Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter Three: The Demonstration of Contingency and Necessity

Notions of Contingency and Necessity and Signs of Contingency

When we observe things, which exist in the external world, including those in the nature, we notice that, by virtue of their essence, existence and nonexistence are not necessary for them. The truth of this claim is attested by their generation(hudūth) and corruption(fasād) , that is, the fact that at a time, they did not exist, then they found existence; and at a certain time, they will perish. If existence was necessary for them, they would not have been preceded or followed by nonexistence; and by the same token, if nonexistence was necessary for them, they would have never existed.

As explained earlier, an entity for which existence and external reality is necessary is called the necessary existent(al-wājib al-wujūd) ; and if nonexistence is necessary for it, it is an impossible existent(al-mumtani‛ al-wujūd) ; and if neither existence nor nonexistence is necessary for it, it is a contingent entity(al-mumkin al-wujūd) .

Though the notions of hudūth and corruption are different from the notion of contingency(imkān) , these two attributes are found only in contingent entities. However, this is not to say that every contingent(mumkin) is hādith, because it is possible to conceive of a contingent, which does not have temporal hudūth and is above temporal changes. For instance, the Divine favor and compassion­­­­­­­­­­ - as instanced by, “ever-favoring to the creation,”[101] - is eternal and beyond temporal limitations; the incorporeal human soul, that even if hādith, will remain in Paradise or Hell forever; and the Divine Face which according to the verse, “But will remain forever the Face of thy Lord, the Glorious and Gracious,”[102] has eternal Glory and Grace.

Making a note of this point makes it easy to differentiate between the demonstration of contingency and necessity(burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb) and the demonstration of hudūth(burhān al-hudūth) . The demonstration of contingency and necessity centers on the middle term of contingency(imkān) , outlined by the generation and corruption of finite beings; and the demonstration of hudūth proceeds from the hudūth of various things.

Contingency is also provable without taking hudūth and corruption into consideration. When the essence of a particular(juz’ī) entity, such as a tree or a human being, is conceived, and none of the two contradictory sides of existence and nonexistence is integral to it, it can be inferred that although in the external world the particular thing is either existent or nonexistent, however, by virtue of its essence, it is without and equidistant to both sides of contradiction. This characteristic - the vacancy of the essence from existence and nonexistence, which is followed by its equidistance to existence and nonexistence - is the source of derivation of the quality of contingency(imkān) .

Further contemplation in this regard would illustrate that any external entity the essence(dhāt) and essential parts(dhātiyyāt) of which are conceivable by the mind and can assume mental existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī) is contingent, because if the essence or essential parts of a certain thing can exist by mental existence, given the impossibility of the transfer of external existence(al-wujūd al-khārijī) to the mind, existence and external reality are not its essence, and are rather outside the boundaries of its essence.

The essence of something to which external reality and existence are necessary and inseparable from cannot transfer to the mind, because real existence projects effects, and mental existence does not produce effects; and a single object, while being the source of many effects, cannot be devoid of producing any effects. Therefore, the mind cannot apprehend the essence and reality of something, which does not come into it; the only thing it can do after its intuitive discernment, is to derive a notion from it and through that notion, which may be at an extreme state of self-evidence, reflect the external reality, which is in extreme occultation. An example is the reality of existence, the essence of which is in extreme disguise from the mind, but the notion of which is self-evident and primary. The Divine sage al-Sabzawārī, with regard to the reality of existence, says,

Its notion is among things most self-evident

While its essence is in extreme concealment[103]

Even if not hādith, and rather eternal and everlasting, something whose quiddity(māhiyya) can transfer to the mind, and the mind can fathom the profundities of its essence, given that it can shift from the external mode of existence(al-wujūd al-khārijī) to its mental mode while maintaining its essence, has to be separable from external existence. Existence and nonexistence cannot be included in the essence of such a thing, or say, such an essence or quiddity is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, and therefore, contingent.

Argument from Contingents to the Necessary

Something that existence and nonexistence are not parts of its essence, and has equidistance towards the two, cannot become existent or nonexistent by virtue of its essence. That is, if not for an external causal efficacy(al-‛illiyya al-fā‛iliyya) , which would necessitate either existence or nonexistence for it and characterize it with one of the two qualities, its essence can be neither existent nor nonexistent. Otherwise, it will mean that while a thing is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, it has existence or nonexistence, and therefore, it is devoid of equidistance towards the two. The concurrence of equidistance and non-equidistance is conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain) , which is impossible.

Therefore, in order to exist or not to exist, every contingent entity(mumkin) needs the causal efficacy of an external agency. The agency that necessitates its existence is its existential cause; and the agency that necessitates its nonexistence is the cause of its nonexistence. In the discussions of causation, however, it is proved that the cause of something’s nonexistence is the absence of its existential cause, and not a real and factual entity on its own.

It follows that every contingent needs a being other than itself and until that “other”(ghair) does not remove its need, it does not come into existence. Therefore, wherever there is a contingent in the external world, the other, which has removed its need and has provided it with existence, also exists.

As indicated earlier, this argument can be derived from sermon 186 of Nahj al-Balāgha. At one section of the sermon it is stated, “Everything, which is known by virtue of its essence, is crafted; and everything, which stands in something other than itself, is caused.” That is, something the essence of which can come into the mind, as explained earlier, cannot have existence as its essence; and therefore, its existence is caused by some agency other than itself.

It should be noted that the “other” upon which the contingent entity is dependent and which satisfies its need cannot be another contingent. Since a contingent entity has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, and something that itself has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, cannot impel another entity that has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence out of the state of equidistance. Rather, in order to depart from the state of equidistance, every equidistant entity needs a non-equidistant entity.

Just as existence and nonexistence are not the essential parts of contingents, and therefore, they have equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, likewise, creation(ījād) and annihilation(in‛edām) are not inherent in them, and they have equidistance towards the two. Therefore, the creation or annihilation of a contingent cannot be attributed to another contingent. Were this possible, it would mean that a contingent entity, which is equidistant towards creation and annihilation, is not equidistant towards them, which is an obvious conjunction of contradictories.

In order to enter the domain of existence, contingents require the causal efficacy of an external agency, or say, an “other,” which causes their existence; and the other, which causes their existence, cannot be a contingent phenomenon.

With regard to the negation of causality of a contingent with respect to another contingent, ‛Abd al-Razzāq al-Lāhijī, the author of Shawāriq al-Ilhām, narrates these two principles from Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī: “A thing is not existent until it exists. And until it is existent, it cannot create.” That is, since the contingent is devoid of existence, it is not existent. And since it is not existent, it cannot bestow existence either.

A contingent can only create when it depends on an external “other,” which cannot be a contingent. Therefore, existence and creation of a contingent is only conceivable when it is established by and dependent upon “another”, which does not have an equal relation towards existence and nonexistence, and in other words, for which existence is necessary.

The articulation of the demonstration(burhān) in this fashion, without any reliance on impossibility of circular or regressive causality, first, proves the Necessary, and then proves the finitude of the series of contingent entities that are mediates(wasā’it) in the act of creation. And if, as is the case, in some of its versions, the argument proceeds from invaldiation of circularity(daur) and regress(tasalsul) , it is not because these two are critical in the cogency of the demonstration. Rather, it is meant to facilitate the comprehension and indoctrination of the demonstration. Therefore, even if circularity(daur) and regress(tasalsul) were not considered void, the demonstration of contingency and necessity would still maintain its tenability.

The need of contingents for the “other” is in the form of a universal affirmative proposition(al-qadhiyya al-mūjiba al-kulliyya) . It does not pertain to the totality of the world, so the fact that totality exists only in the mind could undermine its cogency. Rather, it pertains to every entity that has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence. Given the universality of this need, the existence of these entities, which by virtue of their essences are equidistant to existence and nonexistence, cannot be explained on the score of a specific contingent, since every contingent that may be used in the answer is already included in the universal affirmative proposition. If the existence of a particular contingent entity were to be explained, it would be imaginable to suggest another contingent thing as the reason of its existence. Nevertheless, since the question pertains to the entirety of contingent entities, it is only answerable with an entity that is not included in the aggregate, that is, an entity to which the quality of contingency does not apply and existence for which is necessary.

Instrumentality of the Mediates and the Efficacy of the Necessary

Quidditative contingency(al-imkān al-māhuwī) , which is the middle term of the demonstration of contingency and necessity, is a necessary and inseparable property of the quiddity(māhiyya) . That is, equidistance towards existence and nonexistence is an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of quiddity, so much so that even when due to an external causal efficacy it finds existence and is rearranged from the position of equidistance, its essence remains devoid of existence and nonexistence and continues to be characterized by contingency. This is because even after creation(ījād) , existence does not become the essence(dhāt) or an essential part(juz’ al-dhāt) of the quiddity; and therefore, its need for external causal efficacy continues. Al-Shabistarī, in Gulshan Raz says in this regard:

God, the Exalted, is Witness to the truth of my words

Disgrace leaves not the contingent in the two worlds[104]

If a quiddity which comes into existence through the creation of an external agency should be an instrument(āla) for the existence of another quiddity, this mediation(wasāta) in creation cannot pertain to its contingent essence. It is brought by that agency, which is needless and independent in His existence and creation. From this vantage point, it is clear that the instrumentality(sababiyya) and mediation(wasāta) of contingents in relation to one another is not such that would place God, the Free-of-Need Origin, at the top of the causal series and the contingent intermediates one after the other in a successive manner. Thus, no contingent is a mediate in the transfer of grace(faidh) by virtue of its essence; and given that they are sustained by the Necessary(al-Wājib) and recipient of His grace, the Origin is present within the context of their instrumentality and mediation.

The mediation of instruments in the transfer of Divine grace is not like the mediation of pipes in transfer of water. A tap takes water from pipelines that are instruments between the tap and the reservoir. No contingent in the series of contingents possesses the existence that has to be transferred to the next contingent; rather, the Divine grace is present within the series and nearer to each one of its units than any other unit. “Nowhere taketh place any secret counsel between three [persons] but He is the fourth of them, nor between five, but He is the sixth, nor [between] less than that, nor [between] more but He is with them wherever they may be.”[105]

If efficacy and creation of the Being, which is free of need and dependence, that is, the Necessary Existent(al-Wājib al-wujūd) , were limited to the creation of the first contingent entity - which would, in turn, create the second contingent, which would, in turn, create the third, and so on - and the series of contingents existed in a successive fashion without any temporal distance between its units, it would suggest that the Necessary grants existence and creation to the essence of the contingent. It would further follow that the contingent, by receiving the grace(faidh) , loses its state of equidistance and essential contingency. Moreover, it would imply that the Free-of-Need Origin is at the top of the series and is one of its many units; and His grace is the source of the grace, which descends from the first contingent to the second and then to other creatures. This would translate to the view that His essence and grace are limited to the top of the successive series. Nonetheless, both corollaries are corrupt, since quidditative contingency(al-imkān al-māhuwī) , as explained earlier, contrary to potentiality(al-iste‛dād) , is an attribute that does not separate from the contingent. Additionally, infinitude of the Necessary and boundlessness of His grace, which are proved in the discussions of His attributes, do not reconcile with Him being confined to the first member of the putative series.

To call the instrumentality(sababiyya) and mediation(wasāta) of instruments(asbāb) and mediates(wasā’it) between the first efficient cause and its effect causality is for the sake of facilitating teaching and learning. In fact, these mediates resemble mirrors that merely exhibit the emanation of Divine grace and His exclusive rule, and by virtue of their essences, none of them have any role in creation; and thus, no mediate is a true efficient cause. In other words, ascription of causal efficacy to mediates - similar to ascription of existence to contingents - is in view of the association of Divine grace with them, and more accurately, in view of the manifestation of Divine grace in them. Therefore, such ascription is figurative.

Hudūth of the Mediates and Eternity of the Divine Grace

The demonstration of contingency and necessity(burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb) illustrates that the need and dependence of an effect on its cause owes to its contingency(imkān) . And since contingency is inseparable from the contingent quiddity, as long as a contingent is graced with existence, its intense dependence and need to its existential cause continues. For this reason, the efficient cause has presence and authority over all conditions of its effect, and the effect’s need is not limited to a specific condition, such as the moment of its hudūth.

The Sustentative Authority(al-ihāta al-qayūmiyya) of the efficient cause over its effect negates the existence of a horizontal relationship between the two. Causal efficacy is not perceivable between entities that come into being one after another in the course of time in a successive series, because during the entire period of its existence, the effect is needful to its existential cause. However, the temporally successive entities follow one another, and the existence of the following entity coincides with the nonexistence of the preceding entity. How can something that exists now be the effect of an efficient cause that does not exist any more?

The causality, which the non-philosophic minds assign to temporally successive series, is not, in fact, something to which the effect owes its existence. In philosophical parlance, things that come into existence and events that happen in a temporal sequence - such as parents who are conditions of the inception of their and their children’s children - are considered conditions and supplementary causes(al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda) ; and the efficient cause of every entity is the Necessary Being Who is with the effect all its life long. “And He is with you wherever you be.”[106]

It can be inferred from this discussion that the supplementary causality(al-‘illiyya al-e‛dādiyya) of things, which are horizontal to contingents, unlike the causality of something that may be vertical to them, is not by virtue of their essence. Rather, it pertains to that very infinite and expansive Divine grace and “One Command”[107] , which has manifested in the image of mediates and conditions. The Majestic Qur’ān, in view of this reality, denies the causality and mediation of conditions and instruments such as parents and farmers in the generation of children and crops, and reserves this role for the Almighty Allah: “Have ye seen what ye emit [the life germ]? Is it ye that create or are We the Creators? … Have ye seen what ye sow? What! Is it ye that grow it or are We the Growers?”[108]

After proving the Necessary through the demonstration of contingency and necessity(burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb) , the finitude of the vertical succession of instruments and conditions can be established. Al-Fārābī has argued for the finitude of vertical causes on the same grounds.[109] However, the finitude of conditions and supplementary causes that are horizontal to each other cannot be justified on the same account. For this reason, the infinite succession of dependent entities along the course of eons is compatible with the demonstration of contingency and necessity. Because if there is an infinite succession of dependent entities, not only it cannot suggest finitude for the Divine grace, rather it will indicate the boundlessness and eternity of God’s grace. “And every favor of Yours is eternal.”[110]

Such eternity, like the everlasting life of the Paradise-dwellers, does not pertain to the essence of contingents. It owes to the Divine grace and benevolence and its attribution to the world and creatures is figurative(majāzī) . Because if eternity is ascribed to the essence of the contingent entities, contingency - which is an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of quiddity - gives place to necessity. This follows that an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) , that is, contingency, is not an essential property, which is a conjunction of contradictories.

This argument would have indicated the impossibility of the eternity of the world, if the Divine grace were solely availed to a single contingent entity. However, in the infinite series of supplementary causes(al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda) , such an entity does not exist, as in the successive series, every entity is subject to change and mutability and every unit generates and corrupts. As far as the putative series or whole is concerned, it is a mental concept which, as a result of perception of multiplicities, is brought about in the mind and does not have any external reality over and above the units of the series. Therefore, in the course of temporally successive hādiths, an entity the eternity of which alone may reflect the infinite grace does not exist. For this reason, the Divine grace and favor is eternal, but their recipients, by virtue of their essences, are in absolute nihility and nonexistenc; and it is by Divine grace that the natural world, which is the world of change and flux, generates and corrupts at every moment. With regard to this, says al-Sabzawārī his Al-Mandhūma,

His Benevolence is eternal and perpetual

While the recipient is ever-perishing and nihil[111]

Criticisms and Evaluations

The demonstration of contingency and necessity revolves around the essential contingency of quiddities. The main characteristic of this demonstration is the fact that it does not depend on a specific phenomenon such as motion, design, hudūth, and so forth. Its focal point is the relation of essence of entities with existence and being real.

This demonstration has entered western philosophical thought in the Middle Ages through the works of Ibn Rushd(Averroës) and the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas. Later in the modern western philosophy, it became subject to scrutiny and criticism. In addition to its western critiques, the demonstration of contingency and necessity has also been evaluated by Islamic philosophers.

The criticisms of the demonstration of contingency and necessity in Islamic philosophy apply to some of its versions, not to the exposition we presented. In some versions of the demonstration, the impossibility of circular and regressive causation has not been relied upon and the series of contingent entities has been considered as a totality. Such versions have been subject to criticism that the series is a mental concept, and in the external world, it does not have a reality over and above its units; in other words, in the external world, an entity such as the series or aggregate, the contingency of which would lead to its existential cause, does not exist.

Some versions of the demonstration rely upon the impossibility of circular and regressive causation. This has encouraged the proponents of the possibility of causal regress(al-tasalsul al-‛illī) to criticize the demonstration. However, first, the impossibility of regressive causation is not deniable, because although not every causal series is impossible, a series that is characterized by the three qualities of infinity, causal relationship between its members, and coexistence of its members at the same time, is impossible for the reasons given at its appropriate place. Second, the demonstration’s cogency does not really depend on the impossibility of circular or regressive causation, and its usage has a mere educational purpose.

As on the one hand criticisms of the demonstration of contingency and necessity in contemporary western philosophy indicate their lack of understanding of the argument, on the other, it stands for the defective and faulty translations of intimations that are grounds of common consensus amongst the luminaries of Divine wisdom.

In some translations, other arguments, such as the demonstrations(barāhīn) of motion and hudūth have been mentioned under the title of demonstration of contingency and necessity; and then criticisms, which may apply to them, have been presumed to be valid with respect to the demonstration of contingency and necessity. At other instances, the demonstration of contingency and necessity has been differentiated from another argument, which has been named ‘the argument of causality’. While causation(‛illiyya) is a common principle that is used in every argument, including the demonstration of contingency and necessity, and it does not constitute an independent argument horizontal to the demonstration of contingency and necessity and other arguments.

In addition to the fact that the tenability of most theistic arguments, such as the demonstrations of hudūth, motion, design, and so forth, presupposes the validity of the principle of causation, should the very principle of causation be disputed, the necessary relationship between an argument’s premises and the conclusion thereof will be subject to doubt. This would jar the path of reason and rationality on the one hand, and make critique irrelevant as well. This is because every argument is based on the causal rapport between its premises and the conclusion thereof, and every criticism must have a demonstrative form. If the principle of causation is not accepted, there will be no way, as explained fully before, to prove or negate anything.

In order to prevent confusion between the demonstrations of Divine Essence and those of His attributes and disallow the expectations of proving Divine attributes from the arguments of His essence, it is important to differentiate between the notion of Divine Essence and notions, which reflect His attributes. Moreover, in order to critique or defend an argument in its own context and ensure that different arguments are not confused with one another, the content of every argument’s premises must be preserved.

The middle terms of the demonstrations of hudūth, motion, and contingency and necessity are different from one another; and, as it will come, their conclusions are not identical either. The tenability of the demonstrations of hudūth and motion is indebted to the demonstration of contingency and necessity, so much so that without this adduction they fail to prove the Necessary.

Evaluation of Hume’s Criticism

The version of the demonstration of contingency and necessity, which has come in this work, illustrates the corruption and invalidity of the criticism advanced by some a western theologian and philosophizer. The criticism asserts that if the world’s parts are equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, and therefore are characterized by contingency and need to an external causality, the same does not necessarily have to be true about their ensemble, since there is no evidence to suggest that the parts and the ensemble are governed by the same rules. For instance, it cannot be generalized from the fact that every human being has a mother that the entire human race has also a mother.

The critic has presumed that the argument is based on quidditative contingency of the totality of world’s parts, whereas the demonstration(burhān) proceeds from the premise that without the efficacy of an external agency, a contingent entity cannot come into existence. This proposition speaks of all contingent beings, not their whole, because the whole does not even exist. And since it does not exist, it is neither necessary nor contingent, and therefore, it does not have a need of another. This lack of need is a negative proposition the subject of which does not exist, what we call a negative proposition by the nonexistence of its subject(al-sāliba bi intifā‛ al-maudhū‛) . Obviously, although the ensemble of the contingent entities, which is a mental concept, does not exist in the external world, it does have a mental existence under the auspices of the existence of knowledge. In this shadowy existence(al-wujūd al-dhillī) , the title of aggregate is predicated to it by predication as essence(al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī) , not by predication as extension(al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī) . Therefore, on its own right, being contingent entity, it is a member of the series of contingent entities and an extension for the mentioned proposition. As explained during the exposition of the demonstration(burhān) , every contingent entity the quiddity of which is entertained, since the said proposition is applicable to it, it is characterized by need and dependence and can be realized only through the causal efficacy of a reality, which is not characterized by this quality and is, by virtue of its essence, needless and independent.

Even if the aggregate of contingents were not a mere mental existence and were real and external, the said proposition will still be applicable to it. This further strengthens the demonstration(burhān) , since in this case, the aggregate of the world is a real and a non-reified quiddity, the existence or nonexistence of which is conceivable without any contradiction, and therefore, is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence. It follows that the preponderance of either existence or nonexistence over the other requires a preponderant that will justify the preponderance.

This illustrates that the criticism, which is related from Hume, is not applicable to the demonstration of contingency and necessity. Hume contends that we have never experimented the totality of the world so the claim of its need to an external causal efficacy could be justifiable. This criticism can be considered valid only if the argument were based on the contingency of the aggregate of the contingent entities; whereas first, the aggregate lacks external existence; and second, the aggregate of the contingent entities has not been used in this demonstration(burhān) as a premise; and third, even if the aggregate existed and were used in the argument, contingency and need would be its essential properties, and apprehension of these properties does not require experiment.

The Denial of Philosophic Meaning of Necessity and its Answer

Another criticism directed at the demonstration of contingency and necessity asserts that necessity is a logical category, and an existential proposition cannot be narrated with logical necessity. It claims that if existence was necessary for God, the proposition “God is nonexistent” would be self-contradictory, and “God exists” will be logically necessary and true, whereas we can doubt God’s existence.

In other words, necessity is a logical concept that describes the modality of tautological propositions, and it cannot be used to reflect external existence of things. There is nothing, Hume argues, the existence of which is demonstrable and whatever we conceive of as existent, we can conceive of as nonexistent. For instance, we can conceive, without any contradiction, of God’s nonexistence even if this may imply the nonexistence of the world. Whereas, if existence had logical necessity for God, the conception of His nonexistence would certainly entail contradiction.

In order to answer this criticism, it has to be established that necessity has a common meaning in logic and philosophy. Necessity is used in philosophy with the same meaning that describes modality of propositions in logic. Furthermore, necessity is an axiomatic concept, which philosophy first proves its existence, and then logic presupposes its truth as a lemma borrowed from philosophical discussions, and explains its various types.

It was elucidated earlier that necessity, possibility, and impossibility are axiomatic concepts and do not have real definitions. However, because philosophy is the study of existence, the division of existent things into necessary, contingent, and impossible is a philosophical inquiry. Appraisal of things in relation to existence in the form of two exclusive disjunctive propositions(al-munfasila al-haqīqiyya) results in the division of things into necessary, contingent, and impossible; and the same appraisal in the form of one exclusive disjunctive proposition results in the dichotomy of things into necessary and contingent entities.

These entire divisions center on the principle of non-contradiction; that is, the impossibility of conjunction and negation of contradictories(istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-naqīdhain) . Since either existence is necessary for a thing, or it is not; if it is not, then either nonexistence is necessary for it or it is not. On the other hand, either existence is necessary for an existent thing, or it is not. However, if existence is not necessary for it, nonexistence cannot be necessary for it, as it exists. Therefore, if an existent entity is not necessary, since it cannot have necessity of nonexistence, it is a contingent entity.

After philosophy depicts these divisions in a demonstrative format and narrates the external existence of the last two kinds, logic, in the province of its inquiry - which is the mental concepts - identifies their extensions(masādīq) and puts forth thirteen kinds of necessary propositions.

Some mutakellimūn, such as al-Qādhī Adhud al-Ijī in his Al-Mawāqif, have presumed that there is a difference between philosophical and logical necessity.[112] Al-Ijī holds that if necessity had an identical meaning in philosophy as well as in logic, then in instances where essential parts(dhātiyyāt) or essential properties(lawāzaim al-dhat or al-‛awāridh al-dhātiyya) of a thing are predicated to it, it would mean that the thing is a necessary being. For example, the proposition “Four is necessarily even” would indicate that four has necessity of existence.

Sadr al-Din al-Shirāzī, in the discussions of modality of the noble book of Al-Asfār, has rejected al-Iji’s presumption as false and has made it clear that necessity has one meaning; however, in every case it corresponds to its predicate and subject.[113] If it is stated that, for instance, four is necessarily even, it does not imply that four is necessarily existent. Rather it means that four is necessarily even. Therefore, what has been implied is tenable, and what is untenable has not been implied.

Logic’s(al-mantiq) dependence on philosophy in the subject of necessity resembles its dependence on philosophy in the subject of predication(haml) . In the discussions of unity(wahda) and multiplicity(kathra) , existence is divided into one and multiple. Then unity and multiplicity are divided into various kinds. Among the types of unity(wahda) , there is individual unity(al-wahda al-shakhsiyya) , specie unity(al-wahda al-nau‛iyya) , genus unity(al-wahda alj-jinsiyya) , sheer unity(al-wahda al-mahdha) , and the unity that encompasses multiplicity. This last kind of unity is called “it-is-itness”(hū-hūwiyya) . “It-is-itness” is predication, which is either as essence(al-haml al-awwalī) or as extension(al-haml al-shā’yẻ) . Logic takes predication as granted and formulates its discussions on its basis; nonetheless, the affirmation of predication itself is not a logical inquiry.

Not only in many of its discussions, but also in the subject of its study, that is, acquired knowledge or concepts and judgments, logic is indebted to philosophy, because the existence of knowledge as well as its division into acquired and intuitive the division of acquired knowledge into concepts and judgments are philosophical inquiries. The fact that some of these phenomena are primary or self-evident does not eclipse their philosophical identity, since the criterion for including a proposition in a discipline is the analysis of its subject; if its subject is existence, and the predicate is assigned to it qua existence, then the proposition pertains to philosophy.

In short, necessity is a self-evident concept, and the study of its reality is a philosophic inquiry. Logic uses this secondary philosophical intelligible(al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-falsafī) in the context of predications and copulas of propositions that are secondary logical intelligibles(al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-mantiqī) .

Although necessity has a single meaning, as indicated earlier, it has different rules in different instances. The said criticism originates from the assumption that first, necessity has a mere logical meaning and does not have a philosophical usage that would describe external things and realities, and second, logical necessity is restricted to analytical propositions where the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. The critic has presumed that necessity exists only when a subject is predicated to itself or to its essential parts, such as “Human is human” or “Human is an animal.”

According to this presumption, necessity is inevitably restricted to mental concepts and it cannot reflect the external reality of things. The reply to this presumption is that necessity is not exclusive to analytical and tautological propositions and it can be literally used in the predication of essential properties(al-a‛rādh al-dhātiyya) of a thing, a category the scope of which is wider than essential parts.

The essential parts(al-dhātiyyāt) of an essence are things that are included in its definition(hadd) , and their predication is considered tautology or identity-claim. On the other hand, essential properties of things­ - for instance, contingency(imkān) with respect to finite entities - are concepts that are not included in their definitions.

Contingency is a concept, which is not an essential part of finite entities. It is abstracted and predicated to them only after they are assessed with existence and nonexistence. In the light of this, it becomes clear that need and dependence on the external causal efficacy are not concepts that are the essence or essential parts of contingents, and therefore, they are their essential properties.

The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not depend on the rational analysis of conceived notions and quiddities; rather, it is based on the rational analysis of realities that exist in the external world. It proceeds from the assessment of the essences of existent things with relation to existence and nonexistence. In this demonstration, even the notion of existence qua notion of existence is not used, and rather, the notion of existence qua its external reality is examined.

The arguments that are dedicated to the analysis of Divine attributes elucidate that the Necessary does not have a quiddity in addition to His reality and existence; in other words, His quiddity is His external factuality(al-Wājib mahiyyatuhu inniyyatuh) . Similarly, His necessity does not have an extension separate from His reality and is nothing but the severity and extremity of His existence. Therefore, the usage of necessity in relation to God does not reflect the modality of predication; it reflects severity, emphasis, and extremity of a phenomenon that has no reality but factuality.

Since the critic considers necessity as a mere logical concept, the usage of which is exclusive to tautological propositions, he presumes that should God have necessity of existence, then external existence must be an essential part of His concept, and its negation, like any other proposition that takes away the essence or essential part of a subject, would be self-contradictory.

External existence is not included in the notion of the Necessary. The necessity, which is involved in the notion of the Necessary, is not a necessity, which describes the modality of propositions; it is a necessity, which is sheer external existence and factuality.[114] The notion of the necessary being, which reflects this sort of necessity, on its own right, is devoid of such necessity, since although, by predication as essence it is the Necessary; by predication as extension, it is a mental phenomenon, which exists in the sphere of human knowledge, and is a contingent and perishable.

The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not proceed from the premise that existence is an essential part of the notion of the Necessary Being. Since if it were the case, comprehension of this notion would be simultaneous to discernment of God’s existence and negation of His existence would be self-contradictory, and there would not be any need to prove His existence.

Evaluation of the Epistemological Criticism

Another criticism raised against the demonstration of contingency and necessity stems from certain epistemological perspectives. It states that the demonstration would be tenable if it were the case that the external reality was rationally discernable, and additionally, rational discernments were representative of external reality. Nonetheless, if reality is a brute phenomenon with a complete irrational identity, the argument is not conclusive.

For instance, the demonstration relies on an exclusive disjunctive proposition, which divides existent things into necessary and contingent things. This disjunctive proposition is contingent upon the principle of non-contradiction, which relates the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories. However, the conjunction of contradictories is a rational judgment about the external world; should the external world have a brute and irrational identity, the applicability of this judgment to the external world, and consequently, the validity of the conclusion of the demonstration will be subject to doubt.

The answer to this criticism becomes clear by what was elucidated with regard to epistemic worth of knowledge. The critic in this criticism has made the entirety of human knowledge subject to criticism. This distrust, which proclaims skepticism(shakkākiyya) and devaluates knowledge, entails nothing but sophism and negation of reality.

Although this and other similar skeptical and sophist perspectives dominate the contemporary western thought, it cannot so much as justify or explain itself. Like the basic reality, knowledge is a primary phenomenon, such that there is no way to deny or express skepticism with regard to it. Though every kind of doubt and skepticism about knowledge is, by predication as essence, doubt and skepticism about it, by predication as extension, it is the undeniable acknowledgement of the reality of knowledge; and therefore, the basic reality of knowledge cannot be denied or doubted in any situation.

Chapter One: Knowledge and Sophistry

Priority of Ontology over Epistemology

There is a sort of commensurability between epistemology and ontology; that is, every person’s view about the reliability of knowledge has a rational relationship with his ontological perspectives. This is due to an exchange of some propositions between these two disciplines. That is, on one side of the spectrum, the epistemological inquiry presupposes some ontological propositions, while on the other side, certain epistemological propositions are taken as granted in ontological arguments. This mutual interdependence, however, can be presented in a way that avoids circularity(daur) .

The ontological propositions that are presupposed at the beginning of the epistemological inquiry - and denial or doubt with respect to which make the study of knowledge irrelevant and acceptance thereof is an imperative condition of entering the epistemological inquiry - are,

· There is a reality.

· The human being is real.

· The human being’s knowledge is real.

These are ontological propositions; nevertheless, skepticism(shakkākiyya) with regard to them makes the epistemological inquiry irrelevant. That is, the study of the reliability and origin of knowledge is reasonable only if the truth of these statements is acknowledged. To an epistemologist who doubts these premises, inquiry and non-inquiry as well as answer and non-answer cannot make any difference. If someone inquires about cognition, or expresses doubt or skepticism(shakkākiyya) , he does possess a number of concepts, such as the concept of reality and existence, and holds the truth of certain propositions, such as the propositions that reflect his own existence and the existence of his knowledge.

Similar to these ontological propositions that make the study of knowledge possible, certain other ontological premises - the rejection of which entails the denial of definite knowledge of reality - pave the way to affirm the reliability of knowledge and discredit skepticism(shakkākiyya) .

Metaphysical Sources of Knowledge

One of the fundamental ontological questions that plays a pivotal role in the epistemological inquiry is the question of whether reality is entirely physical or there are incorporeal and metaphysical entities.

From the materialist view that considers the reality solely spatiotemporal, knowledge is a physical phenomenon that develops in the nervous system because of human interaction with the natural world. According to this view, events are caused by factors which theosophers and believers in metaphysical realities consider supplementary causes(al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda) , that is, instrumentalities(asbāb) and conditions(sharā’it) of realization of events and in contrast with the Divine and metaphysical agency Who is the source of emanation(ifādha) of grace(faidh) .

The materialist worldview portrays man and the world as two natural entities with mutual influence over each other, whereby some effects that the human being receives from the natural elements appear before him as his perceptions. And since the human being and the world cause the generation of knowledge, knowledge is a third reality that is other than the human being, “the knower,” and the world, “the known.” In other words, this analysis entails that since knowledge is generated because of the human being’s interaction with the world, it is a new entity whose reality is always different from the realities of the knower and the known. By adding this premise to the fact that in the process of cognition, what man directly knows is his knowledge and he knows “the known” indirectly through his knowledge, this constant “otherness” of knowledge and the known makes the cognition of the external world impossible. Thus, in the materialist worldview, knowledge loses its epistemic worth of illustrating the reality, and the gulf of doubt and skepticism(shakkākiyya) between notion and the known is never bridged.

Open and Latent Skepticism

Skepticism(shakkākiyya) can be divided into two kinds: unequivocal or open, and complex or latent. Unequivocal or open skepticism is involved when during the discourse of conformity of knowledge to reality, the epistemologist denies the possibility of reaching reality and declares his unequivocal uncertainty about knowledge’s disclosure of the reality. Complex and latent skepticism(shakkākiyya) , however, is dominant when although the epistemologist makes efforts to avoid admitting skepticism and makes claims of reliability of knowledge - or makes promises thereof in an unknown or never-coming future - his presuppositions and perspectives invite skepticism.

Incorporeality, Universality, Immutability, and Continuity of Knowledge

The above analysis makes it clear that materialist ontology inevitably leads to a skeptic epistemology and if someone studies knowledge from the position of a materialist, even if he does not admit it, he is prejudiced toward a latent form of skepticism.

Contrary to the materialist perspective, which restricts the process of cognition to its natural phases only dismissing its metaphysical dimensions, and holds premises that lead to a skeptical epistemology, the metaphysical worldview acknowledges the spiritual and incorporeal dimensions of knowledge and holds premises that invalidate skepticism. The study of knowledge’s qualities from the position of a metaphysician establishes certain premises, which further strengthen the foundations of belief in metaphysical dimensions and incorporeal existence.

Knowledge is characterized by universality(kulliyya) , immutability(thabāt) , and continuity(dawām) ; and these attributes - irrespective of whether knowledge is reliable - do not exist in physical and natural entities that are characterized by particularity(juz’iyya) and are the very flux(taghayyur) and motion(haraka) .[8]

Through a hypothetical syllogism(al-qiyās al-istithnā’ī) or the second figure of the categorical syllogism(al-qiyās al-iqtirānī) , any single of these three attributes can prove the incorporeality of knowledge. This, on its own right, is sufficient to disprove the assertion that the reality is solely material, and thus, to indicate the possibility of further incorporeal beings.

The hypothetical syllogism for the affirmation of incorporeality of knowledge can run as follows:

If knowledge is physical, then it must have flux, motion, and particularity.

Nevertheless, the consequent is false.

Therefore, the antecedent­ - that is, the physicality of knowledge - is false as well.

The categorical syllogism for the affirmation of the above claim can be presented in this way:

Knowledge is immutable, continual, and universal.

Physical entities are always mutable, changing, and particular.

Therefore, knowledge is not physical.

Since a syllogism is determined by its middle term, and the above demonstration(burhān) - which has been elucidated in two ways - has three middle terms(universality, immutability, and continuity) , it can be translated into three syllogisms, each one capable of proving the objective.

Proponents of materialistic epistemology have made tireless efforts to deny these attributes of knowledge or to explain them on physical and natural accounts. For instance, it has been asserted that universality is the vagueness and obscurity involved in the conformity of a given concept with respect to individuals, and that the presumption of immutability and continuity of knowledge owes to resemblance the preceding and following parts of cognition. We have expanded on falsity of these analyses in Epistemology in Qur’ān.[9]

Corollaries of Knowledge

Rational analysis of a mental concept(al-mafhūm al-dhehnī) reveals that knowledge(‛ilm) is a phenomenon, which is associated with a number of notions, and wherever there is knowledge, there are eight different notions that can be abstracted from its various aspects. However, these notions are not all predicated to knowledge in the same manner and only extensions(masādīq) of some of them have external unity(wahda) . Understanding the difference between these notions can delineate the boundaries of discussion and define the axes of critique, which in turn can help avoid many fallacies. These eight items - six of which have been by our teacher Āyatullah al-Shaykh Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī, sanctified be his soul, in his Durar al-Fawā’id[10] - are as follows:

1. The reality and existence(wujūd) of knowledge itself.

2. The quiddity(al-māhiyya) of knowledge; as every finite being has an existence and a quiddity, being a finite entity, knowledge has these two things.

3. The mental quiddity(al-māhiyya al-dhehniyya) of the “known,” that is, the quiddity of the object of knowledge that is in the mind.

4. The mental existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī) [11] of the “known”, that is, the existence of quiddity of the “known”(al-ma‛lūm) that is in the mind and cannot produce any effect.

5. The external quiddity(al-māhiyya al-khārijiyya) of the known, that is, the quiddity of the object of knowledge that exists in the external world. When looking at this external quiddity or essence, regardless of its existence, the very same quiddity exists by the mental mode of existence. However, it is possible that a concept lacks any extension and not be instantiated in the external world.

6. The external existence(al-wujūd al-khārijī) of the known quiddity or essence.

7. The existence of the knower, that is, the agency who possesses knowledge.

8. The quiddity of the knower.

Four of these eight items are existential and the other four are quidditative. Out of the four existential items, three pertain to external existence and one to mental mode of existence. Therefore, three out of the four quidditative items have external existence; and one of them, the quiddity of the known entity in the mind, has mental existence.

There are a number of relationships of unity(wahda) and otherness between these eight items. For instance, the quiddity and existence of knowledge, which have an obvious conceptual difference, have real unity(wahda) qua their external extension - that is, as explained in the discussions of the principality of existence(asāla al-wujūd) and respectivality of quiddity(e‛tebāriyya al-māhiyya) [12] , quiddity and existence are not two different things in the external world; rather, just one thing exists externally from which these two separate concepts are abstracted. Such a unity(wahda) also exists between the knower and his quiddity, and between the external existence of the known and its quiddity.

In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known(wahdat al-‛ālim wa al-ma‛lūm) , a sort of unity(wahda) between the existence of the knower and knowledge(wahda al-‛ālim wa al-‛ilm) is proved. Such a unity does not exist between the quiddities of knowledge and the knower, nor between the external or mental quiddity of the known and the quiddity of the knower. Nor does it exist between the external existences of the known and the knower. The reason that some philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā in some of his books[13] , have rejected such unity, is their failure to notice the axis of unity and have presumed that the unity is suggested between quiddities of the knower and the known.

In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known, it also becomes clear that what is known directly and by virtue of its essence is the existence of knowledge, which is in unity with the existence of the knower; and the mental quiddity is known indirectly. Therefore, the indirect knowledge of the external entity is yet more indirect, since the external entity is known by means of something that is itself known indirectly.

Knowledge and Mental Existence

An important result of the analysis of knowledge is that it magnifies the difference between knowledge and mental existence and their attributes. Recognition of these differences leads to the creation of two new chapters in philosophy exclusively devoted to the inquiry of each one of them.

When a notion is entertained, though the external extension of this concept, if it has one, produces many effects, the concept is devoid of these effects in the realm of conception and knowledge. The concept, however, does produce certain other effects, which cannot be produced by the external existence to which it pertains. For instance, certain concepts bring forth gaiety and laughter, and others evoke sorrow, grief, and even death.

Imagine that a certain gathering learns that one of its member’s possessions have been destroyed by fire. Although the concept of fire in the people’s minds does not bear the effects of external fire like heat and burning, it does exert an external effect on everyone. For instance, the unfortunate individual whose capital has been destroyed, is disheartened, his jealous enemies rejoice, and other people become alarmed and take measures to protect their own properties against fire.

The agency that has exerted these effects on people and has made them sad or happy is certainly not the external existence of fire, because, first, it is possible that the news is not true, and second, if it were the external existence of fire that had influenced them, then other effects of external fire like heat and burning should also be visible. Hence, it is the existence of knowledge that has exerted these effects over the people. And to put it more accurately, knowledge is the quiddity that is coupled with that existence which has exerted these effects.

Knowledge, similar to bravery, fear, and distress, is among those notions whose external extensions(masādīq) come into existence in man’s being as one of his attributes and are accidents that characterize their subjects by themselves. For instance, when someone bears the quality of bravery or knowledge, he is designated as brave or knowledgeable. Knowledge is, however, different from other attributes as it represents external things.

The existence that is real within the soul and produces numerous effects, like the ones just mentioned, is the existence of knowledge, not the existence of the quiddity that has become known and is present before the mind by predication as essence(al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī) .[14] This is because it produces the effects of knowledge, not the effects of the known. The known is illustrated as well, though not by its external existence, but rather by an existence which is in the shadow(dhill) of the existence of knowledge.

The shadowy existence(al-wujūd al-dhillī) of the known, that is, its mental existence, is not the shadow of the external existence of the known, since if it were so, it would be impossible to entertain concepts or hold the truth of propositions relating to things that are nonexistent in the external world. The mental existence of concepts and propositions is in the shadow of existence of knowledge. Since mental existence is not independent of and horizontal to the existence of knowledge and other external beings, the quiddities or essences that exist by it do not produce the effects of their external extensions(masādīq) . In this weak presence under the auspices of its rapport with knowledge, the quiddity is predicable to itself only as a notion and by predication as essence, and should its relation with knowledge cease to exist, even the predication as essence will loose its veridicality.

Divisions of Knowledge

Dichotomy of knowledge into acquired knowledge(al-‛ilm al-husūlī) and intuitive/presential knowledge(al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī) is the result of certain secondary-order rational analyses. In a further division, acquired knowledge is divided into two kinds: concepts and judgments, both of which are further divided into primary(al-‛ilm al--awwalī) , self-evident(al-‛ilm al-badīhī) , and discursive(al-‛ilm al-nadharī) classes.

Primary knowledge, whether a concept(tasawur) or a judgment(tasdīq) , is an epistemic unit that its comprehension and understanding is inevitable and necessary. That is, the human mind is compelled to know primary cognitions and has no choice but to be aware thereof. It should be noticed, however, that although the mind is compelled to know primary matters, one is not compelled to have faith and believe in them. Rather, as it will be discussed in detail, everyone has a free will with regard to having faith and believing in something he knows, hence the possibility that at certain levels, faith and knowledge separate from one another.

Knowledge, Faith, and Theoretical and Practical Reasons

Faith(īmān) and knowledge are two distinct categories. The former pertains to practical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) and the latter to theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) .

Practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) is the human being’s decision-making dimension the object of which is his actions, such as sincerity, devotion, love, and so forth. Theoretical reason, with its various features of sensation(al-ehsās) , imagination(al-takhayul) , estimation(al-wahm) , and ratiocination(al-ta‛aqul) , is concerned with comprehension. Practical wisdom(al-hikma al-‛amaliyya) is the inquiry of things that owe their existence to the human being’s will. Conversely, theoretical wisdom(al-hikma al-nadhariyya) studies things that exist regardless of man’s conduct. It is worth mentioning that the scope of theoretical reason’s inquiry is not restricted to the objects of theoretical wisdom, and as mentioned by al-Fārābī, practical wisdom is also its object of cognition.

Faith is a relation between a person and the object of his knowledge, which comes into being through an act of decision-making and thus, pertains to the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) . One has to be reminded that this relationship between soul and the object of its knowledge should not be confused with the judgmental relationship(al-nisba al-hukmiyya) [15] of propositions that are expressed by copulas. That is, if an epistemic unit is a proposition that comprises a subject and predicate and a judgmental relationship, the judgmental relationship pertains to the theoretical reason(al-aql al-nadharī) and the human will is not applicable to it.

Although in superior levels of existence - that is, in the levels where knowledge and power have external identity - practical and theoretical reasons are one as well, theoretical and practical reasons are different and separate from one another in the inferior levels of existence. By rational differentiation between faith and knowledge in these levels, there are four conceivable situations:

1. Knowledge with respect to a certain reality along with faith in it, as in the case of a learned faithful.

2. Knowledge with respect to a certain reality without having faith in it, as in the case of a learned infidel.

3. Faith in something that it is not known and a false concept or proposition is held about it, as in the case of an unreasoning pious - because he has faith in something that he does not positively know and merely has a conjecture about it.

4. Absence of both faith and knowledge with respect to a certain reality, as in the case of an unreasoning infidel.

Self-evident and Primary Cognitions

Given the fact that the ignorance of theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) with respect to objects of primary knowledge(al-‛ilm al-awwalī) is inconceivable, primary knowledge cannot be found in the last two of the above suppositions, where only it is the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) that may accept and have faith, or reject a certain idea.

A primary concept(al-tasawwur al-badīhī) has a number of qualities. It is clear and indubitable. It cannot be defined; and if one is inattentive to its meaning, his attention can be drawn towards it. It would be like a situation in which an individual has something in his hand or is standing before an ocean, yet is inattentive to it. In such a situation, his attention is drawn by pointing out to what he already knows.

Drawing one’s attention(tanbīh) does not call forth new cognition that has been previously unknown. Rather, it causes something to be noticed that is already known but out of one’s attention. The concepts of existence, reality, thing, nonexistence, and the like are primary concepts that are intuitively known by all; and if someone does not know them, in fact, he is inattentive towards the fact that he knows them.

A primary proposition(al-qadhiyya al-badihiyya) is necessarily true and the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) cannot not know it. It is indubitable; and if it is supposed that someone doubts it - which is an inconceivable supposition - then its veracity would be indemonstrable.

The most prominent quality of primary knowledge can be illuminated by its comparison with self-evident knowledge(al-‛ilm al-badihī) . Comprehension of self-evident facts does not require any definition or proof, nevertheless, if doubted, they can be defined and proved. Self-evidence(badāha) of these facts is indebted to the mind’s affinity with their essential parts[16] and the premises that entail them. An example of such knowledge is “the propositions whose syllogisms are with them”(al-qadhāyā allatī qiasātohā ma‛ahā) . That is, the middle terms of their syllogisms are self-evident and axiomatic properties of their major and minor terms and are discerned so swiftly that there is no need to put them in a syllogistic form.

Necessary Truth of Primary Propositions

Comprehension of necessity of truth or veridicality(dharūra al-sidq) of primary knowledge is the work of theoretical reason. This necessity of veridicality indicates the relationship of the subject and the predicate, which is expressed by a proposition’s copula. It must be stressed that the difference of such necessity and certitude from psychological necessity and certitude, which are the attributes of the knower and are as opposed to doubt and conjecture, must not be overlooked.

The necessity, which the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) discerns in primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) , is cognitive necessity(al-dharūra al-‛ilmiyya) . It reflects the necessity of a predicate’s predication to its subject in a way that one cannot find a way not to know it. This necessity is not the necessity, which indicates the modality(jiha) of a proposition. Being in contrast to possibility(imkān) and impossibility(imtenā‛) , the latter necessity indicates the modality of a given proposition’s copula, whereas the former only conveys definiteness of the verity of a proposition and reflects the connection of the subject with the predicate without any suggestion with respect to its modality of possibility, impossibility, or necessity.

In the case of primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) , such as the necessarily veridical principle of non-contradiction(mabda’ ‛adam al-tanāqudh) , the mind cannot find a way to reject or express their falsehood, and if so should be desired, every step taken for this objective will presuppose the veridicality of the proposition, which is intended to be invalidated. On the other hand, they are indemonstrable; that is, if someone were ignorant of them - which is an impossible supposition - it would be impossible to prove their validity.

Difference between Epistemic Certitude and Psychological Certitude

The above analysis and definition of primary knowledge - which in fact calls attention to its manifest and necessary truth - roots out many criticisms, which are perceivable in this regard. Since this analysis, as projected by Islamic philosophers, is not based on the psychological persuasion and certitude of an individual or group, which are commonly influenced by various social predilections and cultural biases. As on one hand, it cannot be criticized on the basis of absence of common grounds of rationality shared by every individual and nation, on the other. It also sidesteps the objection, which denies the rapport between certainty about something and the truth thereof; namely, the criticism, which questions whether universal consensus of all human beings or the psychological certitude of one person is adequate for the verity of a given proposition.

In social or individual convictions, conviction, as a psychological attribute of a society or individual, can evolve as a result of various psychological factors. But in the appraisal of theoretical reason, until a conviction or belief is not coupled with necessity of verity, which is the condition of every cognitive certitude, it is devoid of epistemic respectability and as something, which is not definitely known, can be at different levels of doubt and conjecture, depending on its acceptability.

One need be reminded that not all propositions that are necessarily true are considered primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) . Primary propositions are axioms whose necessary truth becomes manifest by the mere conception of their subjects and predicates; invalidation thereof presupposes their validity; and if not known, are indemonstrable.

Other propositions the necessary truth(dharūra al-sidq) of which is acknowledged by the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) , yet their truth is inferential, are of two kinds. If its middle term is manifest that it does not need to be searched for, and arranged in a syllogism, the proposition is a self-evident proposition(al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya) ; otherwise, it is a discursive proposition(al-qadhiyya al-nadhariyya) .

In discursive propositions(al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) , a cognitive journey has to be cruised from the conception of their subjects and predicates and the discernment to their necessity of veridicality. This journeyed distance is such that it cannot be bridged by psychological persuasions. In self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) , although there is no such actual gap between the two, yet it can be conceived. In primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) , however, because a proposition that would reflect the presence of such a distance cannot be thought of or expressed without presupposing their very truth, a distance as such is not even supposable. Therefore, the separation of conceptual knowledge of primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) and epistemic certitude about their truth is not conceivable, which if possible, it would have been justified to inquire how does their conceptual knowledge entail epistemic certitude about them.

Although with regard to self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) the named inquiry - how does their conceptual knowledge(al-‛ilm al-tasawwurī) entail epistemic certitude(al-yaqīn al-‛ilmi) about them - is useless, it can be conducted. Nevertheless, as far as discursive propositions(al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) are concerned, this is a serious inquiry and if not adequately answered, the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) will consider the given belief and conviction a figment of fantasy and an artifact of illusion. Faith with respect to propositions about which this inquiry has not been rendered is solely the work of practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) and, like the faith of the unreasoning pious, does not proceed from rationally acceptable premises.

Often such practical and epistemic propensities - which are strengthened by daily habits and social preferences and changed into character traits - are confused with epistemic certitude. However, characteristics of the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) and the many differences between psychological belief and epistemic certitude can avert this confusion.

Epistemic Certitude, Probability, and Social Conventions

Theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) credits cognitive worth to a knowledge that is marked by epistemic certitude and necessity of veridicality. A proposition’s necessity of veridicality(dharūra al-sidq) is not clear, it is evidently not known. Other conceivable states such as doubt and conjecture are not attributes of the proposition, or its subject and predicate and the relationship between the two. Rather, these are the attributes of the mind that does not know the truth of the proposition. These states, as instanced by the Noble Qur’ān “And surmise availeth not the truth at all”[17] do not bear any epistemic worth with regard to knowing the reality. Rather, because a considerable portion of the human being’s activities is undertaken in proportion to the likeliness or importance of certain events, their only benefit is their practical use. Likeliness or probability of an event does not, however, open a window to reality. It narrates the ratio of practicality of an idea entertained in the mind. Likewise, the importance of an event does not bring forth knowledge of the external world, since such importance is not caused by the external reality, and is influenced by the vitality of a certain event for an individual.

In the human being’s day-to-day activities, the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) usually pays heed to things that have high probability and things that have great importance, even though they may not have high probability. Similarly, much of social conducts is based on socially popular conventions. However, high probability or importance of an event and social conventions do not disclose external reality.

Probability does not determine a proposition’s truth or falsehood, that is, whether it corresponds with reality. A true proposition with regard to what it is true, and from the aspect of its truth, is always true; and a false statement with regard to what it is false, and from the aspect of its falsehood, is always false. Probability is involved when a given proposition’s truthful reflection of an event is not known, and then with consideration to other instances where truths or falsehood of the propositions are known, the probability of the given proposition is computed. By this measure, the unknown instance, is, for practical purposes, assumed of the more likely instances.

An event’s probability in the future is not really an attribute of the event or of its proposition, and in fact, it is a presumption made through consideration of similar situations and the truth of their propositions. By computation and analogy of these propositions, a new presumption based on the more occurring instances is ascribed to the event at hand; and it is in that realm of presumption that the event is characterized with probability. Notice this reification(e‛tebār) , which is created by the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) and is paid heed to for its practical utility, is different from philosophical abstractions and secondary intelligibles(al-ma‛qūlāt al-thāniyya) which are true and the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) is constrained to to abstract.

The abstraction of first probabilities may pertain to mental concepts. Propositions have certain relations with one another that are formed in the mind by their comparison. For instance, when someone reports the presence of one white marble in a sack that has five marbles of which three are white, his statement is valid about the three white marbles and false about the other two. It follows that if this statements is made about every marble in the sack, the ratio of valid to false statements will be three to five, which is a veridical ratio inferred from the comparison of the three true to the total five statements. The practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) , however, attributes this ratio of truth to any proposition, which describes the color of one of the marbles and the truth or inaccuracy thereof is not known. It also relates this ratio to the whiteness of every marble in the sack. To the contrary, however, any proposition with respect to reality it is narrating is either true or false, and a third situation between the two is inconceivable. Likewise, external whiteness cannot be predicated to its subject but necessarily and likeliness so forth cannot justify ascription of an attribute to a subject.

In reality, the 3/5 ratio, which has been drawn from our bigger picture of the exemplary set has no real and external relationship with the color of a particular marble. It merely reflects the extent of justifiability of an individual’s expectation and hope for the validity of a statement the truth of which he does not know and how should he conform his conduct with regard to his expectations.

Foundation of Discursive Propositions on Primary and Self-Evident Propositions

With regard to their representation of reality, primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) are marked with necessity of veridicality, which is not a hypostatization(e‛tebār) of the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) . Rather, it is a factual necessity and in conformity with reality which the mind, after conceiving the subject and predicate of a given primary proposition, is compelled to acknowledge. Although the necessity of veridicality of self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) is manifest like that of primary propositions, as indicated earlier, it is possible to doubt or prove them.

The validity of discursive propositions(al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) is neither primary nor self-evident. These propositions are attained through syllogistic arrangement of self-evident premises and, more precisely speaking, primary premises. Similarly, when the validity of non-primary self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) is questioned, they can be reduced to primary propositions. The reduction of non-primary propositions to primary propositions requires two elements: formal(sūrī) and material(māddī) .

Primariness of the First Figure

The formal element is the arrangement of premises into a syllogistic order, which represents the direction of deduction of discursive propositions(al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) from self-evident(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) and primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) . The material element is the content of the premises from which the conclusion is derived.

Argumentation(istedlāl) has three forms, since the relationship of an argument’s conclusion with its premises - because of which it is possible to trace the unknown conclusion from premises that are known - is of three kinds:

•The conclusion comprises a particular subject that is included in a universal premise. Such an argument, where a particular is inferred from a universal, is called syllogism(qiyās) .

•The conclusion comprises a universal subject and is inferred from particular premises. Such an argument, where particular examples lead to a general conclusion, is called induction(istiqrā’) .

•The conclusion and the premises all have particular subjects; and since they have some sort of similarity, it is argued that they are identical in other aspects as well. Such an argument is called analogy(tamthīl) .

Analogy and induction cannot provide grounds for a necessary conclusion, and thus, cannot yield to cognitive certitude. They can produce definite conclusions only when, with the assistance of some premises, are rearranged into a syllogism. In other words, those analogies and inductions lead to definite conclusions that the mind is aware of their syllogistic forms.

Syllogism(qiyās) is of two kinds: categorical(iqtirāni) and disjunctive(istethnā’ī) . Disjunctive syllogisms are convertible into categorical syllogisms. There are four figures of categorical syllogisms, the conclusiveness of first of which is primary(awwalī) and the other three are convertible to the first figure.

The first figure is a form of argument conclusiveness of which is primary(awwalī) and the proposition, which recounts its conclusiveness, as it will be explained later, is an axiomatic proposition, which on its own right, if not primary(awwalī) , is reducible to a primary proposition.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction

If the premises from which discursive conclusions are derived are not primary(awwalī) , they can be reduced to primary propositions. The primary proposition, which all self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) and discursive propositions(al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) are eventually reduced to, is the principle of non-contradiction.

Primariness(awwaliyya) and self-evidence(badāhya) are attributes that can mark propositions as well as concepts. Concepts involved in a primary proposition can be primary(awwalī) , self-evident(badīhī) , or discursive(nadharī) . Similarly, primary and self-evident notions may constitute primary, self-evident, or discursive propositions.

For instance, a contingent’s need to external causal efficacy is a self-evident proposition(al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya) . Its complexity, however, owes to some concepts involved therein. If the meaning of contingency(imkān) - which is the negation of necessity of existence and nonexistence and equidistance(tasāwī al-nisba) towards both - and the notion of preponderance without a preponderant factor(tarjīh bilā murajjeh) is comprehended, the need of a contingent being(mumkin al-wujūd) to an external cause would take no time to be acknowledged.

The impossibility of conjunction and negation of contradictories(istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-naqīdhain) is a primary proposition. The Mu‛tazilite mutakellimūn who have advanced the notion of “hāl”[18] , have not questioned the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain) ; rather they have questioned whether the notions of existence and nonexistence are contradictories(naqīdhain) . However, being a discursive matter, this can be explained by referring to self-evident and primary concepts.

The principle of non-contradiction(mabda’ ‛adam al-tanāqudh) [19] is not only self-evident but primary; and other propositions and cognitive principles - even the law of identity(asl al-hū-hūwiyya) - owe their necessity of truth to this principle.

The law of identity(asl al-hū-hūwiyya) asserts the necessity of an entity’s being itself. If conjunction of contradictories were possible, a thing, while it is necessarily itself, would be subject to negation from itself and necessity and non-necessity will be suggested in a single instance.

The evidence that substantiates the primariness(awwaliyya) of the principle of non-contradiction is that it is indubitable, and every effort towards expression of doubt or denial with respect to it, presupposes its truth. If conjunction of contradictories were possible, the existence and nonexistence of skepticism(shakkākiyya) and the skeptic(shakkāk) would be equal. In this case, skepticism and the skeptic cannot be definitely said they exist, because it cannot be ruled out there may be a conjunction of doubt and non-doubt and skeptic and non-skeptic. Hence, what the skeptic is claiming about the falsity of principle of non-contradiction may coexist with its exact contradictory statement. Thus, it is impossible to utter the falsity of the principle of non-contradiction.

Just as when some one opens his eyes, the first thing he sees is light, and he sees other things in its illumination, primary and self-evident concepts and propositions are the first things that the human being discerns when he enters the realm of perception and knowledge. Among the propositions that the mind cannot not know and under whose auspices other self-evident and definite propositions are discerned, is the principle of non-contradiction.

In the eighth section of the first essay of Al-Ilāhiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā’, Ibn Sīnā, God have mercy on him, explains that the impossibility of negation of contradictories(irtefā‛ al-naqīdhain) is also reducible to the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories(istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-naqīdhain) .[20] That is, the impossibility of negation of contradictories is self-evident, however, if doubted, it can be proved by reliance on the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories. Because, if A and non-A are contradictories, and both are negated; with the negation of A, non-A will be true, and due to negation of non-A, A will be true. Consequently, because of the negation of non-A and A the conjunction of A and non-A, which is the conjunction of contradictories, is implied.

As in the arguments for discursive or even non-primary self-evident propositions(al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) , the eventual recourse is the first figure(al-shakl al-awwal) , in the series of contents or materials of propositions(mawwād al-qadhāyā) , the arguments which lead to discursive and non-primary self-evident propositions are finally reduced to the principle of non-contradiction.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Validity of the First Figure

As far as their content(mawādd) is concerned, propositions are reducible to ones that are more axiomatic. Such transfers from discursive to more axiomatic propositions take place in figures that are convertible to the first figure. However, figures cannot be reduced to content; and therefore, the validity of the first figure is primary(awwalī) . However, a statement, which recounts its validity, is a self-evident proposition(al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya) that can be reduced to the principle of non-contradiction(mabda’ ‛adam al-tanāqudh) , which is primary(awwalī) . Likewise, should the credibility of a proposition, which is the conclusion of a first-figure syllogism be questioned, it can be restored by taking recourse to the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories.

The first figure can be illustrated as follows:

A is B.

B is C.

Therefore, A is C.

The conclusiveness of this conclusion and the validity of the first figure can be proved as follows: If A is not C, then it must be non-C. And because according to the minor premise A is B, B is, therefore, non-C. But according to the major premise, B is C; and “B is C”, is contradictory to “B is non-C.”

This argument proves the validity of the first figure and the verity of a conclusion derived thereby. But if this argument is used to prove the validity of the first figure, in addition to the problem of impossibility of reduction of figure to material, it will also be open to the objection that the argument itself is a first-figure syllogism, or in a figure, which is reducible to it. Therefore, proving the validity of the first figure by an argument as such would amount to begging the question and serve no purpose other than drawing attention to what is already known(tanbīh) .

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and Multiplicity of Definite Propositions

An interrogatory that has been addressed by our teacher, ‛Allamah Tabātabā’ī, is that if the chain of contents or materials is reducible to only one necessarily true proposition, namely the principle of non-contradiction, then the necessity of veridicality(dharūra al-sidq) of other self-evident and discursive propositions would be indemonstrable. This is because every deduction, in addition to self-evidence or primariness of the validity of its figure, requires two premises, upon which rests the truth of the conclusion. It follows that if one premise is definitely known to be true and the other is not, the conclusion will not be definitely known to be true. Therefore, in order to reach a definite conclusion, more than one definitely true premise is required.

The answer to this interrogatory is that the principle of non-contradiction is not a categorical proposition(al-qadhiyya al-hamliyya) , but rather, an exclusive disjunctive proposition(al-munfasila al-haqīqiyya) , and other propositions discerned through sensation or other means - which have self-evident forms but are not definitely known, because definiteness is certitude about the affirmation of a predicate for its subject and the impossibility of its negation from the subject - can be given necessity of veridicality by transference to this principle. For instance, a syllogism about knowledge, whose existence is intuitively known, can be outlined as follows:

Knowledge exists.

Anything either exists or it does not exist.

Therefore, knowledge definitely exists.

By incorporation of principle of non-contradiction, other statements that are devoid of necessity of veridicality(dharūra al-sidq) and are not parallel to the principle of non-contradiction can be ascertained. For instance, if it is sensually proved that a leaf is green, or it is seen as green, it can be argued that because conjunction of two contradictories is impossible, the greenery of the leaf or its being seen as green is definitely true and its opposite is definitely false.

The principle of non-contradiction provides four things that are critically importance in the attainment of cognitive certitude:

1.Certitude about affirmation of the predicate for the subject.

2.Certitude about the impossibility of negation of the predicate from the subject.

3.Perpetuity of the fist certitude.

4.Perpetuity of the second certitude.

Thus, the principle of non-contradiction(mabda’ ‛adam al-tanāqudh) brings new cognitions - which are either sensually discerned or abstracted and predicated by the consideration of the essences of the various subjects - into the realm of definite cognitions, and enriches the treasure of man’s knowledge. Thus, the paradox, which may be conceived about the proliferation of definite cognitions, is answered.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Traditions

Al-Kulainī and al-Sadūq narrate from Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, Divine blessings be with him, that after proving the existence of Almighty God, the Imam said, “There is no distance between affirmation and negation.” This statement reflects the impossibility of negation of contradictories(istehāla irtefā’ al-naqīdhain) .[21]

In his Al-Tawhīd, Al-Shaykh al-Sadūq narrates a conversation between Imam al-Redhā, peace be with him, and Sulayman al-Marwazī, a mutakellim from Khurāsān regarding the hudūth[22] and eternity of the Divine Will(al-Irāda) . In this tradition, the Imam explains the corollaries of both hudūth and eternity of the Divine Will and says, “Choose one of the two paths, surely if a thing is not eternal, it is hādith[23] ; and if it is not hādith, it is eternal.”[24]

The Imam, peace be with him, says further, “Don’t you know that something that has always been cannot be hādith and eternal at the same time?”[25] That is, a hādith is temporally preceded by nonexistence, and an eternal entity is not preceded by nonexistence, and the instantiation of both amounts to conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain) .

Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr’s Criticism of the Use of Syllogism

A critic of Ibn Sīnā and one known for his disapproval of acquired knowledge(al-‛ilm al-husūlī) , Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr questions the validity of the syllogistic method. He considers the first figure, which substantiates all other figures of syllogism, incapable of conveying certitude. For instance, according to him, in the syllogism

Socrates is a human being.

Every human being is mortal.

Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

the major premise of the syllogism is a universal proposition(al-qadhiyya al-kulliyya) that relates the mortality of all human beings including Socrates. Therefore, in order to know Socrates’ mortality, it is sufficient to know the major and there is no need to constitute a syllogism. Because if Socrates’ mortality is not known, then the claim of knowing the major is not justified. Thus, according to him, the first figure, similar to “begging the question,” is a fallacy.

The answer to this paradox is that the critic does not have a correct understanding of universal propositions, or he is inattentive towards them. Universal propositions are not acquired by inductive or empirical methods, so they would be ensembles of particular and individual(juz’ie) propositions.

Propositions such as “Every whole is bigger than its part” and “No nonexistent is existent,” are not attained by experiment or induction, in which case their validity would be subject to correction through discovery of new wholes, new experiments, and instances of exception or falsification. If universal propositions were obtained by experiment and induction, they can be necessary only in instances where all of their particulars are observed and enumerated. In such a supposition, obviously, the universal proposition is known through its particulars, including the subject of its minor premise; and therefore, a syllogism comprising a universal proposition as such is evidently begging the question.

Universal propositions reflect the necessary relationships between their subjects and predicates. Necessary relationships between subjects and predicates are not restricted to instances where an essential part(juz’ al-dhāt) of a subject is predicated thereto. If it were the case, cognitive necessity would be restricted to tautological propositions. Rather, necessity is found in other propositions as well, including propositions in which the predicate is an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) [26] of the subject and is abstracted from, and predicated to, the essence of the subject. This fact has been pointed out by the Divine sage al-Sabzawārī:

A predicate abstracted from the essence of the subject

Differs from a predicate which is an external associate

[27]

The predication of a subject’s essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) to that subject - such as the predication of contingency to quiddity(al-māhiyya) - as opposed to the predication of its essential part, bears new information. Since this new universal information, which is exclusive to its subject and predicate, has not been attained by inductive or experimental means, and rather is self-evident(badīhī) , primary(awwalī) , or reducible to self-evident and primary propositions, it is not incompatible with inattentiveness or ignorance with respect to its particulars. If the particular(juz’ī) of a certain universal is identified by sensory means(ehsās) , or one of its subsets is discovered through deduction, by incorporating this new information along with that universal major premise, the cognition of a new fact regarding that particular or subset is attained.

For instance, when we attain the universal knowledge(al-‛ilm al-kullī) that every human being is mortal, given the universality of this knowledge, is other than our knowledge of a particular individual’s mortality. Therefore, if we identify a particular entity as a human being, by constructing a syllogism, we can infer his mortality.

In universal propositions, if the judgment is about the essence(dhāt) of a subject, like “A whole is bigger than its part,” the proposition is described as a quantified universal proposition(al-mahsūra al-kulliyya) . If the quantified universal proposition is procured by means of experiment and induction, it is similar to a reservoir, which is filled by pumping water into it. Nevertheless, if the predicate is an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of the subject, which is universally proved for it by demonstration, the proposition is similar to a spring that gushes from within and illustrates its truth to everyone who observes its deduction.

Intuitive Knowledge and its Categories

Acquired knowledge pertains to notions and quiddities that have mental existence. They begin at primary(awwalī) and self-evident(badīhī) concepts and propositions and eventuate at discursive(nadharī) cognitions. The mental existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī) of quiddities and essences depends upon the existence of knowledge. The external existence of knowledge, which bears the essence or quiddity of knowledge, is in union with the knower’s existence without the mediation of any concept. This unity of the knowledge and the knower(wahda al-‛ālim wa al-ma‛lūm) , which is prior to the generation of concepts, is associated with a sort of awareness called intuitive or presential knowledge(al-‛ilm al-shuhūdī or al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī) .

Acquired knowledge(al-‛ilm al-husūlī) applies only to things that appear as notions and quiddities. It cannot reach realities that are beyond the horizon of notional manifestations and are sheer external reality. In these instances, only after such realities have been intuitively witnessed, is it that certain notions that reflect them emerge. The task of these notions is to reflect and indicate things that have been intuitively discerned, and for this reason, they are useless for someone who is not familiar with shuhūd.

Of the things the human being is intuitively aware of is the existence of the basic reality, the existence of himself, and the existence of his knowledge. Notions that represent these realities are primary notions.

Like acquired knowledge, which is divided into primary(awwalī) , self-evident(badihī) , and discursive(nadharī) knowledge, intuitive knowledge is also divided into three kinds: primary, self-evident, and complex.

An intuitive knowledge is primary(awwalī) if it cannot be denied or doubted and one cannot be inattentive towards it. Self-evident and complex intuitive knowledge are reducible to primary intuitive knowledge. Like discursive acquired knowledge, which is brought about by cogitation and demonstrative efforts, complex intuitive knowledge is acquired by purification of the soul and its emancipation from the vices of conceit.

If inspired by the verse, “Nay! Would that ye knew it with the knowledge of certitude, ye shall surely see the Hell,”[28] should it be desired to acquire shuhūdi knowledge respecting realities like Paradise and Hell, to reach at least the level of individuals like Hāritha ibn Mālik - who declared, “It is as if I am looking at the Throne(‛Arsh) of my Lord”[29] - becoming a speaking witness of the Throne of the Benevolent God, one must purify himself for long time.

Primary(awwalī) and self-evident(badihī) intuitive knowledge(al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī) reflect all-inclusive realities, so inclusive that the mind cannot but know them. The notions abstracted from these realities have universality(kulliyya) , immutability(thabāt) , and continuity(dawām) , and are primary or self-evident. Complex intuitive knowledge pertains to finite(mahdūd) and particular(juz’ī) realities, and the notions prescinded from them are disclosed to the conceptual format by reliance on realities that encompass these finite and particular realities.

If by ascending up the rungs of sincerity, the wayfarer of the shuhūdi journey succeeds in acquiring vision of universal realities(al-haqā’iq al-kulliyya) and gaining companionship of the Absolute Real(al-Haq al-Mutlaq) , he is protected against Satanic ambushes and interference. That is because Satan cannot fly beyond the heavens of imagination and estimation and is chased away when he makes the intention of entering and hearing what is above that ceiling. “But any listening now findeth a flaming dart in wait for him.”[30]

Individuals who succeed in reaching this zenith on the merit of their sincerity are safe from the mischief of doubt(shak) and skepticism(shakkākiyya) in their shuhūd; and in their journey, they are “the straight path(al-sirāt al-mustaqīm) ” and “the criteria of equity(mawāzīn al-qist) .”

Such immunity to doubt and skepticism is indebted to the fact that doubt is involved when a certain thing is one among several items. For example, if a shelf has a number of books and one of them is intended from a distance, this situation is an instance where distinguishing the intended book from the rest of the books may involve doubt. Nonetheless, intellectual realities(al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya) , and chief among them the Absolute Real(al-Haq al-Mutlaq) , are infinite realities that are beyond numerablity. If reached, they can never be subject to doubt and skepticism. Likewise, if someone is enjoying universal shuhūd in relation to the realities of the mundus imaginalis[31] under the auspices of universal shuhūds, he is also secure and immune to doubt and skepticism.

However, individuals in the rudimentary stages of wayfaring are similar to people who, in the realm of acquired knowledge, are gazing at the heavens and are engrossed in the observation of the cosmos. Obviously, external celestial bodies are known to them indirectly, and should they suffer from weak vision, they will face doubt and skepticism in their observation. In order to ascertain the content of their observation, they will have to rely on someone who has good eyesight.

Someone who experiences a deranged shuhūd in the course of wayfaring, first, his shuhūd lacks the certitude which is the hallmark of the vision of intellectual realities(al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya) , and second, he is compelled to evaluate his mystical experiences with “the criteria of equity.” This evaluation sometimes takes place in a mystical experience as a shuhūd, and occasionally it is rendered by transferring the content of a certain shuhūd into the notional format and rational assessment thereof.

A statement is considered trustworthy in rational assessment, which has an unequivocal content and has been narrated by a reliable chain of narrators from the Infallible(Ma‛sūmīn) sources of mystical cognition. However, if a tradition lacks anyone of these elements - that is, its content is not unequivocal and clear, or it lacks the reliable chain of narrators, or its source cannot be ascertained to be an Infallible entity - it cannot serve as a criterion of evaluation.

The shuhūdi evaluation of a deranged mystical discovery is like an instance where a question rises in an exemplification(tamāthul) in the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) , and in the same intermediate realm, in a state similar to dream and fantasia, the wayfarer hesitates and asks a guide who has attained that perception. The guide, during the same mystical experience, manifests and reveals the perplexing matter in such a way that there does not remain any chance for doubts. Notional evaluation is involved when the mystical experience has ended and some of its notions have stayed in the mind; and then those notions are evaluated by the criteria of reason, Qur’ānic verses, and traditions narrated from the most benevolent Prophet and the Infallible Imams - may the greetings of Allah be unto them.

Soul and the Intuitive Knowledge thereof

Everyone’s awareness with respect to his soul is by intuitive knowledge(al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī) , because soul is not a notion or quiddity in which case it would exist through the mental mode of existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī) and would be known through the conceptual framework of knowledge. What a notion can do is to indicate the soul; and as far as quiddity is concerned, it is something that finds reality subordinately to the existence of the individual and is placed before comprehension and acquired knowledge by the mediation of the mind. Like notions, it has a secondary and indirect indication of what it is associated or united with.

Individuals like René Descartes, who have failed this fine point, have presumed they trace their reality from their effects. After asserting skepticism(shakkākiyya) towards everything, Descartes locates his self as the first reality by using doubt as the middle term of his argument. To prove the existence of one’s soul by using doubt and thoughts as middle terms, in addition to placing the soul among things that exist by mental existence and are found in the mind, undermines the primariness(awwaliyya) of its knowledge as well.

Ibn Sīnā, in the third chapter of Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, and in the Psychology of Al-Shifā’, and then Sadr al-Muta’allihīn[32] in the discussions psychology in Al-Asfār, stress the fact that regardless of his mental or external, cognitive or practical, effects, man cannot prove his soul through his own effects.

Ibn Sīnā’s argues in this regard that should someone doubt his self and desire to prove it through his effects, through his thoughts for instance, in the minor premise, he will either mention the thoughts absolutely or as his own. If thoughts are mentioned absolutely, that is, not mentioned as “my thoughts”, the argument cannot prove the arguer’s soul. At most, it will indicate that there is an agency, such as a thinker, who is responsible for producing the thoughts. However, if thoughts are mentioned as his­ - for instance, it is stated, “I think,” - in this case “I” and its reality have already been presupposed as the agency to whom the thoughts pertain. Therefore, the argument cannot demonstrate the existence of the soul as its conclusion.[33]

Ibn Sīnā’s demonstration illustrates that man cannot recognize his self through rational arguments and middle terms such as his thoughts; rather, he intuitively knows his self before he knows any of his effects. This argument, first of all, denies the discursiveness and even self-evidence of the human being’s knowledge of his self; and a closer examination can even reveal the impossibility of acquired knowledge(al-‛ilm al-husūlī) with respect to one’s soul, because, acquired knowledge, whether discursive, self-evident, or primary, is acquired though thinking. And thinking being a human action and effect, as indicated by the demonstration, he must know his self before he knows his effects, including include his thoughts and concepts. Since everyone knows his self, therefore, everyone knows his self through a cognition, which precedes acquired knowledge, namely, through intuitive knowledge.

The soul’s intuitive knowledge of itself is primary; and the notions that are derived from this knowledge and reflect the self, like the notion of “I,” are primary as well.

In the horizon of acquired knowledge, the notion of “I” - like the notions of existence, reality, knowledge, and like the propositions that acknowledge the basic reality, one’s own reality, or the existence of one’s knowledge - is primary. Obviously, such definite primary propositions(al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) , for their affinity with the principle of non-contradiction, which derives from the shuhūd of the Absolute Reality(al-Haq al-Mutlaq) as well, have necessity of veridicality(dharūra al-sidq) and doubt and skepticism are irrelevant with respect to them.

Aside from Ibn Sinā’s above proof, in his Al-Mutarehāt, Shaykh al-Ishrāq(the Master of Illumination) has established two demonstrations to indicate that the only medium of knowing one’s own self is intuitive knowledge and that it is impossible to know one’s self through notional knowledge. Having two different middle terms, these two demonstrations, which he has received during a mystical discovery and shuhūdi conversation with Aristotle, are distinct and independent from one another. The middle term of one of them is the particularity(juz’iyya) of the soul and universality(kulliyya) of notions and quiddities and that of the second one is the presence of the soul before itself and the absence of concepts and quiddities from it.

His first demonstration can be outlined in a second-figure syllogism as follows:

Everyone finds his reality as a specific and particular thing.

All concepts, including the concept of “I”, are universal.

Therefore, everyone’s reality is other than the concept of “I” or any other mental concept.

The second demonstration affirms that every individual’s reality is present before himself, whereas the notion of “I,” by predication as essence(al-haml al-awwalī) , is “he,” by predication as extension(al-haml al-shāỷ) . Therefore, every person’s reality is other than the notion that indicates him and everyone intuitively discerns his reality before he discerns the said notion. That is because in every condition, even when expressing skepticism or ignorance, the human being alludes to himself; and to be ignorant of one’s own self is unawareness of the knowledge one has about himself.[34]

Man’s knowledge of his own reality is one of his intuitive and primary assets. This knowledge does not reflect whether the soul is an accident(‛aradh) or substance(jauhar) . Therefore, it is not subject to the criticism that if soul is intuitively known and acquired knowledge is incapable of discerning its reality, then there is no way to prove that it is a substance.

The discussion whether soul is an accident or a substance is part of the inquiry regarding its quiddity; and as a secondary-order analysis, it is rendered after soul’s existence has been intuitively known. This analysis belongs to the conceptual framework in which things exist by mental existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī) and - like unity(wahda) of quiddity and existence and unity of concept(mafhūm) and extension(misdāq) - have a sort of unity with the soul. Evidently, this inquiry is open to extensive discussions that proceed from primary and self-evident premises towards discursive knowledge.

Abstraction and Universalization of Causation

Causation(‛illiyya) means a necessary relationship between external events. The manner in which we discern it is similar to how we intuitively discern our own reality and abstract the concept of “I” or soul from it. That is, the primary and axiomatic concept of causation is discerned from the intuitive perception of soul’s relationship with its faculties and actions. One ought to be reminded that since every argument relies upon its premises’ necessary entailment of its conclusion - that is, the causality of the premises with respect with their conclusion - it is beyond the capacity of rational arguments to prove or deny the presence of causal relationships between external events. In other words, if causation is doubted, just as on the one hand it cannot be proved by relying upon itself, on the other, without using the very principle of causation, it would be impossible to construct an argument for its rejection. Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, may Allah sanctify his tomb, says, “If causation is accepted, argument is plausible; and if it is denied, reasoning would be irrelevant.”[35] Therefore, an inquiry that is dedicated to the analysis of causation, in fact, has the role of its explanation, not that of its proving it.

When soul gains an intuitive perception of its faculties, actions, and wills, and when it discerns the notion of causal relationship between things, it examines the corollaries and characteristics of this notion. In the next step, it universalizes causation in a syllogistic fashion - not analogically as suggested by those not acquainted with this principle - with respect to things that are outside its sphere of existence.

For instance, when the soul discerns quidditative concepts and compares them with existence and nonexistence, it acknowledges their equidistance(tasāwi al-nisba) towards existence and nonexistence, and equates the preponderance(tarjīh) of one of these two contradictories(naqīdhain) over the other with the validity of both equidistance and non-equidistance, evidently a conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain) . Therefore, it ascribes the preponderance of one of the two to an external causal efficacy and sees it as the result of a necessary relationship between the quiddity and that cause. Further analyses, however, transfer the causal nexus from quiddity to the reality and being which is in union with it, and indicate that quiddity has essential nihility(al-halāka al-dhātiyyaa) in every condition.

The inquiry of existential causes(al-‛ilal al-wujūdiyya) of various quiddities comprises the analysis of four causes - material(al-‛illa al-mādiyya) , formal(al-‛illa al-sūriyya) , final(al-‛illa al-ghāyiyya) , and efficient(al-‛illa al-fā‛iliyya) . Although the celebrated explanation of the existence of contingents(mumkināt) is purely on the score of material causes; many proofs, such as the arguments of incorporeality of the soul and its various faculties, indicate that causality is not solely restricted to material causes and rather material causes are limited to a certain portion of the realm of existence. Moreover, analysis of the meaning of matter establishes the necessity of formal, final, and efficient causes; and with the affirmation of incorporeal entities, it is further ascertained that causality is free of need to material and formal causes. In the series of incorporeal entities, the precedence of final cause over efficient cause - that is, the efficacy(fā‛iliyya) of final cause in relation to the efficient cause - and the precedence and principality of efficient cause over the other causes is proved.

Knowledge and Epistemology

Knowledge always reflects a “known” - something that is its object. Considering the various categories of objects of cognition, it is marked by a number of divisions - such as philosophy, mathematics, and the many natural sciences.

Epistemology is a secondary-order discipline that studies knowledge. A discipline itself, it is subject to the same criteria and principles, which it proves for other disciplines.

Epistemology, as the inquiry of general and comprehensive principles of knowledge, comprises certain principles, which are valid with regard to every discipline including itself. Some propositions that are of extreme importance in the epistemological inquiry are as follows:

•Knowledge exists.

As explained earlier, skepticism with regard to this proposition makes inquiry and conversation irrelevant and its rejection invites nothing but sophism.

•Knowledge’s reflection of the reality is infallible.

This is a direct corollary of the previous proposition; since, if it is denied that knowledge represents reality, the only thing left is ignorance.

•If principles of knowledge are observed, reality can be reached.

In other words, it is possible do reach arrive at the reality and occasionally, because of violating epistemic principles, one may remain ignorant and sustain fallacies.

Epistemology, however, does not determine the validity or falsity of the content of another discipline. Such an appraisal has to be conducted according to the fundamental criteria of each discipline itself. What epistemology can do is to describe and name a veridical cognition’s attributes such as immutability, incorporeality, continuity, and so forth. It is an epistemologist’s task to differ or concur with the view, which suggests that due to the intertwined and collective evolution of the various disciplines, the entirety of man’s knowledge is subject to evolution and change. Likewise, to deny or affirm the immutability, or necessity of immutability, of certain cognitions is an epistemological inquiry. Nonetheless, which cognitions are definite and have been acquired through acceptable measures, and which ones are unscientific and nothing but ignorance under the veil of knowledge, has to be determined in each pertinent discipline.

It becomes clear from this explanation that the abundance of disagreements and errors, which is an obvious mark on every subject, does not undermine the reliability of the fundamental principles of cognition and it cannot justify the negation of possibility of knowledge or negation of its accuracy and reliability.

Not only the presence of discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of scholars of various fields does not put in question the validity of epistemological principles, rather, based on these contradictory remarks, an epistemologist can infer the overall presence of valid and false cognitions. Obviously, when two contradictory opinions are expressed about a single object, given the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories(istehāla ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain) , it can be stated that indubitably, one of them is true and the other one is false. However, it is not for epistemology to identify the valid assertion. Rather, it is the task of the expert of each science to render such judgments in accordance with the fundamentals of his particular science and formal standards of logic.

Noncompliance with the logical standards results in a myriad of flaws and errors, which further lead to incoherent and contradictory remarks. Should mere occurrence of mistakes or contradictory statements be a reason to negate knowledge or question its infallibility, then this, contrary to the popular opinion, is not exclusive to a specific discipline such as philosophy and applies to every empirical or discursive branch of knowledge.

Philosophy in its General and Specific Senses

Philosophy is sometimes used in a broader sense whereby it is coterminous with knowledge. Obviously, since knowledge encompasses every awareness that reflects reality and has cognitive worth, in its general sense, philosophy even comprises the empirical and natural sciences. Therefore, in a general division, knowledge or philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical branches.

Theoretical wisdom(al-hikma al-nadhariyya) or philosophy is the inquiry of things, which exist irrespective of the human will and conduct. This section of philosophy bears numerous divisions. Its chief sections are as follows:

•The higher wisdom(al-hikma al-‛ulyā) , also called the first philosophy(al-hikma al-ūlā) . It is this branch of knowledge to which the term philosophy is applied in its specific sense. Since higher philosophy is also concerned with the cognition of the Necessary(al-Wājib) , it is called theology(Ilāhiyāt) .

•The middle wisdom(al-hikma al-wustā) , also called mathematics.

•The low wisdom(al-hikma al-sufla) . This section of knowledge comprises the natural and experimental sciences.

Natural sciences are concerned with the inquiry of physical things. Mathematics studies things that have intermediate corporeality(al-tajarrud al-barzakhī) , that is, although they lack physique, they do have quantity. The first philosophy, the discipline to which the current applications of philosophy and hikma is exclusive, is the inquiry of absolute reality. Its predicates are those accidents of absolute reality, which precede its division by the various mathematical, natural, moral, and logical delimitations.

Practical wisdom(al-hikma al-‛amaliyya) analyzes things that exist because of the human will. It is further divided into three kinds: ethics, home economics, and public administration.

This division of knowledge that al-Fārābī and other Islamic philosophers have elucidated its details, illustrates that philosophy, in its general sense, has never been a single discipline. It has had a wide application by which it subsumed many diverse disciplines. As for the first philosophy, or philosophy in its specific sense, it is a particular branch of knowledge that has never encompassed other disciplines. Therefore, the much-celebrated opinion that philosophy used to encompass every branch of knowledge and the empirical sciences separated from philosophy as they gradually evolved, lacks foundation. If by philosophy its general meaning is meant, it has never been a single discipline with a specific subject of inquiry. And if it’s specific meaning is in view, then it has never included other disciplines. However, if it is meant that with the empirical sciences’ advance, rational and incorporeal methods of knowledge became obsolete and experiential perspectives replaced metaphysical views, it is a valid statement. Nevertheless, except for their intellectual universals(al-kulliyāt al-‛aqliyya) that are not subject to experiment, natural sciences were founded on experiment from the beginning.

Philosophy and Particular Disciplines

Definition of philosophy as “a theomorphic process towards similarity to God,” or “human transition into an epistemic world that is identical with the external world,” as pronounced by al-Fārābī and philosophers after him, is respecting the first philosophy. The acknowledgement of philosophers, among them Ibn Sīnā in his treatise Al–Hudūd, that defining things and identifying their essential parts and properties is extremely difficult, pertains to natural and physical entities.[36]

Philosophy, mathematics, and a certain portion of ethics, use incorporeal and intellectual notions. The possibility of knowing these realities and identifying their essential properties(al-‛awāridh al-dhātiyya) , and thereby establishing definite demonstrations(barāhīn) about them, cannot be denied. Natural sciences that try to discern quiddities and essences by sensory and experiential methods hardly arrive at reality of things, and therefore, they are unable to establish demonstrations.

Absence of demonstrations(barāhīn) in experimental sciences has led these disciplines to suffice at conjectural premises and conclusions and use results generated from such conjectural syllogisms for practical purposes. The human expectation from the empirical sciences is their wider practical application for exploitation of natural resources. However, in the realm of propositions that are devoid of direct practical use, anything less than certitude is useless.