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The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy

The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy Author: Michael Beaney
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The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy

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The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy

Author: Michael Beaney
Publisher: www-users.york.ac.uk

Philosophy and Mysticism (Irfan) ›

Western Philosophy

^English ^{2023-05-09 19:49:11}

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy

Michael Beaney

Table of Contents

[Introduction] 4

1- Frege and Russell: Decompositional and Transformative Analysis 11

2- Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: Connective and Explicatory Analysis 19

3- Bolzano and Husserl: Semantic, Conceptual and Phenomenological Analysis 24

4- Conclusion: The Varieties of Analysis 28

References 30

Notes 34

Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis, and I remain firmly persuaded, in spite of some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible.

(Russell, My Philosophical Development , ch. 1)

[Introduction]

One of the most important developments in twentieth-century philosophy - arguably,the most important development, at least in the English-speaking world - was the rise of analytic philosophy. There has been increasing debate in recent years over what exactly ‘analytic philosophy’ means, as the term has been used in a wider and wider sense and it has become harder and harder to identify any common assumptions, methods or themes. But there is general agreement on its main sources: the work of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), G. E. Moore (1873-1958) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in the period from roughly 1880 to 1920. (Frege’s first book,Begriffsschrift , setting out his new logic, was published in 1879; and Wittgenstein’sTractatus was published in 1921.) More specifically, the origins of analytic philosophy are often dated to the rebellion by Russell and Moore against British idealism at the turn of the twentieth century. But there is little doubt that as Russell’s and Moore’s ideas were developed - in particular, as Russell became convinced that mathematics was really logic, and through Wittgenstein’s early work - Frege’s writings became increasingly influential. In theTractatus , Wittgenstein critically engages with Frege’s and Russell’s ideas above all else, with the result that both Frege and Wittgenstein have taken their place alongside Russell and Moore as the acknowledged founders of the analytic tradition.

Central to Russell’s and Moore’s rebellion against idealism was the emphasis placed on analysis, as the remark cited above from Russell’sMy Philosophical Development indicates. But both Russell and Moore were notoriously unclear as to what exactly ‘analysis’ meant, and they use the term in a number of ways throughout their writings. At the time of their rebellion, however, thedecompositional conception was undoubtedly dominant: analysis was understood as the process of decomposing something into its constituent parts. This conception is explicit in Moore’s 1899 paper, ‘The Nature of Judgment’. On the naïve realist view advocated in this paper, the world is composed of ‘concepts’, which are synthesized into propositions, both concepts and propositions being independent of us. Analysis is then accorded a fundamental role in Moore’s epistemology: “A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts” (1899, p. 8).

Both Moore’s naïve realism and the associated decompositional conception of analysis were endorsed by Russell in his initial rejection of idealism, but such a view faces obvious problems. How can we give an account of propositions about non-existent objects, for example? Much of Russell’s subsequent philosophy is an attempt to think through and find solutions to such problems - the problems raised by adopting a decompositional conception of analysis in the context of repudiating idealism.[1] After the initial exuberance of his naïve realism, Russell gradually developed tools to cut back on his ontological commitments. This led first to his theory of denoting concepts, which was replaced within a few years by his theory of descriptions, on the basis of which he then developed his full-blown philosophy of logical atomism. By this time Wittgenstein, too, having been Russell’s pupil, was developing his own form of logical atomism, which found its definitive statement in theTractatus .

How can this path to logical atomism, however, be thought to have given rise to a whole new tradition of philosophy? Naïve realism is hardly new, and even logical atomism has its precursors in the work of Leibniz, in particular. In any case, neither naïve realism nor logical atomism can be regarded as characteristic of analytic philosophy after the 1920s. More specifically, the decompositional conception of analysis which seems to lie at the heart of Moore’s, Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s early work is far from new. In its general form, such a conception played a key role in Descartes’ philosophy (inspired by his analytic geometry) and in Locke’s empiricism, to take just two examples from the early modern period, and in the particular case of concepts, found its classic statement in Kant’s account of analyticity.[2] So if decompositional analysis is meant to characterize analytic philosophy, then why has analytic philosophy been thought to start with Russell and Moore?

The answer is that it is not decompositional analysis on its own that characterizes analytic philosophy, even during its logical atomist phase. In my view, the single most significant event in the development of analytic philosophy was not Russell’s and Moore’s rebellion against idealism, but the appearance in 1905 of Russell’s theory of descriptions. Frank Ramsey rightly described this theory as a ‘paradigm of philosophy’ (1931, p. 263), a view that was endorsed by Moore (1959, p. 151). What is crucial about the theory of descriptions is that it introduced a quite different conception of analysis, which might be characterized as atransformative orexplicatory conception. Fundamental to the theory is therephrasing of the sentence to be analyzed, a sentence of the form ‘TheF isG ’, where ‘TheF ’ represents the definite description, into a sentence of a quite different form. To take Russell’s classic example, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is analyzed as ‘There is one and only one King of France, and whatever is King of France is bald’. There is nothing decompositional about this type of analysis. ‘The present King of France is bald’ is not being analyzed into ‘The present King of France’ and ‘is bald’, for example. The definite description is ‘analyzed away’: no such phrase appears in the analyzed sentence.

Again, though, the idea of transformative analysis itself was not new. It can be found in medieval logic, for example, and arguably goes back to Aristotle’s logic and ancient Greek geometry (which is the original source of talk of ‘analysis’). Indeed, in some sense, transformation is involved in all types of analysis.[3] A good example of the idea in its pure form can be found in the conception of paraphrasis articulated by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). In hisEssay on Logic (published posthumously, in 1843), Bentham wrote: “By the word paraphrasis may be designated that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity” (1843, p. 246). Bentham applied the method in ‘analyzing away’ talk of ‘obligations’ (cf. 1843, p. 247), and the similarities between Bentham’s method and Russell’s theory of descriptions have been discussed, most notably, by John Wisdom (1904-93) in a book devoted to just this relationship published in 1931.[4]

In its distinctive modern form, however, transformative analysis originated with Frege, which is why Frege has also come to be seen as one of the founders of analytic philosophy. The central project of Frege’s life was to demonstrate that arithmetic is reducible to logic, and in pursuing this he both invented modern quantificational logic, which made the project feasible, and provided analyses of number statements. On his account, a number statement such as ‘Jupiter has four moons’ is analyzed as ‘The conceptmoon of Jupiter has four instances’ (cf. 1884, §§ 46, 54).[5] That is, it is viewed not as predicating of Jupiter the property of having four moons, as a simple decompositional analysis might suggest, but as predicating of the (first-level) conceptmoon of Jupiter the (second-level) propertyhas four instances , which can be logically defined in Frege’s theory. To make clear that number statements can be logically defined, in other words, Frege had to transform the statements to show what was ‘really’ involved.

What distinguishes Frege’s and Russell’s use of transformative analysis from earlier uses? Here what is crucial is the role played by quantificational logic, which Frege invented and which Russell further developed and applied. Quantificational logic offered a far more powerful means of representing propositions and inferences than had hitherto been available, but only worked by assuming that ordinary language sentences could indeed be radically transformed in formalizing them. The radical nature of these transformations and the use to which they were put in Frege’s and Russell’s logicist projects inevitably opened up semantic, epistemological and metaphysical questions. What is the relationship between ordinary language and formal logic? What governs the ‘correctness’ of a logical formalization? Clearly, not everything is preserved in such transformations, so whatis preserved and what can be allowed to vary? If we make use of notions such as ‘content’, ‘sense’, ‘meaning’, ‘denotation’ or ‘reference’ in justifying the analyses, then how are these notions to be explained and what are their relationships? To what extent are our analyses answerable to the world itself? Can we say anything a priori about what the world must be like, and if so what? What is the relationship between language and thought? How do they represent or engage with the world? These and many other such questions have provided the dynamic of the analytic movement ever since the work of Frege and Russell.

Of course, many of these questions have been asked before in different forms, but what made such questions pressing was the need to justify the new logic, and what arose, as a result, was far greater self-consciousness about our use of language and its potential for leading us astray. This greater self-consciousness has prompted talk of a ‘linguistic turn’ having occurred in twentieth-century philosophy, a turn that was arguably first made in Wittgenstein’sTractatus , drawing on Frege’s and Russell’s ideas. But underlying this linguistic turn was the analytic turn instigated by Frege’s and Russell’s use of transformative analysis in developing and applying quantificational logic. It is the philosophical questions that this raised that have given shape to the analytic tradition.

But where does this leave decompositional analysis with which analytic philosophy seemed to begin? The relationship between decompositional and transformative analysis is one of the key issues addressed in this volume - in particular, in Part One. But the short answer, as far as Russell is concerned (brought out in the papers by Griffin and Hylton), is that transformative analysis was introduced toreinforce his appeal to decompositional analysis, which he continued to assume was required at the ultimate level of analysis. For the aim of transformation was to reveal the ‘real’ logical form of the proposition to be analyzed, the constituents of the fully analyzed sentence being assumed to correspond to, and be structured in exactly the same way as, the ultimate simple constituents of the reality represented. As far as Frege is concerned, the issue is more complicated, since Frege did not share Russell’s fundamental assumption that every propositional content can be uniquely analyzed into ultimate simple constituents. For Frege, function-argument analysis (as utilized in transformative logical analysis) played a far greater overt role than whole-part (decompositional) analysis, although (arguably) he still made tacit appeal to the latter in the ontological conclusions he drew. (For discussion of the differences between Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of analysis, see the papers by Reck, Levine and Beaney.)

Although Russell does not seem to have recognized the distinction between transformative and decompositional analysis, at least explicitly, the distinction (or something like it) did come to be drawn by the members of the so-called ‘Cambridge School of Analysis’ in the late 1920s and early 1930s - in the second phase of analytic philosophy (to endorse the division suggested by Hacker in his paper; see p. [2] below). In their terminology, there was a difference between ‘logical’ or ‘same-level’ analysis, which simply transformed one sentence into another, and ‘philosophical’ or ‘metaphysical’ or ‘reductive’ or ‘directional’ or ‘new-level’ analysis, which revealed the underlying ontological commitments. (The distinction can also be seen as implicit in Wittgenstein’sTractatus , as the papers by Hanna and Phillips indicate.) There was a great deal of debate in this period about the nature and role of analysis, the main result of which was growing criticism of the reductive conception.[6] But with the distinction in place, it was possible to accept this criticism without rejecting analysis altogether. Same-level analysis could be endorsed without metaphysical reductionism, and this became the hallmark of the phase (or phases) of analytic philosophy that followed.

The move away from reductive conceptions of analysis and the development of alternative conceptions can be found, for example, in the work of the Vienna Circle during the 1920s and 1930s (in the third phase of analytic philosophy distinguished by Hacker). The most significant figure in this regard was Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), whose first major work,Der logische Aufbau der Welt , was published in 1928. TheAufbau opens with endorsement of what Russell called in 1914 ‘the supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing’: “Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” (1917, p. 115). This has often been interpreted as recommending a programme of ontological eliminativism, as suggested by the theory of descriptions, but Carnap interprets it epistemologically, as permitting what he calls ‘rational reconstruction’. (Russell’s own understanding of logical construction is discussed in the papers by Hylton and Linsky.) As Carnap characterizes it in the preface to the second edition of theAufbau , rational reconstruction is “the searching out of new definitions for old concepts”, where the new definitions “should be superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and, above all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts” (1961, p. v). As he goes on to note, such clarification of concepts is what he later called ‘explication’; and the idea of explication is one of the themes explored in this volume, beginning with the paper by Reck.[7]

Carnap’s programme of explication provides one example of the transition to less reductive conceptions of analysis. But undoubtedly the most striking and important example is Wittgenstein’s later work, in which he explicitly repudiates his earlier logical atomism, and develops a new view of philosophy as conceptual clarification. Wittgenstein’s early and later thought is discussed in three of the papers in Part Two of this volume, by Hacker, Hanna and Phillips. Wittgenstein’s ideas were enormously influential, not only in Cambridge, among his various pupils and colleagues, but also in Oxford in the two decades or so after the Second World War (in the fourth phase of analytic philosophy distinguished by Hacker), when related methodologies were used by Gilbert Ryle (1900-76), J. L. Austin (1911-60) and Peter Strawson (1919-2006), to name three of the most dominant figures. Strawson has talked of ‘connective’ analysis replacing reductive analysis (1992, ch. 1), and this is an apt way to encapsulate the transition. But connective analysis was not only a feature of British philosophy. As Baldwin shows in his paper, a connective conception can also be found prior to the Second World War in the work of C. I. Lewis (1883-1964), the most important American analytic philosopher of the period. The development of connective forms of analysis provides the main theme of the papers in Part Two.

I suggested above that the single most significant event in the development of analytic philosophy was the appearance of the theory of descriptions in 1905. But 1905 also witnessed the introduction by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) of the idea of ‘phenomenological reduction’,[8] which was a key moment - perhapsthe key moment - in the development of phenomenology. The analytic and phenomenological traditions have often been seen as rivals in the history of twentieth-century philosophy, but in recent years, the common origins of the two traditions and their philosophical connections have been stressed.[9] One important influence on Husserl, for example, was Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), whose work anticipates many ideas in later analytic philosophy. Bolzano’s conception of analysis is discussed by Lapointe in the first paper of Part Three.

Just as much as Frege and Russell, Husserl’s philosophy grew out of an interest in the foundations of mathematics, and he became deeply concerned to combat psychologism. From his earliest work onwards, his aim was to uncover the sources of our meaning-constituting acts, initially in mathematics and logic, later more generally. (Husserl’s early development is explained in the paper by Moran.) Indeed, we can also see an analytic turn as having taken place in giving rise to phenomenology. As in the case of analytic philosophy, this had many aspects. In my own work on conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy, I have distinguished three main modes of analysis - the regressive, the decompositional and the transformative (see §1 of my paper below). The decompositional and transformative modes have already been introduced. But the regressive mode, understood as the process of identifying the principles, premises, causes, etc., by means of which something can be derived or explained, was arguably dominant in conceptions of analysis up until the early modern period, and regressive conceptions have been prevalent ever since (even if overshadowed by decompositional conceptions).[10] Frege’s and Russell’s concern to reveal the logical source of our knowledge of arithmetic, encapsulated in logical laws and definitions, can be seen as illustrating the conception, and Russell alluded to the conception himself in the title of a paper written in 1907, ‘The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics’. The regressive conception is also a feature of Husserl’s methodology. We can see it reflected in Husserl’s remark in theCrisis that he uses the key word ‘transcendental’ “in the broadest sense for the original motif … which through Descartes confers meaning on all modern philosophies … the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge” (1936, §26).

As Husserl’s use of the term ‘transcendental’ suggests, though, there is a Kantian dimension to Husserl’s project, and the remark itself indicates a Cartesian motivation as well. So what was new in Husserl’s analytic turn? What Husserl himself identified as crucial was his ‘discovery’ in 1905 of the method of reduction (later elaborated into a number of procedures), by which all our various everyday, psychological and scientific assumptions are ‘bracketed’ in order to focus on the underlying concepts and structures of our cognitive acts.[11] Phenomenology became the task of “clarifying the essence of cognition and of being an object of cognition”, as he put it inThe Idea of Phenomenology (1964, p. 18).

It is not just the coincidence of date that prompts the comparison with Russell here. For, as I suggest in my own paper, just as Russell was concerned to identify the indefinables of philosophical logic, as he described it in thePrinciples (quoted on p. [15] below), to be apprehended by ‘acquaintance’, so too Husserl was concerned to isolate through phenomenological reduction the ‘essences’ that underlie our logical thinking, to be apprehended by ‘essential intuition’ (‘Wesenserschauung ’). Furthermore, as Haaparanta brings out in her paper, there are also elements of ‘transformation’ in phenomenological reduction, which raise philosophical issues, and the paradox of analysis, in particular, which equally affect the kind of transformative analysis exemplified by the theory of descriptions.

Insofar as grasping ‘essences’ amounts to “fixing concepts in intuition”, as Moran characterizes phenomenological analysis (see p. [19] below), Husserl’s project can also be seen as one of conceptual clarification. This is discussed, in complementary ways, by Moran and Thomasson in their papers. Moran elucidates the ‘transcendental subjective’ aspects of Husserl’s methodology, while Thomasson compares phenomenology with ordinary language philosophy. Appreciating the similarities and differences between phenomenological analysis and forms of analysis in analytic philosophy sheds much light on both. Certainly, comparison demonstrates just how subtle and intricate are the relationships between the various conceptions of analysis that can be found in the two traditions, conceptions that themselves have roots in earlier conceptions. The nature of phenomenological analysis and its relationship to other conceptions of analysis form the central theme of the papers in Part Three.

Even in a book devoted to the topic of analysis, with fourteen contributors writing from a variety of perspectives, it is not possible to do justice to the full range of conceptions of analysis in twentieth-century philosophy. This volume focuses on certain key figures in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, in the period prior to the Second World War. But both earlier and later conceptions are also discussed, since these help place the developments in this period in context. In the rest of this introduction I will say a little more about each of the papers in turn, highlighting their significance in the overall picture that I have all too briefly sketched in these first few pages. I draw some conclusions in the final section.

324 - التفكّر

324. THINKING

1499 - الحَثُّ عَلَى التَّفَكُّرِ

1499. ENCOURAGING THINKING

( كَذلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ اْلْآياتِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَفَكَّرُونَ)1

“Thus does Allah clarify His signs for you so that you may reflect.” 2

(اُنظر) البقرة : 266 ، 269 وآل عمران : 13 ، 137 ، 191 والأنعام : 11 ، 36 ، 50 ، 152 والأعراف : 3 ، 176 ، 185 ، 201 ويونس : 24 ، 73 ، 101 ويوسف : 109 ، 111 ، والرعد : 3 والحِجر : 75 والنحل : 11 ، 36 والمؤمنون : 85 والفرقان : 50 ، 73 والنمل : 62 ، 69 والعنكبوت : 20 ، 24 ، 35 ، 43 والروم : 8 ، 9 ، 21 والمؤمن : 13 ، 58 ، 82 والجاثية : 3 - 5 ، 13 و محمد : 10 والقمر : 4 ، 15 والحشر : 2 والحاقّة : 11 والمزّمّل : 19 و الإنسان : 29

(See also: Qur'an 2:266, 2:269, 3:13, 3:137, 3:191, 6:11, 6:36, 6:50, 6:152, 7:3, 7:176, 7:185, 7:201, 10:24, 10:73, 10:101, 12:109, 12:111, 13:3, 15:75, 16:11, 16:36, 23:85, 25: 50, 25:73, 27:62, 27:69, 29:20, 29:24, 29:35, 29:43, 30:8, 30:9, 30:21, 40:13, 40:58, 40:82, 45:3-5, 45:13, 47:10, 54:4, 54:15, 59:2, 69:11, 73:19, 76:29)

5111. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : التفكُّرُ يَدعُو إلَى البِرِّ والعَمَلِ بهِ3

5111. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Thinking instigates goodness and action upon it.'4

5112. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن تَفَكَّرَ أبصَرَ5

5112. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who thinks perceives.'6

5113. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن أكثَرَ الفِكرَ فيما تَعَلَّمَ أتقَنَ عِلمَهُ ، وفَهِمَ ما لم يَكُن يَفهَمُ7

5113. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Whoever increases his thinking in whatever he learns, his knowledge will become proficient, and he will come to understand whatever he did not understand before.'8

5114. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : لا عِلمَ كالتَّفكُّرِ9

5114. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'There is no knowledge like thinking.'10

5115. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الفِكرُ مِرآةٌ صافِيَةٌ11

5115. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Thinking is a transparent mirror.'12

5116. الإمامُ الحسنُ عليه السلام : التفكُّرُ حَياةُ قَلبِ البَصيرِ13

5116. Imam Hasan (AS) said, 'Thinking is the life of the heart of the cognizant.'14

5117. الإمامُ الحسنُ عليه السلام : اُوصيكُم بتَقوَى اللَّهِ وإدامَةِ التَّفَكُّرِ ؛ فإنَّ التَّفَكُّرَ أبو كُلِّ خَيرٍ واُمُّهُ15

5117. Imam Hasan (AS) said, 'I advise you with Godwariness and continuous thinking, for thinking is the father and mother of all good.'16

5118. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام: الفِكرَةُ مِرآةُ الحَسَناتِ وكَفّارَةُ السَّيّئاتِ17

5118. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'A thought is the mirror of merits and the penance for vices.'18

Notes

1. البقرة : 219

2. Quran 2: 219

3. الكافي : 2 / 55 / 5

4. al-Kafi, v. 2, p. 55, no. 5

5. نهج البلاغة : الكتاب 31

6. Nahj al-Balagha, Letter 31

7. غرر الحكم : 8917

8. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 8917

9. نهج البلاغة : الحكمة 113

10. Nahj al-Balagha, Saying 113

11. نهج البلاغة : الحكمة 5

12. Ibid. Saying 5

13. بحار الأنوار : 78 / 115 / 11

14. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 78, p. 115, no. 11

15. تنبيه الخواطر : 1 / 52

16. Tanbih al-Khawatir, v. 1, p. 52

17. بحار الأنوار : 71 / 326 / 20

18. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 71, p. 327, no. 22

1500 - لا عِبادَةَ كَالتَّفَكُّرِ

1500. THERE IS NO WORSHIP LIKE THINKING

5119. اُمُّ أبي ذَرٍّ - وقد سُئلَت عن عِبادَةِ أبي ذَرٍّ - : كانَ نَهارَهُ أجمَعَ يَتفكَّرُ في ناحِيَةٍ عن الناسِ1

5119. The mother of Abu Dharr when asked about the worship of Abu Dharr, said, 'He spent his whole day thinking in a place far away from people.'2

5120. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : أفضَلُ العِبادَةِ إدمانُ التَّفكُّرِ في اللَّهِ وفي قُدرَتِهِ3

5120. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'The best of worship is perpetually thinking about Allah and His power.'4

5121. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : تَفَكُّرُ ساعَةٍ خَيرٌ مِن عِبادَةِ سَنَةٍ (إنَّما يَتَذَكَّرُ اُولُوا الأَلبابِ)5

5121. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'Thinking for an hour is better than worshipping for a year, for“Only those who possess intellect take admonition.” 67

(اُنظر) العبادة : باب 1215 ، 1217

(See also: WORSHIP: section 1215, 1217)

Notes

1. تنبيه الخواطر : 1 / 250

2. Tanbih al-Khawatir, v. 1, p. 250

3. الكافي : 2 / 55 / 3

4. al-Kafi, v. 2, p. 55, no. 3

5. بحار الأنوار : 71 / 327 / 22

6. Quran 39 :9

7. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 71, p. 327, no. 22

1501 - مايُصَفِّي الفِكرَ

1501. THAT WHICH PURIFIES THOUGHT

5122. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام: مَن قَلَّ أكلُهُ صَفا فِكرُهُ1

5122. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Whoever eats less, their thought will be more purified.'2

5123. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : كيفَ تَصفُو فِكرَةُ مَن يَستَديمُ الشِّبَعَ ؟ !3

5123. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'How can one's thought be purified if they are constantly full.'4

Notes

1. غرر الحكم : 8462

2. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 8462

3. غرر الحكم : 6975

4. Ibid. no. 6975

1502 - التَّفَكُّرُ المَنهِيُّ عَنهُ‏

1502. PROHIBITED THINKING

5124. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الفِكرُ في غَيرِ الحِكمَةِ هَوَسٌ1

5124. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Thinking outside [the bounds] of wisdom is fantasy.'2

5125. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن كَثُرَ فِكرُهُ في المَعاصي دَعَتهُ إلَيها3

5125. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Whoever thinks much about sins, will be prompted to commit them.'4

5126. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن تَفَكَّرَ في ذاتِ اللَّهِ أَلحَدَ5

5126. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who contemplates in the essence of Allah becomes a disbeliever.'6

(اُنظر) المعرفة (2) : باب 1254

(See also: INNER KNOWLEDGE OF ALLAH: section 1254)

Notes

1. غرر الحكم : 1278

2. Ibid. no. 1278

3. غرر الحكم : 8561

4. Ibid. no. 8561

5. غرر الحكم : ح 8487 ، عيون الحكم والمواعظ : ص 449 ح 7976

6. Ibid. no. 8487

325 - القبر

325. THE GRAVE

1503 - القَبرُ أوَّلُ مَنازِلِ الآخِرَةِ

1503. THE GRAVE THE FIRST STAGE OF THE HEREAFTER

5127. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : إنّ القَبرَ أوَّلُ مَنازِلِ الآخِرَةِ ، فإن نَجا مِنهُ فما بَعدَهُ أيسَرُ مِنهُ ، وإنْ لم يَنجُ مِنهُ فما بَعدَهُ لَيسَ أقلَّ مِنهُ1

5127. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The grave is the first station of the Hereafter. If one is saved from it, whatever comes after it is easier. And if he is not saved from it, whatever comes after it is no less difficult than it.'2

5128. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله - لَمّا مَرَّ بقَبرٍ دُفِنَ فيهِ بالأمسِ إنسانٌ وأهلُهُ يَبكُونَ - : لَرَكعَتانِ خَفيفَتانِ ممّا تَحتَقِرُونَ أحَبُّ إلى‏ صاحِبِ هذا القَبرِ مِن دُنياكُم كُلِّها3

5128. The Prophet (SAWA), when he passed by a grave wherein someone had been buried the day before, and the person's family was crying over the grave, said, 'Two simple units of prayer that you deem insignificant are dearer to the person in this grave than the whole of your world.'4

5129. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أوّلُ عَدلِ الآخِرَةِ القُبورُ ، لا يُعرَفُ شَريفٌ مِن وَضيعٍ5

5129. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The first [experience of the] justice of the Hereafter is the grave, it does not differentiate between the base-born and the noble.'6

5130. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : ما رَأيتُ مَنظَراً إلّا والقَبرُ أفظَعُ مِنهُ7

5130. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'I have never seen a scene more horrid than the grave.'8

5131. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : جاوِرِ القُبورَ تَعتَبِرْ9

5131. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Live near the graves and you will take a lesson.'10

5132. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : إنّ لِلقَبرِ كلاماً في كُلِّ يَوم ، يقولُ : أنا بَيتُ الغُربَةِ ، أنا بَيتُ الوَحشَةِ ، أنا بَيتُ الدُّودِ ، أنا القَبرُ ، أنا رَوضَةٌ مِن رِياضِ الجَنّةِ أو حُفرَةٌ مِن حُفَرِ النارِ11

5132. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'The grave speaks every day. It says: I am the house of loneliness, I am the house of gloom, I am the house of worms, I am the grave, I am a garden of the gardens of Heaven, or a hole from among the holes of Hell.'12

5133. الإمامُ الكاظمُ عليه السلام - عندَ قَبرٍ - : إنّ شيئاً هذا آخِرُهُ لَحَقيقٌ أن يُزهَدَ في أوَّلِهِ ، وإنّ شيئاً هذا أوَّلُهُ لَحَقيقٌ أن يُخافَ آخِرُهُ13

5133. Imam al-Kazim (AS) said at a graveside, 'Verily the thing [i.e. life] whose end is this [grave] deserves to be spent in asceticism, and verily the thing [i.e. the Hereafter] which begins with this [grave] deserves to be feared.'14

Notes

1. بحار الأنوار : 6 / 242 / 64

2. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 6, p. 242, no. 64

3. تنبيه الخواطر : 2 / 225

4. Tanbih al-Khawatir, v. 2, p. 225

5. الجعفريّات : 205

6. al-Jafariyyat, p. 205

7. تنبيه الخواطر : 1 / 284

8. Tanbih al-Khawatir, v. 1, p. 284

9. غرر الحكم : 4800

10. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 4800

11. الكافي : 3 / 242 / 2

12. al-Kafi, v. 3, p. 242, no. 2

13. معاني الأخبار : 343 / 1

14. Maani al-Akhbar, p. 343, no. 1

1504 - سُؤالُ القَبرِ

1504. QUESTIONING IN THE GRAVE

5134. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله - في قولِهِ تعالى‏ : (يُثَبِّتُ اللَّهُ الّذينَ آمَنوا بالقَولِ الثّابتِ في الحَياةِ الدُّنيا وفي الآخِرَةِ)1 - : في القَبرِ إذا سُئلَ المَوتى‏2

5134. The Prophet (SAWA), with regards to Allah's verse in the Qur'an:”Allah fortifies those who have faith with an immutable word in the life of this world and in the Hereafter”3 , said, 'In the grave when the dead are interrogated'.4

5135. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : يُسألُ المَيِّتُ في قَبرِهِ عن خَمسٍ : عن صَلاتِهِ ، وزَكاتِهِ ، وحَجِّهِ ، وصيامِهِ ، ووَلايَتِهِ إيّانا أهلَ البَيتِ ، فتَقولُ الوَلايةُ مِن جانِبِ القَبرِ للأربَعِ : ما دَخَلَ فِيكُنَّ مِن نَقصٍ فَعلَيَّ تَمامُهُ5

5135. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'A dead person will be questioned about five things: his prayer, his alms-tax (zakat), his obligatory pilgrimage (hajj), his fasting, and his acceptance of our divine guardianship (wilaya), the ahl al-bayt. Our guardianship will address the other four from inside the grave, 'Any deficiency that is in you, I will fill.'6

5136. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : لا يُسألُ في القَبرِ إلّا مَن مَحَضَ الإيمانَ مَحضاً ، أو مَحَضَ الكُفرَ مَحضاً7

5136. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'A person will not be questioned in their grave unless they have total pureness of faith or total disbelief.'8

Notes

1. إبراهيم : 27

2. بحار الأنوار : 6 / 228 / 29

3. Quran 14 :27

4. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 6, p. 228, no. 29

5. الكافي : 3 / 241 / 15

6. al-Kafi, v. 3, p. 241, no. 15

7. الكافي : 3 / 236 / 4

8. Ibid. v. 3, p. 236, no. 4

1505 - عَذابُ القَبرِ

1505. PUNISHMENT IN THE GRAVE

5137. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : يا عِبادَ اللَّهِ ، ما بعدَ المَوتِ لِمَن لم يُغفَرْ لَهُ أشدَّ مِن المَوتِ ؛ القَبرُ ، فاحذَرُوا ضِيقَهُ وضَنكَهُ وظُلمَتَهُ وغُربَتَهُ وإنّ المَعيشَةَ الضَّنْكَ الّتي حَذَّرَ اللَّهُ مِنها عَدُوَّهُ عَذابُ القَبرِ1

5137. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'O servants of Allah! That which comes after death for those who have not been forgiven is worse than death itself and it is the grave. So, be warned of its tightness, its hardship, its darkness and its loneliness And the hard life that Allah has warned His enemies about is the punishment of the grave.'2

5138. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : فإنّكُم لو قد عايَنتُم ما قد عايَنَ مَن ماتَ مِنكُم لَجَزِعتُم ووَهِلتُم وسَمِعتُم وأطَعتُم ، ولكنْ مَحجوبٌ عَنكُم ما قد عايَنُوا، وقَريبٌ ما يُطرَحُ الحِجابُ‏3 !4

5138. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'If you were to see what the dead from among you have seen, you would become grieved, and you would be frightened, and you would listen and obey. However, what they have seen is veiled from you, and the veil will soon be lifted!'5

5139. الإمامُ الباقرُ عليه السلام : مَن أتَمَّ رُكوعَهُ لم تَدخُلْهُ وَحشَةٌ في قَبرِهِ6

5139. Imam al-Baqir (AS) said, 'Whoever's bowings in his prayer [ruku] are perfect will not experience fright in their grave.'7

Notes

1. الأمالي للطوسي : 28 / 31

2. Amali al-Tusi, p. 28, no. 31

3. نهج البلاغة : الخطبة 20

4. قال ابن أبي الحديد : وهذا الكلام يدلُّ على‏ صحَّة القول بعذاب القبر ، وأصحابنا كلُّهم يذهبون إليه وإن شنَّع عليهم أعداؤهم من الأشعريَّة وغيرهم بجحده (شرح نهج البلاغة : 1 / 298 )

5. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 20

6. ثواب الأعمال : 55 / 1

7. Thawab al-Amal, p. 55 no. 1

326 - القتل‏

326. KILLING

1506 - حُرمَةُ قَتلِ النَّفسِ‏

1506. THE PROHIBITION OF KILLING A SOUL [I.E. A HUMAN BEING]

( مِنْ أَجْلِ ذلِكَ كَتَبْنا عَلَى‏ بَنِي إِسْرَائيلَ أَنَّهُ مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسَاً بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أوْ فَسادٍ فِي الأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّما قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعاً وَمَنْ أَحْياها فَكَأَنَّما أَحْيا النَّاسَ جَمِيعاً)1

“That is why We decreed for the children of Israel that whoever kills a soul, without [its being guilty of] manslaughter or corruption on the earth, is as though he had killed all mankind, and whoever saves a life is as though he has saved all mankind.” 2

(اُنظر) النساء : 29 ، 92 ، 93 والمائدة : 28 والأنعام : 140 ، 151 والكهف : 74 والفرقان : 68 والتكوير : 9

(See also: Qur'an 4:29, 4:92, 4:93, 5:28, 6:140, 6:151, 18:74, 25:68, 81:9)

5140. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أعتَى الناسِ مَن قَتَلَ غيرَ قاتِلِهِ ، أو ضَرَبَ غيرَ ضارِبِهِ3

5140. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The most aggressive of people is he who kills someone other than his killer, or strikes someone other than one who struck him.'4

5141. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أوَّلُ ما يُقضى‏ بينَ الناسِ يَومَ القِيامَةِ في الدِّماءِ5

5141. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The first thing that will be judged between people on the Day of Resurrection is the blood shed [between them].'6

5142. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : لَزَوالُ الدنيا جَميعاً أهوَنُ علَى اللَّهِ مِن دَمٍ سُفِكَ بغيرِ حَقٍّ7

5142. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The eradication of the whole world is more insignificant for Allah than the blood that has been shed without right.'8

5143. الإمامُ الرِّضا عليه السلام : حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ قَتلَ النفسِ لِعِلَّةِ فَسادِ الخَلقِ في تَحليلِهِ لو أحَلَّ ، وفَنائهِم وفَسادِ التَّدبيرِ9

5143. Imam al-Rida (AS) said, 'Allah forbade the killing of human beings for the reason that creation would be corrupted were it to be permissible, and due to their annihilation and the chaos [that would ensue].'10

Notes

1. المائدة : 32

2. Quran 5 :32

3. الأمالي للصدوق : 73 / 41

4. Amali al-Saduq, p. 28, no. 4

5. كنز العمّال : 39887

6. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 39887

7. الترغيب والترهيب : 3 / 293 / 6

8. al-Targhib wa al-Tarhib, v. 3, p. 293, no. 6

9. كتاب من لا يحضره الفقيه : 3 / 565 / 4934

10. al-Faqih, v. 3, p. 565, no. 4934

1507 - قَتلُ المُؤمِنِ‏

1507. KILLING OF A BELIEVER

( وَمَنْ يَقْتُلْ مُؤْمِناً مُتَعَمِّداً فَجَزاؤُهُ جَهَنَّمُ خالِداً فِيها وَغَضِبَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَعَنَهُ وَأعَدَّ لَهُ عَذَاباً عَظِيماً)1

“Should anyone kill a believer intentionally, his requital shall be hell, to remain in it [forever]; Allah shall be wrathful at him and curse him and he shall prepare for him a great punishment” 2

5144. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : يا أيُّها الناسُ ، أيُقتَلُ قَتيلٌ وأنا بَينَ أظهُرِكُم لا يُعلَمُ مَن قَتَلَهُ ؟! لو أنّ أهلَ السماءِ والأرضِ اجتَمَعُوا على‏ قَتلِ رجُلٍ مُسلمٍ لَعَذَّبَهُم اللَّهُ بلا عَددٍ ولا حِسابٍ3

5144. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'O people! Will a person be killed whilst I am among you, and it is not known whom the killer is?! If all the people of the heavens and the earth were to get together and kill a Muslim [believer], Allah would punish them all without account and judgment.'4

5145. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : مَن أعانَ على‏ قَتلِ مؤمنٍ بشَطرِ كَلِمَةٍ لَقِيَ اللَّهَ يَومَ القِيامَةِ مَكتوبٌ بينَ عَينَيهِ : آيِسٌ مِن رَحمَةِ اللَّهِ5

5145. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Whoever helps in the killing of a believer even with a part of a word, he will meet Allah on the Day of Judgment with the following words written between his eyes: 'Doomed from the mercy of Allah.'6

5146. الإمامُ الباقرُ عليه السلام : مَن قَتَلَ مُؤمناً مُتَعمِّداً أثبَتَ اللَّهُ تعالى‏ علَيهِ جَميعَ الذُّنوبِ ، وبَرِئَ المَقتولُ مِنها ، وذلكَ قولُ اللَّهِ تعالى‏ : (أُرِيدُ أن تَبُوأَ بِإثْمِي وإثْمِكَ فتَكونَ مِن أصْحابِ النّارِ)7 8

5146. Imam al-Baqir (AS) said, 'Whoever intentionally kills a believer, Allah will affirm for him all the sins, and will acquit sins from the one he has killed. This is according to Allah's verse in the Qur'an:“I desire that you earn [the burden of] my sin and your sin, to become one of the inmates of the Fire.” 910

5147. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام - لمّا سُئلَ : المؤمنُ يَقتُلُ المؤمنَ مُتَعمِّداً هَل لَهُ تَوبَةٌ ؟ - : إن كانَ قَتَلَهُ لِإيمانِهِ فلا تَوبةَ لَهُ ، وإن كانَ قَتَلَهُ لِغَضَبٍ أو لِسَبَبِ شي‏ءٍ مِن أمرِ الدنيا فإنَّ توبَتَهُ أن يُقادَ مِنهُ11

5147. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) was once asked, 'A believer intentionally kills a believer, does he have the right to repent?' The Imam replied, 'If his killing him was due to his belief, then he does not have the right to repentance. But if he killed him due to anger or any other worldly reason, then his repentance is that he be killed for it.'12

Notes

1. النساء : 93

2. Quran 4 :93

3. كنز العمّال : 39952

4. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 39952

5. كنز العمّال : 39895، وراجع وسائل الشيعة : 8 / 615 باب 163

6. Ibid. no. 39895

7. المائدة : 29

8. ثواب الأعمال : 328 / 9

9. Quran 5 :29

10. Thawab al-A'mal, p. 328, no. 9

11. الكافي : 7 / 276 / 2 ، راجع وسائل الشيعة : 19 / 19 باب 9

12. al-Kafi, v. 7, p. 276, no. 2

1508 - تَحريمُ قَتلِ الإنسانِ نَفسَهُ‏

1508. THE PROHIBITION OF SUICIDE

( يا أَيُّها الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَأْكُلُوا أَمْوَالَكُم بَيْنَكُم بِالْباطِلِ إِلَّا أَنْ تَكُونَ تِجارَةً عَنْ تَرَاضٍ مِنكُمْ وَلَا تَقْتُلُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كانَ بِكُمْ رَحِيماً)1

“O you who have faith! Do not eat up your wealth among yourselves unrightfully, but it should be trade by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves. Indeed Allah is most merciful to you.” 2

5148. الإمامُ الباقرُ عليه السلام : إنّ المؤمنَ يُبتَلى‏ بكُلِّ بَليَّةٍ ويَموتُ بكُلِّ مِيتَةٍ إلّا أنّهُ لا يَقتُلُ نفسَهُ3

5148. Imam al-Baqir (AS) said, 'A believer may be afflicted with all kinds of misfortunes, and may die in all sorts of ways, but he must not kill himself.'4

5149. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : مَن قَتَلَ نفسَه مُتَعمِّداً فهُو في نارِ جَهنَّمَ خالِداً فيها5

5149. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'Whoever intentionally kills himself will dwell in the Hellfire forever.'6

Notes

1. النساء : 29

2. Quran 4 :29

3. الكافي : 3 / 112 / 8

4. al-Kafi, v. 3, p. 112, no. 8

5. كتاب من لا يحضره الفقيه : 4 / 95 / 5163

6. al-Faqih, v. 4, p. 95, no. 5163

327 - القرآن‏

327. THE Quran

1509 - عَلَيكُم بِالقُرآنِ‏

1509. ADHERE TO THE QUR'AN

( وَلَقَدْ آتَيْنَاكَ سَبْعاً مِنَ الْمَثَانِي وَالْقُرْآنَ الْعَظِيمَ)1

“Certainly We have given you [the surah of] the seven oft-repeated verses and the great Quran.” 2

( وَلَقَدْ يَسَّرْنَا الْقُرْآنَ لِلذِّكْرِ فَهَلْ مِنْ مُدَّكِرٍ)3

“Certainly We have made the Quran simple for the sake of admonishment. So is there anyone who will be admonished?” 4

5150. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : إذا التَبَسَتِ الاُمورُ علَيكُم كَقِطَعِ اللَّيلِ المُظلِمِ فعلَيكُم بالقرآنِ ؛ فإنّهُ شافِعٌ‏مُشَفَّعٌ ،وماحِلٌ مُصدَّقٌ ، ومَن جَعَلَهُ أمامَهُ قادَهُ إلَى الجَنَّةِ ، ومَن جَعَلَهُ خَلفَهُ قادَهُ إلَى النارِ5

5150. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'When matters become obscure for you like the darkness of the night, then turn to the Quran, for it is the mediating intercessor and the trustworthy deviser. Whoever puts it in front of them, it will lead them to Heaven, and whoever puts it behind them, it will drag them to Hell'.6

5151. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله - لَمّا قِيلَ لَهُ : اُمَّتُكَ سَتُفتَتَنُ ، فَسُئلَ : ما المَخرَجُ مِن ذلكَ ؟ - : كتابُ اللَّهِ العَزيزُ ، الذي لا يَأتيهِ الباطِلُ مِن بَينِ يَدَيهِ ولا مِن خَلفِهِ ، تَنزيلٌ مِن حَكيمٍ حَميدٍ ، مَنِ ابتَغَى العِلمَ في غَيرِهِ أضَلَّهُ اللَّهُ7

5151. The Prophet (SAWA), when it was said to him that his community will be tested, they asked how they may be delivered from it, to which he replied, 'The noble Book of Allah that cannot be overcome with falsehood, neither from in front nor from behind. It is descended from the all-Wise, the Praised One. Allah will lead astray whoever seeks knowledge in other than it.'8

5152. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله: علَيكُم بالقرآنِ، فاتَّخِذُوهُ إماماً وقائداً9

5152. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'You must adhere to the Quran, so take it as an Imam and a leader.'10

5153. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : فَضلُ القرآنِ على‏ سائرِ الكلامِ كَفَضلِ اللَّهِ على‏ خَلقِهِ11

5153. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The superiority of the Quran over any other speech is as the superiority of Allah over His creation.'12

5154. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : القرآنُ غِنىً ، لا غِنىً دونَهُ ، ولا فَقرَ بعدَهُ13

5154. 5163. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The Quran is rich, and there is no richness without it, and no poverty after it.'14

5155. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : مَن اُعطِيَ القرآنَ فَظَنَّ أنّ أحَداً اُعطِيَ أكثَرَ ممّا اُعطيَ فقد عَظَّمَ صَغيراً وصَغَّرَ كبيراً15

5155. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Whoever is given the Quran, and then doubts that someone has been given something more than him, this person has aggrandized something little and belittled something great.'16

5156. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : مَن أرادَ عِلمَ الأوَّلينَ والآخِرينَ فَلْيُثَوِّرِ القرآنَ‏17 ،18

5156. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Whoever wants the knowledge of the first and the last should explore the Quran.' 1920

5157. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : فَتَجلّى‏ لَهُم سبحانَهُ في كتابِهِ مِن غَيرِ أن يَكُونوا رَأوهُ بما أراهُم مِن قُدرَتِهِ21

5157. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He, most High, has manifested Himself for them in His Book, without them seeing Him, by showing them His power.'22

5158. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : اللَّهَ اللَّهَ في القرآنِ ، لا يَسبِقُكُم بالعَمَلِ بهِ غَيرُكُم23

5158. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Allah Allah [i.e. I advise you] with the Quran, nobody other than you should be quicker in acting according to it.'24

5159. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : تَعَلَّمُوا كتابَ اللَّهِ تباركَ وتعالى‏ ؛ فإنّهُ أحسَنُ الحَديثِ وأبلَغُ المَوعِظَةِ ، وتَفَقَّهُوا فيه فإنّهُ رَبيعُ القُلوبِ ، واستَشفُوا بنُورِهِ فإنّه شِفاءٌ لِما في الصُّدورِ ، وأحسِنُوا تِلاوَتَهُ فإنّهُ أحسَنُ القَصصِ25

5159. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Learn the Book of Allah Almighty; for it is the best of speech and the most eloquent exhortation. Get educated through it, for it is the spring of the hearts. Get cured by its light, for it is the cure for everything in the heart. Excel in its recitation for it is the best of stories.'26

5160. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : إنّ فيهِ شِفاءً مِن أكبَرِ الداءِ ، وهُو الكُفرُ والنِّفاقُ ، والغَيُّ والضَّلالُ27

5160. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'In it there is the cure for the greatest sickness, which is disbelief, hypocrisy, error, and going astray.'28

5161. الإمامُ زينُ العابدينَ عليه السلام : لو ماتَ مَن بَينَ المَشرِقِ والمَغرِبِ لَما استَوحَشتُ بعدَ أن يكونَ القرآنُ مَعي29

5161. Imam Zayn al-Abidin (AS) said, 'If everyone from the east to the west was to die, I would not feel lonely if I had the Quran with me.'30

Notes

1. الحِجر : 87

2. Quran 15 :87

3. القمر : 17

4. Quran 54 :17

5. كنز العمّال : 4027

6. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 4027

7. تفسير العيّاشيّ : 1 / 6 / 11 ، اُنظر تمام الحديث

8. Tafsir al-Ayyashi, v. 1, p. 6, no. 11

9. كنز العمّال : 4029

10. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 4029

11. بحار الأنوار :92 / 19 / 18

12. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 92, p. 19, no. 18

13. بحار الأنوار : 92 / 19 / 18

14. Ibid. v. 92, p. 19, no. 18

15. معاني الأخبار : 279

16. Maani al-Akhbar, p. 279

17. فليُثَوِّر القرآن : أي لينقّر عنه ويفكّر في معانيه وتفسيره وقراءته (النهاية : 1 / 229 )

18. كنز العمّال : 2454

19. Meaning that they should contemplate in its meaning and interpret its exegesis. (See: al-Nihaya, v. 1, p. 229)

20. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 2454

21. نهج البلاغة : الخطبة 147

22. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 147

23. نهج البلاغة : الكتاب 47

24. Ibid. Letter 4

25. تحف العقول : 150

26. Tuhaf al-Uqul, 150

27. نهج البلاغة : الخطبة 176

28. Ibid. Sermon 176

29. الكافي : 2 / 602 / 13

30. al-Kafi, v. 2, p. 602, no. 13

1510 - القُرآنُ في كُلِّ زَمانٍ جَديدٌ

1510. THE QUR'AN IS NEW IN EVERY ERA

5162. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : لا تُخلِقُهُ كَثرَةُ الرَّدِّ ووُلوجُ السَّمعِ1

5162. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The frequency of its recitation and its falling on ears does not render it old.'2

5163. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام - لمّا سُئلَ : ما بالُ القرآنِ لا يَزدادُ علَى النَّشرِ والدَّرسِ إلّا غَضاضَةً؟ - : لأنَّ اللَّهَ تباركَ وتعالى‏ لم يَجعَلْهُ لِزمانٍ دونَ زَمانٍ ، ولا لِناسٍ دونَ ناسٍ ، فهُو في كلِّ زَمانٍ جَديدٌ ، وعِند كُلِّ قَومٍ غَضٌّ إلى‏ يَومِ القِيامَةِ3

5163. Imam al-Sadiq (AS), when asked, 'Why is it that the Quran only increases in freshness the more it is promulgated and taught?' He replied, 'Because Allah, Blessed and most High, did not make the Quran for a certain time and not another, or for certain people and not others. It is new in every time and fresh for all people until the Day of Judgment.'4

Notes

1. نهج البلاغة : الخطبة 156

2. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 156

3. بحار الأنوار : 92 / 15 / 8 وعن يعقوب بن السكّيت النحوي قال : سألت أبا الحسن الثالث عليه السلام ما بال القرآن - وذكر نحوه - بحار الأنوار : 92 / 15 / 9

4. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 92, p. 15, no. 8