Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter Eight: The Argument from Design

A thorough assessment of the much-celebrated argument that proceeds from the world’s orderly concatenation requires that three questions be carefully analyzed:

· What is order?

· Does order exist?

· Why does order exist?

The inquiry of these key questions, in addition to ensuring that the argument’s conclusions do not trespass beyond what is contained in its premises, should also shed light on some other secondary issues so their independent analysis will not be needed.

What is Order?

Order(nadhm) is not a quiddity(māhiyya) so it could be defined through its genus(jins) and differentia(fasl) . However, in order to insure that our inquiry proceeds from logically solid grounds, it is prudent to clarify the meaning of order, since if an inquiry is devoted to examining whether a certain notion is instantiated in the external world, then before acceptance or dismissal, it is imperative to elucidate what does that notion stand for.

Although order is not a quiddity, in terms of being a secondary philosophic intelligible(al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-falsafī) , it is similar to quiddities. Order is reflected in the regularity of things, and the meaning of regularity, which is opposite to entropy, is evident. As will be reiterated at the end of the chapter, it is important to retain in mind that orderliness is opposite to entropy, not evil. Hence, even if there is evil in the world, its operation is orderly and it is bound by specific rules.

Regularity or orderliness can be conventional(e‛tebārī) , artificial(senā‛ī) , or factual(wāqe‛ī) . An example of conventional regularity would be the regularity of words of a sentence. The orderly arrangement of books of a library and the splendid complexities of a watch are instances of artificial regularity. Factual order is like the configuration of the animal body.

Although used in the analogical exposition(al-taqrīr al-tamthīlī) of the argument from design, artificial design is not, however, central to its inquiry and in fact analogy(tamthīl) has little significance in demonstrative discussions. The argument’s analogical exposition­­ could run, for instance, as follows: As it is justified to infer from the labyrinth complexities of a watch that it has a designer, likewise, it is not irrational to trace the orderliness of the world to a cosmic orderer(al-nādhim) . In brief, in these versions the similarity of artificial design and cosmic orderliness is extended to their similarity in being the work of an intelligent designer.

Factual order, the grounds whereby foundations of the argument from design is laid, is neither indebted to conventions of the society nor to the imagination of inventors. Its abode is the external reality and it is apprehended from the comparison of external things. Factual order has three kinds:

1. Causal order(al-nadhm al-‛illī)

2. Teleological order(al-nadhm al-ghā’ī)

3. Immanent order(al-nadhm al-dākhilī)

Causal order reflects the cognation(musānikha) of a cause with its effect. As instanced by the verse, “Everyone acteth after his own mold”[155] causes only produce certain effects, and certain effects are produced only by certain causes. Teleological order represents the relationship of an effect with its final cause. It means that events advance towards specific goals and not every event can produce every outcome. The denial of the former and this kind of order amounts to the denial of the principle of causation, which would indicate the rule of entropy and chaos over the world and that anything could be produced by anything.

Immanent order reflects the regularity of internal parts of a configuration. It is exclusive to things, which have prima matter(al-mādda al-ūlā) and form(sūra) , genus and differentia, or are totalities of subordinate parts. Immanent order is inconceivable for something that is externally sheer, that is, is not made of extraneous parts.

On numerous occasions, the Noble Qur’ān alludes to these tripartite regularities of things; and in some verses, like the verse“Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything its form, and then guided it,”[ 156] the Divine Book mentions all three together. This verse speaks of God as the efficient cause of all things Who has furnished them with an impeccable “form” or regularity and guided them towards their goals.

In the light of this, it is fair to state that the regularity of members of a concatenation - on which the argument from design is based - is only conceivable between a series of things, which function towards a common objective. Therefore, the argument from design, contrary to other arguments such as the arguments from hudūth, motion, and contingency, cannot be organized with consideration to just one entity. Rather, it requires an ensemble, which is perceived in the context of its members and in relation to a common objective.

Does Order Exist?

At the threshold of inquiry into the existence of factual order, it should be kept in mind that the presence of factual order is perceivable in three spheres: the natural world(‛ālam al-mādda) , the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) , and the world of intellects(‛ālam al-‛uqūl) . The first category of order is discerned by the empirical sciences; the second is studied by the mathematical sciences, logic, and philosophy; and Gnosticism inquires into the orderliness of intellectual realities. However, the sole field of critique and apology in the context of the argument from design is the orderliness of the natural world.

The minor premise of the argument from design is not a purely empirical premise. Design and orderliness is not a sensible quality, which can be apprehended by sensation. It is similar to the principle of causation, which is not sensually discerned, since the maximum sensory perception with respect to causation is the observation of constant succession and concurrence of changes in physical beings. In the case of natural order, however, we do not perceive something as palpably sensible as succession and concurrence of events. Order is an elaborate regularity and concatenation between two or more things; and sensation(ehsās) cannot detect such regularity and concatenation. In fact, it is our reason that discerns the presence of orderliness and design in natural entities from our experiential and sensual perceptions. Occasionally, if natural order is mentioned as a sensory object, it is because reason detects it with the assistance of the senses, as it is held that reason apprehends motion with the help of sensation. Therefore, individuals, who deny the epistemic worth of the rational approach and consider sensation(ehsās) the sole means of knowledge, can never have definite knowledge with respect to the presence of order.

One need be reminded that if the argument’s minor premise is conjectural, the conclusion of the argument will be conjectural as well, because a syllogism’s conclusion is always defined by its weakest premise. Furthermore, if the argument’s minor premise relates the presence of order and design at a cosmic scale, given that the argument is valid, a cosmic orderer(al-nādhim) and designer will be proved. But if the argument is founded on an order of a rather limited scope, the argument’s conclusion will be in proportion to the limited order included in its premise.

The presence of order in the world can be affirmed by two different approaches: the purely rational approach and the rational-sensual approach, which was just indicated. Difference between the two is important to notice. In brief, through syllogism du pourqoi(al-burhān al-limmī) - that is, arguing from transcendental sources and using the Divine names of beauty and glory as middle terms to the existence of order in the world - reason has the capacity to not only infer the universal orderliness of the world, but also to establish its perfection. For instance, through syllogism du pourqoi, al-Ghazzālī traces certain Divine attributes such as the Creator, the All-Knowledgeable, the Generous, Omnipotent, and so forth, to the perfection of the world, which He has created. Shaykh al-Ishrāq approves al-Ghazzālī’s method of inferring world’s perfection from the attributes of its efficient cause. However, one who is arguing from the attributes of the cosmic Creator to cosmic orderliness and perfection cannot lend his knowledge of the cosmic Creator to a syllogism, which intends to prove Him. The affirmation of this sort of expansive and universal order, which dominates the entire realm of existence, is far beyond the scope of empiricism, which can only relate the limited portion of the cosmos, which is within the sphere of human sensation.

Although empiricism cannot indicate a universal cosmic regularity, nevertheless, an overall order is conveniently provable. This is indebted to the evident immanent and teleological regularities of things discernable to man - whether they pertain to nature, the mundus imaginalis, or the intellectual world. For instance, the Peripatetic philosophers infer the presence of plant and animal souls from the many coordinated activities of faunae and florae, which are not because of their body; and Shaykh al-Ishrāq[157] argues for the existence of their archetypes(arbāb al-anwā‛) on the basis of their intelligent and wise orderliness. Moreover, if the inquiry of how certain objectives are realized by certain behaviors of the natural elements leads to the creation of various branches of empirical sciences, then these behaviors are marked by knowledge and contrivance. In light of this observation, the presence of design, at least on a limited scale, is not deniable. Hence, the tenability of the argument from design lies with the veridicality of its major premise.

Why does Order Exist?

The inquiry of the major premise of the argument from design is devoted to establishing whether the presence of order in the world can be traced to an intelligent designer. In other words, it assesses the veridicality of a universal major premise, which assigns every order to an orderer(al-nādhim) and rules out the possibility of haphazardness. That is because if some orders are brought about by intelligent causal efficacy and some may be haphazard, then - given that the argument is in the form of a first-figure syllogism, which in order to be conclusive, must include a universal major premise - the existence of an orderer cannot be concluded.

It is important to notice that in demonstrative reasoning, it is only epistemic certitude, which can provide logical grounds of inference. Although psychological certitude, which is mostly the result of individual habits and social predilections, is beneficial to religious faith; it cannot withstand rational critique and cannot relay cognitive judgments to others.

Among the methods tried to prove the major premise of the argument is probability. It has been argued that since the likeliness of haphazard occurrence of the natural world’s splendid regularity is almost zero, therefore, it cannot be by chance and is indebted to a knowledgeable causal efficacy.

However, there are some points, which undermine the tenability of this perspective:

First: Probability approximates the likelihood of haphazard and desultory occurrence of an orderly arrangement of elements to zero, nonetheless, it never reduces it to zero. Therefore, it may be able to deliver a sort of simplistic confidence and psychological certitude; however, it can never entail cognitive certitude.

Second: The need of contingents with respect to the Necessary and the impossibility of chance are based on definite demonstrations(barāhīn) , nevertheless as far as the arrangement of the natural elements, regardless of their contingency and equidistance to existence and nonexistence, is concerned, chance and haphazardness cannot be easily ruled out. This is because all conceivable arrangements of natural elements have equal probability with one another.

For instance, the proponent of the probability argument may analogize the orderly nature of the world to a series of one thousand coins, which are marked from one to one thousand. The chances of haphazard arrangement of such a series of coins in a away that coin number one be placed first and coin number two second, and so on until coin one number thousand thousandth, is almost zero. Therefore, if an arrangement as such is rendered, it is not irrational to infer that the arranger is an intelligent agency. However, if this example is carefully analyzed, it becomes clear that all of the other conceivable scenarios have an equally weak probability. Even if coins were arranged in a different order, for instance, if they were arranged from one thousand to one, the odd coins were placed ahead of the even coins, or vice versa, or they were arranged in the most disorderly fashion perceivable, all of the arrangements would have an equal probability in comparison with one another.

If the existence of an all-knowledgeable designer is not already established through rational deduction and the possibility of haphazard occurrence of the present concatenation is not ruled out, the present or even the most perfect concatenation will have an equal likelihood in comparison with any other perceivable concatenation - including the worst and the ugliest. In other words, should each one of the perceivable concatenations be compared with one another, none of them will have more or less probability than another one.

Likelihood is involved when the probability of the present or most perfect concatenation is compared with the sum of the probabilities of other perceivable concatenations. It is in such a situation that it is legitimate to assert that the probability of the present ensemble’s desultory arrangement is close to zero; therefore, the probability of the opposite side, which is the totality of all other perceivable concatenations, is close to one. However, notice that the external reality is always one of the perceivable arrangements and the totality that encompasses some or all of the non-perfect concatenations is a mental phenomenon. Reality always bears one of the perceivable arrangements, and whatever arrangement it may be, it has an equal probability against the present or most perfect concatenation.

Third: As explained earlier, probability - even if it is regarded with respect to a specific instance and not a mental totality - is not a real attribute of a thing. As a mental and practical reification(e‛tebār) , it only indicates the reasonable extent of expectation and hope a person should have about something. However, as far as the external world is concerned, probability does not relate anything about it.

Probability can be helpful for the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) . In fact, its valuable applications in the coordination of individual and social acts are not deniable. This is the reason why in disciplines where the overriding objective is practical solution of problems and in whereby comprehension of reality is not critically important, the usage of probability is very popular and even imperative. However, with respect to philosophical and theological doctrines, where truth is the highest consideration and the inquiry does not acquiesce to anything less than certitude, application of probability is futile and erroneous.

To authenticate the cogency of a given argument, as explained earlier, it is important that the truth of its premises and their entailment of the sought conclusion be assessed. We found that the minor premise of the argument from design was by and large acceptable, while its major premise does not have rational foundations.

However, even if the disputability of the universality of its major premise were set aside, the problem of an argument, which proceeds from the intelligent coordination of a certain concatenation, is that, even if conclusive, it does not prove a first efficient cause. It merely demonstrates an agency responsible for a particular design and knowledgeable thereof. However, whether it is above contingency, hudūth, and flux, is entirely open to question. Even if the argument were based on the orderliness of the entire world, it would indicate that its orderer is an all-powerful, knowledgeable, and incorporeal being, which is not included in the harmonious totality, nonetheless, it would not establish that his existence is necessary. Therefore, in order to prove the necessity of the designer, further arguments, such as the demonstration of contingency and necessity, would have to be elicited.

In short, if the weakness of the major premise were to be overlooked, the presence of order could be traced to an orderer, and since order is a knowledgeable act, the orderer’s attribute of knowledge would be affirmed as well. However, this still does not indicate whether the orderer has necessity or unity. For these limitations of the argument from design, the sages of the Islamic philosophical schools of Illumination(hikma al-ishrāq) , Peripatetic(hikma al-mashā’) , and Transcendent Wisdom(al-Hikma al-Muta‛āliyya) have demurred from it. Certain references to the orderly nature of the world in some of their works are in the context of arguments of Divine attributes such as unity, knowledge, and wisdom. Again, this is because the essential attributes of the necessary are identical with His Essence, however, given their conceptual difference, it is possible to conduct independent analysis and inquiry with respect to each one of them.

The Argument from Design and the Noble Qur’ān

It is deemed prudent to indicate, though in brief, that if the premises of an argument are purely rational, the argument is a demonstration(burhān) . If the premises comprise rational as well as generally-accepted subjects(musallamāt) , but the argument relies mostly on the generally-accepted subjects, such an argument is decent contention or kindly exhortation(al-jidāl al-ahsan) . But if the premises are generally accepted subjects, which lack rational foundations, the argument is a fallacy and void contention.

The demonstrative shortcoming of the argument from design in indicating the Deity’s existence does not imply that it has no exhortative value. The argument, in fact, can conveniently inspire consent of certain individuals - namely the ones who admit that the world is marked with orderliness and believe in the Necessary’s unity and “Creatorness”(khāliqiyya) - to acknowledge to al-tawhīd al-rūbūbī and after that al-tawhīd al-‛ibādi.[158] For this reason, the Noble Qur’ān resorts to kindly exhortation of the polytheists and idolaters of Hijāz, a group that constituted a considerable portion of population at the time of revelation.

At the early period of Islam’s rise, idolatry was the chief social force, which opposed Islam. Idolaters were those infidels who had faith in a single God but believed that idols were their archetypes(arbāb al-anwā‛) , which mediated between God and His creatures. The people of Hijāz offered sacrifices before idols and worshipped them in order to achieve their wishes through their intercession.

Another social group was the People of the Book. These people were mostly the Jewry of Medina and Christians whose presence was felt primarily in the southern parts of the peninsula. In addition to these two groups, the Qur’ān mentions another group of people who ascribed their affairs to time(dahr) and considered it the factor, which determined their lives and deaths. After the rise of Islam and establishment of its political domination, these dogmatic patterns were altered; and as it appears from the conversations and debates narrated from the Shiite Imams, ideological opposition to Islam mostly manifested in the form of schools, which negated the very essence of the Necessary.

The Noble Qur’ān, as the book of guidance for the entire human race, satisfies the needs of the gentry of sages as well as the commonality. In some verses - such as the chapter of Monotheism(Sūra al-Tawhīd) and the first verses of the chapter of Iron(Sūra al-Hadīd) - one can see the profundity, which, over the many ages, has inspired Islamic theosophy and Gnosticism with a sense of direction. On the other hand, the kindly exhortation of some other verses addresses those people who have been inflicted by polytheism and have been led astray with respect to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī and al-tawhīd al-ibādī. As God, the Exalted, decrees enjoinment by wisdom, admonishment, and kindly exhortation - “And call those unto way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation and dispute with them in the manner which is the best”[159] - the apostles in general, and their last and greatest in particular, were heedful of their audience’s capacity of comprehension. They exemplified the creed “We the congregation of prophets converse to people according to the capacity of their intellects.”[160]

In a lengthy tradition in Al-Ihtejāj, when Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be with him, was asked about the jadals of the Prophet, he answered that God had obliged him to use jadal and the Noble Qur’ān, on occasions, uses it as well.[161] On many issues, which the Shiite Imams, peace be with them, have propounded with demonstrations(barāhīn) , they have, on certain appropriate occasions, taken recourse to admonition and kindly exhortation(al-jadal al-ahsan) .

In his Al-Tawhīd, al-Shaykh al-Sadūq, blessings be with him, narrates that two different individuals asked Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be with him, whether God has the power to place the earth in an egg-sized tiny container in a way that neither the earth loses its size nor the container expands. The Imam, peace be with him, gives one of them a rhetorical(jadalī) answer and the other a demonstrative one.

In response to the first inquisitor, the Imam, peace be with him, says “Open your eyes, do not you see the expansive heavens and the earth? How God has placed something which is bigger than the earth in your eyes which are smaller than an egg.” This answer was sufficient to satisfy the inquisitor.[162]

In his answer to the second individual, while stressing that by His infinite power, God can do everything, the Imam says “What you have asked is impossible and nothing(lā shai’) .”[163] That is, although God is powerful to do everything, however, you have not asked about a “thing”; therefore, what you have inquired about is not an exception to the Divine omnipotence; rather, it is excluded from the domain of power. This response of the holy Imam, peace be with him, comprises a profound philosophical analysis about impossible phenomena that an impossible thing has a notion the extension(misdāq) of which is “nothing”.

The argument from design has been used in the Noble Qur’ān in a rhetorical manner. It addresses those polytheists whose behavior and belief God, the Exalted, describes thus: “And if thou asketh them who created the heavens and the earth, certainly will they say, ‘God.’”[164] “And worship they besides God, what can neither hurt them nor profit them, and say they: ‘These are our intercessors with God.’”[165]

The Qur’ān is addressing a congregation, which on the one hand believes in God’s unity and acknowledges that the world is ruled by an intelligent administration and orderliness, and on the other, holds that this administration and orderliness pertain to archetypes(arbāb al-anwā‛) , which are intercessors between God and His creatures. In this situation, where the premises of the argument from design are grounds of mutual consensus, the Noble Qur’ān resorts to kindly exhortation and, in a rhetorical argument, traces God’s creatorness to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī and al-tawhīd al-‛ibādī.

In theism’s course of descent(al-qaus al-nuzūlī) , every higher level substantiates the truth of its lower level. In brief, the Essential unity(al-tawhīd al-dhātī) indicates the Creator’s unity(al-tawhīd fi al-khāliqiyya) , the Creator’s unity is sufficient evidence to yield knowledge to Lord’s(Rabb) unity(al-tawhīd al-rubūbī) , which in its own right, establishes al-tawhīd al-‛ibādī. Similarly, in its course of ascent(al-qaus al-su‛ūdī) , al-tawhīd al-‛ibādī can be traced to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī, and the fact that He is the Lord(Rabb) and is indicated by His creatorness; and His creatorness is proved by His Essential Necessity.

The Argument from Design and the Problem of Evil

The question whether evil exists in the world or not is an independent inquiry. However, even if the dispute of evil’s existence is laid aside, the fact is that the argument from design, in whatever form constructed, is immune to the problem of evil. This is because as long as a given concatenation is harmoniously functioning towards its objective, it can be asserted that it has design and orderliness; and there is no mutual necessity between having design and regularity and having a virtuous objective.

If the world is orderly, then evil, if existent at all, functions within the structure of the world’s order. An animal, which produces poison, does not change any and every food into poison. Rather, he too behaves within the organized network of relations and produces poison and destruction within the boundaries of the existent order.

The argument from design can be rendered defective only if either the present design’s purposefulness is denied or it is not ascribed to an orderer(nādhim) . However, the argument’s tenability is not subject to absence or presence of evil in the world.

Chapter Nine: The Argument from Miracles

Miraculous acts - such as the unusual incidents, which occur after invocations and prayers; succor from unseen sources in individuals’ lives like heeling of the ill; uncontrollable and unpredictable incidents, which lead to solutions of social predicaments; or flashes of thoughts, which suddenly solve scholarly and scientific problems - have been used in the west’s Judeo-Christian theology as premises of an argument for the existence of the Necessary. It has been asserted that such incidents are true and do not have any physical or natural cause, therefore, their cause, which is not physical, exists.

This contention, if not adduced further by some other argument, such as the demonstration of contingency and necessity, is not able to prove the Necessary and is subject to many objections.

First, individuals who have not experienced such extraordinary incidents, and to whom these experiences have not been narrated in an ascertaining manner, can have doubts about the very occurrence of such incidents.

Second, suppose such incidents do occur, their attribution to the Necessary and the consequent affirmation of the Necessary’s existence is open to question. Attribution of these incidents to the Necessary can held valid only if three conditions are satisfied: First, the principle of causation is accepted and the “causedness”(al-ma‛lūliyya) of these incidents is established. Second, all of the natural and metaphysical factors, which can generate these incidents, are taken into account. Third, the causality of all of these conceivable factors, except for the causality of the Almighty Necessary, is invalidated.

The argument in the form presented above is subject to the criticism by people who are skeptical about the principle of causation. Moreover, even if causation is acknowledged, since other factors, which can explain these incidents have not been conceived and ruled out, the argument does not entail the existence of the Necessary.

Extraordinary and unexpected incidents, which occur in the realm of soul - such as the sudden solutions of scientific and scholarly questions or practical virtues, which are instantaneously attained through passionate spiritual experiences - can be rooted in the past life of the person blessed with such cognitive or practical benedictions.

Our teacher, ‛Allāmah Sha‛rānī, Paradise of Allah be for him, used to say that sometimes a catechumen hears something from his teacher or sees it in a book and chronicles it in a corner of his memory. Then after twenty or thirty years when he assumes the post of teaching, during scholarly analyses, once again that previously heard or read matter appears in his mind. Inattentive towards the reason of such detection, he presumes that this is a flash of his own thought and assumes, No one has preceded me in this discovery. One such instance has occurred in the Al-Makāsib of our grand shaykh, al-Ansārī - may Allah bless his soul.

As profound a book as it is, Al-Makāsib is not a work to have been completed in a short time. Rather, the several years it has been written in have been a good portion of the life of our late Shaykh - may God bless his soul. This renowned jurisprudent, in one section of Al-Makāsib, quotes a discussion from the late ‛Allāmah al-Hillī; and then in another section that has been written perhaps a decade later, when that intimation reappears from his noble subconscious mind, and neither seeing it in the limited number of books he had nor recalling it in his recent readings, he assumes this is one of his own innovations and credits himself for it. Just as unknown factors exercise influence in the inward matters of the human being, they can prevail in his external matters as well.

The skeptic atheist can always maintain that the splitting of the sea by Moses, the Interlocutor, or his splitting the earth to swallow Korah, or the split of the moon by the signal of the Seal of Prophets, and incidents like the return of the sun, are all certainly extraordinary events, nonetheless, each one may have an unknown cause that, however not yet discovered, is possible to be identified one day.

Such extraordinary events of help from invisible sources can be instrumental in producing psychological certitudes. However, such certitude - which is actually a sort of confidence and practical satisfaction - does not bear cognitive certitude; and it is well established that in rational demonstrations(barāhīn) , nothing less than cognitive certitude is satisfactory.

Miracles in the View of Islamic Philosophers and Western Theologians

According to the Majestic Qur’ān, a miracle is a sign, which attests to the particular prophethood(al-nubūwa al-khāssa) of a person who has claimed prophethood. Islamic philosophers and mutakellimūn argue from the miracles of the most benevolent Prophet to his particular prophethood; and when a particular prophethood is proved, general prophethood(al-nubūwa al-‛āmma) [166] is proved as well, since no particular can exist without a universal, and no conditional without an absolute. Nevertheless, no Islamic philosopher or mutakellem has ever established an argument to prove the Necessary Essence based on miracles.

For certain individuals, miracles do not have any sort of indication with respect to religious doctrines. For instance, someone who does not accept the existence of God or some of His names and attributes such as the Guide(al-Hādī) , the Administrator(al-Mudabbir) , and so forth, or a person who does not believe in the general prophethood, or someone who doubts the principle of causation and considers chance and haphazardness possible, cannot infer the truth of religious tenets from an extraordinary event, which cannot be explained on the score of the known physical grounds.

If certain religious doctrines, such as the existence of God and the necessity of apostleship and religious guidance for people who do not have direct guidance from the Deity, are accepted, miracles can rationally indicate the prophethood of a specific person. From this perspective, miracles do not contradict the principle of causation and are not incompatible with natural laws; rather, their occurrence is an imperative law of existence.

If miracles were to contradict the principle of causation, then haphazardness and chance would be permissible, which in turn would make the inquiry of the existence of God irrelevant.

Extraordinary Events: Mu‛jiza, Karāma, I‛āna, and Ihāna

In kalāmi parlance there is a technical difference between different extraordinary acts. A mu‛jiza[167] is an extraordinary event, which is associated with a challenge to prove a certain prophethood. Being associated with a challenge is the hallmark, which distinguishes a mu‛jiza from other extraordinary events. If an extraordinary event takes place because of the will or the sacred soul of a saint, it is called karāma. If it happens because of the supplication of a righteous servant of God, it is called i‛āna[168] . Extraordinary events may occur as a result of causes, which are attained through learning and meditation such as sorcery. It is also possible that they take place to falsify someone who has falsely claimed prophethood and has challenged others. In the last case, an extraordinary event is called ihāna[169] . For instance, when al-Musaylama al-Kadhdhāb spat into a well to show to people that he has blessed it and that its water will increase, what happened was that even the little water, which was in the well dried. Although the exsiccation of the well in this manner was an extraordinary event, nevertheless, it was not what the perverted claimant had hoped and it led to his debasement.

The most unique characteristic of a mu‛jiza is that it illustrates God’s omnipotence. A prophet, who claims to have a message from the Absolute Origin, as his prophethood is extraordinary and does not come from finite and conditional sources, exhibits an extraordinary sign that attests to his connection to the Source of existence. Because God, the Exalted - Who undertakes the creation and guidance of all entities including the human beings - is not subject to sensual vision, His guidance is not effectuated in a direct manner with them. Rather, it is carried out by the few chosen servants, who with the chastity of their tongues and serenity of their hearts have the aptitude of Divine interlocution and vision. Thus, as instanced by the Qur’ān, His apostles appear with signs that testify to their connection to the Source of creation: “And We have sent thee [O Our Apostle Muhammad] unto mankind as [Our] Apostle, and God is sufficient a witness [thereof].”[170] The witness and attestation of God is that He manifests His extraordinary signs on the hands of His prophets.

Miracles as Rational Proofs

Miracles are proofs of particular prophethood; however, only people who are availed of reason can benefit from them. Someone who perceives miracles with physical eyes only and does not fathom what lies behind the appearance, may evince astonishment and wonder and even succumb to them, nevertheless, he is far from attaining a certitude, which is free of doubts and reservations.

In order to be able to ascertain a given prophethood, first, a reasonable person should be able to differentiate between an extraordinary act and an act, which is performed through artificial means. Second, he should recognize the mutual necessity between the claim’s veridicality and the miracle.

In the scene of challenge and defiance by Moses, the Interlocutor, since the magicians were better aware of sorcery’s limitations than other people, they instantaneously realized that the extraordinary act was beyond the means of sorcery; and already believing in God as the true Guide, they immediately embraced the Lord of Moses and stood firm in their faith. However, as for the people who merely saw a stick become a serpent and failed to apprehend its rational implications, just as they pinned their faith to Moses by watching a stick become a dragon, they crowded around the Samaritan by seeing the speech of a calf. While the Samaritan’s work was sorcery, and his call to the divinity of a calf, a dogma that reason testifies to its falsehood.

Ibn Sīnā in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, and Nasīr al-Din al-Tūsī in his commentary on the same book, divide miracles into two classes: practical miracles(al-mu‛jiza al-fe‛lī) and verbal miracles(al-mu‛jiza al-qaulī) . They hold that verbal miracles are more beneficial for the gentry of people afforded with erudition, whereas practical miracles are more befitting for the commonality.[171]

The Seal of the Prophets had many practical miracles, which mostly satisfied the commonalty. However, the gentry of the companions, well-aware of the profound meanings and exalted stature of the Noble Qur’ān, sufficed on the Qur’ān and never made any demands for practical miracles. The Majestic Qur’ān, the verbal miracle of the Seal of the Prophets, is an eternal miracle that with a clean and vociferous challenge attests to the prophethood of that Hadhrat, bliss be for him and his kin, for anyone who believes in God and His attributes.

Rational Possibility and Ordinary Impossibility of Miracles

It is sometimes presumed that miracles are rational impossibilities(al-muhālāt al-‛aqliyya) executed by God. However, just as miracles do not violate causation, they are not rationally impossible events either. A miracle is merely an ordinary impossibility(al-muhāl al-‛āddī) ; that is, it cannot be carried out by the finite and conditional implements; however, God’s omnipotence can perform what may be ordinarily impossible for others. An event that is beyond and inaccessible to the ordinary human capabilities and is not attainable by acts of meditation, is not in the capacity of anyone but God.

A stick’s becoming a serpent, or running water’s coming to a halt and other miracles are not rational impossibilities. For instance, it is not impossible that wood, with the progress of time and decomposition of its elements, become the food of a snake and be assimilated into its body, and then transform into sperm and become a snake. Similarly, a strong storm or dam can hinder the flow of water and deviate it or bring it to a halt. Nonetheless, the metamorphosis of a stick into a dragon or the halt in the flow of Nile - in the way done by Moses, the Interlocutor - or splitting the moon by the signal of the Beneficent Prophet, can neither be carried out by the finite implements, which are at man’s disposal nor by meditation and sorcery.

A rationally impossible thing cannot have an external extension. Therefore, when Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be with him, was asked about God’s power to place the world in an egg-shell, he responded, “Although God’s power is infinite, nevertheless, what you are asking is a nothing.”

“Nothing”(lā shai) , like non-existence or conjunction of contradictories, is a concept, which does not narrate an external extension. Therefore, because it is nothing, it is not subject to the infinite power of God.

The Qur’ān, a Divine book revealed over twenty-three years upon the pure and holy heart of the Benevolent Messenger of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin, and free of contradictions and discrepancies, is not a rational impossibility. Rather the production of a work parallel to it is an ordinary impossibility(al-muhāl al-‛āddī) . Al-Shaykh al-Tūsī in al-Tibyān, and after him Amīn al-Islam al-Tabarsī in Majma‛ al-Bayān and many interpreters from the commonality of the Muslims, who consider miracles rational impossibilities, have tried to answer what they consider the criticism that Qur’ān is not a rational impossibility, and have tried to prove the rational impossibility of bringing a work parallel to the Noble Qur’ān. However, the fact is that neither are miracles rational impossibilities, nor is the Noble Qur’ān an extension of a rational impossibility.

The Noble Qur’ān’s purity from any discrepancey and its harmony and consistency, despite the fact that it was compiled in different circumstances during twenty-three years, is a reality, which is not attainable by ordinary means. God, the Exalted, says on this matter: “And if it had been from any other than God, they surely would have found in it much discrepancy.”[172] Similarly, the eloquence of the Majestic Qur’ān is not a rational impossibility. Instead, it is an ordinary impossibility that is coupled with a challenge from the Prophet - a challenge which does not seek to prove God or the general prophethood, but rather, proves the particular prophethood of the Benevolent Messenger of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin.