Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Aristotelian Perspectives for Post-modern Reason (I)

Phronesis, Scientific Rationality and Environmental Responsibility

Alfredo Marcos

University of Valladolid

Department of Philosophy

Plaza del Campus s/n,

47011 Valladolid, Spain

amarcos@fyl.uva.es

Table of Contents

Introduction. 3

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism. 7

Phronesis in Aristotle 12

Prudence and Scientific Rationality: ‘Do not block the way of inquiry.’ 15

Prudence and Environmental Responsibility: ‘May human life remain possible.’ 19

Conclusion. 23

Notes 24

Introduction

In the Modern Age, certainty became the highest and most sought-after espistemic value, even more valued than truth, and the so-called scientific method was seen as the surest path to certainty. Indeed, human reason became identified with the application of a supposed scientific method of Cartesian or Baconian inspiration. The domain of the practice became considered either one more area for the mere application of the scientific method, an application which would lead to human progress, or as an area beyond reason. One of the stereotyped convictions attributed to the enlightened mentality is this: insofar as human life in all its extremes becomes more rational, that is, more scientific, practical problems will begin to be solved. Indeed, Rousseau, in hisDiscourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750), pointed out that human progress did not always go hand in hand with scientific and technical progress, which today is a self-evident truth that is not discussed. On the other hand, dual accounting, that is the consideration that science is fully rational and the other areas of human activity are not, as well as an insult to common sense, has rebounded against science itself, for its practical aspects cannot be hidden, and it is hardly possible to parcel off a purely logical context, as that of justification set out to be.

It is obvious that not even the application of a supposed scientific method can guarantee the progressive character of our practical decisions. To this evidence there has been added the recognition of science’s own practical aspects. This evolution has convinced many of the impossibility of obtaining certainty even in the domain of science, which has given rise to diverse forms of desperation regarding the abilities of human reasoning. This oscillation between the obsession for certainty and desperation with regard to reason has been the tune most frequently danced to in modern times.

Yet today we do not want environmental problems to be left entirely up to the expert’s decision or the irrational imposition of power or arbitrariness, but to be tackled in reasoned dialogue, on a footing of equality, by scientists, technicians, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, private individuals, representatives of social movements - and indeed philosophers! We are recognizing, at least implicitly, the possibility of being reasonable in an area where we do not expect absolute certainty, and we accept that human reason goes beyond the limits of science and technology, that reason is more deeply rooted in human life than a mere method could ever be. To reach this point we have had to come a long way as far as our concept of reason and science is concerned, and have also needed a great deal of experience - bittersweet experience - regarding the practical consequences of science. Everything would seem to show, then, that the most typical extreme positions of modern times are being abandoned, and that we have entered the post-modern period[1] .

My intention in these pages is to explore the possibilities of a project of basically Aristotelian inspiration for the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects of reason, for the search for a happy medium between the extremes of logicism and irrationalism. In my opinion, this outlook has much to contribute to the on-going debate on the rationality of science and on the environmental questions that its application brings up. This is, indeed, a particular aspect of the relationship between reason and practice, but not just any aspect: traditional philosophical problems are arising now, and they will continue to come up in the future, in direct connection with environmental matters - this will be an area and a way for the classical topics of philosophy to reappear. Rationality, good and evil, justice, the relationship between being and value, the objectivity or subjectivity of knowledge, etc., are venerable philosophical topics that we shall have to reconsider in the light of environmental problems, as they were once tackled in connection with questions of politics, theology, society, science and economy.

I shall now outline the steps that my exposition will follow, together with other considerations necessary for it to fall within the limits of a short piece. In the first place, we need a correct characterization of Modern Age which makes it possible to explain the causes of a bad relationship between theory and practice. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted task. Here we can hardly even approach a full idea of modernity. What we can do, however, is point out one of its most essential characteristics[2] , in some wise the cause of many others and especially near to the interests of this paper. I mean the predilection for certainty, which is a constant of the modern spirit, just like the energetic and cyclic irrationalist reactions. Obsession with certainty and sceptical desperation are mutual causes of each other like pre-Socratic opposites. We shall speak of this insection 2 (‘Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism’) .

Secondly, we must go through the Aristotelian concepts which may, in my opinion, take us out of this thankless to-ing and fro-ing. What I mean basically is the Aristotelian notions of prudence (phronesis ) and practical truth (aletheia praktike ). Insection 3 (Prudence in Aristotle) , I shall set out the contents of Aristotelian prudence and the contribution that it can make to the present debate. An analogous study of the notion of practical truth will be set out in the second part of this paper[3] .

The concept of prudence is one that has been taken from the area of Aristotelian practical philosophy, where absolute certainty is not expected, but neither are decisions left to mere arbitrariness or imposition. The novelty consists in that, when we recognize, as we do today, that science itself is a human action, the notion taken from practical philosophy may be used for understanding and integrating scientific rationality. When science is characterized as an activity governed by prudence, it moves away from both the logicist and the irrationalist poles, from the obsession with certainty and from the ‘anything goes’, from algorithm and anarchism. Furthermore, if science is made a prudential activity, it will be much easier for us to connect its particular way of rationality with that of discussions, decisions and environmental actions.

Although it is true that Aristotelian notions can be suggestive, it is not true that they do no more than answer contemporary questions. For them to be active in the on-going debate on the relationship between theoretical reason and practical reason, they must be developed,updated through contemporary texts. The profit from this manœuvre is double: it makes Aristotle’s concepts available for the present debate and gives some contemporary ideas a very comprehensive and fertile philosophical framework, the Aristotelian framework. In the remaining sections. I shall tryto bring to the current debate the Aristotelian notion of prudence through the fallibilism of Peirce and Popper and through Hans Jonas’ imperative of responsibility. The fallibilist attitude is, to my mind, the most suitable post-modern characterization of scientific rationality and of human rationality, and applied to environmental problems it would give rise to the so-called principle of responsibility.

Insection 4 (Prudence and scientific rationality: Do not block the way of inquiry ) , I maintain that in science a fallibilistic attitude alone opens the doors to prudential reason, and that the ontological and anthropological bases of prudence are also suitable for fallibilism, founding it and encouraging it. In Aristotle, there are certain fallibilistic attitudes but they are ambiguous and combine with other statements in which science is characterized as universal and necessary knowledge. In this regard, Peirce’s texts are most useful and clearest, and, of course, nearest to the present problems of science. Fallibilism is for him an attitude, that is something practical - rather than a concept or a rule it is the scientific attitudepar excellence . On the basis of the fallibilist attitude there stands what may be the ultimate and most universal rule of scientific rationality:Do not block the way of inquiry .

Insection 5 (Prudence and environmental responsibility: May human life remain possible ), I set out to bring the Aristotelian idea of prudence to the on-going debate on the environment. I shall proceed as in the previous case, showing its proximity to and continuity with the present notion of responsibility as treated by Hans Jonas. Again we have an Aristotelian concept that can be developed or, as Jonas himself would say, improved on, by a notion of today. In return, this present notion is supported by a very articulate and coherent ontology. Jonas sets out the so-called principle of responsibility as the ultimate element of the moral control of our relationship with the environment:Proceed in such a way that you do not endanger the conditions for humanity’s indefinite continuity on Earth .

I consider that Peirce’s and Jonas’s formulations - each in its own area, respectively that of science and that of ethics - the expression of one and the same attitude, of one and the sameactual - and therefore post-modern - way of understanding rationality, and that both fit perfectly into a metaphysical framework of Aristotelian inspiration. Essentially, these ideas are convergent, and respond to one attitude and may be based on one Aristotelian conception of reality, and together they offer a good answer to questions for their scientific rationality and their environmental responsibility.

The principles of Peirce and Jonas can, however, be taken as inadequate as a characterization of human action, for they do not take into account its creative aspects. The truth is that both, though they do not guarantee it, are directed towardscreative discovery : they set out to ensure that it will be possible at any moment, while nurturing and fomenting the conditions for it and removing obstacles. They uphold the openness of human action so that it can adjust to the future course of events, always open and never completely determined. The present article will therefore require a later development in which the notion of creative discovery is tackled along with its connection with the Aristotelian concept ofpractical truth .

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism

Among the characteristics of modern thought is the predilection for certainty[4] . The search for certainty has been one of the signs of identity of a whole intellectual tradition, of what Husserl[5] calls ‘European science’. According to Husserl, the abandonment of this search steeps us in crisis, in scepticism or in any type of naturalism. However, as Kolakowski[6] rightly observes, neither Descartes nor Husserl managed to distinguish between the subjective feeling of evidence and the objective evidence of truth. Consequently, in many of the modern philosophical traditions, the pursuit of certainty has become a threat to the pursuit of truth, an impulse towards different types of idealism and a cause of crisis (by inference and by reaction) rather than an antidote to it.

The pursuit of certainty -infallibilism , in the words of Laudan - is one of the legacies of Cartesian philosophy. One could state, as Clarke does, that Cartesian science is defined in terms of certainty rather than in terms of the truth of the explanations proposed.[7] A text in which Decartes himself sets this point out clearly is:

‘What can it matter to us for something to be absolutely false if anyway we believe it and we do not have the slightest suspicion that it is false?’[8]

Or, if a negative formulation is required, ‘any knowledge that can be rendered doubtful must not be called scientific’[9] and ‘I treat [...] as false everything which is merely likely’[10] These words give the tone of what would from then on be the object of the quest for the scientific method.

It is, in any event, a question of establishing methods whose results will be certain knowledge, methods which we can only trust, whether or not subjective certainty is accompanied by objective truth.

Francis Bacon initiated another route of access to certainty, this time with an empirical and inductive character. According to Bacon, the inductive method is theart of invention andmachine , as well asformula ,clear and radiant light [11] , and other similar boons. Those of Bacon’s ideas with the greatest influence on subsequent scientific thought are those which he expressed in his second book of theNovum Organum , that is his inductive logic, the so-called Baconian method. In general, and as Rossi states, many have seen in Bacon the constructor of a gigantic ‘logic machine’ doomed to not being used. With the Baconian method, according to Spedding, we cannot do anything. We consider it a subtle, elaborate and ingenious mechanism, but one which can produce nothing[12] . In spite of everything, Bacon’s image as the founder of the new science thanks to his discovery of the inductive method was greatly appreciated by the founders of theRoyal Society and the authors of the great illustratedEncyclopædia .

In what situation do we place the practical with regard to rationality when the first value is certainty?

Many modern thinkers begin their writings with the observation of the disappointing state of the philosophy of human things in comparison with natural philosophy, that is the natural science. Dissension and lack of certainty, both in metaphysics and in moral philosophy, are the points causing the greatest unrest. Both Descartes and Hume, to mention two of the most noteworthy, feel that the model that inquiry into mankind should follow is that of natural and formal sciences, which have already opened up a path, a method to certainty and consensus. So, Descartes set out to find ‘the highest and most perfect moral science, which, presupposing a knowledge of other sciences, is the ultimate degree of wisdom’[13] . Naturally, Descartes had to settle indefinitely for what he called  ‘provisional morals’. Hume stated with his empiricist approach base on the inductive method, ‘Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension’[14] . This science will imply the extension of the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy to the study of human nature, and within it to the study of morals. Regarding politics, Hume has still fewer doubts, and states categorically that it can be reduced to a science endowed with a degree of certainty almost as perfect as that of mathematics[15] .

But this naturalist approach to the study of man, which in principle promises the so longed-for certainty, leads to further disappointments and carries with it the germ of its own destruction, in the long term threatening natural science itself, which will always be an activity and product of human freedom and reason. Today we know from experience how these tendencies implicit in the naturalist position itself have been developed, but in Hume, the whole trajectory is already indicated. Naturalization of moral studies seems to demand a methodological reduction of the normative and the evaluative, which will end up being established as a definitive ontological reduction of human reason and freedom, which are mutually inseparable and inaccessible to the empirical method and never totally explained from strictly naturalist bases. Thence are derived an emotivism and an irrationalism which threaten science itself insofar as its practical aspects are recognized along with its inability to produce absolutely certain knowledge. Hume assures that ‘We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’[16] . Paradoxical though this may seem, this resignation that the practical should be the place for feelings derives from a reduced notion of reason, excessively bound up with a given idea of science and method and an extreme valuation of certainty.

In Hume there is no renunciation of certainty, the basis of which is confided to habit, but one of reason. Predilection for certainty leads Hume to irrationalism, not to scepticism[17] . Karl Popper sums up the situation as follows, saying that, according to Hume, the scientific method is inductive, but:

‘... induction is completely invalid as an inference. There is not a shadow of a logical argument that would support the inference to a generalization from statements about the past (such as past repetitions of some 'evidence'). He [Hume] said that in spite of its lack of logical validity, induction plays an indispensable part in practical life [...] Thus there is a paradox.Even our intellect does not work rationally '. [p.94] [...] This led Hume, one of the most reasonable thinkers of all time, to give up rationalism and look at man not as endowed with reason but as a product of blind habit. Acording to Russellthis paradox of Hume's is responsible for the schizophrenia of modern man ’. [p.95][18]

If anything can be learnt for the present it is that we lack a notion of practical reason that is well structured and free of traditional errors. Practical criteria cannot depend on a supposed scientific method and cannot aspire to confer absolute certainty on our decisions, but we do not have to go without reason in practical situations, as there is no need to identify reason with a supposed scientific method or with the sure way to certainty. In part, the obstacles encountered by Hume and Descartes in the development of an idea of practical reason have been abolished, for today we are aware that sciences are not governed strictly by the Cartesian method or by the inductive method, and that they are far from reaching complete certainty, which does not make them directly irrational. Above everything else it is the renunciation of the obsession with certainty that enables us today to imagine a suitable notion of practical reason.

It will be said that a notion of practical reason already existed in Kant. And this is so. But two observations must be made in this regard. In Kant, unlike in Hume, there is a radical denaturalization of practical reason, which today seems unacceptable. Such is the case that for Kant, prudence mainly has nothing to do with practical reason, but with theoretical reason, paradoxical though this may seem. This means that he excludes it from the nucleus of morals and considers it a mere technical ability for the pursuit of happiness[19] . In the Modern period, from Descartes to Bacon, any technique was considered to be no more than applied science, and that if any problem arose in practice, it was due to deficiencies in theory. This view of science as immediately applicable soon spread, as we have seen in Hume, to morals, so the application of a science of man, which would not present genuinely technical problems, but only theoretical ones, would solve the problems of human happiness. Philosophers of the Enlightenment felt attracted by this new way of approaching human affairs. Kant shared the technological optimism of his day although he was the first to resist the concept of morals as a technique, that is, as the application of a science of man to the pursuit of happiness (happiness, by the way, previously defined by that very science). Kant, on the other hand, sought to protect morals from influences external to the very freedom of the subject. He did this by excluding the traditional contents from the nucleus of practical philosophy. According to Kant, prudence lies rather in theoretical reason, as it could become a mere applied science[20] . In the interests of autonomy of reason, Kant separates morals radically from nature, setting it in the sphere of the freedom of the subject. The attempt to protect morals from naturalism leads to the new excess of putting it in the hands of logicism. The categorical imperative is, at root, of a logical character:Behave in such a way that you might also want your maxim to become universal law . The ‘might also want’ invoked here is, as Jonas[21] states, that of reason an its concord with itself, an ability which would only be negated by self-contradiction.

In Aristotle, on the other hand, happiness is man’s natural and legitimate aim, whereby it was possible, according to Aubenque, ‘to integrate thetechnical moment of the correct choice of means in the definition of morality’[22] .

The second observation concerns the certainty of what Kant takes to be really practical. No comparison can be made between the splendid certainty which Kant attributes to Newtonian science and thepractical faith in postulates necessary to give consistence to the practical use of reason. In an atmosphere of extreme valuation of certainty and of the scientific method, the Kantian foundation for practical reason, which, in short, leads to the postulates of human freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, was not believed or taken seriously. Kant expressed his admiration and  respect for two areas of reality,the starry sky above me and the moral law inside me . But to keep them separate is not sustainable, for indeed he who looks at the stars and grasps moral law is a human being who takes part in the two areas of reality, as a system subject to physical laws and as a free being. The integration of the two spheres seems necessary without the negation of either of them. But if we separate to such an extent the degree of certainty that we attribute to the knowledge of each of them, and if we set such a high value on certainty, then the so-called practical use of reason runs the risk of immediately being seen as one more mask of the irrational, as a concession of Kant’s to his beliefs, affections, desires or interests. The historical proof that this two sets of accounts cannot be tenable for long is what happened to Kantian tradition. Either it tended towards an idealism that suppressed the peculiarity of the practical and made it depend for everything on theory by identifying the rational with the real, or it drifted towards an irrationalism in which the pure use of reason had the same fate as the practical use, until it was seen as one more mask of the will to power[23] . The pure and practical uses of reason must be integrated and must support each other, for today we know that they either stand or fall together[24] . But this requires a reconsideration of the ideal of certainty and of the nature of science which has only come about in the twentieth century.

Since Hegel and since Nietzsche, several campaigns have been launched in the pursuit of certainty. One of the last ones in favour of certainty, automatism and the segregation of the practical, based on the identification of reason with science, was called Neo-positivism (and it was pursued as the so-calledreceived view ). Its internal decadence apart, it was Popper’s philosophy and Kuhn’s criticisms that put an end to this venture, and with it to a way of making philosophy of science. Kuhn laid forth the practical aspects of scientific rationality. As he states - in my opinion, rightly - ‘Recognizing that criteria of choice can function as values when incomplete as rules has, I think, a number of striking advantages [p. 331] .’[25] . In Popper, a clear renunciation of the ideal of certainty and a re-instatement of truth are to be notice.

The recognition of the practical implication of science, both in its genesis and applications and in its justification, and the renunciation of the idea of certainty no doubt mark the end of the epoch in which the supposedly scientific method was shown as the zenith and model of human reason, where all philosophy aspired to ideal of certainty or took its failure as the failure of reason, first in the practical terrain and then, as an inexorable consequence, in the theoretical. Today there is an abandonment of the logico-linguistic conception of theories in favour of a pragmatic conception of science. Science, it is said, is action. But, as previously the possibility of a practical reason was not clear, nor was its articulation with theory, the rationality of science itself has been questioned. Kuhn has been accused of being relativist and irrationalist, an accusation which he has rejected, but without going so far as to construct a philosophical basis on which to base this rejection. For their parts, Peirce and Popper, each in his own way, have tackled this subject but both have recoiled, paradoxically, to quasi-Hegelian positions.

Science taken as action, as the art of research, of teaching, diffusion of knowledge and application, etc., can and must be judged with criteria that cannot in themselves be exclusively scientific or merely arbitrary, but a part of the general rationality of human life. The birth, then, of new disciplines, of new ways of making philosophy of science, such asbioethics ,environmental ethics andSTS studies , is not just a collateral phenomenon, a momentary collision point between science and practical thought, but an indication of a new way of conceiving rationality itself, or at least an indication of the need for this new reason.

I believe that the time has come to perfect concepts and attitudes that have always had a vocation to integrate the theoretical and practical planes without ruling out either of them, concepts and attitudes which were born to avoid the swing of the pendulum between the logicist and irrationalist extremes (between Permenides and Heracleitus, between Charybdis and Scylla).

Phronesis in Aristotle

Aristotle characterizes prudence (phronesis ) as

‘A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.’[26] .

By means of this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition, or state of capacity (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be knowledge linked with human action. In the second place, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technique (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral virtues and sets it among the intellectual ones. Finally, the fact that it deals with what is good and bad for mankind, and not right and wrong in an abstract way, sets prudence apart from wisdom (sophia ).

So far we have sketched the limits of the notion of prudence and others akin to it, and the points where they overlap[27] , but we must not forget that ‘Regardingpractical wisdom [phronesis ] we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it’.[28]

Texts about prudence suggest that it is an intellectual virtue, but that it implies experience lived, which concerns both means and ends, for its final horizon is the good life as a whole, and that it is at the service of wisdom, that is, it is an instrument for obtaining this. However, Aristotle goes as far as to say:

‘We ought to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom [phronimos ] not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.’[29]

In general, prudence pursues wisdom and wisdom stimulates human prudence. It is best to ‘possess both, or preferably prudence’[30] . Of animals, Aristotle says that they too are prudent[31] , but as they lack wisdom their prudence is certainly limited. For all this, prudence is worth pursuing for itself, regardless of its possible usefulness, given that it is a virtue[32] .

Prudence is a virtue, and virtue, for Aristotle, is:

‘a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [phronimos ] would determine it.’[33]

Virtue, therefore, is a habit or disposition to choosing the right medium between excess and shortage. But this is not easy, for the right means is not the arithmetic mean. To find it we need another rule. This rule will be the one established by the prudent man and applied just as he would apply it. In short, we cannot determine what is or is not virtuous without the concurrence of the prudent man.

The mid point is dictated by reason or by the straight rule of the prudent man. This reason or straight rule is, rather, correct reason, that is corrected reason. It is the limit to which a process of correction tends, one of elimination of errors, by relation to the end sought:

‘[...] there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (katà tòn orthòn lógon )’[34] .

Therefore, prudence requires experience:

‘Young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.’[35]

Experience is time and memory, but not just any lapse of time, but one which one has spent reflecting, trying to understand the nature of the things we see, of the actions we do and what happens to us. Experience is the memory of a time lived and thought, for it is the fruit of succeeding corrections.

But let us remember that prudence itself is a virtue and, moreover, ‘it is impossible to be practically wise [phronimos ] without being good’[36] . Therefore, nobody could be prudent without following the ruled dictated by prudence. Nobody could be prudent without having been already. This vicious circle (or virtuous one, depending on how we look on it) is resolved by education and action, that is, by action steered by somebody prudent until one becomes prudent oneself[37] .

The prudence of an experienced person serves for drawing up rules, ‘since the universals are reached from the particulars’[38] . Butmethodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[39] .

Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule. Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision.

Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice. The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity (epieíkeia )[40] .

‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[41]

The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[42] .

But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[44] .

In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that:

‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand. But the latter no longer finds its model and guide in the former, and must look on its own level for a rule which, nevertheless, will still be intellectual or “dianoetic”.’[45]

This integration is achieved, then, through prudence and practical truth: scientific research is still part of human action and, as such, is subject to the ethical rule of prudence, and to the service of the ultimate of man’s ends, happiness, which in turn consists in true knowledge, as well as co-existence[46] and a moderate degree of welfare[47] .

Science is rooted in human life, in practical values, in time and in experience through prudence, which is a virtue and is intellectual; or, more correctly, through the prudent person. Furthermore, this prudential conception of human reason is rooted in a very realistic, profound, fruitful and commonly accepted idea of human nature: ‘desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire’[48] .

Discourse Four: Efforts to prove the Bay’at was of free choice after Zahra’s martyrdom

A suspicion

Sunni sources mention that Bay’at with Abu Bakr took place in a free atmosphere with a free choice. Ibne Abil Hadeed Motazalli (d. 656) has this to say in this aspect:

“This is what a group of narrators say and reputed persons of prominence among them too say. He (Ali) did not do Bay’at with Abu Bakr for six months. He remained in his house. He did not do Bay’at until the death of Fatima. When she died he did Bay’at voluntarily.”[92]

Cause of Zahra’s wrath against Abu Bakr

Readers by now must have become aware of the claim Sunni sources allege that Ali performed Bay’at with Abu Bakr by his own will and wish, after Zahra’s martyrdom!!

As if the only hindrance of his willing Bay’at was remaining alive of the daughter of the Prophet. And if there was delay in this for some months it was only because of this hindrance and there was no other reason!!

Such claims convey that Ali did not see any wrong in doing Bay’at in addition to his having recognized the legitimacy of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. The handicap was the daughter of the Prophet whom he revered and respected.

Therefore as soon as she passed away he hurried over to Abu Bakr and paid allegiance to him!!

It is nothing but a clever ploy to gain legitimacy of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and to cast doubts on the sacredness of the anger of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) on Abu Bakr and make it as insignificant as female emotion.[93]

Analysis and criticism about allegation that Bay’at with Abu Bakr took place with his (Ali’s) free choice becomes important:

Because Sahih Bukhari[94] and Muslim[95] mention that it entailed wrath of Zahra against Abu Bakr.

In fact, the text runs thus:

Likes of Muhammad bin Ismail Bukhari and Muslim bin Hajjaj Nishapuri have used words like: “So Fatima, daughter of Prophet of God, got enraged at Abu Bakr and left him (deserted). She boycotted him till her death.”[96]

“and Fatima got angry at Abu Bakr. So she left him and did not talk to him till she died.”[97]

They have mentioned these points in their books. Indeed, it had been their efforts to invalidate or discredit these narrations. So they took to vague claims such as Bay’at willingly after the martyrdom Zahra.”

They have cast suspicion on anger of God in the person of Zahra - Siddiqa Tahera - on Abu Bakr and her most elevated station.

First the allegation that Bay’at was by Ali’s desire should undergo a thorough scrutiny then alone would it enable us to rely on narrations regarding anger and discontent of Zahra against Abu Bakr. Criticism is necessary to bring out the treasury of history where its gleam and glitter will dazzle and astonish the fact-finding sights and blind the prejudiced eyes.[98]

On the basis of this to establish the falsehood of claim that Bay’at was of free choice goes parallel to defend Zahra’s anger against Abu Bakr. Exposing this matter will enable one to draw a line between wrong and right after the passing away of the Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.s.) especially regarding the discussion of Imamate and Caliphate.

Motive of Sunnis in proving the occurrence of this Bay’at?

With reference to suspicion surrounding the correctness of Bay’at of Imam Ali (a.s.) with Abu Bakr during the early stage of the usurpation of Ali’s Caliphate, defenders of Caliph have preferred to pave the way for another Bay’at free from all these troubles which the first Bay’at carried. They thought this would be advantageous to wipe out stigmas of shame, which the preceding events brought to them.

To get more familiar with the above refer to following sources:

Ibne Hazm: Al-Fasl Fil Milal Wan Nihal, Vol. 4, Pg. 235

Ibne Athir: Al-Kamil Fit Tarikh, Vol. 2, Pg. 10

Abil Fida: Al-Mukhtasar, Vol. 1, Pg. 165

Ibne Jauzi: Tadhkiratul Khawaas, Pgs. 60-61

Ibne Athim Kufi: Al-Futuh, Pg. 8

It is interesting that some have come under the influence of these writings of Sunni Sources and they say:

“Some say that Ali never did Bay’at with Abu Bakr. This is against historical reality. Such sayings are outcome of bigotry which conceals historical facts.”[99]

And more interesting is that other defenders of School of Caliphate allege that Imam Ali (a.s.) did Bay’at in the very early days of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate, and he did it with all his pleasure and willingness.

Some have inserted thoughts, which are their own created lies between the lines of their writings:

Ibne Abde Rabb: Al-Iqd al-Fareed, Vol. 4, Pg. 247

Tabari: Tarikh al-Umam wal Mulook, Vol. 3, Pg. 207

Ibne Katheer: Al-Sirah al-Nabawia, Vol. 4, Pg. 495

Nuwairi: Nihayat al-Arab, Vol. 4, Pg. 37

It should be mentioned here that the allegation is in open contrast with all historical documents. Further, it clearly contradicts the view of Sunni scholars, which says that Ali did not do Bay’at with Abu Bakr as long as Zahra was alive.[100]

In how many ways Sunnis narrate this incident?

These narrations can be divided into three categories:

Type One) Issue of Murtad (apostasy)

Type Two) Issue of the letter of Ali

Type Three) Special meeting of Ali with Abu Bakr

It must be mentioned that some have tried to establish legality of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate by means of these very narrations, which to them serve as a foundation. They go on and make claims like:

“After passing away of Prophet, Ali did not enter into Bay’at with Abu Bakr for a period. Then afterwards he agreed and did Bay’at with Abu Bakr.”[101]

“Ali refrained from Bay’at for a short period. But his high moral and generous nature impelled him to agree to Bay’at.”[102]

“Ali and a group of elder companions of Prophet refrained from Bay’at with Caliph whom they themselves had selected. But after a period they saw that their refusal to do Bay’at would result in undue repercussions in Islamic world. So later they paid allegiance. Secondly, they saw that one who had occupied the seat of Caliph is a man who would make every possible effort to strengthen Islam. This was the final aim and aspiration of Ali from Caliphate. So he did Bay’at.”![103]

Criticism of Three Standards in Narrations of Sunni Sources Concerning willing Bay’at

First standard: Scrutiny into allegation of becoming Murtad of some Arabs

Balazari (d. 279) writes:

“When the issue of apostasy arose Uthman came to Ali and said:

Cousin, as long as you do not give Bay’at no one will go out to fight these enemies. And he insisted on this so much that Ali came to Abu Bakr with Uthman and pledged allegiance.”

After Ali’s Bay’at to Abu Bakr Muslims became glad. They prepared to fight the Murtads and from every side people went to the battle.”![104]

In view of the above document the issue of this Bay’at can be divided into three original pivots, which are as follows:

1 - Apostasy of Arabs and its danger to Islam and Muslims.

2 - The allegation of Uthman that no one was willing to join the campaign to crush the movement as long as Ali refrains from Bay’at.

3 - A vast army set out to crush the apostates as a proof of completion of this Bay’at.

Allegation of Sunni Sect concerning the Bay’at having had taken place because of Murtads cannot be considered reliable

A) Investigation on reliability of this narration

The real pivot of this Bay’at is Arabs becoming Murtad in the time of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. Now we must see whether there is any or a little truth in it and to what extent.

Biographies in Sunni historical sources show a vast canvas of ‘Denial of Faith after accepting it’ (which in Arabic is Irtitaad - the noun of the Adjective Murtad) during Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. This creates a probability of imminent danger that could change into a terrible attack on Medina.

“Tabari from Saif and he from Sahl bin Yusuf narrates that: the various tribes of Thalaba bin Saad and other tribes who had associated with them under a pact like the tribe of Murra and Abas in a place called Abraq, which was in the territory of Rabaza. Another group from Bani Kinana too had joined this confederation. They became a large multitude, which this location fell short to house them all.

Being short of accommodation, they divided into two groups. One group remained in that same location, Abraq. The second group moved to another location named Zilqissa. Tolaiha Asadi who had claimed himself to be a Prophet sent help and forces to his brother, Jibal, who was the chief there.

Among these tribes, the tribes of Diyil and Laith and Madhij too were present. Auf, son of Falan bin Sanin, administered the Marra tribe in Abraq. The leadership of the tribe of Thalaba and Abas was responsibility of Harith bin Falan. Harith was one of the folk of the tribe of Bani Saba.

So their number went on increasing and their multitude widened.

These tribes delegated a number of their men to Medina as their representative. The representative of the Murtad groups that returned from Medina reported to their respective tribes the weakness and paucity of men in Medina. What they had witnessed in Medina they reported to their chiefs concerned. The weakness among Muslims, the little number of Muslims created greed in the minds of the chiefs of the various tribes gathered in Abraq. Their strength and extraordinary manpower encouraged them to attack Muslims and they got ready for it.

After three days, a large number Murtads started the most calculated attack on Medina by night.”![105]

These events are related as a preliminary ground for the battle of Abraq. This is the first battle of Murtad by the soldiers of Abu Bakr. Historians have stated these events in various versions but the point of apostasy is same. The danger inherent in it is reflected in the narration of Balazari.

In the course of Tabari’s narration of these developments and events, we come across preliminary events that preceded the Abraq battle. We give hereunder extract from Tabari:

“Abu Bakr got the intelligence of the attack designed by Murtads. He appointed Ali, Talha, Zubair and Ibne Masood at the entrance points of Medina.”[106]

In view of this allegation the Bay’at (of Ali) was concluded in those early days, that is when the Murtads delegated their representatives to Medina and Abu Bakr became aware of their plan.

Therefore Abu Bakr was able to provide the people of Medina with necessary elements of defense. According to the claims he (Abu Bakr) made Ali the commander of the army stationed at the entrance point to Medina.

There is a close link between the narration of Balazari about Bay’at and credibility of events related to the battle of Abraq. This link enhances credibility of Balazari and makes the events believable.

In spite of this, the events are surrounded by surmise and suspicion.

Investigation of correctness and occurrence of the Battle of Abraq and events following it

Allamah Askari in Volume Two of Abdullah bin Saba and other historical stories has dwelled much on the analysis of battles and victories during Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. In his analysis he has exposed the fabrications and lies of Saif bin Umar.

Regarding the reliability of report about Abraq battle and events ensued therefrom, which we have mentioned, he writes:

“Through serious research it should be said with certainty:

Things narrated with so many details about Abraq battle and story of Zilqissa[107] - all are fabricated and created by Saif. No historian except Saif has narrated them. So it is nothing but a lie and imagination of Saif.

Neither is true apostasy of most of these tribes whom Saif has accused of being Murtads. There was no gathering of Murtad in Abraq and Zilqissa. There is no basis of sending representatives of Murtad to Medina. Likewise, the choice of Abu Bakr has no base. There is no truth in it. Again, he posted soldiers at entry points of Medina. He sent army to fight them. All this is again wrong. Nothing of it is correct. The four battles[108]

which Saif has attributed to Abu Bakr are also without ground.”[109]

The following extracts from Rijaal books sufficiently prove that Saif bin Umar was a liar

“1 - Yahya bin Moin (d. 233) says about him:

His sayings are weak and feeble.

2 - Nasai, author of Sahih (d. 303) says:

Many have avoided him. They do not quote from him because of his not being honest or reliable.

3 - Abu Dawood (d. 275) says:

He is worthless. A great liar!

4 - Ibne Abi Hatim (d. 327) says:

They have ignored his narrations.

5 - Ibne al-Sakan (d. 353)

He is weak.

6 - Ibne Hibban (d. 354)

He used to invent traditions and narrate them attributing to some reliable source. He is accused of being an atheist. Saif is accused of creating false traditions.

7 - Darqutni (d. 385) says:

He is weak. His narrations are avoided.

8 - Hakim (d. 405) says:

His traditions are avoided because he is said to be an atheist.

9 - Firozabadi (d. 817) complier of Qamoos says:

He is weak.

10 - Ibne Hajar (d. 825) says:

He is weak.

11 - Suyuti (d. 911) says:

He is very weak.

12 - Safiuddin (d. 923) says:

He is considered weak.”[110]

Result

Most narrations regarding Bay’at quoted by Sunni writers are from Saif. Similar is the issue of Murtad and battle of Abraq. Hence it loses credit and does not carry any historical credibility.

B) Analysis of proof of this narration

The issue of Bay’at is related to the issue of Murtad and battle of Abraq. Its correctness too is related to the above.

In Sunni books, like Tarikh Tabari, the issue of Murtad and story of attack of Medina by Murtads commences from the battle of Abraq and ends at Umme Zamal becoming a Murtad.

Continuation of scrutiny about authenticity of Abraq battle and events following it

According to Sunni sources, Murtads after their defeat in Abraq battle invited the Tai tribes to co-operate with them and another battle took place in Zilqissa at Buzakha. They confronted eleven divisions of Abu Bakr’s army but were again defeated.

These people who were defeated for the second time gathered around a woman who had become Murtad. Her name was Umme Zamal. Again they posed danger to Islam. This movement too was crushed by forces of Caliph.[111]

On the basis of this authenticity of Bay’at, narrator of which is Balazari, is related to authenticity of the four battles:

1 - Battle of Abraq.

2 - Campaign at Zilqissa and battle at Buzakha.

3 - Apostasy of Tai tribe.

4 - Apostasy of Umme Zamal.

The interesting point is that some researchers consider all narrations relating to above events as fabricated. They give credibility only to developments that occurred at Zilqissa - and that too not totally. We quote some texts:

“Usamah along with his army returned to Medina from the battle of Syria. It was the time Abu Bakr was preparing for confrontation with Murtad. With a group of Muslims he left Medina and reached Zilqissa, which is twelve miles from Medina on route to Najd. He camped here and his army also remained alert.

Khalid bin Waleed was sent to Murtad tribes. Abu Bakr vested the command Ansaar to Thabit bin Qays and made Khalid commander-in-chief. Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to move towards Tolaiha and Oyinat bin Hisn who were stationed in the vicinity of Bani Asad tribe at a place called Buzakha.

In the meantime Abu Bakr told Khalid: Good will shortly ensue from this meeting of yours with my army at Khaiber. Of course Abu Bakr’s words were based on policy and were a trick. His idea was that the enemy would come to know; and this would create a dread in their hearts. It is concluded thus because Abu Bakr had already sent all his warriors with Khalid towards the enemy. There remained no one with Abu Bakr to be sent to the support of Khalid either to Buzakha or Khaiber.[112]

Yaqubi too has mentioned in his history the incident in which Abu Bakr moved towards Zilqissa and appointment of Khalid as Commander. Yaqubi adds that the appointment of Thabit as leader of Ansaar was after Ansaar objected to Abu Bakr why he did not appoint anyone of them as the commander.”[113]

“When we compare the narrations of Saif regarding Abraq battle and story of Zilqissa with narrations of other historians it obviously shows the imaginative mind of Saif. Because all other historians are unanimous in saying that Abu Bakr left Medina for battle only once. After the return of Usamah from Muta[114] he moved towards Zilqissa. There he provided a well-ordered army and vested Khalid with command of this army. He made Thabit chief of Ansaar under supervision of Khalid. Then Abu Bakr ordered them to move towards Buzakha to crush Tolaiha and those from tribes of Asad and Fuzara who had gathered around him.”[115]

“Other historians write regarding this that from groups living on outskirts of Medina only two tribes rose against Islam. One was Asad, the tribe of Tolaiha himself and the other was Fuzara a branch of Ghatfan and Ghatfan itself was a sub tribe of Qays Eylan. Except these two, no other tribe is seen aiding Tolaiha or fighting against Muslims.”[116]

“In the army of Tolaiha there were a few persons from Asad tribe, which was his own tribe and a few other from Fuzara tribe under the supervision of their chief Uyanna bin Hisn.”[117]

“Some historians again write that soldiers of Tolaiha assembled in Buzakha a populated place of Asad tribe. Khalid bin Waleed came from Zilqissa with two thousand seven hundred men from Fuzara and confronted them. A severe battle took place between them.”[118]

More interesting is the point that the issue of Bay’at of free choice is related to the issue of apostasy of Tai tribe while the fact is that:

“Tai is the same tribe, which was not Tolaiha’s supporter, but they took the stand against - Tolaiha. Whenever an army confronted Tolaiha, they too joined them against Tolaiha. They used to say: Abu Bakr must fight you so hard that you will name him Abul Fahal. Besides, he (Khalid) sought help from them in the battle against Tolaiha.”[119]

For the first time issue of Murtad was shown as a great danger:

1 - Usamah’s army had returned from Muta so Abu Bakr had no shortage from military aspect.

Therefore there was no need for him to demand Ali’s allegiance in order to call for volunteers.

2 - Tolaiha and his associates were not in considerable number and the issue of apostasy was not so widespread that it needed a huge army to be crushed.

As a matter of fact, the issue of Murtads was not a serious danger to threaten a town like Medina that it should have required demanding Ali to give Bay’at to Abu Bakr.

Result

The issue of Bay’at of free will of Imam Ali (a.s.) for the sake of crushing the revolt of Murtads is a thing added to historical documents. The propaganda disseminated on the wings of falsehood was so high that the issue of Murtads gained a ground.

Another look at the case of Apostasy of Arabs

The researchers have acknowledged the Murtad Arabs were few in number. In his research into the history of battles against Murtad, Allamah Askari has concluded that it was not such a serious matter.

The issue of apostasy was such that researchers have very simply passed by without pursuing it like Allamah Askari.[120] So the lies written by Tabari in this respect remained unchallenged. But when historical records and documents mentioned in Sunni books are scrutinized it proves that:

“The vastness of Arabian Peninsula caused the historians to believe that apostasy was also so widespread. While the limited number of inhabitants who accepted Islam during Prophet’s lifetime remained adherents of Islam.”[121]

“Most historians have exaggerated the matter. They imagined the length and breadth of Arabian Peninsula and fancied that the issue of Murtads[122] was also as widespread. So they wrote: The Arabs became Murtads - a superlative expression reflecting a wrong idea that all the population apostised while in fact it was not so. They exempted three towns: Medina, Mecca and Taif from being Murtad. But research shows a different picture. Many tribes were loyal to Islam and government at Medina. If was quite likely they even helped the central government in crushing Murtads.

Through historical testimonies and sources we shall prove that most of these tribes and people adhered to their faith in Islam and the exaggeration in this issue is uncalled for…

There are many reports that indicate people’s loyalty to Islam and their scorn of apostasy. A few instances are as under:

1 - Most historians are unanimous that there was no apostasy in Mecca, Medina and Thaqif and they even came out to help in crushing the apostates of Asad, Zibyan and Ghatfan.[123]

2. Loyalty of tribes living between Mecca, Medina and Taif like Muzina, Ghiffar, Johaina, Balla and…to Islam.[124]

After the Prophet’s passing away some of these tribes paid Zakat to Abu Bakr. The Caliph sought their help in his coming battle of Ridda.[125]

There are indications that some individuals of Amir and Hawazin also remained loyal to Islam. As mentioned in the report of Fujaat that Amir and Hawazin used to support all the Muslims of Sulaym tribe.[126]

A group among the tribe of Bani Kalb under leadership of Imrul Qays bin al-Asbagh and similarly a group from Bani al-Qain under leadership of Umar bin al-Hakam who was an agent of the Prophet, remained Muslims until the last.[127]

Besides these there are many in Yemen such as Nakha, Jofi, Murad and Madhij who separated themselves from Aswad Ansi and protected themselves from apostasy…

A large number of tribes from Bani Tameem also remained Muslims and they remained firm against the claim of prophethood of Sajjah. On the basis of this it can be said that among the Bani Tameem the number of those who remained Muslims was more than those who had doubts about Islam or those who had apostised.

Maqdasi has absolved many from Nakha’a and Kinda from being Murtads in addition to Bahrain, Mecca and Medina.[128]

The fact is that to give such vastness to the issue of apostasy is a mistake. So the right thing is that some claimants of prophethood and their followers and some others who attacked the central government of Medina may be called apostates. Even the claimants of prophethood cannot be called apostates because they had not accepted Islam in the first place that they could turn away from it.

Perhaps the fact that apostates were scattered in a large area caused the historians to believe that they were in such a large number.

In Tarikh Ridda while listing apostate tribes the following are absolved from being Murtads: Abas, some from Ashja, Ghiffar, Juhaina, Muzina, Kaab, Thaqif, Tai, Huzail, people of Sarrah, Bajila, Khathama, Hawazin, Nasr, Jusham, Saad bin Bakr, Abdul Qays, Doos, Shajeeb, Hamadan and Anba in Sanaa.[129]

…the result is that the issue of apostasy was not so widespread in Arabian Peninsula as historians have made it out to be and most of them remained Muslims and were loyal to Islam.”[130]

Conclusion

As you saw the magnitude of apostasy described by Waqidi and Tabari is not having any truth as shown in analysis of Allamah Askari. But researchers have not followed the line of Allamah Askari and thus apostasy remains in the same exaggerated condition.

On the basis of this from every angle you look at the issue of apostasy you will conclude that:

The apostasy of Arabs was neither so widespread nor such a serious danger to Islam.

Therefore its suppression has no connection with the Bay’at of Imam Ali (a.s.) to Abu Bakr.[131]

Three main outcomes of scrutiny of the issue of Apostasy of Arabs

Conclusion 1 - The scrutiny can be summed up in one sentence: The issue of apostasy of Arabs was a fabricated case. Bay’at of Imam Ali (a.s.) had no bearing on it as Sunnis claim.

Conclusion 2 - Even if for the sake of argument we even accept the issue of apostasy of Arabs in the magnitude as is claimed, yet we do not see any Bay’at taking place. In narration of Balazari the words (so he gave Bay’at) are fabricated and a presumption of narrator himself.

Conclusion 3 - Even if for the sake of argument we accept the narration of Balazari it does not exercise any influence on historical realities as the Bay’at itself was a forced one. It was only a show.

In other words, the Bay’at which occurred as a show was basically invalid.

On the margins of analysis of issue of apostasy of Arabs

If for the sake of argument we suppose that the matter of Bay’at is correct we must pursue the concealed motives and aims of Caliphate about the Bay’at and make a fresh analysis of circumstances surrounding its occurrence.[132]

Because in this issue there is likelihood of preparation of background to a psychological war in Medina as Uthman’s meetings with Ali shows.

This idea arises because the name of Tai has crept in the case of Tolaiha and battle of Buzakha while according to historical records they were not apostates but among supporters of Abu Bakr.[133]

Therefore there is probability that from the very base, the matter narrated by Tabari on the authority of Saif[134] -was not a lie but the tribe of Tai demonstrated Irtitaad to the benefit and advantage of Abu Bakr. It can be said to be a pre-prepared game with mutual understanding. An emergency atmosphere is created in Medina. And they send representatives to put awe in the people which evidently served to benefit the Caliph.

Therefore it can be said:

Upon the martyrdom of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) all the attention of the system of Caliphate concentrated in subduing the opponents living outside Medina.[135]

In the meantime, that which was a source of anxiety to the Caliph was effort of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) to overthrow his regime. That also at a time when he wanted to send all available troops out of Medina and his own departure from Medina to Zilqissa.

Therefore they had to find a way that this time they had to without any ceremony and show off and also without any display of threats and enmity take assurance from Amirul Momineen (a.s.) that he will assume silence and abstain from an armed uprising.

In these circumstances they initiated a systematic propaganda.

So first of all they spread the terror of attack of apostates on Medina.

Then Uthman pressurized Ali to give Bay’at so that the regime can mobilize people for suppressing the apostates and that there was no other way to defend Islam and Muslim.

Because of this propaganda it seemed that if Ali still refused allegiance it would at least tarnish his character in the view of people and put a question mark on his rightfulness.

From this aspect Bay’at to the Caliphs was under the pressure of public opinion and widespread propaganda of government machinery against His Eminence (a.s.).

In the analysis of this issue Allamah Askari writes:

“The correct Bay’at is that which must be given at pleasure and with willingness, otherwise it is not Bay’at. It is only a handshake, or at the most a show of Bay’at.

So Bay’at of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) after six months took place under pressure and for preservation of Islam. So in fact, it was a Bay’at without any willingness and just a show and a handshake.”[136]

Last Reminder

More interesting is the point that some narrations regarding the issue of apostasy do not mention anything about the occurrence of Bay’at of Ali, they only repeat the matter of silence.

These documents clearly prove that the phrase ‘so he did Bay’at’ in the narration of Balazari is an interpolation by the narrator and there is no truth in it.

Tabari Imami (4th century) narrates from Waqidi (d. 207):

“When Arabs turned Murtad, Uthman came to Ali and said: O, cousin of Prophet! As long as you do not do Bay’at with Abu Bakr, no one goes to fight the enemy. You yourself are better aware of things. Your viewpoint is correct. But I fear this present issue could develop into a great trouble and might bring havoc to all of us.

Uthman kept on insisting on Ali and his pleadings bore fruit. Finally he brought Ali to Abu Bakr.

Muslims became happy with this development. From every side the horse riders came out. People became desirous to fight. They got ready for the battle.

His attitude that he will neither undertake a movement not an armed uprising alone acted as a deterrent. Because swords of mischief were pulled out and flames of havoc were leaping high. The lances were directed against Islam and Muslims. So he gave up demand of restoration of his rights.[137] ”[138]

Second standard: Scrutiny into narrations regarding the letter of Ali

Another document used to prove willing Bay’at is Imam’s letter to his companions. On the basis of it they claim:

“Ali refrained from Bay’at for a certain period. The hypocrites started their activities. Then the issue of Murtad arose. These two issues posed an eminent danger to Islam and Muslims. Therefore for sake of Islam Ali did Bay’at with Abu Bakr at his free will.”![139]

A) A look at this letter

1 - The letter in Al-Imamah was-Siyasah is as follows:

“I withheld my hand even though I considered no one more deserving than myself for the successorship of Prophet. So I remained patient on destiny till I saw a group departing from Islam calling others to give up the religion of Muhammad and Ibrahim.

So I feared that if I do not help Islam and Muslims the havoc will be far greater than that of giving up succession to the Prophet. So I went to Abu Bakr and did Bay’at.”![140]

2 - In Ansaab al-Ashraaf the letter is referred to without its contents.[141]

3 - In Al-Gharaat the contents of this letter are:

“I withheld my hand even though I considered no one more deserving than myself for the successorship of Prophet. So I remained patient on destiny till I saw a group departing from Islam calling others to give up the religion of Muhammad and Ibrahim.

So I feared that if I do not help Islam and Muslims the havoc will be far greater than that of giving up succession to the Prophet. So I went to Abu Bakr and did Bay’at.”![142]

A - 1) Remark about Al-Gharaat

Although the writer of this book is Ibrahim bin Muhammad Thaqafi Kufi (d. 283) an Imamiyah scholar but the first copy of Al-Gharaat has come down to us only through a Sunni channel so we treat it as a Sunni source.[143]

A - 2) Common points in Narrations of Ibne Qutaibah and Thaqafi

A close attention to the above will bring to light two basic pivots common in both.

Pivot A

People going Murtad in the period of occurrence of this Bay’at as proved from the words: ‘I saw people returning from Islam’.

Pivot B

Going of Imam Ali (a.s.) to Abu Bakr and doing Bay’at with him as mentioned in the words: ‘Then I went to Abu Bakr and did Bay’at’.

B) A glance at the incident mentioned in this letter

1 - Ibne Qutaibah writes about the reason of writing this letter:

“Hujr bin Adi, Amr bin Hamaq and Abdullah bin Wahab Rasibi visited Ali to inquire Imam’s opinion about Abu Bakr and Umar…”[144]

2 - Balazari writes:

“Hujr bin Adi Kindi, Amr bin Hamaq Khuzai, Habba bin Juwin Bajili Urani, Abdullah bin Wahab Hamadani and Ou bin Saba came to Ali…”[145]

3 - Thaqafi Kufi writes:

“Amr bin Hamaq, Hujr bin Adi, Habba Urani, Harith Awar and Abdullah bin Saba visited Ali…”[146]

B - 1) Outcome

As you must have noted in the documents of this letter appear some personalities such as Abdullah Ibne Wahab Rasabi Hamadani Sabayee. Balazari calls him Ibne Saba. Thaqafi calls him Abdullah bin Saba as one of the questioners, which is a point worth contemplation.[147]

Abdullah bin Wahab Rasabi Hamadani was among the Khawarij and was the commander of Khawarij in the battle Nahrawan.

Shia and Sunni, both sects, regard Abdullah bin Saba as a perverted and deviated person. According to research of Allamah Askari, he (Abdullah) is a creation of Saif bin Umar and was a design to distort historical facts.

On the other hand Tabari Imami, the elder,[148] (4th century) has mentioned this letter in his book, Al Mustarshid Fil Imamah[149] from Shoba (Amir bin Saraheel Abu Umar Kufi) who is only considered reliable by Sunni sect and the Shias have opposed him.[150]

C) Investigation of credibility of sources mentioned in this letter

As you must have noted the text of this letter is mentioned in two ancient sources: Al-Imamah was-Siyasah by Ibne Qutaibah Dinawari and Al-Gharaat by Thaqafi Kufi.

Since only Thaqafi Kufi was of Shia faith and Ibne Qutaibah was a follower of the School of Caliphate his quotation in this particular case cannot be trusted.

In the coming pages you will see that Ibne Qutaibah is very much inclined to represent Ali firstly, in good terms with Abu Bakr; and secondly to do Bay’at with him on his own willingness and desire.

Therefore Ibne Qutaibah in quoting the matter about the willing Bay’at of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) to Abu Bakr blames the associates of the Caliph and therefore assumes an external position; so in this pursuit he has dared to confirm fabricated documents in which the signs of fabrication and deviation are very much prominent.[151]

Therefore there is likelihood that the letter might have been distorted by Ibne Qutaibah and since he has quoted it regarding willing Bay’at it becomes unreliable.

As for Al-Gharaat the most genuine and reputed source of this letter it must be said:

1 - This book Al-Gharaat has reached to us through Sunni sources only.[152]

2 - The writer of Al-Gharaat has written it in Isfahan. In those times in Isfahan lived stanch anti-Shia people. Most were opposed to Imam Ali (a.s.).[153]

Muhaddith Armavi in preface to this Al-Gharaat gives the reason why Thaqafi lived in Isfahan. According to him:

“…Thaqafi was originally from Kufa, later he migrated to Isfahan because in Kufa he had written a book on the virtues of the Purified Ahle Bayt (a.s.) and the defects of their enemies which the people of Kufa admired and appreciated very much. But they advised him not to publish it as it was time to be in dissimulation. Thaqafi asked them of a place where Shias were less or it is far from Shias. They told him such a town was Isfahan. So Ibrahim swore that he would not publish the book but in Isfahan.

So he migrated from Kufa to Isfahan and published the book which was against dissimulation there.”[154]

Hence there is very strong likelihood that the copy makers of Isfahan who were of the Sunni School mixed and interpolated the material of the book with their own prejudice against Ahle Bayt of Prophet.

C - 1) Evidences that show deviation in Al-Gharaat

Evidence 1 - In the printed copy of Al-Gharaat we read the instructions of ablution in line with Sunni sect. the instructions direct to wash the fact instead of passing of palm over them. This is Sunni practice which contradicts Shia method.[155]

Such interpolation is also found in the letter of Imam Ali (a.s.) addressed to Muhammad bin Abu Bakr in Egypt.

The signs of interpolation in Evidence 1

Shaykh Mufeed has copied this letter in Amali. He has taken it from Al-Gharaat. Some among its contents are like this:

“Then pass your palm over your head and feet.”[156]

The interesting thing is that Ibne Al-Hadeed Motazalli has also not mentioned it in Sharh Nahjul Balagha.[157]

Therefore it can be said:

This interpolation was done by those who duplicated Al-Gharaat. It served their purpose to insert their belief within the words of Imam Ali (a.s.).

Muhaddith Armavi has mentioned in the footnote in Al-Gharaat quoting from Muhaddith Noori:

“It is clearly known that contents of Al-Gharaat have been distorted by Sunnis; because they narrate from it.”[158]

Evidence 2 - The printed copy of Al-Gharaat contains many virtues and superior qualities of Caliphs. While the irrefutable fact is that all qualities attributed to Caliphs are false on the basis of the attitude of Imam Ali (a.s.) in the six-persons Shura committee formed to appoint a Caliph. Abdur Rahman bin Auf laid a condition that the new Caliph must follow the path of Abu Bakr and Umar. The reply of Ali was so severe and harsh[159] that it leaves no room to doubt that the text concerning Caliphs is nothing but a fabrication.

The fabrication that has taken place concerns two letters of Imam Ali (a.s.). One was addressed to Qays bin Saad bin Ubadah in Egypt and the other to his (Ali’s) own companions.

Signs of forgery in Evidence 2 (including 2 letters)

Evidence 2 - Letter One

The text of this letter[160] is as follows in Al-Gharaat:

“After the Prophet Muslims chose from among themselves two virtuous men as their Caliphs and leaders who acted on the book of God and administered the affairs in the best possible way. They did not go beyond the tradition of Prophet. Then God captured their souls. May God have mercy on them.”![161]

In this concern, Allamah Mirza Habeebullah Hashimi Khoei writes in his commentary of Nahjul Balagha:

“They could have been such as a show off to the people. Although it is also possible that these interpolations were made by the opponents of Shias and inserted into the text.”[162]

That which proves the veracity of Allamah Hashimi Khoei is that:

What has come in the statements of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) is actually the people’s view about the two Caliphs. There is another letter of Ali addressed to Huzaifa bin Yaman in the town of Madayn. The letter reads as follows:[163]

“After passing away of Prophet some Muslims raised two men to Caliphate. They were pleased with the behavior and the conduct of those two.”[164]

The difference in the words of Ali is another proof of deviation in the text. The difference in the wording is clear comparing the printed copy of Al-Gharaat with the narration of Sayyid Ali Khan Madani.

He (Sayyid Ali Khan Madani) has copied the letter in his book Al-Darjaat ar-Rafiya from Al-Gharaat. The text concerning Caliphs runs as follows:

“After the Prophet, Muslims brought among themselves two men into succession as their chiefs who acted in the best way till their death.”[165]

The difference in the text with that of the printed copy of Al-Gharaat shows that Al-Gharaat gradually underwent deviations by several hands. There does not exist any copy which may tally with another. However little or trifle, but there is a deviation in each. One differs from another. This is an open proof of it not being original.

Evidence 2 - Letter Two

This letter in Al-Gharaat[166] reads thus:

“Umar took over the charge of affairs. He administered the things in the best way. He had a blessed soul.”[167]

Muhaddith Armavi writes in footnote of the text of this letter from Allamah Muhammad Baqir:

“It seems it was such in the eyes of the people. He has mentioned about Abu Bakr in the same manner. Of course dissimulation too is obvious in the speech. It is also quite likely that deviation should have taken place by opponents.”

Allamah Majlisi too writes that the contents of the letter reflect the view of the people about the Second Caliph. It is not that of Imam Ali (a.s.) himself. If cannot be. There is narration regarding the letter, which we refer to.

Tabari Imami, the elder (4th century) is among those who have mentioned the contents of the second letter. In his book Al-Mustarshid fil Imamah the contents pertaining to the Second Caliph are:

“And he (Umar) was among the people of good character and a blessed soul.”[168]

Difference in the text with that of Al-Gharaat indicates deviation and shows hand-to-hand circulation of the copy.

C - 2) Results of the investigation of above evidences

As such, the copy of Al-Gharaat is short of credibility as that of Imamate and Siyasat regarding the Bay’at at a free will.

D) A look towards inadvertency of Balazari to the contents of the letter of Ali

Once again, if we divert our attention to the reasons common between narrations of this letter (Point A-2) and place it by the side of Balazari’s narration we will find that the narration of Balazari is in line with the contents of Imam Ali’s (a.s.) letter telling the same thing.

In the contents of the letter inserted in the book Al-Mustarshid, difference is recorded. This makes complete the application of the letter with the narration of Balazari. The text in the book Al-Mustarshid reads thus:

“And I saw people not moving against them (the enemies of God) because of my isolation and non-participation.”[169]

With reference to the above points following questions arise:

1) Balazari himself is one of the narrators of Arabs turning Murtads and the Bay’at of Imam Ali (a.s.) with Abu Bakr at his free will. He has refrained from mentioning the contents of the letter. He only mentions the primary ground that cause the writing of the letter. Why?[170]

2) What justification could be there for Balazari for ignoring to mention the text of this letter?

3) The copy of the letter which was in possession of Balazari whether it did not indicate occurrence of such a Bay’at? All present copies of the letter mention that a Bay’at of Ali with Abu Bakr did take place at his own choice and willingness. This is quite in line with the religious inclinations of Balazari and his taste of writing history.

Reply

The answer of these questions can be found in the narration of Muhammad bin Jurair bin Rustom Tabari (4th century). In his narration, there is no mention of Bay’at. So such a letter does not meet any of the aims of Balazari.

The text of the letter according to Al-Mustarshid is as follows:

“I withheld my hand though I saw myself more deserving for the place of Muhammad among the people as one who denies his self.

So I endured what God had desired. Then I saw among the people their return from Islam openly. They invited the people to give up God’s religion and change the Ummah of Muhammad.

So I feared that if I do not support Islam and sit idle I will have to see ruin and destruction therein. Its havoc upon me will be greater than losing Caliphate.

And I saw people not inclined to fight the enemy of God because of my isolation and lack of participation.

So I went to Abu Bakr and co-operated with him. Had I not done this, Islam would have been destroyed.”[171]

Reminder

The words of Imam Ali (a.s.): Had I not done this, Islam would have been destroyed convey the meaning of ceasefire and that is all.

Three prime results of scrutiny of Ali’s letter

Result 1

The false story of Arabs going Murtad, which Tabari has created and publicized to make it doubtless, is used as a tool to draw benefit from this letter. With the help of this letter, deviations are made according to their desire. Misunderstandings and advantages are drawn to support the claims of Sunnis.

It is important to note that we should not necessarily go to the Arabs Murtad when the subject matter happens to be any Murtad. Muhaddith Armavi writes in the footnote of Al-Gharaat in explanation of ‘Return of the people’ on the authority of Allamah Majlisi:

“It is likely that he should have meant the hypocrites who had gathered around Abu Bakr and were always seeking an opportunity to create mischief or an element to provide them with an excuse to become Murtad.”[172]

This idea is supported by Imam Ali’s (a.s.) wordings. He refers to the time after the incident of Saqifah and the early Caliphate. A little attention is enough to reach to the said conclusion. Hypocrites are meant here not Murtads. It corresponds to the time when Ali had not isolated himself. He was after an armed uprising to take his usurped right.

It was exactly when Ali sensed the danger of people turning their back upon Islam. He felt the danger of Islam’s annihilation. It is the same meaning in which Allamah Majlisi has said that the Imam assumed silence. And the words: “I saw ruin and destruction of Islam more terrible than losing authority over your affairs.”

Therefore:

So the Bay’at which is the theme of this letter on the ground of Arabs Murtad is fabricated.

Sunni historians have a very strong inclination to pose the Bay’at of free choice as linked to the issue of Murtad which is false and lacking veracity and this has led to interpolation in the letter to their advantage.

The alterations were as follows:

Supposition A) The words: “So I went to Abu Bakr and did Bay’at with him” are added in the original letter to so that it will support the false narrations of Ahle Sunnat in this matter.

Supposition B) The words: “I saw that as I had not given Bay’at people refrained from campaign, so I went to Abu Bakr” are added to the original letter so that people may began to think on the lines of a Bay’at done willingly and accept the claims of historians like Balazari.

These additions in the contents can give three dimensions to the sense of “I co-operated with him.” This phrase exists in the narration of Tabari Imami in a sense of ‘ceasefire’. It was later changed to Bay’at. There are several possibilities in it.

The ups and downs of the letter do not carry any reference to incidents of Arabs becoming Murtad or Bay’at at free choice which is the subject of Sunni claim. It seems to be of the early days of usurpation of Caliphate from Ali. In those days, Ali went into isolation. Those days were very hard and difficult for Ali.

Result 2

Supposing this letter was at the time of Murtad issue, the phrase: “I did Bay’at” is conjecture of the narrator[173] or it was added later.

Result 3

If we suppose the correctness of the whole text of this letter and the correctness of the phrase: “So I gave Bay’at to him”, the phrase of “So I feared that if I do not help Islam…” which is common[174] in all narrations, will makes it ‘a Bay’at for show, which is invalid’; still they claim:

“His Eminence (a.s.) did Bay’at at his free will.”[175]

On the margin of scrutiny of the letter of Amirul Momineen (a.s.)

If we treat this letter in accordance with the narration of Balazari, the analysis previously done becomes applicable here too. As a result:

The Bay’at mentioned in this letter is of show without reality. It is nothing more than a handshake, so it is devoid of any effect or reliability.[176]

In fact with reference to this letter the event that ensued should be named as “Show of Bay’at which is basically invalid”.

Third standard: Scrutiny of Narrations about the secret meeting of Ali with Abu Bakr

Narration No. 1

“It is mentioned in Tarikh Tabari[177] that a man told Zuhri: Is it not that Ali did not do Bay’at with Abu Bakr until six months? Zuhri said: Not only Ali, but no one among Bani Hashim did Bay’at until Ali did. Because when Ali saw that people were not inclined to have him as their Caliph he was compelled to compromise with Abu Bakr. Therefore he sent a messenger to Abu Bakr and invited him to come for talks, but alone. Ali did not like Umar to accompany him. He knew the roughness of Umar and the extent of his impoliteness. Umar told Abu Bakr not to go alone but Abu Bakr replied: No, by God, I’ll go alone to him. What do you think they will do? Abu Bakr visited Ali all alone. He saw all the members of Bani Hashim were around Ali. Ali got up; received Abu Bakr. First, he (Ali) thanked and praised god. Then said: O, Abu Bakr! Your virtues we do not deny, nor does it stand on way to do Bay’at with you. I do not envy with what God has directed to your side. But in our view in this affair we too have a share. You have laid hand over it. You have withheld it from us. After this, Ali recalled his relation and close link with the Prophet of God. Then Ali dealt in detail on things that relate him with the Prophet. Abu Bakr was so influenced that he wept. Ali became silent. Then Abu Bakr spoke after thanking and praising God: I swear by God, kinship with the Prophet of God is the dearest thing to me. I do not give preference to my own relations and kinship to that of Prophet of God. I again swear by God that the properties that are between you and me I have not laid possession thereon but for the sake of good and for benefit of all. I have heard from the Prophet of God: We do not leave anything for inheritance. What we leave is charity. The progeny of Muhammad too feeds thereon. I take refuge of God. I do not recall anything that the Prophet had done. I too shall do it. Then Imam Ali (a.s.) said: Our rendezvous is afternoon for Bay’at. Abu Bakr after finishing prayers faced the people and narrated the conversation between him and Ali. Then Ali got up. He spoke to the people about the greatness of Abu Bakr and his right. Then he went towards Abu Bakr and did Bay’at with him.

Then people gathered around Ali and appreciated him for what he had done. This narration is quoted by Tabari on the authority of Ayesha.”![178]

Narration No. 2

Ibne Qutaibah Dinawari in his book, Al-Imamah was-Siyasah has given another version of the special meeting of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) with Abu Bakr.

“Then Abu Bakr went to the Prophet’s mosque and faced the people then he excused Ali for not giving Bay’at to him.

After that Ali got up and praised his station and extolled his greatness and precedence. After this he went to Abu Bakr and did the Bay’at. People approached Ali and said: You did a good thing. After the matter of Abu Bakr’s Bay’at ended he used to tell the people for three days: I left you free for my Bay’at. Is anyone you displeased with it?

Ali stood up before the people and said: By God! We have not appointed you as our leader and chief. It is the Prophet of God who has preferred you over all of us so that our religion remains safe. Now who could drag you behind for the sake of our world?”![179]

Each points of this event is astonishing and indicates the falsehood of these two narrations

A) Excuse for compromise with Abu Bakr!

The Arabic word used means ‘made himself little’ or ‘vilified himself’. This means Ali accepted to vilify himself to compromise with Abu Bakr.

In the two books of Bukhari and Muslim the words are: ‘he implored to compromise with Abu Bakr and do Bay’at.’ In a sense it is near to the above meaning.[180]

B) Testimony to the superiority of Abu Bakr!

The sentence: ‘It does not restrict us to do Bay’at with you, Abu Bakr nor is it a denial of your virtues.’ is a vain allegation in open contradiction with Sunni view of ‘Elected Caliphate’.

It is surprising why Abu Bakr in chaos of Saqifah while disputing with Ansaar did not refer to his virtues or superior qualities.

C) Caliphate was a bounty that God gave to Abu Bakr!

It cannot be believed that Ali (a.s.) said: ‘Caliphate was a bounty God directed towards you (Abu Bakr).’[181]

D) Accepting that inheritance of Prophet was Sadaqah!

It is meant by the words: ‘I have heard from the Prophet of God: We do not leave anything for inheritance. What we leave is charity.’

E) The Prophet preferred Abu Bakr to others!

As mentioned in the statement: ‘…Who can detain you for the sake of our world?’

Deviated Consequences of Forged Narrations

1 - Interpreting and replacing the divinely ordained Caliphate of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) with precedence and replacing the Imamate that is divinely ordained into that of Imamate by selection.

2 - Deviation in the meaning of rightfulness of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) and change in the meaning of protests of His Eminence, Ali (a.s.) in this regard.

3 - Separation of position of Imamate from the position of Caliphate and separation of the holders of these offices!

4 - They not only believe but even persist on Caliphate being at the choice of people.

5 - A wrong interpretation of Ali’s refraining from Bay’at with Abu Bakr and distortion in the analysis of his aims in not doing Bay’at with Abu Bakr.

6 - Finally Ali’s willingness to do Bay’at with Abu Bakr without any compulsion.

7 - Giving legitimacy to Abu Bakr’s Caliphate and bringing it out of the circle of usurpation.

8 - Excusing Abu Bakr for his perversion from religious course.

9 - Showing as though Islamic regulations were practiced in Abu Bakr’s rule.

10 - Showing as though Abu Bakr had committed himself to follow the conduct of the Prophet.

11 - Showing as though Ali had a belief in fitness of Abu Bakr to the office he had usurped.[182]

12 - Showing as though Ali participated in the administration of the government.

13 - Showing as though Ali compensated the shortcomings of Abu Bakr.

14 - Showing as though there lasted good relations based on good terms with Ahle Bayt (a.s.) of the Prophet from the side of Abu Bakr.

15 - Showing as though there lasted goodwill, peace, affection and friendship from the side of Ali towards Abu Bakr.

Thus they say:

“Imam Ali (a.s.) had another point in his view. He feared the things would spoil and a chaos might take place if the administration falls in incompetent hands. So he hesitated to do Bay’at for some period. He was very much concerned that no corruption creeps in religion or belief of people. But later Imam Ali (a.s.) saw Abu Bakr handled the matters prudently. He was particular to keep within bounds of religion and also particular to carry out the penalties, decrees and other religious commitments. This satisfied Ali. At this point, he did not allow himself to prolong his hesitation. So he finally did Bay’at.”![183]

“Ali inspite of his position did Bay’at with Abu Bakr without any coercion. First he pointed out his mistakes then drew Abu Bakr’s attention to failings in administration. He gave legitimacy to Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. When all the loopholes were filled, he saw no reason to not enter into Bay’at with Abu Bakr. Later he co-operated with Abu Bakr in running the government.”![184]

This shows how elevated the position of Ali was. In fact, Ali occupied the highest rank. His position was greater than Caliphate. He invited Abu Bakr to his house. Abu Bakr repeatedly acknowledged the superiority of Ali and verbally and practically extolled the greatness of Ali. Ali too frankly said:

“We do not deny your bright past nor do we deny your virtues.”

“We are not rivals to you in your Caliphate. We do not envy you. Bay’at was withheld for this reason that Imam Ali (a.s.) because of his position as Imam and a guardian should have been consulted.

But when Abu Bakr swore that he endears the link with the Prophet more than his own relatives and kinship and commits himself to follow the footsteps of Prophet, Ali said to him: Tomorrow for Bay’at our rendezvous is the mosque.”![185]

“There is no crime greater than that there be accord between the Imam and Caliph but discord among the people.”![186]

What does history say?

We need not go after a proof or testimony. The falsehoods are obvious and evident in both the narrations of Tabari and Ibne Qutaibah. We suffice only with the statement of the Second Caliph to Ali and Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle.

It is a confession of Umar in the presence of Uthman, Abdur Rahman bin Auf, Zubair and Saad bin Abi Waqqas.[187] The falsehood of above narrations is proved at once.

Document No. 1

This document is recorded and mentioned in Sahih Muslim one of the most reputed and reliable sources among Sunni sect. In this document Umar bin Khattab says:

“The Prophet passed away. Abu Bakr said: I am the (wali) successor[188] of the Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.s.) in your leadership.

You two (Abbas and Ali) came to demand your inheritance. You (Abbas)

demanded inheritance of your nephew and you (Ali) inheritance of your wife from her father.

Then Abu Bakr said: The Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.s.) said: We are not inherited. What we leave is charity.

But you accused him to be a liar, a sinner, a cheater and a betrayer.”[189]

Even if Imam Ali (a.s.) had accepted one of these things for Abu Bakr was it proper for him to praise him before the people?

Document No. 2

Indeed even if claims of Bukhari, Tabari and Ibne Qutaibah regarding the issue of Bay’at of free choice and the conversation of Ali with Abu Bakr and his words - all this were also true, why did Ali in the six-person committee openly reject the condition put forward by Ibne Auf that made it compulsory to follow the conduct of two Caliphs? Ali openly refused to follow the footsteps of Abu Bakr and Umar and put to question the legality of their Caliphate.[190]

Similarly, there are other historical documents that Imam Ali (a.s.) did not do Bay’at with Abu Bakr after Zahra’s martyrdom. Because as it is said:

The term Bay’at carries a distinct sense in Islam. It makes some matters necessary for one who enters into Bay’at.

On the basis of this foresight of Umar bin Khattab and Amr Aas about the reactions of Amirul Momineen (a.s.) that it would be at least a ceasefire between His Eminence (a.s.) and Abu Bakr and Amirul Momineen (a.s.) will only give up his dispute with Abu Bakr.[191]

Document No. 3

Abu Bakr says to Umar in consultation:

“I plan to send Ali to the battle against Kinda and Hadhramaut (in Yemen) as I am aware of his courage, bravery and virtues. He is a man of Justice. So a majority of people would be pleased with him.

Umar agreed and confirmed the qualities, which Abu Bakr attributed to Ali but said: I am afraid Ali would not agree[192] and if he refused no one would show any inclination to go to war except by force.[193]

Therefore I suggest that Ali remains in Medina and the Caliph benefits from his consultation while Akrama bin Abi Jahl can go to fight.

Abu Bakr agreed to Umar’s proposal.”[194] “Ali did not go to fight their battles since neither he considered their Caliphate illegitimate not the Kinda people apostates but the Caliph and his advisors feared in this matter and delegated Akrama to the battle.”[195]

Document No. 4

Abu Bakr summoned Amr Aas and asked his opinion how to utilize the services of Ali in suppressing Tolaiha.

“Amr said: Ali will not obey your order.”[196]

In conclusion, it can be said:

These two documents clearly indicate that Bay’at which took place was not at a free choice nor it was done willingly and nor it was in relation to Murtad Arabs otherwise Ali (a.s.) would have accepted the command of the Caliph’s army and obeyed his orders.

Final conclusion about Bay’at by choice as Sunnis claim

A) From all investigations in this regard it can be concluded that except for the attack on Zahra’s house no other efforts were made by the Caliph to take allegiance from Ali (a.s.). Still with every leniency we can say:

Ali performed something similar to Bay’at.[197] This also he did to save Islam within a limited framework.

Imam Ali (a.s.) about his attitude says:

“People did Bay’at with Abu Bakr while (by Allah) I was more superior to him and deserving of it.[198] So I too obeyed[199] fearing the people would return to infidelity. Some would cut throat of some by sword. After Abu Bakr Bay’at was given to Umar [and he was made Caliph] while (by God) I was more deserving[200] than he to it. But I feared people might become infidels.”([202] )([202] )

B) All narrations, which take root from various and several sources, are dubious and not certain. They are rife with signs of falsehood and deviation. In such a way that it can be said:

The aim of spreading these narrations is to veil the shameful deeds and attack on Zahra’s house to take Bay’at from His Eminence (a.s.) in the initial period of the usurped Caliphate of Abu Bakr.

C) If we pay attention to the conditions under which Bay’at of Ali was, it would be clear that it was invalid from religious viewpoint.

D) Analysis of events after passing away of Prophet rescinds the use of the word Bay’at even if it were concomitant with its conditions. The sense by terms of such ‘silence’ or ‘not campaigning by sword’ do not convey the meaning of Bay’at. Therefore it would be better to use them instead of Bay’at.

E) In the analysis of events after the martyrdom of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) - supposedly accepting the historical documents - it could only be called a Bay’at of show and hence invalid from the legal point of view.