Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Aristotelian Perspectives for Post-modern Reason (I)

Phronesis, Scientific Rationality and Environmental Responsibility

Alfredo Marcos

University of Valladolid

Department of Philosophy

Plaza del Campus s/n,

47011 Valladolid, Spain

amarcos@fyl.uva.es

Table of Contents

Introduction. 3

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism. 7

Phronesis in Aristotle 12

Prudence and Scientific Rationality: ‘Do not block the way of inquiry.’ 15

Prudence and Environmental Responsibility: ‘May human life remain possible.’ 19

Conclusion. 23

Notes 24

Introduction

In the Modern Age, certainty became the highest and most sought-after espistemic value, even more valued than truth, and the so-called scientific method was seen as the surest path to certainty. Indeed, human reason became identified with the application of a supposed scientific method of Cartesian or Baconian inspiration. The domain of the practice became considered either one more area for the mere application of the scientific method, an application which would lead to human progress, or as an area beyond reason. One of the stereotyped convictions attributed to the enlightened mentality is this: insofar as human life in all its extremes becomes more rational, that is, more scientific, practical problems will begin to be solved. Indeed, Rousseau, in hisDiscourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750), pointed out that human progress did not always go hand in hand with scientific and technical progress, which today is a self-evident truth that is not discussed. On the other hand, dual accounting, that is the consideration that science is fully rational and the other areas of human activity are not, as well as an insult to common sense, has rebounded against science itself, for its practical aspects cannot be hidden, and it is hardly possible to parcel off a purely logical context, as that of justification set out to be.

It is obvious that not even the application of a supposed scientific method can guarantee the progressive character of our practical decisions. To this evidence there has been added the recognition of science’s own practical aspects. This evolution has convinced many of the impossibility of obtaining certainty even in the domain of science, which has given rise to diverse forms of desperation regarding the abilities of human reasoning. This oscillation between the obsession for certainty and desperation with regard to reason has been the tune most frequently danced to in modern times.

Yet today we do not want environmental problems to be left entirely up to the expert’s decision or the irrational imposition of power or arbitrariness, but to be tackled in reasoned dialogue, on a footing of equality, by scientists, technicians, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, private individuals, representatives of social movements - and indeed philosophers! We are recognizing, at least implicitly, the possibility of being reasonable in an area where we do not expect absolute certainty, and we accept that human reason goes beyond the limits of science and technology, that reason is more deeply rooted in human life than a mere method could ever be. To reach this point we have had to come a long way as far as our concept of reason and science is concerned, and have also needed a great deal of experience - bittersweet experience - regarding the practical consequences of science. Everything would seem to show, then, that the most typical extreme positions of modern times are being abandoned, and that we have entered the post-modern period[1] .

My intention in these pages is to explore the possibilities of a project of basically Aristotelian inspiration for the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects of reason, for the search for a happy medium between the extremes of logicism and irrationalism. In my opinion, this outlook has much to contribute to the on-going debate on the rationality of science and on the environmental questions that its application brings up. This is, indeed, a particular aspect of the relationship between reason and practice, but not just any aspect: traditional philosophical problems are arising now, and they will continue to come up in the future, in direct connection with environmental matters - this will be an area and a way for the classical topics of philosophy to reappear. Rationality, good and evil, justice, the relationship between being and value, the objectivity or subjectivity of knowledge, etc., are venerable philosophical topics that we shall have to reconsider in the light of environmental problems, as they were once tackled in connection with questions of politics, theology, society, science and economy.

I shall now outline the steps that my exposition will follow, together with other considerations necessary for it to fall within the limits of a short piece. In the first place, we need a correct characterization of Modern Age which makes it possible to explain the causes of a bad relationship between theory and practice. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted task. Here we can hardly even approach a full idea of modernity. What we can do, however, is point out one of its most essential characteristics[2] , in some wise the cause of many others and especially near to the interests of this paper. I mean the predilection for certainty, which is a constant of the modern spirit, just like the energetic and cyclic irrationalist reactions. Obsession with certainty and sceptical desperation are mutual causes of each other like pre-Socratic opposites. We shall speak of this insection 2 (‘Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism’) .

Secondly, we must go through the Aristotelian concepts which may, in my opinion, take us out of this thankless to-ing and fro-ing. What I mean basically is the Aristotelian notions of prudence (phronesis ) and practical truth (aletheia praktike ). Insection 3 (Prudence in Aristotle) , I shall set out the contents of Aristotelian prudence and the contribution that it can make to the present debate. An analogous study of the notion of practical truth will be set out in the second part of this paper[3] .

The concept of prudence is one that has been taken from the area of Aristotelian practical philosophy, where absolute certainty is not expected, but neither are decisions left to mere arbitrariness or imposition. The novelty consists in that, when we recognize, as we do today, that science itself is a human action, the notion taken from practical philosophy may be used for understanding and integrating scientific rationality. When science is characterized as an activity governed by prudence, it moves away from both the logicist and the irrationalist poles, from the obsession with certainty and from the ‘anything goes’, from algorithm and anarchism. Furthermore, if science is made a prudential activity, it will be much easier for us to connect its particular way of rationality with that of discussions, decisions and environmental actions.

Although it is true that Aristotelian notions can be suggestive, it is not true that they do no more than answer contemporary questions. For them to be active in the on-going debate on the relationship between theoretical reason and practical reason, they must be developed,updated through contemporary texts. The profit from this manœuvre is double: it makes Aristotle’s concepts available for the present debate and gives some contemporary ideas a very comprehensive and fertile philosophical framework, the Aristotelian framework. In the remaining sections. I shall tryto bring to the current debate the Aristotelian notion of prudence through the fallibilism of Peirce and Popper and through Hans Jonas’ imperative of responsibility. The fallibilist attitude is, to my mind, the most suitable post-modern characterization of scientific rationality and of human rationality, and applied to environmental problems it would give rise to the so-called principle of responsibility.

Insection 4 (Prudence and scientific rationality: Do not block the way of inquiry ) , I maintain that in science a fallibilistic attitude alone opens the doors to prudential reason, and that the ontological and anthropological bases of prudence are also suitable for fallibilism, founding it and encouraging it. In Aristotle, there are certain fallibilistic attitudes but they are ambiguous and combine with other statements in which science is characterized as universal and necessary knowledge. In this regard, Peirce’s texts are most useful and clearest, and, of course, nearest to the present problems of science. Fallibilism is for him an attitude, that is something practical - rather than a concept or a rule it is the scientific attitudepar excellence . On the basis of the fallibilist attitude there stands what may be the ultimate and most universal rule of scientific rationality:Do not block the way of inquiry .

Insection 5 (Prudence and environmental responsibility: May human life remain possible ), I set out to bring the Aristotelian idea of prudence to the on-going debate on the environment. I shall proceed as in the previous case, showing its proximity to and continuity with the present notion of responsibility as treated by Hans Jonas. Again we have an Aristotelian concept that can be developed or, as Jonas himself would say, improved on, by a notion of today. In return, this present notion is supported by a very articulate and coherent ontology. Jonas sets out the so-called principle of responsibility as the ultimate element of the moral control of our relationship with the environment:Proceed in such a way that you do not endanger the conditions for humanity’s indefinite continuity on Earth .

I consider that Peirce’s and Jonas’s formulations - each in its own area, respectively that of science and that of ethics - the expression of one and the same attitude, of one and the sameactual - and therefore post-modern - way of understanding rationality, and that both fit perfectly into a metaphysical framework of Aristotelian inspiration. Essentially, these ideas are convergent, and respond to one attitude and may be based on one Aristotelian conception of reality, and together they offer a good answer to questions for their scientific rationality and their environmental responsibility.

The principles of Peirce and Jonas can, however, be taken as inadequate as a characterization of human action, for they do not take into account its creative aspects. The truth is that both, though they do not guarantee it, are directed towardscreative discovery : they set out to ensure that it will be possible at any moment, while nurturing and fomenting the conditions for it and removing obstacles. They uphold the openness of human action so that it can adjust to the future course of events, always open and never completely determined. The present article will therefore require a later development in which the notion of creative discovery is tackled along with its connection with the Aristotelian concept ofpractical truth .

Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism

Among the characteristics of modern thought is the predilection for certainty[4] . The search for certainty has been one of the signs of identity of a whole intellectual tradition, of what Husserl[5] calls ‘European science’. According to Husserl, the abandonment of this search steeps us in crisis, in scepticism or in any type of naturalism. However, as Kolakowski[6] rightly observes, neither Descartes nor Husserl managed to distinguish between the subjective feeling of evidence and the objective evidence of truth. Consequently, in many of the modern philosophical traditions, the pursuit of certainty has become a threat to the pursuit of truth, an impulse towards different types of idealism and a cause of crisis (by inference and by reaction) rather than an antidote to it.

The pursuit of certainty -infallibilism , in the words of Laudan - is one of the legacies of Cartesian philosophy. One could state, as Clarke does, that Cartesian science is defined in terms of certainty rather than in terms of the truth of the explanations proposed.[7] A text in which Decartes himself sets this point out clearly is:

‘What can it matter to us for something to be absolutely false if anyway we believe it and we do not have the slightest suspicion that it is false?’[8]

Or, if a negative formulation is required, ‘any knowledge that can be rendered doubtful must not be called scientific’[9] and ‘I treat [...] as false everything which is merely likely’[10] These words give the tone of what would from then on be the object of the quest for the scientific method.

It is, in any event, a question of establishing methods whose results will be certain knowledge, methods which we can only trust, whether or not subjective certainty is accompanied by objective truth.

Francis Bacon initiated another route of access to certainty, this time with an empirical and inductive character. According to Bacon, the inductive method is theart of invention andmachine , as well asformula ,clear and radiant light [11] , and other similar boons. Those of Bacon’s ideas with the greatest influence on subsequent scientific thought are those which he expressed in his second book of theNovum Organum , that is his inductive logic, the so-called Baconian method. In general, and as Rossi states, many have seen in Bacon the constructor of a gigantic ‘logic machine’ doomed to not being used. With the Baconian method, according to Spedding, we cannot do anything. We consider it a subtle, elaborate and ingenious mechanism, but one which can produce nothing[12] . In spite of everything, Bacon’s image as the founder of the new science thanks to his discovery of the inductive method was greatly appreciated by the founders of theRoyal Society and the authors of the great illustratedEncyclopædia .

In what situation do we place the practical with regard to rationality when the first value is certainty?

Many modern thinkers begin their writings with the observation of the disappointing state of the philosophy of human things in comparison with natural philosophy, that is the natural science. Dissension and lack of certainty, both in metaphysics and in moral philosophy, are the points causing the greatest unrest. Both Descartes and Hume, to mention two of the most noteworthy, feel that the model that inquiry into mankind should follow is that of natural and formal sciences, which have already opened up a path, a method to certainty and consensus. So, Descartes set out to find ‘the highest and most perfect moral science, which, presupposing a knowledge of other sciences, is the ultimate degree of wisdom’[13] . Naturally, Descartes had to settle indefinitely for what he called  ‘provisional morals’. Hume stated with his empiricist approach base on the inductive method, ‘Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension’[14] . This science will imply the extension of the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy to the study of human nature, and within it to the study of morals. Regarding politics, Hume has still fewer doubts, and states categorically that it can be reduced to a science endowed with a degree of certainty almost as perfect as that of mathematics[15] .

But this naturalist approach to the study of man, which in principle promises the so longed-for certainty, leads to further disappointments and carries with it the germ of its own destruction, in the long term threatening natural science itself, which will always be an activity and product of human freedom and reason. Today we know from experience how these tendencies implicit in the naturalist position itself have been developed, but in Hume, the whole trajectory is already indicated. Naturalization of moral studies seems to demand a methodological reduction of the normative and the evaluative, which will end up being established as a definitive ontological reduction of human reason and freedom, which are mutually inseparable and inaccessible to the empirical method and never totally explained from strictly naturalist bases. Thence are derived an emotivism and an irrationalism which threaten science itself insofar as its practical aspects are recognized along with its inability to produce absolutely certain knowledge. Hume assures that ‘We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’[16] . Paradoxical though this may seem, this resignation that the practical should be the place for feelings derives from a reduced notion of reason, excessively bound up with a given idea of science and method and an extreme valuation of certainty.

In Hume there is no renunciation of certainty, the basis of which is confided to habit, but one of reason. Predilection for certainty leads Hume to irrationalism, not to scepticism[17] . Karl Popper sums up the situation as follows, saying that, according to Hume, the scientific method is inductive, but:

‘... induction is completely invalid as an inference. There is not a shadow of a logical argument that would support the inference to a generalization from statements about the past (such as past repetitions of some 'evidence'). He [Hume] said that in spite of its lack of logical validity, induction plays an indispensable part in practical life [...] Thus there is a paradox.Even our intellect does not work rationally '. [p.94] [...] This led Hume, one of the most reasonable thinkers of all time, to give up rationalism and look at man not as endowed with reason but as a product of blind habit. Acording to Russellthis paradox of Hume's is responsible for the schizophrenia of modern man ’. [p.95][18]

If anything can be learnt for the present it is that we lack a notion of practical reason that is well structured and free of traditional errors. Practical criteria cannot depend on a supposed scientific method and cannot aspire to confer absolute certainty on our decisions, but we do not have to go without reason in practical situations, as there is no need to identify reason with a supposed scientific method or with the sure way to certainty. In part, the obstacles encountered by Hume and Descartes in the development of an idea of practical reason have been abolished, for today we are aware that sciences are not governed strictly by the Cartesian method or by the inductive method, and that they are far from reaching complete certainty, which does not make them directly irrational. Above everything else it is the renunciation of the obsession with certainty that enables us today to imagine a suitable notion of practical reason.

It will be said that a notion of practical reason already existed in Kant. And this is so. But two observations must be made in this regard. In Kant, unlike in Hume, there is a radical denaturalization of practical reason, which today seems unacceptable. Such is the case that for Kant, prudence mainly has nothing to do with practical reason, but with theoretical reason, paradoxical though this may seem. This means that he excludes it from the nucleus of morals and considers it a mere technical ability for the pursuit of happiness[19] . In the Modern period, from Descartes to Bacon, any technique was considered to be no more than applied science, and that if any problem arose in practice, it was due to deficiencies in theory. This view of science as immediately applicable soon spread, as we have seen in Hume, to morals, so the application of a science of man, which would not present genuinely technical problems, but only theoretical ones, would solve the problems of human happiness. Philosophers of the Enlightenment felt attracted by this new way of approaching human affairs. Kant shared the technological optimism of his day although he was the first to resist the concept of morals as a technique, that is, as the application of a science of man to the pursuit of happiness (happiness, by the way, previously defined by that very science). Kant, on the other hand, sought to protect morals from influences external to the very freedom of the subject. He did this by excluding the traditional contents from the nucleus of practical philosophy. According to Kant, prudence lies rather in theoretical reason, as it could become a mere applied science[20] . In the interests of autonomy of reason, Kant separates morals radically from nature, setting it in the sphere of the freedom of the subject. The attempt to protect morals from naturalism leads to the new excess of putting it in the hands of logicism. The categorical imperative is, at root, of a logical character:Behave in such a way that you might also want your maxim to become universal law . The ‘might also want’ invoked here is, as Jonas[21] states, that of reason an its concord with itself, an ability which would only be negated by self-contradiction.

In Aristotle, on the other hand, happiness is man’s natural and legitimate aim, whereby it was possible, according to Aubenque, ‘to integrate thetechnical moment of the correct choice of means in the definition of morality’[22] .

The second observation concerns the certainty of what Kant takes to be really practical. No comparison can be made between the splendid certainty which Kant attributes to Newtonian science and thepractical faith in postulates necessary to give consistence to the practical use of reason. In an atmosphere of extreme valuation of certainty and of the scientific method, the Kantian foundation for practical reason, which, in short, leads to the postulates of human freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, was not believed or taken seriously. Kant expressed his admiration and  respect for two areas of reality,the starry sky above me and the moral law inside me . But to keep them separate is not sustainable, for indeed he who looks at the stars and grasps moral law is a human being who takes part in the two areas of reality, as a system subject to physical laws and as a free being. The integration of the two spheres seems necessary without the negation of either of them. But if we separate to such an extent the degree of certainty that we attribute to the knowledge of each of them, and if we set such a high value on certainty, then the so-called practical use of reason runs the risk of immediately being seen as one more mask of the irrational, as a concession of Kant’s to his beliefs, affections, desires or interests. The historical proof that this two sets of accounts cannot be tenable for long is what happened to Kantian tradition. Either it tended towards an idealism that suppressed the peculiarity of the practical and made it depend for everything on theory by identifying the rational with the real, or it drifted towards an irrationalism in which the pure use of reason had the same fate as the practical use, until it was seen as one more mask of the will to power[23] . The pure and practical uses of reason must be integrated and must support each other, for today we know that they either stand or fall together[24] . But this requires a reconsideration of the ideal of certainty and of the nature of science which has only come about in the twentieth century.

Since Hegel and since Nietzsche, several campaigns have been launched in the pursuit of certainty. One of the last ones in favour of certainty, automatism and the segregation of the practical, based on the identification of reason with science, was called Neo-positivism (and it was pursued as the so-calledreceived view ). Its internal decadence apart, it was Popper’s philosophy and Kuhn’s criticisms that put an end to this venture, and with it to a way of making philosophy of science. Kuhn laid forth the practical aspects of scientific rationality. As he states - in my opinion, rightly - ‘Recognizing that criteria of choice can function as values when incomplete as rules has, I think, a number of striking advantages [p. 331] .’[25] . In Popper, a clear renunciation of the ideal of certainty and a re-instatement of truth are to be notice.

The recognition of the practical implication of science, both in its genesis and applications and in its justification, and the renunciation of the idea of certainty no doubt mark the end of the epoch in which the supposedly scientific method was shown as the zenith and model of human reason, where all philosophy aspired to ideal of certainty or took its failure as the failure of reason, first in the practical terrain and then, as an inexorable consequence, in the theoretical. Today there is an abandonment of the logico-linguistic conception of theories in favour of a pragmatic conception of science. Science, it is said, is action. But, as previously the possibility of a practical reason was not clear, nor was its articulation with theory, the rationality of science itself has been questioned. Kuhn has been accused of being relativist and irrationalist, an accusation which he has rejected, but without going so far as to construct a philosophical basis on which to base this rejection. For their parts, Peirce and Popper, each in his own way, have tackled this subject but both have recoiled, paradoxically, to quasi-Hegelian positions.

Science taken as action, as the art of research, of teaching, diffusion of knowledge and application, etc., can and must be judged with criteria that cannot in themselves be exclusively scientific or merely arbitrary, but a part of the general rationality of human life. The birth, then, of new disciplines, of new ways of making philosophy of science, such asbioethics ,environmental ethics andSTS studies , is not just a collateral phenomenon, a momentary collision point between science and practical thought, but an indication of a new way of conceiving rationality itself, or at least an indication of the need for this new reason.

I believe that the time has come to perfect concepts and attitudes that have always had a vocation to integrate the theoretical and practical planes without ruling out either of them, concepts and attitudes which were born to avoid the swing of the pendulum between the logicist and irrationalist extremes (between Permenides and Heracleitus, between Charybdis and Scylla).

Phronesis in Aristotle

Aristotle characterizes prudence (phronesis ) as

‘A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.’[26] .

By means of this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition, or state of capacity (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be knowledge linked with human action. In the second place, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technique (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral virtues and sets it among the intellectual ones. Finally, the fact that it deals with what is good and bad for mankind, and not right and wrong in an abstract way, sets prudence apart from wisdom (sophia ).

So far we have sketched the limits of the notion of prudence and others akin to it, and the points where they overlap[27] , but we must not forget that ‘Regardingpractical wisdom [phronesis ] we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it’.[28]

Texts about prudence suggest that it is an intellectual virtue, but that it implies experience lived, which concerns both means and ends, for its final horizon is the good life as a whole, and that it is at the service of wisdom, that is, it is an instrument for obtaining this. However, Aristotle goes as far as to say:

‘We ought to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom [phronimos ] not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.’[29]

In general, prudence pursues wisdom and wisdom stimulates human prudence. It is best to ‘possess both, or preferably prudence’[30] . Of animals, Aristotle says that they too are prudent[31] , but as they lack wisdom their prudence is certainly limited. For all this, prudence is worth pursuing for itself, regardless of its possible usefulness, given that it is a virtue[32] .

Prudence is a virtue, and virtue, for Aristotle, is:

‘a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [phronimos ] would determine it.’[33]

Virtue, therefore, is a habit or disposition to choosing the right medium between excess and shortage. But this is not easy, for the right means is not the arithmetic mean. To find it we need another rule. This rule will be the one established by the prudent man and applied just as he would apply it. In short, we cannot determine what is or is not virtuous without the concurrence of the prudent man.

The mid point is dictated by reason or by the straight rule of the prudent man. This reason or straight rule is, rather, correct reason, that is corrected reason. It is the limit to which a process of correction tends, one of elimination of errors, by relation to the end sought:

‘[...] there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (katà tòn orthòn lógon )’[34] .

Therefore, prudence requires experience:

‘Young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.’[35]

Experience is time and memory, but not just any lapse of time, but one which one has spent reflecting, trying to understand the nature of the things we see, of the actions we do and what happens to us. Experience is the memory of a time lived and thought, for it is the fruit of succeeding corrections.

But let us remember that prudence itself is a virtue and, moreover, ‘it is impossible to be practically wise [phronimos ] without being good’[36] . Therefore, nobody could be prudent without following the ruled dictated by prudence. Nobody could be prudent without having been already. This vicious circle (or virtuous one, depending on how we look on it) is resolved by education and action, that is, by action steered by somebody prudent until one becomes prudent oneself[37] .

The prudence of an experienced person serves for drawing up rules, ‘since the universals are reached from the particulars’[38] . Butmethodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[39] .

Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule. Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision.

Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice. The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity (epieíkeia )[40] .

‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[41]

The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[42] .

But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[44] .

In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that:

‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand. But the latter no longer finds its model and guide in the former, and must look on its own level for a rule which, nevertheless, will still be intellectual or “dianoetic”.’[45]

This integration is achieved, then, through prudence and practical truth: scientific research is still part of human action and, as such, is subject to the ethical rule of prudence, and to the service of the ultimate of man’s ends, happiness, which in turn consists in true knowledge, as well as co-existence[46] and a moderate degree of welfare[47] .

Science is rooted in human life, in practical values, in time and in experience through prudence, which is a virtue and is intellectual; or, more correctly, through the prudent person. Furthermore, this prudential conception of human reason is rooted in a very realistic, profound, fruitful and commonly accepted idea of human nature: ‘desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire’[48] .

9. What is the reality of Angels?

The Noble Qur’an has spoken about the angels on numerous occasions with a great number of verses speaking of their attributes, characteristics and responsibilities. So much so that the Qur’an places the issue of belief in the angels at par with belief in Allah (s.w.t.), the prophets and the Divine books, and this itself is proof of the fundamental importance of this issue.

آمَنَ الرَّسُولُ بِمَا أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ رَبِّهِ وَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ كُلٌّ آمَنَ بِاللٌّهِ وَ مَلاَئِكَتِهِ وَ كُـتُبِهِ وَ رُسُلِهِ‏

“The messenger believes in what has been revealed to him from his Lord, and (so do) the believers; they all believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His messengers.” 1

Undoubtedly, the existence of the angels is one of the issues of the ghaib (Unseen) and therefore, proving their existence and their characteristics cannot be accomplished except by means of transmitted proofs; hence, we ought to accept them according to the ruling of 'believing in the Unseen'.

The Qur’an mentions their characteristics as follows:

1. The angels are entities that possess intelligence and comprehension, and are the honourable servants of Allah (s.w.t.).

بَلْ عِبَادٌ مُكْرَمُونَ

“Nay! they are honored servants.” 2

2. They are totally subservient to Allah (s.w.t.) and never exhibit insubordination towards Him.

لاَ يَسْبِقُونَهُ بِالْقَوْلِ وَ هُمْ بِأَمْرِهِ يَعْمَلُونَ

“They do not precede Him in speech and (only) according to His commandment do they act.” 3

3. They have been assigned important and greatly varied responsibilities on the part of Allah (s.w.t.).

- A group upholds the 'Arsh (Throne).4

- A group 'regulates the affair'.5

- A group of them are for the seizing of the souls.6

- A group is vigilant of the deeds of the humans.7

- A group protects humans from perils and untoward incidents.8

- A group is responsible for punishing and chastising the rebellious and recalcitrant nations.9

- Some angels are divine helpers for the believers during battles.10

- And finally some of the angels bring down the Revelation and the Divine books for the prophets…11

…And if we were to enumerate each of their duties, the discussion would become greatly protracted.

4. They are perpetually engaged in glorifying and sanctifying Allah (s.w.t.), as we read in verse 5 of Suratul Shura.

وَ الْمَلاَئِكَةُ يُسَبِّحُونَ بِحَمْدِ رَبِّهِمْ وَ يَسْتَغْفِرُونَ لِمَنْ فِي الأََرْضِ‏

“And the angels sing the praise of their Lord and ask forgiveness for those on earth.”

5. Despite all the above, man, due to his ability to develop and achieve perfection, is superior to them to the extent that all the angels, without exception, fell into prostration when Adam was created and he became their teacher.12

6. Occasionally they take the form of humans and manifest themselves before the prophets and even individuals who are not prophets, as we read in the chapter Maryam (s.a.) that a great angel appeared before Maryam (s.a.) in the form of a 'perfect' man.

فَأَرْسَلْنَا إِلَيْهَا رُوحَنَا فَتَمَثَّلَ لَهَا بَشَراً سَوِيًّا

“Then We sent to her Our spirit, and there appeared to her a well-made man.” 13

On other occasions they appeared before prophets Ibrahim and Lut (a.s.) in the form of humans.14

From the end of these verses it can also be inferred that the people of prophet Lut (a.s.) too witnessed them in that 'measured' human form.15

Is this appearance in the human form an objective reality? Or was it an imagination or a kind of seizing of the eyes? The apparent meaning of the verses seem to indicate the first meaning, although some distinguished commentators have opted for the second view.

1. From the Islamic traditions it can be inferred that they are so numerous that their numbers cannot be compared to the humans at all. We read in a tradition that Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) was asked: Are the angels more in number or the humans? Whereupon he (a.s.) replied: “By Allah, in Whose grasp is my soul! The angels of Allah that are present in the heavens are more than the particles of sand present on the earth; in the heavens there does not exist a place to put one's foot except that there is an angel there, engaged in glorifying and sanctifying Allah.”16

2. They do not eat and drink, and neither do they marry. In a tradition Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) says: The angels do not eat food, do not drink water and do not marry, rather, they stay alive by means of the zephyr of Allah's 'Arsh (Throne)!)17

3. They are not overcome by sleep, lethargy and heedlessness. Imam 'Ali (a.s.) says: In them there is no lassitude, heedlessness and disobedience. Sleep never prevails over them, their intellects are never overcome by inadvertence and forgetfulness, their bodies never experience lethargy, and they are never ensconced in the loins of fathers and the wombs of mothers.18

4. They possess different grades and varied ranks; some are always in a state of ruku' while others are perpetually in a state of prostration.

وَ مَـا مِنَّا إِلاَّ لَهُ مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ وَ إِنَّا لَنَحْنُ الصَّآفُّونَ وَ إِنَّا لَنَحْنُ الْمُسَـبِّحُونَ‏

“And there is none of us but has an assigned place, and most surely we are they who draw themselves out in ranks, and we are most surely they who declare the glory (of Allah).” 19

Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) has said: “Allah (s.w.t.) possesses certain angels, who are in (a state of) ruku' (and shall continue to remain so) until the Day of Judgment, and certain angels, who are in (a state of) sajdah, (and shall continue to remain so) until the Day of Judgment.”20

(For further information about their characteristics and categories, refer to 'The Chapter of Angels' of the section السَّماَء وَ الْعَالــم of the book Biharul Anwar (vol. 59, pp. 144-326) and Nahjul Balaghah, Sermons 1, 91, 109 and 171.)

Question

In view of the characteristics that have been mentioned above, are angels corporeal or non-corporeal entities?

Undoubtedly, with the characteristics that they possess, they cannot be constituted of this lowly and elemental matter; nevertheless it is possible for them to have been created out of subtle material elements - material elements that are superior to this ordinary matter familiar to us.

Proving absolute immateriality for the angels - immateriality with respect to place, time and parts - is not an easy task and furthermore, research on this subject does not possess that great a benefit. The important thing is that we recognize the angels according to the attributes that have been mentioned by the Qur’an and the conclusive Islamic traditions, and regard them as a huge assemblage of lofty and preeminent entities of Allah (s.w.t.) without attributing any status to them except that of servitude and slavery (of Allah (s.w.t.) ) and without regarding them as being partners to Allah (s.w.t.) in creation and worship, for then this would be downright polytheism and kufr.

In connection with the angels we content ourselves with what has been discussed and leave the details for books, specifically devoted to this topic.

In numerous expressions of the Torah the angels have been referred to as Gods - an expression enshrouded with polytheism and one of the signs of the distortion of the present Torah. But the Noble Qur’an is pure from such expressions for it does not ascribe to them any rank except that of servitude, worship and execution of Allah's (s.w.t.) commands. Moreover, as we have previously mentioned, it is apparent from various verses of the Qur’an that the rank of the Perfect Man is loftier and more exalted than that of the angels.21

Notes

1. Suratul Baqarah (2), Verse 285

2. Suratul Anbiya (21), Verse 26

3. Suratul Anbiya (21), Verse 27

4. Suratul Haqqah (69), Verse 17

5. Suratul Nazia'at (79), Verse 5

6. Suratul A'raf (7), 37

7. Suratul Infitar (82), Verse 10 - 13

8. Suratul An'am (6), Verse 61

9. Surat Hud (11), Verse 77

10. Suratul Ahzab (33), Verse 9

11. Suratul Nahl (16), Verse 2

12. Suratul Baqarah (2), Verse 30 - 34

13. Surat Maryam (19), Verse 17

14. Surat Hud (11), 69, 77

15. Surat Hud (11), Verse 78

16. Biharul Anwar, vol. 59, pg. 176, no. 7. There are numerous other traditions too that have been mentioned in this regard.

17. Ibid., pg. 174, no. 4

18. Biharul Anwar, vol. 59, pg. 175

19. Suratul Saffat (37), Verse 164 - 166

20. Biharul Anwar, vol. 59, pg. 174

21. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 18, pg. 173

10. What is ‘Raj'at (the Return)? Is its occurrence possible?

Raja't is one of the popular Shi'ite beliefs and its explanation, briefly, is as follows:

After the reappearance of Imam Mahdi (a.s.) and on the threshold of Resurrection, a group of the sincere mu'mineen and a group of the immensely wicked disbelievers and rebellious individuals shall return to this world. The first group shall subsequently advance several ranks towards perfection whilst the second group would taste a severe chastisement.

The late Sayyid Murtadha, one of the greatly distinguished scholars, explains as follows: “After the reappearance of Hadhrat Mahdi (a.s.), the Exalted Allah (s.w.t.) shall cause group of those, who had previously departed from the world, to return to this world in order that they may be partners in the reward and glory of assisting him (a.s.) and in witnessing Allah's rule over the entire world; He shall also cause the most obstinate enemies to return in order to extract revenge from them.”

He then adds: “No intellectual person can ever claim that Allah (s.w.t.) does not possess the power to cause this occurrence to happen and, since this cannot be considered to be impossible, it is itself a proof of the truthfulness of this issue. Nonetheless, our opponents reject this so vehemently as if they regard it to be an event that is inconceivable.”

He then further adds: “The consensus of the Twelve-Imam Shi'ites proves this belief, for there is none, from amongst them, who oppose it.”1

Nevertheless, from the statements of some of the scholars and also from the words of late Tabrisi in his book Majma'ul Bayan, it appears that a minority from amongst the Shi'ites had opposed this belief, interpreting Raj'at to mean the return of the rule and government of the Ahlul Bayt (a.s.) and not the return of the people and coming to life of the dead. However, they are few in number and accordingly do not injure the consensus.

There are indeed numerous aspects that need to be discussed which we shall present here, in a few words, so as not to deviate from the subject matter:

1. Without any doubt, for a group of dead individuals to come back to life in this world is entirely possible, just as the coming to life of all the humans on the Day of Judgment is entirely possible. Astonishment over such an issue is akin to the disbelief exhibited by the pagan polytheists over the issue of Resurrection, and mockery with respect to this issue is analogous to their mockery. This is because the intellect does not consider such an occurrence to be impossible; indeed the Power of Allah (s.w.t.) is so extensive and all-embracing that for Him all these issues are simple.

2. In the Noble Qur’an there are five instances of raj'at, occurring with respect to past nations:

A) Regarding a prophet, who passed by a settlement which lay in ruins while the bodies of its inhabitants lay scattered. He asked himself as to how Allah (s.w.t.) would bring them to life after they have died whereupon Allah (s.w.t.) made him to die for one hundred years and then, bringing him to life, asked: “How long have you tarried? He replied: A day or a part of it. He was told: No. A hundred years have passed by you.”2

Whether this prophet had been 'Uzayr or someone else does not make a difference. The significant point is the explicit declaration of the Qur’an about life after death in this world itself.

فَأَمَاتَهُ اللٌّهُ مِائَةَ عامٍ ثُمَّ بَعَثَهُ

“So Allah made him die for a hundred years, then raised him to life.”

B) In verse 243 of Suratul Baqarah, the Qur’an speaks about a group of individuals, who, out of fear of death (and according to some commentators, under the pretext of plague had refrained from participating in the jihad) had stepped out of their houses, whereupon Allah (s.w.t.) commanded them to die and then raised them to life again.

فَقَالَ لَهُمُ اللٌّهُ مُوتُوا ثُمَّ أَحْـيَاهُمْ‏

“Allah said to them: 'Die': Then He restored them to life.”

Some commentators, who have been unable to digest the occurrence of such an unusual incident, have regarded it as just a presentation of an example. However, it is plain that such interpretations, vis-à-vis the apparent meaning and the explicit statements of the verse in connection with the occurrence of this issue, are unacceptable.

C) In verses 55 and 56 of Suratul Baqarah, which are in connection with the tribe of Bani Isra’il, we read that a group from amongst them, desiring to see Allah (s.w.t.), were overcome by a deadly lightning and died, after which, Allah (s.w.t.) brought them back to life in order that they may thank Him for His bounties.

ثُمَّ بَعَثْنَاكُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَوْتِكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ

“Then We raised you up after your death that you may give thanks.”

D) Verse 110 of Suratul Maidah, while enumerating the miracles of Prophet 'Isa (a.s.), states:

وَ إِذْ تُخْرِجُ الْمَوْتى‏ بِإِذْنِي

“And when you brought forth the dead by My permission.”

This expression indicates that 'Isa (a.s.) made use of this miracle (bringing the dead to life) of his; moreover, the imperfect tense of the word تَخرُجُ indicates repetition, which itself can be regarded as a kind of Raj'at (for those whom he (a.s.) brought back to life).

E) And finally, in verse 73 of Suratul Baqarah, when there arose a dispute and disagreement amongst the Bani Isra’il with respect to unearthing the killer of a murdered person, the Qur’an says that they were ordered to sacrifice a cow possessing certain specific features, and to tap a part of its body upon the body of the murdered person in order that the person may return to life (and disclose the name of his murderer thereby putting an end to the dispute)

فَقُلْنَا اضْرِبُوهُ بِبَعْضِهَا كَذٌلِكَ يُحْيِ اللٌّهُ الْمَوْتى‏ وَ يُرِيكُمْ آيَاتِهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ

“So We said: Strike the (dead body) with part of the (sacrificed cow), thus Allah brings the dead to life, and He shows you His signs so that you may understand.”

Apart from these five instances, there are other occasions which are observed in the Noble Qur’an - such as the story of the People of the Cave which is also something similar to raj'at, and the story of the four birds of Prophet Ibrahim (a.s.) that are brought back to life after being sacrificed in order to demonstrate for him the possibility of the resurrection of man - an incident, which is very significant when discussing raj'at.

Accordingly, how is it possible that a person accepts the Noble Qur’an as a Divine book and, despite all these clear verses, suntil denies the possibility of raj'at? Essentially, is raj'at something other than a return to life after death?

Can raj'at not be regarded as a small example of Resurrection, in this small world? How can one, who accepts Resurrection in that extensive scale, reject the issue of raj'at? Or ridicule its concept? Or speak like Ahmad Amin Misri, who, in his book Fajrul Islam, writes:

األْيَهُوْدِيَّةُ ظَهَرَتْ بِالتَّشَيُّعِ بِالْقَوْلِ بِالرَّجْعَةِ

“Another Judaism has manifested in Shi'ism due to the concept of raj'at!”3

Honestly, what difference lies between this statement of Ahmad Amin and the disavowal of physical resurrection by the pagan Arabs?

3. What we have stated up to this point has proved the possibility of the occurrence of raj'at; and its occurrence is emphasized by numerous traditions which have been narrated from the Imams of the Ahlul Bayt (a.s.), and since it is beyond the scope of our discussion to present them all, it should suffice for us to quote the statistics compiled by the late 'Allamah Majlisi, who says:

How is it possible that a person believes in the truthfulness of the words of the Imams of the Ahlul Bayt (a.s.) but (at the same time) refuses to accept the 'successively transmitted' traditions in connection with raj'at - explicit traditions, which are almost two hundred in number and transmitted by forty odd trustworthy transmitters and eminent scholars in more than fifty books! If these traditions are not 'successively transmitted', then which tradition can be such?4 and5

Notes

1. Safinatul Bihar, vol. 1, pg. 511 (under رجع )

2. Suratul Baqarah (2), Verse 259

3. 'Aqaidul Imamiyyah of Sheikh Muhammad Ridha Mudhaffar, pg. 71

4. Biharul Anwar, vol. 53, pg. 122

5. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 15, pg. 555

11. What is the philosophy of Raj'at?

From Islamic traditions, it can be inferred that this issue is confined to those righteous believers, who possess an elevated rank with respect to their faith, and similarly disbelievers, who are placed at a low-grade rank with respect to their disbelief. It appears that the return of these two groups into the world is for the purpose of completing a circle of perfection in the case of the first group and tasting worldly chastisement regarding the second group.

The wisdom of Allah (s.w.t.) necessitates that the group of sincere believers - who, in their journey towards spiritual perfection, had come across obstructions in their life due to which their development had been left incomplete - continue their journey towards perfection by being brought back into this world. They shall then witness the universal government of truth and justice, and participate in the establishment of this system. This is because participation in the establishment of such a government is one of the greatest distinctions (for man).

On the contrary, the group of obstinate tyrants, apart from their special chastisement on the Day of Judgment, should also be punished in this world like the punishment tasted by obstinate nations such as 'Ad, Thamud, the people of Fir'awn and Prophet Lut (a.s.), and the only way to accomplish this is by means of raj'at.

In a tradition, Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) says:

إِنَّ الرَّجْعَةَ لَيْسَتْ عَامَّةٌ وَ هِيَ خَاصَّةٌ، لاَ يَرْجِعُ إِلاَّ مَنْ مَحَّضَ الإِيـمَانَ مَحْضاً أَوْ مَحَّضَ الشِّرْكَ مَحْضاً

“Surely the raj'at is not universal, but specific; only those shall be returned, who are downright pure in faith or downright pure in polytheism.”1

It is possible that verse 95 of Suratul Anbiya, which states:

وَ حَرَامٌ عَلى قَرْيَةٍ أَهْلَکْنَاهَا إِنَّهُمْ لاَ يَرْجِعُونَ

“And it is binding on a town which We destroy that they shall not return)” is also an allusion towards this meaning. This is because the issue of non-return is stated in connection with those, who have tasted their punishments in this world; thus, it becomes manifest that those, who have not witnessed their punishments, ought to return and taste it.

Another possibility that exists is that the return of these two groups in that specific phase of human history is to present before mankind two important signs - the power of Allah (s.w.t.) and the issue of Resurrection (the Origin and the End) - in order that by witnessing it they reach the zenith of their faith and spiritual perfection, and do not possess any kind of shortcoming.2

Notes

1. Biharul Anwar, vol. 53, pg. 39

2. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 15, pg. 559

12. What is the reality of Tawakkul and what is its philosophy?

The word tawakkul1 has been derived from وکالت (wakalat), meaning 'taking for oneself a representative', and a good representative generally possesses the following four characteristics: Awareness, Trustworthiness, Strength and Sympathy.

It might not appear necessary to mention that one selects a barrister for a task when the individual lacks the strength to defend himself. He therefore seeks the strength of another person and uses his assistance to solve his personal problem.

Accordingly tawakkul means that man, in the face of the difficulties of life, enmity and troubles of opponents, the tangles of existence which hinder his journey towards his objectives, and in instances wherein he finds himself unable to untie the knots, takes Allah (s.w.t.) as his support but, at the same time, does not stop his own efforts and endeavours. Rather, in those instances too, wherein he possesses the strength to perform the work, he looks upon Allah (s.w.t.) as the fundamental influencing force. This is because in the eyes of a (true) monotheist, He is the source of all strength and power.

Contrary to the attribute of 'relying on Allah (s.w.t.) ' is 'relying on other than Him' - meaning living dependently upon someone else and not possessing self independence.

Scholars of ethics state: Tawakkul is the direct outcome of 'Unity of Divine acts'; this is because, as we have mentioned previously, in the eyes of a monotheist every motion, endeavour, movement and occurrence that takes place in this world eventually finds a connection with the Primary Cause of this world i.e. Allah (s.w.t.); consequently, a monotheist regards every strength and power to originate from Him.

The Philosophy of 'Tawakkul'

In the light of our previous statements, it can be inferred that:

Firstly: Relying on Allah (s.w.t.) - the interminable Source of power and strength - causes man to become more resilient in the face of the troubles and adversities of life. An example of this is when the Muslims suffered a severe blow in the battle of Uhud and the enemies, after having abandoned the battlefield, decided to return once again midway from their journey (back home) with the aim of inflicting a final blow upon the Muslims.

The Qur’an states that when the Muslims were informed of this, those who possessed firm faith were untouched by fright in this extremely dangerous moment when they had lost most of their active forces. On the contrary, placing their reliance on Allah (s.w.t.) and seeking assistance from the power of faith, they increased themselves in firmness and resistance. As a result the victorious enemies, being informed of this, hastily retraced their advance.2

Examples of such resistance, under the light of tawakkul, are observed in numerous verses, amongst them being verse 122 of Surat Ale 'Imran, in which the Qur’an says that reliance on Allah (s.w.t.) prevented the two groups of soldiers from being overcome with lassitude, in the battlefield.

In verse 12 of Surat Ibrahim it has been mentioned that tawakkul should be accompanied by patience in the face of the attacks of the enemy.

In verse 159 of Surat Ale 'Imran it has been ordered that when intending to perform an important task, initially consultation should take place; this should be followed up by a firm decision after which, one should place one's reliance on Allah (s.w.t.) (and proceed in accordance with the decision taken).

The Qur’an even says that only those, who possess faith and tawakkul, shall be able to exhibit resistance vis-à-vis satanic whisperings and not be influenced by them.

إِنَّهُ لَيْسَ لَهُ سُلْطَانٌ عَلـى الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَ عَلـى‏ رَبِّهِمْ يَتَوَكَّلُونَ‏

“Surely he has no authority over those who believe and rely on their Lord.” 3

From the entire collection of these verses it can be concluded that tawakkul means that man, in the face of problems, does not experience a feeling of weakness and inferiority, but instead considers himself victorious by relying on the infinite power of Allah (s.w.t.). Thus, tawakkul is a hope-inspiring, energy-insuntiling and reinforcing factor which increases perseverance and resistance.

If the concept of tawakkul meant taking to a corner and sitting idle, it would be meaningless to attribute it to the soldiers and the likes of them.

And if some believe that resorting to various means and natural factors is not in conformity with the spirit of tawakkul, they are mistaken. This is because endeavouring to separate the effects of natural causes from the Will of Allah (s.w.t.) is a kind of polytheism. But is it not a fact that whatever the natural causes possess is from Him alone? And is it not that everything is in accordance with His Will and command? Yes, if we were to regard the causes and means to be an independent apparatus as opposed to Allah's Will, this would be incompatible with the spirit of tawakkul.

How is it possible to interpret tawakkul in this manner when the Noble Prophet (S), the leader of those who exhibited tawakkul, had never been heedless of utilizing every opportunity, appropriate plan and other exterior means for furthering his aims and objectives; all these only go to prove that the meaning of tawakkul does not have that negative dimension attached to it at all.

Secondly: Relying on Allah (s.w.t.) delivers man from being dependent (on others) - a state, which is the source of humiliation - and imparts freedom and self-confidence to him.

At this point we present some of the traditions in connection with tawakkul for the purpose of illuminating its actual meaning.

Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) says:

إِنَّ الْغِـنـى وَ الْعِزَّ يَجُولاَنِ فَإِذَا ظَفِرَا بِمَوْضِعِ التَّوَكُّلِ أَوْطَنَا

“Verily, independence and honour are in (a state of) travel and when they come to the place of 'tawakkul' they take up residence there.”4

In this tradition, tawakkul has been presented as being the actual dwelling place of independence and honour.

It has been narrated that the Noble Prophet (S) said: I asked Jibrail: “What is 'tawakkul'?” He replied: “Cognizance (of the fact) that the creation (of Allah) can neither cause harm nor yield benefit; neither can it grant nor withhold (a bounty); (one must) sever all expectations from the creation (of Allah). When a person becomes such, he shall never work for anyone other than Allah (s.w.t.) and shall never hope and expect from anyone other than Him, and this is the reality of 'tawakkul'.5

Once someone questioned Imam 'Ali ibne Musa al-Ridha (a.s.)6 :

مَا حَدُّ التَّوَكُّلِ؟ فَقَالَ أَنْ لاَ تَخَافَ مَعَ اللٌّهِ أَحَداً

“What is the extent of 'tawakkul'? He (a.s.) replied: That you do not fear anyone once you have relied on Allah!”7 and8

Notes

1. Relying on Allah (s.w.t.) (Tr.)

2. Surat Ale 'Imran (3), Verse 173

3. Suratul Nahl (16), Verse 99

4. al-Kafi, vol. 2, Chapter al-Tafwidh IlAllah (s.w.t.) Wa al-Tawakkul 'Alaihi, no. 3

5. Biharul Anwar, vol. 15, Part 2 Fi al-Akhlaq, pg. 14 (Old Publication)

6. Safinatul Bihar, vol. 2, pg. 682

7. For more explanations in connection 'tawakkul' and other such issues, refer the book Angizah-e-Paidaish-e-Madhhab.

8. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 10, pg. 295

13. What is the philosophy behind Du'a and Invocations?

Those, who have not comprehended the reality of du'a, and its educative and psychological effects, have levelled various objections against it:

At times they say: Du'a brings about a state of narcosis within people for, instead of exhorting them towards effort and utilization of advanced means, it directs them towards supplications and teaches them that they should pray, rather than exert themselves!

And occasionally they say: Basically, is supplicating not interference in Allah's (s.w.t.) work? Allah (s.w.t.) performs whatever He deems to be the best; He loves us and knows better than us what is best for us and so, why should we seek things from Him at times as we please?

At other times they say: Apart from all these, does du'a not conflict with the attribute of ridha1 and taslim2 ?

Those who propound these objections are oblivious of the psychological, social, educative and spiritual effects of supplication. This is because man, in order to strengthen his determination, and eliminate his distresses, is occasionally in need of a support, and it is the du'a that lights up the lamp of hope within him.

People, who neglect du'a and supplication, shall eventually face undesirable social and psychological effects in the long run.

In the words of a well-known psychologist: “Absence of invocations amongst a nation is equivalent to the collapse of that nation! A society that has strangulated within itself the need for invocations is usually not safeguarded from degradation and degeneration. Of course, it should not be forgotten that invocating only in the mornings while passing the entire day akin to barbarians, is futile; supplications ought to be performed continuously and in every state, and care should be taken to ensure that its profound influence upon man is not lost.”3

Those, who claim that du'a possesses a narcotic effect, have failed to comprehend the meaning of du'a. Supplicating to Allah (s.w.t.) does not mean that we withdraw ourselves from all the natural means that lie at our disposal and instead, raise our hands and set about praying; rather, it means that after utilizing all the means available before us to the best of our abilities and if we fall short, we resort to du'a and, by turning towards and leaning on Allah (s.w.t.), we invigorate within ourselves the spirit of hope, seeking succour from the unfailing assistance of the Great Origin.

Accordingly du'a is confined to inadequacies and dead-ends, and not a means that acts as a substitute for natural factors.

Although invocations induce serenity, at the same time, they also stimulate a kind of amazement and internal expansion with respect to cerebral activities, and occasionally also inspire a spirit of courageousness and heroism within man. Invocations make manifest our excellences with unique indications - pure look, composed behaviour, internal expansion and happiness, firm conviction, ability to accept guidance and confront the adversities.

These are the things that indicate upon the existence of a concealed treasure deep within us, and by means of this strength, even those who are backward and less capable can better utilize their mental and ethical abilities, and derive greater benefits. However, it is rather unfortunate that in our present world, those who can comprehend (the concept of) supplication correctly are very few indeed.4

From what we have stated above, the answer to the objection that the concept of du'a is inconsistent with ridha and taslim also becomes clear. This is because du'a, as has been explained above, is a kind of quest for the ability to acquire a greater share of the infinite grace and blessings of Allah (s.w.t.).

In other words man, by means of du'a, develops within himself a great worthiness for acquiring increased blessings of Allah (s.w.t.), and it is self-evident that exertion towards perfection is, in reality, taslim in the face of the laws of creation and not something in contrast to it.

Additionally, du'a is a kind of worship, (and an exhibition of) servitude, and by means of it man achieves a fresh attentiveness towards Allah (s.w.t.). Therefore, just as all the other acts of worship possess an educative influence, du'a too possesses such an influence.

And when they say that du'a is interference in Allah's (s.w.t.) work! Allah (s.w.t.) does whatever is advisable and prudent, they have overlooked the fact that distribution of Allah's (s.w.t.) bounties is dictated by capability - the greater the capacity, the greater shall be the share of the Divine gifts that shall come a person's way.

And it is for this reason that Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) has said:

إِنَّ عِندَ اللٌّهِ مَنْزِلَةً لاَ تُـنَالُ إِِلاَّ بِمَسْأَلَةٍ

“Allah (s.w.t.) has ordained ranks, which cannot be achieved except by means of supplication.”5

A scholar has stated: “When we supplicate, we link and associate ourselves to the infinite Power, Who has interconnected the entire universe.”6

He also states: “Today, the most recent science, i.e. psychiatry, teaches the same things that the prophets used to teach. Why? The reason being that psychiatrists have discovered that du'a, prayers and possessing a firm conviction with respect to religion eliminates worries, anxieties, agitations and fear - factors that are cause for more than half of our inconveniences.”7 and8

Notes

1. Satisfaction and pleasure over divine decree. (Tr.)

2. Submission to Allah (s.w.t.). (Tr.)

3. Niyayish - a Persian translation of a book written by the well-known doctor and psychologist Alexis Carrol.

4. As written by Alexis Carrol.

5. al-Kafi, vol. 2, pg. 338, Chapter Fadhl al-Du'a Wa al-Haththu 'Alaihi, no. 3

6. Aain-e-Zindagi, pg. 156

7. Ibid., pg. 152

8. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 1, pg. 639

14. Why is it that our Supplications Occasionally Remain Unanswered?

Attention towards the conditions for the acceptance of prayers reveals new realities in the issue of du'a, and manifests its constructive influence. In the Islamic traditions, some of the conditions (to be taken into regard) for the purpose of acceptance of one's prayers are as follows:

In order to have the prayers answered, first of all one should strive for the purification of the mind and soul, be repentant over (past) sins, embark upon development of the self and seek inspiration from the lives of divine leaders.

It has been reported that Imam as-Sadiq (a.s.) said: Let it never be that any of you seeks a thing from Allah (s.w.t.) except that he first praises and glorifies Him, sends salutations upon the Noble Prophet (S) and his holy progeny, confesses to his sins and exhibits repentance over them; after having done these, he should then seek his desire from Him.1

Endeavouring to have a pure life, free from usurped riches, oppression and injustice, and to refrain from acquiring one's livelihood by illegal means.

It has been reported that the Noble Prophet (S) said:

مَنْ أَحَبَّ أَنْ يُسْتَجَابَ دُعَاؤُؤَهُ فَلْيُطَيِّبْ مَطْعَمَهُ وَ مَكْسَبَهُ‏

“One who desires to have his supplications answered, should purify his food and earnings.”2

One should not desist from combating evil and inviting others towards Allah (s.w.t.).

This is because the supplications of those, who forsake 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil', are not answered. The Noble Prophet (S) has said: “You must enjoin the good and forbid the evil or else Allah (s.w.t.) will cause the evil ones to prevail over the righteous ones from amongst you, and however much they may pray, (their prayers) shall not be answered!”3

In fact, abandoning this great duty of 'national supervision' leads to turmoil within the society as a result of which the society would be left open for the evil ones; (when this happens) supplications for the elimination of the consequences arising out of this state would be futile since this state has resulted out of man's own deeds.

Acting in Accordance with Divine Covenants

Faith, good deeds, trustworthiness, and righteousness, (collectively) form another of the conditions for the acceptance of prayers. This is because one who is not faithful to his pledge with respect to Allah (s.w.t.), should likewise not expect Allah's (s.w.t.) promise of answering a supplicant to be true for him too.

A person once, complaining to the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) about his prayers not being answered, said: Despite the fact that Allah (s.w.t.) has said “Call upon Me, I will answer you”, why is it that when we supplicate to him, He does not answer our prayers?

The Imam (a.s.) replied:

إِنَّ قُلُوبَبُکُمْ خَانٍ بِثَمٌنِيَةِ خِصاَلٍ

“Your hearts (and thoughts) have been unfaithful with respect to eight things (and this is the reason your prayers go unanswered).”

1. You have acquired the cognizance of Allah (s.w.t.) but you do not fulfill what is due to Him; consequently your cognizance of Him has not benefited your state!

2. You have brought faith upon His Messenger but (later) went on to oppose his customs; where then is the yield of your faith?

3. You have read His book but have not acted upon it; you stated: “We have heard and we obey”, but then rose up in opposition to it!

4. You say: “We fear Allah's punishment”, but perpetually perform acts that lead you closer to it.

5. You claim to be covetous of Allah's reward however you continue to perform acts that lead you away from it.

6. You consume Allah's bounties but do not extend thanksgivings to Him.

7. You have been ordered to be Shaytan's enemy (whereas you sketch plans to befriend him); you claim to be his enemy but, in practice, you do not oppose him.

8. You place into great scrutiny the faults of others but conveniently disregard your own; with such a state of affairs, how do you expect your prayers to be answered when you yourself have shut its doors? Be pious, rectify your deeds and enjoin the good and forbid the evil so that your prayers are answered.”4

This meaningful tradition explicitly states: “Allah's promise to answer the invocations of a supplicant is not absolute, but conditional - the condition being that you should fulfill your own pledges and covenants; however the reality is that you have broken your pledge in eight ways. If you were to put an end to these, your prayers would be answered.”

Another condition for the acceptance of one's prayers is to adjoin it with efforts and hard work. In one of the short sayings of the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) we read:

أَلدَّاعِي بِلاَ عَمَلٍ كَالرَّامِي بِلاَ وَتَرٍ

“A supplicant (who prays) without effort and endeavour is like an archer without a bowstring!”5

In view of the fact that the bowstring is a means to propel the arrow towards the target, the influence of 'effort' in the effectiveness of du'a becomes evident.

The above five conditions are illustrative of the reality that not only should du'a not become a substitute for the natural means and ordinary measures with the purpose of achieving an objective but rather, in order for it to be answered, there ought to occur a complete transformation in the life of the supplicant - his outlook ought to be overhauled and his past deeds reviewed.

In view of the above, does it not appear that characterizing du'a as being narcotic and soporific indicates either a lack of knowledge or a sinister motive?6

Notes

1. Safinatul Bihar, vol. 1, pg. 448, 449

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Safinatul Bihar, vol. 1, pg. 448

5. Nahjul Balagha, Short Sayings 337

6. Tafsir-e-Namuna, vol. 1, pg. 643