Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Creative Aspect of Language Use and the Implications for Linguistic Science

Eran Asoulin

Published by: www.philsci-archive.pitt.edu

WWW.ALHASSANAIN.ORG/ENGLISH

Table of Contents

Abstract3

1. The Creative Aspect of Language Use4

1.1. Unboundedness5

1.2. Stimulus Freedom 5

1.3. Coherence and Appropriateness to Circumstance6

2. Linguistics and Science8

2.1. Internalism, Externalism, and Science9

2.2. Internalism versus Individualism 10

3. Can Externalism Form the Basis of a Science of Language? 13

3.1. Horwich’s Use-Theory of Meaning 13

3.2. Problems with Use-Theories of Meaning 14

3.3. Problems with Externalist Theories in General15

4. The Internalist Explanation of the Creative Aspect of Language Use17

4.1. Semantics and Chomskyan Internalism 18

5. Concluding Remarks19

References21

Notes25

Abstract

The creative aspect of language use provides a set of phenomena that a science of language must explain. It is the “central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itself” and thus “a theory of language that neglects this “creative” aspect is of only marginal interest” (Chomsky, 1964, p. 7; p. 8). Therefore, the form and explanatory depth of linguistic science is restricted in accordance with this aspect of language. I discuss the implications of the creative aspect of language use for a scientific theory of language, noting the possible further implications for a science of the mind. I will argue that a corollary of the creative aspect of language use is that a science of language can study the mechanisms that make language use possible, but that such a science cannot explain how these mechanisms enter into human action in the form of language use.

Keywords: creative aspect of language use; linguistic science; science of the mind; externalism; Chomskyan internalism.

1. The Creative Aspect of Language Use

The creative aspect of language use provides a set of phenomena that a science of language must explain. It is indeed the “central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itself” and thus “a theory of language that neglects this “creative” aspect is of only marginal interest” (Chomsky, 1964, p. 7; p. 8). As a result, the form and explanatory depth of a science of language will be restricted in accordance with this aspect of language. I will discuss the implications of the creative aspect of language use for a scientific theory of language, noting along the way the possible further implications for a science of the mind. I will argue that a corollary of the creative aspect of language use is that a science of language can study the mechanisms that make language use possible, but for reasons to be explored such a science may be unable to shed light on how these mechanisms enter into free human action in the form of language use.

The creative aspect of language use refers to the kind of linguistic creativity that is displayed in ordinary human linguistic production and comprehension. All humans have the ability to produce and understand an infinite number of novel sentences - sentences that are new in the linguistic experience of the speaker/hearer and perhaps also new in the history of their language. Descartes saw an essential difference between humans and other animals that was most clearly exhibited by our linguistic ability to form new statements, which express new thoughts and are appropriate to but not directly caused by their contexts.

Chomsky (1966) summarises Descartes’s views[1] as follows:

[…] it is the diversity of human behaviour, its appropriateness to new situations, and man’s capacity to innovate - the creative aspect of language use providing the principal indication of this - that leads Descartes to attribute possession of mind to other humans, since he regards this capacity as beyond the limitations of any imaginable mechanism. Thus [according to Descartes] a fully adequate psychology requires the postulation of a “creative principle” alongside of the “mechanical principle” that suffices to account for all other aspects of the inanimate and animate world and for a significant range of human actions and “passions” as well. (Ibid., p. 53)

The creative aspect of language use thus poses a problem for a science of language because human language, “being free from control by identifiable external stimuli or internal physiological states, can serve as a general instrument of thought and self-expression rather than merely as a communicative device of report, request, or command [as animal communication systems appear to be]” (Ibid., p. 57). In other words, the problem is how to account for the creative aspect of language use in a scientific context when it appears to be a form of free human action. I argue below that the solution to this problem involves accepting that the mechanisms underlying the creative aspect of language use can be a fruitful subject matter for a science of language, but that language use itself may not be. Though before doing so, I discuss in more detail the main issues that Descartes raised in regard to human language use. They are: (1) that it allows for an unbounded expression of thought and (2) it is independent from direct stimulus control yet at the same time (3) it is appropriate to new situations and coherent in new contexts.

1.1. Unboundedness

Linguistic productivity is the ability to produce and understand an unlimited number of sentences that one has not previously encountered. Descartes viewed productivity in all domains - language, mathematics, vision, etc. - as deriving from a single source. Modern cognitive science has taken a modular approach, insisting that each domain has its own productivity engine (cf. Brattico & Liikkanen, 2009). In order for a grammar to be able to produce from the set of finite primitive elements an infinite set of expressions it must be recursive. The details of the notion of recursion need not concern us here, suffice it to say that it involves embedding a structural object within another instance of itself - as when a noun phrase is embedded within another noun phrase[2] . Non-linguistic examples include the way in which the set of natural numbers is defined recursively, recursion in music[3] , or the recursion that is displayed in spatial reasoning and navigation. Fitch et. al. (2005, p. 186) illustrate recursion by asking the reader to consider “such concepts as ((((the hole) in the tree) in the glade) by the stream) and ask whether there is an obvious limit to such embedding of place concepts within place concepts (… in the forest by the plain between the mountains in the north of the island…).”

1.2. Stimulus Freedom

The second issue Descartes raised in regard to the creative aspect of language use relates to the fact that a person’s use of language is stimulus-free in the sense that verbal behaviour is “free of identifiable external stimuli or internal physiological states” (Chomsky, 1966, p. 110, fn. 11). That is, “Though our language use is appropriate to situations, it is not controlled by stimulus conditions. Language serves as an instrument for free expression of thought, unbounded in scope, uncontrolled by stimulus conditions though appropriate to situations, available for use in whatever contingencies our thought processes can comprehend” (Chomsky, 1980, p. 222).

One can easily think of examples that show this sort of stimulus freedom. One can speak of elephants when there is nothing in the speaker’s environment that could conceivably be called a stimulus that caused the utterances. Or one could speak of Federico Lorca’s Poet In New York when the only conceivable stimulus in the speaker’s environment is elephants and the African landscape. Under no notion of causality can such utterances be said to have been caused by anything in the speaker’s environment. If one does attempt to offer a casual explanation it will not be causality as scientifically construed, but rather the interpretation of a speech event as part of a pattern that can only be identified a posteriori (cf. McGilvray, 2001).

Stimulus-freedom implies not only that language use has no direct causal relation with the environment of the speaker/hearer; Chomsky also argues that there is a sense in which language use has no strict causal relation with internal states either. Thus, he remarks that “Descartes and his followers observed that the normal use of language is constantly innovative, unbounded, apparently free from control by external stimuli or internal states, coherent and appropriate to situations” (1988, p. 5, my emphasis). Elsewhere, Chomsky refers to a normal feature of everyday usage of language: “the fact that it is typically innovative, guided but not determined by internal state and external conditions, appropriate to circumstances but uncaused, eliciting thoughts that the hearer might have expressed the same way” (Chomsky, 1996, p. 17, my emphasis).

The issue at hand, however, is not the existence of internal or external causes, but rather the viability of including environmental causes or specific internal causes of language use within a scientific theory of language. I argue below that a scientific theory of language cannot be a fruitful and deeply explanatory one if it insists on including such purported causes or correlations with the environment - or, given the proper qualifications, with internal states.

1.3. Coherence and Appropriateness to Circumstance

“The normal use of language”, writes Chomsky, “is thus free and undetermined but yet appropriate to situations; and it is recognised as appropriate by other participants in the discourse situations who might have reacted in similar ways and whose thoughts, evoked by this discourse, correspond to those of the speaker” (1988, p. 5). In other words, linguistic “discourse is not a series of random utterances but fits the situation that evokes it but does not cause it” (Ibid.). People assume that the utterances of their interlocutors are relevant, coherent, and appropriate to the circumstance at hand. And even when an utterance fails to do so, we impose an interpretation on it in which it is assumed to be relevant, coherent, and appropriate.

A science of language has to deal with the fact that novel sentences are appropriate to though not determined solely by the circumstances of their use. If in addition to the mechanisms that make language use possible, a theory insists on including within its scope aspects of language use then it must contend with the fact that it is unclear what counts as a relevant or appropriate circumstance[4] . Claiming that a circumstance is that which is judged to be coherent by a speaker/hearer only poses the question to be answered and does not provide any insight. Wilson & Sperber (2004, p. 611), for example, believe that:

The fact that ostensive stimuli create expectations of relevance follows from the definition of an ostensive stimulus and the Cognitive Principle of Relevance. An ostensive stimulus is designed to attract the audience’s attention. Given the universal tendency to maximise relevance, an audience will only pay attention to a stimulus that seems relevant enough. By producing an ostensive stimulus, the communicator therefore encourages her audience to presume that it is relevant enough to be worth processing.

However, everyday language use is replete with ambiguities, allusions, metaphors, and many other similar phenomena, and contexts of speech are enormously varied and only tenuously related to particular utterances. It is thus unlikely that one can construct a theory that, say, systematically lists the circumstances to which a particular utterance is supposed to be appropriate. The reason is that, as Descartes noticed, although expressions are appropriate to circumstances, they are stimulus free and causally unrelated to the speaker’s environment. A fortiori, being appropriate cannot be equated with being caused by environmental conditions, for the purported correlation between language and the world is suspect[5] . This is the externalist conception of semantics criticised below.

It is important to stress that the claim is not that correlations do not exist. Rather, the claim is that even though correlations may exist in some form, they are not a fecund subject matter for a serious science of language. One may object that, say, relevance theory in pragmatics or formal semantics do not aim at the rigour, formal structures, or explanatory methods or models of science per se.

However, there are plenty of theorists who explicitly claim that their theory of language is scientific in the sense that it can posit lawful correlations between linguistic behaviour and aspects of the environment and the contexts in which utterances are produced. Paul Horwich (1998; 2005) is a case in point. I discuss below Horwich’s claims that his use-based theory of semantics is compatible with a linguistics construed as an empirical science.

To recap, then, the main issues that Descartes raised in regard to the creative aspect of language use are: that language use allows for an unbounded expression of thought and is independent from direct stimulus control, yet at the same time it is appropriate to new situations and coherent in new contexts.

Before detailing the implications that such observations have in regard to a science of language, what follows are some remarks about linguistics and science.

2. Linguistics and Science

For the purposes of this article one can make a distinction between two methods of constructing a scientific theory of language: an externalist approach and an internalist approach. The classic arguments for externalism are found in Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980)[6] . The main externalist claim is that mental states are individuated by reference to environmental features or social contexts, and therefore in order for a person to have intentional mental states they must be related to the environment in the right way. Externalism entails that if two individuals are physically identical their respective utterances of, say, water, can still have different meanings if the relevant features of their environment are different.

Externalism has become a widely held position that is especially popular within the philosophies of mind and language. Indeed, some feel that “externalism has been so successful that the primary focus of today’s debate is not so much on whether externalism is right or wrong, but rather on what its implications are” (Wikforss, 2008, p. 158), and that “Over the past 30 years much of the philosophical community has become persuaded of the truth of content externalism“ (Majors & Sawyer, 2005, p. 257). Externalism has thus become “almost an orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind” (Farkas, 2003, p. 187).

Internalism, on the other hand, holds that, for the purposes of scientific inquiry into language, the internal properties of the human mind are the relevant and fruitful subject matter of scientific research. Internalism (more specifically, Chomskyan internalism) has thus recast the notion of language qua social phenomenon or abstract object into a form that is susceptible to empirical scientific inquiry. Hinzen provides the following succinct definition of Chomskyan internalism:

Internalism is an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment. (2006, p. 139)

Internalism thus studies the internal structure and mechanisms of an organism; the external environment comes into the picture when the internal processes are ascribed content by the theorist, thus explaining how the internal mechanisms constitute a cognitive process in a particular environment. Such content ascriptions vary with the theorist’s interests and aims, but the (ascription of) content is not an essential part of the internalist theory itself (cf. Egan, 1995).

I discuss below the scientific claims and merits of externalism and Chomskyan internalism and the consequences that the creative aspect of language use has in regard to each qua scientific theory. I argue that whatever merits externalism may possess and despite its popularity, it is unable to provide a fruitful framework for a scientific theory of language. One might object that externalists do not see their enterprise as scientific and thus it is a moot point to compare it to other scientific pursuits. However, as I show below, there are externalists (Putnam, Davidson, Horwich, Fodor, Burge, et. al.) who explicitly state that their theory is a scientific one. Thus, since both externalists and Chomskyan internalists claim their theories to be scientific, it is possible and illuminating to compare the two from the perspective of scientific explanatory strategies and to ask which of the two is the most promising avenue in regard to constructing an explanatory scientific theory of language.

In other words, while it is true that externalists discuss their theories in terms of the determination of mental content, this does not preclude assessing their theories from the point of view of explanatory scientific strategy. As is the case with Chomskyan internalists, externalists attempt to explain the phenomena of language production and comprehension, and thus it is valid to assess the success of these explanations and compare them to competing theories that also try to explain the same phenomena. That is, substantive theoretical or philosophical differences are necessarily also ones of explanatory strategy. Since the aim of science is to construct theories that explain and predict phenomena, it is valid for one to compare these two approaches that claim to be scientific from the point of view of explanatory strategies.

2.1. Internalism, Externalism, and Science

Debates about the scientific status of linguistic theories are of course nothing new. Robert Lees’s 1957 review of Chomsky (1957) argues that it was one of the first serious attempts at linguistic science “which may be understood in the same sense that a chemical, biological theory is ordinarily understood by experts in those fields” (Lees, 1957, p. 377). Lees is one of the first in a long tradition that has supported the scientific claims of generative linguistics. Recently, John Collins remarked that “the greatest service Chomsky has provided for philosophy is to do philosophy of science via the construction of a new science” (2008, p. 25)[7] . McGilvray argues in regard to the “cognitive aspect of the faculty of language, or the computational system itself” that “there is a serious scientific enterprise devoted to its investigation, and with respect to capturing its structure, at least, there has been considerable progress” (1998, p. 238). Moreover, he says that he is “perfectly happy to say that the various branches of syntax are physical sciences, even if they are sciences of what is in the head, for all that “physical” means is that one has an honest science” (Ibid., p. 243).

Another example is Alec Marantz, who states that mainstream generative linguistics “operates at the nexus of computation, philosophy of language, and cognitive neuroscience” (2005, p. 431). Boeckx & Piattelli-Palmarini write that “The Chomskyan revolution in linguistics in the 1950s in essence turned linguistics into a branch of cognitive science (and ultimately biology) by both changing the linguistic landscape and forcing a radical change in cognitive science to accommodate linguistics […]”, and thus they “are persuaded, on solid grounds we think, that in the past 50 years [generative] linguistics has progressively established itself as a genuinely scientific discipline” (2005, p. 447).

How should one assess these claims? What definition or methodology of science can one appeal to in order to argue for or against the scientific status of a theory of language? Lees hints at a key distinguishing factor that can identify good science: an axiomatic system and an overarching explanatory theory. He compares Chomsky’s approach to studying language to the development of chemistry: it was only after Lavoisier’s work in the late eighteenth century that chemistry developed from its beginnings in alchemy to a scientific discipline.

Lavoisier’s work allowed chemistry to achieve its scientific status by pushing the discipline to concern itself not so much with the correctness of its postulates - though that is of course essential - but with explanatory theory construction.

The postulation of an overarching explanatory theory and an accompanying axiomatic system, though necessary, is not sufficient to distinguish a fecund and deeply explanatory science from one that is not. Chomskyan internalism proposes an explanatory theory, but, arguably, so does externalism: Putnam remarks that “a better philosophy and a better science of language” must encompass the “social dimension of cognition” and the “contribution of the environment, other people, and the world” to semantics (Putnam, 1975, p. 193, my emphasis). Horwich (2001, p. 371) argues that Davidson’s externalist truth-theoretic program “became widely accepted, instigating several decades of “normal science” in semantics.” Davidson himself is somewhat ambivalent, but still holds that “my own approach to the description, analysis (in a rough sense), and explanation of thought, language, and action has […] what I take to be some of the characteristics of a science” (1995, p. 123). Burge (2003, p. 465) remarks that he sees no reason why formal semantics, which postulates “reference, or a technical analogue, as a relation between linguistic representations and real aspects of the world, should not be an area of fruitful systematic scientific investigation.”

So apart from the construction of a self-consistent explanatory theory, which both externalism and internalism arguably have, what can distinguish the two in regard to their scientific credentials? I propose that the distinguishing criterion should be the subject matter of their theories. It is not enough to have an explanatorily self-consistent theory: your theory must also explain a scientifically tractable aspect of the world. In other words, if your theory fails to divide nature at the joints, then no improvement of its methodology or its explanations will matter. Moreover, observations of the creative aspect of language use imply that if one takes language use as the subject matter of one’s theory, as externalists do, then such a theory is unlikely to yield a deeply explanatory science. Before I offer an argument for this, a few remarks of clarification are in order.

2.2. Internalism versus Individualism

Putnam constructs various thought experiments to argue for the externalist claim that the individuation of meanings is impossible if one only considers thinkers in isolation, and thus a semantic theory must consider the person’s interaction with the environment and with other language users. The Twin Earth thought experiment is the most famous, but there are others that make the same point. One of which concerns the difference between an elm tree and a beech tree. Putnam claims to have the same concept for both elm trees and beech trees because, unlike botanists, he cannot tell them apart. But Putnam claims that “elm” and “beech” nevertheless have different meanings when he utters them. This is so even though, ex hypothesi, his mind-internal phenomena are identical whenever he utters “elm” or “beech”. Therefore, according to Putnam, considering the mind-external environment - the expert botanists, in this case - is the only way to discern the meaning of his utterance of “elm” or “beech”. He argues that one’s “individual psychological state certainly does not fix its extension; it is only the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that fixes the extension” (1975, p. 146, emphasis in original).

It is hard to argue with such a claim; of course one can only discern what a person’s utterance refers to by consulting the external environment. In order to determine the extension of Putnam’s utterance of either “elm” or “beech” one must consult not only Putnam’s mind-internal states and knowledge but also the knowledge of an expert who can distinguish between an elm and a beech, as well as the environment in which the utterance was produced. Be that as it may, however, the question arises as to the relation between such a search for individuation conditions and a science of language. That is, what is the relation, if any, between the search for the conditions under which one is justified in ascribing a particular meaning to an utterance, and a science of language that seeks to explain how linguistic utterances are produced and comprehended? I argue that studying the mechanisms in the mind by which meaning is made possible is one enterprise, the ascription of meaning to particular utterances another[8] .

Millikan (2004, p. 227) concurs when she says in regard to Putnam’s argument that if “we explain the externalist idea in this crude way […] it becomes hard to see how anyone could deny it.” That is, “If the question were, merely, how are the referents or extensions of thoughts determined, it seems patently obvious that nothing inside someone’s head could, by itself, determine that anything in particular existed outside the head.” Millikan says that externalism so defined should not be so obviously true, but instead of turning against externalism she clings to it. But her remedy does not help and in fact complicates the matter further. Her externalist theory defines “inner representations by the way they function, not just in the head, but as parts of much larger systems that include portions of the environment” (Ibid., p. 229). The functions of the inner representations, on Millikan’s account, were selected by natural selection in the course of the organism interacting with its environment in a “Normal” way. Thus, it is “this reference to a certain kind of history of selection and/or development that adds the radically externalist twist to this theory of mental representation” (Ibid.).

Millikan believes that mental representations can only be individuated by reference to their function, and thus she argues that we must adopt an externalist and evolutionary stance to individuation because “What a thing was designed to do is not always evident just from its inner function, even from its inner function plus the structure of its current environment” (Ibid.)[9] She remarks that “whether an inner happening or structure is a representation is not merely a matter of its inner structure.” But the question again arises as to whether this claim is relevant to scientific theories of meaning or mental representations that attempt to discover the mechanisms by which language production and comprehension are possible? Externalists claim that the criteria of the ascription of meaning or of function belong in a scientific theory of language, but I argue below that this will not yield a fruitful science.

As a final remark, it should be noted that Chomskyan internalism is compatible with the view that the individuation of meanings is impossible without considering the environmental context of an utterance. If the aim of your theory is to discover the conditions under which an outside observer can make a correct judgement as to the meaning of a specific utterance (relative to the way the meaning is used within the linguistic community of the speaker), then of course such a theory must include within its domain the environment outside the head. But such a claim has little to do with a scientific theory of meaning. The externalist claim that it does follows from their glossing over an important distinction between the theory itself and the way in which the theorist uses and interprets the theory to achieve certain explanatory goals (cf. Egan, 1995; 1999; 2003). This ambiguity is evident in remarks such as Ben-Menahem’s (2005), who notes in regard to one of Putnam’s examples that “to speak of coffee tables it does not suffice for us merely to have the concept of a coffee table, but we must be in contact with actual coffee tables” (p. 10, emphasis in original). In other words, there’s an ambiguity between a theory that explains our ability to have the concept of, say, a coffee table, and a theory that purports to explain how it is that we use this concept to talk about actual coffee tables. Or, more generally, the difference is between a theory of the mechanisms in virtue of which language production and comprehension is made possible, and a theory of the use of those mechanisms in, say, social interaction. When externalists claim that a science of language must encompass the social dimension of linguistic behaviour, it is not clear whether the claim is that this aspect of linguistic behaviour must be included within the scope of the theory itself, or whether this aspect can be connected to the theory by what Egan calls the theory’s interpretation function. This distinction is important, for failure to adhere to it results in a defective explanatory theory.

3. Can Externalism Form the Basis of a Science of Language?

Let us now look at an externalist theory of language in detail in order to assess whether it can form the basis of a fecund and explanatory scientific theory of language.

3.1. Horwich’s Use-Theory of Meaning

Horwich (2005; 2008; 2010) claims that his use-based semantics is compatible with a linguistics construed as an empirical science. I give a brief sketch of his theory - by contrasting it with truth-theoretic semantics - and then argue that the reasons for doubting Horwich’s scientific claims are the same as the reasons for rejecting externalist theories of meaning in general as candidates for scientific theories of language.

Horwich (2008) is a critique of mainstream formal semantics in which he argues that there is no reason to think that language has a truth theoretic basis. He claims that while the problems truth-theoretic semantics presents “are highly challenging, requiring considerable skill and ingenuity, and that enormous progress has been made in these endeavours over the last forty years or so”, citing such progress “is not enough to vindicate truth-theoretic semantics as an empirical subject, as an integral part of the global scientific enterprise” (p. 318, fn. 12, emphasis in original). He argues that in order to be scientific, truth-theoretic semanticists must show how their derivations have contributed to the explanation of observable events. However, “that has not, and cannot, be done” (Ibid.).

Horwich’s main objection to truth-theoretic semantics has to do with compositionality and the assumption of formal semanticists that the focus of semantics should be sentence meanings. Davidson’s truth-theoretic approach, for example, involves a compositional theory of meaning in which the meanings of sentences depend on the meanings of their constituent words. Horwich takes the opposite approach, for he believes that compositionality is relatively easy to accommodate and thus one needs to first identify the meanings of words and then “presupposing compositionality, to trivially deduce the theoreticalmeanings of sentences” (Ibid., p. 314).

Inverting the focus of semantics from sentences to words has the deflationary effect of nullifying truth-theoretic semantics because truth conditions apply to sentences and not to words. Given this focus on words, Horwich suggests that the theoretical characterisation of word meanings should be deduced not from sentence meaning but from sentence usage. And so his alternative is an externalist semantic theory that rejects truth conditions in favour of the claim that “the underlying basis of each word’s meaning is the (idealized) law governing its usage - a law that dictates the “acceptance conditions” of certain specified sentences containing it” (Horwich, 2005, p. 26). This law of acceptance conditions purportedly solves the puzzle of why it is that, say, “The sky is blue” tends to be recognised as true.

Horwich believes that the phenomena that semantics needs to explain are those of sentence acceptance. He elaborates: “I don’t mean “accepted as grammatical”, but “accepted as true”, i.e., “in the belief-box”.” Moreover, acceptance “sometimes leads to utterance (depending on the speaker’s desires); therefore explaining the acceptance of a sentence may contribute to explaining its being uttered” (2008, p. 315, fn. 9, emphasis in original). According to Horwich, there are scientific laws that govern sentence acceptance. Given such laws, “it will be relatively easy to see how word-meanings, alongside other factors, will be capable of explaining what needs to be explained (namely, the acceptance-status of all sentences containing it)” (Ibid., p. 318, emphasis in original). And so insofar as linguistics is an empirical science, says Horwich, “standing alongside psychology, neurology, biology, physics, etc.”, such acceptance-laws “should be testable against concrete observable events” (Ibid., p. 315). Thus, “the semanticist of a given language ought to be looking, concerning each word, for the basic law governing its use” (Ibid., p. 319), and if such laws are forthcoming and explanatorily fruitful, Horwich believes that “Semantics would then somewhat resemble fundamental physics” (Ibid., p. 318). In other words, the claim is that there are law-like regularities of word use, which are purportedly “characterised in non-semantic, non-normative terms” - that is, in naturalistic, scientific terms. These regularities are then used to derive facts about which rules of language use people implicitly follow. These regularities and rules, then, “suffice to fix what we mean by our words and hence sentences” (Horwich, 2010, p. 113, emphasis in original).

3.2. Problems with Use-Theories of Meaning

Horwich writes that if “a semantic theory explains the phenomena of sentenceacceptance - and if it coheres with theories of phonology, syntax, and pragmatics to yield a science that explains all the phenomena of linguistic activity - then it is a good theory” (2008, p. 319). He argues that truth-theoretic semantics cannot yield such a science but that his use-based semantics can. However, since both are externalist theories that claim to find scientifically tractable regularities in language production, and due to the creative aspect of language use, I argue that they cannot yield a fruitful and explanatory science of language.

As noted above, Horwich believes that “the underlying basis of each word’s meaning is the (idealized) law governing its usage” (2005, p. 26). He claims that in order to make linguistics an empirical science semanticists need to look for the basic laws governing the use of words, but this assumes that there are scientifically interesting regularities in language use; and that is far from obvious. Moreover, the phenomenon of, say, a particular word’s usage, is merely the effect of the internal psychological mechanisms of language. The regularities of language use, such as they are, do not explain anything but rather are what needs to be explained. Cummins (2010) talks of the “scandal” of the widely held belief that scientific explanation is subsumption under law: “Laws tell us what the mind does, not how it does it. We want to know how the mind works, not just what it does” (Ibid., p. 140). It is the capacity for language use that science seeks to explain, and laws of word use that Horwich postulates are at best the effects of this capacity. The laws describe the data to be explained, and the explanation involves the mechanisms in virtue of which language use is made possible. In fact, most scientific explanation in general follows what Thagard (2012) calls the mechanista view of scientific method, which holds that to explain a phenomenon is to describe a mechanism that produces it. Thus, in order to be an explanatory theory, use-based semantics needs not only laws of word use, the existence of which is tenuous at best, but also the mechanisms in virtue of which word use is made possible.

More specifically, sentence acceptance, a main tenet of Horwich’s theory, is deeply problematic, and it is unclear whether it can be generalised beyond the examples that Horwich gives (cf. Schiffer, 2000). But even if the notion of sentence acceptance can be spelled out, use theories of meaning, as Gupta (2003)[10] remarks, rest “on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning” (p. 654). That is, sentence acceptance may overlap to some extent with sentence meaning, but they are not the same thing. Gupta argues that there is little reason to think that explanatorily basic patterns of sentence acceptance in Horwich’s theory can provide the meaning of a word. This is because “the acceptance of sentences depends not just on the meanings of words but also on the methods of obtaining information (and misinformation) about the world” (Ibid., p. 666).

3.3. Problems with Externalist Theories in General

Whatever the details of use theories of meaning and their idiosyncratic difficulties, they are still externalist theories and thus face the same general problems as all externalist theories.

The fact that sentence acceptance depends not just on the meanings of words but also on the methods of obtaining information about the world hints at the main reason for the inability of externalist theories such as Horwich’s to serve as scientific theories of language: the problem is the subject matter and scope of the theories. The reason is the same reason given by Katz & Fodor (1963, p. 179) fifty years ago. They ask the reader to compare the following three sentences:

Should we take junior back to the zoo? Should we take the lion back to the zoo? Should we take the bus back to the zoo? They then remark that, for example, “Information which figures in the choice of the correct readings for these sentences includes the fact that lions, but not children and busses, are often kept in cages.” After listing a handful of other examples, they note that the “reader will find it an easy matter to construct an ambiguous sentence whose resolution requires the representation of practically any item of information about the world he chooses.” Thus, a linguistic theory that takes it upon itself to resolve such ambiguities clearly must include within its scope every feature of the world that speakers may need in order to arrive at the correct reading of an ambiguous utterance. But practically any piece of information about the world is potentially relevant. Further problems arise when theorists investigate the truth of an utterance in relation to the mind-external world.

A theory that includes language use and the mind’s relations to the world within its explanatory scope cannot hope to find reliable relations of this sort - let alone systematise them into a fruitful explanatory scientific theory. This is due to the creative aspect of language use: if language use is indeed uncaused in the above sense, but is at the same time coherent and appropriate to the circumstances at hand, then there will be no scientifically interesting regularities of the sort Horwich and other externalists claim to exist. This is in addition to the fact that even if there were such regularities, they would merely be a rewording of the phenomena to be explained.

Another problem is that meaning is defined in externalist theories in a way that makes them unable to distinguish between the speaker’s linguistic knowledge and their world knowledge. In Putnam’s example of elms and beeches, the theorist must consult not only the mind-internal mechanisms of the speaker but also their, and other speakers’, world knowledge. To really know whether Putnam’s utterance means “elm” or “beech” the theorist must, according to externalism, (1) consult Putnam’s linguistic knowledge, (2) his world knowledge about elms and beeches (and whether he can tell them apart), and (3) the world knowledge of other speakers (the expert botanists who can tell the difference between elms and beeches). Clearly, then, externalists demand that a theory of linguistic meaning include within its scope not only the internal linguistic mechanisms of the speaker, but also the world knowledge of the speaker and the relation that holds between the speaker’s utterance and the world. But if all of the aforementioned must be included in the same theory, then externalism cannot in principle distinguish between linguistic knowledge and world knowledge (cf. Haiman, 1980).

In other words, a linguistic ability is couched by externalists in terms of representations of all the knowledge about the world that speakers share. However, as Katz & Fodor remark, “since there is no serious possibility of systematizing all the knowledge of the world that speakers share, and since a theory of the kind we have been discussing requires such a systematization, it is ipso facto not a serious model for semantics” (1963, p. 179)[11] . The same holds for all externalist theories of meaning: they are not a serious model for scientific theories of meaning because their subject matter is too wide in scope. In other words, if the creative aspect of language use is the subject matter of your theories, and if Descartes was right to point out the uncaused yet appropriate nature of language use, then externalist theories of language use will not yield a fruitful and explanatory science. As outlined in the next section, however, a scientific theory of the mechanisms that underlie language use is possible.

Has Khums BeenForgiven during the Absence of Imam Zaman (a.s.)?

They ask: “Hasn’t Khums been forgiven during the absence of Imam Zaman (a.s .) from his holiness to Shiites and still have people the duty to pay Khums to Bayt Al-Mal in order to spend in necessary ways of consumption? While several cabbalas say that: “Imams of Ahlul Bayt has forgiven Khums”. Therefore if we accept that Khums is obligatory on all kinds of income, then we should also accept that Khums is forgiven during the absence time!

***

The answer to this question is available almost in all of Fiqh books and those who assume that this question is a new question or they are the only persons who have seen the Ahadith of Tahlil (to make Halaal) are hardly mistaking.

A glimpse to Fiqh books especially the bookswhich recent Faqihs have wrote shows that this matter had been completely in the area of attention of Faqihs and they had answered to that.

We consider it necessary to explain this issue completely for respected readers in order to give more description.

Cabbalas which have caused this hallucination consist in five groups:

First, are cabbalas which have been said about the spoils of war and captives of war and women who were among slaves and had been taken as servants by people and those people married them and had children with those women.

We know that if Jihad had not been performed by the permission of Imam, then all of spoils which are taken are for Bayt Al-Mal and should be spent by the permission of Imam and if jihad had been performed by the permission of Imam then Khums applies on them and in case of not paying the Khums, using them is Haraam.

Therefore, female servants who had taken by people as spoils and their Khums had not been paid were Haraam to their owners and theydidn’t have the right to treat those women as their wives.

Therefore, if you notice this ruling then understand that children who are born from these women are illegitimate, therefore Imams of Ahlul Bayt have forgiven this part of Khums which is related to those women in order that their children born legitimately.1

According to this short preface, we mentionthis group of cabbalas in continue :

1- We read in cabbala of “Zurays Kunasi” that Imam Sadiq (a.s .) said: “Do you know that from where adultery entered among (some of) people?I said no. He said: From the Khums of us Ahlul Bayt, except our pure Shiites which is Halaal for them and also it is Halaal for their birth”.2

2- Muhammad ibn Muslim quotes from Imam Baqir (a.s.) or Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that he said: “The most severe thing which people are involved with in the day of judgment is that the owner of Khums stands and says My God! (Usurped) My Khums but we made it Halaal for our Shiites in order that their birth to be pure and their children born pure.3

3- Fazil (Ibn Yassar) quoted from Imam Sadiq (a.s .) that he said: “A person who feel our love in his hearth thanks Allah for his first gift.I said: What is the first gift of Allah your holiness? Hesaid: It is the purity of birth (and sperm).

Then he said: Amir Al-Mu’mineen (a.s .) told Fatima (a.s.) that make your share from spoils Halaal for the fathers of our Shiites in order to make them pure.

Then Imam Sadiq (a.s.) said: We made mothers of our Shiites Halaal for their fathers in order that they become pure (and their children to be Halaal children)”.4 And Also Ahadith 15, 16, 18 and 20 from chapter 4 of chapters of Anfal and Hadith 8 from chapter 8 of chapters “What Khums is obligatory in it”.

These eight Ahadith has been expressed clearly about the issue of female servants and we know that according to affirmation of Faqihs they are excluded from Khums but obstinate and less-literate people have wanted to make them as a prove for Tahlil (to make Halaal) of Khums in absolute way without noticing to content of them and noticing to explicit Fatwas of Faqihs, unaware that with a little attention to the content of these Ahadith their lie will be revealed.

***

Second, are Ahadith which proves the Tahlil of Khums in specific and certain time, because as we said before Prophet (S) and Imams (a.s.) as the governor of Islamic government had the right to forgive this Islamic tax in special conditions according to benefits of Muslims.

As it had necessitated to add some extraordinary taxes temporarily and limited in hard conditions, also this is one of the authorities of Islamic government to dispense with that temporarily according to the conditions of Muslims.

We mentioned some examples of these Ahadith in continue:

1- “Younos ibn Ya’qoob” quotes that I was with Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that a man entered and said your holiness, there are assets and benefits and merchandises that we gain and we know that you right is in them and we are guilty about this matter; Imam (a.s.) said: If we order you to pay these rights today this is unfair (it means that we forgive them to you because of strong pressure from government or living which is on you).5

2- Hakim (Ibn Eisa) quotes from Imam Sadiq (a.s .) that I asked what is the meaning of the verse “و اعلموا انما غنمتم ”? He answered: “Any benefit whicha human gains day by day; but my father forgave Shiites in order them to be pure”.

All of these Ahadithare related to exemption of a group of Muslims who were in special conditions from this Islamic tax plan and it is not the proof of general exemption at all.

The clear proof and strong evidence about this matter is that some of other Imams (a.s.) or Imam Baqir (a.s.) and Imam Sadiq (a.s.) had charged Shiites to pay that and take this Islamic tax from them seriously in conditions that they were capable of paying, and we mention some examples in continue:

1- “Muhammad ibn Zayd Tabari” quotes that one of merchants from Fars who were one of friends of Imam “Ali ibn Mousa Al-Reza (a.s.)” wrote a letter to his holiness and askedfor the Tahlil (to make Halaal) of Khums, his holiness wrote him:

“In the name of Allah the compassionate the merciful, Allah is most granter and generous, he had made a prize for any good act and deprivation of prize for abstaining from good acts; there is no Halaal (free and permitted to use) asset unless Allah has made it Halaal (know that) Khums helps us to organize religious tasks and also tasks about our family and our Shiites, and we save our honor by that against tyrants.

Therefore, do not ignore paying of Khums …

Muslim is a person who is loyal to the divine oath and pledge, not in the way his tongue says that and his hearts denies”.6

2- And also the same person quotes that a group came to Imam “Ali ibn Mousa Al-Reza (a.s.)” from Khorasan and asked him to exempt them of paying Khums, Imam said: “I do not permit such a thing, you express your kindness to me by your words, but you withhold the right which Allah has legislated for us and has made us its servants from us, I do not exempt any of you, do not exempt, do not exemp”.7

3- Abu Basir quotes from Imam Baqir (a.s .) that I heard that his holiness was saying: “Anyone who buy something from Khums, Allah will not forgive him because he has bought a thing which is not Halaal for him”.8

Moreover, cabbalas 8, 9 and 10 of this chapterand also cabbalas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of chapter eight from chapters of “What Khums is obligatory in it” say that some of Imams (a.s.) not only didn’t permit the Tahlil of Khums, but also took that seriously for spending in necessary cases.

Itis understood well from these cabbalas that the matter is not permanent and forever, but it is exclusive to specific conditions like some of tax exemptions.

***

Third, has been about a specific person, which means that a specific person had came to Imam (a.s .) and Imam exempt him from paying Khums by considering his conditions.

Example of this matter is Hadith 13 of chapter 1 from chapters ofAnfal9 which shows that a person called “Hakam ibn Oliya Asadi” came to Imam Baqir (a.s.) while he had brought the Khums of his assets, his holiness took that Khums and then forgive it to him.

Because the conditions of this person were in the form that because of need or encourage or any other purpose, it was best thing to do to exempt him from paying Khums.

And the sentence that Imam said “I make this Halaal for you” is a proof for the fact that this order had not been a general ruling, unless this expression doesn’t make any sense.

***

Fourth, are cabbalas which theirs contents are about Tahlil but it clears by noticing that the meaning of them is not Khums, but it is “Anfal” (Spoils and also public resources)

Like cabbala 12 of chapter 4 from chapters ofAnfal which the late owner of Wasael has mentioned that with other cabbalas of Tahlil in one chapter, but it is understood well from below of the cabbala that it is related to Anfal lands (public resources).

Therefore, all emphasize of this cabbala is on the issue of lands and fields.

And also seventeenth cabbala of this chapter.

***

Fifth, arecabbalas which are not exclusive to specific time or person, and their features are absolute Tahlil, that are only three cabbalas which we study in continue.

First is the cabbala that “Salim ibn Mukram” (Abu Khadija) quotes from Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that I was there when someone came to Imam (a.s.) and said I want you to permit me for sexual intercourse with women, Imam was frightened by his words; a person from attendance said he does not mean to rape people, but he means that he wants to buy a female servant (from spoils and assets which their Khums has not been paid) or a women to marry him, or a heritage which he receives, or the income of business or the thing that someone gives him as a gift; Imam (a.s.) said these are all Halaal for all of our Shiites, consisting those who are present here or absent, those who are dead or alive, or those who will be born until the end of days, these are Halaal for everyone.10

Although nothing has been mentioned explicitly about the Khums in text of Hadith, but thething which Imam (a.s.) has made Halaal for everyone consisting of merchandise and spoils of war and gifts should be an asset which Khums has been implied on it.

But we should note that first of all, the document of this Hadith is weak because Salim ibn Mukram who his another name is Abu Khadija is the subject of lots of discussions among scholars of Rijal science; some persons considered him reliable and some others considered him very weak, and some scholars has stop discussing about him and expressed no comment, and accordingly cabbalas which he had quoted alone are not acceptable.

Secondly, if we pay little attention to the question which has been asked from Imam, it clears that whole discussion in cabbala is about female servants whom Khums had been implied on them or women who their Mahr (marital gift) had been paid from assets which their Khums had not been paid, or a female servant or a women who has been given to a person with gifts and heritages which Khums had implied on them.

Briefly, content of Hadith is completely about women and wives who are given to a Muslim, and either their Mahr or they themselves have been one of cases of implication of Khums and the answer of Imam (a.s.) is also exclusive to this part, unless this does not any sense that a person asks about women and another person from attendance generalize his words to everything.

Therefore the last thing which is understood from this Hadith is that any right which belongs to the Khums of Mahr of women and spouses has been made Halaal by Imam (a.s.) for anytime and anyone of Shiites in order for “purity of birth” which means legitimacy of children, and as we said before this is the matter which our Faqihs had expressed in Fiqh books as an exception, but it could not be the proof of forgiveness of Khums forever, but forgiveness is exclusive to the issue of wife and female servant.

Also we know that according to cabbalas of chapter of “Mahr” (marital gift) if a person has decided not to pay the Mahr of a woman or pay it from a Haraam asset, he is considered as adulterer.11

Although some Faqihs understood Tahrim (being Haraam) and some others Karahat (being disliked) from this kind of Ahadith, but anyhow it shows that paying Mahr from asset which is not completely owned by a person is not without influence on the condition of child and accordingly this part of Khums has been forgiven in order for purity of children.

There it is not possible to prove a thing with thiscabbala which has neither enough implication nor reliable document.

Second one is a Hadith that “Ma’aaz ibn Kathir” quotes from Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that he said: “There is lots of opportunities for our Shiites in order to spend their wealth in charity in the way of Allah, but when our Qa’im (he who arises) arises, any treasure which anyone has saved will become Haraam for him, in order to give that treasure to him and use it for achieving to his goals”.

But as it clears by an accurate look, nothing has been mentioned about the issue of Khums in this Hadith, but it points to the fact that capitalists and rich people of the nation can save wealth and also spend in charity in the way of Allah until the day that Mahdi (a.s.) arises, then in that day they should give all of their savings to him in order to use them for advancement and expansion of justice of earth.

The best reason for the fact that Hadith has no relation with Khums is that he says they should give all of their savings to Mahdi not only its Khums (one fifth), because if the purpose of Hadith was the issue of Khums he should say give its Khums to him.

Also we should note that there is “Muhammad ibn Sinan” among tellers of this Hadith whom his condition is not clear for the scholars of Rijal science and they have arguments about him.

Third one is a Mursala Hadith which has been quoted in “Interpretation of Ayyashi” from Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that he said: “The most difficult thing which people are involved with in the day of judgment is that the owner of Khums stands and say My God! My Khums (has not been paid), but our Shiites are exempted from this matter”.

It is obvious without saying anything that, this Hadith is Mursala and an unknown person has quoted that from Imam Sadiq (a.s .) and it is impossible to refer to it according to the Hadith science and this is an expression which all scholars of Rijal have accepted.

***

We conclude from all that we said, that there is no acceptable proof for Tahlil of Khums in an absolute way available, and those who claim like this in fact had not studied these cabbalas enough, unless it is clear according to above assortment that there is no cabbala available which its content shows the exemption of all people from Khums.

Albeit if we see cabbalas by an elementary view, maybe this hallucination occurs, but as we saw it clear by studying and analyzing and correct assorting of cabbalas that hallucination of absolute Tahlil is not correct and Khums is still available as an Islamic order.

And all people have to perform that like other duties.

Notes

1. It has been completely discussed about slavery in Islam and why Islam has allowed such a thing about the captives of wars and the plan of Islam for making slaves free and preventing humans to be trade in the book “Islam and freedom of slaves”.

2. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, Hadith 3 from chapter 4 of chapters of Anfal.

3. Hadith 5, from chapter 4 of chapters of Anfal.

4. Hadith 10, from chapter 4 of chapters of Anfal.

5. Hadith 6, from chapter 4 of chapter of Anfal.

6. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, chapter 3 from chapters of Anfal, Hadith 2.

7. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, chapter 3, Hadith 3.

8. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, chapter 3, Hadith 5.

9. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6.

10. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, chapter four of Anfal, Hadith 4.

11. Refer to Wasael Al-Shi"aa, vol. 15, pages 21 & 22 & 23 (chapter 11 from chapters of Mahrs).

Had Khums Been Taken from People at the Beginning of Islam?

For answering this question we should say that if purpose of beginning of Islam is the time of Imams (a.s.), then the answer is positive, because as it is understood from previous discussions most of leader Imams (a.s.) not only took the Khums of all kinds of income in their time, but their ordered people emphasizing on paying this Khums, and even they had chosen special deputies and agents for collecting this Khums and people like “Ali ibn Mahzyar” and “Abu Ali ibn Rashid” and like them had this duty.1

And if the purpose of beginning of Islam is specifically the time of Prophet (S) and Amir Al-Mu’mineen (a.s.), then we should say that Khums had been taken in their time from spoils of war and also mines and treasures and diving (gems which gains by diving from the sea) and the proof of this matter has been quoted in Sunan of Beihaghi that in time of Ali (a.s.) a person found a treasure and came to Imam, Imam (a.s.) said: Four fifth of that asset is yours and one fifth (Khums) of that asset is mine.2

And also another matter like this has been quoted in the same book in another Hadith.3

And also in that same book which is one famous resources of Ahlul Sunnah has been quoted that he said: there is Khums in “Rekaz”; people asked that what is Rekaz? He said: Gold andsilver which Allah has created from the day of beginning in the earth.4

Also, a detailed Hadith about this matter has been quoted in Wasael Al-Shi’aa from the time of Ali (a.s.) that a person found a “Rekaz” (mine of treasure) in the time of Ali (a.s.) and when his holiness informed about that he told that man: Bring its Khums and hand it over.5

We had some Ahadith in previous discussions that showed Prophet (S) ordered continuously that there is Khums in Soyoob and people should pay its Khums and as we said before “Soyoob” pronounced as “Oyoob” is plural form of “Sayb” pronounced as “Ghayb” in the meaning of mines and treasures and some persons said that it can also consists of any kind of gift and bestowal and by the way we conclude that order of Khums in other than soils of war had been issued in the time of prophet (S) and Prophet had ordered people to give that in his letters.6

But this question remained that if Khums had been taken from all kinds of income in the time of Prophet (S) and Ali (a.s.) or not?

We say in answer to this question that we do not have clear historical evidences about this matter that Khums of all incomes had been taken in the time of Prophet (S) and Ali (a.s .), but this matter makes no problem about this ruling.

Because as we said before, taking and forgiving of this Islamic tax is one of authorities of Islamic government, when government find itself needless or people in trouble it can forgive that but when government has needs and sees the ability of paying in people it can take that, like later Imams who some of them had took Khums and some others had forgave that according to the conditions of people or Bayt Al-Mal.

In the time of Prophet (S) and Ali (a.s.) lots of spoils from battles and also great income from Kharaj lands which their rents had been paid to Bayt Al-Mal had gained by Islamic government; amount of these spoils some times were so much that their Khums could easily solve most of financial problems of Islamic government.

And also sometimes income from Kharaj lands were so much that Bayt Al-Mal had been overflowed by assets and in these conditions there were no need for taking Khums of all incomes and therefore they had forgave it to people practically.

At the beginning of Islam when the need of Bayt Al-Mal was so much to resources of income, conditions of Muslims were so unsettled and weak that paying Khums after Zakat was cumbersome for them, and accordingly Khumshad not been taken .

But in the time of other Imams (a.s.) when the Khums of spoils of war and also income of Kharaj lands had been taken by usurper caliphs and Imams had not them, and also people had the ability of paying the Khums of all of their incomes, Imams had taken Khums from them.

Briefly, not taking Khums in the time of Prophet (S) and Ali (a.s .) from all kinds of income is not he reason for nonexistence of this ruling in the program of rulings of Islam.

Mentioning this point is also necessary that it is understood from some letters of Prophet (S) which we quoted before that he had taken Khums from “Anfal” (dead land, pasturages and streams).

And we read in the book “Kanz Al-Ummal7 ” which if one famous resources of Ahlul Sunnah that he said:

ان لکم بطول الارض و سهولها و تلاع الاودیة و ظهورها على ان ترعوا نباتها و تشربوا مائها على ان تؤدّوا الخمس

Notes

1. Refer to Ahadith of chapter eight from chapters of “What Khums is obligatory in it”, vol. 6 of Wasael Al-Shi’aa.

2. Sunan of Beihaghi, vol. 4, page 156.

3. Sunan of Beihaghi, vol. 4, page 157.

4. Sunan of Beihaghi, vol. 4, page 152.

5. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, the book of Khums, chapter six, Hadith 1.

6. Refer to the book “Makateeb Al-Rasool”, pages 397 & 405 and also “Usd Al-Ghaba”, section 3, page 38.

7. Kanz Al-Ummal, vol. 7, page 65; and in the book “Makateeb Al-Rasool”, page 365, it has been quoted from other resources.

Is allocating Khums for Sadat Discrimination?

Some people assume that this Islamic tax which consists twenty percent of lots of assets and half of it has been allocated for Sadat (pl. of Sayyid) and children of Prophet (S) is considered as a kind of racial superiority, and it is possible to see partiality for relatives and discrimination in that, and this matter is not compatible with the soul of social justice of Islam and universality and generality of that!

Answer:

Surely, people who think this way had not studied the conditions and characteristics of this Islamic ruling completely, because the complete answer to this questionis hidden in these conditions; the explanation of this expression is that:

First of all, half of Khums which is for Sadat of Bani Hashim should be given exclusively to their poor persons, and only as much as they need for one year to live and nothing more than that; therefore only persons who are either superannuated or ill, and orphan children or any other person who has reached a dead end in costs of living in any way.

Therefore, persons who are able to work and potentially or practically can gain an income which cover their costs of living, never can use this part of Khums, and the sentence which is famous among people that: “Sadat take Khums even the chute of their house has been made by from gold!” is nothing more than common talk and has no fundamentals at all.

Secondly, poor and needy persons of Bani Hashim do not have the right to spend anything from “Zakat” and inchange they should only use this part of Khums.1

Thirdly, if the share ofSadat which is half of Khums is more than their need, then that amount should be paid to Bayt Al-Mal, as if their need is more than their share from Khums, inevitably they should be paid from Bayt Al-Mal or the share of “Zakat”.2

According to these triple reasons, it clears that in fact no differencehad been made between Sadat and other than Sadat in financial matters.

Needy and poor persons of Sadat can cover their costs of living for one year from Zakat but theyare deprived from Khums and poor people who are not from Sadat can use Khums, but they do not have the right to use Zakat.

In fact, two sources are available here, source of Khums and source of Zakat, and each of these two groups can only use one of these two resources in equalamount which is the costs of living for one year.

But persons who did not pay attention to these characteristics and conditions assume that more share has been placed for Sadat from Bayt Al-Mal.

The only question that remains is that if there is no difference in result between these two sources then what benefit can this program have?

The answer to this question can also be understood by noticing a matter, and the matter is that there is an important difference between Khums and Zakat and the difference is that Zakat is one of taxes which in fact considers as public assets of Islamic society, therefore its usages should be in this same part, but Khums is one of taxes which is related to Islamic government; it means that costs of Islamic government and its governor should be provided from this source.

Therefore, deprivation of Sadat from public assets (Zakat) in fact is for preventing the relatives of Prophet (S) from this part, in order not to give anybody any excuse that Prophet (S) has dominated his relatives on public assets.

But needy and poor persons of Sadat should also be provided; this matter has been foreseen in Islamic laws in the way that they use the budget of Islamic government not the public budget.

Therefore, not only Khums is a superiority or advantage for Sadat, but it is a kind of putting them aside for public benefits in order that no misdeem can be made.3

In other hand, these cabbalas prove this fact that “Zakat” is not a considerable income which anyone tries to gain that and people use that for gaining blessings, but these are dirty assets because a person had not worked for that and pure and clean assets are those which human works and endeavors for gaining them.

And the main goal is that Zakat reaches people who really deserve it not the ones who are lazy and idle and do not want to work for their living, albeit this is salubrious and completely without obstacle for people who really deserve Zakat and seemingly this expression (Awsakh) is taken from the holy verse (verse 130 of Tawba Sura) “خذ من اموالهم صدقة تطهّرهم ” because this verse say that paying Zakat is the cause of purity and we know that in order to pure a thing we should always remove its dirt from it.

It is interesting that this matter has been mentioned it Ahadith of Shi’aa and Ahlul Sunnah; we read in a Hadith from Imam Sadiq (a.s.) that a group of people from Bani Hashim came to Prophet (S) and asked his holiness to launch them in the duty of collection Zakat of four-footed animals and they said we deserve more for this share which Allah has specified for collectors of Zakat; Prophet (S) said: Bani Abdul Muttalib! Zakat is not Halaal (permitted) neither forme nor you, but I promise my intercession in change of this deprivation … you should be satisfied of thing s which Allah and your Prophet have specified for you (and do not deal with Zakat)! They said we got satisfied.4

It is well understood from this Hadith that Bani Hashim had known this matter as a deprivation forthemselves and the Prophet (S) promised them the intercession in change.

We read a Hadith in “Sahih of Muslim” which is one of most famous books of Ahlul Sunnah that briefly says “Abbas” and “Rabi’a ibn Harith” came to Prophet (S) and asked him that their sons who were two young persons called “Abdul Muttalib ibn Rabi’a” and “Fazl ibn Abbas” to be the collectors of Zakat and take a share like others in order to provide the costs of their marriages, Prophet (S) denied that and ordered that their means of marriage to be provided from another way and Mahr to be paid from Khums.5

It is also understood from thisHadith which is too long with details that Prophet (S) insisted that prevent their relatives from achieving Zakat (public assets).

It cleared from thethings which we said that Khums is not only considered as an advantage for Sadat, but it is a kind of deprivation in order to save public benefits.

Notes

1. The proofs of this matter that Bani Hashim dynasty have been prevented from taking Zakat are lots of cabbalas which have been quoted in Shiites’ and Sonnies’ books, and these cabbalas are so much that no place for any kind of doubt will remain, and denying these cabbalas is equal to denying self evidence matters; for information about these cabbalas in Shiite resources you can refer to the book Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, chapter 29 from chapters of “people who deserve Zakat”, first, second, third and fourth Hadith.

And Also chapter 30, first Hadith; chapter 31, third Hadith; chapter 32, third, fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth Hadith; chapter 33, first Hadith and chapter 34, fourth Hadith.

And for more information about Ahadith of this issue in Sunni resources, you can refer to the book “Sunan of Beihaghi”, vol. 7; the book “Al-Sadaqat”, page 29, chapter “آل محمّد لایعطون من الصّدقات المفروضات ” and page 30, chapter “بیان آل محمّد الّذین تحرّم علیهم الصّدقة المفروضة ”.

And Also to the book “Majma’ Al-Zawa’ed”, vol. 2, page 89, chapter “الصّدقة لرسول اللّه و لآله ” and the book “Makateeb Al-Rasool”, pages 216, 224, 230 and 432.

And to the book “Musannaf” by Abdul Razzaq, vol.4, page 50, chapter “لا تحلّ الصّدقة لآل محمّد ” which there is lots of cabbalas quoted about this matter.

And also to the book “Al-Mughani” by Ibn Qudama, p r i n ted in Beirut, vol. 2, page 519, and the book “Sunan of ibn Dawood”, p r i n ted in Beirut, vol. 2, page 45 and other books.

2. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, chapter 3 from chapters of share of Khums, Hadith 1 and 2.

3. It is considerable that in some of Islamic cabbalas like Hadith 2, chapter 29 from chapter of “people who deserve Zakat”, vol. 6 of the book “Wasael Al-Shi’aa”, Zakat has been expressed as “Awsakh” (dirt of people’s hands), and the purpose of this expression is to encourage Bani Hashim to this deprivation that they have and in another side, show people that they should provide their needs with their own efforts as much as they can and they should not impose themselves to Bayt Al-Mal, and only people who have crushed under the pressure of life can be provided in this way.

4. Wasael Al-Shi’aa, vol. 6, page 186.

5. Sahih of Muslim, vol. 2, page 752.

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