Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter Ten: The Argument from Religious Experience

Religious Experience and Demonstrative Reasoning

Absence of ratiocination and weak fundamentals of philosophical thinking have led the Judeo-Christian theological tradition to some delirious admonitions and discourses, which are devoid of demonstrative tenability. Later, along the history of western philosophy, this set of demagoguery has invited a series of disorderly and confused pro and con debates.

Among the arguments, which lack philosophical and demonstrative form, is an argument, which has been called the argument from religious experience. It proceeds from the inward experiences, discoveries, and visions with respect to a reality, which has an intrinsic sanctity and value.[173]

Though rational argument supports the possibility of shuhūdi cognition of the reality of existence, nevertheless, two points have to be established here. First, shuhūd has several levels and it is only in its certain levels whereby certitude about the content of a given shuhūd can be held. Particular and convulsive(mutazalzil) shuhūds are not ascertaining even during the experience and vision. Second, though a person who is not familiar with shuhūdi experiences cannot establish a definite argument to reject or invalidate the shuhūds of a Gnostic, on the other hand, the Gnostic’s shuhūds cannot bring forth certitude for him either.

The only way that a person who has not been in the realm of shuhūd can gain knowledge and certitude regarding the content of another person’s shuhūd is to have convincing proof about its truth. Such proof is either established directly on the experienced reality such as the demonstrations for the existence of God, or through proving the infallibility of the individual who has experienced such shuhūds in the three stages of revelation, reception, and conveyance.

Some western theologians have suggested an argument for the existence of God on the grounds of religious experiences of individuals. This argument can be summed up as follows:

Experience in relation to a sacred and transcendent reality exists.

Such experiences are not the works of natural causes.

Therefore, a supernatural reality, which is God, exists.

Even if the skeptic agnostic who has not undergone any such inward experience overlooks what he views as the disputability of the first premise, the argument is still untenable because its second premise is evidently on shaky grounds, since according to some psychological theories, religious experience has been explained on purely natural accounts. For instance, they have been ascribed to the psychological and social factors, which cause other mental phenomena. Moreover, even if the veridicality of the second premise were laid aside unchallenged, the argument would only indicate a supernatural entity. However, whether this supernatural entity has unity or necessity of existence is wide open to question.

The fact of the matter is that religious experiences, simply because they are inward and conscious experiences, do not bring about any cognitive certitude(al-yaqīn al-‛ilmī) for the person who undergoes them or for others for that matter. In order to have certitude regarding the content and truth of one’s shuhūd, one must have “truth of certainty”[174] during his shuhūd; otherwise, after his shuhūd, he must rationally establish that his experience was not influenced by psychological factors and it really reflected reality.

Definite and Indefinite Shuhūds

Some people think that during the actual course of mystical or religious experiences, one cannot have doubts and doubts arise only after ecstasies cease and one returns to the realm of acquired knowledge. This is a false presumption.

Many shuhūds and mystical experiences are devoid of certitude and are coupled with doubt and uncertainty. This is similar to when you observe a group discussion in a dream and hear contradictory remarks; in this state, you analyze some of the remarks and experience doubt and uncertainty about them, and finally, you may be convinced of a different opinion.

Definite shuhūds are devoid of delirium and incoherence; they have immutability and universality. The universality of shuhūdi realities is not conceptual; rather, it is expansive. Therefore, shuhūdi certitude is attained by reaching intellectual(al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya) and meta-intellectual realities(al-haqā’iq fauq al-‛aqliyya) , not by accumulating concepts. The certitude secured from these realities is not psychological certitude, which might be regarded as a dyad of fantasy or surmise, and consequently, it would be justified to inquire whether this certitude is brought about by unscientific means. Such certitude is epistemic certitude. As factual external realities, the necessity of veridicality of shuhūdi realities encompasses the comprehension in a way that there remains no chance for doubt or uncertainty regarding them. Epistemic certitude - which is the necessity of veridicality as in the necessity of the basic reality, for instance - encompasses human comprehension in a way that it becomes impossible to doubt it. When a person encounters a necessity as such, he has no choice but to accept it.

Once the shuhūd of intellectual and meta-intellectual realities attained, one finds the infinite presence of these realities from every direction; and consequently, doubt and uncertainty becomes impossible.

Particular shuhūds, which take place in the inferior levels of existence and pertain to the natural world and the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) , due to the flux of their subjects, are subject to change; and due to their finitude, the faculties of imagination(khiyāl) and estimation(wahm) cause deceit and trickery and transfuse the qualities and effects of finite realities from one realm to the other. Thus, a reality that is witnessed in the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) is not reflected in the image that develops after the involvement of imagination and estimation, and therefore, the individual is overwhelmed by doubt and uncertainty.

If the wayfarer lets the star of reason illuminate his soul, the fooleries of imagination and estimation will be diminished; and then, imagination and estimation shall follow the command of reason and illustrate the realities of nature and mundus imaginalis as they are observed by intellects. Then, once again, the mundus imaginalis becomes commensurable to perception, and with the absence of nonconformity, doubt and skepticism are supplanted and light of certitude shines through to the lowest levels of shuhūd. At this state, at every direction that the Gnostic looks, he sees nothing but the Real, and he does not have the slightest doubt or skepticism about Him. The Master of the Monotheists and the Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali, bliss be for him, says, “I have not doubted the Real, since I have seen Him.”[175]

Thus, skepticism, delirium, and disorientation can sometimes be found in the content of shuhūd as well and they cannot be avoided but through shuhūd of intellectual realities. If during the journey, the wayfarer finds the ability to communicate with intellectual realities or with people who have reached them, he discovers the falsity of experiences that are influenced by the fooleries of imagination and estimation and are rooted in his terrestrial and earthly past. This in turn facilitates his familiarity with realities of the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) . However, if he fails to achieve this benevolence, he strays in shuhūd, and in brief, he is a person astray in the state of shuhūd who cannot differentiate between the way and the non-way.

If there is any succor for such a person, it can be given only after cessation of the passion and after his emancipation from the evil of the Satan who dominates him. In this state, he can judge his experiences on the basis of rational concepts, which are attained from distant visions of intellectual realities, and gain certitude about that portion of his experience only which is supported by rational proof. This certitude, however, is not because of his mystical experiences, but rather owes to the rational proof, which authenticates its truth. He must reject experiences, which the rational approach attests to its falsity, and regard experiences that have neither been authenticated nor rejected by reason with doubt and uncertainty. Then, in the light of reason, should he succeed in discerning the necessity of the presence of Divine guidance in creation - that is, the necessity of prophethood - and furthermore, through miracles and the like, should he be successful in identifying its instantiation, he can also rely on the sayings of the prophets and their legatees. This will further enable him to exercise judgment with respect to those observations, which the rational arguments were incapable of authenticating. Thus, he can be certain of any shuhūd, which is in accordance with the authenticated and reliable traditions of the prophets and their successors, and thank and praise God for observing them, and rebuff any discovery, which is not compatible with the veracious sayings, and seek refuge with the Benevolent God from their evil.

Deviation from Rational Cognition and Decline into Open and Latent Skepticism

The evaluation of inner experiences through rational arguments, the Noble Qur’ān, and the traditions of the Infallibles, peace be with them, is feasible only for a person who trusts acquired knowledge, that is to say, he does not consider the affirmation of central religious doctrines, such as the existence of God, prophethood, the hereafter, and so forth, beyond the capacity of reason. But consider a person whose shuhūd does not reach the intellectual and meta-intellectual realities, when not in the state of shuhūd, he is not afforded acquired knowledge, whose conceptual cognition is limited to sensual perceptions, and what he considers knowledge is hypothesis and theories which are not only indemonstrable but cannot be definitely invalidated either, in short a person who is inflicted by open or disguised skepticism(shakkākiyya) . Even supposing such a person is having inward experiences, his experiences are devoid of cognitive worth and he has no criterion for their cognitive evaluation.

Such experiences, besides their nonconformity with each other and with the experiences of other people, are delirious and confused perceptions, which only provide hypotheses and theory-subjects for psychologists who can only regard them as objects of knowledge, not as a form of knowledge.

If a person receives an intimation in a dream or he thinks he is witnessing the visage of an infallible entity while awake, this mere exemplification cannot bring cognitive certitude. It is possible that visage has been exemplified by the foolery of his ego and assistance of Satan. As for the traditions stating that Satan does not appear in form of infallible entities, even supposing that such a person has affirmed monotheism and prophethood by acquired knowledge and has paved the way for himself to receive guidance from the infallibles, these traditions do not provide him with sufficient grounds to argue for the validity of his experience. As Mulla Muhsin al-Faydh al-Kāshānī says in his Al-Mahajja al-Baydhā’, if a person has not seen God’s chosen servants, Satan can falsely attribute to the Benevolent Prophet or his successors an image the appearance of which has been occasioned by his ego. If Satan is able to attribute an image or statement to God or His Prophet at the hands of forfeiters of traditions in wakefulness, is he unable to accomplish that in stupor?

In short, the inner experiences of people who do not have intellectual and meta-intellectual shuhūd have no cognitive worth. Therefore, central religious tenets such as the existence of God and His names of beauty cannot be based on such uncertain grounds. It is only if the person trusts the conceptual format of knowledge that he can evaluate these experiences through the criterion of reason. Therefore, inner experiences, which are not substantiated by reason, are devoid of any cognitive reflection about reality. If such experiences have any reflection at all, it is of the sort of narration that any natural phenomenon would have about its causes. Such experiences are like nightmares, which reflect the psychological conditions and past deeds of individuals. Therefore, such experiences are rather more useful to psychologists who study phenomena like the causes and nature of nightmares.

Indeed, the inner experiences of such people do have another sort of reflection regarding their efficient causes. Nonetheless, their sound interpretation is solely in the capacity of people who are aware of the clandestine mysteries of the worlds, recognize the manifestations of the Divine beauties and majesties, know the stages of Paradise and Hell, and identify the signs of benevolence and wrath of the Benevolent and Avenging God.

Chapter Eleven: The Moral Arguments

Discursive Arguments based on Moral Commands

Moral arguments have a variety of expositions. In some of its versions, the existence of an immutable and absolute authority and mentor has been argued on the basis of the immutability and absoluteness of moral codes. In some others the existence of a non-human source whose will overrules the human will has been substantiated by feeling the magnitude of moral commands in circumstances in which man’s will is tempted by other choices at his disposal. Other expositions use the mutual necessity between law and a lawgiver to prove a legislative source; or the presence of moral codes common across diverse cultures has been used to support the supposition of a god who has inscribed these codes on human hearts.

Sensing the voice of conscience or the moral command and the resultant feeling of guilt and contrition or the sense of worry and fear during or before an immoral act is the common element and shared premise of these arguments. The common weakness of all of them also stems from this premise, because only after confirmation of its accuracy is it possible - with an exposition however different from the ones mentioned - to argue for the existence of a source and cause, which it may imply. Still, this will not prove this causes’ existential and eternal necessity.

If the fundamental premise of the argument, which claims the universality of moral codes, is accepted, the argument can lead to the non-human source of these codes. In other words, if it is authenticated that every person, before acting in non-compliance with meritorious moral behavior, feels fear and unease, and afterwards, he experiences shame and regret, and the universality of these laws and rules are such that everybody - regardless of social class, race, culture, and support or ostracism from the society - undergoes the sense of sinfulness and fear, it can be inferred that the source of these codes is none of these situations, and rather they spring from a source beyond them.

The Common Criticism of the Moral Arguments

The focal point of criticism is the first premise, since there is no way to prove it. The premise could be affirmed through either induction or deduction. Induction can bring certainty only if it is complete, and we can never attain a complete induction of the consciences of all individuals. And as far as the deductive method is concerned, the relationship between the subjects and predicates of its premises, which is expressed by the copulas, must be necessary in order for the deductive method to bring certainty. Relationships are necessary when the predicate is an essential part or an essential property(al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of the subject. In the first case, the proposition will have an analytical form, and in the latter, if it is not axiomatic, it must be made so by using axiomatic middle terms.

The universality of moral commands in a way that they are acknowledged by everyone is disputable. In order to adequately justify the existence of God on the grounds of the universality of moral commands, the argument must first prove the said premise in an ascertaining manner, since in philosophic matters, nothing less than certitude is satisfactory.

Because disciplines, which are dedicated to the inquiry of natural phenomena are meant to advance practical purposes, they can make due with conjectural information also. Rather, in many instances, because of the difficulty of attaining certitude, the natural scientist does not have a choice but to suffice on uncertain hypotheses.

A science dependent on experiment and induction, such as medicine, cannot abandon patients struggling between life and death and wait for the attainment of certitude. Rather, it is forced to try to solve the imperative issues of life by making use of theories with an acceptable probability of success.

While mathematical sciences depend upon natural premises, or are used with regard to natural phenomena, they also face the dilemmas faced in the natural sciences, and consequently, lose their syllogistic quality.

Should the existence of surface, which is used in most geometric figures, be doubted on the basis of theories such as the atomic theory of Democritus, it will entail uncertainty about the natural and external existence of any figure that an architect may draw for a building. Nevertheless, the architect - despite his doubts, but with a decent probability of the validity of his view, or even without regard to its validity or invalidity - uses the sketch because of the confidence he has in its practical applications.

Cognition of God as a reality, which is the foundation of faith and bastion of true belief can neither be based on hypotheses that have solely practical use and lack ontological veridicality, nor can it be founded upon conjectural information. This is because conjecture has no use in a field where the criterion is certitude, and where the claimants are not satisfied with anything less than certitude. “Verily conjecture availeth not the truth at all.”[176] “Say [O’ Our apostle Muhammad], ‘Bring forth your proof if ye be truthful.’”[177] The validity of the moral arguments depends on proving the minor premise. And until it is proved, the argument remains subject to doubt, since doubt does not depend on disproving the claim; the inability to prove the claim is enough to cast doubt. In addition to that, since the said premise is in the form of universal affirmative, it cannot be proved by presenting particular examples.

If, as is actually the case, the arguer holds that the immutable and universal moral commands are not brought about by any particular cultural, political, economical, or psychological condition, given it is a universal and all-encompassing assertion, its truth must be proved for every situation; and until it is proved, its universality remains subject to skepticism. Rather, the discovery of even one example contradicting the held universal affirmative is sufficient to explicitly illustrate its falsehood. Moreover, if in the absence of one of these conditions, even if one individual dismisses these moral commands, the influence of that absent condition in the formation of moral commands can be inferred. For these reasons and the ones to come, the affirmation of the Necessary as the only authority who is the source and cause of moral principles, on the basis of moral commands, is questionable.

The Affirmation of Incorporeal Existence through Analysis of Reason

Through analysis of the activities of both practical and theoretical reasons, Islamic philosophers have argued for metaphysical and supernatural existence. However, their approach is different from the moral arguments above, where God’s existence has been used to explain the prevalence of universal moral codes shared across different social and natural conditions.

In the fourth chapter of Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, Ibn Sīnā, may God bless his tomb, conducts an exceptional analysis of the psyche. On the grounds that the activities of the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) and other inner conditions such as love, sincerity, will, and the like, are not marked by any physical and material characteristics, he argues for the incorporeality of soul.[178] Ibn Sīnā’s argument can unquestionably proceed even from a single universal concept, will, or sincerity of a single human being, in a specific condition. However, this argument does not prove the Necessary. It merely proves incorporeal existence; and even the incorporeal being, which it proves is not outside or beyond the soul. Its conclusion is limited to the incorporeality of the soul and some of its theoretical and practical features.

Kant’s Moral Arguments

Emmanuel Kant does not intend to theoretically analyze moral commands and explain them on theistic accounts; rather, he holds that the acknowledgement of moral commands presupposes the existence of God, the everlastingness of soul, and some other issues that he views the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) incapable of discerning. He believes that after the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) discerns moral commands, which are necessarily true, the mind inevitably acknowledges their corollary, namely the existence of God and the everlastingness of the human soul. Therefore, from Kant’s perspective, faith in God is founded on moral consciousness as opposed to the moral codes being based upon belief in God.[179]

Notice that Kant’s argument from the truth of moral commands, which are aimed to promote summum bonum, that is, the highest good, to the external existence of the highest good and everlastingness of the soul does not rely on the induction of moral commands in every human being. Moreover, it does not endeavor to trace the presence of these principles to their source. And finally, it only depends on the discernment of these commands by people who can discern them. Notwithstanding, his argument is open to two fundamental criticisms. These criticisms undermine the tenability of his argument even if one does not dispute Kant’s position that the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) acknowledges these commands.

The First Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument

The first criticism states that Kant’s argument cannot indicate the existence of the Necessary, soul, free will, and so forth, since in Kant’s view, if mental concepts are not associated with sensual perception, they cannot narrate about the external world or bear any meaning with respect to reality. Therefore, the mutual necessity he suggested between principles of the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) and the acknowledgement of God and human will and so on, has only moral value, and does not open a window to the external world.

Kant’s moral argument does not demonstrate God’s existence as an external reality, nor does it satisfy any doubts a person may have about God. It merely says that if one wants to think morally, he must embrace these presuppositions. In other words, if the moral principles, which are embedded in the practical reason, are acknowledged, the existence of will, free choice, soul, everlastingness thereof, and the existence of the highest good must be acknowledged as well. One need not be reminded that such acknowledgement, as far as the narration of reality is concerned, is devoid of any credibility. Therefore, his moral argument does not prove the existence of God, a reality Who calls forth the ascent of humans towards Himself as claimed by the Divine religion.

The Second Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument

The second criticism questions whether any moral command can yield knowledge of a proposition, such as the existence of God or the everlastingness of human soul, which is pertinent to the theoretical reason. Moral commands pertain to the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) and have specific subjects and predicates, and some of these propositions, as stated by Kant, are self-evident to the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) . However, regardless of which propositions are self-evident, a proposition, which belongs to the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī) , cannot be reasonably deduced from propositions, which pertain to the practical reason. Therefore, moral commands do not lead to theoretical propositions. This is not to deny that new propositions pertinent to the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) can be inferred from syllogistic arrangement of propositions pertinent to the practical reason with propositions pertinent to the theoretical reason. That is, when a principle of the practical reason is added as a major premise to a proposition pertinent to the theoretical reason, this addition forms a syllogism the conclusion of which - in terms of being affirmative or negative, universal or particular, and likewise in being theoretical or practical - like all syllogisms, is determined by its inferior premise. And since in this sort of syllogism the major premise is a practical proposition, the conclusion will be a practical proposition as well. For instance:

A teacher educates a pupil.

Anyone who educates someone else deserves his respect.

Therefore, the teacher deserves to be respected by the pupil.

In the example above, the first proposition narrates an external reality. The second proposition is related to the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) , and the syllogism’s conclusion is a practical and moral principle.

Practical principles, before reaching the stage of implementation, and before appearing before human will and choice in the form of a particular duty, inevitably depend upon particular and specific theoretical premises, which relate to external individuals and realities. Therefore, in order to be applicable, moral commands make use of some theoretical and ontological propositions that convey the existence of numerous particular realities, like the propositions “The highest good exists,” “A being with free will is real,” and “The needy and the free of need exist in the external world.” Hence, if the highest good does not exist, the moral command “One must endeavor to reach the highest good” can never come into effect and can never oblige anyone to do anything. Similarly, if free will does not exist, none of the moral propositions can be applicable. Likewise, if there are no needy, no duty can confront those free of need.

To conclude, none of the presuppositions of the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) can prove the realities that bring about the existence of their subjects or accommodate the conditions of their coming into effect. Doubts about free will or the existence of the highest good, concepts included in moral commands, cannot be effaced by relying on moral commands themselves. Instead, it is the discursive affirmation of these realities that lends credence to moral commands. Similarly, the said concepts satisfy the necessary condition of the abstraction of self-evident concepts and formulation of self-evident moral commands. In other words, the mind, through conception of goodness, the highest good, its short-comings, and the free will it has, conceives the moral obligation of trying to obtain that conceived good and then decides to procure it. Therefore, contrary to what Kant presumes, despite the mutual necessity, which exists between the truth of moral commands and some theoretical propositions, the necessity does not spring from moral commands; rather, theoretical premises necessitate moral propositions. In short, certain theoretical concepts and judgments about man and the world necessitate the fundamental moral commands.

If the naturalistic perspective were valid - that is, as the verse of the Noble Qur’ān narrates the position of the sensualist people, “There is nothing but our life in this world; we die and we live and we shall not be raised again,”[180] should human life be restricted to this world and should the human soul not be everlasting, or the human soul, as in Kant’s philosophy, be doubted, or God as the highest good, the one Who is desired by virtue of His Essence(al-matlūb bi al-dhāt) be a mere concept without any external extension - though when the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) conceives the subjects and predicates of the moral propositions, it may acknowledge their validity, however, one is justified in wondering what relevance such moral commands have. In a world where there is no God, no absolute virtue, and the human being is a mere body, moral commands cannot oblige anyone to do anything, and thus, they cannot call forth sacrifice as a moral obligation, when vanity tempts the soul towards other considerations.