Are you Free or Slave?

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Are you Free or Slave?

Are you Free or Slave?

Author:
Publisher: Jami’at ul-Athar
English

1

Chapter 6: Freedom of Opinion

One of the most important and relevant problems in today's world, especially since the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the problem of freedom of opinion.

Article 18 of the International Convention on Civil and Political rights states that: Everyone has the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

While Article 19 states that: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without reference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

In this chapter we will examine freedom of opinion from the view point both of reason and Islam, and then explain why this question is so much promoted in today's world. But first we must consider three questions as an introduction to the subject. These are: the meaning of opinion, the sources of opinion and the meaning of freedom of opinion.

The Meaning Of Opinion

As we saw in some detail in chapter I the world for opinion in Arabic and Persian (aqideh) is derived from the verbal root 'adq', meaning to tie or knot. When a view is 'tied' to person's believes, rightly or wrongly, correctly or incorrectly, in accord or at odds with reality, to the benefit or harm of himself and society-is called an opinion.

Sources Of Opinion

From where do a person's opinion and beliefs, which are the basis of his actions and positions he adopts, originate? This question is extremely important, since it must be answer before we study the problem of freedom of opinion. If we have the answer to this question it will be easier to express an opinion about freedom of opinion.

With a little reflection it becomes clear that a person's opinions and beliefs originate from these two sources:

a) research

b) Taqlid

Sometimes a person arrives at a view or opinion about a question by independent thought and by study and research. For example, he concludes from his researches that the earth goes round the sun or that the sun goes round the earth that something other than material objects exists or does not exist, and so on. In such a case the source of his opinion is research, regardless of his theory being in accord with reality or not.

And sometimes a person's opinions and beliefs are not the product of research and study with an open mind: either he has accepted an opinion without carrying out research or, if he has reached his beliefs while his mind was captive to Taqlid. The roots of a person's opinions are therefore either research or Taqlid. There is of course a third source, which consists of inspiration or enlightenment, but since this source is not general, but only to be found in exceptional persons, we will exclude it from the present discussion.1

It is worth nothing that a close study of the matter reveals that people's opinions and beliefs are not as a rule based on thought and research, but on Taqlid. One’s parents, clan or tribe, social environment party organization or group, the personalities one admire, all these are the source of inspiration for one’s views. Without demanding reason or proof, but purely on the basis of Taqlid, people accept those views and gradually become accustomed to them until they are ‘tied’ to their minds and become appendices to them, firmly established in their very souls as their own opinions.

For this reasons people’s family and social environment play a fundamental role in the formulation of their opinions. Whatever family and environment a person lives in, he usually adopts the opinions and views if individuals in that family or environment, and to tell the truth, therefore are few people who have acquired their opinions and beliefs entirely by means of personal investigation.

This is why the Quran warns people that if they follow the opinions of most people in the world they will be led astray, since such beliefs lack any scientific basis:

‘If you were to obey the majority of mankind they would lead you astray from God’s path. They follow nothing but idle speculation and guess’ (6:116).

Freedom Of Opinion

Before discussing freedom of opinion we must specify what we mean by such freedom, because until its meaning is clarified we cannot judge whether it is right or wrong. Freedom of opinion may be interpreted in three ways:

a) Freedom to choose one’s opinions, i.e. the freedom to believe whatever one likes.

b) Freedom of expression, i.e. the freedom to express whatever on believes.

c) Freedom to propagate opinion, i.e. the freedom to advocate and disseminate whatever one likes.

So when freedom of opinion is under discussion it is possible that any of these three meanings, or all of them, may be meant.

Now, having clarified the meaning of the word opinion, the sources of opinions and the many of freedom of opinion, let us see what our reason has to say about freedom of opinion.

Freedom Of Opinion From The Point Of View Of Reason

Reason has a specific view about each of the three interpretations of the expression, freedom of opinion, and so we cannot give a single categorical judgment on the matter, but must examine each of these interpretations separately.

a) Freedom of choice in one’s opinions

The first interpretation of freedom of opinion is the sense that a person is free to choose his own opinions, and to adopt any opinion he likes and to believe whatever strikes his fancy.

A little contemplation soon shows us that this kind of freedom of opinions is, in practice impossible; because a person’s opinions and beliefs are not in his control, nor are they in the control of others. A person can neither believe whatever he wants, nor can another person forcibly impose an opinion or belief on him.

Opinions are not like garments that a person can put on, or change, as the fancy takes him, or that someone else can force him to wear. A person’s beliefs are like his loves. Love and friendship cannot be switched on at will, so that he can feel love for anyone or anything as he decides, nor is it in the power of anyone else to induce him to feel love for a person or thing, or not to feel it. If a person is convinced that it is daytime now, he cannot neither believe of his own accord that it is night-time, nor can anyone else force him to change his opinion. A person may be induced to say something against his opinion, but it is not possible for him to be induced to change his opinion.

In 1632, Galileo wrote a book on the subject of the theories of Ptolemy and Copernicus. A year later the Pope summoned him to Rome and declared that his opinion that the earth moves around the sun was blasphemous. The Pope forced him to kneel down and recant his view. The story is well known that after Galileo had recanted he got up and left the room and then they noticed that he had written on the ground with his finger “Nevertheless, the earth does move.”2

Only in one case can an opinion change and that is when the source of the opinion changes. If the source of the opinion was research it may be that research, in continuing his studies, will come across evidence proving that his earlier opinion was wrong, or if the source of his opinion was Taqlid it may be that the chain of Taqlid will be broken.3

b) Freedom of expression

The second sense in which the expression ‘freedom of opinion’ is used is the freedom to state or express one’s opinion. From the point of view rights for a person to be able to say what his opinion is without being molested by anyone, just as everyone has the right to lead his private life as he wishes, provided of course that he does not disturb others in doing so.

The freedom to express one’s opinion, apart from being the natural right of every person, also promotes the exchange of ideas, the development of scientific beliefs and the correction of opinions. There is therefore the slightest doubt from the point of view of reason the validity and even the necessity of his freedom. There are two further aspects of the matter which deserve inspection, however. The first is whether a person has the right to express a view which is contrary to what he knows to be correct and contrary to his real beliefs. The second is whether or not from the point of view of reason a person has the duty to correct a fallacious opinion or a belief that is not based on though and research.

The answer to the first question must be that if is purely a question of the judgment of reason, however much reason may disapprove of a person expressing an opinion which is contrary to his real beliefs, to the extent his use of this freedom does not harm others there is no justification in depriving him of it.

The answer to the question is that reason, while considering the expression of an opinion to be free, also considers it one’s duty to endeavor to correct false opinions, for two reasons. The first is that opinion is the basis of action and superstition and false beliefs can lead society to corruption and perdition. The second reason is that to campaign against superstition is a step towards freedom of thought, and reason cannot ignore its obligation to promote such freedom.

It should also be borne in mind that freedom of opinion and freedom of thought are fundamentally opposed to each other: opinion and thought cannot both be free, because as we have already explained opinion is something which is ‘tied’ onto a person’s mind, forming a knot there and becoming an appendix to his very soul.

So if a person’s beliefs are not based on thought and research they become chains which fetter his reason and soul, imprisoning his mind in walls of superstition and preventing him from thinking freely or arriving at scientific beliefs that are in accord with reality. We must therefore choose between freedom of thought or the freedom to have superstitious opinions, and if we choose freedom of thought the campaign to break the chains of superstitious belief becomes a serious and essential matter.

Just as if a person who is bound fast in chains and cannot free himself single-handed needs the help of someone who is free so mind that is bound fast in the chains of fallacious beliefs, and encircled by incorrect opinions cannot free itself from the bondage of incorrect beliefs, and someone else who is free is needed to break these chains and set him free.

From the point of view of reason therefore, it is incumbent on a person to correct the opinions of others, and by virtue of the fact that it is impossible to correct opinion by force or compulsion the appropriate measure consist of explaining matters so as to promote correct opinions, acquaint people with the true facts by means of logic and proof, and replacing Taqlid with research.

If, however, an individual or a group become obstacles to freedom of thought and the correction of opinion, logic and proof are ineffective, and in this case reason tells us that such obstacles must be forcibly destroy so as prepare the ground for the development of correct opinions and the collapse of false ones.

c) Freedom to propagate opinion

The third sense in which the expression ‘freedom of opinion’ can be interpreted is the freedom to propagate and promote opinions, and transmit them to others, whether such opinions are based on research or Taqlid whether they are in accord with reality or not, and whether they are beneficial or harmful to society.

When reason, according to what have been mentioned, considers it an obligation to fight superstition, it most certainly cannot justify absolute freedom to propagate opinion. How can reason accept the spreading of superstitious beliefs that have no intellectual or scientific basis; ideas which imprison the mind and halt the growth of society, or even cause social retrogression and harm? Wrong and harmful beliefs are a kind of psychological sickness. Ideological diseases are more dangerous than physical ones: When does not permit an individual to spread the physical diseases that one may have in the society how can it justify the right to spread psychological diseases?

Belief in Slavery

The inherent slave-like nature of the deprived classes is an opinion ascribed to Aristotle, who says in his book under the title of “Politics”: ‘Nature made slaves. Generally, the barbarians and people far from civilization were created for submission and services and the Greeks for commanding and freedom.’4

Will Durant says: ‘After the passage of several centuries slavery because a custom, and people regarded it as essential and innate: Aristotle considered it natural and unavoidable and St. Paul sanctified it and in his opinion it was a system in keeping with God’s will.5

Ernest Renan also confirms this opinion. He says: The West is the master-race and the East is the race of labors and this is why nature made the race of laborers greater in number’.6

Burying Females Alive

According to Will Durant: ‘In some places, such as New Guinea, New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and India, women were strangled and buried with their dead husbands and were expected to kill themselves so as to be able to serve their husbands in the next world’.7

Infidels at the time of the Prophet of Islam believed that females were a cause for shame, and therefore buried their daughters alive.

Belief in The Nutritional Qualities Of Blood

Will Durant, in discussing the general characteristics of civilization, after mentioning the various kinds of food eaten by primitive peoples, from louse-stew8 to human flesh9 writes of human blood as follow: ‘Now for many tribes human blood is a delicious food. Many of tribal people who are pure and good sometimes drink human blood, either as a medicine or in completion of a row or a religious rite. They usually believe that when they drink a person’s blood his strength passes to the drinker.’10

These are examples of millions of superstition and false beliefs of various societies. If someone were to write a book about superstitious beliefs it would run to dozens of volumes.

Does reason permit these false and dangerous beliefs and similar, get even more dangerous beliefs, which imperialism today propagates for drinking the blood, eating the flesh and enslaving of man in modern from, to be freely transmitted?

Islam And Freedom Of Opinion

So far we have been looking at freedom of opinion from the point of view of reason and, to summarize briefly, we have concluded that freedom of opinion in the sense of individual liberty to choose one’s opinion is not a rational concept, and in the sense of a person’s right to express his opinion it is one of his natural rights, and in the sense of the right to propagate superstitious and harmful beliefs and to transmit them to society, it is strictly forbidden from the point of view of reason.

Now let us see what the Islamic attitude to freedom of opinion is. The short answer is that the Islamic attitude to freedom of opinion is the same as the rational attitude. The detailed answer requires an examination of the Islamic view on each of the three senses of freedom of opinion based on the available evidence.

As was explained in our examination of the rational attitude a person’s beliefs are in principle outside his control in the sense that he can believe or disbelieve whatever he wishes. Opinions are not like garments that a person is free to choose or to change as the fancy takes him or that he can constrained to change against his will. Opinion is like love which can only change if the source itself changes.

Since opinion is not subject to choice, freedom of choice in this matter is not something that can be discussed in an Islamic context. This it was that when a number of nomadic Arabs of the tribe of Bani Asad came to the Prophet of Islam in a year of drought and professed their adherence to Islam11 , but did not really accept Islamic beliefs and were motivated by materialistic considerations, the following Quranic verse was revealed:

‘The nomadic Arab say they have found faith. Tell them they are not true believers. They should say they profess Islam, and true faith has not yet entered their hearts’ (49:14).

To profess Islam is to express one’s adherence to Islamic beliefs, while faith is heart-felt belief in Islamic ideology.12 Expressing one’s beliefs is within a person’s power, but possession of true faith is not. A person may have various motivations for expressing his belief, but faith is a produce of the heart and can only be claimed when Islamic beliefs have become an appendage of the soul.

Freedom of Expression In Islam

A study of the Quran and the hadith, as well as of the history of Islam, shows that Islam officially recognizes the freedom to express one’s opinions. Indeed, no other religion respects this kind of freedom to the extent that Islam does. Not only is the expression of opinion is free in Islam but the Quran advises people to listen to various different views and opinions and to examine and criticize them with an open mind, and when the investigation has revealed which are the soundest views to adopt them as a basis of action.

In other words, the guidance provided by the Quran is that a person should use freedom of expression as a means to promote the growth of sound opinion and to enable the best opinions to be identify and adopted:

‘Give good news to those of My servants who, listen to what is said and follow what is best ‘, (39:17).

Not only is the expression of opinion free in Islam, but individuals are free even to express views that are contrary to their real beliefs. Although Islam considers such conduct to be shameful, and punishable in the hereafter, it nevertheless never compels a person to confess to what he really considers to be true. In numerous verses the Quran specifically status that faith is not a matter for compulsion and the Prophet of God has no obligation to force people to faith.

What Is Faith?

Faith consists of a belief accompanied by confession and the action that such belief demands.13 Confessing Islam opinions without heart-felt belief is not faith,14 and heart-felt belief that is not accompanied by an overt confession is not faith. In this respect, although Pharaoh was convinced that Moses was speaking the truth and although he believed in his heart that Moses had a prophetic mission15 he cannot be considered a true believer because in his stubbornness and pride he would not confess to the unity of God and the prophetic mission of Mosses. But when he was on the point of drawing, in desperation he did make such a confession, and said: ‘I express my faith that there is no god but the God which the Children of Israel believe in, and I am to be counted as one of the Muslims.’ (yunis/90)

Here, Pharaoh expresses his faith under compulsion. Earlier, he had believed in his heart, but now fear of drowning provokes him to making a spoken confession. So he becomes a believer, but out of desperation and compulsion. So we see that faith has two main pillars: belief from the heart and practical confession. The first pillar is not within a person’s power to control, that is to say, he cannot believe or disbelieve anything he wishes as the fancy takes him, but the second pillar is within his control, that is, he can confess to what he believes and take action as these beliefs demand, and similarly he may fail to confess in practical terms to his beliefs.

Heart-felt beliefs, which are the first pillar of faith, since they are not within a person’s power to control, can likewise not be imposed, that is to say, his beliefs cannot compulsorily changed. But the second pillar of faith, which is practical confession. Since it is within a person’s control, is subject to compulsion. Or in other words it is possible to force a person to make a practical confession of his beliefs or to act against them.

Once faith is defined we see that when we say it is not compulsory we are referring to the second pillar of faith, since the first pillar is not susceptible to compulsion. We mean that Islam does not force a person to confess to Islam beliefs without his believing them. On the contrary, as we discussed in detail in chapter 2 and 3 in relation to Taqlid as a basis of opinion and research, Islam does not accept that fundamental beliefs should be acquired except through research and individual investigation.

In other words, of someone says he believes that God created the universe and is the one God he should have his reason for believing this. If he says that Muhammad is the Prophet of God, he should know why. If he says believes that, on the Day of resurrection man will be raised from the dead and his deeds will be examined, he should know reasons for this beliefs, or says that because his parents or teacher said so he too believes this, his beliefs are not acceptable to Islam.

In short, Islam says that fundamental beliefs must be researched and not based on Taqlid, and everybody must solve the basic problems of ideology for himself, and other people’s comments have no use to him. Further, Islam does not compel a person, even to confess to what he believes, in other words, when we say that in the Islamic view faith is not compulsory we mean that not only does Islam not compel a person to confess to Islamic beliefs that he does not really possess, and not only is confession of beliefs based on Taqlid without research and reflection and knowledge unacceptable, but even people who do believe the doctrines of Islam but for some reason do not admit to doing so are free to adopt such a course, and no Muslim has right to force them to confess their beliefs. The Quran specifically states that:

‘There shall be no compulsion in religion, since true guidance is now distinguishable from error.’ (2:256).

This verse, apart from categorically denying the imposition of religious beliefs by force leaves it to the discretion of the individual weather to confess publicly to what he knows to be true, and by doing so explains the reason for this absence of compulsion. It first states that the acceptance of Islamic beliefs and the practical confession of them are not compulsory, and that people are free to accept or not accept Islam (‘There shall be no compulsion in religion’). Immediately after, it explains that the reason for this freedom is that the right path and the wrong path have been clearly indicated (‘true guidance is now distinguishable from error’).

Religion is a program and a path to perfection for man to follow, and in order to do so he must either know the path so as to follow it freely and with conviction, or else he must be taken by that path forcibly.

In the Quranic view once the road to perfection has been defined there is no reason for religion to be compulsory. Rather, there is necessity for man to be free in choosing this road, since the desire for perfection is optional and man fulfill the philosophy of his creator only when he chooses the right road freely and of his own volition. So once the right road is defined, but man abuses this freedom and diverges from the road he knows to be right and chooses a road he knows to be wrong, there is no point in exercising compulsion. Let him fail and afterwards learn what his punishment is.

A point worth nothing, one which the author has not seen referred to by any other writer, is that since in this verse the freedom to accept Islam is under discussion, that is to say ‘true guidance is now distinguishable from error’ it is obvious that this verse, and indeed all the Quranic verses dealing with compulsion refer to people who have been shown the difference between true guidance and error, and those who understand the truth of Islam and Islamic beliefs but for various reasons are not prepared to confess to what they believe.

Nevertheless, the Quran categorically states that none is entitled to force them to do so.Another verse that categorically denies the use of compulsion in the expression of Islamic beliefs is the following:

‘If you are Lord so willed He could have made all the people on earth believe in Him. Would you therefore force faith on people?’ (10:99).

With regard to the revelation of this verse Imam Reza relates that according to his ancestors, going back to Imam ‘Ali some of the Prophet’s companions proposed to him that if he forced some of the people under his authority to accept Islam the number of Muslims would increase and so would their military strength against the enemy. The Prophet replied: ‘I cannot face God having made an innovation that I was not commanded to make, and I am not a person who imposes his will on others.’16

At this point God Almighty revealed this verse, saying in effect ‘O Muhammad, if I had wanted to I could have forcibly converted everyone to Islam. This would be like people suddenly finding faith after death when they are suffering punishment for their evil deeds. If I did this with them they would not be worthy of my rewards and praise. I want them to find faith freely and without compulsion.’

In short, the explanation of this verse, in the light of the circumstances in which it was revealed is this: in the system of creation man has been created as a free being, capable of choosing between perfection and corruption, so that reward and punishment in the after-life have a justification: so the imposition of faith on an individual, since it is against the philosophy of man’s creation is not permissible, and the Prophet of GOD is not entitled to do something which is against the tradition of creation and contrary to the divine will, even though such a deed might strengthen the Islamic government and weaken the enemies of Islam.

The third instance of a Quranic verse which specifically rejects the imposition of faith is this verse, addressed directly to the Prophet:

So give them warning. Verily your duty is only to admonish you are not their custodian. (88-22-3).

In other words, the function of the Prophet is to warn and explain, to communicate the divine message and show the true path, and it is the people themselves who must make their choice and choose the true path. The Prophet was not appointed by God to a position of supremacy over the people so as to impose faith on them forcibly. The prophet’s mission is to expound opinion, not impose it.

The fourth Quranic verse that explicitly condemns the imposition of Islamic doctrine is also addressed directly to the Prophet:

‘You shall not use force on them; rather, use this Quran to warn those who fear My threats.’ (50:45).

These verses tell us that the Prophet of Islam was extremely sad when he saw how his contemporaries were trapped by harmful and superstitious beliefs. He wanted by whatever means, to free them from these chains, so when he realizes that his constant efforts to free a considerable number of them were of no avail the grief in his soul knew no bounds, and his body could not cope with such distress, so that God was obliged to find a way of reducing his grief, the cause of which was his compassion towards the people.

The verses quoted are therefore a kind of consolation to the Prophet, telling him that his duty is to pass on the divine message and to warn the people and not to impose faith on them by force. He has done his duty, God tells him, he has not failed, and if God wished people to become true believers coercion. He would have acted in a different way. What we infer from these verses is expounded more clearly in another verse:

‘You will perhaps kill yourself by worrying about their lack of faith. If We wished, We could reveal to them a sign from heaven and they would be forced into utter humility.’(26:3-4).

And another verse tells us:

‘You may destroy yourself on their account, worrying why they do not believe this new revelation. We have beautified the earth so as to test them and see who acquits himself best‘.

(18:6-7).

These last two verses tell us clearly that the Prophet of Islam was so distressed at the way in which people were enslaved by superstitious beliefs, yet reluctant to accept correct ones, that sometimes there was the very real danger of him dying of grief. It is worth nothing that to comfort the Prophet the first of these quotations17 states that faith cannot be subjected to force, and the second18 alludes to the philosophy of freedom, namely the testing and perfection of man.

The Campaign Against Superstition In Islam

It may be that from what has been said about freedom of opinion and freedom to express one’s opinion in Islam the conclusion is drawn that Islam does not prescribe any measure to combat superstition or correct wrong beliefs. Since if a person’s opinions are not his to control and everyone is free to state his beliefs, and the imposition of faith even on persons who have recognized its truth is not permissible, any such measures would be pointless.

But a moment’s thought shows that such a conclusion is false, because the fact the opinion is not discretionary is not incompatible with the possibility of correcting wrong opinions, and freedom of expression does not preclude a basic campaign against superstitious beliefs, and indeed it is a prelude to such a campaign.

Although Islam confirms freedom of expression as part of the evolution towards the perfection of man it also considers a campaign against superstition so as free the mind from the bondage of incorrect beliefs, to be obligatory, and presages ultimate victory in this campaign Islam, is confident that the day will one day come when human society is freed from such bondage that is the day when Islam rules the whole world.19

The justification of the campaign against incorrect opinions, in the Islamic view, is that reason considers it obligatory, just as the method proposed by Islam for the correction of beliefs is precisely the same as that which is proposed by reason. Islam cannot permit that because of wrong and unrealistic opinions, a person’s real inner beliefs, which form the basis of all his actions, should be unscientific and false, and that if such is the case the situation should remain so.

Islam cannot permit that opinions which are contrary to reason, should fatter a person’s mind, or grapple on to his a very soul or that if his mind remain in the bondage of superstitious beliefs.

The Islamic Way of Dealing with Superstition

As has already been mentioned, the method selected by Islam for dealing with superstitious beliefs is the same as that which reason suggests. To clarify things further, the Islamic approach to the correction of belief may be divided into two parts. The first is the Islamic way of ridding people’s minds of incorrect opinions, and the second is the Islamic way of confronting obstacles to freedom of expression, and encouraging the growth of correct beliefs in society.

With regard to the first part the Islamic, way is a publicity campaign and with regard to the second part it is an armed campaign.

Publicity Campaign Against Superstition

The Islamic way of dealing with superstition eliminating incorrect beliefs from people' s minds and encouraging them to adopt correct opinions and beliefs that are in accord with reality consists in the first instance of reliance on reason and proof, advice and exhortation, debate and free discussion, in other words a publicity campaign.

‘Call people to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation. Dispute with them in the most courteous manner.’ (16:125).

In this verse the Quran proposes logical methods of ridding people’s minds of superstitious beliefs, and instructs the Prophet to use these methods to invite them to adopt Islamic opinions.

These methods are the following:

1. Wisdom

The first practical method proposed by Islam in confronting incorrect opinions is reliance on reason and proof, rational argument, or as the Quran puts it ‘The wisdom’ (al-hikma).

The meaning of al-hikma, as defined by the ‘Mufradat of Raghib’ as the acquisition of truth by means of science and intellect. In other words the discovery of the truth through scientific and intellectual reasoning. Islam in every case relies on proof to substantiate its claims and demands its opponents to produce proofs for theirs.20

2. Exhortation

The second practical Islamic method of dealing with superstitious beliefs, besides reason and proof, is exhortation and counsel. Exhortation consists of two words of warning and instruction which is to be stimulate the emotionally to accept the truth. Thus wisdom, through the intellect and exhortation through the emotions and inmost feelings call upon a person to break the ties of incorrect belief.

A point worth nothing is that in the Quranic verse quoted above ‘exhortation’, is qualified by the epithet ‘kindly’. This is a reference to the fact that exhortation and counsel are only effective in motivating a person’s emotions and feelings to accept the truth if they are free from all adverse qualities, such as harshness, superiority or contempt, and instead are accompanied by various beauties, such as eloquence, a sympathetic attitude, purity of motivation and even the physical appearance of the person giving the exhortation or advice, all of which help to reinforce his message. Most important of all is the necessity for that person to set a good example himself, for the worst kind of exhortation comes from someone who does not practice what he preaches.

Finally, the more admirable and attractive the exhortation is presented the greater will be the effect on the listener, for it frequently happens that the effect of good advice in encouraging ordinary people to adopt sound beliefs and courses of action is greater than the effect of logical arguments and proofs.

Conversely, unattractive exhortation or ‘sermonizing’ is not only ineffective, but can sometimes have a reverse effect and cause a person to reject what he may have accepted through logic and proof, a Persian poem says:

The way in which you recite the Quran-

Being Muslim is not going to be popular around.

3. Debate

The third practical Islamic way of dealing with unscientific opinions, in addition to the methods already mentioned, is debate and free discussion. The Quran makes mentioned of this method, using the terms jedal and mera (dispute and controversy).

Debate in this sense consists of discussion in the form of a dispute or competition, in other words kind of wrestling –match between ideas. The Quran has two different approaches for the healthy confirmation of ideas in debate that lead to the clarification of the truth and the development of correct beliefs. The first one is the expression which is translated above as ‘disputing in the most courteous manner’ and the second is what is ‘controversy’.21

Disputing with courtesy involves the use of the healthiest and kindest forms of debating so as to clarify the truth, and obvious appearance involves the use of proofs so decisive that they are obvious to everyone, learning the other side without an adequate rejoinder.

Islam, which is the religion of all the divinely-inspired prophets, is the founder of free discussion and the healthy confrontation of ideas. The Prophet of Islam, as the bearer of the greatest divine message, in an age when victory and defeat were matters of sheer power and wealth, was the first to introduce such concepts into that society. Both he and the learned members of his family were pioneers in this field and that is why a considerable proportion of the collections of hadith are devoted to debates conducted by the Prophet and the Imams of his family.22

It is worthy to note that the Islamic method of ridding people’s mind of unscientific opinions is completely scientific and logical, and in this regard Islam has entirely refrained from the use of military strength. The method adopted by the Prophet of Islam in his mission, in conformity with the commandments of the Quran, relied on reason proof, good advice and the use of the best and ‘healthiest methods’ of debate and free discussion. He specifically states that his method and that of anyone claiming to follow him is to invite people to god on the basis of insight, vision and, awareness.

‘Say “This is my path, I call on the people to have faith in God, on the basis of insight, and so do my “followers,” (12:108).

It is therefore the height of injustice to say that Islam has ever imposed itself by force, especially since such claims have been made by people whose crimes in the Inquisition are a shameful chapter of in the history of their times. Islam does indeed use military force, not to impose its doctrines; but to remove obstacles that the development of correct beliefs.

The Struggle For The Liberation Of Thought

If reasoning and proof debate and exhortation all fail to give satisfactory results the Islamic way of confronting obstacles that are blocking the road to freedom of thought is armed struggle and war.23

Obstacles to freedom of thought consist if regimes and false traditions that deprive the people of power, thought discernment and hence prevent them from adopting correct opinions.

Corrupt, dictatorial and unjust regimes and powers that are nourished by the ignorance of the masses, and that will collapse if the public becomes known. Such regimes are therefore an obstacle to correct beliefs, or as the Quran put it, an obstacle on the path of God.

After having made the conditions clear and the discussion completed Islam confronts such regimes with force so as to remove the obstacles to freedom or through and prepare the way for the growth of correct opinion through enlightenment.

In the discussion entitled ‘The Prophethood’ on understanding the Prophet of Islam and the way in which he dealt with his opponents we shall see that in confronting hostile powers he first of all used debating tactics and relied on reason and proof, and at the second stage he resorted to mobahilah a traditions Arab practice of calling on the creator to act as arbitrator in a dispute, and if neither of these methods proved effective, he considered warfare and battle as ways of breaking the obstacles to awareness and freedom of thought. Debate and mobahileh were final words of the Prophet’s against the powers that were opposed to him.

In addition to corrupt regimes, traditions affecting a society can be an obstacle to freedom of thought. If a person is endowed with freedom of thought a moment’s reflection will tell him without the slightest doubt that idolatry, such as the worship of claves or fire, and dozens are even hundreds of other irrational beliefs are pure superstition. But false traditions and customs which have embedded themselves in the heart and soul of those who believe in them are veritable chains fettering the mind and preventing a person from thinking logically. In the words of Shahid Ostad ‘Alameh Mottahari.

First there are greedy and exploitative people who want to establish a regime for themselves. This regime needs an ideological base, for without such a base nothing can be done. The person who established this base is well aware of what he is doing. His treachery is deliberate. He chooses an object, an idol, a bull, a dragon, and gives it extensive publicity. The public are hood winked. Perhaps at first people don’t pay a great deal of attention to it, but then after a few years their example. Generation follows generation and the cult becomes established, as a historical event, and becomes part of the national heritage, one of their national traditions and a matter of great pride, which cannot be abolished. It’s just like plaster. When plaster is first mixed with water it’s a gooly substance and you can mould it into any shape you like. But when it has been moulded into its final shape and begins to dry, the more it dries the larger it becomes hard, until in the end it becomes too hard that you cannot even break it with a pickaxe.

‘Ought we to fight against such cults? In other words, this freedom of through that we say should have should it include opinions like this? The world today is in the grip of a fallacy here.

They say people’s minds should be free, and they say opinions should be free; idolatry in their opinion should also be free. People should be free to worship a cult or a dragon; everyone should be free to worship what they want, and to choose anything they want for their beliefs, whereas in fact these beliefs run counter to freedom of thought. Its opinions like these that tie a person’s mind up in knots.’24

Islam says that the chain of superstitious beliefs which fetters the mind and which cannot be unlocked by reason and proof, and exhortation and counsel, must be opened by military force, and that the obstacle consisting of false traditions, which over the years and over the centuries have sedated up society’s mind with the sediment of erroneous culture until it has become so hard that it cannot be removed with ordinary implements, must be destroyed in a mighty explosion so as liberate men’s minds.

Since direct military action against opinion is as we have seen, impossible, Islam begins its battle against false traditions by campaigning against their social manifestations. For example, in the campaign against idolatry the idol-temples must be destroyed, as Abraham did, and in the campaign against calf-worship the golden calf must be melted down by fire, as Moses did.

Abraham was the only person in his society to discover the secret of existence through independent thought and thus reach a correct philosophy of life.25 Faced with a people who were bogged `down in superstition and false beliefs, and who lacked the basic ability to think for themselves. Abraham tried as hard as he could, using reason and proof and advice, to make them see the error of their ways and to free their minds from the bonds of false beliefs, but without success. The more he admonished them the less effect it had. Finally, he came to the conclusion that he should prove to them in a practical way that these idols, which they had fashioned themselves, could not be true gods.

On day when the people were celebrating festival by going out into the country, Abraham decided to carry out his plan. He went to the main idol, then hung his axe round the idol’s neck and left. Abraham’s plan was to stage a scene in which he would accuse the chief idol of massacring the other idols so as to eliminate false beliefs from people’s thoughts and set their minds at liberty. When the people came back to the town from their festival they discovered that the idols had quarreled and killed each other. All the idols were broken except the chief idol, which had an axe round its neck.

It looked as if the chief idol was responsible for the carnage but their native wit told them it was impossible for a collection of inanimate objects to quarrel among themselves. So they immediately set about looking for the person who was really responsible. Since Abraham had always been complaining about their idolatry and had also threatened to destroy the idols they their idolatry and had also threatened to destroy the idols they summoned him on charges of having killed their Gods and began to interrogate him in public.

The first question was: ‘Did you do this to our gods?’ In order to stir their consciences Abraham replied by saying that the seen indicated that the chief idol had done the killing and if idols could talk why didn’t they asked the idols themselves what had happened?

The way was gradually being prepared for them to free their minds and think independently, Abraham’s answer made the idolaters stop and think, and to realize how wrong they were in their beliefs. In their hearts they blamed themselves for this ideological tyranny and finally they had to confess that their gods could not talk. With their superstitious beliefs thus weakened and the obstacle of false traditions broken, Abraham saw his way clear to begin an appropriate publicity campaign.

He said: ‘Would you worship, rather than God that which can neither help you nor harm you? Shame on you and your false gods! Have you no minds to think with?’ (21:66-67)

It is worth nothing that when Islam has broken the obstacle and freed the mind from the captivity of false beliefs it says ‘Now think! See .what your reason tells you. If it tells you that Islam is right, then accepts Islam, and if it tells you some other religion or ideology is right, then accept that. In other words Islam does not break open one chain with military force in order to fetter the mind with another chain, or even to impose another belief founded on reason and thought. On the contrary, when Islam has freed a person from erroneous beliefs it says, ‘Think, and choose a belief on the basis of thought and research. Even if you choose Islam without thinking, this is not acceptable.

After the conquest of Mecca when the worship of old traditions was broken and amnesty had been declared, the people of the Hejaz flocked to Islam. But the leaders of the idolaters, who had created innumerable difficulties for the Muslim, felt themselves in a dangerous position, and a number of them therefore fled Mecca. One of those who because of his evil past decided to flee was Safwan bin Ummaya.

‘Safwan bin Ummaya, apart from other serious crimes, had publicly hanged some Muslims in Mecca in broad daylight, in revenge for the death of his father, Ummaya, who had been killed at the battle of Badr. Fearing punishment, he decided to leave the hijaz by ship. ‘Omair ibn Wahab, one of the Prophet’s attendants, requested that his faults be pardoned. The Prophet accepted his intercession and gave him the turban he was wearing when he entered Mecca as a sign of safe conduct. ‘Amir went to Jiddah with the turban and personally accompanied Safwan back to Mecca.

When the prophet saw this arch-criminal of the age he told him with great magnanimity that his life and possessions were safe, but it was advisable for him to accept Islam. Safwan requested two months grace to study and think about Islam. The Prophet said. “I’ll give you not two, but four months, so that you can choose this religion with complete knowledge and understanding.” Before four months had passed Safwan embraced Islam.26

Even more interesting than this is the story of how Suheil bin ‘Umar become a Muslim. To use his own words, 'After the conquest of Mecca, when the Prophet of God entered the city, I went to my house and shut myself up and sent my son “Abdullah to the Prophet to request an assurance of safety, for I was not prepared to become a Muslim just to save my own life.”

Abdullah came into the presence of the Prophet and said. “My father requests a promise of safety. Will you give it to him?” “The Prophet said, “Yes, he is in God’s care. He can come out of his house.| then he turned to those around him and said, ‘if any of you see Suheil you must not show any hostility to him. He must be allowed to come out of his house. Upon my soul, Suheil is an intelligent and honorable man, and a person like him cannot fail to understand Islam and become a Muslim.”

‘Once he had received the assurance and heard the Prophet’s words ‘Abdullah left the assembly and returned to his father and told him what had happened. Suheil, perhaps not expecting that the prophet would treat him like this, said in voluntarily, “By God, as a child and a grown man he has always been a good and worthy person.”

After he received this assurance of safety, Suheil, although he remained a non-believer, mixed freely with the Muslims and even accompanied the Prophet’s at the battle of Hunein, without accepting Islam. Until finally at place called Ja ‘rana’. He did so.27

These two tales are clear example of practical biography of the Prophet of Islam in encountering those who theoretically opposed him. These tales prove that despite what a group of orientalists claim, the goals of battles of Islam commanded by Quran decrees were removing the barriers of freedom of opinion and ploughing the ground for the growth of correct beliefs.

Freedom To Propagate Opinion In Islam

So far we have seen that Islam not only confirms freedom of expression but defends it. Now we must see whether Islam permits anyone to propagate any opinion he may have and to communicate it to another person.

On the basis of what was said about the rational attitude towards this question Islam most decidedly cannot permit the absolute right to propagate opinion. To explain the matter further, the following brief summary is necessary: Propagation of opinion sometimes takes the form of reasoning and submission of proof, with the propagandist genuinely basing his arguments on reason and logic, and sometimes it takes the form of demagogy and the transmission of false beliefs by means of trickery and guile.

In the case of opinions which have their origins in thought and logic, to the extent that they rely on reason and logic and argument and proof, their propagation and dissemination, and hence the freedom to propagate them, are included in the category of freedom of expression, and here the Islamic attitude has been fully explained.

But demagoguery for the purpose of communicating opinions which lack a logical base and are harmful to society is something that reason cannot justify-as has already been explained-nor can Islam confirm it against the dictates of reason.

To sum up briefly, we may say that in Islam the expression of opinion is free, but demagogy for the transmission of false opinions to the people is forbidden28 .

Freedom Of Opinion In The World Today

The final question that must be discussed in this chapter is the question of freedom of opinion in the world today, what are the motives for promoting this freedom in international circles, particularly in Europe, and what objectives the world of imperialism is pursuing in its support for this freedom?

We can say that the promotion of the idea of freedom of opinion in the world today is a social reaction to the inquisition that the fathers of the Church carried out in the Middle Ages. They did not allow anyone to express an opinion, even an opinion unconnected with religious matters that was contrary to what the Church taught. For example, because the Church taught that the sun revolved around the earth no one was entitled even if he submitted logical arguments and proofs to show that the sentenced thousands of scholars to be burned alive.

Giordano Bruno, an Italian priest and one such scholar, was sentenced to be burned at the stake in the year 1600, on charges that he had expressed the belief that ‘Anyone who has reached the age of reason can reach an opinion about the world and life in conformity with his rational and deductive faculties.’ The court considered this opinion to be a proof of his opposition to Christianity, since in the Court’s view every Christian who reaches the age of reason must adopt belief’s about the world in accordance with the Holy bible, and not in accordance with his rational and deductive faculties. By expressing his views Bruno proved himself to be an apostate. His apostasy was due to the Devil entering his body and therefore he must be burned so as the exercise the Devil!

In addition, religion, in the view of those who control international politics and the philosophers inspired by these polices, is no more than a pastime and pastimes are not concerned with matters such as right or wrong. Religion, in their view, is like a piece of poetry or a film. As Shahid Ostad ‘Alameh Mottahari says: ‘In the view that concerns only the personal conscience of the individual, regardless of what that religion is, whether, for example, it’s idolatry, such as calf-worship, or worship of God…

‘Regarding the question of religion, since they do not want to admit to the reality of religion and prophethood or accept that prophets really came from God to reveal the true path to man, and that man’s happiness lies in following this true path, they say instead, “we don’t know what they reality and origin of religions are, but we do realize that man cannot live without religion.

One of the essential conditions of human life, one of the pastimes and distractions in man’s life, is that he occupies himself with this thing known as religion. It does not make any difference whether the object he decides to worship is a monotheistic God a man called Jesus Christ, or a calf or an object made of metal or wood. So nobody ought to be persecuted for their beliefs, and whatever a person’s individual preference is, it’s quite all right.29

As has been pointed out, such attitudes towards religion are not inspired by ideas that are based on philosophy, but by ideas that use science and philosophy for political ends.

If those in charge of imperialist policies pretend to be in favor of freedom of opinion it’s not because they really want everyone to be free to express his opinion so that correct beliefs might develop, and people be liberated from superstition, since such freedom would be against the interests for their political power. Instead, they want to distract people’s minds so that they can more easily achieve their anti-popular political object.

And since the best narcotic pastime is religion without politics, and superstitious religious beliefs, there is no difference between the various false religious, so they judge it to be in their political interests to declare religious opinions to be free, so long as these do not conflict with their interests.

But if a religion tries to gain to the world of politics, and became instrumental to the development of correct beliefs and the liberation of the masses from the bondage of incorrect belief, and hence from the domination of imperialism, this religion is not only deemed illicit by the very champions of freedom of opinion, but it’s followers are destroyed by these same exponents of freedom of thought, on the pretend of the defense of freedom.

Notes

1. It is discussed in a later chapter entitled “Understanding with the Heart”.

2. Mohammad Mo’in. Farhange Mo’in (Mo’in’s Dictionary) Vol 6. under ‘Galileo’.

3. Freedom to choose the source of opinion will be discussed in the next sense of the expression ‘Freedom of opinion.’

4. Quted in History of slavery. p.35.

5. Durant, Will. History of civilization. Vol.1.p.33.

6. Durant, Will, History of civilization. Vol.1.p.33.

7. Ibid.p.53

8. Others eat the lice in each other’s hair and when these numerous they cook them in stew, and if they have caught an enemy they eat him with shouts of joy. Ibid.p.17

9. ‘To all of these kinds of foods man added a very tasty dish, the flesh of his fellow, man. It can be shown that cannibalism was once almost universal among primitive tribes. This custom was practiced by people until quite modern times, such as the Irish, Iberians Picts and even the Dares of the eleventh century. In New Britain, human flesh was hung up & sold in butcher’s shops, just like the flesh of other animals’Ibid.p.18

10. Ibid.p.18-19.

11. Commentary by Abu ‘Ali’ Ibn-al- Tabresi, Majm’a-ol-Bayan.Vol. 9. 138.

12. See Mizan, Chapter 255 (Al-Imam…)

13. Ibid, Chapter 255.

14. Holy Quran:49/14,

15. Holy Quran:27/14,

16. Sheikh Sadug. Tawhid. PP. 341-2. Mizan hadith No. 17496

17. Quran, 26:3-4.

18. Quran, 18:6-7.

19. Quran, 48:28.

20. Show us your proof(2:112:27:64;28:75)

A famous dictionary of Quranic words.

21. Quran:Kahf,22

22. This subject will be covered more fully in a later Chapter” The scientific understanding of the Prophet.”

23. See-Darsi bozorg va arzandeh (An Important and instructive lesson.) p. 22.

24. Text of lecture given by the martyred Ostad at the Hoseiniyeh Ershad, in Tehran in the autumn of 1969 entitled-freedom of opinion”, Published in collection of essays entitled “About the Islamic Republic…………..

25. This was showed Abraham the kingdom of heavens of the earth, so that they might have certain faith. (6:75).

26. Jafar Subhani, Forough al-Abadiyat (‘The splendor of eternity’) Vol,II, PP, 736-7. Full detail of Safwan’s Convention to Islam can be found in Kanzol-Ammal, Vol,X-PP.503-6

27. Further details are given in the article “Kurnameh Islam” (“The Islamic record”).

28. “Mohammad Khatim Peyambaran,” “Mohammad the seal of the Prophets” vol.II.PP. 59-71

29. About the Islamic Revolution.

Human Thought, Divine Wisdom, And Islamic Philosophy

In order to steer a middle course between two extreme positions to be found among contemporary Muslim thinkers similar to hard rationalism and fideism in Christian thought, it is suggested that reflection on the universality of philosophical speculation with respect to religion reveals that the rational philosophical defense of religious thought should not be abandoned, but that philosophy must be understood as including much more than that which is associated with the famous ancient Greek philosophers and their legacy.

In order for Islamic philosophy to flourish and to serve Islam, it should be developed beyond the confines of its own heritage without neglecting that valuable heritage. It should aspire to the wisdom and humility exhibited by the prophets, ever since Hadrat Adam, peace be with all of them.

The word 'philosophy' is derived from Greek, but what is denoted by this word is something whose origins cannot be confined to the Greek city-states of the millennium before the life of Hadrat 'Isa, not even if we construe philosophy rather narrowly.

Often, Thales of Miletus (c. 640-546 B.C.) is taken to be the first philosopher of ancient Greece. A descendant of Phoenician immigrants to Greece, he taught that even stones and seemingly dead matter were full of life. He had a mystic's appreciation of nature, and claimed that everything was full of gods.

Some historians conjecture that his most famous belief, “that the universe began from water”, was something he adopted from Egyptian lore.1 Regardless of whether or not it is proper to regard Thales as the first ancient Greek philosopher, we can be sure that he was not known by the term 'philosopher' in his own time, for the term was coined by followers of one of the most important students of Thales, Pythagoras.

Thus the inventors of the word 'philosophy' were the members of a secret cult of ascetic mystics, the Pythagoreans.

Ancient Greek philosophy is often divided between pre-Socratic philosophy and that which came afterward. Others consider Socrates to have been the first real Greek philosopher. In either case, Socrates is certainly one of the most important of the ancient Greeks to have become known as a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom.

While the etymology of the word philosophy provides some clue to its proper meaning, this meaning has become rather more specific than that suggested by the simple love of wisdom. Ancient Greek philosophy is the foundation upon which the history of Western philosophy, the sciences and the humanities all rest.

Because of its foundational position for Western thought, some writers define philosophy as that chain of ideas which includes the giants of modern European thought, such as Descartes, Hume and Kant, and which can be traced back through the Christian medieval period to Greece, Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, or Thales, one of whom is to be designated as the originator of genuine philosophical thought.

But if we begin to wonder about the origins of Greek philosophy, and if we try to find some reason for choosing one of the above figures above the others as the true father of philosophy, then the definition of philosophy as the chain of thought including the well known greats will not be satisfactory.

The earliest links of the chain seem so different from the later links that it seems impossible to say whether any particular ancient Greek thinker should be included or not.

In order to answer the question of which Greek should be considered the first philosopher we must abandon the definition of philosophy solely in terms of the chain of teachers and pupils and turn instead to the question of what characterizes philosophical thought.

Finding the essential character of philosophical thought is no easy matter. Certainly it should not be characterized as any particular set of doctrines, although there have been periods in which such an identification was popular.

Thus, when Ghazali wrote his Tahdfut al-Falasifah he was not attempting to refute philosophy as a topic or set of topics for reflection and investigation, but to refute specific doctrines associated with the mix of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian thought whose major champion was Ibn Sina. As far as method and subject matter are concerned, Ghazali was no less a philosopher than Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd.

It would have been more precise if Ghazali had titled his book Tahafut al-Falsafah Ibn Sina, but the thought of Ibn Sina had so come to dominate the philosophical thought of the Islamic world that philosophy itself was identified with the doctrines taught by Ibn Sina and his followers. This line of thought was a form of rationalism which Ghazali branded as heresy (bid'ah) because he considered the conclusions it advanced as dictated by reason to be not only contrary to religion but based upon faulty arguments in which reason overstepped its own limits.

The idea that philosophers make unwarranted claims on behalf of the intellect became the object of Mawlavi Jalal al-Din Rumi's sarcasm in the Mathnavi.2

Mawlavi claims that the philosophers sin in two ways: first, they overestimate the power of the rational intellect; and second, they fail to appreciate the importance of a more direct form of knowledge through illumination.

The philosopher is in bondage to things perceived by the intellect;

the pure rides as a prince on the Intellect of intellect.

Know that knowledge consists in seeing fire plainly,

not in prating that smoke is evidence of fire.

O you whose evidence, in the eyes of the Sage,

is really more stinking than the evidence of the physician,

Since you have no evidence but this,

O son, eat dung and inspect urine!

O you whose evidence is like the staff in your hand indicating that you suffer from blindness!

Noise and pompous talk and assumption of authority (means)

"I cannot see: excuse me."3

The object of Mawlavi's ridicule is not just any form of philosophy, but is the same form of philosophy against which Ghazali inveighed. The association of philosophy with medicine in the second passage quoted above recalls the fact that Ibn Sina was as famous a physician as a philosopher.

Clearly, Mawlavi does not mean to include Socrates among those he finds guilty of 'noise and pompous talk', for Socrates, like Mawlavi, was engaged in exposing the ignorance of those who proudly but falsely claimed to know. Plato, as well, does not seem to fit Mawlavi's image of the philosopher, for he was just as emphatic as Mawlavi about the importance of illumination over finding evidence and engaging in syllogistic reasoning.

Even Aristotle does not entirely fit with the image Mawlavi portrays of the philosopher, for he was much more concerned than the medieval Aristotelians to point out problems (aporiai) for which he could offer no clear cut solution (like the problem of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics, or the problem of future contingents in De Interpretatione).

The most interesting question that is raised by these reflections is how neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism came to be considered as an official philosophy, a rationally authoritative set of doctrines, rather than the tentative speculation suggested by the Greek thinkers. How did the unresolved problems that were so important for Aristotle move to the sidelines so that bold claims for reason should dominate? How did philosophy become corrupted, dogmatic and proud, when it began in wonder? However, to pursue these questions would be to abandon the task we have set for ourselves of characterizing philosophy.

Philosophy can neither be defined in terms of a single chain of teachers and pupils, nor can it be defined in terms of a set of doctrines. At the same time it is important to try to characterize philosophical writings in such a way that we might distinguish them from religious texts and from what is sometimes referred to as wisdom literature.

Of course, we do not wish to claim that no religious texts are to be considered as philosophy, nor should we deny the philosophical content of some wisdom literature. We are looking for a way to distinguish falsafah from Hikmah, philosophy from wisdom, while allowing for the possibility that the two may overlap.

Since we have already ruled out historical succession and doctrinal content as means to identify philosophy, there appear to be two alternatives left to us: subject and method.

Since the time of Aristotle, metaphysics, or first philosophy, has been defined as the science of being qua being, and the Muslim philosophers generally accepted this definition. This definition, however, does not provide a means to include all the branches of philosophy.

Philosophy has the following branches: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, and aesthetics. There are other branches of philosophy as well: the philosophy of law, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of medicine, social and political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of mind, etc. The 'etc.' is important.

There seems to be no way to eliminate it, no list whose claim to being exhaustive could not be undermined by the development of a new branch of philosophy. We need some way to know when a new branch of human inquiry should be considered as a kind of philosophy, and when it is something else, psychology, ideology, or cultural criticism, for example. We may hope to find some criterion by turning to method.

Philosophers differ from sages because of their employment of reason, it is sometimes said. While the sages draw wisdom from folklore, religion, mythology, and other elements of culture, the philosopher is held to rely on pure reason. But surely the sages employ reason as well. This seems to be implied by Mawlavi's claim that the pure ones ride on the Intellect of intellect.

Sometimes it is said that although all science makes use of rational principles, philosophy is unique in relying on reason alone, with no appeal to empirical findings. Two objections will be raised here. First, there are sciences other than philosophies that rely on reason alone, the sciences of pure mathematics, such as number theory and Euclidean geometry.

Secondly, philosophy, or at least some of its branches, on close inspection does not turn out to be completely immune from empirical discoveries and the ideas abstracted from them. There is no clear line that divides the philosophy of mathematics from pure mathematics, or pure mathematics from applied mathematics.4

Reason seems to be used in the same way or perhaps to shift only gradually as we move from a particular science to the philosophy of that science. Metaphysical theories have been proposed on the basis of philosophical reflection on elementary particle physics, cosmology, and even biology.5

The questions seem to be different. The questions of a science are internal questions, questions that seem to presuppose that their answers can be found through a continuation and extension of the methods currently employed in the field.

Questions concerning a particular science seem to break out of the confines of established modes of inquiry in two directions: at one end there is the matter of applications, and at the other, philosophy. Reason, however, is relied upon equally throughout the spectrum; it is equally vital to the design of a machine and to speculation about the nature of being.

Since philosophy is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the applied sciences, it is tempting to define philosophical method as non-empirical in some sense, even if it is granted that no theorizing is completely immune from ideas that spring more directly from reflection on observation and measurement.

Even if philosophy does not rely entirely on reason alone, and experience can be an avenue for uncovering philosophical truth as well as rational reflection, still, philosophers do not attempt to formulate their theories in ways designed to allow for empirical confirmation or refutation.

In the end, it seems that if we are to be honest, we must admit that we cannot provide an exact definition of philosophy which will include all that is traditionally considered to belong to the field while excluding the special sciences. Perhaps we do not really know what philosophy is, or maybe we do know what it is, but only in a vague way which eludes our attempts at exact definition.

The closest we seem to be able to come to identifying philosophy is by means of its subject and method, by saying that philosophy includes metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic, and inquiries into the foundations of the special sciences.

The method of philosophy is rational as opposed to empirical, but this does not mean that empirical investigations are irrelevant to philosophy. For example, the results of empirical investigations have led to the development of quantum theory, which has raised a number of interesting philosophical questions about the nature of matter and energy, and the displacement of Newtonian physics by relativity theory has done much to undermine some of the central theses of Kant's philosophy.

To admit that philosophy must be cognizant and responsive to developments in the empirical sciences is not, however, to say that the method of philosophy is empirical. The tool of the philosopher is reason, but this is not very informative, for it is a tool used by students of the natural sciences and the humanities. There is no 'ilm that does not require reason.

The methods of philosophy are analysis and synthesis, and in both special attention is paid to logical rigor. Synthesis is an attempt to provide explanations at a quite general level often by constructing a theory or model, or by advocating a project through which such explanations are to be given. For example, materialism is a theory the acceptance of which requires a rejection of all explanations that contain in eliminable reference to non-material entities.

This requirement creates special difficulties in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of mathematics, and many other areas. Thus materialism generates a program of attempting to provide a uniform type of explanation for various phenomena in all the fields of human inquiry.

Utilitarianism in ethics provides another example of a programmatic theory by means of which explanations are to be provided for the various moral features of life. Each broad philosophical thesis or theory generates its own problems.

The successful defense of a philosophical thesis requires that the thesis be shown to be free from contradiction, that it can be integrated within a general philosophical outlook, that the problems it generates are interesting and seem susceptible to solution, that the thesis can be applied in various areas and that it provides interesting insights into the areas in which it is applied.

The application of a thesis to a specific area of inquiry often requires the employment of the other major philosophical method, analysis. Analysis can take a number of forms. There is linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, and other types of analysis. Perhaps they can all be lumped together as ways to analyze problems.

When Socrates asked 'What is justice?', he was extending an invitation to engage in philosophical analysis. Some will respond by speaking of how the word 'justice' is used, and of its etymology; others may respond by considering how people generally think about justice; still others will try to explain what justice is by placing it within a broader philosophical theory. So, the methods of synthesis and analysis are complementary.

By synthesis theories are constructed through which problems are to be analyzed; and analysis proceeds by providing an account of a problem in accord with a more general theory, or by showing how the problem may be solved by means of the theory.

So, for example, Heidegger will provide an analysis of a problem by sifting through the etymologies of the relevant terms involved, picking out the most salient issues thus suggested, and then providing some thesis about the problem which incorporates the points brought out in his analysis, often by extending a train of thought to be found in several thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition.

The process of philosophical analysis and synthesis takes place in a context of criticism. At each stage, the work of the philosopher is subject to the criticisms of others working in the same area. Objections are raised when a theory has counterintuitive consequences, when it contains a logical flaw, or when the arguments produced in its support are found to be unsound.

Philosophical theories are also criticized for their inability to handle important problems, or even when they lack elegance. The main method of philosophical criticism is the analysis of arguments. Here the importance of logic comes to the fore, since it is by logic that arguments are identified and evaluated as valid or invalid. Logic, however, is not always capable of providing insight regarding the truth of the premises upon which a given argument is based.

For the evaluation of premises, sometimes an appeal will be made to empirical investigations, sometimes to rational intuitions, and sometimes further argument will be suggested. A complete characterization of the philosophical methods sketched here would require a text on logic and critical thinking.

Indeed, such books are numerous, and have been throughout the history of philosophy, which they have helped to shape. However, enough has been said to indicate in a rough way what may be understood as philosophy.

Philosophy is that field of inquiry which includes the subjects of metaphysics, epistemology, etc. and which employs the method of analysis and synthesis in a context of logical criticism. Given this understanding of philosophy, we are sufficiently armed to challenge the claim that the exclusive origin of philosophy lies in ancient Greece.

Philosophy can be found in ancient China, India, and Africa. By philosophy here we do not mean only the wise pronouncements of sages or religious figures, but the critical employment of reason in analysis and synthesis directed to some of the central issues of metaphysics, ethics, etc.

A word should be said about religious thought. Some religious thought is devotional, and some of it expresses illuminative insights, some of it concerns pronouncements of doctrine, but sometimes also it is philosophical. The meeting place of religious and philosophical thought is sometimes described as the philosophy of religion and sometimes as philosophical theology.

Occasionally these can be distinguished. The philosophy of religion can be understood analogously to the philosophy of mathematics, or the philosophy of history. It is philosophical inquiry into the most foundational questions concerning religion: the nature and attributes of God, the relation between religion and ethics, and apparent paradoxes involved in religious belief. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, who advocates a very broadly understood empiricism (including inner experience as well as sense perception), defines philosophy of religion as follows:

Philosophy of religion is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion and its relations to other types of experience, the truth of religious beliefs and the value of religious attitudes and practices.

Philosophy of religion is a branch of metaphysics (specifically of axiology) which interprets the relations of man's experience of religious values to the rest of his experience.6

Philosophical theology is the employment of philosophical method to address important questions of theology under the assumption that a given theological creed is correct. The term, “philosophical theology" is used in other senses by various writers: for some it is equivalent to the philosophy of religion,for others it is the same as natural theology, some insist that philosophical theology, qua theology, must limit its attention to a particular creed, although it may include attacks as well as defenses.

However, even in the rather narrow meaning employed here, in which philosophical theology has a specific creed as its topic, the credibility of which is defended by what passes for a philosophical style of argumentation, real philosophy often arises out of philosophical theology. As theologians employ critical methods to debate differences of opinion among those who accept a given creed, eventually critical attention may be turned to the most basic assumptions shared by those who confess a common faith; these assumptions may well include ideas about reality, truth, rational belief, value, and other topics of philosophical controversy.

We must be careful, then, not to dismiss all theological discussions as unphilosophical. In the Islamic tradition, for example, there is much true philosophy to be found in kalam. The early mutakallimun owed much in their perception as well as their analysis of the problems that they addressed to the concepts developed by grammarians of the Arabic language.

By the end of the third century after the hegira, one of the central occupations of the mutakallimin of Basra was the systematic explanation of the ontological implications associated with the use of Arabic predicates, sifat.

While they were certainly interested in specifically theological questions about the nature and attributes of God, they developed much more general theories about the existence of things indicated by subjects and predicates.7

The tradition that began in ancient Greece is especially distinguished by its length and the volume of literature it has produced, by the number of its branches, and by the depth of insights which continue to attract new students.

The glory of the Western philosophical tradition, which includes Islamic philosophy as one of its most important branches, must not, however, blind us to the existence of traditions of philosophical thought which developed independently of Greek philosophy. Of these, the most notable are Chinese and Indian philosophy.

Centuries before Socrates began his philosophical career, the Indians of South Asia were reflecting critically on their universe and doing metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and philosophical theology.8 Chinese and Buddhist philosophers who were contemporaries of Socrates also developed a philosophical dialectic based on a tradition of thought which extended back for some centuries.

In many ways the critical reflections of Eastern philosophers are similar to those of Western philosophers. Both Eastern and Western philosophers are preoccupied with questions about the nature of man, the universe, reality, and the ultimate. There are also more specific areas in which similarities between Western and Eastern philosophy are especially obvious.

Early in both traditions materialism asserted itself as a philosophical alternative to the more prevalent modes of thought, and in both traditions thinkers are to be found who placed more emphasis on experience or on reason for acquiring human knowledge. Finally, both groups also saw in this questioning a great opportunity for self-improvement.

One of the most important areas of philosophy to have been developed independently in Greece, India and China is logic. The earliest known work in the Indian tradition on logic is the Tarka-Sastra of Gotama, which has been estimated to have been composed in 550 B.C.

This work included two subjects, the art of debate (tarka), and the means of valid knowledge (pramana). By the second century C.E., the subjects of syllogistic reasoning and the examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines had been added to Gotama's work and the whole became known as the Nyaya sutra.

While some have speculated that the syllogism in Nyaya may have been influenced by the Aristotelian syllogism, which may have come to India through Alexander, this is highly conjectural, and most contemporary historians seem to think that the Indian syllogism developed independently of Greek thought.9 This work served as a foundational text for the subsequent development of Indian logic among various Buddhist and Jain as well as other Hindu philosophers.

Logic is said to have originated in China with the work Mo­tzu of Mo-ti who is believed to have died before 400 B.C. Mo-ti discusses truth and falsity, affirmation and denial 'with a view to produce order and avoid disorder.'10

He describes a method of philosophical analysis and comparison of elements as well as a method of synthesis. Analysis comes from reason and ends with evidence. Synthesis groups together various facts and ends in a conclusion.

Practical and theoretical reasoning are also distinguished. The discussions to be found in the Mo-tzu are not merely the pre-philosophical fragments of a sage, but display a highly refined degree of logical sensitivity.

The philosophy developed by Mo-ti influences a long line of Chinese philosophers known as Moists and they interacted with thinkers of other Chinese schools of thought by criticizing them and being criticized.

There is also some speculation that Greek thought may have entered China by way of Bactria and the Alexandrian conquest, but again, this is highly speculative, and in any case Mo-ti's work was completed long before Greek or Indian influence would have been possible.11

Only those who are ignorant of the logical discussions in the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy or the Moist school of Chinese philosophy and the dialectic which took place between the advocates and critics of these schools could claim that philosophy as it has been defined above has its exclusive origins in Greek thought. Excuse for such ignorance is no longer possible since a number of books have been published in which Indian and Chinese philosophy are described in addition to those mentioned above.

In addition to books, there are several philosophical journals in which new research in these areas is published: Chinese Studies in Philosophy, the Journal of Indian Philosophy, and Philosophy East and West.

In recent years a number of studies of African philosophy have also been published, although it is difficult to make any definite pronouncements about ancient African philosophy since it was carried out in the context of an oral culture.

Nevertheless, to declare that ancient Africa was without philosophy, without reasoned analysis and theorizing about various issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc., is to commit the fallacy ad ignorantium, to conclude that something is not the case simply because we have no positive evidence.

Even Dr. Shari'ati, despite his familiarity with Fanon and his commitment to the oppressed, complains of those Europeans who are ignorant of the rich culture of Iran and imagine Iran to be without culture, 'like Africa'.

It seems to have been a slip, but it is one that is all too common; and even if such remarks are not motivated by a latent nationalist sentiment, misplaced pride or racism, they are certainly capable of fueling vicious attitudes. This is the dark side of the denial of non-Western philosophies: it may be an indication of something more sinister than ignorance.

In pride, the philosopher says that only I have the ability to understand deep truths, to make fine distinctions, to appreciate great subtlety; only I can reason. And since reason is the specific difference of the human, it follows that only I am human-I and my teachers in the line stretching back to ancient Greece. In the language of many tribes, the word for a member of the tribe and the word for man are the same.

In opposition to this exclusivist denial of the universality of philosophy, we may speak of the philosophy of Hadrat Adam (Peace be with him). This alludes to the fact that it is characteristic of human nature to raise questions about reality, knowledge, goodness, beauty, soundness of reasoning, and to seek to find foundations. And it is characteristic of human nature to pursue answers to these questions through the methods of reason: dialectic, analysis, synthesis, criticism, speculation.

It is written in the Qur'an:

“And He taught Adam the names, all of them…” (2:31).

According to Ibn 'Arabi, these name are the Names of God, although the commentators sometimes claim that for reasons having to do with Arabic grammar the names cannot be of attributes, but must be of living things. The argument is not decisive, since it is possible that the attributes are personalized as a figure of speech.

If Adam's knowledge was of the Names of God, this could be taken to be a symbol of analysis through which the divine reality is understood in terms of the multiplicity of Names. The Names are multiple while the essence of God is simple and unitary. By learning the Names, Adam learns to analyze the divine simple unity in terms of its relations with created things as a multiplicity of attributes.

Even if the names Adam was taught are not to be understood as the Divine Names, but of some other realities, the originality of Adam's position with respect to the One Creator, and the knowledge given of a multiplicity of names certainly suggests the problems of the one and the many, of naming and reference, and of human knowledge. These allusions add to the propriety of allowing that the wisdom of Adam was, at least in part, philosophical.

Adam was the first philosopher. This means that philosophy, as we have described it above, is characteristic of human nature, and that philosophical problems may be associated with the knowledge given by God to Adam as related in the Qur'an.

Mulla Sadra has described the wisdom of Adam as follows:

Know that wisdom (Hikmah) originally began with Adam and his progeny Seth and Hermes, i.e., Idris, and Noah because the world is never deprived of a person upon whom the science of Unity (tawhid) and eschatology rests. And it is the great Hermes who propagated it (Hikmah) throughout the regions of the world and different countries and manifested it and made it emanate upon the "true worshippers". He is the "Father of the philosophers (Abu'l-hukuma') and the master of those who are the masters of the sciences.12

To speak of Adam as a philosopher is to go beyond the claim of the universality of philosophy and to introduce a religious element to the discussion. The philosophy of Adam is religious. From the secular Western point of view this sort of claim will sound odd to the point of absurdity.

Not only atheists, but also Western Christians who consider themselves enlightened, think of Adam as a mythical figure, a character from the tales of the ancients with no relevance to the rational analysis of philosophical problems and the scientific cast of mind typical of the modern philosopher.

On the other hand, those religious people with a narrow sense of piety will consider it contrary to religion and debasing to the prophet Adam to describe him as a philosopher. Prophetic knowledge, they will argue, is by revelation and has no need for the paltry methods of reason.

We may respond to the attack on our Western flank by pointing out that philosophy has a mythic dimension that is overlooked by those with a positivistic outlook. Philosophy is a kind of quest motivated by love. The traces of this original love can even be found in such irreligious Western thinkers as Russell and Sartre.

It is the desire to free themselves from the recognized illusions of past thinkers that motivates their rejections. It should come as no surprise that the love of truth might inspire one to deny the truth.

The mythic dimension of the philosophical quest for truth is a recurrent theme in the philosophical literature of the Western tradition. Many authors have already emphasized the point that what makes for myth is not falsehood.

Important truths may be contained in myths. A story, like the story of Adam, may be called a myth because it is legendary, it has been passed to us from antiquity rather than having been discovered through scientific historical research; but this does not mean that it is false! Rather it is a falsification to deny the mythic dimensions of the philosophical quest and to deny its points of contact with the religious journey.

With respect to those who would deny the philosophy of Adam from a religious point of view, if they persist in their objections even after our explanations of what we mean by this attribution and they understand that we do not mean to claim that we know the position of the first prophet, Peace be with him, on a number of controversial philosophical questions, nor do we make any positive claim even to the effect that the prophet had any philosophical views on any particular philosophical issues, if they nevertheless persist in their opposition even after this, then we shall begin to suspect that their opposition stems from a desire to protect religion from rational inquiry.

There are many theologians and philosophers of religion in the West today who share this sentiment. They are called fideists. They hold that there are higher standards than those of reason by means of which beliefs are to be evaluated, and that with respect to such standards; religious beliefs are to be dearly valued even if they are in opposition to the standards of reason.

One of the most important Christian philosophers to espouse fideism was Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). It is important to understand that Kierkegaard's fideism springs from a rejection of the claims on behalf of reason made by Hegel.

During Kierkegaard's age the followers of Hegel seem to have thought that reason by itself was sufficient to show the place of man and God in the universe and to provide the foundations for religious faith. In reaction against the excessive claims made on behalf of reason, Kierkegaard seems to have gone to the opposite extreme of denying any relevance of reason or philosophy to religion.

Particularly important with respect to Muslim-Christian dialogue is Kierkegaard's attitude toward the Bible. Muslims have traditionally reminded Christians of the dubious historical evidence for the authenticity of the Bible, and have compared lack of information about the origins of the Bible with the relative abundance of data about the revelation of the Qur'an. The response of Christians has often been surprisingly nonchalant.

Of course, a significant number of Christian theologians are engaged in extensive historical research about the origins of the Bible. However, I believe one more commonly encounters a lack of interest in the question, and in some cases even hostility. Such reactions are not simply expressions of unreflective dogmatism, but of the widespread theological view that religious matters are independent of objective truth, and may even be opposed to it.

The lesson taken from modern forms of biblical criticism is that the spiritual value of Scripture is independent not only of the shortcomings of its literal interpretation, but of any claim to objective historicity. This view finds strong expression in the works of Kierkegaard. He argues that even if the Bible were proven absolutely authentic, it would not bring anyone closer to faith, for faith is a matter of passion and is not the result of academic investigations.

Furthermore, he claims that the scientific establishment of the authenticity of the Bible would actually be detrimental to faith, because passion and certainty are incompatible. On the other hand, Kierkegaard claims that even if the Bible were shown to be inauthentic, that its books were not by the supposed authors, and that it lacked integrity, it would not follow that Christ never existed, and the believer would still be at liberty to retain his faith.

Karl Barth, perhaps the most influential Protestant theologian of the twentieth century, takes a remarkably similar view. He is willing to accept historical criticism of the Bible, but claims that faith does not depend on the historical accuracy of beliefs. Christ transcends history. The danger here is that in the rejection of historical, scientific, philosophical or rational criticism, one ensures that no evaluation from outside can threaten one's religious beliefs. Narrow mindedness is protected.

The second most important philosophical influence on contemporary Christian fideism is Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889­-1951). Wittgenstein's fideism is in some ways more moderate than Kierkegaard's. He holds that in different areas of life different 'language games' are played, and that confusion results when the rules of one game are applied to another game to which they are not applicable. The rules of science do not apply to religion.

According to Wittgensteinians, the proper place for reason is in science. In religious belief something else appears to be operative. Against this view one may point out that both religious and scientific discussions tend to obey the logical laws characteristic of rational thought. Where they differ is in the relevance of empirical findings, particularly those of a quantitative nature.

However, it is not at all clear why philosophical reason should be considered the province of that which depends on empirical data and the formal sciences instead of on revelation. The logical principles that are shared by different scientific, religious, and other traditions seem to violate the idea of strict autonomy that Wittgenstein defends.

Perhaps the greatest problem for the Wittgensteinian idea of the autonomy of religious belief is that of incommensurability. Wittgenstein himself complains that he is not sure how religious and non-religious people are able to understand each other. Since it is clear that they are able to understand each other, religious and non-religious languages are not completely independent.

But if they are not completely independent, then the possibility of mutual criticism arises, which the doctrine of autonomy denies. If we are to have spiritual progress, we must be willing to face challenges, not to cut ourselves off from the possibility of challenge. If our religious ideas are to have sufficient flexibility to find proper application in all the spheres of our lives, religion must be permitted to leak out from the confines of ritual procedure and otherworldly preoccupation.

Finally, there is the problem of demarcation. Where does one language game end and another begin? If religion is a form of life analogous to science, how are the various religious traditions to be treated? Are they like competing scientific theories? There is good reason to think not.

Buddhism and Judaism are so disparate that it does not make much sense that they are alternative attempts to describe the same reality. Perhaps they are as different from each other as each is from quantum theory. Perhaps they are like different branches of science. But this is wrong, too. The various religions do compete with one another in some sense.

The Qur'an speaks not only to Muslims, but directly addresses Jews and Christians, idolaters and infidels, and if the Qur'an employs it own specific concept of rationality, it is one which others are expected to be able to understand. Furthermore, the different branches of the sciences merely focus on different aspects of what is agreed by all to be a common reality.

In any case, there is little one can find in Wittgenstein or his followers to assist in determining how traditions of thought are to be classified, when they are to be seen as competitors and when they are to be seen as autonomous. To the contrary, the very existence of the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology indicate that there is no line of demarcation that separates religious from philosophical thought.

In practice the two often merge. Indeed, the philosophical critique of religious ideas is necessary if we are to adequately defend our beliefs, even privately within our own souls, from the charge that we have gone astray, that religious emotion has prompted us to accept absurdities. Like every other area of culture, if isolated from intellectual commerce, religion will suffer the depression of a ghetto economy.

Against our rejection of fideism, we might imagine the protest of Mawlavi: when the mother offers milk to her child, is the child to seek evidence that this is in fact nourishing milk, and that it is offered by its own mother? The immediate recognition of the truth needs no evidence. We can grant the insight of Mawlavi without going as far as he seems on occasion to have done, without rejecting the relevance of philosophy to religion.

It may be admitted that there are circumstances in which it is inappropriate to look for reasons and evidence, not only in religion, but also in the sciences and mathematics, and in virtually all the areas of human inquiry. A large part of wisdom in philosophical investigation is to know what things are to be questioned and what things are to be accepted without further questioning. An unregulated demand for reasons and evidence only brings skepticism.

Philosophical reason is a tool, a vehicle. By itself, it can go nowhere. Syllogisms can be constructed ad nauseam without taking one a step closer to the truth of any matter, but the judicious use of logical technique and the other methods of philosophy may transport us distances which we would otherwise be unable to traverse in security.

For the key to the religious element in the philosophy of Adam we may turn again to the Mathnavi. Adam's employment of reason was combined with humility. Even though he was taught the names and the angels prostrated before him on account of his knowledge, when he sinned he admitted his mistake and turned in humble repentance toward God.

Mawlavi contrasts this attitude with that of Iblis, who uses his reason in order to excuse his disobedience. The philosophy of Ibis is a philosophy tainted by pride. The philosophy of Adam is a philosophy purified by humility.

Today, in the Muslim world as well as among Christians, there is a discussion of what role philosophy can play vis a vis religion. On the one hand, there are those who hold that philosophy provides a rational foundation for religious belief and a general framework for the interpretation of religious beliefs through which the truth of basic religious beliefs may be demonstrated.

This has been the dominant view among Muslim philosophers from Ibn Sina to those inspired by the teachings of 'Allamah Tabataba'i.13 Another school of thought among Shi'i scholars, known as maktab-e tafkik, denies that philosophy can or should serve as a basis for religion (the word tafkik indicates the separation of religion from philosophy).14 Both groups seem to have valuable points to make, although both can also easily pass beyond the limits of plausibility.

The exaggerated claims of rationalist philosophers to be in possession of deductive proofs for religious claims which must be accepted by all reasonable persons invites the response that given the fact that atheists seem to be no worse at logic than theists, faith must be independent of reason. But to abandon reason is to deny the birthright we inherit from Hadrat Adam (AS).

What we must deny and seek to separate from religion is Iblisi philosophy, the pride that overextends the claims of human reason. What we must seek is the wisdom of the prophets (AS) ,including the latent philosophical reasoning to be found there, a humble reason, but one which keeps a firm hand on the reins of the passions and emotions, not to stop them, but to direct them on the straight path, insha'Allah!

Notes

1. Cf. Peter Gorman, Pythagoras: A Life (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 35.

2. This subject is the topic of a paper delivered by Dr. Abd al-Karim Soroush at the 1992 Conference on Greek Orthodox Christianity and Islam in Athens. The topic is also addressed by William C. Chittick in The Sufi Doctrine of Rumi, (Offset Press, 1974), and later in his The Sufi Path of Love,.(Albany: SUNY Press, 1983).

3. Mathnavl, Bk. vI, 2505 f.

4. See Morris Klein's Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty (New York: Oxford, 1983).

5. For example, see Elliott Sober's From a Biological Point of view (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

6. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Philosophy of Religion (fifth printing) (New York: Prentice Hall, 1947), 22.

7. Cf. Richard M. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), p. 14.

8. Cf. R. T. Blackwood and A. L. Herman, eds. Problems in Philosophy: West and East, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), p. 7. Most of this paragraph is paraphrased from the introduction to this work.

9. See the article 'Logic' in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards. For the conjecture of the Greek connection, see Satis Chandra vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971).

10. Cf. Leo Wieger, S.J., A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China, Edward Chalmers Werner, tr., (New York: Paragon, 1969), p. 213.

11. Cf. Weiger, p. 286.

12. Risalah fi'l-huduth, in Rasa'il fadr al-Dln Shlrdzl, (Tehran, 1302), p. 67. The passage is cited and translated by S. H. Nasrin "Hermes and Hermetic Writings in the Islamic World" in his Islamic Studies (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1967), p. 69.

13. One of the most prominent of these philosophers is Prof. MisbahYazdi, whose Amuzesh-e Falsafeh has been translated as Philosophical Instruction: An Introduction to Contemporary Islamic Philosophy, tr. M. Legenhausen and 'A. Sarvdalir (Binghampton: Global Publications, 1999).

14. See Muhammad Riga Hakimi, Maktab-e Tafkik (Qom: Markaz-e Barressiha-ye Islami, 1373/1994).

Human Thought, Divine Wisdom, And Islamic Philosophy

In order to steer a middle course between two extreme positions to be found among contemporary Muslim thinkers similar to hard rationalism and fideism in Christian thought, it is suggested that reflection on the universality of philosophical speculation with respect to religion reveals that the rational philosophical defense of religious thought should not be abandoned, but that philosophy must be understood as including much more than that which is associated with the famous ancient Greek philosophers and their legacy.

In order for Islamic philosophy to flourish and to serve Islam, it should be developed beyond the confines of its own heritage without neglecting that valuable heritage. It should aspire to the wisdom and humility exhibited by the prophets, ever since Hadrat Adam, peace be with all of them.

The word 'philosophy' is derived from Greek, but what is denoted by this word is something whose origins cannot be confined to the Greek city-states of the millennium before the life of Hadrat 'Isa, not even if we construe philosophy rather narrowly.

Often, Thales of Miletus (c. 640-546 B.C.) is taken to be the first philosopher of ancient Greece. A descendant of Phoenician immigrants to Greece, he taught that even stones and seemingly dead matter were full of life. He had a mystic's appreciation of nature, and claimed that everything was full of gods.

Some historians conjecture that his most famous belief, “that the universe began from water”, was something he adopted from Egyptian lore.1 Regardless of whether or not it is proper to regard Thales as the first ancient Greek philosopher, we can be sure that he was not known by the term 'philosopher' in his own time, for the term was coined by followers of one of the most important students of Thales, Pythagoras.

Thus the inventors of the word 'philosophy' were the members of a secret cult of ascetic mystics, the Pythagoreans.

Ancient Greek philosophy is often divided between pre-Socratic philosophy and that which came afterward. Others consider Socrates to have been the first real Greek philosopher. In either case, Socrates is certainly one of the most important of the ancient Greeks to have become known as a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom.

While the etymology of the word philosophy provides some clue to its proper meaning, this meaning has become rather more specific than that suggested by the simple love of wisdom. Ancient Greek philosophy is the foundation upon which the history of Western philosophy, the sciences and the humanities all rest.

Because of its foundational position for Western thought, some writers define philosophy as that chain of ideas which includes the giants of modern European thought, such as Descartes, Hume and Kant, and which can be traced back through the Christian medieval period to Greece, Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, or Thales, one of whom is to be designated as the originator of genuine philosophical thought.

But if we begin to wonder about the origins of Greek philosophy, and if we try to find some reason for choosing one of the above figures above the others as the true father of philosophy, then the definition of philosophy as the chain of thought including the well known greats will not be satisfactory.

The earliest links of the chain seem so different from the later links that it seems impossible to say whether any particular ancient Greek thinker should be included or not.

In order to answer the question of which Greek should be considered the first philosopher we must abandon the definition of philosophy solely in terms of the chain of teachers and pupils and turn instead to the question of what characterizes philosophical thought.

Finding the essential character of philosophical thought is no easy matter. Certainly it should not be characterized as any particular set of doctrines, although there have been periods in which such an identification was popular.

Thus, when Ghazali wrote his Tahdfut al-Falasifah he was not attempting to refute philosophy as a topic or set of topics for reflection and investigation, but to refute specific doctrines associated with the mix of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian thought whose major champion was Ibn Sina. As far as method and subject matter are concerned, Ghazali was no less a philosopher than Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd.

It would have been more precise if Ghazali had titled his book Tahafut al-Falsafah Ibn Sina, but the thought of Ibn Sina had so come to dominate the philosophical thought of the Islamic world that philosophy itself was identified with the doctrines taught by Ibn Sina and his followers. This line of thought was a form of rationalism which Ghazali branded as heresy (bid'ah) because he considered the conclusions it advanced as dictated by reason to be not only contrary to religion but based upon faulty arguments in which reason overstepped its own limits.

The idea that philosophers make unwarranted claims on behalf of the intellect became the object of Mawlavi Jalal al-Din Rumi's sarcasm in the Mathnavi.2

Mawlavi claims that the philosophers sin in two ways: first, they overestimate the power of the rational intellect; and second, they fail to appreciate the importance of a more direct form of knowledge through illumination.

The philosopher is in bondage to things perceived by the intellect;

the pure rides as a prince on the Intellect of intellect.

Know that knowledge consists in seeing fire plainly,

not in prating that smoke is evidence of fire.

O you whose evidence, in the eyes of the Sage,

is really more stinking than the evidence of the physician,

Since you have no evidence but this,

O son, eat dung and inspect urine!

O you whose evidence is like the staff in your hand indicating that you suffer from blindness!

Noise and pompous talk and assumption of authority (means)

"I cannot see: excuse me."3

The object of Mawlavi's ridicule is not just any form of philosophy, but is the same form of philosophy against which Ghazali inveighed. The association of philosophy with medicine in the second passage quoted above recalls the fact that Ibn Sina was as famous a physician as a philosopher.

Clearly, Mawlavi does not mean to include Socrates among those he finds guilty of 'noise and pompous talk', for Socrates, like Mawlavi, was engaged in exposing the ignorance of those who proudly but falsely claimed to know. Plato, as well, does not seem to fit Mawlavi's image of the philosopher, for he was just as emphatic as Mawlavi about the importance of illumination over finding evidence and engaging in syllogistic reasoning.

Even Aristotle does not entirely fit with the image Mawlavi portrays of the philosopher, for he was much more concerned than the medieval Aristotelians to point out problems (aporiai) for which he could offer no clear cut solution (like the problem of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics, or the problem of future contingents in De Interpretatione).

The most interesting question that is raised by these reflections is how neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism came to be considered as an official philosophy, a rationally authoritative set of doctrines, rather than the tentative speculation suggested by the Greek thinkers. How did the unresolved problems that were so important for Aristotle move to the sidelines so that bold claims for reason should dominate? How did philosophy become corrupted, dogmatic and proud, when it began in wonder? However, to pursue these questions would be to abandon the task we have set for ourselves of characterizing philosophy.

Philosophy can neither be defined in terms of a single chain of teachers and pupils, nor can it be defined in terms of a set of doctrines. At the same time it is important to try to characterize philosophical writings in such a way that we might distinguish them from religious texts and from what is sometimes referred to as wisdom literature.

Of course, we do not wish to claim that no religious texts are to be considered as philosophy, nor should we deny the philosophical content of some wisdom literature. We are looking for a way to distinguish falsafah from Hikmah, philosophy from wisdom, while allowing for the possibility that the two may overlap.

Since we have already ruled out historical succession and doctrinal content as means to identify philosophy, there appear to be two alternatives left to us: subject and method.

Since the time of Aristotle, metaphysics, or first philosophy, has been defined as the science of being qua being, and the Muslim philosophers generally accepted this definition. This definition, however, does not provide a means to include all the branches of philosophy.

Philosophy has the following branches: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, and aesthetics. There are other branches of philosophy as well: the philosophy of law, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of medicine, social and political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of mind, etc. The 'etc.' is important.

There seems to be no way to eliminate it, no list whose claim to being exhaustive could not be undermined by the development of a new branch of philosophy. We need some way to know when a new branch of human inquiry should be considered as a kind of philosophy, and when it is something else, psychology, ideology, or cultural criticism, for example. We may hope to find some criterion by turning to method.

Philosophers differ from sages because of their employment of reason, it is sometimes said. While the sages draw wisdom from folklore, religion, mythology, and other elements of culture, the philosopher is held to rely on pure reason. But surely the sages employ reason as well. This seems to be implied by Mawlavi's claim that the pure ones ride on the Intellect of intellect.

Sometimes it is said that although all science makes use of rational principles, philosophy is unique in relying on reason alone, with no appeal to empirical findings. Two objections will be raised here. First, there are sciences other than philosophies that rely on reason alone, the sciences of pure mathematics, such as number theory and Euclidean geometry.

Secondly, philosophy, or at least some of its branches, on close inspection does not turn out to be completely immune from empirical discoveries and the ideas abstracted from them. There is no clear line that divides the philosophy of mathematics from pure mathematics, or pure mathematics from applied mathematics.4

Reason seems to be used in the same way or perhaps to shift only gradually as we move from a particular science to the philosophy of that science. Metaphysical theories have been proposed on the basis of philosophical reflection on elementary particle physics, cosmology, and even biology.5

The questions seem to be different. The questions of a science are internal questions, questions that seem to presuppose that their answers can be found through a continuation and extension of the methods currently employed in the field.

Questions concerning a particular science seem to break out of the confines of established modes of inquiry in two directions: at one end there is the matter of applications, and at the other, philosophy. Reason, however, is relied upon equally throughout the spectrum; it is equally vital to the design of a machine and to speculation about the nature of being.

Since philosophy is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the applied sciences, it is tempting to define philosophical method as non-empirical in some sense, even if it is granted that no theorizing is completely immune from ideas that spring more directly from reflection on observation and measurement.

Even if philosophy does not rely entirely on reason alone, and experience can be an avenue for uncovering philosophical truth as well as rational reflection, still, philosophers do not attempt to formulate their theories in ways designed to allow for empirical confirmation or refutation.

In the end, it seems that if we are to be honest, we must admit that we cannot provide an exact definition of philosophy which will include all that is traditionally considered to belong to the field while excluding the special sciences. Perhaps we do not really know what philosophy is, or maybe we do know what it is, but only in a vague way which eludes our attempts at exact definition.

The closest we seem to be able to come to identifying philosophy is by means of its subject and method, by saying that philosophy includes metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic, and inquiries into the foundations of the special sciences.

The method of philosophy is rational as opposed to empirical, but this does not mean that empirical investigations are irrelevant to philosophy. For example, the results of empirical investigations have led to the development of quantum theory, which has raised a number of interesting philosophical questions about the nature of matter and energy, and the displacement of Newtonian physics by relativity theory has done much to undermine some of the central theses of Kant's philosophy.

To admit that philosophy must be cognizant and responsive to developments in the empirical sciences is not, however, to say that the method of philosophy is empirical. The tool of the philosopher is reason, but this is not very informative, for it is a tool used by students of the natural sciences and the humanities. There is no 'ilm that does not require reason.

The methods of philosophy are analysis and synthesis, and in both special attention is paid to logical rigor. Synthesis is an attempt to provide explanations at a quite general level often by constructing a theory or model, or by advocating a project through which such explanations are to be given. For example, materialism is a theory the acceptance of which requires a rejection of all explanations that contain in eliminable reference to non-material entities.

This requirement creates special difficulties in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of mathematics, and many other areas. Thus materialism generates a program of attempting to provide a uniform type of explanation for various phenomena in all the fields of human inquiry.

Utilitarianism in ethics provides another example of a programmatic theory by means of which explanations are to be provided for the various moral features of life. Each broad philosophical thesis or theory generates its own problems.

The successful defense of a philosophical thesis requires that the thesis be shown to be free from contradiction, that it can be integrated within a general philosophical outlook, that the problems it generates are interesting and seem susceptible to solution, that the thesis can be applied in various areas and that it provides interesting insights into the areas in which it is applied.

The application of a thesis to a specific area of inquiry often requires the employment of the other major philosophical method, analysis. Analysis can take a number of forms. There is linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, and other types of analysis. Perhaps they can all be lumped together as ways to analyze problems.

When Socrates asked 'What is justice?', he was extending an invitation to engage in philosophical analysis. Some will respond by speaking of how the word 'justice' is used, and of its etymology; others may respond by considering how people generally think about justice; still others will try to explain what justice is by placing it within a broader philosophical theory. So, the methods of synthesis and analysis are complementary.

By synthesis theories are constructed through which problems are to be analyzed; and analysis proceeds by providing an account of a problem in accord with a more general theory, or by showing how the problem may be solved by means of the theory.

So, for example, Heidegger will provide an analysis of a problem by sifting through the etymologies of the relevant terms involved, picking out the most salient issues thus suggested, and then providing some thesis about the problem which incorporates the points brought out in his analysis, often by extending a train of thought to be found in several thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition.

The process of philosophical analysis and synthesis takes place in a context of criticism. At each stage, the work of the philosopher is subject to the criticisms of others working in the same area. Objections are raised when a theory has counterintuitive consequences, when it contains a logical flaw, or when the arguments produced in its support are found to be unsound.

Philosophical theories are also criticized for their inability to handle important problems, or even when they lack elegance. The main method of philosophical criticism is the analysis of arguments. Here the importance of logic comes to the fore, since it is by logic that arguments are identified and evaluated as valid or invalid. Logic, however, is not always capable of providing insight regarding the truth of the premises upon which a given argument is based.

For the evaluation of premises, sometimes an appeal will be made to empirical investigations, sometimes to rational intuitions, and sometimes further argument will be suggested. A complete characterization of the philosophical methods sketched here would require a text on logic and critical thinking.

Indeed, such books are numerous, and have been throughout the history of philosophy, which they have helped to shape. However, enough has been said to indicate in a rough way what may be understood as philosophy.

Philosophy is that field of inquiry which includes the subjects of metaphysics, epistemology, etc. and which employs the method of analysis and synthesis in a context of logical criticism. Given this understanding of philosophy, we are sufficiently armed to challenge the claim that the exclusive origin of philosophy lies in ancient Greece.

Philosophy can be found in ancient China, India, and Africa. By philosophy here we do not mean only the wise pronouncements of sages or religious figures, but the critical employment of reason in analysis and synthesis directed to some of the central issues of metaphysics, ethics, etc.

A word should be said about religious thought. Some religious thought is devotional, and some of it expresses illuminative insights, some of it concerns pronouncements of doctrine, but sometimes also it is philosophical. The meeting place of religious and philosophical thought is sometimes described as the philosophy of religion and sometimes as philosophical theology.

Occasionally these can be distinguished. The philosophy of religion can be understood analogously to the philosophy of mathematics, or the philosophy of history. It is philosophical inquiry into the most foundational questions concerning religion: the nature and attributes of God, the relation between religion and ethics, and apparent paradoxes involved in religious belief. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, who advocates a very broadly understood empiricism (including inner experience as well as sense perception), defines philosophy of religion as follows:

Philosophy of religion is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion and its relations to other types of experience, the truth of religious beliefs and the value of religious attitudes and practices.

Philosophy of religion is a branch of metaphysics (specifically of axiology) which interprets the relations of man's experience of religious values to the rest of his experience.6

Philosophical theology is the employment of philosophical method to address important questions of theology under the assumption that a given theological creed is correct. The term, “philosophical theology" is used in other senses by various writers: for some it is equivalent to the philosophy of religion,for others it is the same as natural theology, some insist that philosophical theology, qua theology, must limit its attention to a particular creed, although it may include attacks as well as defenses.

However, even in the rather narrow meaning employed here, in which philosophical theology has a specific creed as its topic, the credibility of which is defended by what passes for a philosophical style of argumentation, real philosophy often arises out of philosophical theology. As theologians employ critical methods to debate differences of opinion among those who accept a given creed, eventually critical attention may be turned to the most basic assumptions shared by those who confess a common faith; these assumptions may well include ideas about reality, truth, rational belief, value, and other topics of philosophical controversy.

We must be careful, then, not to dismiss all theological discussions as unphilosophical. In the Islamic tradition, for example, there is much true philosophy to be found in kalam. The early mutakallimun owed much in their perception as well as their analysis of the problems that they addressed to the concepts developed by grammarians of the Arabic language.

By the end of the third century after the hegira, one of the central occupations of the mutakallimin of Basra was the systematic explanation of the ontological implications associated with the use of Arabic predicates, sifat.

While they were certainly interested in specifically theological questions about the nature and attributes of God, they developed much more general theories about the existence of things indicated by subjects and predicates.7

The tradition that began in ancient Greece is especially distinguished by its length and the volume of literature it has produced, by the number of its branches, and by the depth of insights which continue to attract new students.

The glory of the Western philosophical tradition, which includes Islamic philosophy as one of its most important branches, must not, however, blind us to the existence of traditions of philosophical thought which developed independently of Greek philosophy. Of these, the most notable are Chinese and Indian philosophy.

Centuries before Socrates began his philosophical career, the Indians of South Asia were reflecting critically on their universe and doing metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and philosophical theology.8 Chinese and Buddhist philosophers who were contemporaries of Socrates also developed a philosophical dialectic based on a tradition of thought which extended back for some centuries.

In many ways the critical reflections of Eastern philosophers are similar to those of Western philosophers. Both Eastern and Western philosophers are preoccupied with questions about the nature of man, the universe, reality, and the ultimate. There are also more specific areas in which similarities between Western and Eastern philosophy are especially obvious.

Early in both traditions materialism asserted itself as a philosophical alternative to the more prevalent modes of thought, and in both traditions thinkers are to be found who placed more emphasis on experience or on reason for acquiring human knowledge. Finally, both groups also saw in this questioning a great opportunity for self-improvement.

One of the most important areas of philosophy to have been developed independently in Greece, India and China is logic. The earliest known work in the Indian tradition on logic is the Tarka-Sastra of Gotama, which has been estimated to have been composed in 550 B.C.

This work included two subjects, the art of debate (tarka), and the means of valid knowledge (pramana). By the second century C.E., the subjects of syllogistic reasoning and the examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines had been added to Gotama's work and the whole became known as the Nyaya sutra.

While some have speculated that the syllogism in Nyaya may have been influenced by the Aristotelian syllogism, which may have come to India through Alexander, this is highly conjectural, and most contemporary historians seem to think that the Indian syllogism developed independently of Greek thought.9 This work served as a foundational text for the subsequent development of Indian logic among various Buddhist and Jain as well as other Hindu philosophers.

Logic is said to have originated in China with the work Mo­tzu of Mo-ti who is believed to have died before 400 B.C. Mo-ti discusses truth and falsity, affirmation and denial 'with a view to produce order and avoid disorder.'10

He describes a method of philosophical analysis and comparison of elements as well as a method of synthesis. Analysis comes from reason and ends with evidence. Synthesis groups together various facts and ends in a conclusion.

Practical and theoretical reasoning are also distinguished. The discussions to be found in the Mo-tzu are not merely the pre-philosophical fragments of a sage, but display a highly refined degree of logical sensitivity.

The philosophy developed by Mo-ti influences a long line of Chinese philosophers known as Moists and they interacted with thinkers of other Chinese schools of thought by criticizing them and being criticized.

There is also some speculation that Greek thought may have entered China by way of Bactria and the Alexandrian conquest, but again, this is highly speculative, and in any case Mo-ti's work was completed long before Greek or Indian influence would have been possible.11

Only those who are ignorant of the logical discussions in the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy or the Moist school of Chinese philosophy and the dialectic which took place between the advocates and critics of these schools could claim that philosophy as it has been defined above has its exclusive origins in Greek thought. Excuse for such ignorance is no longer possible since a number of books have been published in which Indian and Chinese philosophy are described in addition to those mentioned above.

In addition to books, there are several philosophical journals in which new research in these areas is published: Chinese Studies in Philosophy, the Journal of Indian Philosophy, and Philosophy East and West.

In recent years a number of studies of African philosophy have also been published, although it is difficult to make any definite pronouncements about ancient African philosophy since it was carried out in the context of an oral culture.

Nevertheless, to declare that ancient Africa was without philosophy, without reasoned analysis and theorizing about various issues in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc., is to commit the fallacy ad ignorantium, to conclude that something is not the case simply because we have no positive evidence.

Even Dr. Shari'ati, despite his familiarity with Fanon and his commitment to the oppressed, complains of those Europeans who are ignorant of the rich culture of Iran and imagine Iran to be without culture, 'like Africa'.

It seems to have been a slip, but it is one that is all too common; and even if such remarks are not motivated by a latent nationalist sentiment, misplaced pride or racism, they are certainly capable of fueling vicious attitudes. This is the dark side of the denial of non-Western philosophies: it may be an indication of something more sinister than ignorance.

In pride, the philosopher says that only I have the ability to understand deep truths, to make fine distinctions, to appreciate great subtlety; only I can reason. And since reason is the specific difference of the human, it follows that only I am human-I and my teachers in the line stretching back to ancient Greece. In the language of many tribes, the word for a member of the tribe and the word for man are the same.

In opposition to this exclusivist denial of the universality of philosophy, we may speak of the philosophy of Hadrat Adam (Peace be with him). This alludes to the fact that it is characteristic of human nature to raise questions about reality, knowledge, goodness, beauty, soundness of reasoning, and to seek to find foundations. And it is characteristic of human nature to pursue answers to these questions through the methods of reason: dialectic, analysis, synthesis, criticism, speculation.

It is written in the Qur'an:

“And He taught Adam the names, all of them…” (2:31).

According to Ibn 'Arabi, these name are the Names of God, although the commentators sometimes claim that for reasons having to do with Arabic grammar the names cannot be of attributes, but must be of living things. The argument is not decisive, since it is possible that the attributes are personalized as a figure of speech.

If Adam's knowledge was of the Names of God, this could be taken to be a symbol of analysis through which the divine reality is understood in terms of the multiplicity of Names. The Names are multiple while the essence of God is simple and unitary. By learning the Names, Adam learns to analyze the divine simple unity in terms of its relations with created things as a multiplicity of attributes.

Even if the names Adam was taught are not to be understood as the Divine Names, but of some other realities, the originality of Adam's position with respect to the One Creator, and the knowledge given of a multiplicity of names certainly suggests the problems of the one and the many, of naming and reference, and of human knowledge. These allusions add to the propriety of allowing that the wisdom of Adam was, at least in part, philosophical.

Adam was the first philosopher. This means that philosophy, as we have described it above, is characteristic of human nature, and that philosophical problems may be associated with the knowledge given by God to Adam as related in the Qur'an.

Mulla Sadra has described the wisdom of Adam as follows:

Know that wisdom (Hikmah) originally began with Adam and his progeny Seth and Hermes, i.e., Idris, and Noah because the world is never deprived of a person upon whom the science of Unity (tawhid) and eschatology rests. And it is the great Hermes who propagated it (Hikmah) throughout the regions of the world and different countries and manifested it and made it emanate upon the "true worshippers". He is the "Father of the philosophers (Abu'l-hukuma') and the master of those who are the masters of the sciences.12

To speak of Adam as a philosopher is to go beyond the claim of the universality of philosophy and to introduce a religious element to the discussion. The philosophy of Adam is religious. From the secular Western point of view this sort of claim will sound odd to the point of absurdity.

Not only atheists, but also Western Christians who consider themselves enlightened, think of Adam as a mythical figure, a character from the tales of the ancients with no relevance to the rational analysis of philosophical problems and the scientific cast of mind typical of the modern philosopher.

On the other hand, those religious people with a narrow sense of piety will consider it contrary to religion and debasing to the prophet Adam to describe him as a philosopher. Prophetic knowledge, they will argue, is by revelation and has no need for the paltry methods of reason.

We may respond to the attack on our Western flank by pointing out that philosophy has a mythic dimension that is overlooked by those with a positivistic outlook. Philosophy is a kind of quest motivated by love. The traces of this original love can even be found in such irreligious Western thinkers as Russell and Sartre.

It is the desire to free themselves from the recognized illusions of past thinkers that motivates their rejections. It should come as no surprise that the love of truth might inspire one to deny the truth.

The mythic dimension of the philosophical quest for truth is a recurrent theme in the philosophical literature of the Western tradition. Many authors have already emphasized the point that what makes for myth is not falsehood.

Important truths may be contained in myths. A story, like the story of Adam, may be called a myth because it is legendary, it has been passed to us from antiquity rather than having been discovered through scientific historical research; but this does not mean that it is false! Rather it is a falsification to deny the mythic dimensions of the philosophical quest and to deny its points of contact with the religious journey.

With respect to those who would deny the philosophy of Adam from a religious point of view, if they persist in their objections even after our explanations of what we mean by this attribution and they understand that we do not mean to claim that we know the position of the first prophet, Peace be with him, on a number of controversial philosophical questions, nor do we make any positive claim even to the effect that the prophet had any philosophical views on any particular philosophical issues, if they nevertheless persist in their opposition even after this, then we shall begin to suspect that their opposition stems from a desire to protect religion from rational inquiry.

There are many theologians and philosophers of religion in the West today who share this sentiment. They are called fideists. They hold that there are higher standards than those of reason by means of which beliefs are to be evaluated, and that with respect to such standards; religious beliefs are to be dearly valued even if they are in opposition to the standards of reason.

One of the most important Christian philosophers to espouse fideism was Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). It is important to understand that Kierkegaard's fideism springs from a rejection of the claims on behalf of reason made by Hegel.

During Kierkegaard's age the followers of Hegel seem to have thought that reason by itself was sufficient to show the place of man and God in the universe and to provide the foundations for religious faith. In reaction against the excessive claims made on behalf of reason, Kierkegaard seems to have gone to the opposite extreme of denying any relevance of reason or philosophy to religion.

Particularly important with respect to Muslim-Christian dialogue is Kierkegaard's attitude toward the Bible. Muslims have traditionally reminded Christians of the dubious historical evidence for the authenticity of the Bible, and have compared lack of information about the origins of the Bible with the relative abundance of data about the revelation of the Qur'an. The response of Christians has often been surprisingly nonchalant.

Of course, a significant number of Christian theologians are engaged in extensive historical research about the origins of the Bible. However, I believe one more commonly encounters a lack of interest in the question, and in some cases even hostility. Such reactions are not simply expressions of unreflective dogmatism, but of the widespread theological view that religious matters are independent of objective truth, and may even be opposed to it.

The lesson taken from modern forms of biblical criticism is that the spiritual value of Scripture is independent not only of the shortcomings of its literal interpretation, but of any claim to objective historicity. This view finds strong expression in the works of Kierkegaard. He argues that even if the Bible were proven absolutely authentic, it would not bring anyone closer to faith, for faith is a matter of passion and is not the result of academic investigations.

Furthermore, he claims that the scientific establishment of the authenticity of the Bible would actually be detrimental to faith, because passion and certainty are incompatible. On the other hand, Kierkegaard claims that even if the Bible were shown to be inauthentic, that its books were not by the supposed authors, and that it lacked integrity, it would not follow that Christ never existed, and the believer would still be at liberty to retain his faith.

Karl Barth, perhaps the most influential Protestant theologian of the twentieth century, takes a remarkably similar view. He is willing to accept historical criticism of the Bible, but claims that faith does not depend on the historical accuracy of beliefs. Christ transcends history. The danger here is that in the rejection of historical, scientific, philosophical or rational criticism, one ensures that no evaluation from outside can threaten one's religious beliefs. Narrow mindedness is protected.

The second most important philosophical influence on contemporary Christian fideism is Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889­-1951). Wittgenstein's fideism is in some ways more moderate than Kierkegaard's. He holds that in different areas of life different 'language games' are played, and that confusion results when the rules of one game are applied to another game to which they are not applicable. The rules of science do not apply to religion.

According to Wittgensteinians, the proper place for reason is in science. In religious belief something else appears to be operative. Against this view one may point out that both religious and scientific discussions tend to obey the logical laws characteristic of rational thought. Where they differ is in the relevance of empirical findings, particularly those of a quantitative nature.

However, it is not at all clear why philosophical reason should be considered the province of that which depends on empirical data and the formal sciences instead of on revelation. The logical principles that are shared by different scientific, religious, and other traditions seem to violate the idea of strict autonomy that Wittgenstein defends.

Perhaps the greatest problem for the Wittgensteinian idea of the autonomy of religious belief is that of incommensurability. Wittgenstein himself complains that he is not sure how religious and non-religious people are able to understand each other. Since it is clear that they are able to understand each other, religious and non-religious languages are not completely independent.

But if they are not completely independent, then the possibility of mutual criticism arises, which the doctrine of autonomy denies. If we are to have spiritual progress, we must be willing to face challenges, not to cut ourselves off from the possibility of challenge. If our religious ideas are to have sufficient flexibility to find proper application in all the spheres of our lives, religion must be permitted to leak out from the confines of ritual procedure and otherworldly preoccupation.

Finally, there is the problem of demarcation. Where does one language game end and another begin? If religion is a form of life analogous to science, how are the various religious traditions to be treated? Are they like competing scientific theories? There is good reason to think not.

Buddhism and Judaism are so disparate that it does not make much sense that they are alternative attempts to describe the same reality. Perhaps they are as different from each other as each is from quantum theory. Perhaps they are like different branches of science. But this is wrong, too. The various religions do compete with one another in some sense.

The Qur'an speaks not only to Muslims, but directly addresses Jews and Christians, idolaters and infidels, and if the Qur'an employs it own specific concept of rationality, it is one which others are expected to be able to understand. Furthermore, the different branches of the sciences merely focus on different aspects of what is agreed by all to be a common reality.

In any case, there is little one can find in Wittgenstein or his followers to assist in determining how traditions of thought are to be classified, when they are to be seen as competitors and when they are to be seen as autonomous. To the contrary, the very existence of the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology indicate that there is no line of demarcation that separates religious from philosophical thought.

In practice the two often merge. Indeed, the philosophical critique of religious ideas is necessary if we are to adequately defend our beliefs, even privately within our own souls, from the charge that we have gone astray, that religious emotion has prompted us to accept absurdities. Like every other area of culture, if isolated from intellectual commerce, religion will suffer the depression of a ghetto economy.

Against our rejection of fideism, we might imagine the protest of Mawlavi: when the mother offers milk to her child, is the child to seek evidence that this is in fact nourishing milk, and that it is offered by its own mother? The immediate recognition of the truth needs no evidence. We can grant the insight of Mawlavi without going as far as he seems on occasion to have done, without rejecting the relevance of philosophy to religion.

It may be admitted that there are circumstances in which it is inappropriate to look for reasons and evidence, not only in religion, but also in the sciences and mathematics, and in virtually all the areas of human inquiry. A large part of wisdom in philosophical investigation is to know what things are to be questioned and what things are to be accepted without further questioning. An unregulated demand for reasons and evidence only brings skepticism.

Philosophical reason is a tool, a vehicle. By itself, it can go nowhere. Syllogisms can be constructed ad nauseam without taking one a step closer to the truth of any matter, but the judicious use of logical technique and the other methods of philosophy may transport us distances which we would otherwise be unable to traverse in security.

For the key to the religious element in the philosophy of Adam we may turn again to the Mathnavi. Adam's employment of reason was combined with humility. Even though he was taught the names and the angels prostrated before him on account of his knowledge, when he sinned he admitted his mistake and turned in humble repentance toward God.

Mawlavi contrasts this attitude with that of Iblis, who uses his reason in order to excuse his disobedience. The philosophy of Ibis is a philosophy tainted by pride. The philosophy of Adam is a philosophy purified by humility.

Today, in the Muslim world as well as among Christians, there is a discussion of what role philosophy can play vis a vis religion. On the one hand, there are those who hold that philosophy provides a rational foundation for religious belief and a general framework for the interpretation of religious beliefs through which the truth of basic religious beliefs may be demonstrated.

This has been the dominant view among Muslim philosophers from Ibn Sina to those inspired by the teachings of 'Allamah Tabataba'i.13 Another school of thought among Shi'i scholars, known as maktab-e tafkik, denies that philosophy can or should serve as a basis for religion (the word tafkik indicates the separation of religion from philosophy).14 Both groups seem to have valuable points to make, although both can also easily pass beyond the limits of plausibility.

The exaggerated claims of rationalist philosophers to be in possession of deductive proofs for religious claims which must be accepted by all reasonable persons invites the response that given the fact that atheists seem to be no worse at logic than theists, faith must be independent of reason. But to abandon reason is to deny the birthright we inherit from Hadrat Adam (AS).

What we must deny and seek to separate from religion is Iblisi philosophy, the pride that overextends the claims of human reason. What we must seek is the wisdom of the prophets (AS) ,including the latent philosophical reasoning to be found there, a humble reason, but one which keeps a firm hand on the reins of the passions and emotions, not to stop them, but to direct them on the straight path, insha'Allah!

Notes

1. Cf. Peter Gorman, Pythagoras: A Life (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 35.

2. This subject is the topic of a paper delivered by Dr. Abd al-Karim Soroush at the 1992 Conference on Greek Orthodox Christianity and Islam in Athens. The topic is also addressed by William C. Chittick in The Sufi Doctrine of Rumi, (Offset Press, 1974), and later in his The Sufi Path of Love,.(Albany: SUNY Press, 1983).

3. Mathnavl, Bk. vI, 2505 f.

4. See Morris Klein's Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty (New York: Oxford, 1983).

5. For example, see Elliott Sober's From a Biological Point of view (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

6. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Philosophy of Religion (fifth printing) (New York: Prentice Hall, 1947), 22.

7. Cf. Richard M. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), p. 14.

8. Cf. R. T. Blackwood and A. L. Herman, eds. Problems in Philosophy: West and East, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), p. 7. Most of this paragraph is paraphrased from the introduction to this work.

9. See the article 'Logic' in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards. For the conjecture of the Greek connection, see Satis Chandra vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971).

10. Cf. Leo Wieger, S.J., A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China, Edward Chalmers Werner, tr., (New York: Paragon, 1969), p. 213.

11. Cf. Weiger, p. 286.

12. Risalah fi'l-huduth, in Rasa'il fadr al-Dln Shlrdzl, (Tehran, 1302), p. 67. The passage is cited and translated by S. H. Nasrin "Hermes and Hermetic Writings in the Islamic World" in his Islamic Studies (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1967), p. 69.

13. One of the most prominent of these philosophers is Prof. MisbahYazdi, whose Amuzesh-e Falsafeh has been translated as Philosophical Instruction: An Introduction to Contemporary Islamic Philosophy, tr. M. Legenhausen and 'A. Sarvdalir (Binghampton: Global Publications, 1999).

14. See Muhammad Riga Hakimi, Maktab-e Tafkik (Qom: Markaz-e Barressiha-ye Islami, 1373/1994).


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