Aristotelian Perspectives for Post-modern Reason (I)
Author: Alfredo Marcos
Publisher: www.fyl.uva.es
Category: Miscellaneous Books
Author: Alfredo Marcos
Publisher: www.fyl.uva.es
Category: Miscellaneous Books
Aristotelian Perspectives for Post-modern Reason (I)
Phronesis, Scientific Rationality and Environmental Responsibility
Alfredo Marcos
University of Valladolid
Department of Philosophy
Plaza del Campus s/n,
47011 Valladolid, Spain
amarcos@fyl.uva.es
Table of Contents
Introduction. 3
Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism. 7
Phronesis in Aristotle 12
Prudence and Scientific Rationality: ‘Do not block the way of inquiry.’ 15
Prudence and Environmental Responsibility: ‘May human life remain possible.’ 19
Conclusion. 23
Notes 24
Introduction
In the Modern Age, certainty became the highest and most sought-after espistemic value, even more valued than truth, and the so-called scientific method was seen as the surest path to certainty. Indeed, human reason became identified with the application of a supposed scientific method of Cartesian or Baconian inspiration. The domain of the practice became considered either one more area for the mere application of the scientific method, an application which would lead to human progress, or as an area beyond reason. One of the stereotyped convictions attributed to the enlightened mentality is this: insofar as human life in all its extremes becomes more rational, that is, more scientific, practical problems will begin to be solved. Indeed, Rousseau, in hisDiscourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750), pointed out that human progress did not always go hand in hand with scientific and technical progress, which today is a self-evident truth that is not discussed. On the other hand, dual accounting, that is the consideration that science is fully rational and the other areas of human activity are not, as well as an insult to common sense, has rebounded against science itself, for its practical aspects cannot be hidden, and it is hardly possible to parcel off a purely logical context, as that of justification set out to be.
It is obvious that not even the application of a supposed scientific method can guarantee the progressive character of our practical decisions. To this evidence there has been added the recognition of science’s own practical aspects. This evolution has convinced many of the impossibility of obtaining certainty even in the domain of science, which has given rise to diverse forms of desperation regarding the abilities of human reasoning. This oscillation between the obsession for certainty and desperation with regard to reason has been the tune most frequently danced to in modern times.
Yet today we do not want environmental problems to be left entirely up to the expert’s decision or the irrational imposition of power or arbitrariness, but to be tackled in reasoned dialogue, on a footing of equality, by scientists, technicians, lawyers, politicians, businessmen, private individuals, representatives of social movements - and indeed philosophers! We are recognizing, at least implicitly, the possibility of being reasonable in an area where we do not expect absolute certainty, and we accept that human reason goes beyond the limits of science and technology, that reason is more deeply rooted in human life than a mere method could ever be. To reach this point we have had to come a long way as far as our concept of reason and science is concerned, and have also needed a great deal of experience - bittersweet experience - regarding the practical consequences of science. Everything would seem to show, then, that the most typical extreme positions of modern times are being abandoned, and that we have entered the post-modern period[1] .
My intention in these pages is to explore the possibilities of a project of basically Aristotelian inspiration for the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects of reason, for the search for a happy medium between the extremes of logicism and irrationalism. In my opinion, this outlook has much to contribute to the on-going debate on the rationality of science and on the environmental questions that its application brings up. This is, indeed, a particular aspect of the relationship between reason and practice, but not just any aspect: traditional philosophical problems are arising now, and they will continue to come up in the future, in direct connection with environmental matters - this will be an area and a way for the classical topics of philosophy to reappear. Rationality, good and evil, justice, the relationship between being and value, the objectivity or subjectivity of knowledge, etc., are venerable philosophical topics that we shall have to reconsider in the light of environmental problems, as they were once tackled in connection with questions of politics, theology, society, science and economy.
I shall now outline the steps that my exposition will follow, together with other considerations necessary for it to fall within the limits of a short piece. In the first place, we need a correct characterization of Modern Age which makes it possible to explain the causes of a bad relationship between theory and practice. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted task. Here we can hardly even approach a full idea of modernity. What we can do, however, is point out one of its most essential characteristics[2] , in some wise the cause of many others and especially near to the interests of this paper. I mean the predilection for certainty, which is a constant of the modern spirit, just like the energetic and cyclic irrationalist reactions. Obsession with certainty and sceptical desperation are mutual causes of each other like pre-Socratic opposites. We shall speak of this insection 2 (‘Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism’) .
Secondly, we must go through the Aristotelian concepts which may, in my opinion, take us out of this thankless to-ing and fro-ing. What I mean basically is the Aristotelian notions of prudence (phronesis ) and practical truth (aletheia praktike ). Insection 3 (Prudence in Aristotle) , I shall set out the contents of Aristotelian prudence and the contribution that it can make to the present debate. An analogous study of the notion of practical truth will be set out in the second part of this paper[3] .
The concept of prudence is one that has been taken from the area of Aristotelian practical philosophy, where absolute certainty is not expected, but neither are decisions left to mere arbitrariness or imposition. The novelty consists in that, when we recognize, as we do today, that science itself is a human action, the notion taken from practical philosophy may be used for understanding and integrating scientific rationality. When science is characterized as an activity governed by prudence, it moves away from both the logicist and the irrationalist poles, from the obsession with certainty and from the ‘anything goes’, from algorithm and anarchism. Furthermore, if science is made a prudential activity, it will be much easier for us to connect its particular way of rationality with that of discussions, decisions and environmental actions.
Although it is true that Aristotelian notions can be suggestive, it is not true that they do no more than answer contemporary questions. For them to be active in the on-going debate on the relationship between theoretical reason and practical reason, they must be developed,updated through contemporary texts. The profit from this manœuvre is double: it makes Aristotle’s concepts available for the present debate and gives some contemporary ideas a very comprehensive and fertile philosophical framework, the Aristotelian framework. In the remaining sections. I shall tryto bring to the current debate the Aristotelian notion of prudence through the fallibilism of Peirce and Popper and through Hans Jonas’ imperative of responsibility. The fallibilist attitude is, to my mind, the most suitable post-modern characterization of scientific rationality and of human rationality, and applied to environmental problems it would give rise to the so-called principle of responsibility.
Insection 4 (Prudence and scientific rationality: Do not block the way of inquiry ) , I maintain that in science a fallibilistic attitude alone opens the doors to prudential reason, and that the ontological and anthropological bases of prudence are also suitable for fallibilism, founding it and encouraging it. In Aristotle, there are certain fallibilistic attitudes but they are ambiguous and combine with other statements in which science is characterized as universal and necessary knowledge. In this regard, Peirce’s texts are most useful and clearest, and, of course, nearest to the present problems of science. Fallibilism is for him an attitude, that is something practical - rather than a concept or a rule it is the scientific attitudepar excellence . On the basis of the fallibilist attitude there stands what may be the ultimate and most universal rule of scientific rationality:Do not block the way of inquiry .
Insection 5 (Prudence and environmental responsibility: May human life remain possible ), I set out to bring the Aristotelian idea of prudence to the on-going debate on the environment. I shall proceed as in the previous case, showing its proximity to and continuity with the present notion of responsibility as treated by Hans Jonas. Again we have an Aristotelian concept that can be developed or, as Jonas himself would say, improved on, by a notion of today. In return, this present notion is supported by a very articulate and coherent ontology. Jonas sets out the so-called principle of responsibility as the ultimate element of the moral control of our relationship with the environment:Proceed in such a way that you do not endanger the conditions for humanity’s indefinite continuity on Earth .
I consider that Peirce’s and Jonas’s formulations - each in its own area, respectively that of science and that of ethics - the expression of one and the same attitude, of one and the sameactual - and therefore post-modern - way of understanding rationality, and that both fit perfectly into a metaphysical framework of Aristotelian inspiration. Essentially, these ideas are convergent, and respond to one attitude and may be based on one Aristotelian conception of reality, and together they offer a good answer to questions for their scientific rationality and their environmental responsibility.
The principles of Peirce and Jonas can, however, be taken as inadequate as a characterization of human action, for they do not take into account its creative aspects. The truth is that both, though they do not guarantee it, are directed towardscreative discovery : they set out to ensure that it will be possible at any moment, while nurturing and fomenting the conditions for it and removing obstacles. They uphold the openness of human action so that it can adjust to the future course of events, always open and never completely determined. The present article will therefore require a later development in which the notion of creative discovery is tackled along with its connection with the Aristotelian concept ofpractical truth .
Modern Age and Actual Age: from the search for certainty to fallibilism
Among the characteristics of modern thought is the predilection for certainty[4] . The search for certainty has been one of the signs of identity of a whole intellectual tradition, of what Husserl[5] calls ‘European science’. According to Husserl, the abandonment of this search steeps us in crisis, in scepticism or in any type of naturalism. However, as Kolakowski[6] rightly observes, neither Descartes nor Husserl managed to distinguish between the subjective feeling of evidence and the objective evidence of truth. Consequently, in many of the modern philosophical traditions, the pursuit of certainty has become a threat to the pursuit of truth, an impulse towards different types of idealism and a cause of crisis (by inference and by reaction) rather than an antidote to it.
The pursuit of certainty -infallibilism , in the words of Laudan - is one of the legacies of Cartesian philosophy. One could state, as Clarke does, that Cartesian science is defined in terms of certainty rather than in terms of the truth of the explanations proposed.[7] A text in which Decartes himself sets this point out clearly is:
‘What can it matter to us for something to be absolutely false if anyway we believe it and we do not have the slightest suspicion that it is false?’[8]
Or, if a negative formulation is required, ‘any knowledge that can be rendered doubtful must not be called scientific’[9] and ‘I treat [...] as false everything which is merely likely’[10] These words give the tone of what would from then on be the object of the quest for the scientific method.
It is, in any event, a question of establishing methods whose results will be certain knowledge, methods which we can only trust, whether or not subjective certainty is accompanied by objective truth.
Francis Bacon initiated another route of access to certainty, this time with an empirical and inductive character. According to Bacon, the inductive method is theart of invention andmachine , as well asformula ,clear and radiant light [11] , and other similar boons. Those of Bacon’s ideas with the greatest influence on subsequent scientific thought are those which he expressed in his second book of theNovum Organum , that is his inductive logic, the so-called Baconian method. In general, and as Rossi states, many have seen in Bacon the constructor of a gigantic ‘logic machine’ doomed to not being used. With the Baconian method, according to Spedding, we cannot do anything. We consider it a subtle, elaborate and ingenious mechanism, but one which can produce nothing[12] . In spite of everything, Bacon’s image as the founder of the new science thanks to his discovery of the inductive method was greatly appreciated by the founders of theRoyal Society and the authors of the great illustratedEncyclopædia .
In what situation do we place the practical with regard to rationality when the first value is certainty?
Many modern thinkers begin their writings with the observation of the disappointing state of the philosophy of human things in comparison with natural philosophy, that is the natural science. Dissension and lack of certainty, both in metaphysics and in moral philosophy, are the points causing the greatest unrest. Both Descartes and Hume, to mention two of the most noteworthy, feel that the model that inquiry into mankind should follow is that of natural and formal sciences, which have already opened up a path, a method to certainty and consensus. So, Descartes set out to find ‘the highest and most perfect moral science, which, presupposing a knowledge of other sciences, is the ultimate degree of wisdom’[13] . Naturally, Descartes had to settle indefinitely for what he called ‘provisional morals’. Hume stated with his empiricist approach base on the inductive method, ‘Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension’[14] . This science will imply the extension of the principles of Newtonian natural philosophy to the study of human nature, and within it to the study of morals. Regarding politics, Hume has still fewer doubts, and states categorically that it can be reduced to a science endowed with a degree of certainty almost as perfect as that of mathematics[15] .
But this naturalist approach to the study of man, which in principle promises the so longed-for certainty, leads to further disappointments and carries with it the germ of its own destruction, in the long term threatening natural science itself, which will always be an activity and product of human freedom and reason. Today we know from experience how these tendencies implicit in the naturalist position itself have been developed, but in Hume, the whole trajectory is already indicated. Naturalization of moral studies seems to demand a methodological reduction of the normative and the evaluative, which will end up being established as a definitive ontological reduction of human reason and freedom, which are mutually inseparable and inaccessible to the empirical method and never totally explained from strictly naturalist bases. Thence are derived an emotivism and an irrationalism which threaten science itself insofar as its practical aspects are recognized along with its inability to produce absolutely certain knowledge. Hume assures that ‘We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’[16] . Paradoxical though this may seem, this resignation that the practical should be the place for feelings derives from a reduced notion of reason, excessively bound up with a given idea of science and method and an extreme valuation of certainty.
In Hume there is no renunciation of certainty, the basis of which is confided to habit, but one of reason. Predilection for certainty leads Hume to irrationalism, not to scepticism[17] . Karl Popper sums up the situation as follows, saying that, according to Hume, the scientific method is inductive, but:
‘... induction is completely invalid as an inference. There is not a shadow of a logical argument that would support the inference to a generalization from statements about the past (such as past repetitions of some 'evidence'). He [Hume] said that in spite of its lack of logical validity, induction plays an indispensable part in practical life [...] Thus there is a paradox.Even our intellect does not work rationally '. [p.94] [...] This led Hume, one of the most reasonable thinkers of all time, to give up rationalism and look at man not as endowed with reason but as a product of blind habit. Acording to Russellthis paradox of Hume's is responsible for the schizophrenia of modern man ’. [p.95][18]
If anything can be learnt for the present it is that we lack a notion of practical reason that is well structured and free of traditional errors. Practical criteria cannot depend on a supposed scientific method and cannot aspire to confer absolute certainty on our decisions, but we do not have to go without reason in practical situations, as there is no need to identify reason with a supposed scientific method or with the sure way to certainty. In part, the obstacles encountered by Hume and Descartes in the development of an idea of practical reason have been abolished, for today we are aware that sciences are not governed strictly by the Cartesian method or by the inductive method, and that they are far from reaching complete certainty, which does not make them directly irrational. Above everything else it is the renunciation of the obsession with certainty that enables us today to imagine a suitable notion of practical reason.
It will be said that a notion of practical reason already existed in Kant. And this is so. But two observations must be made in this regard. In Kant, unlike in Hume, there is a radical denaturalization of practical reason, which today seems unacceptable. Such is the case that for Kant, prudence mainly has nothing to do with practical reason, but with theoretical reason, paradoxical though this may seem. This means that he excludes it from the nucleus of morals and considers it a mere technical ability for the pursuit of happiness[19] . In the Modern period, from Descartes to Bacon, any technique was considered to be no more than applied science, and that if any problem arose in practice, it was due to deficiencies in theory. This view of science as immediately applicable soon spread, as we have seen in Hume, to morals, so the application of a science of man, which would not present genuinely technical problems, but only theoretical ones, would solve the problems of human happiness. Philosophers of the Enlightenment felt attracted by this new way of approaching human affairs. Kant shared the technological optimism of his day although he was the first to resist the concept of morals as a technique, that is, as the application of a science of man to the pursuit of happiness (happiness, by the way, previously defined by that very science). Kant, on the other hand, sought to protect morals from influences external to the very freedom of the subject. He did this by excluding the traditional contents from the nucleus of practical philosophy. According to Kant, prudence lies rather in theoretical reason, as it could become a mere applied science[20] . In the interests of autonomy of reason, Kant separates morals radically from nature, setting it in the sphere of the freedom of the subject. The attempt to protect morals from naturalism leads to the new excess of putting it in the hands of logicism. The categorical imperative is, at root, of a logical character:Behave in such a way that you might also want your maxim to become universal law . The ‘might also want’ invoked here is, as Jonas[21] states, that of reason an its concord with itself, an ability which would only be negated by self-contradiction.
In Aristotle, on the other hand, happiness is man’s natural and legitimate aim, whereby it was possible, according to Aubenque, ‘to integrate thetechnical moment of the correct choice of means in the definition of morality’[22] .
The second observation concerns the certainty of what Kant takes to be really practical. No comparison can be made between the splendid certainty which Kant attributes to Newtonian science and thepractical faith in postulates necessary to give consistence to the practical use of reason. In an atmosphere of extreme valuation of certainty and of the scientific method, the Kantian foundation for practical reason, which, in short, leads to the postulates of human freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, was not believed or taken seriously. Kant expressed his admiration and respect for two areas of reality,the starry sky above me and the moral law inside me . But to keep them separate is not sustainable, for indeed he who looks at the stars and grasps moral law is a human being who takes part in the two areas of reality, as a system subject to physical laws and as a free being. The integration of the two spheres seems necessary without the negation of either of them. But if we separate to such an extent the degree of certainty that we attribute to the knowledge of each of them, and if we set such a high value on certainty, then the so-called practical use of reason runs the risk of immediately being seen as one more mask of the irrational, as a concession of Kant’s to his beliefs, affections, desires or interests. The historical proof that this two sets of accounts cannot be tenable for long is what happened to Kantian tradition. Either it tended towards an idealism that suppressed the peculiarity of the practical and made it depend for everything on theory by identifying the rational with the real, or it drifted towards an irrationalism in which the pure use of reason had the same fate as the practical use, until it was seen as one more mask of the will to power[23] . The pure and practical uses of reason must be integrated and must support each other, for today we know that they either stand or fall together[24] . But this requires a reconsideration of the ideal of certainty and of the nature of science which has only come about in the twentieth century.
Since Hegel and since Nietzsche, several campaigns have been launched in the pursuit of certainty. One of the last ones in favour of certainty, automatism and the segregation of the practical, based on the identification of reason with science, was called Neo-positivism (and it was pursued as the so-calledreceived view ). Its internal decadence apart, it was Popper’s philosophy and Kuhn’s criticisms that put an end to this venture, and with it to a way of making philosophy of science. Kuhn laid forth the practical aspects of scientific rationality. As he states - in my opinion, rightly - ‘Recognizing that criteria of choice can function as values when incomplete as rules has, I think, a number of striking advantages [p. 331] .’[25] . In Popper, a clear renunciation of the ideal of certainty and a re-instatement of truth are to be notice.
The recognition of the practical implication of science, both in its genesis and applications and in its justification, and the renunciation of the idea of certainty no doubt mark the end of the epoch in which the supposedly scientific method was shown as the zenith and model of human reason, where all philosophy aspired to ideal of certainty or took its failure as the failure of reason, first in the practical terrain and then, as an inexorable consequence, in the theoretical. Today there is an abandonment of the logico-linguistic conception of theories in favour of a pragmatic conception of science. Science, it is said, is action. But, as previously the possibility of a practical reason was not clear, nor was its articulation with theory, the rationality of science itself has been questioned. Kuhn has been accused of being relativist and irrationalist, an accusation which he has rejected, but without going so far as to construct a philosophical basis on which to base this rejection. For their parts, Peirce and Popper, each in his own way, have tackled this subject but both have recoiled, paradoxically, to quasi-Hegelian positions.
Science taken as action, as the art of research, of teaching, diffusion of knowledge and application, etc., can and must be judged with criteria that cannot in themselves be exclusively scientific or merely arbitrary, but a part of the general rationality of human life. The birth, then, of new disciplines, of new ways of making philosophy of science, such asbioethics ,environmental ethics andSTS studies , is not just a collateral phenomenon, a momentary collision point between science and practical thought, but an indication of a new way of conceiving rationality itself, or at least an indication of the need for this new reason.
I believe that the time has come to perfect concepts and attitudes that have always had a vocation to integrate the theoretical and practical planes without ruling out either of them, concepts and attitudes which were born to avoid the swing of the pendulum between the logicist and irrationalist extremes (between Permenides and Heracleitus, between Charybdis and Scylla).
Phronesis in Aristotle
Aristotle characterizes prudence (phronesis ) as
‘A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.’[26] .
By means of this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition, or state of capacity (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be knowledge linked with human action. In the second place, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technique (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral virtues and sets it among the intellectual ones. Finally, the fact that it deals with what is good and bad for mankind, and not right and wrong in an abstract way, sets prudence apart from wisdom (sophia ).
So far we have sketched the limits of the notion of prudence and others akin to it, and the points where they overlap[27] , but we must not forget that ‘Regardingpractical wisdom [phronesis ] we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it’.[28]
Texts about prudence suggest that it is an intellectual virtue, but that it implies experience lived, which concerns both means and ends, for its final horizon is the good life as a whole, and that it is at the service of wisdom, that is, it is an instrument for obtaining this. However, Aristotle goes as far as to say:
‘We ought to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom [phronimos ] not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.’[29]
In general, prudence pursues wisdom and wisdom stimulates human prudence. It is best to ‘possess both, or preferably prudence’[30] . Of animals, Aristotle says that they too are prudent[31] , but as they lack wisdom their prudence is certainly limited. For all this, prudence is worth pursuing for itself, regardless of its possible usefulness, given that it is a virtue[32] .
Prudence is a virtue, and virtue, for Aristotle, is:
‘a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [phronimos ] would determine it.’[33]
Virtue, therefore, is a habit or disposition to choosing the right medium between excess and shortage. But this is not easy, for the right means is not the arithmetic mean. To find it we need another rule. This rule will be the one established by the prudent man and applied just as he would apply it. In short, we cannot determine what is or is not virtuous without the concurrence of the prudent man.
The mid point is dictated by reason or by the straight rule of the prudent man. This reason or straight rule is, rather, correct reason, that is corrected reason. It is the limit to which a process of correction tends, one of elimination of errors, by relation to the end sought:
‘[...] there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (katà tòn orthòn lógon )’[34] .
Therefore, prudence requires experience:
‘Young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.’[35]
Experience is time and memory, but not just any lapse of time, but one which one has spent reflecting, trying to understand the nature of the things we see, of the actions we do and what happens to us. Experience is the memory of a time lived and thought, for it is the fruit of succeeding corrections.
But let us remember that prudence itself is a virtue and, moreover, ‘it is impossible to be practically wise [phronimos ] without being good’[36] . Therefore, nobody could be prudent without following the ruled dictated by prudence. Nobody could be prudent without having been already. This vicious circle (or virtuous one, depending on how we look on it) is resolved by education and action, that is, by action steered by somebody prudent until one becomes prudent oneself[37] .
The prudence of an experienced person serves for drawing up rules, ‘since the universals are reached from the particulars’[38] . Butmethodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[39] .
Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule. Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision.
Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice. The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity (epieíkeia )[40] .
‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[41]
The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[42] .
But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[44] .
In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that:
‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand. But the latter no longer finds its model and guide in the former, and must look on its own level for a rule which, nevertheless, will still be intellectual or “dianoetic”.’[45]
This integration is achieved, then, through prudence and practical truth: scientific research is still part of human action and, as such, is subject to the ethical rule of prudence, and to the service of the ultimate of man’s ends, happiness, which in turn consists in true knowledge, as well as co-existence[46] and a moderate degree of welfare[47] .
Science is rooted in human life, in practical values, in time and in experience through prudence, which is a virtue and is intellectual; or, more correctly, through the prudent person. Furthermore, this prudential conception of human reason is rooted in a very realistic, profound, fruitful and commonly accepted idea of human nature: ‘desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire’[48] .
Iran Before Islam
The starting point for our discussions has been chosen from an aspect which in fact marks the origins of Islam, and from another viewpoint, is inseparably linked to the study of ideological, social and practical problems. This approach is also more compatible with the natural course for pursuing these studies. In order to study Islam in its correct, historical perspective, for obtaining a clearer understanding, it was appropriate to have begun with a familiarisation with the region of its birth, namely the Arabian peninsula incorporating Saudi Arabia (Hejaz and Najd), Yemen, the sheikhdoms along the Persian Gulf littoral and the Sea of Oman. We also generally commented on the geographic, social, racial, lingual, religious and economic conditions of that region.
Henceforth our discussion will be related to those civilised regions which bounded the Arabian peninsula of the time.
These civilised regions could basically be divided into two parts: in one part consisting of small free status , linked with the Arabian peninsula and possessing small local governments, which should however be regarded Arab settlements though most of them were installed by great powers. One of these which had parts of Iraq under its influence was the government of Hira (or the Nu'manis and Munadherah) under the hegemony of Iran. Another was Yemen which, being within the Arabian peninsula, had an independent government. For about 150 or 200 years this government had been installed either by Iran or Abyssinia till about the time of the rise of Islam. In the other part were the states in the western part which included the present day Jordan and Israel. This was the Ghassani government which was under the hegemony of Rome. We will have a short and brief discussion about these three small governments in their proper place, since these three states happened to have a significant role in the contemporary history of the rise of Islam which merits particular attention.
A) Ancient Iran
The Arabian peninsula of that time was bounded by four powerful, strong and civilised nations with rather well established governments. Of these four countries, two could be rated as first class and the other two as second class powers. One of the first group was Iran which extended on one side as far as the Tigris and Euphrates and Shatt-al-Arab, namely upto the middle of the present day Iraq and included the Caucasus and the present Iran itself; and on another flank included Turkestan, Afghanistan, a part of Pakistan as far as the Hindus (Sind) River valley. In these regions there lived a people with a long and civilised past which had undergone many tribulations and change, and were regarded as the great neighbours of the Arabian peninsula. The fact is that if we wish to speak on the basis of common usage, Arabian peninsula was just a stretch of desert to which no one paid any attention, and the use of the word 'neighbour' could hardly apply to Iran with its immense size and grandeur as compared with Arabia. But here the discussion is not about great or small but only to become familiar with the geographic neighbours of Arabia.
The second great neighbour was Rome which also neighboured Iran. It was a great power including northern Iraq, present day Turkey and the Balkans, and was known as Eastern Rome. When we mention Rome in this discussion it implies the Eastern Roman empire, since western Rome with its seat in Italy neither remained a great power at that time, nor had any relation with Islam. Of course western Rome of that time included Italy, a portion of Yugoslavia, Albania, some part of Spain and even a part of France, thus Europe of that time was only one country under Rome. Other peoples living beyond its limits were called Berbers.[17] Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire possessed such greatness at that time that it was far above comparison with the other Rome. Western Rome rose to greatness after the Muslims had overthrown Eastern Rome, and the caliphs, namely the Ottoman rulers and kings, had captured the city of Islambol or Constantinople. It was then that in the 15th century A.D. learned men of Eastern Rome fled to Western Rome and became instrumental in causing the Renaissance and provided the base for the present civilisation of Europe and the western world, because during the period which we are discussing, Western Rome was hardly great and indeed was regarded as a second rate power.
These were the great neighbours of the Arabian peninsula. The other two second-rate neighbours were, firstly, Egypt which included the present day Egypt, Libya, Tunis and some part of Sudan. Although this country held some importance from Islam's viewpoint, yet it was not considered a great power such as Iran and Rome.
The next neighbouring country was Abyssinia which included the present day Abyssinia and some part of the Sudan, In this region, too, there was no powerful government, though in Islam's times it was an empire with a considerable past having a civilisation and characterised by noteworthy social and religious freedom.[18]
As is evident while surveying these countries, only two other regions remained in the entire civilised world, namely China and India, and beyond these two we do not find any other place in the world which could be termed civilised, This detail has been mentioned here because certain people, especially among the educated class whether in Iran or here in Germany raise the question whether the prophet brought Islam as a universal religion, and if so, how much did he know about the world outside the Arabian peninsula? The answer is: firstly, that we do not call a person 'prophet' on account of his having been formally educated or having studied books and maps etc. A prophet to us is a person who acquires all the necessary knowledge through divine revelation, and this is without bounds or limits. Secondly, the Prophet (a.s.) in his own time, had sent communications to the rulers of these regions and hence the question whether the Prophet was aware of the other non Arab nations and their basic needs would seem to be a childish question. History has recorded that the Prophet (a.s.), in the third year of his ordainment, was commanded by God to make his call to Islam public and declare it to all his neighbours, relatives and the Quraish. For this purpose he issued an open invitation inviting all to his house, and declared that they would soon have a religious code which would open the gates of the palaces of (Khusrow, the Emperor of Iran) and of caesar and other rulers. Also in the sixth year of his ordainment, he sent letters to the rulers of the three small regions of Hira, Ghassan and Yemen; first to Bazan king of Yemen, then to Khusrow Parviz emperor of Iran, then to the emperor of Eastern Rome, then to the ruler of Egypt (Maquqass), and next to Najashi (Negus) king of Abyssinia. All these letters have been recorded in history, and there is no doubt or question about them. What remains to be said is whether the Prophet of Islam knew of such places as India and China or not. Anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Arab's history would know that one of the principal occupations of life for Arab merchants was the transportation of goods. There they carried from China and India via the Sea of Oman and Hejaz to Europe, i.e. Rome. Thus, not only the prophet but Arab traders as well were familiar with India and China and even their products such as spices, perfumes, handicrafts and China ware which were the industrial and agricultural products of India and China at that time. Trade in such commodities was a part of the commercial pre-occupation of the Arabs of that time. Therefore in discussions should someone raise the question whether the Prophet of Islam was aware of human civilisations existing in the world or not, becomes quite irrelevant. It is likely someone may ask Prophet knew of the inhabited regions of the earth, though we could not possibly answer this question, since we do not believe that he know everything but rather that whatever he needed to know was provided to him through revelation. I really cannot imagine if the Prophet (a.s.) needed to know about all these places in those times.
B) Geographical Situation
The reason we brought up Iran for discussion is firstly, there are certain pertinent points about the Sassanid period such as the rise of the Mazdaki code of life that needs be studied and emphasised. It is an interesting discussion which will be pursued for a comparative analysis subsequently. From the point of view of natural environments, if we were to compare Iran with Arabia, it could be said that Arabia as the birthplace of Islam was a poverty stricken, dry and deprived region whereas Iran or at least some parts of Iran were populated, flourishing and affluent. Incidentally, the areas of the great Iranian plateau which were contiguous to Arabia were all green and included the western slopes of the Zagross mountain range and parts of Lorestan, Bakhtaran, Hamadan and present Kurdestan, as well as part of Mesopotamia along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, all of which are green and full of palm groves, so that in those times the Arabs called these lands the Black Land's. This was so because as of the dry, sandy deserts came to this part, they would notice a dark horizon which in fact was the palm groves and other trees, whereas in their own dwelling places there were only old trees in the rarely found oases. During one journey which I happened to have undertaken I noticed how poverty stricken the region was. Concerning the region along the east coast of the Red Sea, one comes to realise how unprivileged it is since despite its proximity to the Red Sea, no habitation or even a tree could be seen from Jordan right down to Jedda. The seashore, too, totally barren, has nothing more to offer than sand and ground. I don't know whether it is the soil that is bad or the wind which blows in the direction of Africa and carries the vapours of the Red Sea towards Africa because if there were no winds, some of this vapour might have remained to produce rain fall. However, all the vapour is carried towards the opposite side of the sea, namely to Somalia and Abyssinia which derive full benefit. In any case if we were to make a relative study of the area, it will be seen that the region which is adjacent to Arabia in the east is the best part of Iran from the viewpoint of natural environment next of course to the Caspian Sea littoral shores which is a thriving and populous region. It is interesting to know that the average population density in the regions of Gilan and Mazandaran is 100 persons per square kilometer, whereas for the whole of Iran the average is 16. The approximate area of these two provinces is 30,000 square kilometers, and they are so flourishing and populous that about three million people live.[19]
Aside from this prosperous region which was not contiguous to Arabia, the western regions of Iran and eastern part of Iraq which neighboured Arabia, were comparatively prosperous and utilizable from the aspects of climate, vegetation and other environmental factors.
From the viewpoint of area, the border of Iran reached the Sind River valley including the greater part of Afghanistan as far as the Oxus and Jaxartes Rivers and above the Araxes River which included the present Caucasia upto and including the Shatt-al-Arab. There were the boundaries of Iran then and hence Arabia stands no comparison with Iran. At the time of the rise of Islam and even before that, the eastern regions of Iran were called Khorassan in general, a name which is derived from 'Khor-Assa' meaning the region of sun rise, owing to its being situated in the east of Iran. Thus the eastern part of Iran of those days included Khorassan, soutlhern Turkestan, Afghanistan, Baluchestan and Sistan, all ofthem together bearing the name Khorassan.
C) Civilisation
The Iranian civilisation is considered to be an Aryan civilisation, having a precedent of eleven and even twelve centuries prior to the rise of Islam, after having evolved from a nomadic and tribal society to a central authority, whereas Hejaz had not till then reached the stage of a central government. The first government established in Hejaz was under Islam, whereas the government of media (Ecbatan) had been set up twelve centuries before that of Islam, in Hejaz. It will be an interesting example to quote from an inscription by Darius at a public works project. This inscription is naturally composed in a royal and a pompous style usual in that imperial age, however the content of it is rather interesting. Darius ruled in the years 550 to 529 B.C. The first Iranian inscription dates back to his reign, that is to say prior to him there were no such inscriptions. After a short period of chaos and disorder, Darius was able to establish a vast empire in Iran extending as far as Egypt including the entire region of Shaam, Syria and Egypt, and had thus become a neighbour of Greece. At that time the Eastern Roman had not risen, but there was the Roman Empire in the west which had not till then gained any importance. In the time of Darius the two countries of importance were Greece and Egypt. When Iran conquered Egypt, it also brought Greece under pressure. In the wars of that time, Darius frequently waged against the Greeks, he had to employ the sea route since the Greek territory consisted of a number of islands and land campaign would not have been feasible. As the Iranian ships had no access to the Mediterranean, Darius decided to open a sea way for the Iranian warships to reach the Greek shores. Thus he ordered a canal dug which was the precursor of the Suez Canal linking the Mediterranean Sea via the Nile River to the Red Sea. Darius describes the history of this canal in an inscription as follows:
"Ahura-Mazda, the great lord who created the lofty sky, created Man, created Man's good fortune, raised Darius to kingship, has assigned to King Darius this great empire with all these precious horses and multitudes of people.[20] I am King Darius, great king, king over many varied races, king over extensive and remote domains, son of Vishtasb of the Achaemnids; so declares King Darius: I am a Parsi. I govern Egypt from Pars. I decreed this canal be dug to link the between a river called Nile which flows in Egypt to the sea which reaches Iran.[21] This canal has been dug by my command and the ships have sailed via this canal from Egypt to Iran as I had desired."
Thus we see that twelve centuries before the rise of Islam in Arabia, a great and powerful government existed as its eastern neighbour. There is little doubt that amongst the past rulers of Iran Darius was an outstanding figure from the standpoint of ideas, capabilities and policies. This is especially true in connection with his attitude towards the conquered lands since, unlike other great conquerors of the world, he gave more importance to the administration of his domains than merely to conquer them. After retrieving his ancestral territories i.e. the domain of his ancestor Kurosh, he had no inclination to add further territory to his realm, and only wished to create to an extent a welfare administration for his subjects in the extensive realm of Iran of those days. This is a notable aspect of the life of Darius, and thus, according to the writings of orientalists, his accomplishments in that age are definitely outstanding, though this point is not relevant to the present discussion.
D) Class Structure and Social Divisions
Briefly then, such a government existed in the region, in the eastern neighbour of Arabia, about twelve centuries before the rise of Islam, however the basis and nature of those civilised governments were quite different from the Islamic government that followed. In fact these two were essentially unlike each other, since that civilised realm was charaterised by a deep class system.[22] In the extended period of human life, vestiges of which can still be observed in backward societies, people were since birth divided into various classes or castes so that the children of the lower class were naturally condemned to remain inferior and had no right to ascend do a higher class. Such was the class structure then existing.
This class structure existed in Iran, too. As far as I can recall from my studies in history, the seat and center of this caste system was in India, and since the civilisations of Iran, Greece and Rome have been Indo-European in origin, this Indian concept of class society travelled wherever Indian civilisation asserted an influence. But the cruelty and severity which were observed and are still to some extent prevalent in India in enforcing this system, have not been observed else where or in Iran.
In Iran of that time, class system and social attitudes and perceptions took the form that the king was absolute and the concept of 'Shahinshah' or king of kings was introduced in the time of the Medes well before Kurosh and Darius.
The royal class was considered super-human, and other classes were related to common people who were divided into several classes: In the time of Darius the upper most class were those on whose shoulders rested the pillars of the ruling monarehy, namely soldiers who were held above all others in being given social privileges. The second class comprised the farmers[23] and in the third class were included the artisans. Thus there were three classes in the Achaemenid time. History does not mention any organised group named clergy as such in that period, but of course there have been priests in the same way that there had been a faith and religion.[24] The clergy as a class made its appearance in the Sassanid time, and as it will be explained later, this class of priests came to be regarded as the first class, warriors and soldiers as the second class, clerks and civil servants as the third class with the farmers artisans and craftsmen falling in the fourth class.
In his epic 'Shahnameh', Ferdowsi, has this to say about these classes:
There was a group called Katuzis (priests) who were engaged in worshipping,
The next in rank were the Neissaris (military) who were warriors, lions of battle, honour of the army and country;
Then came the Nassoudi (farmers) to whom all are indebted; for, they plough, sow and reap that they may not be blamed;
The fourth group were the Ahyu-Khashi (artisans) who used their hand to shape unruly substances, and employed their ideas and intelligence.[25]
The above were what Ferdowsi has described in his Shahnameh, but according to Tho'alebi[26] there were the following classes: 1. warriors, 2. priests and physicians, 3. clerks and government employees, 4. farmers, craftsmen and artisans,. Tho'alebi's description appears to be historically more reliable, since Ferdowsi's Shahnameh is mostly based on hearsay.
In a letter written by one of the governors of northern Iran to the king of Tabarestan, priests have been accorded the first class, warriors the second, clerks the third, and labourers the fourth class; a classification which differs from Ferdowsi's.
In any case the Priests and soldiers constituted the first and the second classes or vice versa; clerks and government employees the third class, and farmers and artisans made up the fourth class.
In such a society the class implied that the child of a farmer, or artisan or tradesman could when grown up become a good farmer, or artisan or tradesman, but he could never entertain the thought of raising his social status to that of a clergyman, a warrior, a clerk or a government servant; he did not belong there and he did not have the right to hope, except in very exceptional cases when a person could be elevated by the king' s special decree to a higher class. This of course meant an upgrading limited only to that person's lifetime for the education of special talents and skills.
This social system with such limitation was quite contrary to what Islam introduced later on. The class system has purposely been discussed here because in the discussion of various faiths and creeds especially in the Sassanid period of time, this subject will gain importance and deserves particular attention.
E) Progress in Learning
We will deal later with the state of learning and progress in this field during the Sassanids period as concerning scientific and industrial progress in the Achaeminid period in Iran, no substantial evidence is available. However, what is certain is that Darius could not have succeeded in administering such an extensive realm, without a stock of knowledge and learning. However, are particular aspect which occurs in historical evidence is that the sovereigns of Iran seemed to have cherished the idea that all the civilised lands of that time would eventually become part of Iran even though two other states existed.[27] Thus we witness that the great physician of that time is a Greek, and the renowned geographer who was sent to the Sind valley by Darius to .survey that land, and prepare a report, was, too, a Greek.
Even the best and the finest of warriors of that time were Greek, the reason being that in Darius' mind these subjects were not non-Iranians, but were regarded as citizens of the greater Iran. Therefore, it did not occure to Darius and other kings that the people of central region who lived close to the seat of the government should remain among the artisans and tradesmen of the fourth class, while physician, clerks, and warriors should be from Greece, Egypt and outlying regions! So the scholars were brought from the outer regions of the empire while locals comprised the artisans and craftsmen. It is for this reason that the history of that time fails to indicate any outstanding Iranian scholar who was not of Greek, Egyptian or Indian stock. That does not mean of course that such individuals did not exist. Very little historical evidence is available and addedly, most of the available sources are of Greek origin, and the Greeks were not behind others in holding nationalistic prejudice - if anything, they were well ahead in this respect. Therefore, it becomes difficult to reach a verdict in this matter. Anyhow from the point of view of academic learning, no distinguished scholars in particular fields appear in Iran or in India or in Ionia, in the south of Turkey near the Mediterranean, who could equal the personalities from Phoenicia, Chaldea, Assyria, Greece and Egypt. In Phoenicia, which included a part of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and a small portion of Jordan as well, we come across such individuals who were superior to Iran in learning. From the economic aspect, too, they enjoyed better conditions, and were richer and more prosperous than Arabia.
F) Religion in the Achaemenid Period
In Iran, according to available sources, there existed a faith called Mizda'i which professed faith in one god named Ahura-Mizda, a name, having a root which is similar to a Greek word, meaning 'great and possessor of wisdom', hence Ahur-Mizda would mean the great god of wisdom and reason. This faith professed belief in god as the unique creator of the world, and a belief in a number of secondary and tertiary gods, and in angels, in the resurrection which is all very significant, and also in good deeds as something very essential. Thus it is a highly interesting point of note that as a result of such basic religious education in ancient Iran, Islam spread so swiftly eastward.
The Mizda'i religion during subsequent periods became corrupted with superstitions so that a man called Zoroaster appeared to reform the Mizda'i religion. His place of appearance has been a subject of controversy in history.[28]
Of course Zoroaster is not a prophet but a reformer of the Mizda'i code. As to the appearance of Zoroaster quite odd accounts are related in history about the place and the date of his appearance, though generally historical indications place his appearance about six centuries B.C. simultaneously in regions which had a common origin and similar conditions, namely India and Iran. In Iran Mizda'i faith is an ancient religion, and in India Brahmanism is an ancient faith, but no evidence is available about the date of origin of either of them. Mizda'i faith was later on corrupted by superstitions, and Zoroaster as the reformer makes his appearance in Iran. In India Brahmanism, too, gets mixed with superstitions, and a man named Buddha appears to reform it. There is a great resemblance between the life of Zoroaster and Buddha in all the phases from the beginning to the end. In the Semitic regions, too, six centuries later, namely concurrent with the rise of Jesus[29] Christ (a.s.) the main faith had been the monotheistic religion of Judaism. This religion to faith was spoilt by superstitions, and a man named Jesus rose to fight those superstitions. In this way the life of Jesus Christ (a.s.) resembles those of Zoroaster and Buddha. I do truly wish that I could have delved in deeper study in the similarity present, especially in the case of Zoroaster and Buddha, as both of them have a fifty percent resemblance with the lire of Jesus. There is another common characteristic between the lives of Jesus and Zoroaster; the history of Christianity shows that Jesus was ordained as a prophet at the age of thirty. It is said that Zoroaster, too, rose at the same age as a reformer to correct the Mizda'i code by the order of Ahura-Mizda.
Before the rise of Zoroaster, according to the available testimonials of history a class named the Magi held responsibility for religious practices in Iran especially in Azarbayjan, as keepers of the fires. It is has been said that Zoroaster himself was at first either of the Magi class or in contact with them and had even wished to become a Magus. There is a frequent mention of Magus and Magi in the Achaemenid inscriptions, but no mention is made of Zororaster. In Zororaster's hymns, called 'Gathas', no mention has been made of the Magi except in one place, and no mention is made of Darius and Achaemenids at all. Thus it is not clear for us whether the religion in the time of the Achaemenids and Darius' era had been Mizda'i faith or zoroastrianism or different schools of Budaism. What is certain, however, is that Judaism had existed as a religion and then had been patronised by Darius.[30] This point is mentioned in the Jewish holy books as well as historical records.[31] What also appears certain is that in those days in 'he realm of Iran various faiths had been prevalent, and there may not have been a formal or a state religion as such especially since no mention is made of Zoroaster in the inscriptions of Darius, nor has there been a mention of the Achaemenids in the 'Gathas'. This could lead us to deduce that state and religion had separate existence, allowing people to practice their own religion and letting the government proceed with its own function. It is in the Sassanid period that religion gains the government' s support and there is a state it became the religion of the country. This aspect warrants an exclusive and objective study of the Sassanid period since it is closely related to the age of the rise of Islam.
To sum up, this eastern neighbour of Arabia was twelve centuries ahead of Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, in extent, greatness, power, natural resources, social, technical and administrative progress and attainment of central governmental organisation and also historical precedence. How, then, did it happen that such an advanced country should succumb so easily to a newly-risen movement originating in Hejaz, is the topic for our further discussion.
G) Iran in the Sassanid Period
Iran under the Sassanids went through a glorious age distinct in its history. Observations related from this period reveal why Islam spread so rapidly in Iran. Also to be kept in mind, there had existed their natural propensity, dating back three or four centuries for the acceptance of such a faith as Islam. This subject, too, will be discussed briefly.
In the year 224 A.D. almost four centuries before the rise of Islam in, Iran the Sassanids succeeded the Ashkanian dynasty.[32] The Achaemenid rule had its root in Fars, but the Ashkanis were not from that region. The Sassanids once again rose from Fars, and a chief named Ardshir Babakan who was a descendant of Sassan and a governor of Ardavan V, the last Ashkani king, decided to set up a central government modelled after the Achaemenid dynasty with greater Fars as its base including the present Khuzestan.
Within a short time Ardshir managed to gather forces and mobilise them and seize the control and then, after much struggle, establish the government of Iran on the same model and the same extent as the Achaemenid realm.
H) Supremacy of Religion and Political Power
Ardshir was a descendant of Sassan who was a priest, and as such in his psychological, hereditary and personality make up, it asserted decisive influence so that at the assumption of power he decided to establish a government on the basis of religion, and make that religion the state religion of the country so that the two pillars of power, politico-military administration and religion should form as the foundation of his rule. Whether this concept originated from a personal inspiration of Ardshir attributable to descent from a priest, or whether it was a social dictate of the time which his observations led him to believe and which would make his rule smoother, is not an easy question to answer. What is certain, however, is that, though in the Achaemenid period a religion existed, yet a religious freedom existed in the whole of the Achaemenid empire, each group practising its own religion. Though the prevalent religion was Zoroastrianism, yet alongside of it Judaism and some other local faiths also existed. Christianity had not till then made its appearance. It we were to regard Sabean as an ancient faith, it, too, existed in the region of Syria and Phoenicia. During the Achaemenid period there was no religion as the state religion, although the priests were regarded as a distinguished class, yet they had no official recognition. During the Ashkani period, too, the position was the same.
I) Zoroastrianism as the State Religion
Ardshir got the idea of giving a state religion to the country and that the government should have an official religion, and this religion was Zoroastrianism. There may have existed some evidence to show that this matter was based on a social necessity in the sense that Ardshir intended to revive a kind of Iranian nationality based on past history, and link his lineage to the Achaemenids and so prove himself as a kin and descendant of Kurosh; also as Zoroastrianism was an Iranian religion with a considerable following, he figured that by reviving that religion, he could exploit both the lines of propaganda to expand and reinforce his rule. If this was the case, then by establishing a state religion and linking religion with politics was a dictate of his time. Or perhaps these considerations were never relevant and the matter was wholly personal. In any case with the assumption of power by the Sassanids, a new factor entered the social life of the Iranians, namely that the government recognised a state religion that is Zoroastrianism. During the Achaemenid period, Greece was a powerful rival of Iran on its western frontiers, a Greece which frequently included parts of Turkey and Syria. Although until the rise of Alexander no strong government existed in Greece, yet even those small governments asserted some weight. For instance even though Athens was much smaller in area and population as compared with Iran, still it held a high position from the viewpoint of philosophy, civilisation, political concepts and naval power and military potential. Thus they were always a source of trouble for Iran. In the Achaemenid time other antagonists on the western borders were Chaldea, Babylon and Assyria in the region of Iraq, and Syria and a part of Turkey, but the Achaemenids removed these obstacles and conquered them, leaving Greece as a strong opponent. In the Sassanid period there was no powerful Greece any more. In the Achaemenid period although there were governments in Rome and Italy, yet they were not of much importance. But during the Sassanid period that is for eight centuries, there rose a powerful government and a great empire in that part of the world with its center in Rome. This empire, too, had a state religion which was Christianity In north Africa, Egypt still retained its position as an ancient civilisation, and the islands of Crete[33] and Sicily,[34] too, possessed an ancient history and civilisation.
On the whole southern Europe was under the control of a strong government with its center in Rome and Christianity as its state religion. But whether the wide influence of Christianity at that time or thereabouts and its recognition as the state religion had been a pressing necessity and an effective factor in influencing Ardshir in adopting an official religion for his government, is a question that requires further study. But anyhow the Sassanid empire had as its western neighbour a vast and powerful government in the Roman Empire where Christianity was the state religion.
Between the Persian and the Roman empires were situated the remains of Chaldea, Assyria and Babylon which kept on changing hands between these two. The middle east as far as history can recall, has never been a quiet region, especially at the time when the empires of Iran and Rome were engaged in playing vital rules in the world. What is known for certain, however, is that the Sassanid government began its work on a new basis, namely the recognising of a state religion, a religion which was patronised by the ruling class and was attended by elaborate ceremonies by the Zoroastrian priests and their organisation which was able to exert pressure upon religious minorities and followers of other religions. This was actually the case in many of the Sassanid years when non-Zoroastrian minorities remained under duress.
In the discussions related to religion tolerance in Islam and before Islam, it is worth remembering that during the 427 years' rule of the Sassanids in Iran,[35] almost no tolerance was shown. The Iranian government recognised a state religion dominated by a powerful organisation of Zoroastrian priests which kept the religious minorities under duress. This of course was the situation for most of the time.
Meanwhile during the period when Iran was formally recognised as a Zoroastrian state, there appeared signs of influence of different views and faiths, namely the influence of Buddhism, certain Indian creeds, Christianity and Judaism upon the thoughts and beliefs of Iranians. This is the first characteristic of the Sassanid rule which lasted four centuries before the advent of Islam.
J) Administration of the State
The second characteristic of the Sassanid rule was its administration, possessing a developed organisation with official bureaus, correspondence, decrees, accounts and records to a greater extent than before. It could be said that with the arrival of Alexander in Iran and afterwards, Iran went through an evolutionary period in this respect. Thus in this period the influence of tribes who were called 'clerks' or 'secretaries' and worked in government offices, grew much greater during the Sassanid role than before, and they played a significant role. The art of writing in the Sassanid time was not only limited to government business, but was also important in religion. In the early years of this dynasty's rule 'Avesta' which had till then not been compiled and existed only in memorised form that was transferred verbatim from person to person, was compiled with the endeavours of the Zoroastrian priests and even commentaries were added in the form of 'Zand' and 'Pazand'. In this way the principles of faith became defined and organised. Here we quote from a text by the head priest and religious authority of the time of Ardshir Babakan, the first Sassanid king, to show the influence of religion and ecclesiastical organisation in the Sassanid system of government. It says:
"The Mazdai faith was strengthened by my hand, the learned men were rightfully elevated to high placer. Those of the 'Magi' who were seized with doubts and uncertainties, were punished by me, or were pardoned after they had confessed their errors and sins.[36] Fire-temples were built by me and the Magi were assigned to them. God, the King and I confirmed their appointments.[37] Numerous fire-temples were built throughout Iran. Intermarriage between kinsmen and near relatives was once more forbidden.[38] Under my guidance those had worshiped demons, turned back to God. Crowns were removed from the heads of many a sovereign.[39] Faith and religion found glory and splendour, and God's command overshadowed everything. If I were to write down all the tasks which have been accomplished, it would prove a lengthy process. Wherever our army stepped, a fire-temple was set up. In Antioch, Talis, Armenia, Georgia everywhere we set up fire-temples."[40]
Thus it would appear that in these conditions the Sassanids assumed power in Iran and the influence of clerks, secretaries and government recorders as well as clergymen was paramount. To show the influence of the scribes and clerks, we will quote from Henri Masse, a well-known European Orientalist:[41]
"At the head of the government was the Grand Vazir who, under the direct command of the King, administered the country and acted as his deputy when the king was away on travel or engaged in the battlefield. Next to him was the Zoroastrian high priest. This shows that in those days ministerial position and chancellorship served the king and acted for him, whereas previous to this, the Army commander came next to the king in precedence. At this time, although the field commanders and generals held importance, the highest authority in the administration of the country was vested in the Grand Vazir and Chief of scribes and secretaries."
In order to further illustrate extent to which the people's political life was mixed with religion, we will quote another part from Henri Masse's writing: "A large number of clergymen intervened in the affairs of the people and controlled their daily life, thereby gaining much wealth, and extending the sphere of their influence, and becoming an independent state within the state.
Occasionally they would even form a front against the king in collaboration with the nobility, and such, confrontation weakened the Sassanid rule."
The purpose of quoting these points is to show the degree of influence religion exerted in the social life and in governmental affairs and administration of the country. All this paved the way both positively and negatively, for the spread of Islam into Iran.
Generally speaking the two characteristics of the Sassanid period were: the mingling of politics and the government, with religion and the extraordinary degree of influence of the clergy and their religious organisations to such an extent that it would be interesting to note at that time a seminary and a college of logic existed alongside in the city of Rey, for the training of religious students for various positions. Another important point was the high degree of influence the clerks and government employees and keepers of records had in the society.
As it has been noted earlier, the social life of people was always divided into various clans and in this period the order of classes was undergoing a change.
M) Social Class Structure
In the Sassanid time the division of the population into the 'haves' and 'have not' became more apparent. The distinguished classes were made up of the clerks, clergy, military and nobles, while the ordinary classes included artisans, farmers and tradesmen. These upper classes during the most famous and brilliant period, namely in the time of king Khusrow Anushiravan I, enjoyed the most privileged life and were exempted from the payment of taxes and from conscription in wars; all these burdens were placed upon the class of artisans and tradesmen and especially upon the villagers, The artisans and tradesmen class paid taxes only, while the villagers had to give both money and their lives in return for a meagre livelihood. In this manner there existed a great class difference during the Sassanid rule, especially among the ordinary classes which were made up of rural population and the tradesmen and artisans.
1) Foreign Policy
During the four centuries of the Sassanid rule, from the viewpoint of foreign relations, wars between Iran and Rome were the most significant events in the pages of history. In these wars there were several points worthy of attention, the foremost being the intervention of religion in the conduct of wars.
At the beginning of the 5th century A.D. under the leadership of a priest named Nestorius[42] a sect called Nestorians came into being among the Christians in the region of Syria. This sect differed from the other Christians in their beliefs, and for that reason they were condemned for heresy and excommunicated by the powerful church of that time in Constantinope, whereas the sect had a large following in the Middle East. Although Zoroastrianism was at that time the state religion of Iran, the government gave asylum to the Nestorians in order to gather a group of supporters between its own realm and Rome, its powerful neighbour. This support enabled the Nestorians to build churches in the realm of Iran and engage in propagating their religion.
The other point is that when the Roman Emperors saw that the powerful and centralised government in Iran had become a source of trouble for them, after revealing its intentions of conquering all of the Roman empire and moreover, owing to its distance from the territories of Iran and its inability to maintain watch over its distant frontiers, a powerful emperor of Rome named Constantine[43] decided to establish an eastern capital for himself. This coincided with the time when the Iranian emperor, too, had determined to establish a western capital at Tysphon in the territory of Iraq, while the Romans chose the city of Byzantine which later on became known as Constantinople. This change of capital from Rome to Constantinople produced many changes in the past history, the main factor of which was the vicinity of the two powerful neighbours who were engaged in constant dispute, not about any ideology, but about expanding their respective realms and conquering the world, namely personal motives. Thus the foreign policy of Iran in this period was firstly dominated by religion, and secondly by the continued wars lasting four centuries. For one hundred years, there existed a peace pact between them, but for the rest of the period, namely for three centuries they were continuously in a state of war which became quite intense at the end of the sixth century A.D. That is in the time of Khosrow Parviz when intense wars raged between him and Heraclius, the Roman emperor. Both these emperors were contemporaries of the holy Prophet of Islam who sent written communications inviting them to embrace Islam. The war between the Emperors of Iran and Rome continued so long that they were losing their last ounce of strength. We will discuss these wars in more details later on when the subject of the birth of Islam comes up.
N) The Appearance of Manichaeus
As mentioned earlier, the rule of Ardshir, began with the recognition of the Zoroastrian faith. After his death, Shapoor the 1st, his son, became king who after further expanding the realm of his father, dominated the situation. He learnt that a man named Manichaeus[44] had risen claiming to be a prophet. Shapoor 1 received Manichaeus in court and after a few sessions fell deeply under his influence.
Manichaeus was an Iranian who was bom in Iraq in a village by the Tigris. He was familiar with Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, and by mingling these three faiths created a special creed and declared himself its prophet. After meeting Shapoor in Khuzistan and influencing him in favor of his religion, he obtained from Shapoor a directive to all his governors to allow Manichaeus and his missionaries freedom to propagate their religion.
Manichaeus rose as a reformer of the Zoroastrian religion, but he offered a set of teachings which were a combination of the ideas of Zoroaster, Christ and Buddha. For thirty years Manichaeus and his missionaries carried out their mission, winning numerous followers until in the time of Bahram II in the year 277 Manichaeus was arrested and in a court held by the Zoroastrian high priest he was charged with heresy in religion. He was thrown in prison and after 26 days he was killed there in an atrocious manner. His skin was then filled with straw and hung in front of Bahram's court as a warning to anyone who committed heresy in religion.
The question is what led Shapoor to favor Manichaeus' religion? Historians explain that Shapoor had realised that the Zoroastrian faith did not fulfill the needs and spiritual expectations of the people, and was inadequate in satisfying their religious spirit, and for this reason he gave Manichaeus a free hand as a religious reformer. This shows that zoroastrianism, which some people wish to revive now and make it replace Islam in some parts of Islamic lands, was as early as so many centuries before the advent of Islam, as ineffective a creed that it could not satisfy the people, and thus the king allowed a religious reformer like Manichaeus to become active. It should be remembered that at that time a religious vacuum existed in the realm of Iran. Manichaean faith has had a strange fate and has had many ups and downs, not as much as a religion, but as a philosophy it sent ripples as far as China on the one side, and as far as Europe including England and France in the other direction but that in itself is a long story.
O) The Rise of Mazdak
Another interesting development from that religious viewpoint in the Sassanid period is the rise of Mazdak. In the time of Qubad, father of Anushiravan, a man named Mazdak rose with a new religion. In Mazdak's faith a new aspect of faith is discernible that did not exist in the former religions. In Zoroastrianism attention was paid to moral aspects such as truth and honesty and spiritual matters and worship of God, and sacrifice etc., but it did not deal with rights and social problems, and not only accepted class divisions but also supported it. Thhe Manichaean faith, too, despite proposing reforms in religious matters, introduced no social changes. But Mazdak dealt with both religious and social matters. On the one hand with its inclinations towards Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity, namely towards asceticism, abandonment of carnal desires, and isolation from worldly affairs by leading an ascetic life, and with such views about social matters, Mazdak threatened the social order of the time. About his philosophy and religion, Mazdak used to say "True bliss for human beings lies in a peaceful environment free from rancour and enmity. But the disputes and wars which occur among people are either over wealth and enjoyment of affluence, property, water, trade, capital, luxuries or over women. In order to remove these disputes altogether, wealth and women should be commonly shared.[45]
This creed threatened the system of social class structure and quite naturally, it found numerous followers among the deprived classes. Qubad, too, as a young ruler who was opposed to the influence of priests, nobles and upper classes, and felt that their influence would hinder the proper administration of the country, supported Mazdak faith, and patronised Mazdak very strongly. In this way about the year 484 A.D. that is about 125 years before the advent of Islam, a revolutionary religious fervour governed under which the deprived masses tore up the former bonds of class life and formalities and adopted to an extreme extent the ideas of communal sharing of everything including women and abolition of family and marriage and proprietorship, with the result that chaos and disorder reigned everywhere, since such ideas both from the viewpoint of religion and social rights and internal politics were not acceptable to the people of that time, even though Qubad supported Mazdak to diminish the deep influence of the ecclesiastical organisation.
However, the clergy's influence succeeded in rousing people to revolt. On the other hand Mazdak's ideas, too, about family and wealth sharing were so extremist that they shook the foundations of the existing system since they were contrary to human nature. Therefore they could not endure for long, and when Anushirvan assumed power in the year 531 A.D. Mazdak was executed. His followers were scattered or destroyed, and once more the Zoroastrian faith and its priests gained dominance over the situation.[46]
P) Conditions Prevailing in Iran at the Time of the Rise of Islam
At the time of advent of Islam the government of Iran had become strangely weak, and after Khosrow Parviz within a few years he was succeeded by several male and female rulers until Yazdgerd the 3rd assumed power.[47]
In brief, to the east of the region of the birth of Islam there existed a vast realm with an ancient civilisation spread over twelve centuries. In Iran the central government had existed a long time and several religions appearing during this period which had exerted profound influence and found many followers had not survived for long. Neither Zoroastrianism, nor the religions of Manichaeus nor Mazdak could stand against Islam. In that environment there was a kind of readiness and thirst for destroying the existing order both socially and spiritually, and thus Islam entered Iran in an environment that was all set to accept the new faith. Those who attribute the rapid spread of Islam to the use of the sword are not sufficiently familiar with the history of that period. The fact of the matter is as the historians write: In most cases before the soldiers of Islam reached the cities which they had conquered, the populace would throw open the gates for them from within and welcomed them. What is certain is that Iran had fallen into a state of deterioration in all respects whether political social or religious at the time of the rise of Islam.
2) Questions and Answers
Question: You said in your discourse that in t he present world environment there are no societies based on classes, but classes exist in a modified form.
Answer: Not in that form. In the class system certain people are explicitly told that they have not the right to even think of entering a class of an upper status. The hardest and ugliest obstacles that could be imagined exist in such systems which to put limitations on the thinking of a group. It is true that indirect pressure has considerable effect, but the very existence of indirect pressure shows that the worth of those placed under pressure has gone up to some extent. If they tell you that you cannot directly and openly strike a person, it means that the said person's personality has grown in relation to you so that you cannot directly strike him. Of course even today there exist indirect restrictions in the world, though term, class could not be applied to them; they might be called communities. Communities under indirect pressure do exist although these could not be compared with their previous form. You could never think of what a class society actually meant.
Unfortunately among the aristocrats in Iran, sometimes you would see the son of a farmer or villager who, despite his education and worth, is not given the chance to raise his status, simply because of his lineage. This is a vestige of those old class divisions which is a system based on man's inherent selfishness. Therefore you can never uproot it fully, even though it's effect might diminish. Now can you imagine if such a system found legal support, how comical it would be. The existence of such a law which would prevent a farmer or tradesman from rising up to the class of warriors and that he would be punished even for entertaining such a thought, would seem ridiculous and incredible to us. They say that in India there still exists a class system. I cannot bring myself to believe it until I saw it for myself. For us, Muslims such a situation is unthinkable; for, since our birth and growing up we have been accustomed to the concept of Islamic brotherhood and equality. But there is no doubt that there exist groups that always seek to preserve their interests in one way or another.
Question: How did the holy Prophet write his letters? The Qur'an says that he was unlettered and untaught. Did he remain like that till the end?
Answer: The letters were not in the holy Prophet' s own handwriting; they were written by his scribes. According to historical sources the Prophet was able to write during the last years of his life, therefore those letters which were written in the sixth year of his migration, namely three or four years before his demise, are said to have been written in his own handwriting. But we cannot claim that all of them were written by him, since we know whose handwriting they been. Maybe the writers of the other letters would be also discovered.[48]
Question: W ere China and India. protectorates or independent at the time of the rise of Islam? Has there been a mention of dispatch of letters to these lands by the prophet?
Answer: China and India were independent, and the holy prophet sent no letters there. According to some historical sources, the Prophet in the last days of his life sent, not a political but a religious delegation whose members were also merchants. These men entered Tibet after the Prophet's demise in the time of Abu Bakr and began to deal in commodities. This is mentioned occasionally in notes and obscure sources of history, and need much hard work. Of course India and China have both passed through tempestuous times, and their governments were not local like those of Iran and Rome except in China for short periods. But I cannot be sure that this has been the case in the time of the Prophet. However, it may be said that even if they resembled Iran and Rome in having a well-established government, the holy Prophet would most likely not have written to them. He was concerned first with Mecca and then with Medina, and it took him six years to establish order in these two places. Therefore the idea of writing letters to China or India would not appear likely, since as a Prophet who claimed to have power, he had to dominate his near regions first, though a remark is attributed to him saying: "Seek knowledge even if it is found in China."
Attention to the entire civilised world of that time is obvious in the teachings of Islam but not in the form of writing letters, since firstly it is not clear whether a central government had existed there at that time, and secondly, even if such a government did exist, it would not have been of much use for the Prophet to take such a step before bringing his surrounding regions under central. On the whole, the time of writing letters is related to the years when Egypt, Abyssinia, Rome and Iran became the political neighbours of Islam, and it was then that the Prophet wrote to them and to several other smaller rulers in Yemen, Ghassan and Hira which were dependencies.
Question: How were the original inscriptions of Iran deciphered?
Answer: Three European scholars who were Orientalists worked jointly and completed each other's tasks.[49] This is how they proceeded: the first orientalist who was not familiar with the topic of the inscription, succeeded in reading only the proper nouns by means of distinguishing the signs, such as the word 'Darius' and 'Pars' and gradually some letters such as P, A, R, S, I, D, V were deciphered. What was fortunate was that in these inscriptions the Greek and Babylonian translations occurred side by side, thereby providing three texts and this made deciphering much easier than if there had been no translation accompanying the inscription. Thus the expert was able, with the aid of those translation, to read the proper names since they have a similar sound in both languages, and then gradually decipher the letters. One of these scholars spent much of his life collecting this information. Then after the stage of proper names, the subsequent stages were not so difficult, and the next two scholars completed the task. About three experts devoted their whole lifetime in extracting the meaning and finally translating the texts.