FIRST BOOK
It contains three Sections:
First Section: On Words
§8.
That a word is the indication of a meaning (idea), by reason of [its]
appointment for it (so as to represent that idea), is [called] coincidence, as, for instance, that “homo” is the indication of (is used to express the idea of) “rational animal.” [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that in which it (the idea) is included is [called] implication, as for instance, that “homo” is an indication of an animal. [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that to which it (the idea) is external is [called] nexus; for instance, that “homo” is an indication of “capable of instruction” and of “acquiring the art of writing”.
§9.
It is necessary in the indication per nexum that the external thing be in such a condition that the apprehension thereof adhere in the intellect to the apprehension of the thing named, if this be not the case the word will not convey the meaning thereof. But it is not necessary that it be in such a condition that its actual existence be connected with the actual existence of the thing named. For instance the word “blind” is (per nexum) the indication of sight, yet these two things are not connected in their actual existence.
§10.
Coincidence does not (always) comprize implication, as, for instance, in indivisibles (i.e. things the quiddity of which is not composed of parts see notes 18, 19 and 27) and it may or may not comprize nexus; this is uncertain, for it is not known whether there exists an adherens (inseparable property) of every essence, the apprehension of which is connected with the apprehension of that essence. [The opinion of Im´am R´azy] that the apprehension of every essence comprizes [per nexum at least if nothing else,] the apprehension that it is [that essence and] no other, is not admissible.
From this it is clear that implication does not comprize nexus, they, in fact, are (only) found along with coincidence, for the sequens cannot possibly exist as sequens without something of which it is the sequens.
§11.
If any part of the (term which is) indicans by coincidence, is intended to indicate a part of the total meaning, it (the term) is [called] complex, as a thrower of stones, else it is [called] simple. If the simple word is not by itself fit to be a predicable, it is [called] a tool (syncategorematic), as “in” and “not,” and if it is fit to be a predicable, and indicates by its form one of the three times, it is a verb, else it is a noun.
§12.
A noun has either one meaning or more than one. In the first case if it individuates that meaning it is called a proper-name, else (there are two cases possible: firstly), if its conceivable (literally intellective) and real individua are [all] equally represented by it, it is called univocal (literally agreeing, consentient,) as “homo,” “sun;” [secondly,] if it applies to some of the individua] more forcibly, and in preference to others, it is called doubtful as existence in reference to the being which exists of necessity (God), and the beings of contingent existence (the creation.) In the second case, [if a noun has many meanings] it may be, by appointment, equally applicable to those several meanings, like spring [the spring of a clock, a spring of water], - in this case it is called equivocal: or it may have been appointed for one meaning and then have been transferred to a second. If the original meaning has become obsolete the noun is called a transferred word, it depends whether it has been transferred by common usage [as the word “omnibus”] or as a law term, or as a term of science; in the first case it is called “a conventionally transferred (word),” in the second “a juristically transferred (word),” and in the third “a technically transferred (word).” If a word has not quitted its original subject (lost its original meaning), it is called, in relation to it, proper, and in relation (to the signification) to which it has been transferred, trop. Example, lion, in reference to the animal of that name and in reference to a brave man.
§13.
A word is in reference to another word synonymous (literally riding on the same camel, one behind the other,) with it if they agree in meaning, and heteronymous (literally distinct) if they differ in meaning.
§14.
A compound (oratio) is either complete, that is to say, it has a sense by itself (literally, silence after it is admissible) or incomplete. If a complete compound predicates something true or false, it is called information or proposition, and if it does not predicate any thing it is called interjection. If an interjection has by appointment the meaning of a request that a thing be done, and if (it be uttered) with an authoritative voice, it is an order (or an imperative) as, beat thou! if (it be uttered) in a humble voice it is a question or prayer, and if in a middling voice, a request. If it has not the meaning of a request that a thing be done, it is a warning (exclamation) expressive of whining, or weeping, or wondering, or exclaiming, or swearing. If a compound is not complete, it is either a limitation as “rational animal,” or it is not a limitation, as if it consist of a noun and a tool, or of a verb and a tool (adverb).
Second Section: On Simple Meanings (Predicables)
§15.
A notion is particular (singular) if the apprehension thereof of itself excludes the taking place of association, and it is universal (common), if it does not exclude association. The terms indicating these two things are called particular and universal respectively.
§16.
An universal [notion] is either the whole of the quiddity of the particulars under it, or is included in it (i.e. is part of it), or is external, [but joined] to it. The first is called species, whether it contains many individua [or only one, in the former case] it is said in answer to [the question], “what is it?” in regard both to association and peculiarity as homo, [in the latter case] if it does not contain several individua it is said in answer to [the question] “what is it,” in regard to its peculiarity only, as “sun.” Species is therefore an universal, which is said of one or several things which agree in their verities in answer to [the question] “what is it.”
§17.
In the second case [if the universal is part of the quiddity it must be one of two things, either a genus of the quiddity or its difference], it is called a genus if the universal is the totality of that part [of the quiddity] which is common to the quiddity and to another species. It is said in answer to [the question] “what is it?” in regard to association only. Genus is described as a universal, which is said of many things differing in their verities, in answer to [the question] “what is it.”
§18.
The genus is called near, if the answer [to the question] regarding a [given] quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus is the immediate answer regarding that quiddity, and regarding all [the species] which are associated with the said quiddity, under the same genus, as animal in reference to man.
The genus is called remote, if the answer [to the question] regarding the quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus, is different from the answer regarding the quiddity, and those other [species mentioned above as coming under the near genus]. If the genus is remote by one degree, two answers can be given, as living being in reference to man; and if it is remote by two degrees, three answers can be given, as body in reference to man; and if it is remote by three degrees, four answers can be given, as substance in reference to man, etc.
§19.
If it (the universal notion) is not (or does not comprehend) the totality of that part [of the quiddity], which is common to it (the quiddity) and to another species [i.e. if it is not a genus, one of two things must be the case]; either it cannot be common [to both] at all [being peculiar to the quiddity as rational is according to the Arabs to man] or it [is only] a portion of the part which is common to both; although co-extensive therewith. Else (if it were more extensive it would follow that) it must be common to the quiddity and to some other species [not included in the genus] but, agreeably to the above supposition, it must, in reference to such other species, not comprehend the whole part which may be common [to the quiddity and that species], but only a portion of it [and so by assuming that the notion is part of the quiddity of another species we should only rise to a higher branch on the tree of Porphyry]. (This reasoning) does not lead to an [interminable] chain, but to something which is co-extensive with the totality of the part which is common (or genus). This [universal] consequently divides the genus, and whether it distinguish the quiddity from what is associated with it under a genus or under “existence,” [which may be considered the summum genus] it is [called] difference (literally division).
§20.
Difference is described as a universal predicated of a thing to the question “what thing is it in its substance?” It follows that if a verity is composed of two - or several - co-extensive things, each of these two things is its difference, for it distinguishes it from those things which are associated with it in “existence”.
§21.
The difference which distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the genus, is called near (specific), provided it distinguishes it in the near genus e.g. “rational” is the difference of “man” [in the subaltern genus “animal,” distinguishing it from other animals]. And it is called remote (generic) if it distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the remote genus, e.g. “sensitive” is the difference of “man” [in the remote genus “living being”].
§22.
The third [universal is external to the quiddity but joined to it.]
If it is inseparable from the essence it is called adherent (property), else it is called separable accident. The adherent adheres to the existence [of a thing], as blackness to the negro, or it adheres to the quiddity, like being even to four. The adherent is [called] evident, if the apprehension of the adherent together with the apprehension of the thing to which it adheres, is sufficient to convince the intellect of the cohesion between the two, as the divisibility of four into two equal parts; and it is [called] not-evident, if a medium is required to convince the intellect of their cohesion, as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles. Some say that an adherent is evident, if the apprehension thereof adheres to the apprehension of the thing of which it is the adherent. The first [definition] is more general. The separable accident may either pass quickly, as the blushing of shame and flushing of anger, or slowly, like greyness of hair, [under the use of certain medicines which are supposed to have this effect], or youth.
§23.
Both the adherent and separable [accident], if they are peculiar to singulars of the same verity, are called peculiar, as risible, else they are called general accident, as locomotion. The “peculiar” is described as a universal said, as a accident, only of things of the same verity. Common accident is described as a universal, said as an accident, of singulars of the same verity and of other things also in the way of accidentality. The universals therefore are five: species, genus, difference, peculiar (accident) and common accident.
Third Section: Five Inquiries on Universals and Particulars.
First Inquiry
§24.
[There are] universals, whose existence is impossible in reality, but not the conception thereof of itself, as “an equal to God.” [There are universals] whose existence may be possible but they do not really exist, as “a griffon.” [Under some universals] there is only one [individual], and it is impossible that there should be another, as God; or it is possible that there be others, as the sun; or there are many but they are limited in number, as the seven planets; or they are unlimited in number, as the rational souls.
Second Inquiry
§25.
Ifwe say of “animal” for instance, that it is a universal, three things are to be observed. Animal is to be considered in itself, and as a universal, and as the compound of these two things. The first is called a physical universal, the second a logical universal, and the third amental (metaphysical) universal. The physical universal is existing in reality, for it (animality) is a part of every animal which exists, and a part of what exists has [of course] existence. In regard to the other two universals, opinions are divided as to their existence in reality. The inquiry on this subject does not belong to logic.
Third Inquiry
§26.
Universals are co-extensive, if one is true of just as much (i.e. of as many individuals) as the other, as “homo” and “rational.” There is absolute generality and peculiarity between them (i.e. one ismore extensive than the other and contains it wholly), if one of the two, is true of all of which the other is true, but not vice versa; as “animal” and “man.” There is generality and peculiarity between them in some respect if either is true only of a part of that of which the other is true; as man and white. And they are heterogeneous if neither of the two is true of any thing of which the other is true; as man and horse.
§27.
The contradictories of two co-extensive [terms] are co-extensive; for else one of them (contradictories) would be true of that about which the other is false, and it would follow that one of the two co-extensive [terms] is true of that about which the other is false - this is impossible. [E.g. every non-man is an irrational being and every irrational being is a non-man.]
The contradictory of an absolutely more general [term] is more peculiar than the contradictory of an absolutely more peculiar [term,] for the contradictory of the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of what the contradictory of the more general term is true, but not vice versa, [non-man contains more than non-animal]. Were the first [of these two assertions] not founded, the peculiar [term] itself [i.e. not its contradictory; man e.g.,] would be true of some things of which the contradictory of the more general [term e.g. non-animal] is true, and hence it would follow that the more peculiar is true [of certain things] and that the more general is not true [of the same things] - this is impossible. As to the second [assertion viz., that the contradictory of a more general term contains less than the contradictory of a more peculiar term], were it unfounded the contradictory of the more general [term] would be true of every thing of which the contradictory of themore peculiar [term] is true, and hence it would follow that the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of which the more general is true - this is impossible. There is no generality whatever between the contradictories of terms one of which is more general in ‘some respect,’
because it is certain that such a generality exists between the absolutely more general [term] itself [e.g. animal] and the contradictory of the more peculiar [term, as for instance non-man;] whilst there is universal heterogeneousness between the contradictory of the absolutely more general and the more peculiar [term] itself. The contradictories of two heterogeneous [terms] are heterogeneous, and their heterogeneousness is [called] particular heterogeneousness, for if [two terms] are in no case true simultaneously [of the same thing], as non-existence and non-nihilum (non-existence and existence), it is [called] universal heterogeneousness; and if they are true simultaneously, as non-man and non-horse, it is called particular heterogeneousness, because one of the two heterogeneous terms is necessarily true [of certain objects] of which the contradictory of the other heterogeneous term is true. Particular heterogeneousness is, therefore, surely an adherent [of the contradictories of two heterogeneous terms.]
Fourth Inquiry
§28.
[The term] “particular” is not only used in the abovementioned sense [see §15] - in which it is called “veritable particular” - but also to de-note any more peculiar [term] which is under a more general one, and in this case it is called “relative particular.” The latter term is more general than the former, for every veritable particular is a relative particular, but not vice versa. The former is the case (i.e. every veritable particular is a relative particular), because every individuumcomes under its quiddity,which denudes [the individua under it] of their individuality, (i.e. which abstracts from the individuality of the individua); and the second is the case (i.e. the reverse is not true), because the relative particular may be a universal, but the veritable particular cannot be a universal.
Fifth Inquiry
§29.
The species which is of the description mentioned above [§16] is called the veritable species; but the term is also used of any quiddity, if to the question “what is it” regarding the said quiddity [e.g. what is “man?”] and some other quiddity [e.g. what is “horse”], the genus [e.g. “animal”] is primarily said in answer. This is called the relative species.
§30.
Species has four degrees, for either it is the most general of all species, and in this case it is called the high species (summa species), as “body;” or it is themost peculiar, and in this case it is called the low species, as “man,” this is also called the species specierum; or it is more general than the low species and more peculiar than the high, this is called the intermediate species, as “animal” and “living body;” or it is detached from all other species, this is called the singular (or solitary) species, as logos, if we say that substance is the genus of logos.
§31.
Genus has the same four degrees, but the high genus (summum genus), e.g. “substance,” and not the low genus, e.g. “animal,” is called the genus generum in the gradation of the genera. Examples of the intermediate genus, are “living being” and “body,” and an example of the singular genus is “logos,” supposing that “substance” is not the genus of “logos.”
§32.
The relative species is to be found without the veritable species, as in the intermediate species. Again the veritable species is to be found without the relative one, e.g. in indivisible verities. These two kinds of species do not stand to each other in the relation of absolute generality and peculiarity, but either of the two is in some respects more general than the other, because they are both true of the low species.
§33.
If [only] a part of what ought to be said in answer to the question “what is it” is said, and if that be [a] coincident [term,] it is called jacens in via [questionis], quid est, e.g. if we ask regarding man, “what is it,” and receive the answer “animal” or “rational,” in reference to (or instead of) “rational animal.” If [only] a part is said in answer to the same question, and if, what is said, be a term for it by implication, it is called inclusum in responsione (i.e. pars responsionis) [ad questionem] quid est, as “living being,” “sensitive,” “endowed with voluntary motion,” animal being indicated by these terms by implication.
§34.
The summum genusmay have a difference which establishes it (or is an essential part of it), for it may be composed of two or more co-extensivle things; but it must necessarily have a difference which divides it (separates its significates). The low species must necessarily have a difference which establishes it, but it can have no difference which divides it. The intermediate [genera] must have differentiae which establish them and differentiae which divide them. Every difference which establishes the summum genus establishes also the low genus, but not vice versa; again every difference which divides a lower genus divides also the summum genus but not vice versa.
Fourth Section: On Definitions (i.e. the ways of defining)
§35.
The definiens (definition) of a thing is [an expression] the apprehension of whcih involves the apprehension of the thing defined, or its distinction from every thing else. The definiens must not be the essence itself [i.e. homo is not a definition for man], for the definiens is known prior to the definitum, and a thing is not known prior to itself. It further must not be more general (more extensive) than the definitum else it does not answer the purpose of definition (or limiting), nor must it be more peculiar (more limited), else it conceals (or excludes some of the individua). The definiens must be co-extensive in generality and peculiarity.
§36.
The definiens is called a limes perfectus (perfect boundary) if it consists of the near genus and near difference, [as rational animal for man]; and limes imperfectus (imperfect boundary) if it consists of the near difference only, [as rationalis for homo], or of the near difference and the distant genus, [as a rational body for man]. And it is called complete description (literally sketch,) if it consists of the near genus and a property, [as the risible animal for man], and imperfect description, if it consists of the property alone, or of the property and the distant genus, [as risible body for man.]
§37.
Care must be taken not to define a thing by what is equally known or unknown, as if we were to define “motion” by “absence of rest,” or “couple” by “what is not single.” Nor must a thing be defined by another thing, which is known only through the former. It is equally objectionable whether it be immediately known through it, e.g., ifwewere to say “report” means an “account” and “account” means “report;” ormediately, e.g., if we were to say the number two is the first pair; pair is what can be divided into two equal parts, two parts are called equal if neither exceed the other and the parts are two.
Care must also be taken not to use barbarous unusual words, whose indication (meaning) is not intelligible to the hearer, for in this case the purpose is lost sight of.
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Author: Najm al-Din ’Umar al-Qazwni al-Katibi
