Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Aristotelian Perspectives for Post-modern Reason (I)

Phronesis, Scientific Rationality and Environmental Responsibility

Alfredo Marcos

University of Valladolid

Department of Philosophy

Plaza del Campus s/n,

47011 Valladolid, Spain

amarcos@fyl.uva.es

Table of Contents

Introduction. 3

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism. 7

Phronesis in Aristotle 12

Prudence and Scientific Rationality: ‘Do not block the way of inquiry.’ 15

Prudence and Environmental Responsibility: ‘May human life remain possible.’ 19

Conclusion. 23

Notes 24

Introduction

In the Modern Age, certainty became the highest and most sought-after espistemic value, even more valued than truth, and the so-called scientific method was seen as the surest path to certainty. Indeed, human reason became identified with the application of a supposed scientific method of Cartesian or Baconian inspiration. The domain of the practice became considered either one more area for the mere application of the scientific method, an application which would lead to human progress, or as an area beyond reason. One of the stereotyped convictions attributed to the enlightened mentality is this: insofar as human life in all its extremes becomes more rational, that is, more scientific, practical problems will begin to be solved. Indeed, Rousseau, in hisDiscourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750), pointed out that human progress did not always go hand in hand with scientific and technical progress, which today is a self-evident truth that is not discussed. On the other hand, dual accounting, that is the consideration that science is fully rational and the other areas of human activity are not, as well as an insult to common sense, has rebounded against science itself, for its practical aspects cannot be hidden, and it is hardly possible to parcel off a purely logical context, as that of justification set out to be.

It is obvious that not even the application of a supposed scientific method can guarantee the progressive character of our practical decisions. To this evidence there has been added the recognition of science’s own practical aspects. This evolution has convinced many of the impossibility of obtaining certainty even in the domain of science, which has given rise to diverse forms of desperation regarding the abilities of human reasoning. This oscillation between the obsession for certainty and desperation with regard to reason has been the tune most frequently danced to in modern times.

Yet today we do not want environmental problems to be left entirely up to the expert’s decision or the irrational imposition of power or arbitrariness, but to be tackled in reasoned dialogue, on a footing of equality, by scientists, technicians, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, private individuals, representatives of social movements - and indeed philosophers! We are recognizing, at least implicitly, the possibility of being reasonable in an area where we do not expect absolute certainty, and we accept that human reason goes beyond the limits of science and technology, that reason is more deeply rooted in human life than a mere method could ever be. To reach this point we have had to come a long way as far as our concept of reason and science is concerned, and have also needed a great deal of experience - bittersweet experience - regarding the practical consequences of science. Everything would seem to show, then, that the most typical extreme positions of modern times are being abandoned, and that we have entered the post-modern period[1] .

My intention in these pages is to explore the possibilities of a project of basically Aristotelian inspiration for the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects of reason, for the search for a happy medium between the extremes of logicism and irrationalism. In my opinion, this outlook has much to contribute to the on-going debate on the rationality of science and on the environmental questions that its application brings up. This is, indeed, a particular aspect of the relationship between reason and practice, but not just any aspect: traditional philosophical problems are arising now, and they will continue to come up in the future, in direct connection with environmental matters - this will be an area and a way for the classical topics of philosophy to reappear. Rationality, good and evil, justice, the relationship between being and value, the objectivity or subjectivity of knowledge, etc., are venerable philosophical topics that we shall have to reconsider in the light of environmental problems, as they were once tackled in connection with questions of politics, theology, society, science and economy.

I shall now outline the steps that my exposition will follow, together with other considerations necessary for it to fall within the limits of a short piece. In the first place, we need a correct characterization of Modern Age which makes it possible to explain the causes of a bad relationship between theory and practice. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted task. Here we can hardly even approach a full idea of modernity. What we can do, however, is point out one of its most essential characteristics[2] , in some wise the cause of many others and especially near to the interests of this paper. I mean the predilection for certainty, which is a constant of the modern spirit, just like the energetic and cyclic irrationalist reactions. Obsession with certainty and sceptical desperation are mutual causes of each other like pre-Socratic opposites. We shall speak of this insection 2 (‘Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism’) .

Secondly, we must go through the Aristotelian concepts which may, in my opinion, take us out of this thankless to-ing and fro-ing. What I mean basically is the Aristotelian notions of prudence (phronesis ) and practical truth (aletheia praktike ). Insection 3 (Prudence in Aristotle) , I shall set out the contents of Aristotelian prudence and the contribution that it can make to the present debate. An analogous study of the notion of practical truth will be set out in the second part of this paper[3] .

The concept of prudence is one that has been taken from the area of Aristotelian practical philosophy, where absolute certainty is not expected, but neither are decisions left to mere arbitrariness or imposition. The novelty consists in that, when we recognize, as we do today, that science itself is a human action, the notion taken from practical philosophy may be used for understanding and integrating scientific rationality. When science is characterized as an activity governed by prudence, it moves away from both the logicist and the irrationalist poles, from the obsession with certainty and from the ‘anything goes’, from algorithm and anarchism. Furthermore, if science is made a prudential activity, it will be much easier for us to connect its particular way of rationality with that of discussions, decisions and environmental actions.

Although it is true that Aristotelian notions can be suggestive, it is not true that they do no more than answer contemporary questions. For them to be active in the on-going debate on the relationship between theoretical reason and practical reason, they must be developed,updated through contemporary texts. The profit from this manœuvre is double: it makes Aristotle’s concepts available for the present debate and gives some contemporary ideas a very comprehensive and fertile philosophical framework, the Aristotelian framework. In the remaining sections. I shall tryto bring to the current debate the Aristotelian notion of prudence through the fallibilism of Peirce and Popper and through Hans Jonas’ imperative of responsibility. The fallibilist attitude is, to my mind, the most suitable post-modern characterization of scientific rationality and of human rationality, and applied to environmental problems it would give rise to the so-called principle of responsibility.

Insection 4 (Prudence and scientific rationality: Do not block the way of inquiry ) , I maintain that in science a fallibilistic attitude alone opens the doors to prudential reason, and that the ontological and anthropological bases of prudence are also suitable for fallibilism, founding it and encouraging it. In Aristotle, there are certain fallibilistic attitudes but they are ambiguous and combine with other statements in which science is characterized as universal and necessary knowledge. In this regard, Peirce’s texts are most useful and clearest, and, of course, nearest to the present problems of science. Fallibilism is for him an attitude, that is something practical - rather than a concept or a rule it is the scientific attitudepar excellence . On the basis of the fallibilist attitude there stands what may be the ultimate and most universal rule of scientific rationality:Do not block the way of inquiry .

Insection 5 (Prudence and environmental responsibility: May human life remain possible ), I set out to bring the Aristotelian idea of prudence to the on-going debate on the environment. I shall proceed as in the previous case, showing its proximity to and continuity with the present notion of responsibility as treated by Hans Jonas. Again we have an Aristotelian concept that can be developed or, as Jonas himself would say, improved on, by a notion of today. In return, this present notion is supported by a very articulate and coherent ontology. Jonas sets out the so-called principle of responsibility as the ultimate element of the moral control of our relationship with the environment:Proceed in such a way that you do not endanger the conditions for humanity’s indefinite continuity on Earth .

I consider that Peirce’s and Jonas’s formulations - each in its own area, respectively that of science and that of ethics - the expression of one and the same attitude, of one and the sameactual - and therefore post-modern - way of understanding rationality, and that both fit perfectly into a metaphysical framework of Aristotelian inspiration. Essentially, these ideas are convergent, and respond to one attitude and may be based on one Aristotelian conception of reality, and together they offer a good answer to questions for their scientific rationality and their environmental responsibility.

The principles of Peirce and Jonas can, however, be taken as inadequate as a characterization of human action, for they do not take into account its creative aspects. The truth is that both, though they do not guarantee it, are directed towardscreative discovery : they set out to ensure that it will be possible at any moment, while nurturing and fomenting the conditions for it and removing obstacles. They uphold the openness of human action so that it can adjust to the future course of events, always open and never completely determined. The present article will therefore require a later development in which the notion of creative discovery is tackled along with its connection with the Aristotelian concept ofpractical truth .

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism

Among the characteristics of modern thought is the predilection for certainty[4] . The search for certainty has been one of the signs of identity of a whole intellectual tradition, of what Husserl[5] calls ‘European science’. According to Husserl, the abandonment of this search steeps us in crisis, in scepticism or in any type of naturalism. However, as Kolakowski[6] rightly observes, neither Descartes nor Husserl managed to distinguish between the subjective feeling of evidence and the objective evidence of truth. Consequently, in many of the modern philosophical traditions, the pursuit of certainty has become a threat to the pursuit of truth, an impulse towards different types of idealism and a cause of crisis (by inference and by reaction) rather than an antidote to it.

The pursuit of certainty -infallibilism , in the words of Laudan - is one of the legacies of Cartesian philosophy. One could state, as Clarke does, that Cartesian science is defined in terms of certainty rather than in terms of the truth of the explanations proposed.[7] A text in which Decartes himself sets this point out clearly is:

‘What can it matter to us for something to be absolutely false if anyway we believe it and we do not have the slightest suspicion that it is false?’[8]

Or, if a negative formulation is required, ‘any knowledge that can be rendered doubtful must not be called scientific’[9] and ‘I treat [...] as false everything which is merely likely’[10] These words give the tone of what would from then on be the object of the quest for the scientific method.

It is, in any event, a question of establishing methods whose results will be certain knowledge, methods which we can only trust, whether or not subjective certainty is accompanied by objective truth.

Francis Bacon initiated another route of access to certainty, this time with an empirical and inductive character. According to Bacon, the inductive method is theart of invention andmachine , as well asformula ,clear and radiant light [11] , and other similar boons. Those of Bacon’s ideas with the greatest influence on subsequent scientific thought are those which he expressed in his second book of theNovum Organum , that is his inductive logic, the so-called Baconian method. In general, and as Rossi states, many have seen in Bacon the constructor of a gigantic ‘logic machine’ doomed to not being used. With the Baconian method, according to Spedding, we cannot do anything. We consider it a subtle, elaborate and ingenious mechanism, but one which can produce nothing[12] . In spite of everything, Bacon’s image as the founder of the new science thanks to his discovery of the inductive method was greatly appreciated by the founders of theRoyal Society and the authors of the great illustratedEncyclopædia .

In what situation do we place the practical with regard to rationality when the first value is certainty?

Many modern thinkers begin their writings with the observation of the disappointing state of the philosophy of human things in comparison with natural philosophy, that is the natural science. Dissension and lack of certainty, both in metaphysics and in moral philosophy, are the points causing the greatest unrest. Both Descartes and Hume, to mention two of the most noteworthy, feel that the model that inquiry into mankind should follow is that of natural and formal sciences, which have already opened up a path, a method to certainty and consensus. So, Descartes set out to find ‘the highest and most perfect moral science, which, presupposing a knowledge of other sciences, is the ultimate degree of wisdom’[13] . Naturally, Descartes had to settle indefinitely for what he called  ‘provisional morals’. Hume stated with his empiricist approach base on the inductive method, ‘Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension’[14] . This science will imply the extension of the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy to the study of human nature, and within it to the study of morals. Regarding politics, Hume has still fewer doubts, and states categorically that it can be reduced to a science endowed with a degree of certainty almost as perfect as that of mathematics[15] .

But this naturalist approach to the study of man, which in principle promises the so longed-for certainty, leads to further disappointments and carries with it the germ of its own destruction, in the long term threatening natural science itself, which will always be an activity and product of human freedom and reason. Today we know from experience how these tendencies implicit in the naturalist position itself have been developed, but in Hume, the whole trajectory is already indicated. Naturalization of moral studies seems to demand a methodological reduction of the normative and the evaluative, which will end up being established as a definitive ontological reduction of human reason and freedom, which are mutually inseparable and inaccessible to the empirical method and never totally explained from strictly naturalist bases. Thence are derived an emotivism and an irrationalism which threaten science itself insofar as its practical aspects are recognized along with its inability to produce absolutely certain knowledge. Hume assures that ‘We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’[16] . Paradoxical though this may seem, this resignation that the practical should be the place for feelings derives from a reduced notion of reason, excessively bound up with a given idea of science and method and an extreme valuation of certainty.

In Hume there is no renunciation of certainty, the basis of which is confided to habit, but one of reason. Predilection for certainty leads Hume to irrationalism, not to scepticism[17] . Karl Popper sums up the situation as follows, saying that, according to Hume, the scientific method is inductive, but:

‘... induction is completely invalid as an inference. There is not a shadow of a logical argument that would support the inference to a generalization from statements about the past (such as past repetitions of some 'evidence'). He [Hume] said that in spite of its lack of logical validity, induction plays an indispensable part in practical life [...] Thus there is a paradox.Even our intellect does not work rationally '. [p.94] [...] This led Hume, one of the most reasonable thinkers of all time, to give up rationalism and look at man not as endowed with reason but as a product of blind habit. Acording to Russellthis paradox of Hume's is responsible for the schizophrenia of modern man ’. [p.95][18]

If anything can be learnt for the present it is that we lack a notion of practical reason that is well structured and free of traditional errors. Practical criteria cannot depend on a supposed scientific method and cannot aspire to confer absolute certainty on our decisions, but we do not have to go without reason in practical situations, as there is no need to identify reason with a supposed scientific method or with the sure way to certainty. In part, the obstacles encountered by Hume and Descartes in the development of an idea of practical reason have been abolished, for today we are aware that sciences are not governed strictly by the Cartesian method or by the inductive method, and that they are far from reaching complete certainty, which does not make them directly irrational. Above everything else it is the renunciation of the obsession with certainty that enables us today to imagine a suitable notion of practical reason.

It will be said that a notion of practical reason already existed in Kant. And this is so. But two observations must be made in this regard. In Kant, unlike in Hume, there is a radical denaturalization of practical reason, which today seems unacceptable. Such is the case that for Kant, prudence mainly has nothing to do with practical reason, but with theoretical reason, paradoxical though this may seem. This means that he excludes it from the nucleus of morals and considers it a mere technical ability for the pursuit of happiness[19] . In the Modern period, from Descartes to Bacon, any technique was considered to be no more than applied science, and that if any problem arose in practice, it was due to deficiencies in theory. This view of science as immediately applicable soon spread, as we have seen in Hume, to morals, so the application of a science of man, which would not present genuinely technical problems, but only theoretical ones, would solve the problems of human happiness. Philosophers of the Enlightenment felt attracted by this new way of approaching human affairs. Kant shared the technological optimism of his day although he was the first to resist the concept of morals as a technique, that is, as the application of a science of man to the pursuit of happiness (happiness, by the way, previously defined by that very science). Kant, on the other hand, sought to protect morals from influences external to the very freedom of the subject. He did this by excluding the traditional contents from the nucleus of practical philosophy. According to Kant, prudence lies rather in theoretical reason, as it could become a mere applied science[20] . In the interests of autonomy of reason, Kant separates morals radically from nature, setting it in the sphere of the freedom of the subject. The attempt to protect morals from naturalism leads to the new excess of putting it in the hands of logicism. The categorical imperative is, at root, of a logical character:Behave in such a way that you might also want your maxim to become universal law . The ‘might also want’ invoked here is, as Jonas[21] states, that of reason an its concord with itself, an ability which would only be negated by self-contradiction.

In Aristotle, on the other hand, happiness is man’s natural and legitimate aim, whereby it was possible, according to Aubenque, ‘to integrate thetechnical moment of the correct choice of means in the definition of morality’[22] .

The second observation concerns the certainty of what Kant takes to be really practical. No comparison can be made between the splendid certainty which Kant attributes to Newtonian science and thepractical faith in postulates necessary to give consistence to the practical use of reason. In an atmosphere of extreme valuation of certainty and of the scientific method, the Kantian foundation for practical reason, which, in short, leads to the postulates of human freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, was not believed or taken seriously. Kant expressed his admiration and  respect for two areas of reality,the starry sky above me and the moral law inside me . But to keep them separate is not sustainable, for indeed he who looks at the stars and grasps moral law is a human being who takes part in the two areas of reality, as a system subject to physical laws and as a free being. The integration of the two spheres seems necessary without the negation of either of them. But if we separate to such an extent the degree of certainty that we attribute to the knowledge of each of them, and if we set such a high value on certainty, then the so-called practical use of reason runs the risk of immediately being seen as one more mask of the irrational, as a concession of Kant’s to his beliefs, affections, desires or interests. The historical proof that this two sets of accounts cannot be tenable for long is what happened to Kantian tradition. Either it tended towards an idealism that suppressed the peculiarity of the practical and made it depend for everything on theory by identifying the rational with the real, or it drifted towards an irrationalism in which the pure use of reason had the same fate as the practical use, until it was seen as one more mask of the will to power[23] . The pure and practical uses of reason must be integrated and must support each other, for today we know that they either stand or fall together[24] . But this requires a reconsideration of the ideal of certainty and of the nature of science which has only come about in the twentieth century.

Since Hegel and since Nietzsche, several campaigns have been launched in the pursuit of certainty. One of the last ones in favour of certainty, automatism and the segregation of the practical, based on the identification of reason with science, was called Neo-positivism (and it was pursued as the so-calledreceived view ). Its internal decadence apart, it was Popper’s philosophy and Kuhn’s criticisms that put an end to this venture, and with it to a way of making philosophy of science. Kuhn laid forth the practical aspects of scientific rationality. As he states - in my opinion, rightly - ‘Recognizing that criteria of choice can function as values when incomplete as rules has, I think, a number of striking advantages [p. 331] .’[25] . In Popper, a clear renunciation of the ideal of certainty and a re-instatement of truth are to be notice.

The recognition of the practical implication of science, both in its genesis and applications and in its justification, and the renunciation of the idea of certainty no doubt mark the end of the epoch in which the supposedly scientific method was shown as the zenith and model of human reason, where all philosophy aspired to ideal of certainty or took its failure as the failure of reason, first in the practical terrain and then, as an inexorable consequence, in the theoretical. Today there is an abandonment of the logico-linguistic conception of theories in favour of a pragmatic conception of science. Science, it is said, is action. But, as previously the possibility of a practical reason was not clear, nor was its articulation with theory, the rationality of science itself has been questioned. Kuhn has been accused of being relativist and irrationalist, an accusation which he has rejected, but without going so far as to construct a philosophical basis on which to base this rejection. For their parts, Peirce and Popper, each in his own way, have tackled this subject but both have recoiled, paradoxically, to quasi-Hegelian positions.

Science taken as action, as the art of research, of teaching, diffusion of knowledge and application, etc., can and must be judged with criteria that cannot in themselves be exclusively scientific or merely arbitrary, but a part of the general rationality of human life. The birth, then, of new disciplines, of new ways of making philosophy of science, such asbioethics ,environmental ethics andSTS studies , is not just a collateral phenomenon, a momentary collision point between science and practical thought, but an indication of a new way of conceiving rationality itself, or at least an indication of the need for this new reason.

I believe that the time has come to perfect concepts and attitudes that have always had a vocation to integrate the theoretical and practical planes without ruling out either of them, concepts and attitudes which were born to avoid the swing of the pendulum between the logicist and irrationalist extremes (between Permenides and Heracleitus, between Charybdis and Scylla).

Phronesis in Aristotle

Aristotle characterizes prudence (phronesis ) as

‘A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.’[26] .

By means of this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition, or state of capacity (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be knowledge linked with human action. In the second place, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technique (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral virtues and sets it among the intellectual ones. Finally, the fact that it deals with what is good and bad for mankind, and not right and wrong in an abstract way, sets prudence apart from wisdom (sophia ).

So far we have sketched the limits of the notion of prudence and others akin to it, and the points where they overlap[27] , but we must not forget that ‘Regardingpractical wisdom [phronesis ] we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it’.[28]

Texts about prudence suggest that it is an intellectual virtue, but that it implies experience lived, which concerns both means and ends, for its final horizon is the good life as a whole, and that it is at the service of wisdom, that is, it is an instrument for obtaining this. However, Aristotle goes as far as to say:

‘We ought to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom [phronimos ] not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.’[29]

In general, prudence pursues wisdom and wisdom stimulates human prudence. It is best to ‘possess both, or preferably prudence’[30] . Of animals, Aristotle says that they too are prudent[31] , but as they lack wisdom their prudence is certainly limited. For all this, prudence is worth pursuing for itself, regardless of its possible usefulness, given that it is a virtue[32] .

Prudence is a virtue, and virtue, for Aristotle, is:

‘a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [phronimos ] would determine it.’[33]

Virtue, therefore, is a habit or disposition to choosing the right medium between excess and shortage. But this is not easy, for the right means is not the arithmetic mean. To find it we need another rule. This rule will be the one established by the prudent man and applied just as he would apply it. In short, we cannot determine what is or is not virtuous without the concurrence of the prudent man.

The mid point is dictated by reason or by the straight rule of the prudent man. This reason or straight rule is, rather, correct reason, that is corrected reason. It is the limit to which a process of correction tends, one of elimination of errors, by relation to the end sought:

‘[...] there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (katà tòn orthòn lógon )’[34] .

Therefore, prudence requires experience:

‘Young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.’[35]

Experience is time and memory, but not just any lapse of time, but one which one has spent reflecting, trying to understand the nature of the things we see, of the actions we do and what happens to us. Experience is the memory of a time lived and thought, for it is the fruit of succeeding corrections.

But let us remember that prudence itself is a virtue and, moreover, ‘it is impossible to be practically wise [phronimos ] without being good’[36] . Therefore, nobody could be prudent without following the ruled dictated by prudence. Nobody could be prudent without having been already. This vicious circle (or virtuous one, depending on how we look on it) is resolved by education and action, that is, by action steered by somebody prudent until one becomes prudent oneself[37] .

The prudence of an experienced person serves for drawing up rules, ‘since the universals are reached from the particulars’[38] . Butmethodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[39] .

Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule. Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision.

Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice. The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity (epieíkeia )[40] .

‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[41]

The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[42] .

But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[44] .

In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that:

‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand. But the latter no longer finds its model and guide in the former, and must look on its own level for a rule which, nevertheless, will still be intellectual or “dianoetic”.’[45]

This integration is achieved, then, through prudence and practical truth: scientific research is still part of human action and, as such, is subject to the ethical rule of prudence, and to the service of the ultimate of man’s ends, happiness, which in turn consists in true knowledge, as well as co-existence[46] and a moderate degree of welfare[47] .

Science is rooted in human life, in practical values, in time and in experience through prudence, which is a virtue and is intellectual; or, more correctly, through the prudent person. Furthermore, this prudential conception of human reason is rooted in a very realistic, profound, fruitful and commonly accepted idea of human nature: ‘desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire’[48] .

Who Are Ahlul-Bayt? Part 1

بِسْمِ اللَّـهِ الرَّحْمَـٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Introduction

According to most authentic traditions in collections of both Sunni and Shi’a, Ahlul-Bayt (People of the House) of the Prophet are one of the two most precious Symbols of Islam after the departure of the Prophet (S). There are numerous traditions in the collection of both schools that the Prophet (S) has reminded us to stick to these two weighty things (al-Thaqalain), namely Qur’an and Ahlul-Bayt, in order not to go astray after him.

The Messenger of Allah also informed us that these two weights are non-separable and are with each other till the day of Judgment. This requires us that for understanding the interpretation of Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (S) we should refer to those who are attached to it, namely Ahlul-Bayt.

Knowing exactly who Ahlul-Bayt are, thus becomes a very vital matter when one considers the above tradition of the Prophet (S) as well as many other traditions which unequivocally state that adherence to Ahlul-Bayt is the only way of salvation. This clearly implies that the one who follows a wrong set of Ahlul-Bayt (!!), will be led astray.

Considering the critical importance of the subject, it will not be surprising to see that the Shi’a differ from some Sunnis in this subject. In fact, the Sunnis do not have one voice in specifying the Members of the House the Prophet. Most Sunnis are in the opinion that the Ahlul-Bayt of the Prophet (S) are:

• Fatimah al-Zahra (sa) (the daughter of the Messenger of Allah),

• Imam ‘Ali (as),

• Imam al-Hasan (as),

• Imam al-Husayn (as),

• Wives of the Prophet (S)

Others among the Sunnis further include ALL the descendants of the Prophet to the list! Some other Sunnis are very generous and include all the descendants of Abbas (the Abbasid) as well as the descendants of Aqil & Ja’far (the two brothers of Imam ‘Ali) to the list. It should be noted, however, that there have been some leading Sunni scholars who did NOT consider the wives of the Prophet among Ahlul-Bayt. This happens to be consistent with the Shi’a point of view.

To the Shi’a, the Ahlul-Bayt of the Prophet (S) consist of the following individuals ONLY:

• Fatimah al-Zahra (sa),

• Imam ‘Ali (as),

• Imam al-Hasan (as),

• Imam al-Husayn (as),

• Nine descendants of Imam al-Husayn (as).

and including the Prophet (S) himself, they will become fourteen individuals. Of course, at the time of the Holy Prophet only five of them (including the Prophet) were living and the rest were not born yet.

The Shi’a further assert that these fourteen individuals are protected by Allah from any kind of flaws, and thus worthy of being obeyed beside Qur’an (the other Weighty Symbol), and they are the only people who have the full knowledge of the interpretation of the Qur’anic verses.

In this discussion, we would like to explain why the Shi’a exclude the wives of the Prophet from Ahlul-Bayt, and also we will briefly discuss why Ahlul-Bayt are protected/infallible. (More detailed discussion on the infallibility is provided in Chapter 2). We base our proofs on:

1. Qur’an,

2. Traditions from the authentic Sunni Collections,

3. Historical events.

Evidence From Qur’an

The Holy Book of Allah mentions Ahlul-Bayt and their exceptional virtue in the following verse which is known as "Purification Verse”(Ayah al-Tat’hir):

إِنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّـهُ لِيُذْهِبَ عَنكُمُ الرِّجْسَ أَهْلَ الْبَيْتِ وَيُطَهِّرَكُمْ تَطْهِيرًا

"Verily Allah intends to keep off from you every kind of uncleanness O’ People of the House (Ahlul-Bayt), and purify you with a perfect purification". (Qur’an, the last sentence of Verse 33:33)

Note that the word "Rijs”in the above verse has got the article "al-”at its beginning which makes the word universal. Thus "al-Rijs”means "EVERY KIND of impurity". Also at the end of the verse, Allah states "and purify you a PERFECT purification.”The word "perfect”comes from the emphasis of "Tat’hiran". This is the only place in Qur’an that Allah uses the emphasis of "PERFECT purification".

According to the above verse, Allah expresses his intention to keep Ahlul-Bayt pure and flawless/sinless, and what Allah intends it will certainly take place as Qur’an itself testifies (see 16:40).

Indeed, a human can be sinless because he is not forced to commit sin. It is the human’s choice to accept the instructions of Allah and get His help to avoid sin, or to neglect Allah’s commandments and commit the sin. Allah is advisor, and encourager, and warner. A sinless human is still a human; no doubt about it. Some people assert that in order to be human, one SHOULD have some mistakes. Such claim is unsupported. The truth is that Human CAN make mistakes but he does not have to.

It is the Grace of Allah that attracts His servants towards Him, WITHOUT compelling them any way. This is our choice to pursue this attraction and refrain from doing mistakes, or to turn away and commit the mistakes. However, Allah has GUARANTEED to show the Right Path and to provide a pure life for those who seek it:

Whoever works righteousness man or woman and is faithful, We shall revive a PURE life for him. (Qur’an 16:97)

And whosoever keeps his duty to Allah, Allah will appoint a way out for him. (Qur’an 65:2)

It is worth mentioning the sentence of Qur’an in verse 33:33 which is related to purification of Ahlul-Bayt, has been placed at the middle of verses related to the wives of the Prophet (S), and this was the main reason why some Sunnis include the wives of the Prophet in Ahlul-Bayt.

However, the sentence related to Ahlul-Bayt (given above) distinguishes itself from the sentences before and after it with a clear distinction. The sentences before and after, use only feminine gender which clearly shows they are addressing the wives of the Prophet (S). However, in contrary, the above sentence uses only masculine gender which is a clear indication that that Qur’an is changing the individuals who it is referring to.

People who are familiar with Qur’an to some extent, know that such a sharp change of addressee is not a weird-thing, and it has been applied to several places in Qur’an. For instance we read in Qur’an:

"O Joseph! pass this over and (O wife of Aziz!) ask forgiveness for your sin, for truly you have been at fault."(Qur’an 12:29)

In the above verse, "O wife of Aziz”has not been mentioned and the address to Joseph (as) looks to continue. However the transition of the address from masculine gender to feminine gender clearly shows that the second sentence is addressing the Aziz’s wife and not Prophet Joseph (as). Notice that both sentences are within one verse. Also note the immediate change of addressing from Aziz’s wife to Joseph and again back to the wife in verses before verse 29 and also within that verse.

In Arabic language, when a group of women are being addressed, feminine gender is employed. However, if only one man exists among that group, masculine gender is used instead. Thus the above sentence of Qur’an clearly shows Allah is referring to a group other than the wives of the Prophet, using masculine gender, and that group includes some male members.

From the verse 33:33 alone, we cannot conclude that the wives of the Prophet are not included in Ahlul-Bayt. This latter claim can be proven by the authentic traditions of the Sunnis from Sihah Sittah in which the Prophet mentioned who Ahlul-Bayt are; and also by comparing the specifications of Ahlul-Bayt given in the verse of Qur’an with the behavior of the some of the wives of the Prophet mentioned in Sihah Sittah to prove the contrary.

What can be understood from the verse ALONE is that Allah is changing His address (which was exclusively the wives of the Prophet at the beginning of the verse) to some people who include some male members, and may or may not include the wives of the Prophet.

Authentic Traditions

It is interesting to see that both Sahih Muslim and Sahih al-Tirmidhi as well as many others confirm the Shi’ite point of view explained above. In Sahih Muslim, there is a chapter named "Chapter of Virtues of the Companions". Inside this chapter, there is a section called "Section of the Virtues of the Ahlul-Bayt of the Prophet". There exists ONLY ONE tradition in this section, and this tradition has no reference to the wives of the Prophet (S). The tradition is known as "The Tradition of Cloak/Mantle”(Hadith al-Kisaa), and is as follows:

Narrated Aisha:

One day the Prophet (S) came out afternoon wearing a black cloak (upper garment or gown; long coat), then al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali came and the Prophet accommodated him under the cloak, then al-Husayn came and entered the cloak, then Fatimah came and the Prophet entered her under the cloak, then ‘Ali came and the Prophet entered him to the cloak as well. Then the Prophet recited: "Verily Allah intends to keep off from you every kind of uncleanness O’ People of the House (Ahlul-Bayt), and purify you a perfect purification (the last sentence of Verse 33:33)."

Sunni reference:

• Sahih Muslim, Chapter of virtues of companions, section of the virtues of the Ahlul-Bayt of the Prophet (S), 1980 Edition Pub. in Saudi Arabia, Arabic version, v4, p1883, Tradition #61.

Below is the Arabic text of above tradition given in Sahih Muslim:

خرج النبي غداة وعليه مرط مرحل من شعر أسود فجاء الحسن فأدخله معه ، ثم جاء الحسين فأدخله معه ، ثم جاءت فاطمة فأدخلها، ثم جاء علي فأدخله ثم قال: إِنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ لِيُذْهِبَ عَنكُمُ الرِّجْسَ أَهْلَ الْبَيْتِ وَيُطَهِّرَكُمْ تَطْهِيرًا

One can see that the author of Sahih Muslim confirms that:

1. Imam ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn are the Ahlul-Bayt,

2. The purification sentence in Qur’an (the last sentence of Verse 33:33) was revealed for the virtue of the above-mentioned individuals, and NOT for the wives of the Prophet (S).

Muslim (the Author) did not put any other tradition in this section (section of the virtues of Ahlul-Bayt). If the author of Sahih Muslim believed that the wives of the Prophet were included in Ahlul-Bayt, he would have quoted some traditions about them in this section.

It is interesting to see that Aisha, the wife of the Prophet (S) is the narrator of the above tradition, and she herself is testifying that Ahlul- Bayt are the above-mentioned individuals (i.e., Imam ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn, may the blessing of Allah be upon them all).

Another version of the "Tradition of Cloak”is written in Sahih al-Tirmidhi, which is narrated in the authority of Umar Ibn Abi Salama, the son of Umm Salama (another wife of Prophet), which is as follows:

The verse

"Verily Allah intends to (33:33)"

was revealed to the Prophet (S) in the house of Umm Salama. Upon that, the Prophet gathered Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn, and covered them with a cloak, and he also covered ‘Ali who was behind him. Then the Prophet said: "O’ Allah! These are the Members of my House (Ahlul-Bayt). Keep them away from every impurity and purify them with a perfect purification.”Umm Salama (the wife of Prophet) asked: "Am I also included among them O Apostle of Allah?”the Prophet replied: "You remain in your position and you are toward a good ending."

Sunni reference: Sahih al-Tirmidhi, v5, pp 351,663

Here is the Arabic text of above tradition given by Sahih al-Tirmidhi:

نزلت هذه الآية على النبي "إنَّما يريدُ اللهَ...”في بيت أُم سلمه فدعا النبي فاطمه و حسناً و حسيناً فجعلهم بكسائه و علي خلف ظهره ثم قال: ألَّلهم هؤلاء أهل بيتي فاْذهب عنهم الرجس و طهرهم تطهيراً. قالت أمُّ سلمه: و أنا معهم يا نبي الله؟ قال أنتِ على مكانك و أنتِ إلى خير .

As we see, al-Tirmidhi also confirms that Imam ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn are the Ahlul-Bayt, and the purification sentence in Qur’an (the last sentence of Verse 33:33) was revealed for the virtue of the above-mentioned individuals, and NOT for the wives of the Prophet (S). Also it is apparent from above authentic tradition that the Prophet himself excluded his wives from Ahlul-Bayt. If Umm Salama (ra) was among Ahlul-Bayt, why didn’t the Prophet answer her positively? Why didn’t he enter her into the cloak? Why did the Prophet tell her that she remains in her own position? If the Prophet (S) would consider Umm Salama among Ahlul-Bayt, he would surely have entered her to the cloak and would have prayed for her perfect purity as well.

It is also worth mentioning that the Prophet (S) did NOT say: "These are among the Members of my House". He rather said: "These are THE Members of my House”since there was no other member of Ahlul-Bayt who was alive at the time of the Prophet (S). Also notice that Umm Salama (ra) who is the virtuous wife of the Prophet is the narrator of the tradition to his son and gives the testimony that who Ahlul-Bayt are.

In the tradition of al-Hakim the wording the last question and answer is as follows:

Umm Salama said: "O Prophet of Allah! Am I not one of the members of your family?”The Holy Prophet replied: "You have a good future but only these are the members of my family. O Lord! The members of my family are more deserving."

Sunni reference: al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v2, p416

Also the wording reported by al-Suyuti and Ibn al-Athir is as follows:

Umm Salama said to the Holy Prophet: "Am I also one of them?”He replied: "No. You have your own special position and your future is good."

Sunni reference:

• Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v2, p289

• Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Suyuti, v5, p198

Also al-Tabari quotes Umm Salama saying:

I said, "O Prophet of Allah! Am I not also one of your Ahlul-Bayt?”I swear by the Almighty that the Holy Prophet did NOT grant me any distinction and said: "You have a good future."

Sunni reference: Tafsir al-Tabari, v22, p7 under the commentary of verse 33:33

Beside Sahih Muslim and Sahih al-Tirmidhi from which we quoted the Tradition of Cloak on the authority of Aisha and Umm Salama respectively, below are more Sunni references of the Tradition of Cloak who reported both versions of the traditions:

(3) Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v6, pp 323,292,298; v1, pp 330-331; v3, p252; v4, p107 from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri

(4) Fadha’il al-Sahaba, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v2, p578, Tradition #978

(5) al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v2, p416 (two traditions) from Ibn Abi Salama, v3, pp 146-148 (five traditions), pp 158,172

(6) al-Khasa’is, by an-Nisa’i, pp 4,8

(7) al-Sunan, by al-Bayhaqi, narrated from Aisha and Umm Salama

(8) Tafsir al-Kabir, by al-Bukhari (the author of Sahih), v1, part 2, p69

(9) Tafsir al-Kabir, by Fakhr al-Razi, v2, p700 (Istanbul), from Aisha

(10) Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Suyuti, v5, pp 198,605 from Aisha and Umm Salama

(11) Tafsir Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, pp 5-8 (from Aisha and Abu Sa’id al-Khudri), pp 6,8 (from Ibn Abi Salama) (10 traditions)

(12) Tafsir al-Qurtubi, under the commentary of verse 33:33 from Umm Salama

(13) Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p485 (Complete version) from Aisha and Umar Ibn Abi Salama

(14) Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v2, p12; v4, p79 narrated from Ibn Abi Salama

(15) Sawa’iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Ch. 11, sec. 1, p221 from Umm Salama

(16) Tarikh, by al-Khateeb Baghdadi, v10, narrated from Ibn Abi Salama

(17) Tafsir al-Kashshaf, by al-Zamakhshari, v1, p193 narrated from Aisha

(18) Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, v1, pp 332-336 (seven traditions)

(19) Dhakha’ir al-Uqba, by Muhibb al-Tabari, pp21-26, from Abu Sa’id Khudri

(20) Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, p166 (by several transmitters)

... and more ...

Here is another authentic variation of "The Tradition of Cloak”which is related to Safiyya who was another wife of the Prophet (S). Ja’far Ibn Abi Talib narrated:

When the Messenger of Allah noticed that a blessing from Allah was to descent, he told Safiyya (one of his wives): "Call for me! Call for me!”Safiyya said: "Call who, O the Messenger of Allah?”He said: "Call for me my Ahlul-Bayt who are ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn.”Thus we sent for them and they came to him.

Then the Prophet (S) spread his cloak over them, and raised his hand (toward sky) saying: "O Allah! These are my family (Aalee), so bless Muhammad and the family (Aal) of Muhammad.”And Allah, to whom belong Might and Majesty, revealed: "Verily Allah intends to keep off from you every kind of uncleanness O’ People of the House (Ahlul-Bayt), and purify you a thorough purification (Qur’an, the last sentence of Verse 33:33)".

Sunni References:

• al-Mustadrak by al-Hakim, Chapter of "Understanding (the virtues) of Companions, v3, p148. The author then wrote: "This tradition is authentic (Sahih) based on the criteria of the two Shaikhs (al-Bukhari and Muslim)."

• Talkhis of al-Mustadrak, by al-Dhahabi, v3, p148

• Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v3, p33

Although the majority of traditions on this issue show that the last sentence of the verse 33:33 was revealed in the house of Umm Salama (as quoted earlier), the above tradition implies that it might have been revealed in the house of Safiyya.

Based on the opinion of the Sunni scholars including Ibn Hajar, it is quite possible that the verse was revealed more than once. In each occasion, the Prophet repeated his action in front of different wives so that they all realize who his Ahlul-Bayt are.

The testimony of three wives of the Prophet (Aisha, Umm Salama, and Safiyya) leaves us no room but to believe that the Ahlul-Bayt at the time of the Prophet were no more than five individuals: Prophet Muhammad, Lady Fatimah, Imam ‘Ali, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn (Peace be upon them all).

The fact that the gender in later part of Verse 33:33 is switched from feminine to masculine, has led the majority of Sunni commentators to believe that the last part was revealed for Imam ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn, as Ibn Hajar al-Haythami indicated:

Based on the opinion of the majority of (Sunni) commentators, the saying of Allah:"Verily Allah intends to (the last sentence of the verse 33:33)”was revealed for ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn, because of the usage of masculine gender in the word "Ankum”and after that.

Sunni reference: al-Sawa’iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar, Ch. 11, section 1, p220

Although the Shi’a have great respect for the highly righteous wives among the wives of the Prophet (S), such as Khadija, Umm Salama, Umm Ayman and (may Allah be pleased with them) who closely followed the Prophet and his Ahlul-Bayt before and after the demise of Prophet (S), yet we do not include even those respected individuals into Ahlul-Bayt since the Prophet clearly excluded them according to the authentic Sunni and Shi’i traditions. Ahlul-Bayt have exceptional virtues that no other pious person after the Prophet would possess them in the world, which are according to Qur’an: sinlessness, flawlessness and perfect purity.

Who Are Ahlul-Bayt? Part 2

بِسْمِ اللَّـهِ الرَّحْمَـٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the previous part, three authentic versions of "The Tradition of Cloak/Mantle”(Hadith al-Kisaa) reported in Sahih Muslim and Sahih al-Tirmidhi, and Mustadrak al-Hakim. In these traditions three wives of the Prophet testified that the Prophet (S) specified that the Members of his House (in his lifetime) are restricted to his daughter Fatimah (sa), her husband ‘Ali (as) and their two sons: al-Hasan (as), and al-Husayn (as).

Also according to the quoted traditions, the purification sentence in Qur’an (the last sentence of Verse 33:33) was revealed for their virtue and NOT for the wives of the Prophet (S). Now, let us see what the Messenger of Allah used to do for quite some time after the revelation of the verse:

The Long-Term Custom Of The Prophet After The Revelation Of The Purification Verse

It has been widely narrated that after the revelation of the purification verse of Qur’an (Ayah al-Tat’hir), the Messenger of Allah used to recited this verse at the door of the House of Fatimah and ‘Ali before every prayer when people were gathering to pray with the Messenger of Allah. He continued this practice for many months simply to show the people who his Ahlul-Bayt are. Anas Ibn Malik narrated:

The Messenger of Allah (S), from the time the revelation of "Verily Allah intends to... (the last part of Verse 33:33)”and for six (6) months thereafter, stood by the door of the House of Fatimah and said: "Time for Prayer Ahlul-Bayt; No doubt! Allah wished to remove all abomination from you and make you pure and spotless."

Sunni References:

• Sahih al-Tirmidhi, v12, p85

• Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v3, p258

• Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p158 who wrote this tradition is authentic as per the criteria of Muslim and Bukhari

• Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Suyuti, v5, pp 197,199

• Tafsir Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, pp 5,6 (saying seven month)

• Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p483

• Musnad, by al-Tiyalasi, v8, p274

• Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v5, p146

Abu al-Hamra narrated:

"The Messenger of God continued eight (8) months in Medina, coming to the door of ‘Ali at every morning prayer, putting his two hands on the two sides of the door and exclaiming: "Assalat! Assalat! (prayer! prayer!) Certainly God ward off all uncleanness from you, O Members of the House of Muhammad, and to make you pure and spotless."

Sunni References:

• Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Suyuti, v5, pp 198-199

• Tafsir Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p6

• Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p483

• Dhakha’ir al-Uqba, by Muhibbuddin al-Tabari, p24 on the authority of Anas Ibn Malik

• Isti’ab, by Ibn Abd al-Barr, v5, p637

• Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v5, p146

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, pp 121,168

• Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, p338

Also Ibn Abbas (ra) narrated:

"We have witnessed the Messenger of God for nine (9) months coming to the door of ‘Ali, son of Abu Talib, at the time of each prayer and saying: ‘Assalamu Alaykum Wa Rahmatullah Ahlul-Bayt (Peace and Mercy of God be upon you, O Members of the House). Certainly God wants only to keep away all the evil from you, Members of the House, and purify you with a thorough purification.’ He did this seven times a day."

Sunni reference: al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Hafidh al-Suyuti, v5, p198

In Majma’ al-Zawa’id and exegesis of Suyuti it has been quoted from Abu Said Khudri with a variation in words that:

For forty days the Holy Prophet approached the house of Fatimah al-Zahra (sa) every morning and used to say: ‘Peace be upon you O people of the House! The time for the prayers has come’. And thereafter he used to recite this verse: O people of the Prophet’s House.... And then said: ‘I am in a state of war with him who fights with you and am in a state of peace with him who is at peace with you’.

Sunni References:

• Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Hafidh al-Suyuti, v5, p199

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, pp 121,168

He repeated this openly at the time of each prayer so as to demonstrate the meaning of this verse verbally as well as practically and he explained it to his followers on the lines of the sacred verse: "We have revealed the Qur’an to you so that you could tell the people what has been revealed to them and that perhaps they will think. (Qur’an 16:44)”This concept became well known among the people and even the companions of the Holy Prophet argued on its basis on behalf of the Holy Prophet’s family:

Those Who Protested Based On The Purification Verse To Prove The Virtues Of The Holy Family

1. Imam al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali (as)

al-Hakim (in al-Mustadrak) in connection with the attainments of Imam al-Hasan, and al-Haythami (in connection with the excellence of the Holy Family) have narrated that Imam al-Hasan (as) addressed the people after the martyrdom of his father Imam ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib (as) and said during his speech:

O People! Whoever knows me, knows me and whoever doesn't know me should know that I am al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali; I am the son of the Holy Prophet and of his executor (Wasi). I am the son him who invited people to Allah and warned them of the torture of His Hell-fire. I am the son of the luminous Lamp. I belong to the family upon whom Gabriel used to descend and from there ascend to heavens. I belong to the family from whom Allah has ward off all filth and made them pure.

Sunni References:

• al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p172

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, p172

It has been narrated in Majma’ al-Zawa’id and Tafsir Ibn Kathir that:

After his father’s martyrdom when (Imam) al-Hasan attained the Caliphate, one day while he was performing his prayers, a man attacked him and thrust a sword in his thigh. He remained confined to bed for some months.

Thereafter, he recovered and delivered a sermon and said: "O People of Iraq! Fear Allah. We are your Amirs (leaders) and your guests and belong to the family about whom Almighty Allah has said: ‘O People of the Prophet’s House..’ Imam al-Hasan dwelt on this subject so much that all those present in the Mosque began to cry."

Sunni References:

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, p172

• Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p486

• This tradition has also been quoted by al-Tabarani and others

2. Ummul Mu’minin, Umm Salama (ra)

In Mushkil al-Athar, al-Tahawi has quoted Umrah al-Hamdaniyyah as saying:

I went to Umm Salama and greeted her. She inquired: "Who are you?”I replied: "I am Umrah Hamdaniyyah.”Umrah says, "I said O mother of the Faithful! Say something about the man who has been killed among us today. One group of the people like him and another group is inimical towards him,”(He meant Imam ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib). Umm Salama said, "Do you like him or are you hostile to him?”I replied, "I neither like him nor I am hostile to him.”(Here the narrative is defective and thereafter it is like this:)

Umm Salama began to tell about the revelation of the verse of Tat’hir and said in this behalf: "Allah revealed the verse: O People of the Prophet’s House... There was none in the room at that time, except Gabriel, the Holy Prophet, ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. I said: ‘O Prophet of Allah! Am I too one of the people of the House?’ He replied: ‘Allah will reward you and recompense you.’ I wished that he might have said ‘Yes’ and would have valued such a reply much more than anything else in the world.’"

Sunni reference: Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, v1, p336

Ahmad in Musnad; Tabari in his exegesis and al-Tahawi in Mushkil al-Athar have quoted Shahr Ibn Haushab, to have said:

When the news of the martyrdom of al-Husayn reached Medina I heard Umm Salama, wife of the Holy Prophet, saying: "They have killed al-Husayn. I myself observed that the Holy Prophet spread his Khaibari cloak on them and said: ‘O Allah! These are the members of my family! Ward off any uncleanness from them and keep them clean and pure!’"

Sunni References:

• Musnad, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v6, p298

• Tafsir al-Kabir, by Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p6

• Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, v1, p335

3. Ibn Abbas (ra)

Ahmad, al-Nisa’i, Muhibbuddin, and al-Haythami have reported (the wording being of Ahmad’s Musnad):

‘Amr Ibn Maimoon said: "I was with Ibn Abbas when nine persons came to him and said: ‘Ibn Abbas! Either come out with us or provide us privacy.’ He said: ‘I shall go out with you.’ In those days the eyes of Ibn Abbas were all right and he could see. They had mutual conversation and I am not aware as to what they talked about. After some time Ibn Abbas returned to us. He was then shaking off his dress saying: ‘Fie be upon them! They are talking about the man who enjoys ten excellences.’

(Later in the narration Ibn Abbas details the virtues of the Imam till he says:) ‘The Holy Prophet spread his cloak upon ‘Ali, al-Hasan and al-Husayn and said: O People of the Prophet’s House! Allah intends to keep you pure from all sorts of uncleanness and blemish and to purify you with a thorough purification.’"

Sunni References:

• Musnad, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v1, p331 (First edition)

In al-Khasa’is, al-Nisa’i has quoted Amir Ibn Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas as saying:

Muawiyah said to Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas, "Why do you refrain from abusing Abu Turab?”Sa’d said, "I don’t abuse ‘Ali for three attributes of his which I heard from the Holy Prophet. If even one of them had been for me, I would have valued it much more than anything else on earth. I heard from the Holy Prophet that When he left Imam ‘Ali as his representative in Medina and proceeded to fight a battle, ‘Ali said: ‘Are you leaving me with the women and the children in Medina?’ The Holy Prophet replied: ‘Don't you like that your position vis-a-vis me should be like that of Aaron (Haroon) with Moses. You enjoy the same position in regard to me as Aaron enjoyed with Moses.’

On the fateful day of Khaibar, too, I heard the Holy Prophet as saying: ‘Tomorrow I shall give the standard (of the army) to one who loves Allah and His Prophet and Allah and His Prophet also love him’. All of us were keen to be graced and singled out in the face of this declaration and wished that the standard might be in our hands. In the meantime the Holy Prophet said: ‘Bring ‘Ali to me.’ ‘Ali came in such a condition that he had some trouble in his eyes.

The Holy Prophet applied the saliva of his mouth to (Imam) ‘Ali’s eyes and gave the standard in his hand. Moreover, when the verse of Tat’hir was revealed, the Holy Prophet called ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn near himself and said: ‘O Allah! These are the People of my House.’"

Sunni References:

• al-Khasa’is, by al-Nisa’i, p4

• A fairly similar narration is given in Sahih Muslim, English version, Chapter CMXCVI (Virtues of ‘Ali), p1284, Tradition #5916

Also al-Tabari, Ibn Kathir, al-Hakim, and al-Tahawi have quoted from Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas that:

At the time of the revelation of the verse, the Holy Prophet called ‘Ali along with his two sons and Fatimah and accommodated them under his own cloak and said: ‘O Lord! These are the members of my family’.

Sunni References:

• Tafsir al-Kabir, by Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p7

• Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p485

• al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v3, p147

• Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, v1, p336; v2, p33

• History of al-Tabari, Arabic version, v5, p31

• Abu Sa’id al-Khudri

It narrated on that:

Abu Sa’id al-Khudri: I heard the Messenger of Allah saying: "This verse has been revealed about five individuals: Myself, ‘Ali, al-Hasan, al-Husayn, and Fatimah."

Sunni References:

• Tafsir Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p5, under the verse 33:33

• Dhakha’ir al-Uqba, Muhibbuddin al-Tabari, p24

• al-Sawa’iq al-Muhriqah, by Ibn Hajar, Ch. 11, section 1, p221

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami

• Wathilah Ibn Asqa’

al-Tabari while commenting on the verse 33:33, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, al- Hakim who considers the tradition to be authentic according to the criteria of Muslim and al-Bukhari, also Bayhaqi, al-Tahawi, and Haythami quote Abu Ammar as having said (the wording is of al-Tabari):

I was sitting with Wathilah Ibn Asqa’ when a discussion took place about ‘Ali and the people abused him. When those present rose to leave he said to me: ‘Keep sitting so that I may talk with you about the man whom they have been abusing. I was with the Holy Prophet when ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn approached him and the Holy Prophet spread his cloak on them and said: "O Allah! These are the members of my family. Ward off every uncleanness from them and keep them clean and pure."

Sunni References:

• Tafsir al-Kabir, by Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p6

• al-Mustadrak, by al-Hakim, v2, p416; v3, p417

• Musnad, by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, v6, p107

• Majma’ al-Zawa’id, by al-Haythami, v9, p167

• Mushkil al-Athar, by al-Tahawi, v1, p346

• Sunan, al-Bayhaqi, v2, p152

Also Ibn al-Athir quoted Shaddad Ibn Abdullah saying:

I heard from Wathilah Ibn Asqa’ that when the head of (Imam) al-Husayn was brought, one of the Syrians abused (Imam) al-Husayn and his father, Wathilah stood up and said: "I swear by Allah that ever since I heard the Holy Prophet say about them: ‘O People of the Prophet’s House! Allah intends to keep you pure from uncleanness and blemish and to purify you with a thorough purification,’ I have always loved ‘Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn (Peace be upon them).’"

Sunni reference: Usdul Ghabah, by Ibn al-Athir, v2, p20

• ‘Ali Ibn al-Husayn, Zain al-Abideen (as)

While commenting on the verse 33:33, al-Tabari, Ibn Kathir and al-Suyuti have stated in their exegesis:

‘Ali Ibn Husayn said to a Syrian: "Have you read this verse in Surah al-Ahzab, O people of the House! Allah intends to keep you pure from blemish and to purify you with a thorough purification (Qur’an 33:33)?"

The Syrian said: "Does this verse pertain to you?”The Imam replied: "Yes, it pertains to us."

Sunni References:

• Tafsir al-Kabir, by Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, v22, p7

• Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v3, p486

• Tafsir al-Durr al-Manthoor, by al-Hafidh al-Suyuti, v5, p199

al-Kharazmi has quoted this very narration in his Maqtal in the following words:

When, after the martyrdom of (Imam) al-Husayn the grandson of the Holy Prophet, (Imam) Zain al-Abideen and other prisoners belonging to the House of the Holy Prophet were carried to Damascus and stationed in a jail located by the side of the Grand Mosque of Damascus, an old man approached them and said: "Praised be Allah who killed you and annihilated you and relieved the people from your men and provided the Commander of the Faithful (Yazid) with authority over you.”

‘Ali Ibn al-Husayn said: "O old man! Have you read the Holy Qur’an?” He replied: "Yes.”Then the Imam said: "Have you read the verse: Muhammad! ‘Say, I do not ask you of any reward for my preaching except the love of my kinsfolk’?”The old man said: "Yes. I have read it."

The Imam said: "Have you read the verse: ‘So give what is due to the near ones, the needy and the wayfarer.’ and the verse: ‘Know that whatever (income) you gain, one fifth belongs to Allah, the Messenger, his near ones, orphans the needy and the wayfarers, if you believe in Allah and what We revealed to Our servant in the Holy Qur’an’?” The old man replied: "Yes. I have read them."

The Imam said: "I swear by Allah that the word ‘near ones’ refers to us and these verses have been revealed about us. (The Imam added): And have you also read this verse in the Holy Qur’an wherein Allah says: ‘O people of the Prophet’s House...’ (33:33)?”The old man said: "Yes. I have read it". The Imam said: "What is meant by people of the Prophet’s House! It is we whom Allah has especially associated with the verse of Tat’hir (purification)."

The old man said: "I ask you by Allah! Are you of the same family?”The Imam replied: "I swear by my grandfather the Prophet of Allah that we are the same people."

The old man was stunned and expressed regret for what he had said. Then he raised his head towards the sky and said: "O Allah! I ask forgiveness for what I have said, and forsake enmity against this family and hate the enemies of the progeny of Muhammad."

Sunni reference: Maqtal al-Husayn, by al-Khateeb al-Kharazmi