Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Pearls and Corals

Treatise on the Condition of Sincerity (Al-Ikhlas) Required by Religious Speakers

By: Mirza Husayn Nuri

Translated by: Syed Ali Imran

Table of Contents

FOREWORD. 3

ABOUT THE TRANSLATION. 7

INTRODUCTION. 9

SINCERITY. 13

RECITING IS A FORM OF WORSHIP. 15

OSTENTATION IN RECITATION. 16

WAYS TO ATTAIN WAGES THROUGH RECITING. 20

IS OSTENTATION IN WORSHIP PERMISSIBLE? 30

THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF TELLING LIES AND FABRICATING TALE WHEN RECITING  34

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZERS AND MOURNERS TOWARDS THE RECITERS  36

Notes 41

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST GRACIOUS, THE MOST MERCIFUL

FOREWORD

The Shi'i communities in the Western world face numerous challenges, often times strikingly inconsistent with those faced by Shi'i Muslim communities of the East. Aggression against religious philosophies, ideologies, traditions and rituals is carried out in order to belittle them, but are more often than not, presented under the guise of intellectual discourse. These attacks are generally geared to create questions and doubts, and to leave one with a strong desire for answers. Given that the masses of all religious communities are imitators - more or less - in religion, they are therefore highly dependent on the opinions of their religious authorities. Thus, the masses look towards them as a source of guidance and turn to them for answers to their doubts and queries. However, some of these individuals may not always be able to get satisfactory answers to their questions. This may be due to an inability to research the question properly, or at times it is because the expertise of a scholar may be in an area other than that of the question.

Subsequently, in recent years particularly, this quest for seeking answers and explanations has created a popular trend amongst the Shi'i Muslim communities of the West, where individuals who are not scholars in the truest sense of the word, take it upon themselves to address these issues and answer such questions from an authoritative position. Although this trend may be seen as positive by some, many indicators signify that it is truly dangerous and the communities need to be cautious of it.

We have seen in the last decade or two, the growing rise of non-scholarly speakers comfortably sitting on pulpits in order to deliver sermons, presentations and address question and answer sessions for live audiences. These - typically young - speakers generally commence on a very limited scale, perhaps at their local mosque or religious schools. Nonetheless, as they begin to gain popularity, it is not uncommon to begin seeing them recite complete sets of lecture series in the months of Muḥarram, Ramadhān or other seasons. They begin receiving invitations to different religious institutions, different cities and even different countries. What is seen on the opposite end are masses of young men and women, youth in particular, mesmerized by these speakers and we often witness alongside it a complete devaluation of knowledge. More often than not, what becomes associated with these speakers is a celebrity-like status, and many times a cult develops around them. Symptoms of narcissism begin to show themselves on social media and mistakes or incorrect conclusions made by these speakers get over shadowed by the justification done for them by the hordes of their fans.

The issue is definitely a tough one to tackle, not only because there is the issue of these speakers per say, but also because many times the initial gap between the community and true-scholars indeed does exist. Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to obtain a religious legal justification to prevent a person from merely speaking or delivering a lecture in and of itself. Arguments can be made supporting this permissibility by the communities themselves, based on different variables, such as lack of scholars in a given area, the crowd-pulling factor that a certain speaker brings, which speaker is admired and liked by the audience, and so on. Thus, this issue needs to be seen more in light of ethical jurisprudence and in terms of what knowledge truly is meant to be and who it should be attained from.

The response that is generally provided is a simple and straightforward one. A religious speaker, or a speaker who wishes to deliver religious knowledge, should generally be someone who has studied in an Islamic seminary, be it in Qom, Najaf or elsewhere. They should be someone who would generally have a thorough understanding of religious matters - at least in one or two subjects within it, while understanding the depths that exists in other streams. Like with every field, there are institutions where individuals go and study and subsequently become experts in a specific subject. These institutions are where an individual spends a decent number of years studying the intricate details pertaining to that subject and then after meeting certain criteria is considered reliable enough to be able to comment as an authority.

Which circle of academia would take an individual, who has barely studied a little science or engineering, albeit it be through some of the very same books that the experts have used to study from, to come and lecture on that subject at an academic conference without having any verifiable and credible credentials? Which conscious audience would generally pay any heed to the opinions of such a person? The practice is extremely rare and reserved for perhaps a few gems that can be found in any given industry and many times they are linked to a higher authority from whom they get this sense of acceptance amongst an audience. Perhaps an argument can be made that this individual may simply be providing a summary of their readings of different views on a given matter and is thus not stating their own views, rather quoting experts. The slight difference there would be that a person is in reality not presenting his or her own opinions on a subject matter nor behaving as an authority. Regardless, the common practice is that one would need to have some verifiable credibility to convince an audience that they are reliable enough in their research and analysis to be able to give a presentation.

In a narration pertaining to a verse of the Holy Qur'ān, Zayd al-Shaḥḥām asks Imam Bāqir (as) about the words "his food" in the Qur'ānic verse: Then let mankind look at his food (80:24). The Imam (as) responds to him saying: It is his knowledge which he takes, and he should look into who he is taking it from.1

If one travels on a lengthy road trip and is informed that all the restaurants that come on the way have a real risk of giving the person a disease, would this person rather hold his hunger for a few hours or risk attaining that disease? It seems obvious that a sane person would not risk it when it is possible to control their hunger, though they may have to struggle and wait an extra few hours to fulfill their desire for food.

If the same parable can be made with certain speakers, who are not qualified or trained in the proper institutions, neither are they connected to a higher authority, and it is realized that there is a valid and serious risk in them causing harm or damage to the souls of the audience members, why then would the audience not avoid them or at the very least be cautious of what they have to say? Why then do our communities so easily permit individuals who have close to no scholarly credibility, occupy the pulpits and allow their tongues mesmerize the often young and naive audience when it comes to religious knowledge? This is not to say that all scholars who have studied formally are infallible in their speech, or are even capable of delivering a decent lecture at all - however that is a topic on its own and it is something that needs to be re-evaluated; i.e. how important is lecturing and propagating (tablīgh) as it is commonly practiced today, opposed to building communities based on formal teaching and learning practices (tadrīs), and what role does mere lecturing itself play in the development and progress of a community. What is important here is a connection - whether physical or spiritual - that a scholar has or should have with a higher body of knowledge. This itself requires spiritual cleansing and elimination of self-conceit and worship of one's ego.

A second issue is that while a speaker or even a scholar may be very well versed in Islamic subjects, their persona does not represent that of a man of piety, or of those who are generally considered to be Islamic scholars. When one wants their words to hold any weight, one of the conditions for it to be effective is summarized by the notion of: practice what you preach. This notion has been referred to in the narrations as well, and it will be referred to in the translation of the book that follows.

When a speaker develops into a celebrity, and their conduct does not align with what the religious teachings consider to be acts of piety, humbleness, modesty etc., then there is severe danger to the audience. They, and society at large can - or rather will - suffer from negative effects that can last for an eternity. The masses unfortunately, more often than not will be aloof to this even while partaking in the celebrity-cult, and only an outsider would generally be able to witness it.

One purpose of Islamic lecturing and lecturers, especially those who stay within their communities, is to not only be a mere orator, but a spiritual guide. They should be someone who the rest can look up to and learn the value of religion through seeing them practice it to the best of their abilities. This cannot be done unless the person is sincere in its most complete sense. Going out of their way to promote themselves, turning religious lecturing into pure business deals, not practicing what they preach, etc., are examples of scenarios that do not represent sincerity in anyway whatsoever.

Sincerity is one of the most primary conditions of a religious speaker and the instantiations of sincerity are determined, and often clearly defined, by the Qur'ān, and the traditions of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and his progeny (as). Furthermore, an educated and well versed community understands that certain actions and certain types of behaviour or a persona undermines the intention and sincerity of an individual and brings it under doubt.

The discussion on this subject can definitely be further opened up and various aspects and scenarios can be evaluated independently. However, the general overall trend is nevertheless something that should not be encouraged or promoted. With these recent conditions of our societies, I wished to partially translate this gem of a book titled, Lu'lu wa Marjān by Muḥaddith Mirza Ḥusayn Nūri (d. 1902), for both those who speak (scholars and non-scholars) and for those who attend the gatherings where scholars or non-scholars are lecturing.

Syed Ali Imran Qum, Iran

April 9th, 2015 / 19th Jamādi al-Thāni, 1436

ABOUT THE TRANSLATION

The present book is a partial translation of the book Lu'lu wa Marjān (lit. Pearls and Corals) written by Muḥaddith Mirza Ḥusayn Nūri (d. 1902), covering the introduction and the first chapter that deals with sincerity. The original Farsi book used in this translation was published by Bani Zahra Publications. The published book itself was a rephrased version, slightly revised and modified from the original by Jabir Riḍwāni due to the original book making use of vocabulary that even native Iranians were struggling to understand.

The book not only explicitly deals with the phenomenon of non-scholars reciting, preaching and orating from two distinct perspectives, but scholars who do not abide by the moral conduct required of them are also clearly implied. The first section of the original book deals with sincerity, and the second section deals with truthfulness.

Martyr Murtaḍa Muṭahhari praises the book and says this specifically about the second section that deals with honesty and truthfulness:

The second requirement is honesty and truthfulness. Here, he (Muḥaddith Nūri) elaborates on the topic of false and true narration, discussing various forms of lying in such a thorough-going manner that I do not think there is any other book which deals with lying and its various form in the way that it does, and perhaps there is no such other book in the whole world. In it he exhibits a marvelous learning and scholarship.2

I chose to only translate the introduction and the first section on sincerity as that is what I felt was directly relevant to the phenomenon the Western Muslim communities are facing today - particularly where English is used as a medium of preaching.

This is not to say that honesty is not as important, however the author of the book was concerned primarily with falsehood being spread on the pulpits that relate to the tragedy of Karbala. Within the communities where English is the medium of lecturing, I have not yet found this to be a serious issue, as it may be in communities where more traditional languages such as Urdu, Arabic or Farsi are employed to relay the tragedy of Karbala.

Furthermore, I believe the book 'Ashūrā - Misrepresentations and Distortions, which is based on the lectures of Martyr Muṭahhari suffices in terms of presenting a brief summary of what Muḥaddith Nūri discusses in the second part of his book. Anyone interested in getting an overall understanding of what Muḥaddith Nūri covers and brings to attention in the second part of his book, can refer to the book of Martyr Muṭahhari.

This is reiterated by the Martyr himself:

In this book, that great man mentions several examples of falsehoods that have become prevalent in narratives of the historic event of Karbala. Those which I will mention are all or mostly the same things that the Marḥūm Hāji Nūri has lamented about.3

The book of Muḥaddith Nūri was one of the last books he wrote - perhaps during the late 19th/early 20th century - and therefore the reader should be vary of this while reading the translation. Few of the stories that the author quotes may sound odd, or the vocabulary that has been used - such as the usage of dirhams and dinars - are not commonly used in Western societies. However it is important to understand the time, environment, geography and culture that these events took place and when the book was written. Ultimately, what is important is the message and principles being presented to the reader by the author which hold true for all times and places.

As far as the translation itself is concerned, I have not limited myself to translating every sentence as literally as possible, rather I have paid more attention with regards to remaining true to the meaning of the text itself.

INTRODUCTION

Making the believers cry and mourn over the calamities that befell Imam Ḥusayn (as) and the rest of the members of the Holy Household (as), by reciting eulogies, narrating their hardships and carrying out other relevant acts that have not been prohibited by the religious canonical law (shari'ah), is a form of worship. It is a worship that has not only been praised, but rewards and remuneration have also been ordained for it. It has been narrated in the book Kāmil al-Ziyarāt that Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) said to 'Abdullah ibn Ḥammad Baṣri:

“I have heard that in the middle of the month of Sha'bān, some people from the suburbs of Kufa – and other cities – go to him (meaning al-Ḥusayn) and their ladies lament over him, the reciters recite poems about him, the speakers narrate his story, the lamenters lament over him and the poets recite eulogies about him.” I ('Abdullah) replied, “Yes, may I be sacrificed upon you! I have seen some of that which you described.” The Imam said: "Praise be to Allah, who appointed some people to benefit from us, extol us and recite eulogies about us. And (praise be to Allah) who has made some of our enemies slander our Shi'a for their nearness to us while other enemies insult them and condemn their actions." 4

In 'Uyūn al-Akhbār of Sheikh al-Ṣadūq, it has been narrated from Imam al-Riḍa (as) who said to Ḥasan ibn 'Ali ibn Faḍḍhāl:

"Whoever remembered our tragedy and cried and made others cry, his eyes will not shed tears on the day all eyes will be shedding tears." 5

In the books Kāmil al-Ziyarāt, Thawāb al-'Amāl and al-Amāli, it has been recorded that Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) said to Abu 'Umāra Munshid6 :

"Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes fifty people cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes forty people cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes thirty people cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes twenty people cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes ten people cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes one person cry, paradise is for him. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and weeps will be rewarded with paradise. Anyone who recites poetry about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and tries to weep, will be rewarded with paradise." 7

Furthermore, in Kāmil al-Ziyarāt, it has been recorded that Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) said to Abu Harūn Makfūf8 :

"O Abu Harūn! If one recites an elegy about Ḥusayn (as) and makes ten people weep, paradise is for him." Then the Imam kept decreasing the number of people one by one until he reached one person and then said: "If one recites an elegy about Imam Ḥusayn (as) and makes one person weep, paradise is for him." 9

In the same book10 and as well as in Thawāb al-'Amāl it has been recorded that Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) said to Abu Harūn:

"If one recites an elegy about Ḥusayn (as) and weeps and makes ten people weep, paradise is for them. If one recites an elegy on Imam Ḥusayn (as) and weeps and makes five people weep, paradise is for them. If one recites an elegy on Imam Ḥusayn (as) and weeps and makes one person weep, paradise is for them." 11

Also in the same book and in Thawāb al-'Amāl, Sheikh Ṣadūq has recorded that Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) said to Ṣāliḥ ibn 'Uqba:

"Whoever recites a verse of poetry about Ḥusayn (as) and weeps and makes ten people weep, paradise is for them. Whoever recites a verse of poetry about Ḥusayn (as) and weeps and makes nine people weep, paradise is for them." Then he reduced the numbers until he said: "Whoever recites a verse of poetry about Ḥusayn (as) and weeps - (and the narrator says that he thinks the Imam (as) said: or he makes a sad face) - paradise is for him." 12

Sayyid 'Ali ibn Tāūs in his book Lahūf, has said:

“It has been reported from the progeny of the Prophet (pbuh) that: "Whoever weeps over us and makes one-hundred people weep, paradise is for him. And whoever weeps over us and makes fifty people weep, paradise is for him. And whoever weeps and makes thirty people weep, paradise is for him. And whoever weeps and makes ten people weep, paradise is for him. And whoever weeps and makes one person weep, paradise is for him." 13

In Rijal al-Kashi, it has been recorded that after Ja'far ibn 'Affān had recited poetry regarding the calamities that befell Imam Ḥusayn (as) in the presence of Imam Ṣadiq (as) and had made him (as) cry, the Imam said:

"Allah (swt) has made paradise obligatory for you O Ja'far, with all that is within it and He (swt) has forgiven you." Then he (as) said: "O Ja'far, do you want me to say more for you?" He said: "Yes, my master." He (as) said: "There is no one who recites poetry for Ḥusayn (as) and cries and makes other cries through it, except that Allah (swt) makes heaven obligatory for him and forgives him." 14

The above narrations should suffice as a testimony to our claim that this act is indeed a worship. When all the narrations are combined, it can be understood that making others mourn by means of reciting poetry or through other means, is a way of getting closer to Allah (swt), seeking His (swt) forgiveness, attaining salvation on the Day of Judgement and achieving eternal pleasure in Heaven. This is a form of worship that existed during the time of the Imams (as) and continued on after them. Stories and anecdotes regarding it being performed are readily available in the books of narration and obituaries.

This group of believers (i.e. those who recite and make others mourn) was not known by any specific title, until the intelligent and inquisitive Mullah Ḥusayn Kashifi, who lived around the year 900 Ḥijri, compiled a book titled Rawḍa al-Shuhada. People began reciting from this book in religious gatherings with zeal, and since it was a very eloquent and difficult book, not everyone could develop the skills to recite from it. Instead, only a few talented individuals were able to recite from it in the mourning ceremonies. Thus, these individuals became famously known as Rawḍah-khwān, meaning those individuals who recited from the book Rawḍa al-Shuhada.

Thenceforth, they started to recite from other books and also off by memory, but the title of rawdah-khwān fixated itself upon them. Over the course of time, the work of this group of individuals increased, but their original purpose which was to make others cry, became subject to the addition of many different stories, anecdotes, poetries, exaggerated merits, detrimental sermons and other minor issues. Subsequently, the recitation of the elegies became such a special and stellar task that one of the scholars said as a joke: "In this day and age, rawḍah-khawāni has entered the field of sciences and has developed a specific know-how, and for its definition we can define it by saying:

It is a science that deals with discussing the incidents that occurred with the bodies of the martyrs and other matters that relate to them."

In regards to this skill of recitation, knowledgeable scholars and even those devoid of knowledge have compiled books and treatises with great order and prose which have been published in Arabic, Farsi, Turkish and Hindi. The Shi'a are selfless in spending from their wealth and helping out tirelessly in order to organize these gatherings of mourning, which are led by the reciters.15

These people, besides attaining the rewards of the Hereafter, have also witnessed innumerable blessings and bounties in their health, wealth and off-spring. So for this very reason, those who fall short in other cases of giving charity and financial spending - albeit it be obligatory - and even if they do give, it is not with the same zeal and desire, in this specific case (of organizing mourning ceremonies), they tend to help out with great zeal and love. They show great character and desire, and put their wealth and health on the line. But the service offered by the reciter, who is the pillar of this noble gathering, is greater and more honourable than the services of all those who helped organized this gathering. This is because the reciters, as has been highlighted in the narrations quoted previously, are included in a category of people who have been promised forgiveness and heaven. They are also considered to be within a group of those who help other believers in doing good, assist them in remaining righteous and in doing acts that are beneficial. They are a group in regards to whom Allah (swt) has said in His Noble Words تَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى الْبِرِّ وَالتقْوَ ى :16

Hence, according to the many relevant narrations, they will attain rewards alongside all the listeners, mourners and organizers. They will be considered participants in the gathering, and in fact will be counted amongst the special helpers and honourable servants of the Imam (as). Therefore they hold a great, respected and lofty position and status, and it is admissible that they feel honoured over other Shi'a.

Nevertheless, attaining this great rank and entering the group of those who have been aforementioned, is reliant upon certain conditions, of which two are of great importance. The non-existence of either one of them, will render one's struggle useless, their pain fruitless, and their hardship resultless. Their names will be removed from the register of those special ones, or sometimes they will not be added to it at all. Rather, by not meeting these two conditions, their names - God Forbid - will be added to the register of tradesmen, or in the register of liars, or in the register of those who commit treachery, inflict harm or are pagans. As a consequence, despite performing this beautiful act of worship, they will not receive the benefit of their servitude to Allah (swt) and of being service to the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (as).

Thus, every reciter who has decided to enter the ranks of these special ones and attain a lofty position, a status of greater degrees, endless rewards, and untainted honour - regarding which the reward has been ordained and the Imams (as) have given a promise for it - it is necessary that before becoming occupied in this work, they should fulfill these two conditions. After attaining them and while possessing them, one should measure themselves with confidence on the scale of justice, which

is in the capable hands of the steadfast scholars and the guardians of the clear canon law. This is so that the guile of Satan and the dangers of the ego - which are numerous - that makes falsehood appear as the truth, and robes errors with the cloth of righteousness, are unbuckled and one does not throw themselves into a great catastrophe.

These two conditions are sincerity and honesty. These two conditions are the two steps of the pulpit that one climbs up on, and if both or even one of them are not correct or without defect, one will fall face first and will be completely deprived of the blessings of reciting from the pulpit. The explanation of these two conditions will be covered within the next two chapters, God Willing.17

SINCERITY

The original goal and the overall purpose of the Messengers and the Holy Scriptures was to pull mankind towards Allah (swt). It was to show them clear signs and firm miracles in order to inform them that He (swt) is One, Wise, Able and Besought, the Creator, Sustainer, Protector, the One who takes and gives life to all, and that He (swt) has no partner in these affairs.

The Messengers and their vicegerents (as) through their clear words and sufficient proofs, clarified these Attributes of Allah (swt) for us. In order to bring mankind to a platform of belief, acknowledgment, and submission, and for mankind to act upon what they had been commanded to do, the Prophets themselves went through tribulations. They were verbally abused, experienced hardships, and sacrificed their lives and wealth for this noble cause. This was with the hope that people will recognize their Lord. Furthermore, it was with the hope that mankind would recognize themselves as being needy, incapable, and submissive servants and would not see or recognize anyone except Him (swt) as their Creator and Sustainer. It was with the hope that mankind would ask for their needs from Him (swt), fear calamities, and ask Him (swt) to remove them. If they disobeyed Him (swt), they would seek forgiveness from Him (swt) and renounce their disobedience.

For those who believed and showed conformity to the message of the Prophets, they were prescribed with rules on how to live and taught about ethics. Some of the actions that were prescribed, pertained to the heart and others to the limbs. Through these acts, people could express their servitude and admit their inabilities, constraints and neediness. They could ask Allah (swt) for their needs and give Him (swt) the right of His (swt) Divinity. In Islamic lexicon, these prescribed actions are referred to as worship ( عبادة ), which means to honour religious rites and display servitude. This worship will not reach the precipice of perfection and will not be considered correct unless and until the worshipper recognizes himself to be a servant and under the thraldom of Allah (swt).

Many times, people worship and are content with that which Allah (swt) has allotted for them, but they have not understood the true meaning of servitude and do not consider themselves to be true servants. Due to this, they disobey their Lord and do not abstain from committing sins. At times, it is the opposite. They recognize themselves to be servants, but are negligent in their worship. The details

of this subject have been covered in books that describe the differences between the terms worshipper (عابد ), slave (عبد ), worship (عبادة ) and servitude (عبودية ).

In both cases (of worship and servitude), worshippers must not attribute partners to Allah (swt). This means that they should not worship anything besides Allah (swt). They should not consider themselves as a servant of anyone else, nor take anyone else as their Lord, nor recognize anyone else as their master. Furthermore, in both stages they must be attentive and focused, like they should be during the recitation of the holy verse, You alone we worship.18 The implications of the verse must be steady and firm in their hearts, and their actions should be in accordance with what is in their hearts, otherwise they will be guilty of uttering a lie. Thus, if anyone idolizes a creation to a degree that this creation becomes the cause and motivation of their worship, and the creation receives a place in the heart of the worshipper, or the worshipper receives wealth from this idolized creation for their act of worship, this worshipper has indeed taken a partner for Allah (swt) and therefore has entered into one of the categories of the polytheists.

This subject has been clearly articulated in our books and traditions, and a sane and clean intellect also testifies to its validity. In fact, after contemplation, it becomes apparent that the permissibility of carrying out such an act and considering it lawful is irrational, because it is incompatible with the original purpose of the Messengers, Prophets and Books that were sent down. Such acts are not carried out by a wise individual. For the sake of argument, even if we consider it to be permissible, it is not rational to say that such an act warrants any reward or that the doer is somehow deserving of any reward.

RECITING IS A FORM OF WORSHIP

After our introduction, we affirm that making the Shi'a and the believers mourn upon the tribulations of the Family of the Prophet (as) is a worship just like crying itself. This fact is not hidden from the sight of any intellectual. It is a worship that has been emphasized and is so desirable that we have been commanded and encouraged to perform it, and rewards have been set aside for it. Thus, all those who have reached the age of responsibility, are to take part in this worship to the best of their abilities and talents. After performing this act of worship, they are deserving of the rewards allocated for it. The worship of recitation is just like mourning upon the calamities that befell the Family of the Prophet (as), which is in itself one of the greatest acts of worship and something that essentially all are responsible for.

Both these acts (crying and making others cry) are from the same category of worship and originate from the same root. The difference is only such that crying is possible for everyone, but being able to make others cry is not practical for everyone and requires effort and hard work. Therefore, this group of individuals who are recognized as the reciters - who put in effort and endure hardships - raise the flag of this noble tradition high and spend their lives performing this great act of worship.

Of course, however, they must know and should understand that this worship is exactly like other worships. This act will only be considered worship if it is carried out solely for the sake of Allah (swt) and out of love for the Prophet (pbuh) and the Imams (as). One should not have any other purpose or goal while carrying out this worship. If one were to have any other purpose, it should only be to attain the reward that has been promised for this worship, and to remain protected from sins. This still requires one to be sincere and in principle, still requires one to carry out the act for the sake of Allah (swt). It is only through this intention that the rewards ordained for the worship will reach the reciters and only then will they remain safeguarded from sins.

This is like the first step of the pulpit. Meaning, when one places their first step on the pulpit, they must forget everyone except Allah (swt) and His rightful vicegerents (as). He must not look towards winning the heart of anyone, or seek to earn wealth when he climbs the pulpit to recite the tragic narratives and to make the audience cry.

If - God forbid - Satan is able to make the feet of the reciter tremble on the first step of the pulpit and his desires pull him towards this polluted world, and he climbs the pulpit, speaks and recites for the purpose of earning wealth, or to ensure that people around different cities are aware of his talent and excellence so that he becomes the subject of discussions, he has in fact thrown himself in a huge pit of doom, out of which there is no hope of salvation. Some of these issues will now be addressed.

OSTENTATION IN RECITATION

Firstly: Due to this corrupt reason, one prevents themselves from receiving any grace or reward which has been promised for this group of individuals. For the sake of attaining a little bit from this rotten corpse of a world, one resorts to showing-off and ostentation and subsequently deprives themselves of the flawless and eternal blessings of the Hereafter. This is because one of the clearest messages of the religion is that a reward is given for a worship which is done out of servitude. Worship without sincerity is not even considered worship, rather it is considered a concealed form of polytheism.

Sheikh Kulayni has recorded a tradition from Imam al-Ṣadiq (as) as follow:

"He who acquires knowledge of the traditions to earn worldly gains will have no share of rewards in the Hereafter, and he who acquires this knowledge for the betterment of his Hereafter will be sanctioned by Allah the good of this life and the Hereafter." 19

The jurist Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī in his book Sarā'ir, has recorded from the book of Abu al-Qāsim Ja'far ibn Quluwayh that Abu Dharr (ra) stated:

"Whoever acquires knowledge from the knowledge of the Hereafter while wanting to achieve a worldly purpose, will not be able to smell the scent of paradise."20

In the book 'Awāli al-La'āli, it has been recorded that Imam 'Ali (as) heard from the Prophet (pbuh) the following:

"Whoever attains knowledge from those who possess it and acts upon it, will find salvation, and whoever desires the world from it, will receive what he had intended." 21

Sulaym bin Qays al-Ḥilāli, a companion of Imam 'Ali (as) has recorded many narrations from the Imam (as) on this subject in his book, such as:

"And whoever desires the world from it, will perish and receive what he had intended." 22

Apart from not attaining anything in the Hereafter, this narration suggests that such a person will also perish, because he spread knowledge while intending to attain the world. The explanation of this point will come later and there are plenty of other narrations on this subject.

Secondly: The person will enter the rank of those who take the progeny of the Prophet as a financial source for their income and use them (as) to gain wealth and take care of their livelihood.

Sheikh Kulayni has recorded a tradition in al-Kāfi from Imam al-Bāqir (as) who writes in one of his wills to Abu Nu'mān:

"And do not earn a living from people through us, for it will increase you in poverty." 23

The poverty meant in this narration is attributed to both this world and the Hereafter, as it will become clear in a narration of Mufaḍḍal later on.

Sheikh Mufīd brings this narration in his al-Amāli as follows:

"O Abu Nu'mān, do not devour people's wealth by using our name, for that will increasing nothing but poverty." 24

Sheikh Kashi in his Rijal work narrates a tradition on the authority of Qasim ibn 'Awf who says that Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn (as) said25 : و إياك أن تستأكل بنا فيزيدك الله فقرا

And its content is similar to the aforementioned narration.

Sheikh Ḥasan bin 'Ali bin Shu'ba in his book Tuḥaf al-'Uqūl records a tradition where Mufaḍḍal bin 'Umar advises his own companions and says:

"Do not take the family of Mohammed (as) as means by which you collect earnings. I heard Abu 'Abdillah (as) saying: 'People have taken three different courses in following us. Some people have followed us and expected our relief for the purpose that they may obtain worldly pleasures. They have declared their adherence to us and repeated our words, but they have omitted abiding by our deeds. God will take them to Hell in hoards. Some people declared their adherence to us, listened to our words, and showed no negligence in carrying out our orders, all for the purpose of gaining the (worldly) donations of people. God will fill their bellies with fire and will impose upon them starvation and thirst. Some people have declared their adherence to us, retained our wording, carried out our instructions, and have not dissented from our deeds. Those are from us and we are from them.'" 26

The deceased Akhund Mullah Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Mazandarāni and others have explained the narrations that Sheikh Kulayni has brought forth in the chapter of Those Who Use Their Knowledge for Personal Fulfillment. They have said that these narrations are referring to someone who uses knowledge as a tool to eat the wealth of people and makes it a source for his livelihood.

The flames of this second category of individuals have indeed engulfed many knowledgeable people. The most clear example of this is that group of speakers and reciters whose real purpose of learning this skill and that which relates to it, such as learning the meritorious or sorrowful narrations, learning how to lecture and give sermons, and in fact even learning religious terms for matters where their usage is necessary, is solely for the sake of business and attaining wealth. This is done without any hesitation, dissimulation or concealment. Instead, they do transactions just like businessmen. They discuss the prices being too high or too low, and in order to get permission to recite at a gathering, they write letters citing their availability and send a middle-man who can find them a place to recite at. If they receive an amount which is less than what they had expected after reciting at the gathering - with or without permission - they get angry and speak badly about the organizer of the gathering. They shame the organizer and treat him ignominiously. In fact some ill-natured reciters start questioning them from the top of the pulpits, looking for a sponsor and make deals over what they have recited.

One of the absurd and laughable things is that despite these business-like transactions, and exchanging of the Hereafter for this world, this person sits on top of the pulpits in the gatherings, feels proud, and considers himself a special servant of Imam Ḥusayn (as). He considers himself deserving greater rights than others and considers himself more worthy of deserving respect, generosity and glorification. This is why at times, you will see them saying statements like: "My master Imam Ḥusayn (as) did this, said this and did this for you."

This poor and self-blinded person is heedless of the fact that there is no relationship between him and Imam Ḥusayn (as). The distance between him and Imam Ḥusayn (as) is greater than the distance between the earth and the sky. His status is even lower than the lowest rank of workers in society, such as the porter or a vegetable seller. His name is registered in the books of businessmen and just like them, this reciter must also look at his income at the end of the year and pay Khums on the relevant amount as religious law dictates. Despite paying the Khums to those who are entitled to it, his status will remain worse than the rest of the businessmen. This is because permissible income by itself is not from the category of worship and thus its correctness is not conditional upon sincerity and intention of seeking proximity to Allah (swt). Therefore, if the income happens to be attained while devoid of any prohibited act and the work itself also has no prohibition on it in the religious law, one has merely done a neutral act and they would have no sin upon them. If a person works with the intention of making money so that he is able to visit the graves of the Imams (as), or to help the cause of the Progeny of the Prophet (pbuh), scholars and the poor, or to make the living conditions of his family better, or other similar acts which have been recommended in Islam, he will then be deserving of a reward.

However, reciting is like the work of students pursuing religious studies, which is considered a worship and is to be done with an intention of seeking proximity to Allah (swt). This task wavers between two things; if it is done with sincerity and the correct intention it will be greatly beneficial, but if it is done solely with the intention of attaining wealth and this world, it will result in a great loss. This is because this valuable act has been ordained for us to attain the Hereafter, to attain the Satisfaction of Allah (swt) and to attain the blessings of paradise. The purpose of this worship is not to attain the sporadic pleasures of this lowly world and the little perishable wealth.

After mentioning these points, it is clear that merely reciting the merits, virtues, stories and hardships of Imam Ḥusayn (as) does not make anyone his servant. Otherwise anyone who prints and publishes a book containing his merits and the story of his martyrdom with the intention of making money, and in fact even those who carry the book from one city to another for the purpose of earning money and anyone who delivers the book to someone's house for the sake of a few dirhams, will all be considered servants of Imam Ḥusayn (as).

Rather, a reciter will be considered in the ranks of the servants of Imam Ḥusayn (as) when that which he utters is only for the sake of Allah (swt) and for fulfilling the rights of His (swt) legates (as). Otherwise he will be like any other businessman, who considers the merits and calamities as an investment and busies himself in business with them. He would not have a right over anyone and would not have done anyone a favour, and neither will his actions be in accordance with the instructions of the Ahl al-Bayt (as). So how can such an individual consider himself a servant of theirs? How can such an individual consider himself worthy of such an honour?

Therefore, a pious and honest reciter should determine the validity of such a transaction and of that which he receives in exchange for what he recites. Instead of blindly following himself or looking for justifications from other reciters and lecturers like him, he should ask the jurists, so that he has a valid justification for his actions.

4. The Internalist Explanation of the Creative Aspect of Language Use

I argue below that the Chomskyan internalist approach to linguistic science avoids the pitfalls of externalist theories of language and thus provides a promising candidate for an explanatory and fecund linguistic science.

The subject matter of generative linguistics is taken to be linguistic competence, the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of their language, as opposed to linguistic performance, which is the actual use of this knowledge in language production and comprehension. This distinction forms the foundation of generative linguistics and Chomskyan internalism. The actual use of the knowledge of one’s language involves many other factors and phenomena, only one of which is one’s competence. It is only under strict idealisation conditions that performance might be seen as reflecting competence, and the actual causal sequence that brings about a speech act is not directly related to competence.

Another distinction is that between I-language and E-language (Chomsky, 1986). Externalised (E-) language refers to actual speech events, with some account of their context of use. From the E-language point of view, then, a grammar is a collection of statements that describe linguistic performance. Moreover, on this account there need not be one “real” or “correct” grammar that corresponds to the corpus data: as long as it yields a correct description of the corpus data, any number of grammars could in principle apply[12] . David Lewis, for example, says that he can find no way to “make objective sense of the assertion that a grammar G is used by population P whereas another grammar G` which generates the same language as G, is not” (1975, p. 177). Lewis believes that a language is an abstract, formal system that a population selects by convention (cf. Lewis, 1969). Similarly, Dretske (1997) claims that “everything we in fact call a language, at least a natural language, is the product of social factors” (p. 289). Another manifestation of E-language can be seen in Devitt & Sterelny (1989), who argue that rather than being about competence, linguistics is about the properties and relations of observable, external, linguistic symbols (cf. Devitt, 2006).

According to the E-language conception, then, language is, as it were, “out there”, it is not intimately related to the mind. A case in point is Deacon (1997), who is critical of the Chomskyan approach to studying language acquisition, and says:

They [Chomskyans] assert that the source for prior support for language acquisition must originate from inside the brain, on the unstated assumption that there is no other possible source. But there is another alternative: that the extra support for language learning is vested neither in the brain of the child nor in the brains of parents or teachers, but outside brains, in language itself. (p. 105, emphasis in original, my emphasis) [13]

On the internalised (I-) language perspective, however, language is conceived as being intimately related with the mind in that there is some structure in the mind of the speaker/hearer that is responsible for their language. So, unlike the Elanguage conception of grammar, the grammar qua I-language is a theory of a real mental structure to which “questions of truth and falsity arise […] as they do for any scientific theory” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 22). An I-language is a generative procedure in the mind of a speaker/hearer that creates a structural description that combines phonetic, semantic, and structural properties.

The Chomskyan internalist claim is that the proper subject matter of a scientific linguistics should be the knowledge a speaker/hearer has of their language, the knowledge (a structure in the mind/brain) that underlies and makes possible, along with other factors, the speaker/hearer’s language production and comprehension.

4.1. Semantics and Chomskyan Internalism

In the Chomskyan internalist approach to semantics, the language faculty derives an expression Exp by assembling features from the array of lexical items and mapping them to the Phon and Sem representations (i.e., Exp = <Phon, Sem>). The semantic features of an expression (Sem) are mental instructions that interface with, and thus give information to, the conceptual-intentional systems. Sem is the interface between the language faculty and the systems of thought. This approach mirrors the approach to phonology in which phonetic features of an expression (Phon) are mental instructions that interface with, and thus give information to, the sensorimotor systems. The arrays of semantic features that are part of Sem are, as many have repeatedly noted, much more complex and difficult to investigate than the phonological representations. Nevertheless, valuable and fruitful progress has been made in regard to semantic features.

Pietroski (2006) compares linguistic meanings in Chomskyan internalism to blueprints, which are produced by the language faculty for constructing concepts from lexicalised elements. At a higher level is the I-language, which is a biologically-instantiated procedure that pairs phonological instructions with semantic instructions; other systems then execute these instructions. Sems are thus not to be thought of as concepts, for construing them as concepts “may be a category mistake, like evaluating an instruction to fetch a rabbit as male or female” (Pietroski, 2010, p. 252, emphasis in original). In other words, what we have are instructions to build concepts, which provide the inputs to other systems that enter into various human actions, one of which is communication. Chomskyan internalist semantics, then, concerns the nature of the instructions given by the language faculty to the systems of thought; it concerns not the concepts themselves but the instructions to fetch, build, and combine concepts. In other words, it concerns the mechanisms of concept creation (cf. Pietroski, 2008).

This is of course one step removed from what externalist semantics studies, which is the concepts themselves, their role in language use, their relation to the speaker’s environment, and their truth values. As Pietroski remarks, the work of a Chomskyan internalist “will take the form of saying how meaningful Iexpressions can be used to build concepts that are inputs to a more complex process of building concepts that we can use to make truth-evaluable judgements” (2010, p. 272, emphasis in original).

Externalist theories that include within their scope the relation of, say, concepts to the world, run into overwhelming problems, some of which I discussed above. Whereas Chomskyan internalist theories study the mechanisms in virtue of which concept construction and language use is made possible: these are expressions produced by an internal linguistic engine whose components have no direct relation to the outside world. The Sem features are used to construct concepts that are then used by other systems to make truth-evaluable assertions, or communicate an idea, or any number of uses to which language can be put.

The current abstract form of the Sem features will of course be refined until the theoretical vocabulary of a serious science of meaning emerges. But they are a good starting point, for they help recast the notion of linguistic meaning into a form that is susceptible to scientific investigation. The instructions at the Sem interface that are interpreted by the performance systems are used in the act of talking and thinking about the world. And so, on this view of meaning, the instructions to create concepts play the role of “focus[ing] attention on selected aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, and provide intricate and highly specialised perspectives from which to view them, crucially involving human interests and concerns even in the simplest cases” (Chomsky, 2000, p. 125).

In summary, then, Chomskyan internalism postulates a mind/braininternal generative procedure (an I-language) that generates expressions of the form Exp = <Phon, Sem>. This expression (via the Phon and Sem interfaces) is then used by systems outside of the language faculty (but internal to the mind/brain) in language production and comprehension. Chomskyan internalism argues that what is relevant to and tractable by a scientific theory of language is the mechanisms operating within the mind/brain, thus avoiding the problematic aspects of externalist theories discussed above. This of course does not mean that the mind is completely detached from the outside environment (it’s not), nor does it mean that one must individuate meanings by making use of only individualistic or organism-internal vocabulary (for there is the distinction between the computational theory itself and its interpretation by the theorist). Rather, the upshot of Chomskyan internalism is that whatever connection the mind has with the outside world, that connection is unlikely to be within the scope of a scientific theory of language.

5. Concluding Remarks

The argument against externalist theories of language qua scientific theories that appeals to the creative aspect of language use is as follows: since language use allows for an unbounded expression of thought and is independent from direct stimulus control but at the same time it is appropriate to new situations and is coherent in new contexts, an externalist scientific theory of language use is not viable. People can produce and comprehend an infinite number of novel utterances, and it is problematic at best to try to account for their linguistic behaviour directly: no scientifically interesting lawful correlations or predictions of potential linguistic behaviour will be found.

This of course does not mean that the mechanisms that make language use possible cannot be studied, but it does mean that the creative aspect of language use will perhaps remain, as Chomsky puts it, not merely a problem but a mystery[14] . One possibility of dispelling the mystery, still as remote today to pursue seriously as it was when Descartes suggested it, is to postulate a “thinking substance”, a new aspect of mind. As Bracken (1970a) explains, the Cartesians saw no way of extending their physical explanations to cover mental phenomena, and so it was suggested that a new principle, the “creative” principle, must be added to the vocabulary of science. This is on the analogy of the postulation of the then new principle of gravity: the occult qualities of gravity were methodologically objectionable to both the Cartesians and to Newton but they accepted it “largely because the powerful mathematical model Newtown employed carried against all a priori objections” (Ibid., p. 237).

The explanatory success of theories of mind is of course far smaller than that of Newtown’s theory of gravity, but it is worth remembering that even Newton regarded the postulation of gravity as “inconceivable” and “so great an absurdity that […] no man who has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it”[15] . But scientists were eventually forced to accept it due to its mathematical and explanatory power, for gravity gave an account of the essence of matter. The Cartesians, especially as their ideas developed with the Port-Royal tradition, attempted to do the same to the mind. That is, “in grammar we can derive an account of the essence of mind parallel to the account which geometry gives us of the essence of matter” (Bracken, 1983, p. 22). The Cartesians had no model by which to explain the essence of mind that was equivalent to Newton’s postulation of gravity as the essence of matter, and that is what the Port-Royal tradition attempted to provide. Today, Chomsky sees generative linguistics as reviving the Port-Royal efforts to provide a mathematical model of the mind that would take some steps towards an account of the essence of mind, but now with a more restricted subject matter and armed with modern mathematical tools such as those provided by Alan Turing and others (cf. Bracken, 1970a, b, 1983).

To recap, then, externalist theories of language are concerned with normative and epistemic notions such as truth and reference, and these notions are clearly aspects of language use. But if Descartes and Chomsky are right to argue that the creative aspect of language use is now - and perhaps to remain - beyond the scope of scientific explanations then an externalist theory of language that is an explanatorily fruitful scientific theory is impossible. As McGilvray (2005) puts it: “Because people use words for all sorts of purposes, because the use of language is a form of free action, and because there is little reason to think that there can be a science of free action, there is little reason to think that there can be a naturalistic externalist theory of meaning” (p. 204).

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Notes

[1] 1 Cf. Bracken (1983), D’Agostino (1984), and Den Ouden (1975). Cf. Schouls (2000) for detailed discussion of Descartes’ views on the nature and possibility of science.

[2] For more on recursion, cf. Parker (2006), Tomalin (2007), and Zwart (2011).

[3] . 3 Cf. Jackendoff & Lerdhal (2006).

[4] . Cf., for example, Giora (1997).

[5] . Cf. McGilvray (2001).

[6] . See also Burge (1986), Davidson (1987), and McGinn (1989). Wikforss (2008) is an excellent overview and discussion of externalism. It should be noted, however, that even though the umbrella term “externalism” applies to them all, these citations of externalists should not be taken to imply that they all necessarily have similar arguments or that they are in agreement with one another.

[7] . Cf. Collins (2006).

[8] . Cf. Devitt (1984, p. 385): “thoughts are one thing, their ascription another [… it is a mistake for philosophers to] start with the theory of thought ascription, leaving the theory of thought pretty much to look after itself”.

[9] . Cf. Millikan (1984; 1993; 2004a).

[10] . Cf. also Gupta (1993).

[11] . It is worth noting that, as I have argued elsewhere, Fodor appears to have changed his mind about what a serious model of semantics entails. Since at least the 1980s he has argued in favour of an externalist semantics. Cf. Asoulin (2012).

[12] . Cf. Quine (1972) and Lewis (1975), both of whom Chomsky (1986) cites as indicative of the E-language approach. For other E-language approaches see Devitt & Sterelny (1987; 1989), Devitt (2006), and Wallace (1977). See also Millikan ‘In Defence of Public Language’ and Chomsky’s reply in Millikan (2003).

[13] . Cf. Chomsky (2000, p. 22) for discussion of Deacon's view.

[14] . Cf., amongst many others, Chomsky (1982, p. 429).

[15] . Quoted in Chomsky (1993, p. 38).

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4. The Internalist Explanation of the Creative Aspect of Language Use

I argue below that the Chomskyan internalist approach to linguistic science avoids the pitfalls of externalist theories of language and thus provides a promising candidate for an explanatory and fecund linguistic science.

The subject matter of generative linguistics is taken to be linguistic competence, the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of their language, as opposed to linguistic performance, which is the actual use of this knowledge in language production and comprehension. This distinction forms the foundation of generative linguistics and Chomskyan internalism. The actual use of the knowledge of one’s language involves many other factors and phenomena, only one of which is one’s competence. It is only under strict idealisation conditions that performance might be seen as reflecting competence, and the actual causal sequence that brings about a speech act is not directly related to competence.

Another distinction is that between I-language and E-language (Chomsky, 1986). Externalised (E-) language refers to actual speech events, with some account of their context of use. From the E-language point of view, then, a grammar is a collection of statements that describe linguistic performance. Moreover, on this account there need not be one “real” or “correct” grammar that corresponds to the corpus data: as long as it yields a correct description of the corpus data, any number of grammars could in principle apply[12] . David Lewis, for example, says that he can find no way to “make objective sense of the assertion that a grammar G is used by population P whereas another grammar G` which generates the same language as G, is not” (1975, p. 177). Lewis believes that a language is an abstract, formal system that a population selects by convention (cf. Lewis, 1969). Similarly, Dretske (1997) claims that “everything we in fact call a language, at least a natural language, is the product of social factors” (p. 289). Another manifestation of E-language can be seen in Devitt & Sterelny (1989), who argue that rather than being about competence, linguistics is about the properties and relations of observable, external, linguistic symbols (cf. Devitt, 2006).

According to the E-language conception, then, language is, as it were, “out there”, it is not intimately related to the mind. A case in point is Deacon (1997), who is critical of the Chomskyan approach to studying language acquisition, and says:

They [Chomskyans] assert that the source for prior support for language acquisition must originate from inside the brain, on the unstated assumption that there is no other possible source. But there is another alternative: that the extra support for language learning is vested neither in the brain of the child nor in the brains of parents or teachers, but outside brains, in language itself. (p. 105, emphasis in original, my emphasis) [13]

On the internalised (I-) language perspective, however, language is conceived as being intimately related with the mind in that there is some structure in the mind of the speaker/hearer that is responsible for their language. So, unlike the Elanguage conception of grammar, the grammar qua I-language is a theory of a real mental structure to which “questions of truth and falsity arise […] as they do for any scientific theory” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 22). An I-language is a generative procedure in the mind of a speaker/hearer that creates a structural description that combines phonetic, semantic, and structural properties.

The Chomskyan internalist claim is that the proper subject matter of a scientific linguistics should be the knowledge a speaker/hearer has of their language, the knowledge (a structure in the mind/brain) that underlies and makes possible, along with other factors, the speaker/hearer’s language production and comprehension.

4.1. Semantics and Chomskyan Internalism

In the Chomskyan internalist approach to semantics, the language faculty derives an expression Exp by assembling features from the array of lexical items and mapping them to the Phon and Sem representations (i.e., Exp = <Phon, Sem>). The semantic features of an expression (Sem) are mental instructions that interface with, and thus give information to, the conceptual-intentional systems. Sem is the interface between the language faculty and the systems of thought. This approach mirrors the approach to phonology in which phonetic features of an expression (Phon) are mental instructions that interface with, and thus give information to, the sensorimotor systems. The arrays of semantic features that are part of Sem are, as many have repeatedly noted, much more complex and difficult to investigate than the phonological representations. Nevertheless, valuable and fruitful progress has been made in regard to semantic features.

Pietroski (2006) compares linguistic meanings in Chomskyan internalism to blueprints, which are produced by the language faculty for constructing concepts from lexicalised elements. At a higher level is the I-language, which is a biologically-instantiated procedure that pairs phonological instructions with semantic instructions; other systems then execute these instructions. Sems are thus not to be thought of as concepts, for construing them as concepts “may be a category mistake, like evaluating an instruction to fetch a rabbit as male or female” (Pietroski, 2010, p. 252, emphasis in original). In other words, what we have are instructions to build concepts, which provide the inputs to other systems that enter into various human actions, one of which is communication. Chomskyan internalist semantics, then, concerns the nature of the instructions given by the language faculty to the systems of thought; it concerns not the concepts themselves but the instructions to fetch, build, and combine concepts. In other words, it concerns the mechanisms of concept creation (cf. Pietroski, 2008).

This is of course one step removed from what externalist semantics studies, which is the concepts themselves, their role in language use, their relation to the speaker’s environment, and their truth values. As Pietroski remarks, the work of a Chomskyan internalist “will take the form of saying how meaningful Iexpressions can be used to build concepts that are inputs to a more complex process of building concepts that we can use to make truth-evaluable judgements” (2010, p. 272, emphasis in original).

Externalist theories that include within their scope the relation of, say, concepts to the world, run into overwhelming problems, some of which I discussed above. Whereas Chomskyan internalist theories study the mechanisms in virtue of which concept construction and language use is made possible: these are expressions produced by an internal linguistic engine whose components have no direct relation to the outside world. The Sem features are used to construct concepts that are then used by other systems to make truth-evaluable assertions, or communicate an idea, or any number of uses to which language can be put.

The current abstract form of the Sem features will of course be refined until the theoretical vocabulary of a serious science of meaning emerges. But they are a good starting point, for they help recast the notion of linguistic meaning into a form that is susceptible to scientific investigation. The instructions at the Sem interface that are interpreted by the performance systems are used in the act of talking and thinking about the world. And so, on this view of meaning, the instructions to create concepts play the role of “focus[ing] attention on selected aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, and provide intricate and highly specialised perspectives from which to view them, crucially involving human interests and concerns even in the simplest cases” (Chomsky, 2000, p. 125).

In summary, then, Chomskyan internalism postulates a mind/braininternal generative procedure (an I-language) that generates expressions of the form Exp = <Phon, Sem>. This expression (via the Phon and Sem interfaces) is then used by systems outside of the language faculty (but internal to the mind/brain) in language production and comprehension. Chomskyan internalism argues that what is relevant to and tractable by a scientific theory of language is the mechanisms operating within the mind/brain, thus avoiding the problematic aspects of externalist theories discussed above. This of course does not mean that the mind is completely detached from the outside environment (it’s not), nor does it mean that one must individuate meanings by making use of only individualistic or organism-internal vocabulary (for there is the distinction between the computational theory itself and its interpretation by the theorist). Rather, the upshot of Chomskyan internalism is that whatever connection the mind has with the outside world, that connection is unlikely to be within the scope of a scientific theory of language.

5. Concluding Remarks

The argument against externalist theories of language qua scientific theories that appeals to the creative aspect of language use is as follows: since language use allows for an unbounded expression of thought and is independent from direct stimulus control but at the same time it is appropriate to new situations and is coherent in new contexts, an externalist scientific theory of language use is not viable. People can produce and comprehend an infinite number of novel utterances, and it is problematic at best to try to account for their linguistic behaviour directly: no scientifically interesting lawful correlations or predictions of potential linguistic behaviour will be found.

This of course does not mean that the mechanisms that make language use possible cannot be studied, but it does mean that the creative aspect of language use will perhaps remain, as Chomsky puts it, not merely a problem but a mystery[14] . One possibility of dispelling the mystery, still as remote today to pursue seriously as it was when Descartes suggested it, is to postulate a “thinking substance”, a new aspect of mind. As Bracken (1970a) explains, the Cartesians saw no way of extending their physical explanations to cover mental phenomena, and so it was suggested that a new principle, the “creative” principle, must be added to the vocabulary of science. This is on the analogy of the postulation of the then new principle of gravity: the occult qualities of gravity were methodologically objectionable to both the Cartesians and to Newton but they accepted it “largely because the powerful mathematical model Newtown employed carried against all a priori objections” (Ibid., p. 237).

The explanatory success of theories of mind is of course far smaller than that of Newtown’s theory of gravity, but it is worth remembering that even Newton regarded the postulation of gravity as “inconceivable” and “so great an absurdity that […] no man who has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it”[15] . But scientists were eventually forced to accept it due to its mathematical and explanatory power, for gravity gave an account of the essence of matter. The Cartesians, especially as their ideas developed with the Port-Royal tradition, attempted to do the same to the mind. That is, “in grammar we can derive an account of the essence of mind parallel to the account which geometry gives us of the essence of matter” (Bracken, 1983, p. 22). The Cartesians had no model by which to explain the essence of mind that was equivalent to Newton’s postulation of gravity as the essence of matter, and that is what the Port-Royal tradition attempted to provide. Today, Chomsky sees generative linguistics as reviving the Port-Royal efforts to provide a mathematical model of the mind that would take some steps towards an account of the essence of mind, but now with a more restricted subject matter and armed with modern mathematical tools such as those provided by Alan Turing and others (cf. Bracken, 1970a, b, 1983).

To recap, then, externalist theories of language are concerned with normative and epistemic notions such as truth and reference, and these notions are clearly aspects of language use. But if Descartes and Chomsky are right to argue that the creative aspect of language use is now - and perhaps to remain - beyond the scope of scientific explanations then an externalist theory of language that is an explanatorily fruitful scientific theory is impossible. As McGilvray (2005) puts it: “Because people use words for all sorts of purposes, because the use of language is a form of free action, and because there is little reason to think that there can be a science of free action, there is little reason to think that there can be a naturalistic externalist theory of meaning” (p. 204).

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Notes

[1] 1 Cf. Bracken (1983), D’Agostino (1984), and Den Ouden (1975). Cf. Schouls (2000) for detailed discussion of Descartes’ views on the nature and possibility of science.

[2] For more on recursion, cf. Parker (2006), Tomalin (2007), and Zwart (2011).

[3] . 3 Cf. Jackendoff & Lerdhal (2006).

[4] . Cf., for example, Giora (1997).

[5] . Cf. McGilvray (2001).

[6] . See also Burge (1986), Davidson (1987), and McGinn (1989). Wikforss (2008) is an excellent overview and discussion of externalism. It should be noted, however, that even though the umbrella term “externalism” applies to them all, these citations of externalists should not be taken to imply that they all necessarily have similar arguments or that they are in agreement with one another.

[7] . Cf. Collins (2006).

[8] . Cf. Devitt (1984, p. 385): “thoughts are one thing, their ascription another [… it is a mistake for philosophers to] start with the theory of thought ascription, leaving the theory of thought pretty much to look after itself”.

[9] . Cf. Millikan (1984; 1993; 2004a).

[10] . Cf. also Gupta (1993).

[11] . It is worth noting that, as I have argued elsewhere, Fodor appears to have changed his mind about what a serious model of semantics entails. Since at least the 1980s he has argued in favour of an externalist semantics. Cf. Asoulin (2012).

[12] . Cf. Quine (1972) and Lewis (1975), both of whom Chomsky (1986) cites as indicative of the E-language approach. For other E-language approaches see Devitt & Sterelny (1987; 1989), Devitt (2006), and Wallace (1977). See also Millikan ‘In Defence of Public Language’ and Chomsky’s reply in Millikan (2003).

[13] . Cf. Chomsky (2000, p. 22) for discussion of Deacon's view.

[14] . Cf., amongst many others, Chomsky (1982, p. 429).

[15] . Quoted in Chomsky (1993, p. 38).

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