in the context of Western thought?

4) What relationship is there between the social sciences and values in general?

5) What is the future of the relationship between the social sciences and religion overall?

I would like to quickly draw your attention to the fact that the answers to these questions require long discussions and exhaustive research. My aim is only to raise these issues to be debated amongst the specialists, in the hope that Muslim scholars specializing in the field of social sciences would, on the one hand, provide us with ways to get out of the Lizard's hole; and on the other would keep us from erring into nonsensical myth, delusion and obscure Sufi 'theopathetic locutions' and babble talk; all of which do not provide Muslims with the framework with which to surmount long centuries of underdevelopment.

This brief study is, actually, an introduction to auto-criticism of academic theses that are brought forward today by Muslim scholars and specialists in social sciences. This criticism is not aiming to underestimate these efforts, nor is it aiming to refute them. On the contrary, these steps are taken in an endeavor to try to urge those endowed with enthusiasm to increase their efforts towards producing more scientific and practical alternatives, to enable us to diagnose our shortcomings. Also for them to suggest ways of advancement to us, rather than us being led  up the garden path and being presented with empty slogans, which only cause us to stray further away from our final aspirations and goals. Aspirations and goals can be shown to be within arm's reach, when in fact what is really being shown is a mirage, and only a mirage.

Before undertaking this task, I should emphasize that what is meant by religion in this study is Islam, whenever we are discussing religion in the context of Islamic thought; whereas in the context of Western thought, it refers then to any belief system. Furthermore, the approach of this study is not based upon unilateral visions and opinions, neither is the bilateral approach applicable. What we have here is, in fact, an attempt to examine the social sciences and their relationship with religion, from various angles, through discussing views in relation to Islamic thought and Western thought, using relevant examples.

The nature of the relationship between the social sciences and philosophy.

What is agreed between men of science, scholars and philosophers alike, is that philosophy was the 'mother of science'. However, this belief which prevails in Western culture does not have a place in an Islamic setting. Thus, philosophy has never been regarded as the 'mother of science' in the field of Islam. Here it is the judicio-religious sciences based on the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet (thesunnah), which are the supreme sciences, and the basis of all the sciences.

Greek philosophy passed through many phases during the course of history, i.e.. during the pre-Christian period, the post-Christian period, the Islamic period, and finally its recent development during the contemporary Western period. We will confine our attention to the latter two phases. In the following paragraphs a brief account of the position of philosophy and its relationship with the other sciences during these two phases is given.

1) Philosophy's status within the Islamic civilisation framework.

Philosophy or wisdom (hikmah) had not gained much importance in the history of the Arabs prior to Islam. As a matter of fact, philosophy did not occupy any scientific seat during the first chapter of Islamic history, which covered the Prophetic period and the Caliphates of the rightly guided Caliphs. This was simply because the Holy Qur'an and the honorablesunnah, as origins of faith and jurisprudence, amply sufficed the early Muslims to answer their questions related to the universe, its Creator, life and death, the creation of man, and his nature and his mission. However the rapidly spreading conquests, and extensions of the boundaries of the Caliphate resulted in the Arab Muslims coming in contact with a number of different cultures and philosophies, such as the Greek, Persian, Indian, and Judeo-Christian philosophies and  other religions and philosophical sects. It is against this background that the science of scholastic theology (kalam) emerged during the Abbasid period. Indeed, the Mutazilites came into existence in response to the deviated streams and false trends that appeared as the Muslims came in contact with the Magians of Persia and the Hindus. In order to defend the Islamic beliefs (aqida) the Mutazilites resorted to Greek philosophy, which was at the time gradually being translated into Arabic (Kasim, 1969). Whilst there is no need to dwell upon the various schools ofkalam here, it is perhaps worth noting that their intellectual exertions and struggles ended with the loss of the Mutazilites to the Asharites, the victory of the  'People of thesunnah' (Ahli al-sunnah), and the Jabarite (determinist) trend succeeding over the supporters of the rationalist school and the school of free arbitration (Kasim, 1969. Bintu Shati, 1983). This win has been one of the biggest causes of the underdevelopment amongst the Muslims during the last few centuries.

The nature of the struggle between the various schools was such that theulema , being so absorbed in the issue ofaqida , did not show enough interest in the psychological, sociological, economic and political problems of the Muslim society. Instead, more often than not, their intellectual exertions served as a disguise for a struggle for power and a concealment of real social and economic issues. Kasim (1969)  pointed to this fact when he said: "The Ummayad sided with the Jabarites because their protagonist views suited, and endorsed the ruling class against their opponents, explaining that the transition of the Caliphate to them was only by  God's Destiny." (p.7)

Coincidentally, these were the same tactics followed by the French colonialists in Algeria, as they too mobilized the Sheikhs of some Sufi orders to spread theJabarite (determinism) trend among the population, to make them believe that the French colonization was a predestined that could not be revoked, afait accompli! Imam Abdul-Hamid ben Badis fought with great courage and decisiveness against the defeatist attitude which was predominant as a result of that campaign.

The position of philosophy in comparison to the other sciences remained weak in the context of Islamic thought, until the time ofMaimonides who founded a library,Dar-al Hikmah , for the translation of the Greek philosophical heritage, which, as it is known, was an ensemble of philosophy, medicine and mathematics. There is no doubt that the logic of Aristotle and his views on the soul, the physical world and metaphysics, ran through the works of many Muslim philosophers, doctors and mathematicians. However, despite the indisputable impact of Aristotle, Plato and other Greek philosophers, we find that a number of Muslim philosophers found the courage to be critical of these great masters, and, being inspired by the Qur'an, thesunnah, and also by the civilization progress, they added to their works concepts that could never have occurred to the Greeks. Admittedly, it was the topics related to metaphysics and the unseen that the Muslims were most fervent about; but the topic of the soul (al nafs ) gradually gained momentum among the philosophers and doctors, some of whom had different concepts of the soul from Aristotle's. Thus, Al-Kindi, in opposition to Aristotle, asserted that  the soul is an entity separate from the body  (Kasim, p.15). Similarly, Al-Farabi whose opinion on the soul combines both the views of Aristotle and Plato, as, in his eyes, the human being is made up of two entities: the body and the soul. Al-Farabi however did not agree with Plato's position regarding the transmigration of the souls (ibid, p.16). Yet, despite these additions made by the Muslim philosophers particularly by Razi and Ibn Al-Qiyam on the concepts of the soul and the spirit, their addendum were not considered as topics that stood apart from philosophy. The same happened to Muslim scholars who wrote about ethics, for example Ibn-Miskawayah's in hisTahdib Al - Akhlaq wa Tatyib Al - A'raq, and Ibn-Hazm in hisMudawatu - nufus , although the influence on these subjects derived more from the Qur'an and thesunnah, than from Greek philosophy.

What I am trying to convey through this brief account of the status of philosophy in the domain of Islamic thought, which started with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, and ended with Al-Ghazzali, Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd, is the emphasis that was placed on science during this period of Islamic civilization, which demarcated their place from those established during the reign of Greek philosophy. At this time there were also developments in the fields of mathematics, logic, natural sciences, and theology by Muslim philosophers using as their main sources the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions (Hadith). In addition to the gains made from Greek and other philosophies, there appeared new disciplines in the sciences of the Qur'an  and Hadith, and other disciplines that developed from them, for example, the study of the Arabic language and literature. While some philosophers like Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina were trying to reconcile the views of Aristotle with the Islamicaqida , others such as Al-Ghazzali accused this group of heresy and disbelief. After refuting the science ofkalam and philosophy, he concluded that the Sufi path was the way to attain 'true knowledge' (Kasim, 1969); whereas Ibn Rushd endeavored to reconcile philosophy with religious law (shari'a ).

Whilstulema like Ibn Taymiyyah, who concentrated on jurisprudence, refuted Greek logic, he said: "I always knew that Greek logic is not needed by an intelligent person and not beneficial to a stupid one." (p.29)

Ibn Taymiyyah criticized the Greek philosophers by showing the corruption of their ideas in metaphysics and logic, due to the corruption of their principles, and their restricting the means to achieve knowledge to definitions and 'syllogistic demonstrations'. He goes even further and refutes their arguments about 'the definitions' with which 'concepts' are known and also the various forms of 'syllogisms' and their components 'the invariables'. Ibn Taymiyyah also criticized the use of Greek logic by Al-Ghazzali in such works asAl-Mustasfa andMi'yar Al-ilm andMihaku Nadhar . Briefly, Ibn Taymiyyah's refutation of Greek logic is specifically a refutation of Greek "formal logic", due to its sterility, a view that has just recently been agreed to by Western scholars, too.

When we look at Ibn Khaldun's work, we see that he reserved a whole chapter of hisAl-Muqadima to "the refutation of philosophy and the corruption of its source." He highlighted the predicament in which Aristotle, his disciple Plato and the Muslim philosophers who followed them, fell into, especially those Muslim philosophers who shaped their metaphysics obsequiously on Aristotle (excepting Al-Farabi and Ibn  Sina).  Ibn Khaldun dismissed the philosophers' contention glorifying reason and rational thinking, summing up his views he said that "Philosophy does not correspond with its aims, furthermore, it contradicts Divine law."

Despite his harsh criticism, he does remain objective, and fair towards philosophy by stating the positive aspects of this science such as:

- Nurturing mind,

- Training in organizing one's argumentation,

- Training in arriving to the point of an intellectual discussion, by means of arguments and proofs (critical thinking).

 In his final point, however, he advises the students of philosophy to resort to the status of  "religious" law, and to adhere to Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir ) and jurisprudence (fiqh ). If such was the position of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun vis-a-vis philosophy and Greek logic, what place then did they, and other Muslim thinkers reserve for sciences in their classifications of knowledge?

The classification of knowledge in Islamic thought.

After Ibn Khaldun insisted that sciences prosper when urbanization and civilization develop, he produced a classification of knowledge organizing the sciences of his time. According to his classification, sciences form into two groups: one is natural, human beings attain it through intellectual acquisition; the other is traditional, they inherit it from revealed sources. The first one refers to philosophical sciences and the second one refers to natural sciences transmitted through revealed knowledge information. Following this overview, he delved into the details of these sciences and organized them as follows:

1)Traditional religious sciences, which are divided into: exegesis, Qur'anic recitation, science of the Hadith, science of the foundation of the law (usul al fiqh) and he adds to them mysticism (tasawwuf) and dream interpretation.

2)Kalam , which explains religious beliefs and defends them by means of rational arguments.

3)Linguistics , the study of language, grammar, rhetoric, and literature.

4)Rational sciences , which he classified as those sciences, known (during his time) under the name of the 'philosophical sciences', into four groups: logic, physics (to which is attached medicine and agriculture), metaphysics, and mathematics (to which is attached arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). To these groups Ibn Khaldun added the science of magic and talismans, and the science of chemistry. After he identified all of these sciences and exposed their benefits and their harms, only then did he reserve a chapter to "The refutation of philosophy and the corruption of its origin" as mentioned above.

What we observe regarding this classification is as follows:

1) Ibn Khaldun classified the various sciences of his time into two distinct groups by virtue of the source (revealed and rational), by virtue of the topic (law,aqida , language, logic, physics, astronomy, geometry, music, agriculture etc.) and finally by virtue of their methodology (based on revealed knowledge or reflection).

2) Despite Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the "revealed sciences" and the "rational sciences", it is worth noting that he does not, however, separate the natural sciences from philosophy andhikmah .

3) Ibn Khaldun invented a new science, with its own subject matter and

method (sociology), but he did not mention it in his classification.

There are, however, a great many Muslim thinkers who, in producing their classifications of knowledge, have shown that the majority of non-religious sciences and linguistics are intimately attached to philosophy. When speaking of the classification of knowledge in the field of Islamic thought, Al Najjar (1987) commented that the final purpose of science was "to be a servant of religious truth, which is the ultimate objective for the emergence of sciences and their progress." This seemingly elegant expression leaves us, in actual fact, with a number of unanswered problems that Al Najjar did not attend to.

1) He did not explain the concept of 'religious truth' in his paper.

2) He asserted that this 'truth' "is the ultimate objective for the emergence of sciences and their progress." Which sciences are referred to here? and have all sciences really progressed to the level of this ultimate truth "the service of religious truth"?

After describing the classification of knowledge of numerous Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Nadim, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Khaldun and Ahmed ibn Mustapha; Al Najjar raises questions and levels a criticism at these classifications and claims that in the main they were based on  descriptions of science as they "were in reality", and not as "they really ought to be."

The crux of the problem here is Al Najjar's desire for pure rationality which revolves around 'how things ought to be'. This is an instance of philosophical and ethical reasoning, being to the detriment of attempts to come to terms with reality, and trying to change it or reform it in the light of "how things really are". In fact, this escapism from reality and its portrayal in the above terms, as well as escapism  from the study of  causal and correlational relationships among the different phenomena, amounts, although indirectly, to a refutation of the inductive experimental method which is founded upon investigation. The renunciation of the experimental method, dwelling upon Greek logic or on Sufi thought, limiting ourselves to interpretation of the sacred texts (i.e.. the Qur'an and thesunnah ) are factors which have led to the underdevelopment of the Muslim nations,  and is still draining their mental energies.

These energies and efforts that often start with good intentions, end up generating ethical and idealistic concepts that are far from the reality of the Muslim society at large. They are also far from providing us with practical means to escape this retrogressiveness, and tackle the issues through a grasp of the psychological and sociological aspects of the Muslims' condition as it is today.

Therefore, the majority of publications now tend to come under the heading of "the way things ought to be", thereby ignoring reality. However, it is impossible to alter behavioral and social phenomena to "the way things ought to be", if these phenomena are not comprehended "as they really are".

Perhaps, mentioning psychology as an example of a social science that endeavors to study and describe "reality as it is", as much as possible, may assist us in discerning the aims of philosophy and ethics from those of social sciences when analyzing behavioral phenomena.

Some of the aims of psychology as mentioned by Zimbardo (1980) are as follows:

1) To describe behavior, activities and experiments following gathering the data and information related to the area which is under study.

2) To interpret given behavior within either a cultural framework or model, or a particular theory.

3) To predict anticipated behavior based on prior information and data, and then to understand the possible relationships between them to enable conception of new relationships between certain variables.

4) To control behavior so that it becomes possible to monitor different variables and also to change some types of "deviated" or abnormal behaviors.

5) To ameliorate people's standard of living starting with an improvement in the various sectors including: the health, education and social sectors.

Thus, although psychology is a science that occupies itself with the study and reporting of behavior 'as it is', it should not be labeled as a science that cannot actually help in modifying behavior, and elevating it to the level of 'the way things ought to be'. Altering and improving behavior is precisely one of its aims and that is achieved by means of training, education, learning and at times, treatment.

At this conjuncture I would like to indicate that one of the aims of psychology from an Islamic viewpoint, may well be to fill the gap between that which is 'ideal' and that which is 'real', primarily at the conceptual level, and secondly at the behavioral level.

Before embarking on the topic of psychology in general, and psychology from an Islamic perspective in particular, I wish to make reference to the classification of the sciences by Ibn Khaldun and others. The topics which form the social sciences at present, were not, in the estimation of the earlyulema,   topics which were distinguished from philosophy, ethics, or religious sciences. On the contrary, we notice that  subjects relevant to the social sciences were scattered either under the category ofkalam, as in the case of the concepts of freedom and responsibility; or under the category of philosophy and ethics, as in the concept of the soul, its potentialities, its actions, and the scope of its knowledge; or in the case of  "illnesses of the heart", they were included under the headings of ethics ortasawwuf .

Although this may have been the general trend, we know that tentatively some topics began to enjoy increasing appeal to the point that they appeared as categories of their own. This included tax and financing in economy, and power, its delegation and execution in politics. Others dealt with various psychological and spiritual disturbances and their respective cures (spiritual healing), as well as topics covering the field of nature, education and sociology. This specialization and show of interest, and most importantly innovation in some cases, reflects (as Ibn Khaldun indicated) the spread of civilization in the Islamic cities, as well as an expressed need to arrive at practical solutions to the diverse problems faced in these cities, in the intellectual fields and other areas of life.          Despite there being no conflict to speak of between science and religion as such in Islamic civilization; we find that there were some major differences between someulema in the field offiqh and some philosophers, and that these were not rare. These conflicts however need to be viewed in the context of intellectual exchange. We have for instance, the discussion between Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mutazilites over the issue of the creation of the Qur'an, and the arguments that took place between Imam Al-Ghazzali and Ibn-Rushd which were compiled in the famousTahafut al-falasifa (The Refutation of the Philosophers) andTahafut-u-Tahafut  (The Refutation of the Refutation). Some scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah may have, indeed, accused scholars like Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina of disbelief, but this charge was not put forward during the philosopher's lifetime, nor did it lead to punishment.

What we hope to retain from these discussions is the manifestation of different subjects and methods of dealing with them from the examples of the Muslim scholars, as they studied the situations that were facing them; especially in the areas ofaqida , fiqh , logic and situations related to political power. In the field of physics, there was no fundamental conflict between Muslim thinkers, as they did not mix matters of faith with those that pertained to the physical sciences. In the domain of history, the innovation of Ibn Khaldun for instance, revolves primarily around his criticism of the methods followed by his predecessors. He presented their mistakes and mishaps objectively and eventually suggested a new subject and method for study, which he called the sciences of civilization (sociology).

Interestingly, scholars like Ibn Khaldun, innovators of new topics and disciplines, who extended their own ideas, as well as gaining expertise in the field of education and learning, did not call for a detachment or a separation between their area of specialization and the rest of the sciences, such as the religious sciences. In spite of the lack of a background to the claim for separation in the history of Islamic thought, the dismemberment of the various disciplines of knowledge is, however, being proposed today.

Is it really their detachment from other disciplines that has impeded the advancement of the social sciences in the Muslim world? Is there a definite need to detach the social sciences from the rest of the Islamic sciences? And what is the real difference between 'detachment' and the 'dismemberment' of the sciences?

To answer these questions, however, briefly, we need to address the following issue of the relationship between the topics of modern social sciences and those of religious sciences (aqida , law andfiqh ) in the Islamic setting.

PART III: Islamic BeliefsFrom The Shiites Point Of View

CHAPTER IV ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

The World Seen from the Point of View of Being andReality ; The Necessity of God

Consciousness and perception, which are intertwined with man's very being, make evident by their very nature the existence of God as well as the world. For, contrary to those who express doubt about their own existence and everything else and consider the world as illusion and fantasy, we know that a human being at the moment of his coming into existence, when he is already conscious and possesses perception, discovers himself and the world. That is to say, he has no doubt that "He exists and things other than he exist." As long as man is man this comprehension and knowledge exist in him and cannot be doubted, nor do they undergo any change.

The perception of this reality and existence which man affirms through his intelligence, in opposition to the views of the sophist and skeptic, is immutable and can never be proven false. That is to say, the claim of the sophist and the skeptic which negates reality can never be true, because of man's very existence. There is within the immense world of existence a permanent and abiding reality which pervades it and which reveals itself to the intelligence.

Yet each of the phenomena of this world which possesses the reality that we discover as conscious and perceiving human beings loses its reality sooner or later and becomes nonexistent. From this fact itself it is evident that the visible world and its parts are not the essence of reality (which can never be obliterated or destroyed). Rather, they rely upon a permanent Reality through which they gain reality and by means of which they enter into existence. As long as they are connected and attached to it they possess existence and as soon as they are cut off from it they become nonexistent. We call this Immutable Reality, which is imperishable (that is, the Necessary Being), God.

Another Point of View Concerning the RelationBetween Man and the Universe

The path chosen in the previous section to prove the existence of God is a very simple and evident one which man treads with his God-given nature and intelligence without any complication. Yet, for the majority of people, because of their continuous preoccupation with material things and their being drowned in the pleasures of the senses, it has become very difficult to return to their God-given, simple, primordial, and untainted nature. That is why Islam, which describes itself as universal, and which believes all people to be equal in religion, has made it possible for such people to find another way to prove the existence of God. It seeks to speak to them and to make God known to them by means of the very path through which they have turned away from their simple, primordial nature.

The Holy Quran instructs the multitude of men in the knowledge of God through different ways. Most of all, it draws their attention to the creation of the world and the order which reigns over it. It invites men to contemplate the "horizons" and "their own souls," for man in his few days of earthly life, no matter what path he chooses or what state he loses himself in, will never step outside the world of creation and the order which reigns over it. His intelligence and power of comprehension cannot overlook the marvelous scenes of heaven and earth which he observes.

This vast world of existence which stretches before our eyes is, as we know, in its parts and as a whole continuously in the process of change and transformation. At each moment it manifests itself in a new and unprecedented form. It becomes actualized under the influences of laws which know no exception. From the farthest galaxies to the smallest particles which form the parts of this world, each part of creation possesses an inward order and runs its course in a most amazing manner under laws which do not admit any exceptions. The world extends its domain of activity from the lowest to the most perfect state and reaches its own goal of perfection.

Above these particular orders stand more universal orders and finally the total cosmic order which brings together the countless parts of the universe and relates the more particular orders with each other, and which in its continuous course accepts no exceptions and permits no breaches.

The order of creation is such that if, for example, it places a man upon the earth, it constitutes him in such a way that he can live in harmony with his environment. It arranges the environment in such a way that it raises him like a loving nurse. The sun, the moon, the stars, water and earth, the night and the day, the seasons of the year, the clouds, wind and rain, the treasures beneath the earth and on its surface, in other words all the forces of nature, use their energy and resources in providing well-being and peace of mind for him. Such a relation and harmony can be discovered among all phenomena and also between man and his neighbors near and far, as well as within man's own habitat.

Such a continuity and harmony can also be observed within the internal structure of every phenomenon in the world. If creation has given man bread, it has also given him feet to seek it, hands to grasp it, a mouth to eat it, and teeth to chew it. It has related man through a series of means, which are connected with each other like the links of a chain, to the final goal envisaged for this creature, which is subsistence and perfection.

Many men of science have no doubt that the countless relations among things which they have discovered as a result of several thousand years of effort are but humble samples and a foretaste of the secrets of creation and their myriad ramifications. Each new discovery declares to man the existence of an endless number of unknown elements. Could anyone say that this vast world of existence, all of the parts of which either separately or in unity and interconnection bear witness to an infinite knowledge and power, need not have a creator and cold have come into being without reason and cause? Or could it be said of these particular and universal domains or order and equilibrium, and finally of this total cosmic order which through innumerable interrelations has made the world a single unit running its course according to laws which know no exceptions, that all this has occurred without plan and only through accident and chance? Or could anyone say that each of the phenomena and domains in the cosmos has chosen for itself, before coming into being? Or could anyone claim that this world, which is a single unit and which possesses complete unity, harmony and the interconnection of parts, could be the result of multiple and different commands issuing from different sources?

Obviously, an intelligent man, who relates every event and phenomenon to a cause, and who sometimes spends long periods in investigation and efforts to gain knowledge of a cause that is unknown to him, will never accept the possibility of a world existing without a Being as its cause. Such a person, who by observing a few bricks placed upon one another in an orderly manner considers them to be the effect of an agent possessing knowledge and power and who denies the possibility of chance and accident in the putting of the bricks together and therefore concludes that a plan and purpose must have existed beforehand, will not regard the cosmic order as being the result of an accident or the play of chance.

A deeper awareness of the order reigning in the world is enough to show that the world, along with the order reigning over it, is the creation of an omnipotent Creator who has brought it into being through His limitless knowledge and power and who directs it toward an end. All the partial causes which bring about individual events in the world ultimately end in Him. They are in every way under His dominance and are guided by His wisdom. Everything that exists is in need of Him, while He has need of nothing and does not depend on any causes or conditions.

God, the Exalted, says, "Lo!in the heavens and the earth are portents for believers. And in your creation, and all the beasts that He scattereth in the earth, are portents for a folk whose faith is sure. And the difference of night and day and the provision that Allah sendeth down from the sky and thereby quickeneth the earth after her death, and the ordering of the winds, are portents for a people who have sense. These are portents of Allah which we recite unto thee (Muhammad) with truth. Then in what fact, after Allah and His portents, will they believe?" (Quran, XLV, 3-6).

Every reality in this world which we can possibly imagine is a limited reality, that is, one whose actualization depends upon certain necessary causes and conditions. If these do not exist that reality cannot exist in the world. Every reality has a boundary beyond which it cannot extend its existence. Only God is such that He has no limit or boundary, for His reality is absolute and He exists in His Infinity no matter how we try to conceive of Him. His Being does not depend upon and is not in need of any causes or conditions. It is clear that in the case of something limitless we cannot conceive of multiplicity, for any supposedly second reality will be other than the first, as a result of which each would be limited and bound and would set a boundary to the reality of the other. For example, if we consider a limitless volume we cannot conceive another limitless volume alongside it. And if we do suppose another, it will be the same as the first. Therefore, God is one and has no partner.

We have already mentioned the Bedouin who approached Ali in the middle of the fighting during the Battle of the Camel and asked if he asserted that God was one. In answer Ali said, "To say that God is one has four meanings: Two of those meanings are false and two correct. As for the two incorrect meanings, one is that one should say 'God is one' and be thinking of number and counting. This meaning is false because that which has no second cannot enter into the category of number. Do you not see that those who said that God is the third of a trinity [i.e., the Christians] fell into infidelity? Another meaning is to say that so and so is one of this people, namely a species of this genus or a member of this species. This meaning is also not correct when applied to God, for it implies likening something to God and God is above all likeness.

"As for the two meanings which are correct when applied to God, one is that it should be said that God is one in the sense that there is no likeness unto Him among things. God possesses such uniqueness. And one is to say that God is one in the sense that there is no multiplicity or division conceivable in Him, neither outwardly nor in the mind nor in the imagination. God possesses such a unity." (Bihar al-anwar, vol. II, p. 65)

Ali has also said, "To know God is to know His Oneness." (Bihar al-anwar, vol. II, p. 186) This means that the Being of God is unlimited and infinite suffices to prove His Oneness, for to conceive a second for the Infinite is impossible. There is therefore no need of any other proofs, although thereexist many others.

The Divine Essence and Qualities

If we analyze the nature of a human being, we see that he has an essence which is his individual humanity and also qualities through which his essence is known, such as the quality of being born in such a land, or being the son of such a person, or being learned and capable, or tall and handsome; or he possesses the contrary of these qualities. Some of thesequalities, like the first and second, can never be separated from the essence, and others, like being learned or capable, have the possibility or separation and alternation. Yet all are different from the essence and at the same time different from each other.

This point, namely the difference between the essence and qualities and between the qualities themselves, is the best proof that an essence that has qualities, and a quality that makes known an essence, are both limited and finite. For if theessence were limitless and infinite it would encompass the qualities as well, and also the qualities would include each other, and as a result all would become one. For example, the essence of man would be the same as capability and also capability the same as knowledge; height and beauty would be the same; and all of these would possess the same meaning.

From this example it is clear that the Divine Essence cannot be conceived to have qualities in the sense that human beings have qualities. A quality can come about only through setting limits and the Divine Essence transcends all limitations (even the limitation of this transcendence which in reality is a quality).

The Meaning of the Divine Qualities

In the world of creation we are aware ofmany perfections which appear in the form of qualities. These are positive qualities which, wherever they appear, make the object of which they are the quality more perfect and increase its ontological value, as can be seen clearly in the comparison between the live being such as man and a lifeless one such as a stone. Doubtless God has created and bestowed these perfections upon creatures; if He had not possessed them in their fullness Himself He could not have bestowed them upon others and perfected others through them. Therefore, if we follow the judgment of sound reasoning we must conclude that God, the Creator, has knowledge, power, and every other real perfection. Furthermore, as has already been mentioned, the marks of His knowledge and power and, as a result, the marks of life are seen in the order of the cosmos.

But because the Divine Essence is limitless and infinite these perfections which are shown to be His Qualities are in reality the same His Essence and one with each other. The difference observed between the Essence and the Qualities and at the same time between the Qualities themselves is only on the plane of concepts. Essentially there is but one Reality involved which is one and indivisible.

In order to avoid the inadmissible error of limiting the Essence through attributing qualities to it or denying the principle of perfection in it, Islam has commanded its followers to preserve a just balance between affirmation and negation. It has ordered them to believe that God has knowledge but not like the knowledge of others. He has power but not like the power of others. He hears but not with ears. He sees but not with eyes like those of men, and so on.

Further Explanation Concerning Qualities

Qualities in general are of two types: qualities of perfection, and qualities of imperfection. Qualities of perfection, as mentioned above, are of a positive nature and give higher ontological value and greater ontological effect to the object that they qualify. This is clear from the comparison between a live, knowing and capable being and a dead being which lacks knowledge and capability. Qualities of imperfection are the reverse of such qualities. When we analyze these imperfect qualities we see that they are negative and show a lack of perfection, such as ignorance, impatience, ugliness, illness, and the like. Therefore, it can be said that the negation of the quality of imperfection is the quality of perfection. For example, the negation of ignorance is knowledge and the negation of impotence is power and capability.

For this reason the Holy Quran has related each positive quality directly to God and negated every quality of imperfection from Him, attributing the negation of such imperfections to Him, as He says: "He is the knower, the Omnipotent," or He says, "He is the Alive" or "Neither slumber nor sleep overtaketh Him," or "Know that ye cannot frustrate Allah."

The point that must never be forgotten is that God, the Most Exalted, is Absolute Reality without any limit or boundary. Therefore, a positive quality attributed to Him will not possess any limitation. He is not material and corporeal or limited to space and time. While possessing all positive qualities He is beyond every quality and state which belongs to creatures. Every quality which in reality belongs to Him is purified from the notion of limitedness, as He says, "Nought is as His likeness." (Quran, XLII, 11)

Qualities of Action

In addition, qualities are also divided into qualities of essence and qualities of action. A quality sometimes depends only on the qualified itself, such as life, knowledge and power, which depend on the person of a living, knowing and capable human being. We can conceive of man in himself possessing these qualities without taking into consideration any other factor.

At other times a quality does not depend only on the qualified in itself, but, in order to qualify, it also requires the existence of something external as in the case of writing, conservation, desire, and the like. A person can be a writer if he possesses ink, pen, and paper, and he can converse when there is someone with whom to speak. In the same way he can desire when there is an object of desire. The sole existence of man is not sufficient to bring these qualities into existence.

From this analysis it becomes clear that the Divine Qualities which are the same as God's Essence, as already pointed out, are only of the first kind. As for the second kind, whose actualization depends upon an external factor, they cannot be considered as Qualities of the Essence and the same as the Essence, for all that is other than God is created by Him and so, being situated in the created order, comes after Him.

Qualities that pertain to God after the act of creation such as creator, omnipotent, giver of life, giver of death, sustainer, etc., are not the same as His Essence but are additional to it; they are Qualities of Action. By Quality of Action is meant that after the actualization of an act the meaning of a quality is understood from that act, not from the Essence (that performs the act), such as "Creator", which is conceived after the act of creation has taken place. From the creation is understood the quality of God as Creator. That quality depends upon creation, not upon the sacred Essence of God, the Most Exalted, Himself, so that the Essence does not change from one state to another with the appearance of that quality. Shi'ism considers the two qualities of will (iradah) and speech (kalam) in their literal meaning as Qualities of Action (will meaning wanting something and speech meaning conveying a meaning through an expression). Most of the Sunni theologians consider them as implying knowledge and thereby take them to be Qualities of Essence.

Destiny and Providence

The law of causality reigns throughout the world of existence without any breach or exception. According to this law each phenomenon in this world depends for its coming into being upon causes and conditions which make its actualization possible. If all of these causes, which are called the complete cause (the sufficient and necessary cause), are actualized, the coming into being of that phenomenon, or the assumed effect, becomes determined and necessary. And assuming the lack of all or some of these causes, the actualization of the phenomenon is impossible. Investigation and analysis of this thesis will clarify this point for us.

(1) If we compare a phenomenon (or effect) with the whole, complete (or sufficient) cause, and also with the parts of the complete cause, its relation to the complete cause is based on necessity and relation to each of the parts of the complete cause (which are called incomplete or partial causes) is one of possibility and lack of complete determinism. These causes provide the effect only with the possibility of existence, not with its necessity.

The world of existence, in its totality, therefore, is governed throughout by necessity because each of its parts has a necessary connection with its complete cause by the very fact of coming into being. Its structure is composed of a series of necessary and certain events. Yet, the character of possibility is preserved in its parts if we consider each part separately and in itself in the phenomena which are related and connected to partial causes which are other than their complete cause.

The Holy Quran in its teachings has called this reign of necessity Divine Destiny (qada'), for this necessity issues from that Source that gives existence to the world and is therefore a command (hukm) and "Divine Decree" that is certain and is impossible to breach or disobey. It is based on justice and accepts no exception or discrimination. God Almighty says, "His verily is all creation and commandment" (Quran, VII, 54), and "When He decreeth [qada] a thing, He saith unto it only: Be!and it is" (Quran, II, 117), and also "(When) Allah doometh there is none that can postpone His doom [hukm]" (Quran, XIII, 41).

(2) Each part of the cause provides the appropriate measure and "model" for the effect, and the coming into being of the effect is in accordance with the totality of the measures determined for it by the complete cause. For example, the causes that make respiration possible for man do not cause respiration in the absolute and unconditionedsense ; rather they send a determined amount of the air around the mouth and nose through the respiratory channel to the area of the lungs in a determined time and with a determined shape. Likewise, the causes of man's vision (including man himself) do not bring into being vision as such without limits or conditions, but rather a vision which, through the means and organs provided, is limited and measured for men in every respect. This truth is to be found without exception in all the phenomena of the world and all the events that occur in it.

The Holy Quran has called this aspect the truth "Providence" (qadar) and has related it to God Almighty who is the origin of creation, as has been said, "And there is not a thing but withUs are the stores thereof. And we send it not down save in appointed measure [qadar]" (Quran, XV, 21).

In the same way that according to Divine Destiny the existence of each phenomenon and even which occurs in the cosmic order is necessary and cannot be avoided, so also according to Providence each phenomenon and event that occurs will never trespass or disobey in the least degree the measure which God has provided for it.

Man and Free Will

The action which man performs is one of the phenomena of the world of creation and its appearance depends, completely, like other phenomena in the world, upon its cause. And since man in a part of the world of creation and has an ontological relation with other parts of the cosmos, we cannot accept the premise that other parts should not have an effect upon his actions.

For example, when a man takes a bite of bread he needs not only the instruments of his hands, feet, mouth as well as knowledge, power and will, but also the existence of the bread in the external world, its availability, the lack of obstacles and other temporal and spatial conditions. If any of these causes were not actualized, the action would not be possible. Conversely, with the actualization of all of them (the complete cause) the occurrence of the action becomes completely necessary. The necessity of the action in relation to all of the parts of the complete cause is not contradictory to the possibility of the relation of the action with respect to man, who is one of the parts of the complete cause. Man has the possibility or free will (ikhtiyar) to perform the act. The necessity existing in the relation between the action and all of the parts of the cause does not mean that the relation of the action to some of the parts of the cause, of which man is one, should also be that of necessity and determination.

Man's simple and untainted comprehension also confirms this point of view, for we see that people through their God-given nature and intelligence distinguish between such things as eating, drinking, coming and going on the one hand, and on the other, such things as health and illness, age and youth or the height of the body. The first group, which is directly related to man's will, is considered to be performed according to the free choice of the individual so that people command and prohibit them and blame or condemn them. But concerning the second group man has no duty and is not under any Divine command because he cannot exercise a free choice over them.

At the beginning of Islam among the Sunnis there were two schools that were concerned with the theological aspects of human action. One group, holding the view that human action is the result of the unbreakable will of God, considered man to be determined in his actions and held human free will to be devoid of any value and sense. The other group believed man to be independent in his actions, which did not depend upon the Divine will and were outside of the command of Providence (qadar).

But according to the instruction of the Household of the Prophet, which is also in conformity with the literal instructions of the Quran, man is free (mukhtar) in his actions but not independent (mustaqill). Rather, God the Almighty through free will has willed the act. According to our previous analysis, God the Exalted has willed and made necessary the act through all of the parts of the complete cause, of which one is the will and free choice of man. As a result of this kind of Divine will, the action is necessary but in it man has also free will, that is, the action is necessary with respect to all the parts of itscause, and possible and free in choice with respect to one of those parts which is man. The sixth Imam - uponwhom be peace - has said, "It is neither determination nor free will but something between the two."

The fifth and sixth Imams said that "God loves His creation so much that He will not force it to commit sin and then punish it. And God is so powerful that whatever He commands comes to be." Also the sixth Imam has said, "God is so generous that He does not make it a duty for men to do what is not in their power. He is so powerful that nothing comes into being in His kingdom which He does not will." (This is an allusion to the two schools of predestination and free will.) (Bihar al-anwar, vol. III, pp. 5, 6, 15)