Colonizing and Decolonizing Minds
Author: Marcelo Dascal
Publisher: www.tau.ac.il
Category: Miscellaneous Books
Author: Marcelo Dascal
Publisher: www.tau.ac.il
Category: Miscellaneous Books
Colonizing and Decolonizing Minds
Marcelo Dascal
Tel Aviv University
Contents
[Preface] 3
1: What is ‘colonization of the mind’? 4
2: Between colonization and decolonization 7
3: Can there be fully decolonized minds? 14
4: Concluding remarks: Living with a colonized mind? 19
References 22
Notes 24
[Preface]
The colonization of each other’s minds is the price we pay for thought.[1]
Mary Douglas
Whereas the most visible forms of political colonialism have for the most part disappeared from the planet by the end of the millennium, several of its consequences remain with us. Criticism of colonialism, accordingly, has shifted its focus to its more subtle and lasting manifestations. Prominent among these are the varieties of what came to be known as the ‘colonization of the mind’. This is one of the forms of ‘epistemic violence’ that it is certainly the task of philosophers to contribute to identify and struggle against. ‘Postcolonial’ thinkers have undertaken not only to analyze this phenomenon, but also to devise strategies for effectively combating and hopefully eradicating colonialism’s most damaging aspect - the taking possession and control of its victims’ minds.
My purpose in this paper is to contribute, qua philosopher, to both of these undertakings. I begin by trying to clarify the nature of the colonization of the mind and its epistemic underpinnings and the typical reactions to it. Next, I examine examples of these reactions with their corresponding analyses and strategies. The assumptions underlying them reveal certain inherent paradoxes, which call into question the possibility of a full decolonization of mind. I conclude by suggesting an alternative strategy and a series of means to implement it.
1: What is ‘colonization of the mind’?
In this section, the range of phenomena that fall under the label ‘colonization of the mind’ is extended beyond its usual application and briefly toured; the main features of the phenomenon are described; its epistemic characteristics are analyzed; and the typical ‘instinctive’ reactions to mind colonization are considered.
1.1 The metaphor ‘colonization of the mind’ highlights the following characteristics of the phenomenon under scrutiny here: (a) the intervention of an external source - the ‘colonizer’ - in the mental sphere of a subject or group of subjects - the ‘colonized’; (b) this intervention affects central aspects of the mind’s structure, mode of operation, and contents; (c) its effects are long-lasting and not easily removable; (d) there is a marked asymmetry of power between the parties involved; (e) the parties can be aware or unaware of their role of colonizer or colonized; and (f) both can participate in the process voluntarily or involuntarily.
These characteristics are shared by a variety of processes of mind colonization, regardless of whether they occur in socio-political situations that are literally categorized as ‘colonial’. Therefore, ‘colonization of the mind’ may take place through the transmission of mental habits and contents by means of social systems other than the colonial structure. For example, via the family, traditions, cultural practices, religion, science, language, fashion, ideology, political regimentation, the media, education, etc.
Consider education, for instance. The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire has analyzed a typically mind-colonizing educational paradigm, which he suggestively dubbed the ‘banking’ model. In this paradigm, a commodity (knowledge) is ‘deposited’ by those who have it (the teachers) in the minds of those (the pupils) who don’t have it; the task of both is basically passive: the former’s, to transmit and the latter’s to absorb ‘knowledge’.[2]
1.2 The ‘banking’ model displays the characteristicepistemic nature of mind colonization: What grants the colonizer (in this case the teacher) the right to intervene in the pupil’s mind, thereby colonizing it, is the fact that the former possesses and the latter lacksknowledge . This is a commodity that everybody is presumed to desire by virtue of its epistemic properties, namelytruth anduniversality , whence itsapplicability andutility derive.
Analogously, parents have theexperience their children lack, customs and traditions embodyproven methods of survival in natural and social environments, religion grantstranscendental validity to human behavior, language providesreliable tools for mental operations such as identification, conceptualization, classification, and inference, science supplies the basis oftechnologies that work , and ideologies, ofpolicies that are presumed to work . The expressions in italics refer to epistemic warrants that yield epistemic legitimacy and thereby endow teacher, family, tradition, religion, language, science or ideology each with its brand ofepistemic authority .
Notice that in most of these cases those who perform the colonizing are either not aware of the nature of their action or of the epistemic and other damaging consequences of their action.[3]Quite on the contrary, they believe they are helping the colonized, by providing them with better beliefs and patterns of action that improve their ability to cope successfully with the environment. Furthermore, they are also unaware of the fact that for the most part their minds have themselves been colonized by others, whose agents they become by attributing to them the same epistemic authority they rely upon vis-à-vis those they colonize.
In order for any of these sources of authority to become, in turn, an effective vehicle of mind colonization, it must, in addition, obtain the support of power structures capable, by a variety of means, of transmuting epistemic authority intosocial authority and so to ensure its enforcement. These means range from semiotic displays of authority, through overrating some sources of epistemic authority and devaluating others, up to appealing to overt and covert forms of discrimination, making use of socio-economic rewarding or punishment, and sheer violent coercion.
Nevertheless, however powerful the pressure of its means, social authority alone, without an epistemic authority counterpart, isn’t sufficient, for it cannot per se generate the authority necessary for succeeding in the colonizationof minds . Success in this endeavor cannot be achieved by coercion and fear alone, for it consists in inducing a set of beliefs in the colonized mind via some sort of inferential, persuasive process - a process that is cognitive in nature. Its basic constituent is the implicit acceptance by the colonized of a ‘rule of inference’ that automatically grants superiority to the colonizer’s epistemic warrants or reasons when they clash with those of the colonized. By virtue of this rule, when comparing the colonizer’s and his own grounds for holding a specific belief, the colonized will usually tend to prefer the former’s reasons and consequently adopt the colonizer’s belief. In other words, colonizationof the mind is achieved when the colonized adopts the colonizer’s epistemic principle of ‘invidious comparison’.[4]This means his implicit acceptance of the colonizer’s asymmetric distinction between a ‘primitive’ mind - that of the colonized - and a ‘superior’ or ‘civilized’ one - that of the colonizer. It is this acceptance that establishes a sort of implicit agreement between colonized and colonizer which justifies the recurring inference by both to the effect that, in any matter involving cognitive abilities, the former’s performance must be presumed to be inferior to the latter.
1.3 Of course, not always the colonization of mind is successful and yields acceptance and resignation by the colonized, although its rate of success can be considered typical, in so far as it has been surprisingly high throughout history.[5]Another typical reaction of the colonized to the colonization of mind drive of the colonizer, characteristic of the relatively recent ‘decolonization’ movement, is characterized by all out rejection and resistance. These two types of reaction are not the only ones, but they deserve special attention because, though on the face of it contrary to each other, they are widespread and equally ‘instinctive’ or ‘natural’.
Prima facie, the two reactions are indeed radically opposed.[6]While the former acknowledges the epistemic superiority of the colonizer and adopts it as a principle of colonized belief formation, the latter denies the alleged asymmetry, argues that it is groundless because based on an ‘invidious comparison’ procedure that is necessarily biased, and therefore refuses to adopt the presumption of epistemic inferiority of the colonized. While the former assumes the compatibility of adopting the colonizer’s conceptual framework with the preservation of the colonized identity, the latter stresses the incompatibility between these two attitudes, arguing that the adopted or adapted colonizer’s mind ultimately expels the original mind of the colonized, and thereby obliterates the latter’s true or authentic identity. As far as the political consequences are concerned, while the resigned acceptance reaction does not recognize in the adoption of the colonizer’s beliefs and forms of thinking one of the ways through which colonizers enhance their control over colonized behavior, the resistance reaction denounces it as a means of acquiring control over the will of the colonized, thus becoming a powerful tool of oppression, which must be combated.
2: Between colonization and decolonization
In this section, a version of the acceptance strategy, namely, the accommodation of the colonized with the ‘colonial system’ is described; the fact that the evils of this system persist even after the political decolonization of many states suggests the unsuspected depth and influence of mind colonization; the opposite reaction, the radical approach to mind decolonization, based on the total rejection of ‘foreign’ thinking patterns and contents, is then examined and its underlying assumption of a double mental colonization is pointed out; finally, the possibility of intermediate alternatives, admitting some interaction between the ‘two minds’ is discussed.
2.1 Albert Memmi, who experienced personally French colonialism as a native of Tunis and later as a teacher in Algiers, provides invaluable first person insight into the intricacies of the relationship between colonized and colonizer. The contrast between his first book (1957, transl. 1967) on the topic, written at the time of the Maghreb’s struggle for decolonization, and the second (2004, transl. 2006), well after it, raises questions directly pertinent to the issue of mind colonization that are worth being explored here.
In the first book, Memmi portraits colonizer and colonized as living in the grip of a “colonial relationship” that chains them “into an implacable dependence, which molded their respective characters and dictated their culture” (p. ix). Reaffirming his belief that colonialism is primarily an economic enterprise,[7]with no “moral or cultural mission” whatsoever (p. xii), he stresses that the ‘colonial system’ determines and controls their mental attitudes. Even the “colonizer who refuses”, on moral or political grounds, to endorse the exploitation of the colonized population and tries to do something about it, is dominated by the system, for “[i]t is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships” (p. 20). This is a situation in which his “humanitarian romanticism” is viewed by the “colonizer who accepts” as a serious illness and his “moralism” is condemned as intolerable (p. 21). Under these circumstances, the well-intentioned colonizer soon finds himself sharing his companion oppressors’ derogatory image of the colonized: “How can one deny that they are under-developed, that their customs are oddly changeable and their culture outdated?” (p. 24), even though one is aware of the fact hat this is due not to the colonized “but to decades of colonization” (ibid.).
The colonizers, whatever their persuasion, inexorably develop a distorted portrait of the colonized that explains and justifies the roles of both in the ‘colonial system’ as ‘civilizer’ and ‘civilized’. “Nothing could better justify the colonizer’s privileged position than his industry, and nothing could better justify the colonized’s destitution than his indolence” (p. 79). The myth of laziness and incompetence is elaborated and expanded into an essential inferiority and its alleged effects.[8]The incongruity thus generated inevitably leads, “by obvious logic” (p. 121), concludes Memmi, to a “fundamental need for change”,[9]which will necessarily bring about the destruction of the ‘colonial system’: “The colonial situation, by its own internal inevitability, brings on revolt” (p. 128).
While revolt is for him clearly the preferred and necessary alternative, he does not overlook the other of “the two historically possible solutions” (p. 120), which the colonized tries to put into practice, and with top priority: “The first attempt of the colonized is to change his condition by changing his skin” (ibid.). And this changing of skin consists mainly in a change of mind, i.e., in the adoption of the forms of thinking and behaving of the colonizer, in the hope that this will carry with it the corresponding privileges.[10]Nevertheless, Memmi argues, imitation and compromise are ruled out as real possibilities. “[R]evolt is the only way out of the colonial situation, and the colonized realize it soon or later. His condition is absolute and cries for an absolute solution; a break and not a compromise” (p. 127).
Although Marxian assumptions and libertarian themes dominate his analysis, leading to the conclusion that revolt is the only way, Memmi is aware of the powerful role of characteristically mental factors in the unfolding of colonial drama. He describes the ‘absoluteness’ of the colonized situation as a loss of his traditions and culture,[11]a loss of self,[12]a loss of authenticity, unity and belonging.[13]However, even “at the height of his revolt - he points out - the colonized still bears the traces and lessons of prolonged cohabitation. …The colonized fights in the name of the very values of the colonizer, uses his techniques of thought and his methods of combat” (p. 129). Furthermore - and more importantly from the point of view of mind colonization - he ends up inheriting from the colonizer the dichotomous form of thinking that serves as the grounding of racism and xenophobia of all sorts.[14]
Memmi’s second book reflects his deep disenchantment with the fact that the evils of the ‘colonial system’, instead of disappearing with political decolonization, not only persist but have even worsened. Here is a sample of these evils, as seen by Memmi in 2004: “Widespread corruption and tyranny and the resulting tendency to use force, the restriction of intellectual growth through the adherence to long-standing tradition, violence toward women, xenophobia, and the persecution of minorities - there seems to be no end to the postulant sores weakening these young nations” (Memmi 2006: xi). For this situation he blames, among other factors, ‘dolorism’, the “natural tendency to exaggerate one’s pains and attribute them to another” (p. 19) - in this case, the colonial past.[15]Ably exploited by the corrupt economic, political and military potentates, this can only lead to the “destruction of the present” (p. 43).
Memmi stresses the collusion of the intellectuals in this process: “The shortcomings of intellectuals, whether characterized as resignation or betrayal, play a part in national cultural lethargy” (p. 40). They may have their excuses,[16]but their silence “leaves the field open for those who opt for mystic effusion in place of rationality” (ibid.). Instead of envisioning a future for their nations, they “dream only of a return to a golden age, a renewed fusion, the only productive kind in their view, of religion, culture, and politics” (p. 41). They thus join the cohort of developers and believers in a decolonized’s ‘countermythology’, whose advent he had already anticipated in the final pages of his earlier book.[17]It is important to notice, however, that in so doing the intellectuals of the decolonized nations - perhaps unwittingly - endow a past, largely constructed culture with the epistemic authority (see 1.2) without which it would not gain its current political attraction. As the special role he attributes to the intellectual’s lethargy shows, Memmi no doubt detected, in both books, the colonization of mind as a factor both in colonization and in the failure of decolonization.[18]Nevertheless, he did not grant it neither the attention it deserves, nor its proper significance. As a result, he overlooked an important - presumably essential - reason for the continuation and worsening, after decolonization, of the evils of colonization. In all likelihood, the problems Europe and the ‘decolonized’ immigrants that come to its shores face are not only economical, but also - and perhaps mainly - due to the incapacity of both sides to deal properly with the phenomenon of mind colonization, especially with the stereotypical thinking it engenders and sustains both ways.
2.2 Decolonization, if it is to be successful as a reaction against such a deep, powerful, and long lasting colonization of the mind, cannot but be itself as radical as its opponent. It must, therefore, eradicate not only its surface manifestations and the concomitant ‘colonial system’, but its epistemic roots as well.
Frantz Fanon’s (1965, 1967) vigorous anti-colonial position fully acknowledges the need to combat the sources and effects of the colonization of the native’s minds and argues for the intimate relationship between this ‘cultural’ combat and the struggle for independence. His speech at the congress of Black African Writers (1959), “Reciprocal basis of national culture and the fight for freedom”,[19]begins with a very clear statement of the incompatibility between a colonial situation and the independence of a creative cultural life, “[c]olonial domination, because it is total and tends to over-simplify, very soon manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people”, and stresses that “[e]very effort is made to bring the colonized person to admit the inferiority of his culture”. Nothing short of “organized revolt” and violent struggle can put an end to the colonization of his mind achieved through this admission, which is in fact precisely the initially mentioned “total and over-simplified” submission to the forcefully imposed colonizer’s epistemic authority.
The conclusion appears to be ineluctable: “In the colonial situation, culture, which is doubly deprived of the support of the nation and of the state, falls away and dies. The condition for its existence is therefore national liberation and the renaissance of the state”. To the one remaining essential question he identifies, “what are the relations between the [liberation] struggle - whether political or military - and culture?”, Fanon’s reply is predictable: “It is the fight for national existence which sets culture moving and opens to it the doors of creation”. This fight is decisive not only because it is a fight for “the national consciousness which is the most elaborate form of culture”, but also because it is through it that the nation will free its mind from colonization and thus pave the way for recovering its epistemic autonomy. Ultimately, this is why “[a]fter the conflict there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the colonized man”.
Another example of an uncompromising rejection attitude designed to achieve a total, radical decolonization of the colonized mind is the strategy developed by Uhuru Hotep (2008).[20]Unlike Fanon, he does not strive either for a political or for an armed struggle solution. Instead, he focuses on the mental aspects of colonization and his proposals, accordingly, are directly intended to overcome them. The motto chosen for his paper couldn’t be more explicit about Hotep’s main concern: “The central objective in decolonizing the African mind is to overthrow the authority which alien traditions exercise over the African”.[21]Of course the achievement of this aim also requires action in other areas of life, as the motto further stresses: “This demands the dismantling of white supremacist beliefs, and the structures which uphold them, in every area of African life”.
Hotep’s discussion targets the “psychology of African liberation” and, accordingly, he dubs the ensemble of techniques developed by Europeans with the purpose of creating the ‘authority’ capable of subordinating the African mind, a “method of psychological manipulation”. Yet, the obstacle to liberation he identifies and seeks to overthrow is roughly the same I denote by the expression ‘epistemic authority’, whereby I emphasize its philosophical underpinnings. According to him, the method was designed to gain control of the African mind through “disconnect[ing] Africans from their heritage and culture”, which would achieve the colonizers’ purposes “because people who are cut off from their heritage and culture are more easily manipulated and controlled”.[22]This process of ‘deculturalization’, alias ‘seasoning’ (in American slaveholders jargon) and ‘brainwashing’ (in today’s vernacular), comprises three main steps: feel ashamed of yourself, admire and respect the whites, and be rewarded with more indoctrination if successful in the former steps. In Black America, the main instrument, though not the only one,[23]of deculturalization is ‘mis-education’, responsible for “destructive effects on the Black mind by schools that use a pedagogy and curriculum that deliberately omits, distorts or trivializes the role of African people in and their seminal contributions to world history and culture”.
Regardless of what seems to be an excessive emphasis on the intentionally designed, not to say conspiratorial nature of the process,[24]it no doubt yielded in America and elsewhere a prime example of mind colonization in the form of a selective set of mental contents and attitudes, which were adopted by Blacks and clearly valued European history, culture and thinking as superior to their African counterparts. It is the results of this process and the threat of its continuation that Hotep purports to combat.
He summarizes his strategy succinctly and clearly: “In the American context, decolonizing the African mind means reversing the seasoning process”;[25]and with some more detail: “Reversing the seasoning process is a constructive way to frame a psychoeducational approach for cleansing African minds of European or Arab cultural infestation”. Obviously such a reversal, which implies the demise of an operating system and its replacement by another, amounts to no less than a revolution and calls for a rhetoric of total war - even though the battleground is the mind:[26]First remove the occupier; next cleanse the ground; then design your own new-old structure and install it in the freed space.[27]The combat thus involves the virtually simultaneous identification of the vestiges of colonization to be eliminated and of the colonized’s traditions remnants, which the Africans will immediately use, “as the colony is being dismantled”, in order to “fill the liberated spaces with those life-sustaining social values, beliefs and customs that enabled their ancestors to establish stable, autonomous families and communities prior to the Arab or European invasions and conquest of their societies”. It is by recovering and reconnecting in this way with “the best of traditional African culture” that “European dominance of the African psyche” will end for Africans in the Americas; for them, therefore, “decolonization isRe-Africanization ” (author’s boldface).
Behind the fascinating logic of total revolt they argue for, it is no less fascinating to notice that neither Fanon nor Hotep are aware of the double colonization of mind upon which their argument is in fact based. If we recall that, in the extended characterization of ‘colonization of the mind’ (see 1.1, 1.2), the ‘colonizer’ performing the ‘external intervention’ that inserts in the colonized mind contents and patterns of thinking endowed with ‘epistemic authority’ that will serve as a model for that mind, need not be the typical colonizer of a ‘colonial situation’. As we have seen, there are many other kinds of situation where mind colonization may take place. One of them is the transmission of accepted beliefs, patterns of behavior and thought, ideologies, etc. that are considered constitutive of a community’s, society’s or nation’s ‘culture’ or ‘identity’. One cannot but won]der whether, after decolonizing one’s mind through its complete cleansing from the foreign model, the following step in Fanon’s or Hotep’s strategy, namely re-filling the ‘liberated space’ with another set of contents, whatever their origin, does not amount to re-colonizing the just liberated mind.
2.3 In the light of the problems faced by both options - full acceptance and total rejection of mind colonization - we should look for alternatives to them. Of course, such alternatives are not easy to formulate and defend, especially in situations of acute conflict; after all, in comparison to the appealing simplicity of the two poles of the much simpler dichotomy such alternatives purport to overcome, they must not only be rather complex, but also involve a degree of uncertainty that renders them problematic for guiding political action.[28]Still, valuable suggestions for such intermediate alternatives do exist.
When referring (in 2.2) to the motto of Hotep’s paper, I deliberately omitted one sentence of Chinweizu’s quote. My intention was to highlight the mutually exclusive, dichotomous way in which Hotep opposes the European and the African worldviews. Chinweizu, in this respect, is more nuanced. He distinguishes between rejecting the allegiance to ‘foreign traditions’ and advocating that they shouldn’t be learned at all. Here is his missing sentence: “It must be stressed, however, that decolonization does not mean ignorance of foreign traditions; it simply means denial of their authority and withdrawal of allegiance from them”. Hotep, on the other hand, though also combating the mind colonizing effect of granting unwarranted epistemic authority to foreign scholarship, suggests a policy of segregation towards it, presumably on the grounds of a sweeping attribution of falsehood to whatever emanates from the hidden intentions of the colonizer.
The practice Hotep recommends consists in protecting the decolonized African mind from any contact with beliefs that might call into question the legitimate, authentic African perspective. The rule he advises the African youth to follow in order to keep his mind decolonized might be phrased exactly in Peirce’s (1877: 235) words: “systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions”. This is one of the ways to implement what Peirce called ‘the method of tenacity’, whose basic principle is to “cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe” (ibid.: 231). Yet, as Peirce points out, the application of the ‘belief protection rule’ is not easy, for whoever tries to apply it “will find that other men think differently from him” and will realize that “their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief” (ibid.: 235). Chinweizu’s distinction, however, is compatible with this observation of Peirce, for it would permit - at least in principle - a practice of open examination of the epistemic authority of any set of beliefs, without prejudging its acceptability on the grounds of their being foreign or native. Evidently, to take advantage of this possibility and develop on its basis an alternative to the acceptance vs. rejection dichotomy requires much more cognitive effort than that demanded by the ‘tenacity method’. Philosophers may have contributed their share to this effort.
Among African philosophers, there is indeed much concern with the issue of colonization and decolonization of the mind, which is at the background of philosophical reflection in the continent.[29]An interesting question is whether this background concern does not itself affect the range of alternatives that are considered ‘valid’ (should I say ‘politically correct’?). Doesn’t the fact that philosophy is supposed to deal with “the universal” necessarily contest the legitimacy of philosophical accounts from whose scope certain cultures are excluded? And if this is the case, wouldn’t extreme particularistic positions regarding mind colonization rule themselves out as acceptable within a broad philosophical discussion of the topic? Or doesn’t the fact that the discussion takes place in a former colonized environment, say, in the African context, require participants to assume that mind colonization is wrong and that, whatever the arguments presented in the inquiry or debate, the conclusion must be in conformity with its condemnation?
All these questions are in fact present and easily recognizable in the philosophical debate about what is or should be African philosophy that runs through the pages of the Coetzee and Roux (1998) excellent reader, which thus exemplifies the variety of possible positions towards the thorny issue of what should be expected - if at all - from the decolonization of African philosophy. Let us consider a few instances.
In contradistinction to ‘ethnophilosophy’, which sees African philosophy as comprising essentially the collection and interpretation of traditional proverbs, folktales, myths and similar materials, Kaphagawani (1998: 87) discerns another, modern, multi-perspective conception of African philosophy “as a joint venture and product of traditional as well as modern trend philosophers, … of divergent world outlooks and who employ different methods … in debates and research … of relevance to the cultures and nationalities of Africa”. Appealing as this program is, it turns out that its followers “insist, in a frighteningly fanatical way at times, that rationality, rigour, objectivity, and self-criticism be properties of the African philosophy they have in mind” (ibid.). That is to say, they are perceived by Kaphagawani as mind colonization agents, who import European or North-American criteria of philosophizing. He is afraid bowing to these conditions “confines the conception of philosophy to just one aspect”.[30]In support for this claim he appeals to Wiredu (1980: 6): “If we demand that a philosophy has to have all these attributes by definition, then we are debarred from pointing out, what is a well known fact, that some philosophies are unrigorous or unsystematic or dogmatic or irrational or even anti-rational” - all of them, I would add, kinds of philosophy that deserve to be pursued, for their intrinsic value and for the fact that they may contribute significantly to clarifying the nature of those imported criteria African philosophers allegedly ought to blindly respect.
It is curious to observe to what extent an author such as Kaphagawani, eager to protect African philosophy from Euro-American hegemony, inadvertently falls prey to the latter’s mind-colonizing power. In order to justify that there is no need to provide a single, unitary definition of ‘African philosophy’, he argues as follows: “since even Western philosophers define philosophy in different ways, there is no reason why African philosophers should all define African philosophy in the same way” (Kaphagawani 1998: 98).
Finally, an example that should not be missed in the present discussion is the attempt to override the universalistic-particularistic dichotomy by creating an alternative based on merging these two poles. I will limit myself to quote two passages of the first page of a paper dealing with the “moral foundations of an African culture”. Its opening statement is categorical: “Morality in the strictest sense is universal to human culture. Indeed, it isessential to all human culture” (Wiredu 1998b: 306). The opening of the second paragraph is no less categorical: “The foregoing reflection still does not exclude the possibility of a legitimate basis for differentiating the morals of the various peoples of the world” (ibid.). Whether upholding the two claims and combining them successfully is feasible or not depends, of course, on the details of the author’s proposal. In any case, it is a courageous attempt to overcome the grip of an entrenched dichotomy.[31]
Chapter 1: Seeking Clarity
O Mankind! Be careful of your duty to your Lord, who created you from a single entity and created its mate of the same kind and spread from these two, many men and women; and be careful of your duty to Allah, by whom you demand one another your rights, and to the ties of relationship; surely Allah ever watches over you. (4:1)
Fatma: Allah1 expresses that He created mankind “from a single entity” then created its mate; is “mate” in reference to the woman being created from the substance of man? Furthermore, is the Qur’an implying that the creation of the woman came after the making of the man?
Sayyid: There are some Muslim scholars who assert that the man was created first and then the woman was created from the remaining substance of the man. However, by examining the above verse, Allah indicates that the woman and the man were created simultaneously, and that their creation came from the same substance.
This is the meaning of “a single entity: min- nafsin waahida.” The creation of the human is a dichotomy in which one body or mass was divided into two parts. Therefore, both genders were created from the exact substance, simultaneously, and thus no element in the creation of the genders is superior to the other.
Fatma: Then, to who is Allah referring when He mentions, “and created its mate?”
Sayyid: “Its mate” refers to both the wife and husband. Allah affirms that from the same entity He created the spouses. They were not necessarily individually addressed as the wife or the husband. The Qur’an gives compelling evidence that the creation of the man and woman came from one and the same material. Allah divided the genders into two equal parts. There is no precedence, superiority, or inferiority in the creation of the genders. There is equality. The Qur’an states,
“And one of His signs is that He has created for you [men & women], from your own type, spouses so that you may enjoy comfort in their company.” (30:21)
Fatma: I have read in some Islamic references that Eve was created from the rib or remnants of Adam.2 I have always associated this concept with Christian doctrine, not Islam. What is Islam’s position regarding this issue?
Sayyid: There are some ambiguous Islamic references that claim Eve was created from the rib or remnants of Adam, but there is no substantial evidence regarding the authenticity of such references.
Fatma: How did equivocal references appear in Islamic resources? How do Islamic scholars determine whether references have enough substantial evidence to be considered reliable?
Sayyid: Elaborating and defining all Islamic resources that scholars rely on would be too extensive. In brief, I will mention two of the most predominant Islamic sources: the Qur’an and the hadiths3 (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad).4
All Muslim scholars, regardless of their school of thought, agree upon the authenticity of the Qur’an.5 There is no dispute among the schools regarding the immaculateness and flawlessness of the Qur’an. The Qur’an is exactly the
same text today as it was when it was revealed to Prophet Muhammad over 1400 years ago. However, the interpretation of the Qur’an becomes problematic when Islamic scholars attempt to explain the Qur’an. One scholar may elucidate or perceive a verse one way while another scholar may view it from a different perspective or interest.
When it comes to examining traditions of the Prophet, Muslim scholars are very careful about ensuring authenticity. Scholars do not accept every tradition as genuine. First, scholars closely study and thoroughly examine the credibility and reliability of the chain of narrators, as well as, what exactly the narrators said.
If scholars discover any author or narrator to be unreliable or not trustworthy then the traditions of that narrator will be disregarded. At the same time, if scholars perceive authors or narrators to be even somewhat questionable, they will refer to their traditions as being “weak.” The acceptance of a tradition depends on two things.
First, the tradition must be validated through the household of the Prophet, the twelve infallible Imams,6 or through the trustworthy companions of the Prophet. Second, their traditions must not contradict the Qur’an. Once these two criteria are met, then scholars are certain that the tradition is authentic.
In Islamic literature, there is an abundance of unauthentic traditions referred to as “Israelites.”7 In the history of Islam, there were some people who, upon converting to Islam, were truly incognizant and unacquainted with Islamic ideology, yet still wrote unwarranted traditions. Some of these people started to propagate traditions that were unfounded; for instance, indoctrinating traditions that allege some prophets as sinning, committing adultery, and being drunk. Such outlandish lies are alien to the Islamic creed. Muslim scholars label these narrators and their traditions as “Israelite.”
There were also some Muslim narrators who became influenced by non- Muslims; they socialized with them, read their books, and agreed with some of their ideas. Hence, these narrators implemented non- Muslim standards and customs as Islamic traditions. Some of the narrated traditions contradicted the Qur’an, in addition to, the traditions of the Prophet, or had no relation or credibility to Islamic philosophy.
Amidst the two major branches of Islam,8 there is a relentless controversy regarding some narrators of Islamic tradition and what the narrators said. For example, some of the main contributors to Sunni traditions are not regarded in the same fashion in Sh’ia traditions.
Sh’ia scholars cannot accept all traditions written by such known narrators; for instance, one narrator was reprimanded for exorbitant traditions,9 while others wrote extensive traditions in which only a measure can be considered reliable. Occasionally some scholars will use these narrators’ traditions to corroborate a point, if proven from other narrated sources, that the narration was authentic.
To summarize, scholars do not regard every written tradition as authentic. If scholars suspect that a narrator wrote unattested traditions then they will thoroughly examine everything the narrator had said before accepting the authenticity of his traditions.
Returning to your question, there are some Islamic traditions that originated from previous scriptures, which claim Eve was created from the rib of Adam or his remnants, but the authentic sources deny this to be true.
Fatma: I have read traditions that claim Eve instigated Adam to act against Allah’s command, and that she was the reason why man was ousted from Paradise. Is there any truth to these traditions?
Sayyid: Adam and Eve were both dismissed from Paradise because they both disobeyed Allah’s instruction.10 However, the Qur’an puts forth the notion that Adam was more to blame than Eve.11 Nonetheless, they both repented to Allah and both were forgiven.12 Additionally, the Christian doctrine of “original sin” has no place in Islam. This is based on the clear statement in the Qur’an that no person carries the burdened sin of another.13
“Every soul draws the meed of its acts on none but itself, no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another.” (6:164)
Fatma: What I find astonishing is that, during the Prophet’s short period of preaching, he was able to abolish many of the pre- Islamic rituals among pagan Arabs, such as burying daughters alive. He was able to implement rights for women at a time when the concept of women’s rights was unheard of within the society.14
He was able to reform the attitude of a society, that a few years prior was barbaric toward women. What I find perplexing is that soon after the Prophet’s death, the rights and the attitude toward Muslim women ironically appeared to relapse. Today, Muslim women are still struggling in securing their rights and trying to overcome the perception of being treated like second- class citizens amongst their society. Why do you suppose this happened?
Sayyid: The premise you gave is not entirely correct. Certainly, the Prophet abolished all of the uncivilized acts that were being perpetrated against women, such as female infanticide,15 forced prostitution,16 and matrimonial mistreatment.17
At the same time, Islam gave women rights to participate in political affairs,18 to conduct and maintain their business affairs,19 and rights to claim inheritance.20 However, it would not be correct to state that the Prophet was able to reform the attitude of that society entirely.
Examine the chapters “Repentance” and “Hypocrites” in the Qur’an. These chapters depict the duplicity and indisposition of some people in that society.
Analyze how Allah contemptibly addressed some people in that society. Examine how some behaved toward the Prophet and how they caused him a great deal of grief by demonstrating disrespect and disobedience. Some members of that society were insincere, unwitting, and obstinate.
Even after the Prophet’s death, the first successor, Abu Bakr, spent most of his time defending attacks caused by deceitful defectors. It would not be correct to presume that justice, respect, and harmony prevailed.
Islam granted women rights to inherit from their families. However, as an example of a slow- to- change society, shortly after the death of the Prophet, his most beloved daughter Fatima was denied her inheritance. Although she was mainly denied inheritance because of political and economical implications, still the denial was unjustified. In the minds of some people, cultural traditions and customs continued to prevail, especially when they pertained to women.
Women, then and now, are struggling for their rights in Islam. Neither Islam nor the Prophet can be blamed for the societal mistreatment of women. Religion cannot be criticized for denying women their rights. Granted, Muslim women in the 21st century are in a much better position than their predecessors; but still, today, some women are continuously dealing with tribal societies that are ignorant of the true teachings and practices of Islam.
Fatma: Considering what you mentioned about the Prophet not entirely being able to reform the minds and practices of some people surrounding him, then what exactly did the Prophet achieve if the Qur’anic laws were not being adhered to?
Sayyid: Guidance is a divine task based on man’s willingness. The Qur’an states:
“Verily O’ Muhammad you guide not whom you like but Allah guides whom He will and He knows best those who are [willing to be] guided.” (28:56)
The Prophet’s achievement was in initiating laws according to the Qur’an for the sake of humanity, and furthermore, in setting an exemplary lifestyle by teaching others how to manage and deal with events or situations throughout their lifetime.
Qur’anic laws were not exclusively meant for a group of people who lived in Medina or Mecca over 1400 years ago. The Prophet knew that his society would not change easily. Those who embraced Islam during the Prophet’s time were mainly between the ages of thirty and sixty. Their personalities, characters, perceptions, and views on life were already established.
The Prophet could not reform the mentality of everyone in such a short period. It was a transitional period from the age of ignorance and paganism to the age of faith and justness. Qur’anic laws were to be achieved by future generations. Comparatively, as we are working for bettering our children’s lives, likewise was the Prophet. The Prophet was working for the next generation, for those who would adhere and practice to the teachings of Islam.
Fatma: “And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former times of ignorance.” (33:33)
“And stay quietly in your houses.”
This Qur’anic verse seems to be in regards to the wives of the Prophet; however, some Muslim scholars also apply this verse to all Muslim women. Is this verse directed at all Muslim women or just the wives of the Prophet?
Sayyid: This particular verse was addressed to the wives of the Prophet, but this does not mean that every time the Qur’an referred to the wives of the Prophet it was exclusively for them and no other women. While studying the Qur’an, one will come across many verses in which Allah addresses the Prophet, but in truth, Allah is not only addressing the Prophet. Allah required the Prophet to acknowledge the revelations and wanted the rest of the Muslim community to listen and administer them.
“Stay quietly in your house” does not mean that women cannot venture outside of their homes. It is informing women about making unnecessary excursions or being in “questionable environments.” Let me give you an example. If on the battlefield there are enough men working and fighting, then there is no need for women to be there. Certainly, women may assist within other areas, but they should not be on the battlefield, on the frontline in combat.
Some scholars have also interpreted this verse as a forewarning toward one of the wives of the Prophet, informing the wife not to cause any adversity - to remain home. Years after the Prophet’s death, one of his wives assisted in deflecting a war against the legitimate caliph of the time, Imam Ali in the Battle of Camel, in which thousands of Muslims died.
Fatma: How does Islam regard the nature of women?
Sayyid: Women and men are born with the same humanistic qualities and are partners in humanity, according to Islam. A woman is as genuine of a human being as a man, and must, therefore, enjoy the irrefutable and undeniable rights as Allah’s creation.
A woman is in no way born imperfect or less intelligent than that of her counterpart.
“We created man (men and women) in the best of molds.” (95:4)
A woman’s innate disposition in distinguishing right from wrong is the same as a man; she is not more predisposed to evil or its instigation.
“By the soul as it perfected and inspired it about its wrong and its right.” (91:7 & 8)
According to the Qur’an, Allah characterizes a woman as having,
“A great deal of good.” (4:19)
A woman comes into this world with a clean, pure, and unburdened soul.
“Every soul draws the meed of its acts on none but itself; no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another.” (6:164)
A woman’s obligation in fulfilling her religious ritual toward Allah is equal to that of a man, and her rewards and condemnations are the same.
“I shall not lose the sight of the labor of any of you who labors in My way, be it man or woman; each of you is equal to the other.” (3:195)
A woman can reach the same closeness to Allah as a man.
“If any do deeds of righteousness, be they male or female and have faith, they will enter Heaven.” (4:124)
Fatma: What is the view of Islam on the position and accountability of Muslim women in society?
Sayyid: Women were created to be half of society. Women are to assist in ensuring the morality, preserving the safety, and securing the well- being of future generations, and to become mothers. Women are created to become mothers and educators of children, among other significant roles.
In our era, some women have lost pride in being or becoming mothers. The honor, dignity, and admiration for motherhood has fallen. Some regard the title of “mother” or “homemaker” as demeaning. There is no shame or degradation in being a homemaker or mother. There is nothing amiss in loving and nurturing the family.
On the contrary, motherhood is the most important foundation on which children depend. Mothers are the educators of children; they are their teachers. Children look up to their mothers; they admire them, learn from them, inherit their character, their moral beauty, and their compassion. Motherhood is something beautiful, precious, and important. It is a long and difficult journey to become a devoted mother.
Nevertheless, the importance of fatherhood should not be lessened. A father’s role is extremely significant to the family’s well being and his absence would create difficulties. Yet, the absence of a mother could be a disaster for a family. Mothers are the threads that keep the family united.
Mothers are the builders of society. They are the ones who foster great leaders, scientists, doctors, husbands, wives, fathers, and mothers. A mother can change a whole society by raising one child. This child could reform a whole nation; in essence, mothers write history.
Fatma: Does Islam encourage women to be independent and self- sufficient? Can they be free to choose what they want to become in life?
Sayyid: Women need to be independent and self- sufficient before marriage, during marriage, and even in the event of a divorce or death. Women should be prepared, at any given moment, to depend upon themselves. No one is
certain of what the future holds. Being independent and self- sufficient can have many beneficial consequences. It creates feelings of confidence, security, and courage. However, Islam also wants a woman to be mindful that some of her decisions should be made in consultation with someone in her life, like her parents.
Fatma: Does Islam favor segregation of the genders?
Sayyid: Segregation of the genders is entirely dependent on the occasion, circumstance, or establishment. For example, Islam would recommend segregation for social gatherings for the sake of pleasure and amusement, since they may lead to maleficent outcomes.
However, Islam would not object to appropriate mixed gatherings in which intellectual, informative, or spiritual lectures were discussed. The main point is that, if immoral outcomes are not feared then mixed social gatherings are acceptable.
Fatma: Regarding the precepts concerning women in Islam, there is a copious body of literature that instructs women on what is not recommended for them. For example, it is not recommended for women to attend mosques, recite the Qur’an in the presence of men, lecture in the presence of men, or pursue fields that are dominated mainly by men. One tends to find an array of varying restrictions. What is the consensus, amongst the scholars, regarding these issues?
Sayyid: There is no consensus amongst the scholars regarding these issues by reason of controversy. Primarily, when scholars mention the boundaries of women, they are considering that particular society in which women live. For instance, there are some societies where women are not highly visible publicly; therefore, men are socially unaccustomed to women.
In societies where women predominantly stay at home, rarely venture out, even as far as the market, it would not be surprising for scholars to advise women not to patronize the mosques too often. Scholars that make such guidelines do so in an attempt to safeguard women.
In a similar fashion, in societies where women are engaged in and actively participate publicly (such as in the work force or educational institutions) then such an advisement would neither be applicable nor appropriate.
Fatma: I would like to read to you a quote from a Muslim woman who wrote an article in the “London Times” on women in Islam.
Our religion doesn’t give women any human dignity; women are considered slaves, I write against the religion because if women want to live like human beings they will have to live outside the religion of Islamic law.21
What do you suppose this is indicative of?
Sayyid: This quotation is full of bigotry and emotionalism. The author is neither objective nor accurate in her description. Unmarred Islamic laws are contrary to the author’s opinionated conclusions. Islam not only elevated the humanistic stature of women, but also secured women’s positions by empowering them with social rights.
Unfortunately, there are some countries that claim to be Muslim, but they are not adherents of the genuine Islamic faith. This person may have been raised in such a country that claims to be a representative of Islam, but its Islamic practices and values have been abandoned. Perhaps, in her country, Islam is a slogan rather than an exercised religion.
There are some countries that claim to practice Islam, yet deprive women of education, isolate them from social activism, and do not allow them to voice their political opinion. They strip women of their rights, honor, dignity, and continue to maintain that they are representatives of Islam. Unfortunately, we have this today, but this is not Islam; it is social culture.
Additionally, there are some Muslim countries that attempt to depict modernism by electing women as their prime minister. Although they may have women representing their countries in the highest office, in general, they continue to disrespect women within their society. Upon examination of these societies, one may find mistreatment or abuse of women.
Some even arrange marriages for their daughters without their consent. Some husbands regard their wives as bondswomen. Such practices (and others) are customs of society, not customs or values of Islam.
Fatma: Attitudes and practices that are conducted in the name of Islam are actually contrary to the basic messages found in the Qur’an. If one examines some Arab societies in which both Christians and Muslims live together, one tends to find that the Muslim woman living amongst her own people is not respected in the same manner as compared to the Christian woman amongst her fellow citizens.
Generally, the Christian woman is shown more appreciation and respect within her community. Why do you suppose that in some Muslim societies Muslim women are looked upon as secondary amongst her people?
Sayyid: The respect of Christian women you describe is not a result of religion, but tradition. Likewise, the comparative lack of respect that Muslim women receive in their society also did not originate from religion, but from tradition.
There are many Qur’an verses that assert the notion that men and women are to live concordantly with one another. There are considerable amount of verses in the Qur’an that state men and women are equal. The Prophet even described men and women as being halves of one another.
Traditionally, in some Eastern societies, women have been viewed as secondary, but Islam opposes such viewpoints or mistreatments. Some people, however, might read certain passages of the Qur’an and wrongly draw inaccurate conclusions based on the laws of inheritance and testimony that women are placed in a lesser class than that of men.
To understand the laws, one must analyze their derivations, the deeper reasoning, and logic behind them. The laws mostly are based on economic and social foundations and nothing else. They are not based on the wrong assumption that women are secondary or inferior. Islamic laws were made to ensure not only the rights of the individual, but also the rights of society as a whole.
One must also keep in mind that not only Arab or Muslim societies mistreated women. Christian, Jew, Persian, Indian, etc., and non- religious societies have also misused women, and in some places, continue to do so. Even today, in the West, women are mistreated and disrespected in many areas.
Fatma: You mentioned earlier that we are still dealing with tribal societies, and that people continue to be ignorant of the teachings and practices of Islam. Often the foundation of a Muslim family is centered on giving preference, opportunities, and more affection toward their sons than their daughters. Why is this?
Sayyid: Formerly, many people tended toward mainstream society, which perceived men as being superior to women. This perception of superiority was also reflected within the genders of the family. Partiality toward sons was the case in families that were uninformed about the true practices of Islam. This would not be the case in a well- informed Muslim family that based its teachings on the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet.
Nonetheless, we cannot blame Islam for the way parents mistreat their daughters. Islamic literature encourages more affection to be given toward the daughter than the son. Allah instructs parents to offer more attention to their daughters by way of example.
For instance, when parents leave on a trip, the last one they should say good- bye to is their daughter, and upon their return home, she should be the first one to be greeted. This is what the Prophet did to his own daughter, Fatima. Whenever she walked into the room the Prophet used to stand up, kiss her, and offer her his seat.
He would invite her to eat meals with him. Whenever the Prophet returned home from a trip, he would stop at his daughter’s home before going to see his wives.
There are numerous verses in the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet that detail the manner in which a daughter is to be treated. I will cite a few of the Prophet’s traditions regarding the treatment of daughters.
The best of your children are your daughters.22
The sign of a lucky woman is that her first child is a girl.23
First, he should give to his daughters then to his sons. Whoever keeps his daughter happy will get a reward equal to the one who has freed a slave from the progeny of Prophet Ishmael.24
Whoever brings up faithful daughters, educates them, disciplines them, and marries them will be rewarded Paradise.25
Fatma: When the subject of female circumcision is addressed, the word “Islam” is often associated to it. Is there any association between Islam and female circumcision?
Sayyid: There is no association between Islam and female circumcision. Female circumcision may commonly be practiced by some African societies. The fact that those who practice female circumcision may be Muslim, does not justify concluding that it is based on Islamic rituals or practices.
Fatma: In some Muslim countries, and in some cases, when a Muslim woman is suspected or rumored to have committed an illicit act male members of the family would take it upon themselves to execute her. This disturbing act is known as “Death by Honor.” Usually the perpetrator is sentenced to a few years in prison and released. Would this form of conviction be a reflection of Islamic law?
Sayyid: Any crime or sin committed in an Islamic society must be dealt with accordingly through the Islamic and civil courts. Vigilantism is forbidden. Islam honors the life and the lives of all people. Taking the life of another person is considered a cardinal sin. The only person that is permitted to execute the law is a qualified Islamic judge, not a family member.
Therefore, “Death by Honor” has no basis in the Islamic tradition. In fact, the Qur’an comments on the penalty for those who accuse or rumor on the subject of adultery or fornication without providing credible witnesses.
And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses to support their allegations- flog them with eighty strips; and reject their evidence ever after; for such men are wicked transgressors. (24:4)
Notes
1. Arabic word for God.
2. Sahih Al- Bukhari.
3. Hadiths, Sunnah, or traditions are actions, words, and consents of the Prophet Muhammad in matters pertaining to the meaning and practices of Islam which have been transmitted through a line of narrators.
4. Prophet Muhammad proclaimed the message of Islam.
5. Inquires about Shi'a Islam, Sayyid Moustafa Al- Qazwini.
Schools of Islamic thought are paths Muslims follow to the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. There are five schools of thought:
Ja’fari: comprise 23% of the Muslims. Established by Imam Ja’far ibn Muhammad al- Sadiq in Medina, Hijaz 148 H (Islamic calendar). Imam Ja’far al- Sadiq was the sixth imam of the twelve designated imams of the school of Ahlul Bayt (family members of the Prophet Muhammad).
Hanafi: comprise 31% of the Muslims. Established by Imam al- Numan ibn Thabit, better known as Abu Hanafi in Kufa, Iraq during the Abbasid Empire.
Maliki: comprise 25% of the Muslims. Established by Imam Malik ibn Anas al- Asbahi in Medina, Hijaz during the Abbasid Empire in 148 H.
Shafi: comprise 16% of the Muslims. Emerged in Egypt by Imam Muhammad ibn Idris al- Shafi during the Fatimid Dynasty.
Hanbali: comprise 4% of the Muslims. Established by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal in Baghdad, but only gained popularity in the Arabian Peninsula due to the ideas of Muhammad ibn Abd al- Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism.
6. The twelve Imams are the descendents and successors of the Prophet, according to the Ahlul Bayt school of thought.
7. Israelite is a term referring to a set of Biblical stories and accounts which were introduced into the Islamic tradition.
8. Sh’ia: followers of the Prophet through his infallible family (for reference to Ahlul Bayt, see Qur’an 33:33).
Sunni: followers of the Prophet through his companions.
9. Sharh Ibn Aby Al- Hadia, v.1 p. 360.
10. Qur’an, 2:36 & 7:20- 24. Adam & Eve’s disobedience was not considered a sin since Allah’s command was not obligatory. Rather, it was an advisement, according to the Ahlul Bayt school.
11. Qur’an, 20:115- 121.
12. Qur’an, 7:23 & 2:36.
13. Qur’an, 17:15.
14. Few examples: inheritance, voting, freedom of expression, marketing, and education.
15. Qur’an, 16:58/59 & 17:31.
16. Qur’an, 24:33.
17. Qur’an, 2:231- 232.
18. Qur’an, 60:12.
19. Qur’an, 4:32.
20. Qur’an, 4:7.
21. London Times, 22 June 1994, Taslima Nasreen, a Bangladeshi author.
22. Mustadrak Al- Wasel, v. 2, p. 615.
23. Mustadrak Al- Wasel, p. 614.
24. Makarin Al- Akhaq, authority of Ibn Abbas.
25. Wasail Al- Sh’iah, v. 15, p. 100.