A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim

A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim80%

A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim Author:
Translator: Sayyid Abur Rauf Afzali
Publisher: www.shiamawaddatbooks.com
Category: Various Books

A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim
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A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim

A Critical Assessment of Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim

Author:
Publisher: www.shiamawaddatbooks.com
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Chapter Two

Baseless Traditions in Sahih Bukhari

Now that we have shortly studied Bukhari’s life, it is time to study Bukhari’s so-calledSahih in the light of the words of great scholars of tradition. Here I will suffice to narrating the objections and criticisms made [by scholars] against some of Bukhari’s traditions.

The tradition of ‘[Prophet’s] proposing to 'Aisha

Among the baseless traditions of Bukhari’sSahih is its tradition about the Holy Prophet’s proposing to Aisha. According to this tradition, when the Holy Prophet (s) asked for the hand of Aisha in marriage, Abu Bakr (Aisha’s father) said: I am your brother. Here is the full text of thistradition:

Urwa says: The Holy Prophet (s) asked for the hand of Aisha in marriage.

Answering him Abu Bakr said: But I am your brother.

The Holy Prophet (s) said: You are my brother in religion and thus it is permissible for me to marry Aisha.[40]

In hisFath al-Bari , Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalani has questioned the authenticity of this tradition. He quotes Hafiz Mughaltai as saying: The authenticity of this tradition is doubtful. This is because the friendship between the Holy Prophet (s) and Abu Bakr happened in Medina whereas proposing to Aisha was made in Mecca. Thus how is it logically possible for Abu Bar to say: “I am your brother”?

Moreover, the Holy Prophet (s) did not personally embark on proposing to Aisha. Ibn Abu ‘Asim narrates from Yahya bin Abd al-Rahman bin Hatib, from Aisha who says: The Holy Prophet (s) sent Khula, daughter of Hakim, to propose to me.

Addressing Khula, Abu Bakr said: Aisha is the Holy Prophet’s nephew. Can she marry him?

Khula came back and related the story to the Holy Prophet (s).

The Holy Prophet (s) told him: Go back and tell Abu Bakr that you are my brother in Islam and your daughter thus can marry me.

Khula went to Abu Bakr and talked to him about the issue.Abu Bakr said: Invite the Messenger of Allah (s)!Thereupon the Holy Prophet (s) came and Abu Bakr married Aisha to him.[41]

The tradition of ‘intercession of Ibrahim for Azer’

Among the false traditions of Bukhari is a tradition according to which Ibrahim (a.s) will intercede for Azer with Allah on the Day of Judgment. As usual, he repeats this false tradition in many places in hisSahih . As those who are aware of Islamic doctrines know, this tradition puts to question the reputation and credibility of Ibrahim. This is because it proves the following points:

Ibrahim (a.s) disobeyed Allah’s commandments.

He insisted on his disobedience and continued interceding for Azr with Allah.

He resisted intellectual reasons that proclaim: it is impossible to intercede with Allah for polytheists.

He mistakenly thought that the punishment of a disbeliever (like Azer) will bring him the worst of meanness and disgrace.

What is meaner and more disgraceful than this? The stupidest people know that this is wrong not to speak of an infallible Prophet who is appointed to guide people.

He did not understand the meaning of Allah’s promise that He would protect his dignity and honor.

Here is the text of this tradition from Bukhari’s chapter on prophetic commentary.

Ismael narrates from his brother, from Ibn Abu Zaeb, from Sa’eed Maqbari from Abu Huraira who quotes the Holy Prophet (s) as saying: After meeting his father, Ibrahim addressing Allah, says: O my Lord, You promised me that You would not disgrace me on the Day of Judgment.

Addressing him Allah says: I do not allow disbelievers to enter into Paradise.[42]

Another tradition (available in this regard) says: Ibrahim (a.s) says: O my Lord! You promised me thatYou would not disgrace me, but which disgrace is worse than disgracing of my father?[43]

Fakhr Razi’s opinion

The Holy Qur’an says:

و ما کان استغفار ابراهیم لابیه الا عن موعده وعدها ایاه فلما تبین له انه عدو الله تبرأ منه إن ابراههیم لاواه حلیم. [44]

And Ibrahim asking forgiveness for his sire was only owing to a promise which he had made to him; but when it became clear to him that he was an enemy of Allah, he declared himself to be clear of him; most surely Ibrahim was very tender-hearted forbearing.

Commenting on this verse, Fakhr Razi mentions the following points:

One: The relation of this verse to the previous verses can be studied through the following angles:

This verse intends to say that Prophet Muhammad (s) is permitted to do what Prophet Ibrahim (a.s) was not allowed to do.

This verse intends to say that what links this verse to previous verses is the emphasis it lays on detaching oneself from disbelievers whether they are alive or dead. The following verses say that the ordinance of detachment from disbeliever is not confined to the religion of Islam.

Thus the verse mentioned above indicates the ordinance of detaching from disbelievers was available in Ibrahim’s religion. That is the reason why the ordinance of detachment from disbelievers is so strong.

Here Allah, the Exalted, introduces Ibrahim as ‘tender hearted’ and ‘forbearing’. Ibrahim being tender hearted tends profusely to ask Allah’s forgiveness for his father, but, despite that, Allah forbids him from asking forgiveness for his father. Others are thus more emphatically told not ask for forgiveness for disbelievers.[45]

Thus, according to Fakhr Razi Ibrahim was not allowed to ask Allah’s forgiveness for his father and hence he abandoned his father. Thus it is clear for every Muslim that Bukhari’s tradition is fake and fabricated!

Moreover, intellectual reasons also indicate that it is not permissible to ask for Allah’s forgiveness for disbelievers. Speaking concerning this issue, Fakhr Razi says: Elsewhere in another verse, the Holy Quran mentions:

ما کان للنبی والذین امنوا أن یستغفروا للمشرکین[46]

It is not fit for the Prophet and those who believe that they should ask forgiveness for pagans.

This verse gives two meanings:

It is not fit for the Holy Prophet (s) and those who believe to ask forgiveness for pagans and thus the verse is descriptive in meaning.

It is not permissible for the Holy Prophet (s) and believers to ask forgiveness for pagans (and thus the verse is prescriptive in meaning).

According to the first point, prophecy and faith do not allow you to ask forgiveness for pagans whereas according to the second point it is not lawful to ask forgiveness for pagans.

It is, however, noteworthy that both these point are close to one another in terms of meaning. Allah determines the cause of this prohibition in the concluding part of this very verse, as He says:

من بعد ما تبین لهم انهم اصحاب الجحییم[47]

After it has become clear to them that they are the inmates of the flaming fire…

Elsewhere the Holy Qur’an mentions:

ان الله لایغفر ان یشرک به ویغفر ما دون ذلک[48]

Allah does not forgive that anything should be associated with him and forgives what is beside that to whomsoever He pleases.

What is the meaning of these verses? Allah has informed (us) that pagans are the inmates of the flaming fire. As a result, to ask forgiveness for pagans is tantamount to asking Allah not to keep His promises – a thing that is not acceptable.

In addition, Allah has made a decisive decision to punish the pagans. Thus to ask forgiveness for them is not only useless but also results in the decline of the position of a prophet.

Allah the Glorious says:

ادعونی استجب لکم[49]

Call upon Me I will answer you.

On the other hand, He says:

انهم اصحاب الجحیم[50]

They are surely the inmates of flaming fire.

Thus to ask forgiveness ends up in the rejection of the content of either of the two verses mentioned above- a thing that is impossible.[51]

Ibn Hajar Asqalani and justification of this tradition

In short, it must be declared that the tradition of the intercession of Ibrahim for Azer is fabricated and false. One cannot justify it at all. Perhaps it is because of this that some Sunni scholars have altered the words of this tradition, putting in place of ‘Ibrahim’ the phrase ‘a man’.

As an instance, in hisFath al-Bari , Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalani narrates:

Ayyub’s tradition reads: On the Day of Judgment a man meets his father and asks: How am I (as a son of you)?

Father says: You are the best (son of mine).

Son says: Do you obey me today?

Father says: Yes.

Son says: Now hold fast to my garment! Father does so. Thereupon the son begins walking towards his Lord…[52]

Nevertheless, based on what Hafiz Isma’eli, a tradition memorizer and others have said one cannot but admit that the above –mentioned tradition is false.

Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalani says: Isma’eli has questioned this tradition casting doubt on its authenticity. After narrating this tradition, he says: This is not an authentic tradition. This is because Ibrahim knows that Allah does not break His promise. Knowing this, how can one consider the misery of his father as his own misery?

Another scholar says that the tradition mentioned above is in contradiction with the Allah’s words. Allah mentions:

و ما کان استغفار ابراهیم لابیه الا عن موعده وعدها ایاه فلما تبین له انه عدو لله تبرا منه[53]

And Ibrahim asking forgiveness for his sire was only owing to a promise which he had made to him; but when it became clear to him that he was an enemy of Allah, he declared himself to be clear ofhim, most surely Ibrahim was very tender-hearted, forbearing.[54]

Ibn Hajar tries to justify this tradition and gave it a new interpretation. Thus he says: In reply it must be said that interpreters differ on when Ibrahim declared himself to be clear of his father.

Some have pointed out that Ibrahim declared himself to be clear of Azer when the later died as a pagan. Tabari has narrated an authentic tradition from Habib bin Abu Thabit, from Sa’aeed bin Jabir, from Ibn ‘Abas, which confirms this view. A tradition declares that when Azer died Ibrahim (a.s) no longer asked forgiveness for him. It is also narrated from Ali bin Abu Talha, from Ibn ‘Abas that Ibrahim (a.s) was asking forgiveness for Azer as long as he was alive, but when he died he stopped asking forgiveness for him. The same has been narrated from Mujahid, Qatada, and ‘Amr bin Dinar.

Some others have however said that Ibrahim (a.s) will get disappointed from Azer and will declarehimself to be clear of him on the Day of Judgment when Azer gets metamorphosed. This has been touched by a tradition reported by Munzir. We mentioned this tradition before. The same has been narrated by Tabari from Abd al-Malik bin Sulayman who says: I heard Sa’aeed bin Jubair say: On the Day of Judgment, Ibrahim (a.s) will thrice say: O my Lord! My father! As he says this phrase for the third time, he takes Azer’s hand (to go …) but Azer looks at him angrily. It is at this moment that Ibrahim (a.s) declares himself to be clear of him.

Tabari quotes ‘Ubaid bin ‘Umair as saying: Addressing his father, Ibrahim (a.s) says: When you were living in the (physical) world, you did not obey me when I commanded you, but now I will not leave you. Hold fast to my garment. Azer holds fast to somewhere in between Ibrahim’s shoulders but it is now that he is changed into a hyena. As soon as Ibrahim sees his metamorphosed face, he declares himself to be clear of him.

Ibn Hajar says: We can accept both of these views. When Azer died as a pagan Ibrahim declaredhimself to be clear of him and stopped asking forgiveness for him any longer. As Ibrahim sees Azer on the Day of Judgment he takes pity on him and begins asking forgiveness for him. But when he saw the metamorphosed face of Azer he became disappointed and declared himself to be clear of him.

Some scholars have mentioned: Ibrahim (a.s) was not sure that Azer died as a disbeliever, for it was quite possible for Azer to have embraced the faith of Ibrahim without letting him know about it. Thus Ibrahim (a.s), as maintained by the tradition, declares himself to be clear of him when came to know that he died before accepting his religion.

Falsity of Ibn Hajar's view

All rational people – not to speak of knowledgeable ones – easily understand that Ibn Hajar's view is false. This is because he first deals with the scholars differing on when Ibrahim (a.s) declared himself to be clear of Azer, which is not relevant to the objection in question.

It is, however, possible that Ibn Hajar wanted to solve the inconsistency that exists between the above-mentioned verse and the holy verse (it is not fit …) through introducing the Day of Judgment as the time when Ibrahim declared himself clear of Azer. It can be, anyhow, said that this argument is weak from different perspectives.

Based on this justification, the verse (when it was clear to him that he was Allah's enemy, he declared himself clear of him) must be taken to be related to the Day of Judgment. This is while the verse in question has introduced the past as the time when Ibrahim declared himself to be clear of Azer. As we know, it is not permissible to overlook the apparent meaning of a verse without a sound reason.

Many traditions – some of which are accepted as authentic by Ibn Hajar – indicate that Ibrahim (a.s ) declared himself to be clear of Azer in this world. As a result, the verse mentioned above will be in a clear and inevitable contradiction with Ibrahim's asking forgiveness for Azer.

If we agree supposedly that there is difference in regard with the time of Ibrahim's declaring himself to be clear of Azer, and that the second opinion is preferable to the first one, the objection raised by some scholars will be answered, but the objection raised by Hafiz Isma'eli will remain unanswered.

The determination of the Day of Judgment as the time of 'clearing' will cause divergence in the context of the verse mentioned above. This is because the Holy Qur'an relates the story of Ibrahim (a.s) in order to tell us that Ibrahim (a.s) was told not to ask forgiveness for pagans and he declared himself to be clear of his father despite being kind-hearted and highly forbearing. Other believers are thus by no means allowed to ask forgiveness for pagans.

Fakhr Razi who also has such an understanding says: The reason why Allah introduces Ibrahim in these verses as kind-hearted and forbearing is that [Allah intends to tell us that though] his deep love and affection for his father and his kind-heartedness towards him required him to be more kind to his father and children, he declared himself to be clear of his father when he came to know that his father was insisting on disbelief. Thus they must also follow the suit and declare themselves to be clear of pagans. Allah has called Ibrahim as 'forbearing'. This is because tender-heartedness and affection is one of the causes of being 'forbearing'. Being tender-hearted, man becomes more forbearing while getting angry.[55]

Thus if it is meant that Ibrahim (a.s) will declare himself to be clear of his father on the Day of Judgment, how can one conclude that it is more obligatory for Muslims to declare themselves to be clear of pagans?

It seems that Ibn Hajar 'Asqalani has also sensed the weakness of this answer and that is why he feels obliged to say: It is not possible to answer this… He is however not sure about his stance on the issue in question.

Sufficing to this answer, inal-Tawshih , Jalal al-Din Suyuti says: Ibrahim's demand for forgiveness of his father has been criticized. This is because he was aware of Allah's promise that disbelievers were the inmates of fire.

It has been said in reply that [Ibrahim (a.s) knew about Allah's promise but] when he saw Azer was overwhelmed by love and affection and thus could not but demand for his forgiveness.[56]

The above-mentioned answer does not seem to solve the problem. It instead solidifies it and accepts it. This is because it shows that the motif behind Ibrahim’s action is affection and tender-heartedness. The question however remains as to why Ibrahim shows affection [towards Azer] whereas he knows that it is not permissible for him to ask forgiveness for disbelievers.

One may say that affection and tenderheartedness make it permissible for one to ask forgiveness but it has to be mentioned that such reasoning sounds like a joke, having nothing to do with reality. No one can accept such reasoning.

While presenting his justification, Ibn Hajar said: Some scholars say that Ibrahim (a.s) was not sure that Azerhad died as a disbeliever.

It he intends to show the weakness of the quotation made above by his remark,then we do not need to criticize it… But if he intends to reject the criticisms made against Ibrahim by this quotation, his view will be in conflict with many authentic traditions that indicate that Ibrahim (a.s) was aware that Azerhad died as a disbeliever. Ibn Hajr himself has narrated some of these traditions. Suyutii has also touched some of these traditions in hisal-Durr al-Manthur.

Commenting on (فلما تبیین له ) Qutada as quoted by Ibn Jarir and Ibn Abu Hatam, says: As Azer wasdying, Ibrahim (a.s) learnt that it was no longer possible for him to repent.

Abu Bakr Shafi’aee in hisFawaed and Maqdisi in hisal-Mukhtara , Qurbani, Ibn Jarir, Ibn Munzir, Ibn Abu Hatam and Abu al-Sheikh have quoted Ibn Abbas as saying: Ibrahim (a.s) continued to ask forgiveness for Azer until the later was dead. When Azer died as a disbeliever he declared himself to be clear of him.[57]

The tradition of Prophet's ‘praying on the corpse of Ibn Abu Sulul’

One of the baseless traditions of Bukhari – and Muslim as well – is the tradition that has appeared in the commentary section of hisSahih . Bukhari has quoted Umar as saying: After Abdullah bin Ubai died his son, named Abdullah, met the Holy Prophet (s) and asked him to give [him] his shirt to shroud [his father] Abullah bin Ubai.

The Apostle of Allah gave his shirt to him. Thereupon he asked the Holy Prophet (a.s) to pray on his corpse as well.

The Apostle of Allah got ready to pray on the corpse of Abdullah bin Ubai.[Now] Umar stood up and snatched the Holy Prophet’s shirt [from the hand of Abdullah] saying: O Apostle of Allah! Do you want to pray on his corpse while Allah has forbidden you from doing it?

The Holy Prophet (s) said:

انما اخبرنی الله فقال: "استغفر لهم او لا تستغفر لهم سبعین مره" و سأزیده علی السبعین.[58]

Allah has allowed me to do or not to do it saying: “Ask forgiveness for them or do not ask forgiveness for them. Even if you ask forgiveness for them seventy times, Allah will not forgive them.” I will ask forgiveness for him more than seventy times.

Umar said: But Abdullah bin Ubai is a hypocrite!

Ibn Umar says that despite all these the Holy Prophet (s) prayed on the corpse of Abdullah bin Ubai and thus the following verse was revealed:

ولاتصل علی احد منهم مات ابدا ولا تقم علی قبره

And never offer prayer for anyone of them who dies and do not stand by his grave…[59]

Why this tradition was fabricated?

This tradition is fabricated in order to forge excellences for Umar bin Khattab. It is totally forged and fabricated. Many Sunni imams, thanks to Allah, have pointed that it is a fabricated tradition. For example, Ghazzali, after quoting some traditions, points out: This is a false tradition. This is because such reports do not bring us certainty. It is not a match for numerous traditions enumerating the excellences of Hatam (Taei) and Ali (a.s).

No doubt, the story related about the verse pertaining to asking forgiveness is false. This is because Allah wants to show that Ibrahim is utterly disappointed from receiving forgiveness (from Allah for his father). Thus one must not think that the Apostle has forgotten all about it.[60]

As mentioned by the commentators ofSahih Bukhari , Baqilani and Imam al-Haramain have also touched this issue. Qastalani says: Many have faced problems in understanding the liberty (given to Ibrahim) in this verse. We mentioned previously the answer Zamakhshari has given to this objection. The author ofal-Intisaf states: Scholars have erred in understating this verse to the extent that Baqilani questions the authenticity of this tradition saying: We cannot confirm the authenticity of this tradition and say that the Holy Prophet said it.

In hisal-Mukhtasar , Imam al-Haramayn says: This tradition is not an authentic tradition. In hisal-Burhan , he again says that scholars of traditions do not confirm the authenticity of this tradition. In hisal-Mustasfa , Ghazali says: It is highly probable that this tradition is not an authentic tradition. Commenting on his words, Dawudi says: Strangely enough, scholars of tradition have not memorized this tradition.[61]

Concerning this issue, Ibn Hajar 'Asqalani says: Ibn Munir is of the view that scholars have erred in understanding this tradition to the extent that Qazi Abu Bakr has refuted the authenticity of this tradition saying: We cannot confirm the authenticity of this tradition and say that that the Holy Prophet really said it.

In hisal-Taqrib , Baqilani says: This tradition is among the traditions quoted by single individuals[62] the authenticity of which we cannot verify. In hisal-Mukhtasar , Imam al-Haramayn says: This tradition is not an authentic tradition. In hisal-Burhan , he again says that scholars of traditions do not confirm the authenticity of this tradition. In hisal-Mustasfa , Ghazali says: It is highly probable that this tradition is not an authentic tradition. Commenting on his words, Dawudi says: This is a strange tradition that needs further investigation.[63]

The tradition of ‘three lies told by Prophet Ibrahim’

One of the baseless traditions ofSahih Bukhari and Muslim is the tradition that alludes to the three lies allegedly told by Prophet Ibrahim (a.s). The author ofal-Jam’a bayn al-Sahihain says: Muhammad narrates from Abu Huraira who quotes the Apostle of Allah as saying: Ibrahim lied only three times. He lied two times for the sake of Allah when he said: “I am ill” and “Nay, the chief of them has done it” and once for the sake of Sarah. Accompanied by Sarah who was the most beautiful woman of her time, Ibrahim (a.s) once went to a land that was ruled by an oppressive ruler. When they reached there, he told Sarah to say that she was his sister on religious bases for if the king came to know that she was his wife he would snatch her from him.[64]

Fakhr Razi rejects this tradition

Fakhr Razi criticizes this tradition and rejects it saying those who have narrated it are advocates of Hashviya school of thought. He says: One of the advocates of Hashviya school of thought quoted for me the Holy Prophet (s) as saying: Ibrahim (a.s) lied three times.

I said: We do not need to accept such traditions.

To reject my opinion he said: if we do not accept this tradition it will imply that we have in fact considered the narrators as liars.

I said: Look! If we accept such traditions [it will imply that] we have considered Prophet Ibrahim (a.s) as a liar and if we do not accept them it will imply that we have regarded narrators as liars. No doubt, to acquit Prophet Ibrahim (a.s) of lying is far better than acquitting a handful of unknown narrators of lying.[65]

It is worth mentioning that Umar bin ‘Adil has recorded Fakhr Razi’s words and praised him.[66]

The tradition of ‘a prophet setting ant’s nest on fire’

Another fabricated tradition narrated by Bukhari is the tradition that says that one of the prophets being stung by an ant set the entire nest of ants on fire. Bukhari says: Ismael narrates from Malik, from Abu Zinad, from ‘Aaraj, from Abu Huraira who quotes the Holy Prophet as saying: Once a prophet was resting under the shade of a tree when all of a sudden an ant stung him. He got his things collected and then ordered his men to set the entire nest of ants on fire!

Allah said through revelation: Why did you not kill the ant that stung you?!

Fakhr Razi rejects this tradition

To reject this tradition we will suffice to relating again Fakhr Razi’s words. Shah Waliullah Dehlavi narrates Fakhr Razi’s words and then praises him and accepts his words. He says: Here Fakhr Razi has said something which reason accepts. He says: In my point of view, Shias are more feeble-minded and weaker in understanding than the ants in the story of Sulayman. This is because an ant, addressing, its companions said:

قالت نمله یا ایها النمل ادخلوا مساکنکم لا یخطمنکم سلیمان و جنوده و هم لایشعرون[67]

One of the ants said: “O you ants, get into your houses, lest Sulayman and his hosts crush you while they do not know.

The ant knew that Sulayman’s hosts are so perfect morally that they do not crush ants knowingly and intentionally and that they are not unjust to the weak. This is whereas Shias do not know that being in the company of the seal of the Prophets who is the most perfect of them leaves an impact on those who always accompany him and thus does not allow them to be disloyal and to do mischievous acts. Shias accuse the companions of the Holy Prophet (s) of being unjust to his daughter, son-in-law and their children and introducing them as the ones responsible for setting [Imam Ali’s] house on fire, usurping his possessions and treating his family unfairly.[68]

In response it has to be said that Bukhari and other advocates of the authenticity of this tradition are weaker in understanding than ants. This is because they have, by approving off this tradition, accepted that it is legal for an infallible prophet to be unjust and cruel!

The tradition of ‘eating forbidden meat’

The tradition that endorses eating the meat of an animal slaughtered without mentioning Allah’s name is another forged tradition narrated by Bukhari in hisSahih (The Book of Slaughtered).

Mu’alla bin Asad narrates from Abd al-Azir bin Mukhtar, from Musa bin ‘Aqaba, from Salim, from Abdullah who says: Before receiving revelation, the Holy Prophet (s) met Zaid bin ‘Amr bin Nafil somewhere at Baldakh[69] and invited him to a meal full of meat.

Zaid bin ‘Amr, rejecting the Holy Prophet’s invitation, said: I do not eat the meat of animal slaughtered for an idol. I do not eat the meat of an animal slaughtered without mentioning Allah’s name.[70]

Which Muslim can hesitate that this tradition is false? Does the inventor of this tradition not feel ashamed of himself when he says that the Holy Prophet (s) invited Zaid to a meal made of the meat of an animal slaughtered without mentioning the name of Allah and Zaid rejected the invitation?

If we accept – God forbidden – this tradition, then we must regard Zaid bin ‘Amr asbetter and more pious than the Holy Prophet (s)!

How can Sunni scholars believe that such traditions are true about the Holy Prophet (s) whereas they do their best to acquit Abu Bakr of drinking – before drinking was forbidden- and reject traditions related to his drinking saying: Allah prevents the truthful ones from doing evil deeds even before evil deeds are forbidden! This has been mentioned inNawadir al-Usul by Tirmidhi. We will soon relate it. But it has to be asked now if the Holy Prophet (s) was not a truthful one.

Distortion in a fabricated tradition

Ibn Ruzbehan has added a supplement to this forged tradition, which is nothing but mere accusations and lies about Allama Hilli. In response, to Allama’s words, he says: The way he (Allama Hilli) has narrated this tradition shows that he is not credible and thus one cannot rely on the traditions he has narrated from others. In order to attain his goal and put to question the authenticity of the traditions of Sihah Sitta, he has narrated a part of the afore-mentioned tradition and avoided to mention its supplement which is as under:

After hearing the words of Zaid bin ‘Amr bin Nufail, the Holy Prophet (s) said: We too do not eat the meat of an animal sacrifice by pagans or slaughtered without the name of Allah being mentioned. Thus they both avoided eating the meal.

In order to cast doubt on the authenticity of this tradition, he has omitted its supplement. We ask Allah to save us from prejudice which is a bad habit.[71]

[In response to this objection], it has to be said that Ibn Ruzbehan’s objection can be reversed back to himself and that he himself is not credible. This is because this tradition has appeared as such in the book of slaughtered inSahih Bukhari and Allama Hill has thus quoted it exactly.Sahih Bukhari is now accessible to all. One can refer to it in order to find out whether or not our words are correct.

Bukhari has also mentioned this tradition in his Kitab e Manaqib, but not mentioning again the supplement mentioned by Ibn Ruzbehan. In a chapter on the tradition of Zaid bin ‘Amr bin Nufail he says: Muhammad bin Abu Bakr narrates from Salim bin Abdullah bin Umar who said: Before receiving revelation, the Holy Prophet (s) met Zaid bin ‘Amr bin Nufail somewhere at Baldakh. They invited the Holy Prophet (s) to a table but he did not accept to attend it.

At this moment, Zaid said: I do not eat the meat of an animal sacrificed for idols. I eat only the meat those animals that are slaughtered with the name of Allah.

Zaid bin ‘Amr used to object the sacrifices made by Quraish saying: Allah has created the sheep and provided it with water and fodder but you deny it by slaughtering it for the sake of idols without mentioning the name of Allah.[72]

Thus it is clear that Allama Hilli has not been unfaithful in narrating this tradition. He has not added anything to it nor has he omitted anything from it. It is rather Ibn Ruzbehan who has lied by adding a supplement to it. The addition of a supplement to this tradition is a sign of the incredibility of Ibn Ruzbehan. One can regard it as a platform for giving him a no-confidence vote. This is because he invented these lies in order to defend Sihah Sitta by rejecting the objections raised against them. We ask Allah to save us from prejudice which is a bad habit.

It also became clear that Sunni scholars attempt to conceal the defects and flaws of their traditions by distorting them whenever they find themselves caught in a difficult situation. As mentioned, Ibn Ruzbehan distorts this tradition when he claims that this tradition has an additional part.

Muhammad bin Yusuf Salihi has also distorted this tradition. In hisSubul al-Huda, he writes:

Bukhari and Bayhaqi have narrated from Musa bin ‘Aqba, from Salim bin Abdullah bin Umar who has quoted the Holy Prophet (s) as saying: Before receiving revelation, the Holy Prophet (s) met Zaid bin ‘Amr somewhere at Baldakh. Here the Holy Prophet (s) was invited to a table full of [cooked] meat. The Holy Prophet did not, however, accept the invitation and addressing Zaid, he said: I do not eat the meat of an animal sacrificed for the sake of idols. I eat only the meat of those animals that are slaughtered with the name of Allah.

Zaid bin ‘Amr used to object the sacrifices made by Quraish saying: Allah has created the sheep and provided it with water and fodder but you deny it by slaughtering it for the sake of idols without mentioning the name of Allah.[73]

Knowing that this tradition contains many repulsive and disgusting words, Muhammad bin Yusuf Salihi Demishqi has changed the phrase ‘Zaid said’ in this tradition into ‘he said to Zaid’. He considers ‘the Apostle of Allah’ as the subject of the verb ‘said’, indicating that it was the Holy Prophet (s) who said “I do not eat”. This is while the traditionin Sahih Bukhari does not agree with this modification. It considers ‘Zaid’ as the subject of the sentence. Thus according to Bukhari’s version of this tradition, ‘Zaid’ is the subject for ‘said’ and it is ‘Zaid’ who said ‘I do not eat’.

It can be said that according to the tradition of ‘section on excellences’ it was the Holy Prophet (s) who refrained from eating, though this cannot be said on the basis of ‘section on slaughtered’. This is because the tradition that has appeared in section on slaughtered – and also the tradition that is reported by Jurjani and Ismaeili with which we will deal later – contain the verb ‘invited’ and thus it is Zaid who refrains from eating not the Holy Prophet (s).

Based on the quotations we will make later, Ahmad bin Hanbal and other Sunni imams were of the view that the Holy Prophet (s) ate the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols. Thus the subject for the verb ‘refrain / did not eat’ in the tradition in section on virtues is Zaid rather than the Holy Prophet (s). This is because similar traditions explain each other.

It is based on such understanding that Ibn Hajar ‘Asqali, Zarkashi, Suhaili, Qastalani and other commentators of tradition do not consider the Holy Prophet (s) as the subject of the verb ‘refrain / did not eat’.

On the whole, all these constitute one tradition having one subject matter. Thus as the Holy Prophet (s) is not the subject of the verb ‘refrain / did not eat’ in the tradition in section on slaughtered, he is not the subject in the traditionin section on virtues. This is because otherwise the tradition in section on virtues will refute the tradition in section on slaughtered and thus a stronger objection will emerge to face Sunni scholars.

Justification of meaning of tradition

Some Sunni scholars have justified the meaning of the tradition in question. How can one say that the Holy Prophet (s) has refrained from eating the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols whereas the tradition inSahih Bukhari does not indicate such a thing?

It is based on this objection, that Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalani has criticized Ibn Battal who is of the view that the Holy Prophet (s) did not eat the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols, stressing that no version of this tradition contains such a thing. Commenting on the tradition in section on virtues, Ibn Hajar says:

Most traditions indicate that pagans offered the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols to the Holy Prophet (s). The tradition narrated by Jurjani however indicates that it was the Holy Prophet (s) who placed the meat of the sacrificed animal before Zaid.

‘Ayas says: The first tradition is authentic. I am however of the view that the tradition narrated by Jsmaeli is in harmony with the tradition narrated by Jurjani. That is the reason why Zubair bin Bakar, Fakihi and others narrated the tradition narrated by Jurjani.

Ibn Battal says: The table of the meat of the sacrificed animal belonged toQuraish and it was Quraish who placed it before the Holy Prophet (s). The Holy Prophet himself refrained from eating the meat of the sacrificed animal though he invited Zaid bin ‘Amr bin Nufail to eat it.

Refraining from eating the meat of the sacrificed animal, Zaid, addressing Quraish, said: We do not eat the meat of an animal sacrificed for idols.

Thus it is possible for the opinion of Ibn Battal to be correct, though we do not know for sure how he has made such a conclusion. I did not find any tradition that gives such a meaning.

Ibn Hajar says that Ibn Munir has also endorsed the opinion presented by Ibn Battal.

It is worth mentioning that Ibn Hajar has aptly answered Ibn Battal, though his view that Ibn Battal may be somewhat right is totally wrong. Ibn Hajar, as you will see, quotes prominent Sunni scholars as saying that the Holy Prophet (s) ate the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols and invited Zaid to follow the suit, but Zaid did not do so. Thus, Ibn Battal’s view does not seem to be correct in any case.

Ibn Battal’s words explicitly mention that the Apostle of Allah after refraining from eating the said meat, asked Zaid to eat it. This is a very embarrassing claim. How is it possible for the Holy Prophet (s) who is the symbol of trusteeship, piety and moral virtues to refrain from doing something and ask another person to do it without any justification, and thus face an embarrassing response? No wise and religious person can accept the possibility of such a happening?

Some Sunni scholars accept this false tradition

Contrary to Ibn Ruzbehan and the author ofSubul al-Huda , most Sunni scholars have accepted this fabricated tradition. Being fond of Bukhari, they have endorsed his lies and accusations and surrendered to his strange and forged traditions. As an instance, Dawoodi is of the view that the Prophet (s) used to eat the meat of the sacrificed animals of pagans. This is because he did not know that it was forbidden, though Zaid knew about it and therefore he refrained from eating it. Ibn Hajar Asqalani quotes Dawoodi as saying:

Before his prophetic mission, the Holy Prophet (s) did not do the services done by the pagans, though he did not know anything about the rules concerning the sacrifices the pagans were making. This is while Zaid knew about it, for he had learnt about it from the People of Book [Christians or Jews].[74]

On this view, the Holy Prophet (s) used to eat the meat of the sacrifices made by pagans because he did not know that it was forbidden. The People of Book were however aware of it and therefore Zaid who had met them before, did not eat it.

Do these words not imply that he is critical of the Holy Prophet (s) and is trying to lower his position?

How can a believer consider the Holy Prophet – who receives support and guidance from Allah – as [ignorant] not knowing about a particular legal ruling and tell that he did forbidden things and asked others as well to do them?

Others are after solution

Some Sunni scholars [agree that] they cannot refute the tradition reported by Bukhari but they are reluctant to endorse the explicit meaning of this tradition. That is why they are faced with a naughty problem and are trying to find a solution for it.

After narrating the tradition that has appeared in Bukhari (in section on slaughtered), Suhaili says:

There is a simple question about this tradition. How did Allah prevent Zaid from eating the meat of the animals sacrificed for idols and the animals slaughtered without the observation of Islamic rituals but did not prevent the Holy Prophet (s) who was infallible andwas highly deserving this merit at the time of ignorance?

One can answer this question from two perspectives:

This tradition does not say that when the Holy Prophet (s) met Zaid at Baldakh and when he was invited to the table he attended it. Instead it says that Zaid said after being invited to the table that he did not eat the meat of the animal killed without the mention of Allah’s name.

Zaid refrained from eating the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols not on the bases of previous religions but on account of his own personal opinion. This is because the religion of Prophet Ibrahim (s) had forbidden the meat of corpse but it did not say anything about the animal killed not for Allah. Islam was the first religion that introduced this ordinance.

Some of the scholars of the science of principles say: Everything is permissible unless it is forbidden. Thus it was permissible for the Holy Prophet(s) to eat the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols just as it was permissible for him not to eat it.

It may be said that eating such a meat is neither permissible nor forbidden. Such a theory seems to be correct, because previous religions had permitted their followers to eat the meat of sacrificed animals including sheep, camel etc. The innovations made by pagans did not affect the lawfulness of eating the meat such animals – proposed by previous religions – until after the advent of Islam the following verse was revealed:

و لا تأکلوا مما لم یذکر اسم الله علیه[75]

And do not eat of that on which Allah’s name has not been mentioned.

As a result, the permissibility of eating of the meat of animals sacrificed- which was introduced by previous religions - remains unaffected and the innovations made by the People of Book do not have any impact on this ordinance. Thus it was lawful to eat of the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols on the basis of previous religions until the Qur’an pronounced that this was unlawful.

An evacuation of this solution

In my point of view the solution proposed above is very weak and poor. This is because the objection did not focus on eating of the meat of the animals sacrificed for idols. It instead, focused on the fact that it seems very bad to consider eating of it lawful and to ask others to eat of it.

Thus it is a sign of thoughtlessness and imprudence to think that the objection is restricted to eating of the said meat. Do wise believers accept that the Holy Prophet (s) is lower in status than Zaid in reframing from doing acts of disobedience? This is while there is consensus among all Muslims that he was infallible and no one was wiser than him among people.

Qazi Ayad says: No doubt, the Holy Prophet’s ample intellect, intelligence, strong senses, eloquent tongue, dignified acts and noble characterindicate that he was the wisest and the most intelligent person of his time.

If one ponders on the way the Holy the Prophet managed people’s affairs and successfully followed his policies and if one takes into consideration his balanced character, his innovative methods and his doctrines (which are not the product any previous learning - one does not doubt that the Holy Prophet was superior to others in terms of reasoning and understanding.

Wahab bin Munabbih says: I studied seventy one books all of which had introduced the Holy Prophet (s) as the wisest who always made the best choice.

In accordance with another tradition, he says: All these books maintained that compared to the intellect of the Holy Prophet (s) the intellect Allah has given to all human beings from the beginning to the end of creation is nothing but likea sand compared to all other sands combined together.[76]

How can one now given the high position of the Holy Prophet (s) in infallibility, reason and thought, accept Suhaili’s words concerning him?

Despite all these, great Sunni scholars explicitly mention that the Holy Prophet (s) ate of the meat the animals sacrificed for idols.

Ibn Hajar Asqalani says: The tradition of Saeed bin Zaid – which we touched before – and the tradition of Ahmad contains: Zaid said: I sought refuge to what Ibrahim had sought refuge to. Thereupon he laid in prostration before Ka’aba.

Saeed bin Zaid said: Zaid passed by the Holy Prophet (s) and Zaid bin Haritha who were eating of the table spread there. They invited him to the table, but he said: My nephew! I do not eat of the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols. From that day onward, no one saw the Holy Prophet (s) eat of the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols.

Abu Ya’ala Bazzar and others have narrated this tradition as under: Zaid bin Haritha says: One day the Holy Prophet and I – riding on the back of the Holy Prophet’s camel – left Mecca. We slaughtered a sheep before an idol and cooked its meat. Thereupon we met Zaid bin Amr…

After relating the story in detail, Zaid bin Haritha quotes Zaid bin Amr as saying: I do not eat of the meat of the animals killed without the name of Allah.[77]

This is the word of Ahmad and other great Sunni scholars. Given all these, what is the use of Suhaili’s words? Suhaili has made a claim that the religion of Prophet Ibrahim (a.s) does not forbid the meat of the animals killed not for Allah. This claim is however wrong, fabricated by Sunni scholars in order to defend their predecessors and their superstitious beliefs.

It is a sign of God’s grace that Zarkashi rejects Suhaili’s claim saying that Ibrahim’s religion did not permit eating the meat of animals killed not for Allah. Commenting on this tradition in hisal-Tanqih , he says: They spread a table-cloth before him but he refused to eat anything.

If someone says that the Holy Prophet deserves such a merit more than anyone else, it must be said in response that this tradition does not say that the Holy Prophet (s) did not eat anything. In reply to this objection, Suhaili says: Zaid refused to eat of that meat not on account of previous religions but on account of his own opinion. This is because Ibrahim’s religion had not forbidden the meat of the animals killed not for Allah. It has only forbidden the meat of corpse. Islam is the first religion that has forbidden the meat of the animals killed not for Allah. Suhaili’s words are weak. This is because Ibrahim (a.s) was known to be an enemy of idols and his religion was forbidding the meat of the animals killed not for Allah. Allah the Exalted says:

ثم اوحینا الیک ان اتبع مله ابراهیم حنیفا[78]

ThenWe revealed to you. Follow the faith of Ibrahim[79]

We thank Allah that Zarkashi made such a rightful remark and thus it became obvious that Suhaili made this lie in order to defend their misled predecessors.

Khattabi has treated the issue in a different manner. Ibn Hajar Asqalani says: The term ‘ansab’ the plural form of ‘nusub’ meaning idol, is used to refer to stones around Ka’aba. Pagans used to sacrifice their animals on these stones for idols.

Khattabi says: The Holy Prophet (s) did not eat of that which was sacrificed for idols, though he used to eat of other kinds of meat – even that on which the name of Allah was not pronounced. This is because at that time Islam was not revealed. It was forbidden years after the prophetic mission began.[80]

In my point of view, these words are very poetic and discursive. They do not solve the problem the tradition of Bukhari is faced with. This is because this tradition explicitly says that the Holy Prophet (s) offered Zaid the meat of the animals sacrificed for idols. In response Zaid said: I do not eat of the meat of the animal sacrificed for idols. That is the reason why Bukhari has included this tradition in the book of slaughtered in chapter ‘the animals that are slaughtered on the stones surrounding Ka’ab’.

The tradition of Ahmad, Bazzar and Abu Ya’ala which is related by Ibn Hajar Asqalani also mentions explicitly that the said meat was of the animal slaughtered for idols.

Thus it is wrong to believe that the Holy Prophet (s) ate of the meat the animal killed without the observation of Islamic rituals. This is because – as mentioned before – Zarkashi believes that the ban on the meat of animals slaughtered not for Allah is based on the faith of Ibrahim (a.s). How can one thus attribute such things to the Holy Prophet (s)?!

It is obvious that Khattabi’s struggles are in vain. They do not contribute anything to the solution of the problem. No one who thinks properly can believe that the Holy Prophet (s) who gives warning and hope has eaten of the meat of an animal killed not for Allah. May Allah keep us distant from obeyingSatan.

The tradition ‘Prophets do not leave behind inheritance’

Among the baseless traditions of Bukhari is the tradition that has appeared in the book of obligation ofSahih Bukhari .

When the Holy Prophet (s) died his wives decided to send Uthman before Abu Bakr to help them take their share of inheritance [left by the Holy Prophet (s)]. But Aisha said: Did the Holy Prophet (s) not say: We (the prophets) do not leave behind inheritance. What we leave behind is charity.[81]

Our great scholars have mentioned in their books that this tradition is fabricated.[82] The reason why they fabricated this tradition was that they wanted to deprive Prophet’s daughter from the wealth he left behind.[83]

In a discussion with Abu Barkr, Imam Ali (a.s) rejected this tradition and showed that it is in conflict with the Holy Qur’an. This demonstrates it very well that it is not a valid tradition.

Ibn Sa’ad says: Muhammad bin Umar narrates from Hisham bin Sa’ad from Abbas bin Abdullah bin Ma’abad, from Abu Ja’afar who says: In order to take their share of inheritance, Fatima (a), Abbas bin Abd al-Mutallib and Ali (a.s) visited Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr quoted the Holy Prophet (s) as saying: We do not leave behind inheritance. The wealth we leave behind is charity. Thus the wealth he left behind is under my control.

[To prove his point of view], Imam Ali (a.s) appealed to two Qur’anic verses which are:

و وررث سلیمان داوود[84]

And Sulaiman is the heir of Dawood.

And Zakaria said:

یرثنی و یرث من ال یعقوب[85]

(One that) will (truly) inherit me and inherit the posterity of Jacob.

Abu Bakr said: That is what I said and you also know it.

Imam Ali said: This is Allah’s Book that speaks and then he, Fatima (a.s) and Abbas went out.[86]

The tradition of ‘Ali’s quarrel with Prophet over nightprayer’

Among other baseless traditions of Bukhar – which is also narrated by Dehlavi in hisTuhfai al-Ithana’asharia – is the following tradition.

In hisSahih , the most authentic tradition collection among Sunnis, Bukhari narrates via various channels the following:

One night Allah's Apostle came to me and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and asked, "Won't you pray (at night)?" I said, "By Allah I do not offer any prayer other than compulsory prayer. O Allah's Apostle! Our souls are in the hands of Allah and if He wants us to get up He will make us get up." When I said that, he left us without saying anything and I heard that he was hitting his thigh and saying:

و کان الانسان اکثر شیء جدلا[87]

But man is more quarrelsome than anything.[88]

Sunni scholars do not feel shy to appeal to such traditions. Can one believe that Ali (a.s) who was a man of worship and servitude towards Allah quarrels with the Prophet over offering night prayer?

Imam Ali (a.s) was fully obeying the Holy Prophet (s) in every matter. Can one thus believe that he quarreled with the Holy Prophet (a.s) over offering night prayer? How can one accept that Imam Ali (a.s) should have argued like a fatalist against the Holy Prophet (s)?

This is a tradition that is fabricated by the enemies of the Holy Prophet (s). It can be accepted only by those who are the enemies of the Holy Prophet (s) and Imam Ali (a.s).

No believer can stand against offering prayer so insistently saying: By Allah I do not offer any prayer other than compulsory prayer. This is so bad, especially if it is the Holy Prophet (s) who asks you to offer prayer. This is because speaking in such a manner with the Holy Prophet – especially when he orders you to offer prayer – is insulation to him. No believer must do such a thing, not to speak of Imam Ali (a.s) who was utterly following the Holy Prophet’s commands and was the worshiper.

A glance at Imam Ali’s excellences

Speaking about Imam Ali’s worship, Ibn Abi al-Hadid Mu’atazili says: Ali was top in terms of worshiping and piety. His prayers and fasts outnumbered those of all other people. People learnt from him how to offer night prayer, remember Allah and offer supererogatory prayers. He was so careful about supplication and prayer that he did his acts of worship at Lilat al-Harir in the battle of Siffin on a leather carpet when enemies’ arrows were targeting him. He was not afraid and thus he did not leave his worship until he completed it. Due to long prostration, his forehead was patched like camel’s feet. A brief assessment of Imam Ali’s prayers and supplications which are full of praises for Allah’s glories shows how humble, sincere and devoted he is towards Him. It shows what a mind has arranged these words and what a tongue has uttered them.

When Alibin Husain, an outstanding worshiper was asked how his worship was compared to that of his forefather, he said:

عبادتی عند عباده جدی کعباده جدی عند عباده رسول الله ص[89]

My worship compared to the worship of my forefather is like my forefather’s worship compared to the worship of the Apostle of Allah (s).

In chapter seven of his‘Ali’s worship, piety and devotedness’ , Sheikh Muhammad bin Talha says: In regard with his worship, it has to be said: Obedience is the essence of worship. Anyone who worships Allah and is careful about doing obligations and refraining from what is forbidden is a worshiper. The subject matters of Allah’s orders are various and that is why worships are also of different kinds such as prayer, charity, fasting etc. Imam Ali (s) used to hasten to perform different worships. By doing so, he attained lofty stages whereas others could not reach them. Imam Ali (s) did two things simultaneously; while he was offering prayer he gave charity as he was bowing. It was at this time that the following verse from the Holy Qur’an was revealed.

إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ اللّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ الَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلاَةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَهُمْ رَاكِعُونَ[90]

Only Allah is your Vali and His Apostle and those who believe, those who keep up prayers and pay the poor-rate while they bow.

And there is another verse that says:

وَيُطْعِمُونَ الطَّعَامَ عَلَى حُبِّهِ مِسْكِينًا وَيَتِيمًا وَأَسِيرًا[91]

And they give food out of love for Him to the poor and the orphan and the captive.

Thereupon he says: Worship is of different kinds. Imam Ali (a.s) performed all kinds of worships. He believed in the hereafter and its great events. He knew that all human beings would face, after dying and returning to Allah, certain questions in the hereafter. They all need to bow down before their Creator and receive their suitable rewards by entering Paradise or Hell.

Having reached the stage of certainty, Imam Ali (a.s) needed to fasten his belt and spend all his time obeying Allah's commands. This is because only those who are skeptic and impious shirk acts of worship. Imam Ali (a.s) was at the top of certainty and that is why he openly declared:

لو کشف الغطاء ما ازددت یقینا

If the all the veils are removed I will gain no more certainty.

Thus his worships were of high standards, because he had reached the stage of certainty. After narrating some traditions, Sheikh Muhammad bin Talha says: These long stories … indicate that Ali (a.s) was known for his worship and excelled all others in terms of performing all kinds of worship.

He worshiped in the best possible way and believed in it theoretically and practically. He worshiped to the extent that he reached the stage of imamate. Being known for his trusteeship, worship, love, piety, devotion, knowledge, reliance (on Allah), fear (of Allah), hope (in Allah), patience, thankfulness and satisfaction (with Allah), he assumed the leadership of Muslim community.

Ali (a.s) was a man of humble character, thinking, worshipping, contemplating, offering night prayer, remembering Allah, crying (out of fear of Allah), litany and guiding people. He performed various difficult worships which powerful and rich people cannot perform. He went so far worshiping Allah that the Holy Qura'n praised him and introduced him as a righteous person to all others.

In his commentary, Wahidi narrates a marfu'a tradition, on his own documentation, from Ibn Abbas who says: Ali bin Abi Talib (a.s) had four Dirhams. He donated one Dirham at night, one at daytime, the third secretly and the fourth openly. It was due to this that the following verse was revealed:

الَّذِينَ يُنفِقُونَ أَمْوَالَهُم بِاللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ سِرًّا وَعَلاَنِيَةً فَلَهُمْ أَجْرُهُمْ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ وَلاَ خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلاَ هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ[92]

(As for) those who spend their property by night and by day, secretly and openly, they shall have their reward from their Lord and they shall have no fear, nor shall they grieve.

Considering the stories related, it becomes clear that Imam Ali (a.s) was a person who had attained all good qualities and attributes. It suffices him as a privilege that Allah has praised him in different verses of the Holy Qura'n, which is recited by all Muslims till the Day of Judgment.

Thereupon he narrates the following poems about Imam Ali (a.s).

هذی المزایا بعض ما حلی بها ****** و حبی من الخیرات و البرکات

و له وظائف طاعه اورادها ****** معموره الاناء و الاوقات

بعباده و زهاده و تورع ****** و تخشع و تدرع الاحبات

و تقلل و توکل و تفکر ****** و تدبر و تذکر المثلاث

و اذا الظلام سجی یناجی ربه ****** متضرعا بالذکر و الدعوات

یعنو له بخضوع قلب خاشع ****** و هموع طرف مسبل العبرات

علم علت درجاته و فضائل ****** شرقت معارجها علی الشرقات

و مناقب نطقت بها ای الکتاب ****** و حسبها ان جاء شاهدها من الایات[93]

These are some of the privileges that are bestowed on him.

He performed worships that were indicative of his piety, devotion, humbleness, contentment, reliance (on Allah), thinking, contemplating and remembering ideals.

When darkness prevailed everywhere, he would humbly begin to offer his prayers.

He was down to earth, humble and submissive towards Allah.

He was highly knowledgeable and he had virtues others were envying.

Quranic verses have praised him and it suffices him that Qur'an testifies to his virtues.

Elsewhere, Sheikh Muhammad binTalha mentions:

After Ali (a.s) died, Muawiyah bin Abu Sufyan said to Dirar bin Damrah," Describe Ali to me."

"Will you not excuse me from answering you," said Dirar.

"No, describe him," insisted Muawiyah.

"Please, excuse me from doing so," said Dirar.

"I will not," said Muawiyah.

"I will do so, then," said Dirar with a sigh. "By Allah, he was (far-sighted) and very strong. He spoke with a truthful finality, so that, through him, truth became distinguished from falsehood. He ruled justly, and knowledge gushed forth from him, as did wisdom. He felt an aversion to the world and its (pleasures). By Allah, he would cry profusely (from the fear of Allah); long durations would he spend in contemplation, during which time he would converse with his soul. "

"He showed a liking (for religious reasons, of course; to train his soul to be patient and abstemious) to coarse garments and lower quality food. By Allah, it was as if - in his humbleness - he was one of us: when we asked him a question, he would answer us; when we would go to him, he would initiate (the greetings of peace); and when we would invite him (to our homes), he would come to us. Yet, in spite of his closeness to us, we would not speak (freely) with him, because of the dignity and honor that he exuded if he smiled, he revealed the likes of straight and regular pearls (i.e. his teeth). He honored religious people and loved the poor. The strong person could not hope to gain favors from him through falsehood. And the weak person never lost hope of his justness. I swear, by Allah, that on certain occasions, I saw him in his place of prayer when the night was dark and few stars could be seen; he would be holding his beard and crying the way a very sad person cries; and I would hear him saying,

یا دنیا! دنیا! أبی تعرضت ام إلی تشوقت؟

هیهات! هیهات! غری غیری، قد بتتک ثلاثا لا رجعه لی فیک. فعمرک قصیر و عیشک حقیر و خطرک کثیر.

آه من قله الزاد و بعد السفر و وحشه الطریق

"O world, O world, are you offering yourself to me? Do you desire me? Never! Never! Deceive someone other than me. I have divorced you for the third time, so that you cannot return to me. O world, your life is short, the existence you offer is base, and your danger is great.Alas for the paucity of sustenance (i.e. good deeds), the great distance of the journey, and the loneliness of the road!"

Upon hearing this description, Muawiyah's eyes swelled with tears, and not being able to hold them from gushing forth, he was forced to wipe them with his cuffs; and the same can be said for those who were present. Muawaiyah then said, "May Allah have mercy on the father of Al Hasan, for he was, by Allah, just as you described him to be." He then said, "O Dirar, describe your sadness at having lost him."

"My sadness," began Dirar, "is like the sadness of a woman who cannot control her tears or allay her grief after her child, while in her lap, has just been slaughtered." Dirar then stood up and left.[94]

In short, it is not easy to describe Imam Ali’s piety and devotion. This is something that is accepted by all including his enemies. How good it was if the followers of Muawiyya like Muawiyya himself confessed to the reality and did not accept this fabricated tradition.

Fabricated tradition and the objection of fatalism

The above-mentioned tradition implies that Imam Ali’s words contain a kind of fatalism (determinism). Resisting against offering night prayer is nothing compared to this accusation. This is because it is very bad and awful to resort to fatalism and it is a sign of misguidance and disbelief to attribute such things to the leader of believers.

Falsity of fatalism from the viewpoint of Ibn Taymiyya

We will now mention Ibn Taymiyya’s words concerning the falsity of fatalism.

All rational and religious persons agree that it is false to argue on the basis of fatalism. Even the fatalists themselves agree that it is wrong for a person who has committed oppression or violated someone’s rights to appeal to fatalism. They demand for their rights and punish him for what he has done.

Fatalism is something like sophism. It is very obvious that sophism is wrong, though it has its own adherents who go skeptic (not only about other things but also) about their own existence and essential sciences.

Fatalism badly affects practical life to the extent that it dismisses truth and justice and allows falsehood and injustice. Everyone however knows that such a theory is false and no one permits oneself to invoke such theories except unknowingly. If a person knows the expediency and necessity of his actions, he does not appeal to fatalism.

Likewise, if a person knows that his action does not involve any expediency or necessity, again he will not appeal to fatalism.

سیقول الذین اشرکوا لو شاء الله ما اشرکنا و لا أباونا و لا حرمنا من شیء[95]

Those who are polytheists will say: If Allah had pleased we would not have associated (aught with Him) nor our falterers, nor would we have forbidden (to ourselves) anything.

قل هل عندکم من علم فتخرجوه لنا ان تتبعون الا الظن و ان انتم الا تخرصون. قل فلله الحجه البلغه فلو شاء لهدئکم اجمعین[96]

Say: have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to us? You only follow a conjecture and you only tell lies. Say: Then Allah’s is the conclusive argument: so if He pleases, He would certainly guide you all.

Polytheistsnaturally know that this argument is invalid. Suppose a polytheist encroaches on another polytheist’s family or property, killing his child or violating his rights. When he is criticized by others he simply says that if Allah did not approve of his actions he would not do them. Other polytheists will not accept his reasoning. Nor does he himself accept such an argument from others. He appeals to such an invalid argument out of necessity with the aim to silence others.

It is because of this that Allah reproaches them saying:

قل هل عندکم من علم فتخرجوه لنا

Say: have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to us?

Thereupon He says:

ان تتبعون الا الظن و ان انتم الا تخرصون

You only follow a conjecture and you only tell lies.

Thus it is their desire and tendencies (not divine fate) that shape their actions. This is because divine fate is not the main cause behind one’s actions and is not accepted as a proof against others justifying your deed. All people are equal in the face of divine fate. If fate were the main cause behind one’s action, then there would be no difference between just and unjust, truthful and liar, knowledgeable and ignorant, good doer and evil doer, well-behaved and mischievous, advantageous and disadvantageous.

In order to justify their position of not following the prophets, polytheists were appealing to the issue of fate. This is while if a polytheist appeals to fate in order to justify his violation of another polytheist’s rights or to disobey his orders his words will not be heard.

Above all, all polytheists rebuke each other for acting wrongfully or violating others’ rights. But when the Holy Prophet (s) was sent to them and he began to call on them to observe divine rights and to obey divine commands, they began to appeal to fate (in order to shirk their duties). They did so while if a person encroached upon the rights of a polytheist and justified this on the bases of fate they were not ready to lend their ears to him and accept his words.[97]

Ibn Taymiyya and appealing to a fabricated tradition

Elsewhere Ibn Taymiyya extensively criticizes appealing to fate. In the end of his discussion, he accuses Imam Ali (a.s) -out of animosity towards him- of being a fatalist. Referring to a tradition in this connection, he says:

It is necessary to believe in fate, but no one –given the clear dictate of reason – accepts appealing to fate. The fact that this argument is invalid does not falsify the issue of fate. This is because man is naturally inclined to seek his profits and avoid losses. The goodness of his life in this world as well as in the hereafter depends on the observation of this principle. Man tries to get things that bring him profits and ward off losses – no matter whatever they are (be they believing in prophets or something else). To know about advantages and disadvantages of something depends on one’s reason and aims. The prophets have come to actualize or increase human’s advantages and ward off or lessen his disadvantages.

It is on account of this that the followers of prophets are far better than others in terms of following their interests and avoiding losses. Those who reject prophets are lagging far behind from this perspective. They do evil deeds and abandon good deeds. They need to be therefore considered as the worst among human beings. Nevertheless the opponents of the prophets also need to follow their interests by avoiding wrongful acts and their likes.

When there is an encroachment on another person’s life, property or family and the one oppressed demands for justice, no wise person accepts appealing to fate (from the party that has committed the wrong). If the evil doer says that he is innocent because he was obliged on the basis of fate to do such an action, others will respond him by saying: if you happen to be the one who is oppressed and the oppressor tries to justify his unjust act through appealing to fate you will not accept his words. This is because accepting fatalism will no doubt lead to inevitable and lasting corruption.

Thus all people believe in the principle of fate, though no wise person accepts arguing on the basis of fate. There is no contradiction between accepting the principle of fate and rejecting arguments on its bases. One must believe in fate and at the same time reject appealing to it….

Arguing on the basis of fate is regarded as quarrel that is a negative thing. In hisSahih , the most authentic tradition collection among Sunnis, Bukhari narrates via various channels the following:

One night Allah's Apostle came to me and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet and asked, "Won't you pray (at night)?" I said, "By Allah I do not offer any prayer other than compulsory prayer. O Allah's Apostle! Our souls are in the hands of Allah and if He wants us to get up He will make us get up." When I said that, he left us without saying anything and I heard that he was hitting his thigh and saying:

و کان الانسان اکثر شیء جدلا[98]

But man is more quarrelsome than anything.[99]

In response it must be said that if appealing to fate is so bad then attributing it to Imam Ali, the commander of the faithful cannot be justified except on the bases of animosity and hatred towards him. Not to speak of believers, no man of understanding can approve of such a big lie.

Moreover, elsewhere in his book, Ibn Taymiyya has termed those who appeal to fate as worse than Jews and Christians. He says:

According to those who appeal to fate to justify their mistakes, the prophets must keep silent in the face of disbelievers not responding them…. Some mystics also hold such views. After reaching the stage of annihilation,mystics believer their deeds cannot be described as good or bad. Such beliefs are abundantly found among different groups including sufis, fakirs, jurists and ordinary people. No doubt, such people are worse than Shias and Mu’atazilites for the latter two groups accept divine commands and deny fatalism.

Shias and Mu’atazilites on the other hand criticize Sunnis, because they accept divine commands and prohibitions, promise and threat and they admit that they are supposed to do what is made obligatory and to avoid what is forbidden, accepting that thus Allah has not created their deeds and intended their wrongs. They no doubt glorify Allah, consider Him as pure of injustice and accept divine argument, but they fail to reconcile between Allah’s omnipotence, general will, inclusive creation, justice, wisdom, order and prohibition, promise and threat. It is because of this that they say all praise is due to Allah but they deny Him His kingdom.

In my point of view, those who accept Allah’s power, will and creation and based on them they deny Allah’s order and prohibition, promise and threat, are worse than Jews and Christians. This is because according to their beliefs the prophets must keep silent (in the face of disbelievers).

We criticizing those of their ideas that are false ideas, but as far as their true ideas are concerned they are acceptable and true ideas must be accepted no matter who the holder of the idea is. No one is entitled to answer an innovation through an innovation and falsehood through falsehood. Though those who deny fate have fallen into the trap of innovation, those who appeal to fate to resist divine orders have fallen into the trap of a bigger innovation. Just as we can compare those who deny fate to those who worship fire, we can compare those who appeal to fate to those who associate other deities with Allah and oppose the prophets saying:

سیقول الذین اشرکوا لو شاء الله ما اشرکنا و لا أباونا و لا حرمنا من شیء[100]

Those who are polytheists will say: If Allah had pleased we would not have associated (aught with Him) nor our falterers, nor would we have forbidden (to ourselves) anything.

It is worth mentioning that there emerged a group of fatalists in early Islam, though no popular Islamic sect advocated such a belief.[101]

The tradition of Ali's ‘proposing to Abu Jahl’s daughter’

Among other baseless traditions of Bukhari is the fabricated tradition of Imam Ali (a.s) asking for the hand of Abu Jahl’s daughter in marriage. According to this tradition, during the time of the Holy Prophet (s) when Fatima al-Zahra was alive, the commander of the faithful, proposed to Abu Jahl’s daughter. The details of this fabricated story are a under:

Abu al-Yaman has narrated from Shu’aib, from Zuhri, from Ali bin Husain from Miswar bin Makhrama who said:

'Ali demanded the hand of the daughter of Abu Jahl. Fatima heard of this and went to Allah's Apostle saying, "Your people think that you do not become angry for the sake of your daughters as 'Ali is now going to marry the daughter of Abu Jahl. "On that Allah's Apostle got up and after his recitation of Tashah-hud. I heard him saying, "Then after! I married one of my daughters to Abu Al-'As bin Al-Rabi' (the husband of Zainab, the daughter of theProphet ) before Islam and he proved truthful in whatever he said to me. No doubt, Fatima is a part ofme, I hate to see her being troubled. By Allah, the daughter of Allah's Apostle and the daughter of Allah's Enemy cannot be the wives of one man." So 'Ali gave up that engagement. 'Al-Miswar further said: I heard the Prophet talking and he mentioned a son-in-law of his belonging to the tribe of Bani 'Abd-Shams. He highly praised him concerning that relationship and said (whenever) he spoke to me, he spoke the truth, and whenever he promised me, he fulfilled his promise."[102]

This tradition contains reproaches about Imam Ali (a.s) as it also puts to question his high status. It is because of this that believers cannot accept such traditions. How is it possible for the Holy Prophet (s) to reproach a person whom he praised and spoke about his merits among people until hisdeath. Some Sunni scholars have accepted that this tradition contains reproach. As an instance, in his commentary onSahih Bukhari , Ibn Hajar Asqalani says:

و لا ازال اتعجب من المسور کیف بالغ فی تعصبه لعلی بن الحسین علیهما السلام حتی قال: انه اودع عنده السیف لا یمکن احدا منه حتی تزهق روحه رعایه لکونه ابن فاطمه

I keep wondering how Miswar exaggerates about his love of Ali bin Husain (a.s). He says he has deposited a sword with him. Nobody can take it from him until he is killed. This is because he is the son of Fatima…. It is very strange [that despite all this love] he does not take into account Ali bin Husain's feelings and emotions. This is because this tradition explicitly casts doubt on the personality of Ali bin Abi Talib (a.s), as it also distorts the image of his son, Ali bin Husain (a.s). According to this tradition, after marrying Fatima, Imam Ali (a.s) proposes to Abu Jahl's daughter. He continued his move to the extent that the Holy Prophet (s) interferes, strongly rejecting his action.[103]

In hisTuhfa Ithan'ashriyya, Dihlavi has narrated the dialogue between Abu Hanifa and 'Aamash concerning the above-mentioned tradition. In the course of dialogue, Abu Hanifa, addressing 'Aamash says that he who relates such a tradition is rude and impolite.[104]

How can one believe that Imam Sajjad is the narrator of such a tradition (that is absolutely against him and his forefather)?[105]

The tradition of 'the cause of the revelation of Quranic verse'

Among other invalid traditions of Bukhari is the tradition that contains a story that is related to the companions of the Holy Prophet (s) and the supporters of Abdullah bin Ubai. Abdullah bin Ubai apparently accepted Islam but in fact he was not a Muslim. He was the leader of hypocrites. Bukhari says the following verse was revealed in this regard.

وَإِن طَائِفَتَانِ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ اقْتَتَلُوا فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا فَإِن بَغَتْ إِحْدَاهُمَا عَلَى الْأُخْرَى فَقَاتِلُوا الَّتِي تَبْغِي حَتَّى تَفِيءَ إِلَى أَمْرِ اللَّهِ فَإِن فَاءتْ فَأَصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْعَدْلِ وَأَقْسِطُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ[106]

And if two parties of the believers quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of them acts wrongfully towards the other, fight that which acts wrongfully until it returns to Allah's command; then if it returns, make peace between them with justice and act equitably; surely Allah loves those who act equitably.

Musaddad narrates from Mu'atamir from his father from Anas who says:

It was said to the Prophet "Would you see Abdullah bin Ubai." So, the Prophet went to him, riding a donkey, and the Muslims accompanied him, walking on salty barren land.When the Prophet reached 'Abdullah bin Ubai, the latter said, "Keep away from me! By Allah, the bad smell of your donkey has harmed me." On that an Ansari man said (to 'Abdullah), "By Allah! The smell of the donkey of Allah's Apostle is better than your smell." On that a man from 'Abdullah's tribe got angry for 'Abdullah's sake, and the two men abused each other which caused the friends of the two men to get angry, and the two groups started fighting with sticks, shoes and hands. We were informed that the following Divine Verse was revealed (in this concern):-- "And if two groups of Believers fall to fightingthen, make peace between them."[107]

This story is absolutely false and cannot be thus accepted as the cause of the revelation of the verse mentioned above. This is because this happened before Abdullah bin Ubai apparently accepted Islam. If it happened after his apparent acceptance of Islam it would certainly indicate his disbelief and his followers' disbelief. If it were he who addressing the Holy Prophet said, "keep away from me! By Allah, the bad smell of your donkey has harmed me", then it would not be possible for Allah to call them believers.

It is exactly on account of this that based on Zarkashi's tradition, Ibn Battal says: The cause of the revelation of this verse does not have anything to do with the story of Abdullah bin Ubai.

Commenting on this tradition in hisal-Tanqih, he says: By then we came to know that the verse (if two believing groups …) had been revealed. Ibn Battal says: The cause of the revelation of this verse does not have anything to do with the story of Abdullah bin Ubai. This is because Abdullah bin Ubai and his companions were not believers. Even after outward acceptance of Islam, they strongly supported Abdullah bin Ubai in the event of 'Ifk'.

In hisSahih (book of istizan) Bukhari quotes Usama bin Zaid as saying: The Holy Prophet attended a meeting that included polytheists, Muslims, idol worshipers, Jews and Abdullah bin Ubai… This tradition shows that the verse (if two believing groups) does not have anything to do with Abdullah bin Ubai. The revelation of this verse is related to a group of Uwaisis and Khazrajis, who fell in fight with each other using rod and shoes.[108]

It is very strange that Ibn Hajar tries to answer Ibn Battal saying: ibn Battal does not accept that the revelation of this verse is related Abdullah bin Ubai and his companions. He believes that the companions of the Holy Prophet (s) fell in fight with the companions of Abdullah bin Ubai when the later had not yet embraced Islam. Keeping this in mind, how one can say that this verse was revealed about Abdullah bin Ubai and his companions. Moreover, the story of Anas bin Malik and that of Usama bin Zaid are alike. The tradition narrated by Usama says that Muslims and polytheist were abusing each other.

Answering this objection Ibn Hajar says: We can solve this problem by making appeal to taghalib (if there are two names for examplea and b and you use one to represent both you use the technique of taghlib, a thing that is common in Arabic language), though this may give rise to another objection. The tradition narrated by Usama openly says that the story mentioned above happened before the battle of Badr and after the acceptance of Islam by Abdullah bin Ubai and his companions. This is while the verse in question was revealed later when a mission was meeting (the Holy Prophet (s)). It is however probable that this verse was revealed earlier. If it were revealed earlier then the objection would be answered.[109]

In my point of view it is wrong to make use of taghlib here without relying on Allah's Book and His Prophet's tradition. Perhaps Ibn Hajar is also aware of the weakness of his argument. That is why he says, "it is possible … to solve the problem on the basis of taghlib.

The tradition 'Ali is not superior to the Prophet's companions'

One of the baseless traditions narrated by Bukhari is the tradition that says that Ali (a.s) is not superior to the companions of the Holy Prophet (s).

In a section devoted to the virtues of Uthman, he quotes Ibn Umar as saying: During the time of the Holy Prophet (s), we did not regard anyone of the companions of the Holy Prophet (s) as superior to Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. No one else other than these three people was superior to the companions of the Holy Prophet (s).[110]

In response to this fabricated tradition, it has to be said that there are numerous solid proofs that demonstrate Ali's superiority over Abu Bakr and Umar – not to speak of Uthman. The baseness and inferiority of those who have fabricated such traditions have nevertheless caused them to regard Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman as superior to Ali (a.s) and compare Ali (a.s) with Mu'awwiya, Amr As and their likes.

There are several traditions narrated by Shias as well as Sunnis that reject this lie. That is the reason why Ibn Abd al-Barr has rejected it categorically. He quotes Ibn Mu'aeen as saying: Muhammad bin Zakariya, Yahya bin Abd al-Rahman and Abd al-Rahman bin Yahya narrated from Ahmad bin Sa'eed bin Hazm, from Ahmad bin Khalid from Marwan bin Abd al-Malik who said: From among Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali, Ali is known for his virtues and glorious past. Thus he is the holder of a prominent tradition. When somebody told him that according to some people only Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were superior to others not mentioning the name of Ali (a.s), he rebuked him saying that Yahya bin Mu'aeen mentioned Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali (a.s).

Abu Amr says: Relying on a tradition narrated by Ibn Umar some are of the view that during the time of the Holy Prophet (s) only Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were regarded as superior to other companions of the Holy Prophet (s) and no one else other than these three people was considered as superior. Ibn Mu'aeen rejects this tradition very strongly saying: The advocates of this tradition disagree with the practical approach of Sunni jurists and scholars of tradition from the beginning until now.

All these jurists and scholars of tradition regard Ali, after Uthman, as superior to others. No one disagrees with this issue. If they differ at all they differ on whether Uthman is superior to Ali or vise-versa.

Moreover, some previous scholars differed on whether Ali (a.s) was superior to Abu Bakr or vise-versa. This consensus shows that the tradition narrated by Ibn Umar is not but a big illusion, having no correct meaning even if its chain of transmission is authentic. The advocates of this tradition need to accept the tradition reported by Jabir and Abu Saeed which says: …. They do not accept the tradition reported by Jabir and Abu Saeed and that is the reason why their approach suffers from inconsistency.

The tradition that allows taking wage for reciting from the Holy Quran

One of the fake traditions narrated by Bukhari is the tradition that permits taking wage for reciting verses from the Holy Quran.

Abu Muhammad Sayyidan bin Mudarib Bahli narrated from Abu Ma'ashar Yusuf bin Yazid Barra from Abu Malik Ubaidullah bin Akhnas from Ibn Abu Malika from Ibn Abbas who said: Some of the companions of the Prophet passed by some people staying at a place where there waswater, and one of those people had been stung by a scorpion. A man from those staying near the water, came and said to the companions of the Prophet, "Is there anyone among you who can do Ruqya as near the water there is a person who has been stung by a scorpion." So one of the Prophet's companions went to him and recited Surat-al-Fatiha for a sheep as his fees. The patient got cured and the man brought the sheep to his companions who disliked that and said, "You have taken wages for reciting Allah's Book." When they arrived at Medina, they said, ' O Allah's Apostle! (This person) has taken wages for reciting Allah's Book" On that Allah's Apostle said, "ان احق ما اخذتم علیه اجرا کتاب الله ".

"You are most entitled to take wages for doing a Ruqya with Allah's Book."[111]

It is worth mentioning that Ibn Jawzi has reported this tradition in hisal-Mawduat from Aisha.

The tradition of 'asking for rain' narrated by Asbat

One of the traditions thatis utterly baseless is the tradition that says the disbelievers ask for rain. Ibn Masruq says:One day I went to Ibn Masud who said, "When Quraish delayed in embracing Islam, the Prophet I invoked Allah to curse them, so they were afflicted with a (famine) year because of which many of them died and they ate the carcasses and Abu Sufyan came to the Prophet and said, 'O Muhammad! You came to order people to keep good relation with kith and kin and your nation is being destroyed, so invoke AllahI ? So the Prophet I recited the Holy verses of Sirat-Ad-Dukhan: 'Then watch you for the day that the sky willBring forth a kind of smoke plainly visible.' (44.10)When the famine was taken off, the people renegade once again as nonbelievers. The statement of Allah, (in Sura "Ad-Dukhan"-44) refers to that: 'On the day whenWe shall seize you with a mighty grasp.' (44.16)And that was what happened on the day of the battle of Badr." Asbath added on the authority of Mansur, "Allah's Apostle prayed for them and it rained heavily for seven days. So the people complained of the excessive rain. The Prophet said, 'O Allah!(Let it rain) around us and not on us.' So the clouds dispersed over his head and it rained over the surroundings."[112]

Sunni scholars have criticized the portion added by Asbat. Isa says: The quotation by Bukhari of the portion added by Asbat has raised criticisms against him. Dawoodi says: The attachment is not related to Quraish; it is related to the people of Medina. Abu Abd al-Malik says: The portion added by Asbat is suffering from illusion and confusion. This is because he has mixed up the text of tradition reported by Abdullah bin Masud with the tradition reported by Anas bin Malik where it says: "Allah's Apostle prayed for them and it rained heavily for seven days". Furthermore, Isa quotes Hafiz, Sharaf al-Din Damyati as saying: The tradition reported by Abdullah bin Masud relates the story of Quraish in Mecca which does not contain anything as the said additional part. It is very surprising that Bukhari has related this additional part which contradicts with the tradition of authentic reporters.

Aiming at supporting Bukhari, some have said: It is not impossible for this event to have occurred twice. It goes without saying that such justifications do not work. Kermani says: If It is said that the story of Abu Sufayn asking for rain happened in Mecca we must say in response that the story of Abu Sufayan asking for rain happened in Mecca but the part added by Asbat is related to what happened in Medina.[113]

The tradition 'traditions will increase after me'

One of the false traditions found inSahih Bukhari is the tradition in which the Holy Prophet (s) talks about false traditions that are attributed to him. Taftazani said that it is only Bukhari that mentions this tradition in his Sahih. Other scholars of traditions have criticized this tradition. Yayha bin Mu'aeen says that this tradition is fabricated by hypocrites. According to this tradition, the Holy Prophet (s) says:

تکثر لکه الاحادیث من بعدی فاذا روی لکم حدیث فاعرضوه علی کتاب الله

Traditions will increase after me. If someone narrated you a tradition, measure it against Allah's Book (to find out whether or not it is in harmony with it).

In hisal-Talwih ,Sharh al-Tawdih , Taftazani explains everything related to this issue saying: It is said that a tradition reported by a single person is rejected when it is in contradiction with Allah's Book. This is because Allah's Book has priority over a single individual's report, for the former is not doubtful in terms of its text and chain of transmission. The general concepts of the Holy Quran and its outward meanings are however matters of controversy.if the general concepts of the Holy Quran and its outward meanings are uncertain and indefinite the tradition transmitted by a single reporter will be accepted (as both have the same status of not being certain and definite). If on the other hand, the general concepts of the Holy Quran and its outward meanings are taken to be certain and definite, then the tradition transmitted by a single reporter will be of no value. It will be rejected when it happens to contract Allah's Book. This is because wherever there is a possibility for attaining certainty there will be no room for accepting something that does not bring about certainty. In order to prove his point of view, he has appealed to the following tradition by the Holy Prophet (s):

تکثر لکه الاحادیث من بعدی فاذا روی لکم حدیث فاعرضوه علی کتاب الله فما وافق کتاب الله فاقبلوه و ما خالفه فردوه

Traditions will increase after me. If someone narrated you a tradition, measure it against Allah's Book (to find out whether or not it is in harmony with it). Accept whatever that agrees with Allah's Book and reject whatever that disagrees with it.

In response to this argument it has to be said that the tradition mentioned above is a tradition by a single reporter. The scope of the meaning of this tradition has been limited by other well-known and successively narrated traditions. Thus this tradition does not bring about certainty and as a result it cannot prove an issue pertaining to faith.

Moreover the meaning of this tradition is in contradiction with the general meaning of the following verse of the Holy Quran:

و ما اتاکم الرسول فخذوه[114]

Take whatever Allah's Apostle gives you.

Scholars of tradition have also criticized this tradition on the ground that its chain includes an unknown reporter named Yazid bin Rabi'a. It also contains some name in between Ash'as and Thawban. Thus this tradition has been regarded as a munqati'a (broken) tradition.

According to Yahya bin Mu'aeen this tradition is the work of disbelievers. Taftazani further points out that Bukhari's narrating of this tradition does not solve the problems (of being unknown and mutaqati'a) this traditions is faced with.[115]

The tradition that prohibits (playing) musical instruments

One of the baseless traditions Bukhari has reported is the tradition that has been criticized by Ibn Hazm. Ibn Hazm has rejected this tradition as a fabricated one. In hisSahih , Bukhari quotes Hisham bin Ammar from Sadaqa bin Khalid from Abd al-Rahman bin Yazid bin Jabir from Atiyya bin Qais Kilabi from Abd al-Rahman bin Ghanam Ash'ari from Abu Amir or Abu Malik Ash'ari, from the Holy Prophet (s) who says:

لیکونن من امتی قوم یستحلون الخز و الحریر و الخمر و المعازف

No doubt, there will emerge people in my community, who will allow wearing clothes made of wool and silk (or purely of silk), drinking wine and playing musical instruments.

This is a munqati'a (broken) tradition, for there is no link between Bukhari and Sadqa bin Khalid (whom the chain of this tradition includes). Thus this tradition is no doubt incorrect and it is totally fabricated.[116]

The tradition 'a believing adulterer does not in fact commit adultery'

One of the incorrect traditions that have appeared in Sahih Bukhari is the tradition that is found in the book of drinks. Bukhari narrates from Ahmad bin Salh from Ibn Wahab from Yunus from Ibn Shahab from Abu Salma from Abd al-Rahman and Ibn Musayyib from Abu Huraira who quote the Holy Prophet (s) as saying:If a believer is in the state of belief while committing adultery he does not in fact commit adultery.[117]

After rejecting this tradition in his al-Alimwa al-Mut'allim ,[118] Abu Hanifa says:

Some people say when a believer commits adultery he leaves his belief like a person who takes off his clothes. If he however repents Allah will help him to regain his faith. Do you believe in their tradition? If you accept their tradition then it will imply you have accepted the theories developed by Khawarij and if you are skeptic about it then you are skeptic about Khawarij's theories and as a matter of fact give up the principle of justice which you propagate. If you reject their words then you have in fact rejected the words of the Holy Prophet (s). This is because they have narrated the said tradition from different narrators and eventually from the Holy Prophet (s).

Teacher said: They lie. My refutation of their words is not tantamount to the refutation of the words of the Holy Prophet (s). You refute the Holy Prophet (s) when you refute the Holy Prophet himself. If a person however believes in whatever the Holy Prophet (s) says but meanwhile rejects what is unjust and contrary to the teachings of the Holy Quran as the words of the Prophet then he really certifies the Holy Quran and clears the Prophet from uttering anti-Quranic words. If the Holy Prophet begins to oppose the Holy Quran and attribute lies to Allah, Allah shall instantly put an end to his life, cutting off his jugular vein. Thus the Holy Prophet (s) does not oppose the Holy Quran for a person who opposes Allah's Book is not His apostle. The tradition they have reported is counter to the spirit of the Holy Quran, for Allah, the Exalted, says:

الزَّانِيَةُ وَالزَّانِي فَاجْلِدُوا كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنْهُمَا مِئَةَ جَلْدَةٍ وَلَا تَأْخُذْكُم بِهِمَا رَأْفَةٌ فِي دِينِ اللَّهِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَلْيَشْهَدْ عَذَابَهُمَا طَائِفَةٌ مِّنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ[119]

(As for) the fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them, (giving) a hundred stripes, and let not pity for them detain you in the matter of obedience to Allah, if you believe in Allah and the last day, and let a party of believers witness their chastisement.

In another verse, it says:

وَاللَّذَانَ يَأْتِيَانِهَا مِنكُمْ فَآذُوهُمَا فَإِن تَابَا وَأَصْلَحَا فَأَعْرِضُواْ عَنْهُمَا إِنَّ اللّهَ كَانَ تَوَّابًا رَّحِيمًا[120]

And as for the two who are guilty of indecency from among you, give them both a punishment; then if they repent and amend, turn aside from them; surely Allah is Oft-returning (to mercy), the Merciful.

These verses address not Jews and Christians but Muslims. I thus reject the words of those who narrate traditions from the Holy Prophet (s) that are contrary to the Holy Quran. This does not mean that I reject the Holy Prophet (s). I reject those who narrate false words from the Holy Prophet (s). We accuse not the Holy Prophet (s) but reporters (who report false traditions).

As a result, we wholeheartedly accept all [real] traditions reported from the Holy Prophet- whether those which we have heard or those we have not heard. We believe in all these traditions and testify that all of them are correct. We meanwhile however testify that the Holy Prophet, does not, contrary to divine order, legalize what is forbidden, break the ties Allah has made or praise what Allah has not praised. We stand witness that the Holy Prophet (s) always obeyed Allah, did not bring about innovation or attribute lie to Allah. He was very friendly.

مَّنْ يُطِعِ الرَّسُولَ فَقَدْ أَطَاعَ اللّهَ وَمَن تَوَلَّى فَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ عَلَيْهِمْ حَفِيظًا[121]

Whoever obeys the Apostle, he indeed obeys Allah, and whoever turns back, soWe have not sent you as a keeper over them.

Three persons take Prophet to Mi'araj

There is a tradition in Bukhari concerning the Mi'araj journey of the Holy Prophet, which is reported by a person called Sharik. This tradition which is utterly baseless is as below:

Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah narrates from Sulayman from Sharik bin Abdullah who quotes Anas bin Malik as saying:

The night Allah's Apostle was taken for a journey from the sacred mosque (of Mecca) Al-Ka'ba: Three persons came to him (in a dreamy while he was sleeping in the Sacred Mosque before the Divine Inspiration was revealed to Him. One of them said, "Which of them is he?" The middle (second) angel said, "He is the best of them." The last (third) angle said, "Take the best of them." Only that much happened on that night and he did not see them till they came on another night, i.e. after The Divine Inspiration was revealed to him. His eyes were asleep but his heart was not----and so is the case with the prophets: their eyes sleep while their hearts do not sleep. So those angels did not talk to him till they carried him and placed him beside the well of Zam-Zam. From among them Gabriel took charge of him. Gabriel cut open (the part of his body) between his throat and the middle of his chest (heart) and took all the material out of his chest and abdomen and then washed it with Zam-Zam water with his own hands till he cleansed the inside of his body, and then a gold tray containing a gold bowl full of belief and wisdom was brought and then Gabriel stuffed his chest and throat blood vessels with it and then closed it (the chest). He then ascended with him to the heaven of the world and knocked at one of its doors. The dwellers of the Heaven asked, 'Who is it?' He said, "Gabriel." They said, "Who is accompanying you?" He said, "Muhammad." They said, "Has he been called?" He said, "Yes" They said, "He is welcomed." So the dwellers of the Heaven became pleased with his arrival, and they did not know what Allah would do to the Prophet on earth unless Allah informed them…[122]

Muslim Nayshaburi has related this tradition in a different way. He narrates from Harun bin Sa'eed Abali from Ibn Wahab from Sulayman- i.e. Bilal – from Sharik bin Abdullah bin Abu Namr from Anas bin Malik who relates Mi'araj tradition from the Holy Mosque as under:

Before the Holy Prophet (s) receives any revelation, three persons met him while he was asleep in the Holy Mosque….[123]

He has related this tradition in the way Thabit Banani has reported, thus altering it considerably.

The occurrence of mi'araj (ascension) before any revelation was received by the Holy Prophet (s) is incorrect, not accepted by anyone. This is because according to scholars ascension took place at least 15 months after the Prophet mission began.

According to Harbi, ascension happened one year before hijra on 27th night of Rabi'a al-Thani, whereas on Zuhri's point of view it took place five years after prophetic mission started.

Based on Ibn Ishaq's opinion ascension occurred at a time when Islam had spread in Mecca as well as in neighboring places among Arab tribes. The closest to reality are the words uttered by Zuhri and Ibn Ishaq. This is because all agrees that Khadija (a.s) offered prayer with the Holy Prophet after prayer was made compulsory and similarly all accepts that she died three to five years before migration.

When all agrees that prayer was made compulsory on ascension night how can one accept that ascension happed before any revelation was received by the Holy Prophet (s)?

According to Nawavi Sharik reports that [the Holy Prophet (s) was transferred while] he was asleep whereas on the basis of another tradition [it is said that this happened when] he was beside Ka'aba in a state between being awake and asleep. Those advocate the occurrence of ascension as a night dream can make use of the said two traditions as their arguments, but such arguments are flawed, for it the Holy Prophet might have been asleep in the beginning when the angels arrived but later on he was awake and there is no evidence in these traditions that shows that he was asleep throughout all the stages. This has been said by Qazi concerning Sharik's tradition but others have also followed the suit, rejecting thus Sharik's tradition.

Bukhari has narrated Sharik's tradition in detail in hisSahih in a chapter devoted to monotheism. After relating this tradition in hisal-Jam'a bayn al-Sahihayn , Hafiz Abd al-Khaliq says that this tradition is fabricated by Sharik bin Abu Namr who introduced some unknown phrases into it. Some prominent memorizers and imams such as Ibn Shahab, Thabit Banani and Qutada have mentioned this tradition whereas they have not made any mention of Sharik's words.All these aside, Sharik is known among the people of tradition as a memorizer. Rejecting his tradition, Hafiz Abd al-Haq says that the only traditions he relies on in this connection are those mentioned previously [having nothing to do with Sharik's account].[124]

Commenting on Sharik's tradition, Kirmani says that it contains illusions that are totally rejected by scholars. As an instance, Sharik claims that ascension happened before revelation was sent down, whereas this is wrong and nobody has approved of it. Similarly when all agrees that prayer was made obligatory on accession night how can one admit that ascension happed before revelation was sent down?

When the gatekeeper addressing Gabriel said: Has he been sent for? He said: Yes. The answer given by Gabriel to the gatekeeper according to me clearly shows that ascension happed after revelation was sent down.[125]

Commenting on this tradition somewhere in his book, Ibn Qayyim Jawziyya quotes Zuhri as saying: The soul of the Holy Prophet (s) was taken to Bayt al-Maqdis and Heaven one year before he migrated to Medina. According to Ibn Abd al-Barr and others accession happened 14 months before the Holy Prophet migrated to Medina. Though accession happened once, some believe it happened twice; once when he was awake and once when he was asleep. It seems that the advocates of this opinion try to reconcile between Sharik's tradition and other traditions available here. That is why some of them claim that ascension happened twice; once before revelation was sent down as suggested by Sharik's tradition and once after revelation was sent down as suggested by other traditions. Yet others have claimed that ascension happened thrice; once before revelation and two times after it.

All these commentaries show that how confused they are. The problem is that they are literalists and that is why whenever they face any variation in a tradition they take it to mean that the event has taken place more than once. The correct opinion in this regard is that ascension has occurred once and that has happened after revelation was received by the Prophet (s). It is very surprising that some have wrongly assumed that ascension has happened more than once and though each time fifty prayers were made obligatory upon the Prophet he was able to reduce them to five prayers after going back and forth several time between Allah and Moses. How is it possible that Allah makes a concession during the first ascension but ignores it in the second ascension?

Memorizers believe that Sharik is mistaken in terms of using certain terms in this tradition. After relating this tradition in hisMusnad , Muslim says that Sharik has altered this tradition, not relating it in a suitable manner.[126]

Monkey stoned to death for fornication

Another fabricated tradition reported by Bukhari is the tradition according to which a monkey is stoned to death for committing fornication. Na'aim bin Hamad narrates from Hashim from Husain from Amr bin Maymoon who [quotes the Holy Prophet as saying]:

During the era of ignorance I saw people gathering around an adulterous monkey and stoning it to death. I joined them in stoning it.[127]

Hamidi and Ibn Abd al-Barr

Whereas Ibn Abd al-Barr has rejected this tradition, Abu Abdullah Hamidi, commenting on it, says: Since the original copies of Bukhar'sSahih do not contain this tradition, it is very likely that it is among traditions added by others to his book. Ibn Abd al-Barr expresses the same opinion in regard with it. Commenting on it, Ibn Hajar Asqalani says: Having rejected Amr Ibn Maymoon's tale, Ibn Abd al-Barr says that it attributes fornication and punishment to beasts that are not according to scholars under obligation. According to Ibn Abd al-Barr, if the chain of this tradition is authentic then it is likely that the people involved in stoning are jinns, for they are among those under obligation. Ibn Maymoon has reported it only through the chain used by Ismaeli.

In response, it has been said that here fornication and stoning are not to be taken with their literal meanings. Fornication and stoning are used here because the story in question contains elements that are similar to them. Thus the said story does not imply that beasts are under obligation.

In hisal-Jam'a bayn al-Sahihayn , Hamidi regards this tradition as incorrect, adding that only some copies of Bukhari's copies contain it. Abu Mas'ud is the only figure who has touched this point. According to Hamidi, Bukhar's book does not contain such tradition and thus it is probable that others have added it to his book.

Commenting on his words, Ibn Hajar says that his words that it is likely that some have added certain traditions to Bukhari'sbook, are not acceptable as they run counter to what scholars hold. Scholars believe that all the traditions included in Bukhari's Sahih are authentic belonging altogether to Bukhari. Hamidi's words are a false illusion, undermining all traditions in Bukhari's book. If one accepts Hamdi's point of view one may then say that this may be the case with all traditions reported by Bukhari. It thus causes people to lose their faith in the entire traditions reported by Bukhari.[128]

Bukhari and three other fabricated traditions

Bukhari has reported three tradition ending up to Ibn Abbas from 'Ata. From these traditions, two traditions have appeared in divorce book whereas one is available in prophetic commentaries. The traditions in divorce book are as under:

Ibrahim bin Musa narrates from Hisham from Ibn Jarih from 'Ata who quotes Ibn Abbas as saying:The pagans were of two kinds as regards their relationship to the Prophet and the Believers. Some of them were those with whom the Prophet was at war and used to fight against, and they used to fight him; the others were those with whom the Prophet made a treaty, and neither did the Prophet fight them, nor did they fight him. If a lady from the first group of pagans emigrated towards the Muslims, her hand would not be asked in marriage unless she got the menses and then became clean. When she became clean, it would be lawful for her to get married, and if her husband emigrated too before she got married, then she would be returned to him. If any slave or female slave emigrated from them to the Muslims, then they would be considered free persons (not slaves) and they would have the same rights as given to other emigrants. The narrator then mentioned about the pagans involved with the Muslims in a treaty, the same as occurs in Mujahid's tradition. If a male slave or a female slave emigrated from such pagans as had made a treaty with the Muslims, they would not be returned, but their prices would be paid (to the pagans).[129]

Concerning pagans who had covenant [with Muslims], Ibn Abbas reports a tradition that is similar in content to the tradition reported by Mujahid, according to which if a slave or a female slave embraces Islam he or she will not be returned to pagans. Instead, Muslims pay their prices to pagans.

Quoting Ibn Abbas Qatiba says: Qariba, the daughter of Abi Umaiyya, was the wife of 'Umar bin Al-Khattab. 'Umar divorced her and then Mu'awiyya bin Abi Sufyan married her. Similarly, Um Al-Hakam, the daughter of Abi Sufyan was the wife of 'Iyad bin Ghanm Al-Fihri. He divorced her and then 'Abdullah bin 'Uthman Al-Thaqafi married her.[130]

The third tradition found in prophetic commentaries is a below:

Ibrahim bin Musa narrates from Hisham from Ibn Jarih from 'Ata who quotes Ibn Abbas as saying:

All the idols which were worshipped by the people of Noah were worshipped by the Arabs later on. As for the idol Wadd, it was worshipped by the tribe of Kalb at Daumat-al-Jandal; Suwa' was the idol of (the tribe of) Murad and then by Ban, Ghutaif at Al-Jurf near Saba; Yauq was the idol of Hamdan, and Nasr was the idol of Himyr, the branch of Dhi-al-Kala.' The names (of the idols) formerly belonged to some pious men of the people of Noah, and when they died Satan inspired their people to (prepare and place idols at the places where they used to sit, and to call those idols by their names. The people did so, but the idols were not worshipped till those people (who initiated them) had died and the origin of the idols had become obscure, whereupon people began worshipping them.[131]

Great Sunni leaders and these fabricated traditions

Bukhari has mentioned these three traditions in hisSahih . He has narrated from 'Ata from Ibn Abbas, but it has to be noted that great Sunni scholars have put to question the traditions reported by 'Ata in prophetic commentaries, undermining thus their authenticity.

Albeit Ibn Hajar frequently assists Bukhari and defends his positions, here he confesses that Bukhari is faced with a problem that is not easy to solve.According to Ibn Hajar, man is prone to error, implying that Bukhari has erred in recording such weak traditions in his book. He explicitly mentions:

Abu Ali Ghasaei quotes Bukhari as saying: Ibrahim bin Musa narrates from Hisham (Ibn Yusuf), from Ibn Jarih, from Ata from Ibn Abbas who quotes the Holy Prophet (s) as saying:

The pagans were of two kinds as regards their relationship to the Prophet and the Believers. Some of them were those with whom the Prophet was at war and used to fight against, and they used to fight him; the others were those with whom the Prophet made a treaty, and neither did the Prophet fight them, nor did they fight him. If a lady from the first group of pagans emigrated towards the Muslims, her hand would not be asked in marriage unless she got the menses and then became clean. When she became clean, it would be lawful for her to get married, and if her husband emigrated too before she got married, then she would be returned to him. If any slave or female slave emigrated from them to the Muslims, then they would be considered free persons (not slaves) and they would have the same rights as given to other emigrants. The narrator then mentioned about the pagans involved with the Muslims in a treaty, the same as occurs in Mujahid's tradition. If a male slave or a female slave emigrated from such pagans as had made a treaty with the Muslims, they would not be returned, but their prices would be paid (to the pagans).

The remaining pat of this tradition includes that Umar divorced Qariba, the daughter of Abu Umayya. It also includes other stories.

As the commentary goes on Abu Mas'ud from Damascus writes: This and previous tradition is narrated by Ibn Jarih from 'Ata Khurasani from Ibn Abbas in his commentary. Ibn Jarih did not attend 'Ata's commentary class. As a result the commentary he wrote is not his. He took it from Uthman, son of 'Ata and studied it.

According to Abu Ali Abu Mas'ud's words reflect an important point, for according to Salih bin Ahmad bin Hanbal Ali bin Madini says that he has heard Hisham bin Yusuf say: Ibn Jarih told me that had asked 'Ata (Abu Rabbah) to comment on some of the verses of Baqara and 'Al Imran chapters, but he had asked him to excuse him, not making such a request from him.

According to Hisham after this happening whenever Ibn Jarih narrated a tradition from 'Ata from Ibn Abbas he would add the term 'Khurasani' after At'a's name. We were tired writing Khurasani so many times and there was no need for using it.

Ali bin Madini says that he wrote this story for Muhammad bin Noor reported this tradition from 'Ata from Ibn Abbas. Thus the traditionists who reported this tradition from Muhammad bin Noor were thinking that the one from whom they were reporting was 'Ata bin Abu Rabah.

As the discussion goes on, he asks about Yaya bin Qatan's point of view concerning the tradition narrated by Jarih from 'Ata Khurasani, but Yahya said that his tradition is weak. When he says that it was something Ibn Jarih told him, Yahya said that the tradition was weak for Ibn Jarih was acquainted with 'Ata through his book.

Thereupon Ibn Hajar says that according to him tis tradition is not broken and that is why Ibn Jarih makes use of the phrase 'he told me'. This is while Bukhari has narrated this tradition from 'Ata bin Abu Rabh and Khurasani is out of question for he has heard no tradition from Ibn Abbas.

It may be said that that above-mentioned question does not necessarily show that the said 'Ata is 'Ata Khurasani, for this does not mean that Ata bin Abu Rabah who has recorded it in his commentary was not aware of it. Thus it can be said that both 'Ata Khurasani and 'Ata bin Abu Rabah were aware of the said two traditions.

Ibn Hajar further says: This answer is not convincing for I believe that it is not possible to give it a definite answer. Man is prone to error and thus one must always invoke Allah's help. The footnote added by Abu Masud is presented by Ismaeli too. In hisal-Jam'a , Hamidi narrates from Burqani from Ismaeli who says that he has narrated it from Ali bin Madini. Ismaeli, in this quotation, alludes to the story mentioned by Ghassani.[132]

A critique of Asqalani's point of view

It is amazing that Ibn Hajar has mentioned this unconvincing answer in his commentary, though not mentioning that there is no correct answer to this question and man is prone to error. In his commentary on the Holy Quran, he says: Ibn Jariha has reportedly said that the said tradition is somewhat modified and altered. Fakihi also quotes Ibn Jarih, though in a different way, as saying: Allah says:

وَقَالُوا لَا تَذَرُنَّ آلِهَتَكُمْ وَلَا تَذَرُنَّ وَدًّا وَلَا سُوَاعًا وَلَا يَغُوثَ وَيَعُوقَ وَنَسْرًا[133]

And they say: By no means leave your gods, nor leave Wadd, nor Suwa; nor Yaghus, and Yauq and Nasr.

They were the idols the people of Noah were worshiping and 'Ata quotes Ibn Abbas as having said: Some are of the view that the chain of the transmitters of this tradition is broken, for the said 'Ata is from Khurasan who did not meet Ibn Abbas.

After narrating the above-mentioned tradition from Ibn Jarih, Abd al-Razzaq in his commentary says that 'Ata Khurasani narrated this tradition from Ibn Abbas.

According to Ibn Mas'ud Ibn Jarih in his commentary said that 'Ata Khurasani narrated this tradition from Ibn Abbas, though he adds that Ibn Jarih did not attend 'Ata's commentary class. Instead, he got his commentary book from his son Uthman bin 'Ata and went through it. Quoting Ali Madini in his al-Khalal, Salih bin Ahmad bin Hanbal says: Once I asked Yaya bin Qattan about his view concerning the tradition Ibn Jarih reported from 'Ata Khurasani, he said his tradition is weak. I said he uses the phrase "I was told", he said it is not correct, for he got acquainted with 'Ata and his tradition through his book (which borrowed from his son).

Ibn Jarih did not see any harm in using the phrase 'I was told', in what is called 'munawala[134] ' and 'mukataba[135] '.

Ismaeli says that he was informed that Ali bin Madyani had the following opinion concerning Ibn Jarih's commentary: This tradition was narrated by 'Ata Khurasani from Ibn Abass, but those who were recording traditions omitted the later part 'Khurasin' from his full name in order to make it shorter. Later transmitters not knowingthis, took it for 'Ata bin Abu Rabbah. Ismaeli here mentions a story which Salih bin Ahmad quotes from Ali bin Madyani. Ghassani has also mentioned it inhis Tamheed al-Muhmal .

Ibn Madini says that heard Hisham bin Yusuf says: when I asked about the commentary of some of the verses of Baqara and Al Imran, he asked me to excuse him for not answering. Quoting Hisham Ibn Madyani says: After this happening whenever Ibn Jarih narrated a tradition from Ibn Abbas he would add the term 'Khurasani' after it. Hisham said that it was very boring to follow such a pattern and thus abandoned doing this.

Ibn Madini says that he related this story because Muhammad bin Thawr who used – in accordance with one tradition – to narrate this tradition from Ibn Jarih from 'Ata from Ibn Abbas, thinking that the said 'Ata was 'Ata bin Abu Rabbah. Fakihi however narrates this tradition from Muhammad bin Thawr from Ibn Jarih from 'Ata from Ibn Abbas not making use of the term 'Khurasani'.

Abd al-Razzaq also narrates this tradition in the same manner though with the difference that he makes use of the term 'Khurasani'.

Ibn Hajar says that it is very amazing that Bukhari did not note this. He believes that Ibn Jarih has heard this tradition from 'Ata Khurasani as well as 'Ata Abu Rabbah. The fact that 'Ata bin Abu Rabbah did not narrate commentary traditions does not imply that he has not mentioned it elsewhere in other chapter or in his dialogues with others. How did it happen for Bukhari that he did not see this whereas he was very strict in terms of fulfilling the condition of 'connection' and was dependent on his master, Ali bin Madini who has narrated this story?

Concluding his discussion, Ibn Hajar adds one more reason to prove his point of view saying that it is a good reason to prove his opinion that Bukhari has not frequently mentioned this tradition. He has sufficed to quoting it thrice using the above-mentioned chain. If Bukhari did not notice the problem, he would mention it several times. This is because the literal meaning of this tradition is in compliance with his procedural rules.[136]

What we want to demonstrate here is that memorizers and jurists did not take the traditions reported by Bukhari and Muslim for granted. They were critical of them. It is not understandable why Ibn Hajar defends Bukhari whereas he knows here Bukhari is not right. We leave passing any judgments in regards with his defenses to our dear readers.

The Tradition Masruq Narrates from Um Ruman

The Tradition Masruq Narrates from Um Ruman is another forged tradition reported by Bukhari in hisSahih , book expedition.

Musa bin Ismael narrates from Abu Awana from Husain from Abu Wael from Masruq bin Ajda'a from Um Ruman, which is as under:Um Ruman, the mother of 'Aisha said that while 'Aisha and she were sitting, an Ansari woman came and said, "May Allah harm such and-such a person!" Um Ruman said to her: What is the matter?" She replied, "My son was amongst those who talked of the story (of the Slander)." Um Ruman said, "What is that?" She said, "So-and-so...." and narrated the whole story. On that 'Aisha said, "Did Allah's Apostle hear about that?" She replies, "yes ." 'Aisha further said, "And Abu Bakr too?" She replied, "Yes." On that, 'Aisha fell down fainting, and when she came to her senses, she had got fever with rigors. I put her clothes over her and covered her. The Prophet came and asked, "What is wrong with this (lady)?" Um Ruman replied, "O Allah's Apostle! She (i.e. 'Aisha) has got temperature with rigors." He said, "Perhaps it is because of the story that has been talked about?" She said, "Yes." 'Aisha sat up and said, "By Allah, if I took an oath (that I am innocent), you would not believe me, and if I said (that I am not innocent), you would not excuse me. My and your example is like that of Jacob and his sons (as Jacob said): 'It is Allah (Alone) Whose Help can be sought against that you assert.' Um Ruman said, "The Prophet then went out saying nothing. Then Allah declared her innocence. On that, 'Aisha said (to the Prophet), "I thank Allah only; thank neither anybody else nor you."[137]

Great memorizers and this fabricated tradition

According to this tradition, Masruq in Ajda'a has heard the said story from Um Ruman, mother of Aisha. This is while great Sunni memorizers and scholars have taken this tradition to be wrong, saying that Masruq did not live at a time Um Ruman was living. Among these memorizers are the following names:

Abu Bakr Khatib Baghdadi, Abu Umar bin Abd al-Barr Qurtubi, Abu al-Fazl Qazi Ayaz Yahsibi, Ibrahim bin Yusuf, author ofMatali'a al-Anwar 'ala Sihah al-Athar , Abu al-Qasim Suhaili, commentator onal-Sira , Abu al-Fath bin Sayyid al-Nas from Spain, Jamal al-Din Mazi, Shams al-Din Dahabi and Abu Saeed Salah al-Din Ulaei. Here are the words of these great memorizers concerning this tradition. Commenting on this tradition, Ibn Abd al-Barr says: The tradition reported by Masruq is mursal (its chain is broken) and thus he might hear it from 'Aisha.[138] After relating this tradition, Mazi quotes Khatib as saying: This is a strange tradition reported by Abu Wael Masruq. No one has reported if from Masruq other than Husain bin Abd al-Rahman. This tradition is mursal for Um Ruman died at the time of the Holy Prophet (s) and Masruq did not live at her time. Masruq used to report it from Um Masruq in a mursal form saying: 'Um Masruq was asked'. Husain made a mistake as he took Masruq for the person who raised this question. It is possible that some of the reporters of this tradition may have recorded the passive voice of the verb (سئلت ) as its active voice as some record both voices in the same form. If this probability holds it implies that Husain is not mistaken in regard with this tradition and that is why some have narrated this tradition from Husain in the form of a correct format. According to Abu Bakr Khatib, Bukhari has reported this tradition from Masruq using the active voice (I asked Um Ruman), not grasping the problem existing. He says that he has dealt with this issue in detail in hisal-Marasil and thus there is no need to repeat it again.[139]

Elaborating on Um Ruman's life account, Suhaili, a memorizer, says: Bukhari narrates a tradition from Masruq, which says: I asked Um Ruman, mother of Aisha, about the accusations people leveled against Aisha…. This is while Masruq was born according to all scholars after the demise of the Holy Prophet (s) and thus he never saw Um Ruman. Some are of the view that he did not understand the problem properly. Whereas others are of the view that the tradition in question is correct, and thus preferable to the opinion that Um Ruman died during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s). Abu Bakr Ibn Arabi objected to this tradition and thus he ignored it.[140]

According to Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, the tradition Masruq reported from Um Ruman has appeared in Bukhari in 'an'ana (observing the order of reporters) and other formats, whereas Musruq did not live at the time of Um Ruman. The summery of Khatib's response is that Masruq may have used the passive voice of (سئلت ) and the recorder may have also used the same format, but later recorders may have recorded it as active voice, thus introducing a change in it. Thus all the problems that emerged later originate in the way this word was written.[141]

After quoting Khatib's words, Ibn Hajar attempts to answer it and defend Bukhari thus saying: The author ofMashariq and Matali'a , Suhaili and Ibn Sayyid al-Nas have accepted Khatib's point of view. Following Dahabi, Mazzi in hisMukhtasar , 'Alaei in hisMarasil and also other have also agreed with Khatib has pointed out, though the author of al-Huda has tried to resist the opinion cherished by the said scholars.[142]

A glance at the life account of some the [said] memorizers

Qazi Ayaz, a memorizer, is the author ofMashariq al-Anwar ala Sihah al-Akhbar, a well-known and reliable book. In this book of his, he deals with distortions, misspellings and other errors of books likeal-Muwatta ,Sahih Bukhari andSahih Muslim .

Matali'ah al-Anwar ala Sihah al-Athar is also an important book that is authored by Ibrahim bin Yusuf, a memorizer of tradition. Describing it, Chalabi says: It treats the problems faced byal-Muwatta ,Sahih Muslimand Sahih Bukhari , explaining the difficult terms and strange traditions in these books. This book is authored by Ibn Qaraqul Ibrahim bin Yusuf who died in 569 AH. He wrote his book in a way Qazi Ayaz wrote hisMashariq al-Anwar . Shams al-Din Muhammd bin Muhammad Musili (d. 774 AH) presented it in the form poems.

The book begins with these words: Thanks to Allah who made His religion dominant. This work is abstracted from reliable commentaries and explanations made by Abu al-Fazl Ayaz bin Musa bin Ayaz Basti in hisMashriqal-Anwar , with this difference that Abu Ishaq bin Qaraqul, a jurist, summarized, edited and explained it.[143]

An account of the life of 'Alai, a memorizer

His full name is Khalil bin Kalidi Salah al-Adin Abu Sa'ed Demishqi. In hisal-Tabaqat, Qazi Shuhba presents his life account as under:

He was a prominent scholar, researcher and memorizer. He was born in 694 AH in Damascus but settled in Bayt al-Maqdis. He heard numerous traditions from traditionists. He travelled to different countries hearing traditions from around 700 scholars. He learnt the science of tradition from Mazzi and others and the science of jurisprudence from Sheikh Burhan Fazeri and Sheikh Kamal al-Din Ibn Zamalkani. He accompanied Sheikh Burhan Farazi and wrote a Mashikha for him. He topped jurisprudence under Ibn Zamalkani recording plenty of his words and instructions. Though he was allowed to practice ijtihad, he continued learning and memorizing until he excelled others in this area. He taught at Asadiyya School and Sahib Hams' Circle until he was appointed as a professor at Salahiyya School in Quds.

He lived till the end of his life, teaching, issuing religious decrees, narrating traditions and compiling books. In his Mu'aja, Dahabi mentions the name of 'Alai and praises him. Commenting on him, Husain in his Mu'ajam (and its supplement), says: He was a pioneer in jurisprudence, syntax, science of principles, sciences of tradition and rijal. He was expert in understanding texts and documents. He was heir to the memorizers who preceded him. His works show that he was a leading figure in different sciences. He taught, issued religious decrees and debated (with others on religious issues). No one filled in the vacuum that was created after his death.

Focusing on him, Asnawi in hisal-Tabaqat, says: He was a memorizer and a leading jurist of his time. He was intelligent, careful, eloquent, benevolent and magnificent. He wrote good books on tradition as well as on jurisprudence. He taught at Salahiyya School, spending also part of his time to working, issuing religious decrees and compiling books.

In hisal-Tabaqat al-Kubra Subki says: He was a famous and reliable memorizer. He was aware of the names of reporters, their weaknesses and also the texts (of traditions). He was also expert in jurisprudence, theology, prose and poems. He was a practicing Muslim. He was an orthodox Ash'arite. No body replaced him after his death… No one among his contemporaries could reach him in the science of tradition. He was good at other sciences such as jurisprudence, syntax, exegesis and theology. He died in Muharram 761 AH in Quds… He wrote several books …[144]

Ibn Sikkin and the said fabricated tradition

Abu Ali bin Sikkin[145] , a memorizer and author ofal-Huruf fi al-Sahaba which is one of the sources ofal-Isti'ab is another scholar who regards this tradition as wrong and incorrect. Commenting on it, Ibn Hajar says: Prior to Khatib, others also said that this tradition was wrong. Elaborating on Um Ruman's life, Ibn Sikkin in hisSahaba says that Um Ruman died during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s). According to the said tradition, Husain narrates from Abu Wael from Masruq who says that he asked Um Ruman…

According to Ibn Sikkin this is wrong for according to this tradition Masruq reports from Um Ruman. He says Husain is the only reporter who has reported this tradition. Some are of the view that Masruq did not hear any tradition from Um Ruman. This is because Um Ruman died during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s).[146]

An evaluation of the opinion of author of al-Huda

As mentioned by Ibn Hajar, the author ofal-Huda is opposed to other scholars in this regard. The author ofal-Huda is Ibn Qayyim Jawziyya, author ofZad al-Ma'ad fi Huda Khair al-Ibad . It seems as if Ibn Hajar's opinion is wrong. This is because in his book Ibn Qayyim first treats the opinions of those who reject the said tradition. Later on, he deals with the views of those who try to regard it as correct through justifying it. He does not prefer anyone of these two opinions. Thus Ibn Hajar's opinion that Ibn Qayyim is opposed to other scholars who reject this tradition is wrong.

In addition, commenting on the wives of the Holy Prophet (s), Ibn Qayyim says that anyone who is a little bit aware of the history (of Islam) does not dear reject all historians just because of a single tradition. [The tradition Musruqreports from Um Ruman is against what all historians say. This is because according to historians she died during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s). Thus the acceptance of this tradition is tantamount to the rejection of the words of historians].

Commenting on this tradition he narrates from 'Akrama bin Ammar from Abu Zamil from Ibn Abbas who says: Abu Sufyan addressing the Holy Prophet (s) that he had three requests from the Holy Prophet (s). The Holy Prophet (s) fulfilled his requests. One of his requests was that he asked the Holy Prophet (s) to marry Um Habiba, the most beautiful Arab woman who lived in his house.

No doubt, this tradition is wrong. According to Abu Ahmad Ibn Hazm this tradition was no doubt fabricated by 'Akrama bin 'Ammar whereas on Ibn Jawzi's view it was the result of an illusion which some reporters had. It was because of this tradition that 'Akrama was sharply criticized. This is because historians are unanimous that Um Habiba was the wife of Ubaidullah bin Jahsh and she bore a child from him. Ubaidullah and Um Habiba both embraced Islam and migrated to Ethiopia, though later Ubaidullah became a Christian and Um Habiba remained a Muslim. It was at this time that the Holy Prophet (s) sent someone to Ethiopia to ask for the hand of Um Habiba. Najjashi, the king of Ethiopia married Um Habiba to the Holy Prophet (s) and determined a dowry for her on behalf of the Apostle of Allah.

This happening occurred in the year 8 AH. After the conquest of Mecca, Abu Sufyan went to Medina and visited his daughter there in her house. Um Habiba folded Prophet's bed lest Ubu Sufyan should not sit on it.

All agrees that Abu Sufyan and Mu'awiya embraced Islam in the year 8 AH after the conquest of Mecca. This tradition also contains that Abu Sufyan also asked the Prophet to appoint him as a commander to fight against disbelievers just as he fought against Muslims. The Holy Prophet (s) according to this tradition answered him in the affirmative.

The appointment of Abu Sufyan as a commander by the Holy Prophet (s) is not confirmed [by any historians] but there is too much fuss on the meaning of this tradition with the scholars following different courses. Some have even said that according to this tradition the Holy Prophet (s) married Um Habiba after the conquest of Mecca whereas others are of the view that since historians did not mention it, the claim made by those unaware of history is not acceptable…[147]

In short, historians are unanimous that Um Ruman died at the time of the Holy Prophet (s) and thus Masruq did not see him. It is not thus acceptable to refute the consensus made by scholars through a single tradition related by Bukhari in hisSahih .

As mentioned before, like Khatib and others, Ibn Qayyim rejected this tradition of Bukhari and thus Ibn Hajar is wrong when he says that Ibn Qayyim is opposed to Khatib and others.

I suppose Ibn Hajar criticizes Khatib and his followers for endorsing Waqidi's opinion that Um Ruman died during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s) with the aim to defend the tradition reported by Bukhari in his book. The explanations presented by Ibn Qayyim are a suitable answer to what Ibn Hajar said.

As pointed out before, the aim of this study is to prove that great Sunni scholars have criticized some of the traditions reported by Bkhari putting to question their credibility.

Moreover, as Ibn Hajar rejected Waqid's point of view concerning the death of Um Ruman refuting all the objections against it, we also criticize him for his refraining to mention the tradition of Ghadir Khum and state that its authenticity is beyond any doubt. Thus Fakhr Razi's reference to Waqidi's not mentioning the tradition of Ghadir Khums is invalid.

Temporary Marriage forbidden in Khaibar year

Among other invalid traditions reported by Bukhari is the tradition of the prohibition of temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar.

In hisSahih (book on expedition), Bukhari narrates from Yahya bin Qaz'a from Malik bin Ismael from Ibn Shahb from Hasan bin Muhammad bin Ali and his brother Abdullah from their father who quotes Ali bin Abi Talib as saying, "The Holy Prophet (s) prohibited temporary marriage and the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar".[148]

The same tradition has also appeared in chapter 'slaughtered animals' in hisSahih . He narrates from Abdullah bin Yusuf, from Malik from Ibn Shahab from Abdullah and Hasan from their father who quotes Ali bin Abi Talib as saying, "The Holy Prophet (s) prohibited temporary marriage and the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar".[149]

Muslim also narrated this tradition in his book, using different chains saying:

Yahya bin Yahya narrated Ibn Shihab, from Abdullah and Hasan, children of Muhammad bin 'Ali from their father who quoted Imam Ali as saying, "Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon him) on the Day of Khaibar prohibited forever the contracting of temporary marriage and eating of the flesh of the domestic asses."

a) Abdullah bin Muhammad bn Asma Zab'ai narrated from Juwariyya from Malik (as in the previous chain) who said that he heard Ali addressing somebody say, "You are forgetful…. This is because the Messenger of Allah had prohibited us from contracting temporary marriage with women …"

b) Abu Bakr bin Abi Shaiba and Ibn Numair and Zuhair bin Harb from Ibn Ayyina from Zuhair, from Zuhri from Hasan and Abdullah children of Muhammad bin Ali from their father who quotes 'Ali (Allah be pleased with him) as saying, "The Holy Prophet (s) on the Day of Khaibar forbade forever the contracting of temporary marriage and the eating of the flesh of domestic asses".

c) Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Numair narrated from his father, from Ubaidullah from Ibn Shahab from Hasan and Abdullah children of Muhammad bin Ali from their father who said, "Ali (Allah be pleased with him) heard that Ibn Abbas gave some relaxation in connection with the contracting of temporary marriage, whereupon he said: Don't be hasty (in your religious verdict), Ibn 'Abbas, for Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) on the Day of Khaibar prohibited forever the doing of it and eating of the flesh of domestic asses".

d) Abu Tahir and Harmala bin Yahya narrated from Wahab from Yunus from Ibn Shahab from Hasan and Abdullah children of Muhammad bin Ali from their father from an a person who heard Ali (s) addressing Ibn Abbas say, "The Messenger of Allah (s) forbade contracting temporary marriage with women and flesh of domestic assess on the day of Khaibar."[150]

Great Sunni scholars and this fake tradition

This tradition that has appeared inSahih Bukhari andSahih Muslim with various chains explicitly mentions that temporary marriage was forbidden in the battle of Khaibar. This is while great Sunni scholars and traditionists do not accept this story and take it to be a mere illusion. Here are the words of some of great Sunni scholars in this regard.

Commenting on this story, Suhaili, a memorizer says the tradition Malik reports from Abu Shihab, is flawed. This is because according to this tradition the Holy Prophet (s) prohibits temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar.

This is while no historiographer has accepted that temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar. Quoting this tradition from Abu Shihab from Abdullah bin Muhammad, Abu Ainiyya says: Allah's Apostle prohibited eating the flesh of domestic asses and temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar. This tradition implies that he prohibited it soon after the battle of Khaibar was over. This shows that the words used by Abu Shihab not Malik are altered. This is because some of the reporters of Abu Shihab have stated the very words stated by Malik.[151]

Somewhere in hisZad al-Ma'ad , Ibn Qayyim Jawziyya says: The truth is that temporary marriage was prohibited not in the battle of Khaibar but in the year of the conquest of Mecca. This is while some scholars relying on the tradition reported from Ali bin Abi Talib (a.s) inSahih Bukhari andSahih Muslim have thought that temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar…[152]

Elsewhere in his book, he says: The truth is that temporary marriage was prohibited in the year of the conquest of Mecca. This is because authentic traditions signify that Muslims were practicing temporary marriage with the permission of the Holy Prophet (s) in the year of the conquest of Mecca. If temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar it would imply that the same ruling was abrogated twice – a thing that has never happened in Islamic laws. On the other hand, those who dwelled in Khaibar fortress were Jewish not Muslim women and it was not yet permissible for Muslims to marry the People of Book.[153]

He also mentions elsewhere in his book that it is reported that the Holy Prophet (s) legalized temporary marriage in the year of the conquest of Mecca, whereas elsewhere it is reported that he prohibited it in the same year.

In addition, the scholars are divided on whether or not temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar. Thus the truth is thus that temporary marriage was prohibited in the year of the conquest of Mecca and what was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar was only the eating of the flesh of domestic asses…[154]

In hisal-Maghazi , Badr al-Din Aiyni quotes Ibn Abd al-Barr as saying: It is incorrect to say that temporary marriage was forbidden in the battle of Khaibar. According to Suhaili no historiographer has said that temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar.[155]

InSahih Bukhari (chapter on marriage), Shihab al-Din Qastalani reports this tradition as under: Malik bin Ismael narrates from Ibn Ainiyya who heard Zuhri say: Hasan bin Muhammad bin Ali and his brother Abdullah quoting their father informed me that Ali (a.s) addressing Ibn Abbas said: Prophet prohibited temporary marriage and eating the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar.

Commenting on this tradition he says: The phrase 'in the battle of Khaibar' shows that both of them (temporary marriage and eating the flesh of domestic asses) were prohibited [in the same year]. In his al-Maghazi, commenting on the battle of Khaibar, he says:

Allah's Apostle prohibited temporary marriage and eating the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar. Despite all these, in his al-Ma'arifa, Bayhaqi says: Ibn Ainiyya thought Ali's tradition was related to the prohibition of eating the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar not to the prohibition of temporary marriage.

According to Bayhaqi it seems that Ibn Ainiyya intends to say the Prophet – based on the existing traditions – legalized temporary marriage after the battle of Khaibar though he prohibited it again. When Ali (a.s) talked about the prohibition of temporary marriage to Ibn Abbas he referred to the ultimate prohibition.

According to Suhaili the prohibition of temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar is something that is not approved by historiographers…[156]

Commenting on the tradition in the book of expedition, Qastalani quotes Ibn Abd al-Bar as saying that it is wrong to say that temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar. According to Bayhaqi no historiographer has agreed with it.[157]

Ibn Hajar 'Asqalani

Commenting on this tradition, he said: It is said that this tradition is altered, but the truth is that Prophet (s) prohibited eating the flesh of domestic asses and temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar.

Temporary marriage was not legalized in the battle of Khaibar. We will throw light on it elsewhere in the book of marriage.

Quoting related traditions and presenting in detail the opinions expressed by Bayhaqi, Suhaili, Ibn Abd al-Barr and others in the book of marriage, he says: The problem can be solved in this way that Ali (a.s) was not aware of the permissibility of temporary marriage on the day of the conquest of Mecca. This is because as we will explain temporary marriage was prohibited at night as they were starting their journey. Abu Awana has reported a tradition from Salim bin Abdullah in this regard, considering it as authentic. This tradition confirms the outward meaning of the said tradition. According to this tradition, when a man told Ibn Umar that such and such person puts to question the permissibility of temporary marriage, the latter said that by Allah he knew that Allah's Apostle (s) prohibited temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar and since then "we did not practice temporary marriage".[158]

According to me the desire to defend Bukhari has caused Ibn Hajar to accuse – on the basis of Sunni traditions – Imam Ali (a.s), the gate of knowledge of committing error and suffering from ignorance. We must take refuge to Allah from the prejudices that may bring one's downfall.

Dehlavi

The words uttered by Dehlavi and his father Shah Waliullah inQurra al-'Ainain , tell us that Ibn Hajar's opinion is wrong. In his book, Dehlwi addresses the objections raised against Umar bin Khattab. Commenting on the eleventh objection he says: Though temporary marriage and Mut'a Hajj were lawful during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (s), Umar prohibited both of them, abrogating thus divine laws and prohibiting lawful things. As mentioned in Sunni books, Umar himself confesses that he has done such a thing, saying: Two pleasures were lawful during the time of the Holy Prophet (s) but I prohibited them.

In response it has to be said thatSahih Bukhari is the most authentic Sunni source. Here Bukhari narrates a tradition from Salma bin Akwa'a and Sabra bin Ma'abad Juhani from Abu Huraira. This tradition has also appeared in other authentic sources. According to this tradition, Prophet (s) permitted temporary marriage in the battle of Awtas for three days but after the expiration of these three days he prohibited it forever.

Imam Ali's tradition is very popular in this regard, with everybody knowing it to the extent that even his grandchildren narrated this tradition from him.Al-Muwatta ,Sahih Muslim and other famous sources have recorded this tradition, using various chains of transmitters.

Some Shias have cast this doubt that temporary marriage was prohibited in the battle of Khaibar, but it was legalized again in the battle of Awtas.

In reply it has to be said that this doubt originates in misunderstanding and confusing concepts. This is because Ali's tradition of the battle of Khaibar tells us that eating the flesh of domestic asses is forbidden not temporary marriage. Despite all these, his words imply the doubt that both were prohibited in the battle of Khaibar.

Some have dealt with this misunderstanding as truth, considering thus it was in the battle of Khaibar that temporary marriage was forbidden. If Ali (a.s) really believed that it was in the battle of Khaibar that temporary marriage was forbidden how could he refute Ibn Abbas' point of view convincing him (that this was not the case)?

This is while Imam Ali (a.s) referred to this tradition while making attempts to convince Ibn Abbas. He strongly prevented Ibn Abbas from permitting temporary marriage accusing him of being forgetful.

On the other hand, those who think that temporary marriage was forbidden in the battle of Khaibar actually refute the argument presented by Ali (a.s). This kind of approach shows their ignorance and stupidity.[159]

In my point of view, these comments show that the traditions concerning the prohibition of temporary marriage in the battle of Khaibar are wrong and scholars like Bukhari, Muslim and others who rely on such traditions are ignorant. This is because the correctness of these traditions implies that the argument present by Imam Ali (a.s) is not sound.

This shows that Ibn Hajar and those who followed his line of thinking are not prudent enough, because they accuse Imam Ali (a.s) of not knowing about the prohibition of temporary marriage.

It has to be noted that here Dehlavi has related some objections concerning Shias. [We cannot due to lack of space, deal with them here]. To know about the flaws of his objections, dear readers can refer toTasheed al-Mataeen .

Imam Shaf'ai

He believes that the traditions reported from Ali (a.s) concerning the prohibition of the flesh of domestic asses, wrongly contains the term 'temporary marriage'. According to Aini Shafi'ai narrates from Malik (using his chain) from Ali (a.s) who said that Prophet (s) prohibited eating the flesh of domestic asses in the battle of Khaibar.

Shafi'ai did not comment on this tradition, refraining from touching the issue of temporary marriage due to the difference existing about it.[160]

Thus it is crystal clear that Shafi'ai is also critical of these so-called authentic traditions!

Abstract

Great Sunni scholars, tradition memorizers and critics of traditions do not accept many of the traditions reported by Bukhari and Muslim. To explain it further distances us from what is our real aim. Thus we suffice to what we have thus far said.

Now that we learnt that great Sunni scholars questioned many of the traditions reported by Bukhari and Muslim, how can we accept Fakhr Razi's argument that Ghadir tradition is false when he says to prove his point of view that Bukhari and Muslim have not mentioned it? How can we say that the Holy Prophet (s) did not say it, for Bukhari and Muslim have not paid attention to it?

Chapter 1: The bourgeois and the official: a historical overview

German literature, in the narrow sense, is the literature of the states, predominantly the Lutheran states, of the Holy Roman Empire, and of their 19th-century successor kingdoms, which were gathered by Bismarck into his Second Empire and, after an interval as the Weimar Republic, formed the core of Hitler’s Third Empire. Austria, though a part of the Holy Roman Empire, can be excluded from this story, as Bismarck excluded it, together with Hungary and Austria’s other, non-Imperial, territories in the Danube basin. Prussia, however, has to be included because of its crucial role in the political defi nition of Germany, even though the duchy, later kingdom, of Prussia (now divided between Poland, the Baltic states, and Russia) was never part of the Empire but was an external power-base for the Electors of Brandenburg, rather like Austria’s Danubian hinterland, and even though Brandenburg-Prussia contributed little of signifi cance to German literature, outside the realm of philosophy, until the 19th century.

The clergy and the university The Lutheranism is important. The Reformation of the early 16th century marks the beginning of German literature, in the sense of the term used here. Not just because the Reformation followed relatively soon (and doubtless not by chance) on the linguistic changes which brought into existence the modern form of the German language, and on the invention of moveable-type printing, which made it desirable, and feasible, to have a standard written language for the whole area across which German books might circulate. By transferring the responsibility for the defence of the Christian faith from the Emperor to the local princes, the Reformation made it possible to imagine a German (Protestant) cultural identity that could do without the Empire altogether, as free of political links to the Roman past as it was of religious links to the Roman present. More, the Reformation launched the individual Protestant states on a voyage towards cultural and political self-suffi ciency even within the German-speaking world. In particular their clergy, then the largest class of the professionally educated and professionally literate, the bearers of cultural values and memory, were cut off from their fellows, even their fellow Protestants, by the boundaries of their state and their historical epoch. They could call only with reservations on the experience of Christians in other places and times and, in practical matters, they had to make their careers in dependence, direct or indirect, on the local monarch. Charged with providing, or supervising, primary education and other charitable activities, such as the care of orphans, which in Catholic states remained the responsibility of relatively independent religious orders or local religious houses, Protestant ministers were often virtually an executive branch of the state civil service.

The instrumentalization of the clergy in the Protestant princely states exercised a profound infl uence on German literature and philosophy because of a peculiarity in Germany’s political and economic development. The towns, mainly Imperial Free Cities, which in the late Middle Ages had been the most dynamic element in German society - centres of commerce, industry, and banking which were also the centres of a richly inventive middle-class culture, especially in the visual arts - went into decline in the century after the Reformation and failed to adjust to Europe’s shift from overland to overseas trade and to the new importance of the maritime nations. Germany’s devastating religious civil war, the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648, sealed their fate. In the post-war period only the state powers could raise the capital necessary for reconstruction, and with few exceptions, the great Free Cities decayed into mere ‘home towns’. The princely territories, with their predominantly agricultural economies and rural populations that could be pressed into military service, gained correspondingly in relative power and infl uence. A political revolt of the middle classes, which in 16th-century Holland and 17th-century England was largely successful but which in France went underground with the suppression of the Fronde by the young Louis XIV, was in Germany out of the question. The Empire became a federation of increasingly absolute monarchs who in cultural as in political matters looked to the France of the Sun King as their model. The courtly arts, such as architecture and opera, dedicated to the entertainment and glorifi cation of the prince and his entourage, did well, but printed books were predominantly academic (so often in Latin) or, if they were intended to circulate more widely among the depressed middle classes, were either trivial fantasies, without social or political signifi cance, or works of religious devotion commending contentment with one’s lot. One institution, however, of the greatest importance to the middle class, which after the middle of the 17th century fl ourished better in Germany than elsewhere in Europe, was the university. At a time when England made do with two universities, Germany, with only four or fi ve times the population, had around 40. The university had come late to the German lands - the fi rst was at Prague in 1348 - but in the post-Reformation world it had a quite new signifi cance. The absolute, princely state, with its ambition to control everything, needed offi cers to carry its will into every part of its domains, and these the university provided, principally, until the later 18th century, by training the clergy. Practical subjects, such as fi nance and agriculture, were also taught, and much earlier in Germany than in England, but always with a view to their utility in the state administration. The offspring of well-to-do professionals could afford to study law and medicine and rely on family connections to fi nd them a billet, but for an able young man from a poor background the theology faculty, much the largest and most richly endowed, offered the best prospects of social advancement and future employment.

The 18th-century crisis Eighteenth-century Germany was a stagnant society in which economic and political power was largely concentrated in the hands of the state, and intellectual life was initially in the grip of the state churches. There was little room for private enterprise, material or cultural. Yet this society experienced a literary and philosophical explosion, the consequences of which are still with us. The constriction itself put up the boiler pressure. In England and France there was a signifi cant property-owning middle class, a bourgeoisie in the full sense of the word, able to fi nd an outlet for its capital and its energies in trade and industry, emigration and empire, and eventually in political revolution and reform. In Germany the equivalent class was proportionally much smaller and shut away in the towns, where it could engage in political or economic activity of only local importance. What Germany had in abundance was a class of state officials (and of Protestant clergymen who were state officials by another name), who were close to political power, and were often its executive arm, but who could not exercise it in their own right, and could only look on enviously at the achievements of their counterparts in England, Holland, or Switzerland, or, after 1789, in France:

‘They do the deeds, and we translate the narrations of them into German’, wrote one of them. The only outlet for the energies of this peculiarly German middle class was the book. Germany in the 18th century had more writers per head than anywhere else in Europe, roughly one for every 5,000 of the entire population.

Its fi rst industrial capitalists, its only private entrepreneurs who before 1800 were mass-producing goods for a mass market, were its publishers. In the middle of the 18th century Germany’s official class entered a crisis. The Seven Years War (1756-63) defi nitively established Prussia as the dominant Protestant power in the Empire and, on the continent of Europe, a counterweight to Catholic Austria, while Prussia’s ally, England, emerged similarly victorious on the world stage in the race for colonies at the expense of its Catholic rival, France. Yet at this moment when - at least from a German point of view - Anglo-German Protestantism seemed to have demonstrated its superiority in all respects over Europe’s Catholic South, the religious heart of the cultural alliance began to succumb to an enemy within. Under the name of Enlightenment, the deist and historicist critique of Christianity, which had originated largely in England, began to detach Germany’s theologically educated elite from the faith of their fathers. Since there was not much of a private sector in which an ex-cleric could seek alternative employment, and since loyalty to the state church was something of a touchstone for loyalty to the state itself, a crisis of conscience was an existential crisis too. The struggle for a way out was a matter of intellectual and sometimes personal life and death. Two generations of unprecedented mental exertion and suffering within the pressure-vessel of the German state brought into existence some of the most characteristic features of modern culture, which elsewhere took much longer to develop.

Two routes led out of the crisis, one considerably more secure than the other. First, it was possible to adapt Germany’s most distinctive state institution, the university, to meet the new need.

New career paths, inside and outside academic life, became available for those with a scholarly bent but a distaste for theology, through the creation of new subjects of study or the expansion of previously minor options. Classical philology, modern history, languages and literatures, the history of art, the natural sciences, education itself, and, perhaps most infl uential of all, idealist philosophy - in these new or newly signifi cant university disciplines 18th and early 19th-century Germany established a pre-eminence which, in some cases, has lasted into the present.

Second, and more precariously, the ex-theologian could turn to the one area of private enterprise and commercial activity readily accessible to him: the book market. It has been calculated that, even excluding philosophers, 120 major literary fi gures writing in German and born between 1676 and 1804 had either studied theology or were the children of Protestant pastors. But there was a snare concealed behind the lure of literature. To make money a book had to circulate widely among the middle classes, the professionals and business people, and their wives and daughters, not just among the officials. But these were the classes that the political constitution of absolutist Germany excluded from power and infl uence. It was not therefore possible to write about the real forces shaping German life and at the same time to write about something familiar and important to a wide readership. The price of success was triviality and falsifi cation; if you were seriously devoted to real issues you would stay esoteric, and poor. The German literary revival of the 18th century was in great measure the attempt, fuelled by secularization, to resolve this dilemma.

Especially in the earlier phases it seemed that the example of England, the ally in Protestantism, might be the answer, and hopes of a German equivalent to the English realistic novel, at once truthful and popular, ran high. But Germany could not model its literature on that of England’s self-confi dent and largely self-governing capitalist middle class. Its social and economic starting point was different, and it had to fi nd its own way.

In Germany, political power and cultural infl uence were concentrated in absolute rulers and their immediate entourage, loosely termed the ‘courts’. The interface between these centres and the rest of society, and specifi cally the groups that made up the reading public, was provided by the state officials.

Therefore, the class of officials - those who belonged to it, those who were educated for it, and those who sought access to it - formed the growth zone for the German national literature.

In material terms, a state salary, whether a cleric’s, a professor’s, or an administrator’s, or even just a personal pension from the monarch, provided a foundation so that a literary career, albeit part-time, was at least possible and did not have to be a relentless chase after maximal earnings. In intellectual terms, the writers’ proximity to power, and to the state institutions, meant that the issues they raised in the symbolic medium of literature were genuinely central to the national life and identity, even if their perspective was that of non-participants. The public literary genre which most precisely reflected the ambiguous realities of life in the growth zone, and which, towards the end of the century, reached a point of perfection subsequently recognized as ‘classical’, was the poetic drama, the drama which, though performable and performed, was most widely distributed and appreciated as a printed book. The dramatic form reflected the political and cultural dominance of the princely court, for none of Germany’s many theatres were purely commercial undertakings, all required some kind of state subsidy, and even in the Revolutionary period most still served their original and principal function of entertaining the ruler. Circulation as a book, however, as Germany’s equivalent of a novel, both truthful and commercially successful, reflected the aspiration of the middle classes to a market-based culture of their own. And, fi nally, the philosophical, if not explicitly theological, tenor of the themes of these plays reflected the secularization of Lutheranism which was providing a new vocabulary for the description of personal and social existence, whether by playwrights in the state theatres or by professors in the state universities. Among the most important elements in this new vocabulary were the concepts of moral (rather than political) ‘freedom’ and of ‘Art’, as the realm of human experience in which this freedom was made visible. The German ‘classical’ era gave to the world not only the meaning of the word ‘Art’ which enabled Oscar Wilde to say nearly a hundred years later that it was quite useless, but also the belief that literature was primarily ‘Art’ (rather than, say, a means of communication).

The rise of bourgeois Germany ‘Germany’ around 1800 was not so much a geographical as a literary expression. The most powerful impetus to give it a political meaning probably came from Napoleon. He imposed the abolition of the ecclesiastical territories, a radical reduction in the number of the principalities from over 300 to about 40, and the organization of the remainder into a federation of sovereign states, even before the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. His annihilating defeat of Prussia in the same year forced on it a programme of modernization which was to determine German social and political structures for the next century and a half. The modernization did not, however, take the republican form it had taken in France, and though constitutionalism briefl y fl ourished when it was necessary to rouse the people to throw off the Napoleonic yoke from the necks of their princes, it was abandoned after the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 which turned Germany, until 1848, into a confederation of police states. The Prussian commercial, industrial, and professional middle classes were still too weak to challenge the king, or even the landowning nobility (the Junkers), and introduce representative government or a separation of legislature and executive. Instead the successful bid for power came from the king’s officials, and the autocratic absolutism of the 18th century gave way to the bureaucratic absolutism of the 19th - a rule of law, free of conscious corruption and directed to the common welfare, but imposing a military level of discipline on all layers of society. The king’s personal decisions remained fi nal, but they were increasingly mediated, and so to some extent checked, by his civil and armed services, into which the nobility were gradually absorbed - partly as a brake on the ambitions of the middle class. The new Prussia, the largest and most powerful of the German Protestant states, had an altogether new signifi cance for its fellows, once the old Imperial framework had vanished.

Territories which before 1806 could pass as constituent parts of a larger whole, however ramshackle and loosely defi ned, now had to justify themselves as economically and politically self-suffi cient states, a task to which none of them, apart from Prussia, Austria, and perhaps Bavaria, could pretend to be equal. Some kind of association between them had to be found. There was a supine intergovernmental ‘Federation’ dominated by Austria and a much more effective Customs Union (Zollverein) of a smaller number of territories grouped round Prussia, but the word ‘Germany’ now meant something future and unreal. If it had once referred to the Empire and any other territories attached to the Empire in which German was spoken and written, now it meant the political unit in which all, or most, German-speakers would fi nd their home. And there was the rub: who precisely was to be included in this future Germany? It could hardly contain both Prussia and Austria, as the old Empire and the new Federation were able, more or less, to contain them - though there were many dreamers to whom this seemed possible, among them the author of ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ - but equally it could hardly exclude them, given their infl uence over the smaller states and frequent interventions in their affairs. In practice, the two great powers were resolving the issue for themselves: Prussia was expanding purposefully westwards to the Rhineland, while Austria was withdrawing from German affairs to concentrate on its non-German-speaking territories in Eastern Europe and North Italy. In the end, the Protestant intellectuals of Northern Germany, still held together, as under the old regime, by the publishing industry and the university network, threw in their lot with Prussia. After a decade of increasing agitation, 1848, Europe’s ‘year of revolutions’, saw the summoning of the Frankfurt Parliament, a quarter of whose membership was made up of academics, clergy, and writers, and which in 1849 offered the Prussian monarch the kingship of a Germany without Austria. Friedrich Wilhelm IV refused to rule by the free choice of his subjects - ‘to pick up a crown from the gutter’ - though his brother, Wilhelm I, accepted the same ‘lesser German’ (kleindeutsch) crown when Bismarck secured it for him by force of arms in 1866-71.

To the extent to which it was a revolution of professors, and perhaps rather further, the failed German revolution of 1848 was a revolution of the officials, the last act, and the fi nest hour, of the 18th-century reading public. It was an attempt to unify Germany by constitutional and administrative means, while retaining for government, and monarchical government at that, the leading role in the structuring of society. But the balance of power in the German middle class was already beginning to shift fundamentally. Between 1815 and 1848 the population grew by 60%, and as poverty intensifi ed the need for employment grew desperate. After some tentative, state-sponsored beginnings in the 1830s, a fi rst wave of industrialization was felt in the 1840s, with huge (often foreign) investments in a railway network, mainly within the Customs Union, and a consequent economic upswing.

The decade ended with an economic as well as a political crash, and with the last of the pre-industrial famines (partly caused by the same potato blight that devastated Ireland) - factors that together led (as in Ireland) to a surge in emigration. But in the following 20 years Prussia, governed from 1862 by Bismarck, embraced economic liberalism as a means of sweeping away historic and institutional obstacles to the unifi cation of its heterogeneous territories, and the long period of intensive growth began which was to transform Germany into an industrial giant.

As a result, when the Second German Empire was founded in 1871 it had a bourgeoisie, a property-owning and money-making class, which was much larger, wealthier, and more signifi cant for the common good than anything the First Empire had known. The consequences for literature and philosophy were far-reaching. As this class emerged, it battled for self-respect and cultural identity with the long-established middle-class instruments of state power, the officials. The revived bourgeoisie had a more obvious interest in the economic and political unifi cation of Germany than civil servants who owed their positions to the multiplication of power centres, and entry to it was not dependent on passage through the universities. In the early years of the 19th century its frustrated political ambitions expressed themselves, particularly in Prussia, in the literature of escape known as ‘Romanticism’, but as it gained in confi dence its literary culture took on a more explicitly revolutionary, anti-official colour - though the oppositional stance betrayed a continuing dependence on what was being opposed. After the humiliation of official Germany at Frankfurt, however, with industry and commerce fl ourishing in the sunshine of state approval, any sense of inferiority passed, the icons of the previous century were cheerfully ridiculed, literature itself became a paying concern as copyright became enforceable, and novels and plays with such strictly bourgeois themes as money, materialism, and social justice emerged from the realm of the trivial and, for a while, linked Germany’s written culture with that of its neighbours in Western Europe. The uniquely - for the outside world perhaps impenetrably - German culture of the late 18th-century Golden Age, scholarly, humanist, cosmopolitan, survived under the patronage of the lesser courts, in the lee of political events and economic changes, until 1848, but thereafter it declined into academicism or, in the case of the kings of Bavaria, into eccentricity. But though the official class had lost supremacy, it had not lost power, and through the universities, despite the growth of private cultural societies and foundations, it remained the guardian of the national past. As the redefi nition of the German state came to preoccupy all minds, so the servants of the state were able to retain for themselves a certain authority and the two main factions in the middle class sank their differences in the national interest. The concept of ‘Bildung’, meaning both ‘culture’ and ‘education’, was the ideological medium in which this fusion could take place, the value on which all could agree, precisely because it left carefully ambiguous whether you achieved ‘Bildung’ by going to university or simply by reading, or at any rate approving, the right books. The term ‘Bildungsbürger’ gained a currency at this time which it has never since lost. Suggesting a middle class united by its experience of ‘Bildung’, its main function is to identify the official with the bourgeois, to create a community of interest between salaried servants of the state and tradesmen, property owners, and self-employed professionals. A crucial step in the defi nition of ‘Bildung’ was the canonizing of the literary achievements of the official class as ‘classical’. Germany in 1871 was not only to be a nation like England or France - it was to have its literary classics like them too.

In Bismarck’s new Germany the bourgeoisie was accommodated, but kept on a short lead. It was given a voice in the Reichstag, the Imperial Diet, and the lesser representative assemblies of the constituent states, but the executive, with the Imperial Chancellor at its head, was in no formal way responsible to these parliaments.

In practice, of course, the Chancellor needed their co-operation to secure his legislative programme and so officialdom lost the almost absolute power it had enjoyed in the earlier part of the century. But the dominant model for a society in which military service was compulsory was provided by the army (with the upper ranks reserved for the nobility), and Bismarck and his successors treated all attempts to establish parliamentary accountability as insubordination: the socialist party was virtually proscribed for over a decade. Within the constraints imposed by the supreme priority of national unity, the agents of autocracy continued to look down on those they regarded as self-interested individualists and materialists because they made money for themselves, rather than receiving a salary from the state. In the world of ‘Bildung’

too the profession of a shared devotion to the national tradition papered over the deep animosity between those who wrote for a living and the university intellectuals whose literary activity was now largely confi ned to historical and critical study. Like Bismarck, the professor of ‘Germanistics’ - as it was beginning to be called - had as little taste for the bourgeois as for the socialists, Catholics, Jews, or women who were now unfortunately as likely as the bourgeois to involve themselves in the national literature.

In the turmoil of 1848-9, a little-noticed pamphlet, drafted by a German philosopher for a tiny group of English radicals, and with the title of The Communist Manifesto, had prophesied that the free markets aspired to by the national bourgeoisies would grow into a global market, a ‘Weltmarkt’. By the 1870s that prophecy was clearly coming true. Germany’s fi rst experience of globalization was painful, however. The worldwide stock-market crash of 1873, which began in Vienna, led to a long depression from which the world did not emerge until the 1890s. In Germany the depression was relatively shallow and some growth continued, though in the 1880s net emigration (which had totalled 3 million over the previous four decades) reached an all-time high of 1.3 million - a fi gure which is itself a measure of the intensity of globalization. In 1879 Bismarck was moved by the effect of cheap American grain imports on the incomes of the land-owning Junkers to listen to the growing demands for protection from other quarters as well, particularly the heavy industry that would be of strategic importance in wartime, and to abandon his earlier policy of free trade, erecting a tariff wall round his new state. At the same time, he put an end to his ‘cultural war’ (Kulturkampf) with the Catholic Church and endeavoured to outfl ank the working-class movement by introducing Europe’s fi rst system of social security. His motives in establishing ‘state socialism’, as it was soon called, were no different from those that had guided him earlier, and which had deep roots in the German past: first, the overriding need for unity in the state and, second, the interests of the agricultural nobility which continued to furnish Prussia with its ruling class. But the protectionist course on which Germany and the other European states now embarked, and which was eventually adopted even by Britain, long the staunchest advocate, and greatest benefi ciary, of free trade, accentuated the division of Europe, and the world, into would-be autarkic blocs.

Thanks to the inability of politicians, of any country, to imagine an international institutional order which would accommodate to each other the competing energies of numerous growing economies, the developed states, whether empires, federations, or unitary nations, set out to achieve economic and political - that is, military - self-suffi ciency. Germany’s bid for colonies in Africa and the South Seas, which began in 1884, was not so much a serious geopolitical move as a symbolic irritant. Like the huge expansion of the navy, it was a declaration that Germany was anyone’s equal and could look after itself. As general growth resumed in the 1890s it became clear that, with its armed forces backed by the largest chemical and electrical industries in the world, and a coal and steel industry that was catching up on the British, Germany was capable, not necessarily of displacing the British Empire, but certainly of disputing its power to impose its own will. A British hegemony was giving way to a bi-polar world, and from the turn of the century something like a Cold War began in the cultural sphere. Britain turned away from the German models, particularly in philosophy and scholarship, which had had great prestige since the days of the Prince Consort, while voices in Germany emphasized the uniqueness of German literary, musical, and philosophical achievements and the need to protect ‘Kultur’ (the creation of the official classes) from contamination by the materialistic and journalistic (that is, bourgeois) ‘civilization’

of the West. The fusion of disparate elements in the concept of the ‘Bildungsbürger’, though rejected by some of the most clear-sighted critics of the Second Empire, was sustained by projecting its tensions outwards on to the relations between nations and defi ning a unique role for the new Germany. Britain and France at this time wove similar myths of their own special mission in world-history. Tariff walls became walls in the mind, and the mental effects were as serious as the economic distortions which put increasing strains on the inadequate international political order. After more than a decade of toying by the nations of Europe with fantasies of their own exceptionality, in 1914 the war-games went real.

The officials strike back Globalization spelled the end of the bourgeoisie, in the strict sense, and not only in Germany. A class living solely off its capital, off the alienated labour of others, was sustainable only by societies with open frontiers, with open spaces into which the disadvantaged and disaffected could expand. As the world economy grew into a single closed system, and as societies that shrank from the challenge of the political co-operation required by economic integration sought - in vain, of course - to seal themselves off in smaller units, so there was less and less room for a leisured capitalist class, and it was forced increasingly into work. The intrusion of work into the world of capital was reflected, in the fi rst decades of the 20th century, in an intellectual upheaval which broke apart the forms and conventions of the earlier stages of cultural modernity and was at least as violent in Germany and Austria as anywhere else. In literature, art, music, philosophy, and psychology, the concepts of identity, collective and personal, that had been appropriate to an age when the world was wide, and economic expansion was untrammelled by political institutions, were subjected to intense and hostile scrutiny. It was Germany’s misfortune that the representatives of the bourgeoisie achieved the political autonomy, and even supremacy, for which they had been struggling for well over half a century, only when their social and economic and even their cultural position was fatally undermined. In 1918 Germany had its revolution at last. But the new republic was born in military defeat and shackled at once by an unequal peace. It was shorn, not only of its symbolic overseas empire, but of much of its mineral wealth in the territories returned to France and the resurrected Poland. Its middle class, which had grown into prosperity over the previous two generations, was pauperized in the terrible infl ations which reflected the lack of confi dence in its future, and, with the loss of their capital, many private foundations and charities, old and new, ceased to exist. Its rivals, cushioned for a while yet by empire, and by the complacency of victory, could afford to ignore the challenge to their identity implicit in the global market. But Germany and Austria, friendless and unsupported by the labour of subject peoples, had to make their way back to prosperity by their own efforts, as the world’s fi rst post-imperial, and postbourgeois, nations. The culture of the German and Austrian successor-states in the age of the Weimar Republic had about it a radical modernity, indeed postmodernity, whose full relevance to the condition of the rest of the world became apparent only after 1989.

In one crucial respect, however, the Weimar Republic had not been released from its past. The German bourgeoisie might have been reduced to a few super-rich families heading the vertically integrated industrial and banking cartels that had prospered in the days of Bismarck’s ‘state socialism’. But the other component of the middle class, the officials (including the professorate), had survived the debacle remarkably unscathed. The authoritarian monarch had gone, but the state apparatus remained, and its instinct was either to serve authority, or to embody it. The army, the academy, and the administration hankered after their king. They were ill at ease with parliamentary institutions that bestowed the authority of the state on a proletarianized mass society - that is, a society based not on the ownership of land, or even of capital, but on the need and obligation to work. The representative bodies of the Second Empire, crudely divided between nationalists and socialists, had been, largely, a sham and, once the monarchy that was the reason for their existence had passed away, they could not be grown on as a native democratic tradition. Nor was there any obvious external source of democratic inspiration. For nationalists there was no reason to look kindly on the liberal traditions of the victor powers, who hypocritically imposed self-determination on Poles and Czechs, in order to break up Germany and Austria, but withheld it from Indians and Africans, in order to preserve their own empires. To socialists it seemed more important that communist Russia had correctly identifi ed the proletarian nature of modern society than that it was maintaining and extending the brutal Tsarist regime of social discipline. In the absence of native republican models, and with the Prussian inheritance still obscuring the view back to the Holy Roman Empire, the continuing identity of ‘Germany’ was largely guaranteed by the persistence of the official class and its ideology of apolitical ‘Bildung’. The ideology, however, diverted all but the most perceptive writers from the task of defending the constitution. On the one hand, any number of new theories of ‘art’ provided as many reasons for dismissing contemporary politics as superfi cial or inauthentic. On the other, the acceptance of political engagement could lead to a general rejection of conventional ‘culture’ and a coarse anti-intellectualism. The Weimar Republic was betrayed on all sides, and if the writers and artists, on the whole, betrayed it from the left, the public service, including the professors, betrayed it, massively and effectively, from the right. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party presented itself, like ‘state socialism’, as above the distinction between left and right, as the party of national unity in the new age of work, but its appeal was unambiguously that of nostalgia for the authoritarianism decapitated in 1918. Its opportunity came when the excitement of global recovery in the 1920s faltered and, after the great crash of 1929, gave way to global depression. The disastrous decision of the Western nations to respond to this crisis with protectionism took in Germany in 1933 the form of electing a government committed to withdrawing the country from all international institutions and establishing in the economy, as in the whole of society, a command structure based on a military model - a queerly deranged memory of the Second Empire.

In the Third Empire, however, there was none of Bismarck’s subtle accommodation with bourgeois free enterprise. It was the period of officialdom’s greatest and most cancerous expansion, as new layers of uniformed bureaucrats were imposed on old in a permanent revolution generating permanent turf wars, and all the while new, malign, and irrational policies were executed with the same humdrum effi ciency or ineffi ciency as ever and the traditions of Frederick the Great and the 19th-century reformers terminated in Eichmann and the camp commandants who played Schubert at the end of a day’s work. By this stage, however, the culture of the German official class had ceased to be productive and was almost entirely passive. The universities, emptied of anyone of independent mind or Jewish descent, lost their global pre-eminence for ever. The agitprop generated by the ‘Ministry of Popular Enlightenment’ in the form of fi lms, pulp fi ction, or public art is of interest now only to the historical sociologist.

Music and the performing arts were parasitic on the achievements of the past, which by and large they caricatured. The free and creative literary spirits, whether or not they had had official positions, were nearly all either dead or in an exile which they found very diffi cult to relate to their experience of Germany’s past or its present. The professors of philosophy and ‘Germanistics’

who stayed behind devoted themselves at best to relatively harmless editorial projects. Of the worst it is still impossible to speak with moderation.

The bourgeois and the official After zero hour After 1871, 1918, and 1933, the fourth redefi nition of Germany within a lifetime began in 1945. Territorially the adjustment was the biggest there had ever been. Millions moved westwards from areas that had had majority German populations for centuries. The state of Prussia was formally dissolved. Germany was returned approximately to the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire (without Austria) at the time of the Reformation.

Socially and politically too the zones occupied by Britain, France, and the USA recovered something of 16th-century Germany, before the rise of absolutism: a federal republic, with a Catholic majority, dominated by the industrial, commercial, and fi nancial power of several great towns. Hitler had succeeded where all previous German revolutionaries had failed: he had made Germany into a classless society. For 12 years inherited wealth and station had counted for nothing; what mattered was race, party membership, and military rank. After the destruction, and self-destruction, of his absolutist regime the West German Bonn Republic began from a base of social equality unprecedented in the nation’s history. But the foundation had been laid by Hitler’s ‘party of the workers’ and thanks to the relatively rapid withdrawal of the occupying powers in the West the Federal Republic had from an early stage to confront, from its own resources, the question posed by its continuity with the immediate German past. At fi rst the confrontation, in the public mind, took the form of a creative denial, the energetic construction of an alternative Germany, west-facing, republican, committed to free markets and European integration, and in economic terms highly successful. Culturally, however, the underlying continuity betrayed itself in a troubled relationship with the remoter past of the nation. The literary and philosophical achievements of the period around 1800 still enjoyed their Second Empire status of ‘classics’, but they were stylized and reinterpreted as an ‘other Germany’ of the mind from which, in some mysterious and fateful process, the Germany of 1871-1945

had become detached. To claim, however, that the Federal Republic had recovered that ‘other Germany’ - and the claim was implicit in the decision to call its cultural missions ‘Goethe Institutes’ - was to make the improbable claim that it somehow reincarnated the world of the late 18th-century principalities.

The local German dialectic between bourgeois and official which created the literary culture of that era was at an end.

The relentless advance of the global market had destroyed both parties: the European bourgeoisie was no more, swallowed up in the tide of proletarianization which has turned us all into consumer-producers for the mass market; officialdom had lost its privileged relationship to the national identity with the decline in signifi cance of the nation-state and of the local centre of political power. Both the re-canonization of the classics and the contestation of their authority by critics who felt themselves suffi ciently unimplicated in the German past to sit in judgement on it were failures to assess realistically the historical process in which the 18th-century literary revival, the rise and fall of German nationalism, and the emergence of the new republican Germany were all equally involved. The Russian zone of occupation, from 1949 the German Democratic Republic, was the site of unrealism’s last stand. Here, as elsewhere behind the Wall - surely the ultimate tariff barrier - officialdom for 40 years enjoyed an Indian summer, in seamless real continuity with the previous regime of malignant bureaucracy but in total mental and emotional denial of any resemblance to it. Eastern Germany, in physical possession of many of the cultural storehouses of Bismarck’s Prussia-centred Empire, claimed to be the only true inheritor of what the Second Empire had defi ned as ‘classical’ - though it implausibly represented the ‘other Germany’ as a great materialist tradition culminating in Marx, Engels, and the Socialist Unity Party. With some vacillations, which recall similar uncertainties in Hitler’s cultural policy, this party line was maintained in theatres, museums, and the educational system. With far greater rigour than in the West, therefore, any interrogation of the present which threatened to reveal its affi nities with the Germany of 1933-45

was suppressed, and the appalling crimes of that period were dismissed as somebody else’s affair.

So it was left at fi rst to relatively isolated writers and thinkers in the Federal Republic to begin defi ning an identity for the new Germany by remembering the nightmares from which it had awoken. Official memory, in what was left of the university system, struggled, on the whole unsuccessfully, to recover the literature of the previous two centuries as a living tradition. But poets and novelists and writers for radio, supported by a market eager for books, turned, with rather more effect, to the even more intractable task of relating private consciousness to the world-historical disasters that Germany had both infl icted and suffered, and gradually gained recognition outside Germany too.

As the emigrant generation of the 1930s reached maturity, and as universities on either side of the Atlantic came to exchange personnel more freely, it also came to be appreciated in the wider world that German philosophy and critical theory still provided essential instruments for understanding the revolutionary changes of the 20th century, especially if they were allowed to interact with ideas from the English-speaking cultures. After 1968

some of these international developments accelerated, partly as a result of intensive French engagement with German thinkers, but Germany itself found it more diffi cult to move forward, perhaps because the rewards of a generation’s reconstructive efforts were at last being enjoyed. The universities, transformed into institutions of mass education, fi nally lost their privileged position in the nation’s intellectual life except perhaps in the area in which they had begun, Protestant theology. An affl uent social security system took the sting of practical urgency out of domestic moral and political issues, whatever theoretical heat they generated.

Above all, the gravitational fi eld of the Democratic Republic pulled all left-wing thinking out of true, creating the illusion of a political alternative even when the regime was universally acknowledged to have lost all credit, spuriously reviving the attractions of ideas obsolete since 1918, such as authoritarian state socialism and German isolationism, and obscuring the signifi cance of the once more rising tide of globalization. It was to the global ‘culture industry’, to an American TV series of 1979, not to 30 years of work by her native intelligentsia, that Germany owed her public awakening to the hideous truth that only then became generally known by the name of the ‘Holocaust’. When the global market fi nally swept away the last vestige of old Germany in 1989-90, the redefi nition of the nation - again the fourth in a lifetime - continued to be hampered by a persisting nostalgia which was only superfi cially directed at the old East (Ostalgie). In reality, it was the last - let us hope, fading - trace of an animosity that runs through 250 years of German literary engagement with the concept of nationhood: the animosity between the official and the bourgeois, between the representatives of state power (which makes people virtuous) and the forces that make money (and so make people happy). In the ‘Weltmarkt’, the confl ict between the economic system and political power has certainly not gone away - if anything, it has intensifi ed - but it is more diffused, at once more intangibly collective and more internal to the individual. For nearly three centuries the German literary and philosophical tradition has been compelled by local circumstances to concentrate on the point where the opposing forces collide. But there has always also been a cosmopolitan, or internationalist, vein in German literature, and those who in recent generations have tapped into it - even perhaps at the cost of a life of wandering or exile - have been more able than strictly national writers to make Germany’s traumas into symbols of general signifi cance for other countries caught like their own between a national past and a global future.

Chapter 1: The bourgeois and the official: a historical overview

German literature, in the narrow sense, is the literature of the states, predominantly the Lutheran states, of the Holy Roman Empire, and of their 19th-century successor kingdoms, which were gathered by Bismarck into his Second Empire and, after an interval as the Weimar Republic, formed the core of Hitler’s Third Empire. Austria, though a part of the Holy Roman Empire, can be excluded from this story, as Bismarck excluded it, together with Hungary and Austria’s other, non-Imperial, territories in the Danube basin. Prussia, however, has to be included because of its crucial role in the political defi nition of Germany, even though the duchy, later kingdom, of Prussia (now divided between Poland, the Baltic states, and Russia) was never part of the Empire but was an external power-base for the Electors of Brandenburg, rather like Austria’s Danubian hinterland, and even though Brandenburg-Prussia contributed little of signifi cance to German literature, outside the realm of philosophy, until the 19th century.

The clergy and the university The Lutheranism is important. The Reformation of the early 16th century marks the beginning of German literature, in the sense of the term used here. Not just because the Reformation followed relatively soon (and doubtless not by chance) on the linguistic changes which brought into existence the modern form of the German language, and on the invention of moveable-type printing, which made it desirable, and feasible, to have a standard written language for the whole area across which German books might circulate. By transferring the responsibility for the defence of the Christian faith from the Emperor to the local princes, the Reformation made it possible to imagine a German (Protestant) cultural identity that could do without the Empire altogether, as free of political links to the Roman past as it was of religious links to the Roman present. More, the Reformation launched the individual Protestant states on a voyage towards cultural and political self-suffi ciency even within the German-speaking world. In particular their clergy, then the largest class of the professionally educated and professionally literate, the bearers of cultural values and memory, were cut off from their fellows, even their fellow Protestants, by the boundaries of their state and their historical epoch. They could call only with reservations on the experience of Christians in other places and times and, in practical matters, they had to make their careers in dependence, direct or indirect, on the local monarch. Charged with providing, or supervising, primary education and other charitable activities, such as the care of orphans, which in Catholic states remained the responsibility of relatively independent religious orders or local religious houses, Protestant ministers were often virtually an executive branch of the state civil service.

The instrumentalization of the clergy in the Protestant princely states exercised a profound infl uence on German literature and philosophy because of a peculiarity in Germany’s political and economic development. The towns, mainly Imperial Free Cities, which in the late Middle Ages had been the most dynamic element in German society - centres of commerce, industry, and banking which were also the centres of a richly inventive middle-class culture, especially in the visual arts - went into decline in the century after the Reformation and failed to adjust to Europe’s shift from overland to overseas trade and to the new importance of the maritime nations. Germany’s devastating religious civil war, the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648, sealed their fate. In the post-war period only the state powers could raise the capital necessary for reconstruction, and with few exceptions, the great Free Cities decayed into mere ‘home towns’. The princely territories, with their predominantly agricultural economies and rural populations that could be pressed into military service, gained correspondingly in relative power and infl uence. A political revolt of the middle classes, which in 16th-century Holland and 17th-century England was largely successful but which in France went underground with the suppression of the Fronde by the young Louis XIV, was in Germany out of the question. The Empire became a federation of increasingly absolute monarchs who in cultural as in political matters looked to the France of the Sun King as their model. The courtly arts, such as architecture and opera, dedicated to the entertainment and glorifi cation of the prince and his entourage, did well, but printed books were predominantly academic (so often in Latin) or, if they were intended to circulate more widely among the depressed middle classes, were either trivial fantasies, without social or political signifi cance, or works of religious devotion commending contentment with one’s lot. One institution, however, of the greatest importance to the middle class, which after the middle of the 17th century fl ourished better in Germany than elsewhere in Europe, was the university. At a time when England made do with two universities, Germany, with only four or fi ve times the population, had around 40. The university had come late to the German lands - the fi rst was at Prague in 1348 - but in the post-Reformation world it had a quite new signifi cance. The absolute, princely state, with its ambition to control everything, needed offi cers to carry its will into every part of its domains, and these the university provided, principally, until the later 18th century, by training the clergy. Practical subjects, such as fi nance and agriculture, were also taught, and much earlier in Germany than in England, but always with a view to their utility in the state administration. The offspring of well-to-do professionals could afford to study law and medicine and rely on family connections to fi nd them a billet, but for an able young man from a poor background the theology faculty, much the largest and most richly endowed, offered the best prospects of social advancement and future employment.

The 18th-century crisis Eighteenth-century Germany was a stagnant society in which economic and political power was largely concentrated in the hands of the state, and intellectual life was initially in the grip of the state churches. There was little room for private enterprise, material or cultural. Yet this society experienced a literary and philosophical explosion, the consequences of which are still with us. The constriction itself put up the boiler pressure. In England and France there was a signifi cant property-owning middle class, a bourgeoisie in the full sense of the word, able to fi nd an outlet for its capital and its energies in trade and industry, emigration and empire, and eventually in political revolution and reform. In Germany the equivalent class was proportionally much smaller and shut away in the towns, where it could engage in political or economic activity of only local importance. What Germany had in abundance was a class of state officials (and of Protestant clergymen who were state officials by another name), who were close to political power, and were often its executive arm, but who could not exercise it in their own right, and could only look on enviously at the achievements of their counterparts in England, Holland, or Switzerland, or, after 1789, in France:

‘They do the deeds, and we translate the narrations of them into German’, wrote one of them. The only outlet for the energies of this peculiarly German middle class was the book. Germany in the 18th century had more writers per head than anywhere else in Europe, roughly one for every 5,000 of the entire population.

Its fi rst industrial capitalists, its only private entrepreneurs who before 1800 were mass-producing goods for a mass market, were its publishers. In the middle of the 18th century Germany’s official class entered a crisis. The Seven Years War (1756-63) defi nitively established Prussia as the dominant Protestant power in the Empire and, on the continent of Europe, a counterweight to Catholic Austria, while Prussia’s ally, England, emerged similarly victorious on the world stage in the race for colonies at the expense of its Catholic rival, France. Yet at this moment when - at least from a German point of view - Anglo-German Protestantism seemed to have demonstrated its superiority in all respects over Europe’s Catholic South, the religious heart of the cultural alliance began to succumb to an enemy within. Under the name of Enlightenment, the deist and historicist critique of Christianity, which had originated largely in England, began to detach Germany’s theologically educated elite from the faith of their fathers. Since there was not much of a private sector in which an ex-cleric could seek alternative employment, and since loyalty to the state church was something of a touchstone for loyalty to the state itself, a crisis of conscience was an existential crisis too. The struggle for a way out was a matter of intellectual and sometimes personal life and death. Two generations of unprecedented mental exertion and suffering within the pressure-vessel of the German state brought into existence some of the most characteristic features of modern culture, which elsewhere took much longer to develop.

Two routes led out of the crisis, one considerably more secure than the other. First, it was possible to adapt Germany’s most distinctive state institution, the university, to meet the new need.

New career paths, inside and outside academic life, became available for those with a scholarly bent but a distaste for theology, through the creation of new subjects of study or the expansion of previously minor options. Classical philology, modern history, languages and literatures, the history of art, the natural sciences, education itself, and, perhaps most infl uential of all, idealist philosophy - in these new or newly signifi cant university disciplines 18th and early 19th-century Germany established a pre-eminence which, in some cases, has lasted into the present.

Second, and more precariously, the ex-theologian could turn to the one area of private enterprise and commercial activity readily accessible to him: the book market. It has been calculated that, even excluding philosophers, 120 major literary fi gures writing in German and born between 1676 and 1804 had either studied theology or were the children of Protestant pastors. But there was a snare concealed behind the lure of literature. To make money a book had to circulate widely among the middle classes, the professionals and business people, and their wives and daughters, not just among the officials. But these were the classes that the political constitution of absolutist Germany excluded from power and infl uence. It was not therefore possible to write about the real forces shaping German life and at the same time to write about something familiar and important to a wide readership. The price of success was triviality and falsifi cation; if you were seriously devoted to real issues you would stay esoteric, and poor. The German literary revival of the 18th century was in great measure the attempt, fuelled by secularization, to resolve this dilemma.

Especially in the earlier phases it seemed that the example of England, the ally in Protestantism, might be the answer, and hopes of a German equivalent to the English realistic novel, at once truthful and popular, ran high. But Germany could not model its literature on that of England’s self-confi dent and largely self-governing capitalist middle class. Its social and economic starting point was different, and it had to fi nd its own way.

In Germany, political power and cultural infl uence were concentrated in absolute rulers and their immediate entourage, loosely termed the ‘courts’. The interface between these centres and the rest of society, and specifi cally the groups that made up the reading public, was provided by the state officials.

Therefore, the class of officials - those who belonged to it, those who were educated for it, and those who sought access to it - formed the growth zone for the German national literature.

In material terms, a state salary, whether a cleric’s, a professor’s, or an administrator’s, or even just a personal pension from the monarch, provided a foundation so that a literary career, albeit part-time, was at least possible and did not have to be a relentless chase after maximal earnings. In intellectual terms, the writers’ proximity to power, and to the state institutions, meant that the issues they raised in the symbolic medium of literature were genuinely central to the national life and identity, even if their perspective was that of non-participants. The public literary genre which most precisely reflected the ambiguous realities of life in the growth zone, and which, towards the end of the century, reached a point of perfection subsequently recognized as ‘classical’, was the poetic drama, the drama which, though performable and performed, was most widely distributed and appreciated as a printed book. The dramatic form reflected the political and cultural dominance of the princely court, for none of Germany’s many theatres were purely commercial undertakings, all required some kind of state subsidy, and even in the Revolutionary period most still served their original and principal function of entertaining the ruler. Circulation as a book, however, as Germany’s equivalent of a novel, both truthful and commercially successful, reflected the aspiration of the middle classes to a market-based culture of their own. And, fi nally, the philosophical, if not explicitly theological, tenor of the themes of these plays reflected the secularization of Lutheranism which was providing a new vocabulary for the description of personal and social existence, whether by playwrights in the state theatres or by professors in the state universities. Among the most important elements in this new vocabulary were the concepts of moral (rather than political) ‘freedom’ and of ‘Art’, as the realm of human experience in which this freedom was made visible. The German ‘classical’ era gave to the world not only the meaning of the word ‘Art’ which enabled Oscar Wilde to say nearly a hundred years later that it was quite useless, but also the belief that literature was primarily ‘Art’ (rather than, say, a means of communication).

The rise of bourgeois Germany ‘Germany’ around 1800 was not so much a geographical as a literary expression. The most powerful impetus to give it a political meaning probably came from Napoleon. He imposed the abolition of the ecclesiastical territories, a radical reduction in the number of the principalities from over 300 to about 40, and the organization of the remainder into a federation of sovereign states, even before the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. His annihilating defeat of Prussia in the same year forced on it a programme of modernization which was to determine German social and political structures for the next century and a half. The modernization did not, however, take the republican form it had taken in France, and though constitutionalism briefl y fl ourished when it was necessary to rouse the people to throw off the Napoleonic yoke from the necks of their princes, it was abandoned after the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 which turned Germany, until 1848, into a confederation of police states. The Prussian commercial, industrial, and professional middle classes were still too weak to challenge the king, or even the landowning nobility (the Junkers), and introduce representative government or a separation of legislature and executive. Instead the successful bid for power came from the king’s officials, and the autocratic absolutism of the 18th century gave way to the bureaucratic absolutism of the 19th - a rule of law, free of conscious corruption and directed to the common welfare, but imposing a military level of discipline on all layers of society. The king’s personal decisions remained fi nal, but they were increasingly mediated, and so to some extent checked, by his civil and armed services, into which the nobility were gradually absorbed - partly as a brake on the ambitions of the middle class. The new Prussia, the largest and most powerful of the German Protestant states, had an altogether new signifi cance for its fellows, once the old Imperial framework had vanished.

Territories which before 1806 could pass as constituent parts of a larger whole, however ramshackle and loosely defi ned, now had to justify themselves as economically and politically self-suffi cient states, a task to which none of them, apart from Prussia, Austria, and perhaps Bavaria, could pretend to be equal. Some kind of association between them had to be found. There was a supine intergovernmental ‘Federation’ dominated by Austria and a much more effective Customs Union (Zollverein) of a smaller number of territories grouped round Prussia, but the word ‘Germany’ now meant something future and unreal. If it had once referred to the Empire and any other territories attached to the Empire in which German was spoken and written, now it meant the political unit in which all, or most, German-speakers would fi nd their home. And there was the rub: who precisely was to be included in this future Germany? It could hardly contain both Prussia and Austria, as the old Empire and the new Federation were able, more or less, to contain them - though there were many dreamers to whom this seemed possible, among them the author of ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ - but equally it could hardly exclude them, given their infl uence over the smaller states and frequent interventions in their affairs. In practice, the two great powers were resolving the issue for themselves: Prussia was expanding purposefully westwards to the Rhineland, while Austria was withdrawing from German affairs to concentrate on its non-German-speaking territories in Eastern Europe and North Italy. In the end, the Protestant intellectuals of Northern Germany, still held together, as under the old regime, by the publishing industry and the university network, threw in their lot with Prussia. After a decade of increasing agitation, 1848, Europe’s ‘year of revolutions’, saw the summoning of the Frankfurt Parliament, a quarter of whose membership was made up of academics, clergy, and writers, and which in 1849 offered the Prussian monarch the kingship of a Germany without Austria. Friedrich Wilhelm IV refused to rule by the free choice of his subjects - ‘to pick up a crown from the gutter’ - though his brother, Wilhelm I, accepted the same ‘lesser German’ (kleindeutsch) crown when Bismarck secured it for him by force of arms in 1866-71.

To the extent to which it was a revolution of professors, and perhaps rather further, the failed German revolution of 1848 was a revolution of the officials, the last act, and the fi nest hour, of the 18th-century reading public. It was an attempt to unify Germany by constitutional and administrative means, while retaining for government, and monarchical government at that, the leading role in the structuring of society. But the balance of power in the German middle class was already beginning to shift fundamentally. Between 1815 and 1848 the population grew by 60%, and as poverty intensifi ed the need for employment grew desperate. After some tentative, state-sponsored beginnings in the 1830s, a fi rst wave of industrialization was felt in the 1840s, with huge (often foreign) investments in a railway network, mainly within the Customs Union, and a consequent economic upswing.

The decade ended with an economic as well as a political crash, and with the last of the pre-industrial famines (partly caused by the same potato blight that devastated Ireland) - factors that together led (as in Ireland) to a surge in emigration. But in the following 20 years Prussia, governed from 1862 by Bismarck, embraced economic liberalism as a means of sweeping away historic and institutional obstacles to the unifi cation of its heterogeneous territories, and the long period of intensive growth began which was to transform Germany into an industrial giant.

As a result, when the Second German Empire was founded in 1871 it had a bourgeoisie, a property-owning and money-making class, which was much larger, wealthier, and more signifi cant for the common good than anything the First Empire had known. The consequences for literature and philosophy were far-reaching. As this class emerged, it battled for self-respect and cultural identity with the long-established middle-class instruments of state power, the officials. The revived bourgeoisie had a more obvious interest in the economic and political unifi cation of Germany than civil servants who owed their positions to the multiplication of power centres, and entry to it was not dependent on passage through the universities. In the early years of the 19th century its frustrated political ambitions expressed themselves, particularly in Prussia, in the literature of escape known as ‘Romanticism’, but as it gained in confi dence its literary culture took on a more explicitly revolutionary, anti-official colour - though the oppositional stance betrayed a continuing dependence on what was being opposed. After the humiliation of official Germany at Frankfurt, however, with industry and commerce fl ourishing in the sunshine of state approval, any sense of inferiority passed, the icons of the previous century were cheerfully ridiculed, literature itself became a paying concern as copyright became enforceable, and novels and plays with such strictly bourgeois themes as money, materialism, and social justice emerged from the realm of the trivial and, for a while, linked Germany’s written culture with that of its neighbours in Western Europe. The uniquely - for the outside world perhaps impenetrably - German culture of the late 18th-century Golden Age, scholarly, humanist, cosmopolitan, survived under the patronage of the lesser courts, in the lee of political events and economic changes, until 1848, but thereafter it declined into academicism or, in the case of the kings of Bavaria, into eccentricity. But though the official class had lost supremacy, it had not lost power, and through the universities, despite the growth of private cultural societies and foundations, it remained the guardian of the national past. As the redefi nition of the German state came to preoccupy all minds, so the servants of the state were able to retain for themselves a certain authority and the two main factions in the middle class sank their differences in the national interest. The concept of ‘Bildung’, meaning both ‘culture’ and ‘education’, was the ideological medium in which this fusion could take place, the value on which all could agree, precisely because it left carefully ambiguous whether you achieved ‘Bildung’ by going to university or simply by reading, or at any rate approving, the right books. The term ‘Bildungsbürger’ gained a currency at this time which it has never since lost. Suggesting a middle class united by its experience of ‘Bildung’, its main function is to identify the official with the bourgeois, to create a community of interest between salaried servants of the state and tradesmen, property owners, and self-employed professionals. A crucial step in the defi nition of ‘Bildung’ was the canonizing of the literary achievements of the official class as ‘classical’. Germany in 1871 was not only to be a nation like England or France - it was to have its literary classics like them too.

In Bismarck’s new Germany the bourgeoisie was accommodated, but kept on a short lead. It was given a voice in the Reichstag, the Imperial Diet, and the lesser representative assemblies of the constituent states, but the executive, with the Imperial Chancellor at its head, was in no formal way responsible to these parliaments.

In practice, of course, the Chancellor needed their co-operation to secure his legislative programme and so officialdom lost the almost absolute power it had enjoyed in the earlier part of the century. But the dominant model for a society in which military service was compulsory was provided by the army (with the upper ranks reserved for the nobility), and Bismarck and his successors treated all attempts to establish parliamentary accountability as insubordination: the socialist party was virtually proscribed for over a decade. Within the constraints imposed by the supreme priority of national unity, the agents of autocracy continued to look down on those they regarded as self-interested individualists and materialists because they made money for themselves, rather than receiving a salary from the state. In the world of ‘Bildung’

too the profession of a shared devotion to the national tradition papered over the deep animosity between those who wrote for a living and the university intellectuals whose literary activity was now largely confi ned to historical and critical study. Like Bismarck, the professor of ‘Germanistics’ - as it was beginning to be called - had as little taste for the bourgeois as for the socialists, Catholics, Jews, or women who were now unfortunately as likely as the bourgeois to involve themselves in the national literature.

In the turmoil of 1848-9, a little-noticed pamphlet, drafted by a German philosopher for a tiny group of English radicals, and with the title of The Communist Manifesto, had prophesied that the free markets aspired to by the national bourgeoisies would grow into a global market, a ‘Weltmarkt’. By the 1870s that prophecy was clearly coming true. Germany’s fi rst experience of globalization was painful, however. The worldwide stock-market crash of 1873, which began in Vienna, led to a long depression from which the world did not emerge until the 1890s. In Germany the depression was relatively shallow and some growth continued, though in the 1880s net emigration (which had totalled 3 million over the previous four decades) reached an all-time high of 1.3 million - a fi gure which is itself a measure of the intensity of globalization. In 1879 Bismarck was moved by the effect of cheap American grain imports on the incomes of the land-owning Junkers to listen to the growing demands for protection from other quarters as well, particularly the heavy industry that would be of strategic importance in wartime, and to abandon his earlier policy of free trade, erecting a tariff wall round his new state. At the same time, he put an end to his ‘cultural war’ (Kulturkampf) with the Catholic Church and endeavoured to outfl ank the working-class movement by introducing Europe’s fi rst system of social security. His motives in establishing ‘state socialism’, as it was soon called, were no different from those that had guided him earlier, and which had deep roots in the German past: first, the overriding need for unity in the state and, second, the interests of the agricultural nobility which continued to furnish Prussia with its ruling class. But the protectionist course on which Germany and the other European states now embarked, and which was eventually adopted even by Britain, long the staunchest advocate, and greatest benefi ciary, of free trade, accentuated the division of Europe, and the world, into would-be autarkic blocs.

Thanks to the inability of politicians, of any country, to imagine an international institutional order which would accommodate to each other the competing energies of numerous growing economies, the developed states, whether empires, federations, or unitary nations, set out to achieve economic and political - that is, military - self-suffi ciency. Germany’s bid for colonies in Africa and the South Seas, which began in 1884, was not so much a serious geopolitical move as a symbolic irritant. Like the huge expansion of the navy, it was a declaration that Germany was anyone’s equal and could look after itself. As general growth resumed in the 1890s it became clear that, with its armed forces backed by the largest chemical and electrical industries in the world, and a coal and steel industry that was catching up on the British, Germany was capable, not necessarily of displacing the British Empire, but certainly of disputing its power to impose its own will. A British hegemony was giving way to a bi-polar world, and from the turn of the century something like a Cold War began in the cultural sphere. Britain turned away from the German models, particularly in philosophy and scholarship, which had had great prestige since the days of the Prince Consort, while voices in Germany emphasized the uniqueness of German literary, musical, and philosophical achievements and the need to protect ‘Kultur’ (the creation of the official classes) from contamination by the materialistic and journalistic (that is, bourgeois) ‘civilization’

of the West. The fusion of disparate elements in the concept of the ‘Bildungsbürger’, though rejected by some of the most clear-sighted critics of the Second Empire, was sustained by projecting its tensions outwards on to the relations between nations and defi ning a unique role for the new Germany. Britain and France at this time wove similar myths of their own special mission in world-history. Tariff walls became walls in the mind, and the mental effects were as serious as the economic distortions which put increasing strains on the inadequate international political order. After more than a decade of toying by the nations of Europe with fantasies of their own exceptionality, in 1914 the war-games went real.

The officials strike back Globalization spelled the end of the bourgeoisie, in the strict sense, and not only in Germany. A class living solely off its capital, off the alienated labour of others, was sustainable only by societies with open frontiers, with open spaces into which the disadvantaged and disaffected could expand. As the world economy grew into a single closed system, and as societies that shrank from the challenge of the political co-operation required by economic integration sought - in vain, of course - to seal themselves off in smaller units, so there was less and less room for a leisured capitalist class, and it was forced increasingly into work. The intrusion of work into the world of capital was reflected, in the fi rst decades of the 20th century, in an intellectual upheaval which broke apart the forms and conventions of the earlier stages of cultural modernity and was at least as violent in Germany and Austria as anywhere else. In literature, art, music, philosophy, and psychology, the concepts of identity, collective and personal, that had been appropriate to an age when the world was wide, and economic expansion was untrammelled by political institutions, were subjected to intense and hostile scrutiny. It was Germany’s misfortune that the representatives of the bourgeoisie achieved the political autonomy, and even supremacy, for which they had been struggling for well over half a century, only when their social and economic and even their cultural position was fatally undermined. In 1918 Germany had its revolution at last. But the new republic was born in military defeat and shackled at once by an unequal peace. It was shorn, not only of its symbolic overseas empire, but of much of its mineral wealth in the territories returned to France and the resurrected Poland. Its middle class, which had grown into prosperity over the previous two generations, was pauperized in the terrible infl ations which reflected the lack of confi dence in its future, and, with the loss of their capital, many private foundations and charities, old and new, ceased to exist. Its rivals, cushioned for a while yet by empire, and by the complacency of victory, could afford to ignore the challenge to their identity implicit in the global market. But Germany and Austria, friendless and unsupported by the labour of subject peoples, had to make their way back to prosperity by their own efforts, as the world’s fi rst post-imperial, and postbourgeois, nations. The culture of the German and Austrian successor-states in the age of the Weimar Republic had about it a radical modernity, indeed postmodernity, whose full relevance to the condition of the rest of the world became apparent only after 1989.

In one crucial respect, however, the Weimar Republic had not been released from its past. The German bourgeoisie might have been reduced to a few super-rich families heading the vertically integrated industrial and banking cartels that had prospered in the days of Bismarck’s ‘state socialism’. But the other component of the middle class, the officials (including the professorate), had survived the debacle remarkably unscathed. The authoritarian monarch had gone, but the state apparatus remained, and its instinct was either to serve authority, or to embody it. The army, the academy, and the administration hankered after their king. They were ill at ease with parliamentary institutions that bestowed the authority of the state on a proletarianized mass society - that is, a society based not on the ownership of land, or even of capital, but on the need and obligation to work. The representative bodies of the Second Empire, crudely divided between nationalists and socialists, had been, largely, a sham and, once the monarchy that was the reason for their existence had passed away, they could not be grown on as a native democratic tradition. Nor was there any obvious external source of democratic inspiration. For nationalists there was no reason to look kindly on the liberal traditions of the victor powers, who hypocritically imposed self-determination on Poles and Czechs, in order to break up Germany and Austria, but withheld it from Indians and Africans, in order to preserve their own empires. To socialists it seemed more important that communist Russia had correctly identifi ed the proletarian nature of modern society than that it was maintaining and extending the brutal Tsarist regime of social discipline. In the absence of native republican models, and with the Prussian inheritance still obscuring the view back to the Holy Roman Empire, the continuing identity of ‘Germany’ was largely guaranteed by the persistence of the official class and its ideology of apolitical ‘Bildung’. The ideology, however, diverted all but the most perceptive writers from the task of defending the constitution. On the one hand, any number of new theories of ‘art’ provided as many reasons for dismissing contemporary politics as superfi cial or inauthentic. On the other, the acceptance of political engagement could lead to a general rejection of conventional ‘culture’ and a coarse anti-intellectualism. The Weimar Republic was betrayed on all sides, and if the writers and artists, on the whole, betrayed it from the left, the public service, including the professors, betrayed it, massively and effectively, from the right. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party presented itself, like ‘state socialism’, as above the distinction between left and right, as the party of national unity in the new age of work, but its appeal was unambiguously that of nostalgia for the authoritarianism decapitated in 1918. Its opportunity came when the excitement of global recovery in the 1920s faltered and, after the great crash of 1929, gave way to global depression. The disastrous decision of the Western nations to respond to this crisis with protectionism took in Germany in 1933 the form of electing a government committed to withdrawing the country from all international institutions and establishing in the economy, as in the whole of society, a command structure based on a military model - a queerly deranged memory of the Second Empire.

In the Third Empire, however, there was none of Bismarck’s subtle accommodation with bourgeois free enterprise. It was the period of officialdom’s greatest and most cancerous expansion, as new layers of uniformed bureaucrats were imposed on old in a permanent revolution generating permanent turf wars, and all the while new, malign, and irrational policies were executed with the same humdrum effi ciency or ineffi ciency as ever and the traditions of Frederick the Great and the 19th-century reformers terminated in Eichmann and the camp commandants who played Schubert at the end of a day’s work. By this stage, however, the culture of the German official class had ceased to be productive and was almost entirely passive. The universities, emptied of anyone of independent mind or Jewish descent, lost their global pre-eminence for ever. The agitprop generated by the ‘Ministry of Popular Enlightenment’ in the form of fi lms, pulp fi ction, or public art is of interest now only to the historical sociologist.

Music and the performing arts were parasitic on the achievements of the past, which by and large they caricatured. The free and creative literary spirits, whether or not they had had official positions, were nearly all either dead or in an exile which they found very diffi cult to relate to their experience of Germany’s past or its present. The professors of philosophy and ‘Germanistics’

who stayed behind devoted themselves at best to relatively harmless editorial projects. Of the worst it is still impossible to speak with moderation.

The bourgeois and the official After zero hour After 1871, 1918, and 1933, the fourth redefi nition of Germany within a lifetime began in 1945. Territorially the adjustment was the biggest there had ever been. Millions moved westwards from areas that had had majority German populations for centuries. The state of Prussia was formally dissolved. Germany was returned approximately to the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire (without Austria) at the time of the Reformation.

Socially and politically too the zones occupied by Britain, France, and the USA recovered something of 16th-century Germany, before the rise of absolutism: a federal republic, with a Catholic majority, dominated by the industrial, commercial, and fi nancial power of several great towns. Hitler had succeeded where all previous German revolutionaries had failed: he had made Germany into a classless society. For 12 years inherited wealth and station had counted for nothing; what mattered was race, party membership, and military rank. After the destruction, and self-destruction, of his absolutist regime the West German Bonn Republic began from a base of social equality unprecedented in the nation’s history. But the foundation had been laid by Hitler’s ‘party of the workers’ and thanks to the relatively rapid withdrawal of the occupying powers in the West the Federal Republic had from an early stage to confront, from its own resources, the question posed by its continuity with the immediate German past. At fi rst the confrontation, in the public mind, took the form of a creative denial, the energetic construction of an alternative Germany, west-facing, republican, committed to free markets and European integration, and in economic terms highly successful. Culturally, however, the underlying continuity betrayed itself in a troubled relationship with the remoter past of the nation. The literary and philosophical achievements of the period around 1800 still enjoyed their Second Empire status of ‘classics’, but they were stylized and reinterpreted as an ‘other Germany’ of the mind from which, in some mysterious and fateful process, the Germany of 1871-1945

had become detached. To claim, however, that the Federal Republic had recovered that ‘other Germany’ - and the claim was implicit in the decision to call its cultural missions ‘Goethe Institutes’ - was to make the improbable claim that it somehow reincarnated the world of the late 18th-century principalities.

The local German dialectic between bourgeois and official which created the literary culture of that era was at an end.

The relentless advance of the global market had destroyed both parties: the European bourgeoisie was no more, swallowed up in the tide of proletarianization which has turned us all into consumer-producers for the mass market; officialdom had lost its privileged relationship to the national identity with the decline in signifi cance of the nation-state and of the local centre of political power. Both the re-canonization of the classics and the contestation of their authority by critics who felt themselves suffi ciently unimplicated in the German past to sit in judgement on it were failures to assess realistically the historical process in which the 18th-century literary revival, the rise and fall of German nationalism, and the emergence of the new republican Germany were all equally involved. The Russian zone of occupation, from 1949 the German Democratic Republic, was the site of unrealism’s last stand. Here, as elsewhere behind the Wall - surely the ultimate tariff barrier - officialdom for 40 years enjoyed an Indian summer, in seamless real continuity with the previous regime of malignant bureaucracy but in total mental and emotional denial of any resemblance to it. Eastern Germany, in physical possession of many of the cultural storehouses of Bismarck’s Prussia-centred Empire, claimed to be the only true inheritor of what the Second Empire had defi ned as ‘classical’ - though it implausibly represented the ‘other Germany’ as a great materialist tradition culminating in Marx, Engels, and the Socialist Unity Party. With some vacillations, which recall similar uncertainties in Hitler’s cultural policy, this party line was maintained in theatres, museums, and the educational system. With far greater rigour than in the West, therefore, any interrogation of the present which threatened to reveal its affi nities with the Germany of 1933-45

was suppressed, and the appalling crimes of that period were dismissed as somebody else’s affair.

So it was left at fi rst to relatively isolated writers and thinkers in the Federal Republic to begin defi ning an identity for the new Germany by remembering the nightmares from which it had awoken. Official memory, in what was left of the university system, struggled, on the whole unsuccessfully, to recover the literature of the previous two centuries as a living tradition. But poets and novelists and writers for radio, supported by a market eager for books, turned, with rather more effect, to the even more intractable task of relating private consciousness to the world-historical disasters that Germany had both infl icted and suffered, and gradually gained recognition outside Germany too.

As the emigrant generation of the 1930s reached maturity, and as universities on either side of the Atlantic came to exchange personnel more freely, it also came to be appreciated in the wider world that German philosophy and critical theory still provided essential instruments for understanding the revolutionary changes of the 20th century, especially if they were allowed to interact with ideas from the English-speaking cultures. After 1968

some of these international developments accelerated, partly as a result of intensive French engagement with German thinkers, but Germany itself found it more diffi cult to move forward, perhaps because the rewards of a generation’s reconstructive efforts were at last being enjoyed. The universities, transformed into institutions of mass education, fi nally lost their privileged position in the nation’s intellectual life except perhaps in the area in which they had begun, Protestant theology. An affl uent social security system took the sting of practical urgency out of domestic moral and political issues, whatever theoretical heat they generated.

Above all, the gravitational fi eld of the Democratic Republic pulled all left-wing thinking out of true, creating the illusion of a political alternative even when the regime was universally acknowledged to have lost all credit, spuriously reviving the attractions of ideas obsolete since 1918, such as authoritarian state socialism and German isolationism, and obscuring the signifi cance of the once more rising tide of globalization. It was to the global ‘culture industry’, to an American TV series of 1979, not to 30 years of work by her native intelligentsia, that Germany owed her public awakening to the hideous truth that only then became generally known by the name of the ‘Holocaust’. When the global market fi nally swept away the last vestige of old Germany in 1989-90, the redefi nition of the nation - again the fourth in a lifetime - continued to be hampered by a persisting nostalgia which was only superfi cially directed at the old East (Ostalgie). In reality, it was the last - let us hope, fading - trace of an animosity that runs through 250 years of German literary engagement with the concept of nationhood: the animosity between the official and the bourgeois, between the representatives of state power (which makes people virtuous) and the forces that make money (and so make people happy). In the ‘Weltmarkt’, the confl ict between the economic system and political power has certainly not gone away - if anything, it has intensifi ed - but it is more diffused, at once more intangibly collective and more internal to the individual. For nearly three centuries the German literary and philosophical tradition has been compelled by local circumstances to concentrate on the point where the opposing forces collide. But there has always also been a cosmopolitan, or internationalist, vein in German literature, and those who in recent generations have tapped into it - even perhaps at the cost of a life of wandering or exile - have been more able than strictly national writers to make Germany’s traumas into symbols of general signifi cance for other countries caught like their own between a national past and a global future.

Chapter 1: The bourgeois and the official: a historical overview

German literature, in the narrow sense, is the literature of the states, predominantly the Lutheran states, of the Holy Roman Empire, and of their 19th-century successor kingdoms, which were gathered by Bismarck into his Second Empire and, after an interval as the Weimar Republic, formed the core of Hitler’s Third Empire. Austria, though a part of the Holy Roman Empire, can be excluded from this story, as Bismarck excluded it, together with Hungary and Austria’s other, non-Imperial, territories in the Danube basin. Prussia, however, has to be included because of its crucial role in the political defi nition of Germany, even though the duchy, later kingdom, of Prussia (now divided between Poland, the Baltic states, and Russia) was never part of the Empire but was an external power-base for the Electors of Brandenburg, rather like Austria’s Danubian hinterland, and even though Brandenburg-Prussia contributed little of signifi cance to German literature, outside the realm of philosophy, until the 19th century.

The clergy and the university The Lutheranism is important. The Reformation of the early 16th century marks the beginning of German literature, in the sense of the term used here. Not just because the Reformation followed relatively soon (and doubtless not by chance) on the linguistic changes which brought into existence the modern form of the German language, and on the invention of moveable-type printing, which made it desirable, and feasible, to have a standard written language for the whole area across which German books might circulate. By transferring the responsibility for the defence of the Christian faith from the Emperor to the local princes, the Reformation made it possible to imagine a German (Protestant) cultural identity that could do without the Empire altogether, as free of political links to the Roman past as it was of religious links to the Roman present. More, the Reformation launched the individual Protestant states on a voyage towards cultural and political self-suffi ciency even within the German-speaking world. In particular their clergy, then the largest class of the professionally educated and professionally literate, the bearers of cultural values and memory, were cut off from their fellows, even their fellow Protestants, by the boundaries of their state and their historical epoch. They could call only with reservations on the experience of Christians in other places and times and, in practical matters, they had to make their careers in dependence, direct or indirect, on the local monarch. Charged with providing, or supervising, primary education and other charitable activities, such as the care of orphans, which in Catholic states remained the responsibility of relatively independent religious orders or local religious houses, Protestant ministers were often virtually an executive branch of the state civil service.

The instrumentalization of the clergy in the Protestant princely states exercised a profound infl uence on German literature and philosophy because of a peculiarity in Germany’s political and economic development. The towns, mainly Imperial Free Cities, which in the late Middle Ages had been the most dynamic element in German society - centres of commerce, industry, and banking which were also the centres of a richly inventive middle-class culture, especially in the visual arts - went into decline in the century after the Reformation and failed to adjust to Europe’s shift from overland to overseas trade and to the new importance of the maritime nations. Germany’s devastating religious civil war, the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648, sealed their fate. In the post-war period only the state powers could raise the capital necessary for reconstruction, and with few exceptions, the great Free Cities decayed into mere ‘home towns’. The princely territories, with their predominantly agricultural economies and rural populations that could be pressed into military service, gained correspondingly in relative power and infl uence. A political revolt of the middle classes, which in 16th-century Holland and 17th-century England was largely successful but which in France went underground with the suppression of the Fronde by the young Louis XIV, was in Germany out of the question. The Empire became a federation of increasingly absolute monarchs who in cultural as in political matters looked to the France of the Sun King as their model. The courtly arts, such as architecture and opera, dedicated to the entertainment and glorifi cation of the prince and his entourage, did well, but printed books were predominantly academic (so often in Latin) or, if they were intended to circulate more widely among the depressed middle classes, were either trivial fantasies, without social or political signifi cance, or works of religious devotion commending contentment with one’s lot. One institution, however, of the greatest importance to the middle class, which after the middle of the 17th century fl ourished better in Germany than elsewhere in Europe, was the university. At a time when England made do with two universities, Germany, with only four or fi ve times the population, had around 40. The university had come late to the German lands - the fi rst was at Prague in 1348 - but in the post-Reformation world it had a quite new signifi cance. The absolute, princely state, with its ambition to control everything, needed offi cers to carry its will into every part of its domains, and these the university provided, principally, until the later 18th century, by training the clergy. Practical subjects, such as fi nance and agriculture, were also taught, and much earlier in Germany than in England, but always with a view to their utility in the state administration. The offspring of well-to-do professionals could afford to study law and medicine and rely on family connections to fi nd them a billet, but for an able young man from a poor background the theology faculty, much the largest and most richly endowed, offered the best prospects of social advancement and future employment.

The 18th-century crisis Eighteenth-century Germany was a stagnant society in which economic and political power was largely concentrated in the hands of the state, and intellectual life was initially in the grip of the state churches. There was little room for private enterprise, material or cultural. Yet this society experienced a literary and philosophical explosion, the consequences of which are still with us. The constriction itself put up the boiler pressure. In England and France there was a signifi cant property-owning middle class, a bourgeoisie in the full sense of the word, able to fi nd an outlet for its capital and its energies in trade and industry, emigration and empire, and eventually in political revolution and reform. In Germany the equivalent class was proportionally much smaller and shut away in the towns, where it could engage in political or economic activity of only local importance. What Germany had in abundance was a class of state officials (and of Protestant clergymen who were state officials by another name), who were close to political power, and were often its executive arm, but who could not exercise it in their own right, and could only look on enviously at the achievements of their counterparts in England, Holland, or Switzerland, or, after 1789, in France:

‘They do the deeds, and we translate the narrations of them into German’, wrote one of them. The only outlet for the energies of this peculiarly German middle class was the book. Germany in the 18th century had more writers per head than anywhere else in Europe, roughly one for every 5,000 of the entire population.

Its fi rst industrial capitalists, its only private entrepreneurs who before 1800 were mass-producing goods for a mass market, were its publishers. In the middle of the 18th century Germany’s official class entered a crisis. The Seven Years War (1756-63) defi nitively established Prussia as the dominant Protestant power in the Empire and, on the continent of Europe, a counterweight to Catholic Austria, while Prussia’s ally, England, emerged similarly victorious on the world stage in the race for colonies at the expense of its Catholic rival, France. Yet at this moment when - at least from a German point of view - Anglo-German Protestantism seemed to have demonstrated its superiority in all respects over Europe’s Catholic South, the religious heart of the cultural alliance began to succumb to an enemy within. Under the name of Enlightenment, the deist and historicist critique of Christianity, which had originated largely in England, began to detach Germany’s theologically educated elite from the faith of their fathers. Since there was not much of a private sector in which an ex-cleric could seek alternative employment, and since loyalty to the state church was something of a touchstone for loyalty to the state itself, a crisis of conscience was an existential crisis too. The struggle for a way out was a matter of intellectual and sometimes personal life and death. Two generations of unprecedented mental exertion and suffering within the pressure-vessel of the German state brought into existence some of the most characteristic features of modern culture, which elsewhere took much longer to develop.

Two routes led out of the crisis, one considerably more secure than the other. First, it was possible to adapt Germany’s most distinctive state institution, the university, to meet the new need.

New career paths, inside and outside academic life, became available for those with a scholarly bent but a distaste for theology, through the creation of new subjects of study or the expansion of previously minor options. Classical philology, modern history, languages and literatures, the history of art, the natural sciences, education itself, and, perhaps most infl uential of all, idealist philosophy - in these new or newly signifi cant university disciplines 18th and early 19th-century Germany established a pre-eminence which, in some cases, has lasted into the present.

Second, and more precariously, the ex-theologian could turn to the one area of private enterprise and commercial activity readily accessible to him: the book market. It has been calculated that, even excluding philosophers, 120 major literary fi gures writing in German and born between 1676 and 1804 had either studied theology or were the children of Protestant pastors. But there was a snare concealed behind the lure of literature. To make money a book had to circulate widely among the middle classes, the professionals and business people, and their wives and daughters, not just among the officials. But these were the classes that the political constitution of absolutist Germany excluded from power and infl uence. It was not therefore possible to write about the real forces shaping German life and at the same time to write about something familiar and important to a wide readership. The price of success was triviality and falsifi cation; if you were seriously devoted to real issues you would stay esoteric, and poor. The German literary revival of the 18th century was in great measure the attempt, fuelled by secularization, to resolve this dilemma.

Especially in the earlier phases it seemed that the example of England, the ally in Protestantism, might be the answer, and hopes of a German equivalent to the English realistic novel, at once truthful and popular, ran high. But Germany could not model its literature on that of England’s self-confi dent and largely self-governing capitalist middle class. Its social and economic starting point was different, and it had to fi nd its own way.

In Germany, political power and cultural infl uence were concentrated in absolute rulers and their immediate entourage, loosely termed the ‘courts’. The interface between these centres and the rest of society, and specifi cally the groups that made up the reading public, was provided by the state officials.

Therefore, the class of officials - those who belonged to it, those who were educated for it, and those who sought access to it - formed the growth zone for the German national literature.

In material terms, a state salary, whether a cleric’s, a professor’s, or an administrator’s, or even just a personal pension from the monarch, provided a foundation so that a literary career, albeit part-time, was at least possible and did not have to be a relentless chase after maximal earnings. In intellectual terms, the writers’ proximity to power, and to the state institutions, meant that the issues they raised in the symbolic medium of literature were genuinely central to the national life and identity, even if their perspective was that of non-participants. The public literary genre which most precisely reflected the ambiguous realities of life in the growth zone, and which, towards the end of the century, reached a point of perfection subsequently recognized as ‘classical’, was the poetic drama, the drama which, though performable and performed, was most widely distributed and appreciated as a printed book. The dramatic form reflected the political and cultural dominance of the princely court, for none of Germany’s many theatres were purely commercial undertakings, all required some kind of state subsidy, and even in the Revolutionary period most still served their original and principal function of entertaining the ruler. Circulation as a book, however, as Germany’s equivalent of a novel, both truthful and commercially successful, reflected the aspiration of the middle classes to a market-based culture of their own. And, fi nally, the philosophical, if not explicitly theological, tenor of the themes of these plays reflected the secularization of Lutheranism which was providing a new vocabulary for the description of personal and social existence, whether by playwrights in the state theatres or by professors in the state universities. Among the most important elements in this new vocabulary were the concepts of moral (rather than political) ‘freedom’ and of ‘Art’, as the realm of human experience in which this freedom was made visible. The German ‘classical’ era gave to the world not only the meaning of the word ‘Art’ which enabled Oscar Wilde to say nearly a hundred years later that it was quite useless, but also the belief that literature was primarily ‘Art’ (rather than, say, a means of communication).

The rise of bourgeois Germany ‘Germany’ around 1800 was not so much a geographical as a literary expression. The most powerful impetus to give it a political meaning probably came from Napoleon. He imposed the abolition of the ecclesiastical territories, a radical reduction in the number of the principalities from over 300 to about 40, and the organization of the remainder into a federation of sovereign states, even before the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. His annihilating defeat of Prussia in the same year forced on it a programme of modernization which was to determine German social and political structures for the next century and a half. The modernization did not, however, take the republican form it had taken in France, and though constitutionalism briefl y fl ourished when it was necessary to rouse the people to throw off the Napoleonic yoke from the necks of their princes, it was abandoned after the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 which turned Germany, until 1848, into a confederation of police states. The Prussian commercial, industrial, and professional middle classes were still too weak to challenge the king, or even the landowning nobility (the Junkers), and introduce representative government or a separation of legislature and executive. Instead the successful bid for power came from the king’s officials, and the autocratic absolutism of the 18th century gave way to the bureaucratic absolutism of the 19th - a rule of law, free of conscious corruption and directed to the common welfare, but imposing a military level of discipline on all layers of society. The king’s personal decisions remained fi nal, but they were increasingly mediated, and so to some extent checked, by his civil and armed services, into which the nobility were gradually absorbed - partly as a brake on the ambitions of the middle class. The new Prussia, the largest and most powerful of the German Protestant states, had an altogether new signifi cance for its fellows, once the old Imperial framework had vanished.

Territories which before 1806 could pass as constituent parts of a larger whole, however ramshackle and loosely defi ned, now had to justify themselves as economically and politically self-suffi cient states, a task to which none of them, apart from Prussia, Austria, and perhaps Bavaria, could pretend to be equal. Some kind of association between them had to be found. There was a supine intergovernmental ‘Federation’ dominated by Austria and a much more effective Customs Union (Zollverein) of a smaller number of territories grouped round Prussia, but the word ‘Germany’ now meant something future and unreal. If it had once referred to the Empire and any other territories attached to the Empire in which German was spoken and written, now it meant the political unit in which all, or most, German-speakers would fi nd their home. And there was the rub: who precisely was to be included in this future Germany? It could hardly contain both Prussia and Austria, as the old Empire and the new Federation were able, more or less, to contain them - though there were many dreamers to whom this seemed possible, among them the author of ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ - but equally it could hardly exclude them, given their infl uence over the smaller states and frequent interventions in their affairs. In practice, the two great powers were resolving the issue for themselves: Prussia was expanding purposefully westwards to the Rhineland, while Austria was withdrawing from German affairs to concentrate on its non-German-speaking territories in Eastern Europe and North Italy. In the end, the Protestant intellectuals of Northern Germany, still held together, as under the old regime, by the publishing industry and the university network, threw in their lot with Prussia. After a decade of increasing agitation, 1848, Europe’s ‘year of revolutions’, saw the summoning of the Frankfurt Parliament, a quarter of whose membership was made up of academics, clergy, and writers, and which in 1849 offered the Prussian monarch the kingship of a Germany without Austria. Friedrich Wilhelm IV refused to rule by the free choice of his subjects - ‘to pick up a crown from the gutter’ - though his brother, Wilhelm I, accepted the same ‘lesser German’ (kleindeutsch) crown when Bismarck secured it for him by force of arms in 1866-71.

To the extent to which it was a revolution of professors, and perhaps rather further, the failed German revolution of 1848 was a revolution of the officials, the last act, and the fi nest hour, of the 18th-century reading public. It was an attempt to unify Germany by constitutional and administrative means, while retaining for government, and monarchical government at that, the leading role in the structuring of society. But the balance of power in the German middle class was already beginning to shift fundamentally. Between 1815 and 1848 the population grew by 60%, and as poverty intensifi ed the need for employment grew desperate. After some tentative, state-sponsored beginnings in the 1830s, a fi rst wave of industrialization was felt in the 1840s, with huge (often foreign) investments in a railway network, mainly within the Customs Union, and a consequent economic upswing.

The decade ended with an economic as well as a political crash, and with the last of the pre-industrial famines (partly caused by the same potato blight that devastated Ireland) - factors that together led (as in Ireland) to a surge in emigration. But in the following 20 years Prussia, governed from 1862 by Bismarck, embraced economic liberalism as a means of sweeping away historic and institutional obstacles to the unifi cation of its heterogeneous territories, and the long period of intensive growth began which was to transform Germany into an industrial giant.

As a result, when the Second German Empire was founded in 1871 it had a bourgeoisie, a property-owning and money-making class, which was much larger, wealthier, and more signifi cant for the common good than anything the First Empire had known. The consequences for literature and philosophy were far-reaching. As this class emerged, it battled for self-respect and cultural identity with the long-established middle-class instruments of state power, the officials. The revived bourgeoisie had a more obvious interest in the economic and political unifi cation of Germany than civil servants who owed their positions to the multiplication of power centres, and entry to it was not dependent on passage through the universities. In the early years of the 19th century its frustrated political ambitions expressed themselves, particularly in Prussia, in the literature of escape known as ‘Romanticism’, but as it gained in confi dence its literary culture took on a more explicitly revolutionary, anti-official colour - though the oppositional stance betrayed a continuing dependence on what was being opposed. After the humiliation of official Germany at Frankfurt, however, with industry and commerce fl ourishing in the sunshine of state approval, any sense of inferiority passed, the icons of the previous century were cheerfully ridiculed, literature itself became a paying concern as copyright became enforceable, and novels and plays with such strictly bourgeois themes as money, materialism, and social justice emerged from the realm of the trivial and, for a while, linked Germany’s written culture with that of its neighbours in Western Europe. The uniquely - for the outside world perhaps impenetrably - German culture of the late 18th-century Golden Age, scholarly, humanist, cosmopolitan, survived under the patronage of the lesser courts, in the lee of political events and economic changes, until 1848, but thereafter it declined into academicism or, in the case of the kings of Bavaria, into eccentricity. But though the official class had lost supremacy, it had not lost power, and through the universities, despite the growth of private cultural societies and foundations, it remained the guardian of the national past. As the redefi nition of the German state came to preoccupy all minds, so the servants of the state were able to retain for themselves a certain authority and the two main factions in the middle class sank their differences in the national interest. The concept of ‘Bildung’, meaning both ‘culture’ and ‘education’, was the ideological medium in which this fusion could take place, the value on which all could agree, precisely because it left carefully ambiguous whether you achieved ‘Bildung’ by going to university or simply by reading, or at any rate approving, the right books. The term ‘Bildungsbürger’ gained a currency at this time which it has never since lost. Suggesting a middle class united by its experience of ‘Bildung’, its main function is to identify the official with the bourgeois, to create a community of interest between salaried servants of the state and tradesmen, property owners, and self-employed professionals. A crucial step in the defi nition of ‘Bildung’ was the canonizing of the literary achievements of the official class as ‘classical’. Germany in 1871 was not only to be a nation like England or France - it was to have its literary classics like them too.

In Bismarck’s new Germany the bourgeoisie was accommodated, but kept on a short lead. It was given a voice in the Reichstag, the Imperial Diet, and the lesser representative assemblies of the constituent states, but the executive, with the Imperial Chancellor at its head, was in no formal way responsible to these parliaments.

In practice, of course, the Chancellor needed their co-operation to secure his legislative programme and so officialdom lost the almost absolute power it had enjoyed in the earlier part of the century. But the dominant model for a society in which military service was compulsory was provided by the army (with the upper ranks reserved for the nobility), and Bismarck and his successors treated all attempts to establish parliamentary accountability as insubordination: the socialist party was virtually proscribed for over a decade. Within the constraints imposed by the supreme priority of national unity, the agents of autocracy continued to look down on those they regarded as self-interested individualists and materialists because they made money for themselves, rather than receiving a salary from the state. In the world of ‘Bildung’

too the profession of a shared devotion to the national tradition papered over the deep animosity between those who wrote for a living and the university intellectuals whose literary activity was now largely confi ned to historical and critical study. Like Bismarck, the professor of ‘Germanistics’ - as it was beginning to be called - had as little taste for the bourgeois as for the socialists, Catholics, Jews, or women who were now unfortunately as likely as the bourgeois to involve themselves in the national literature.

In the turmoil of 1848-9, a little-noticed pamphlet, drafted by a German philosopher for a tiny group of English radicals, and with the title of The Communist Manifesto, had prophesied that the free markets aspired to by the national bourgeoisies would grow into a global market, a ‘Weltmarkt’. By the 1870s that prophecy was clearly coming true. Germany’s fi rst experience of globalization was painful, however. The worldwide stock-market crash of 1873, which began in Vienna, led to a long depression from which the world did not emerge until the 1890s. In Germany the depression was relatively shallow and some growth continued, though in the 1880s net emigration (which had totalled 3 million over the previous four decades) reached an all-time high of 1.3 million - a fi gure which is itself a measure of the intensity of globalization. In 1879 Bismarck was moved by the effect of cheap American grain imports on the incomes of the land-owning Junkers to listen to the growing demands for protection from other quarters as well, particularly the heavy industry that would be of strategic importance in wartime, and to abandon his earlier policy of free trade, erecting a tariff wall round his new state. At the same time, he put an end to his ‘cultural war’ (Kulturkampf) with the Catholic Church and endeavoured to outfl ank the working-class movement by introducing Europe’s fi rst system of social security. His motives in establishing ‘state socialism’, as it was soon called, were no different from those that had guided him earlier, and which had deep roots in the German past: first, the overriding need for unity in the state and, second, the interests of the agricultural nobility which continued to furnish Prussia with its ruling class. But the protectionist course on which Germany and the other European states now embarked, and which was eventually adopted even by Britain, long the staunchest advocate, and greatest benefi ciary, of free trade, accentuated the division of Europe, and the world, into would-be autarkic blocs.

Thanks to the inability of politicians, of any country, to imagine an international institutional order which would accommodate to each other the competing energies of numerous growing economies, the developed states, whether empires, federations, or unitary nations, set out to achieve economic and political - that is, military - self-suffi ciency. Germany’s bid for colonies in Africa and the South Seas, which began in 1884, was not so much a serious geopolitical move as a symbolic irritant. Like the huge expansion of the navy, it was a declaration that Germany was anyone’s equal and could look after itself. As general growth resumed in the 1890s it became clear that, with its armed forces backed by the largest chemical and electrical industries in the world, and a coal and steel industry that was catching up on the British, Germany was capable, not necessarily of displacing the British Empire, but certainly of disputing its power to impose its own will. A British hegemony was giving way to a bi-polar world, and from the turn of the century something like a Cold War began in the cultural sphere. Britain turned away from the German models, particularly in philosophy and scholarship, which had had great prestige since the days of the Prince Consort, while voices in Germany emphasized the uniqueness of German literary, musical, and philosophical achievements and the need to protect ‘Kultur’ (the creation of the official classes) from contamination by the materialistic and journalistic (that is, bourgeois) ‘civilization’

of the West. The fusion of disparate elements in the concept of the ‘Bildungsbürger’, though rejected by some of the most clear-sighted critics of the Second Empire, was sustained by projecting its tensions outwards on to the relations between nations and defi ning a unique role for the new Germany. Britain and France at this time wove similar myths of their own special mission in world-history. Tariff walls became walls in the mind, and the mental effects were as serious as the economic distortions which put increasing strains on the inadequate international political order. After more than a decade of toying by the nations of Europe with fantasies of their own exceptionality, in 1914 the war-games went real.

The officials strike back Globalization spelled the end of the bourgeoisie, in the strict sense, and not only in Germany. A class living solely off its capital, off the alienated labour of others, was sustainable only by societies with open frontiers, with open spaces into which the disadvantaged and disaffected could expand. As the world economy grew into a single closed system, and as societies that shrank from the challenge of the political co-operation required by economic integration sought - in vain, of course - to seal themselves off in smaller units, so there was less and less room for a leisured capitalist class, and it was forced increasingly into work. The intrusion of work into the world of capital was reflected, in the fi rst decades of the 20th century, in an intellectual upheaval which broke apart the forms and conventions of the earlier stages of cultural modernity and was at least as violent in Germany and Austria as anywhere else. In literature, art, music, philosophy, and psychology, the concepts of identity, collective and personal, that had been appropriate to an age when the world was wide, and economic expansion was untrammelled by political institutions, were subjected to intense and hostile scrutiny. It was Germany’s misfortune that the representatives of the bourgeoisie achieved the political autonomy, and even supremacy, for which they had been struggling for well over half a century, only when their social and economic and even their cultural position was fatally undermined. In 1918 Germany had its revolution at last. But the new republic was born in military defeat and shackled at once by an unequal peace. It was shorn, not only of its symbolic overseas empire, but of much of its mineral wealth in the territories returned to France and the resurrected Poland. Its middle class, which had grown into prosperity over the previous two generations, was pauperized in the terrible infl ations which reflected the lack of confi dence in its future, and, with the loss of their capital, many private foundations and charities, old and new, ceased to exist. Its rivals, cushioned for a while yet by empire, and by the complacency of victory, could afford to ignore the challenge to their identity implicit in the global market. But Germany and Austria, friendless and unsupported by the labour of subject peoples, had to make their way back to prosperity by their own efforts, as the world’s fi rst post-imperial, and postbourgeois, nations. The culture of the German and Austrian successor-states in the age of the Weimar Republic had about it a radical modernity, indeed postmodernity, whose full relevance to the condition of the rest of the world became apparent only after 1989.

In one crucial respect, however, the Weimar Republic had not been released from its past. The German bourgeoisie might have been reduced to a few super-rich families heading the vertically integrated industrial and banking cartels that had prospered in the days of Bismarck’s ‘state socialism’. But the other component of the middle class, the officials (including the professorate), had survived the debacle remarkably unscathed. The authoritarian monarch had gone, but the state apparatus remained, and its instinct was either to serve authority, or to embody it. The army, the academy, and the administration hankered after their king. They were ill at ease with parliamentary institutions that bestowed the authority of the state on a proletarianized mass society - that is, a society based not on the ownership of land, or even of capital, but on the need and obligation to work. The representative bodies of the Second Empire, crudely divided between nationalists and socialists, had been, largely, a sham and, once the monarchy that was the reason for their existence had passed away, they could not be grown on as a native democratic tradition. Nor was there any obvious external source of democratic inspiration. For nationalists there was no reason to look kindly on the liberal traditions of the victor powers, who hypocritically imposed self-determination on Poles and Czechs, in order to break up Germany and Austria, but withheld it from Indians and Africans, in order to preserve their own empires. To socialists it seemed more important that communist Russia had correctly identifi ed the proletarian nature of modern society than that it was maintaining and extending the brutal Tsarist regime of social discipline. In the absence of native republican models, and with the Prussian inheritance still obscuring the view back to the Holy Roman Empire, the continuing identity of ‘Germany’ was largely guaranteed by the persistence of the official class and its ideology of apolitical ‘Bildung’. The ideology, however, diverted all but the most perceptive writers from the task of defending the constitution. On the one hand, any number of new theories of ‘art’ provided as many reasons for dismissing contemporary politics as superfi cial or inauthentic. On the other, the acceptance of political engagement could lead to a general rejection of conventional ‘culture’ and a coarse anti-intellectualism. The Weimar Republic was betrayed on all sides, and if the writers and artists, on the whole, betrayed it from the left, the public service, including the professors, betrayed it, massively and effectively, from the right. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party presented itself, like ‘state socialism’, as above the distinction between left and right, as the party of national unity in the new age of work, but its appeal was unambiguously that of nostalgia for the authoritarianism decapitated in 1918. Its opportunity came when the excitement of global recovery in the 1920s faltered and, after the great crash of 1929, gave way to global depression. The disastrous decision of the Western nations to respond to this crisis with protectionism took in Germany in 1933 the form of electing a government committed to withdrawing the country from all international institutions and establishing in the economy, as in the whole of society, a command structure based on a military model - a queerly deranged memory of the Second Empire.

In the Third Empire, however, there was none of Bismarck’s subtle accommodation with bourgeois free enterprise. It was the period of officialdom’s greatest and most cancerous expansion, as new layers of uniformed bureaucrats were imposed on old in a permanent revolution generating permanent turf wars, and all the while new, malign, and irrational policies were executed with the same humdrum effi ciency or ineffi ciency as ever and the traditions of Frederick the Great and the 19th-century reformers terminated in Eichmann and the camp commandants who played Schubert at the end of a day’s work. By this stage, however, the culture of the German official class had ceased to be productive and was almost entirely passive. The universities, emptied of anyone of independent mind or Jewish descent, lost their global pre-eminence for ever. The agitprop generated by the ‘Ministry of Popular Enlightenment’ in the form of fi lms, pulp fi ction, or public art is of interest now only to the historical sociologist.

Music and the performing arts were parasitic on the achievements of the past, which by and large they caricatured. The free and creative literary spirits, whether or not they had had official positions, were nearly all either dead or in an exile which they found very diffi cult to relate to their experience of Germany’s past or its present. The professors of philosophy and ‘Germanistics’

who stayed behind devoted themselves at best to relatively harmless editorial projects. Of the worst it is still impossible to speak with moderation.

The bourgeois and the official After zero hour After 1871, 1918, and 1933, the fourth redefi nition of Germany within a lifetime began in 1945. Territorially the adjustment was the biggest there had ever been. Millions moved westwards from areas that had had majority German populations for centuries. The state of Prussia was formally dissolved. Germany was returned approximately to the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire (without Austria) at the time of the Reformation.

Socially and politically too the zones occupied by Britain, France, and the USA recovered something of 16th-century Germany, before the rise of absolutism: a federal republic, with a Catholic majority, dominated by the industrial, commercial, and fi nancial power of several great towns. Hitler had succeeded where all previous German revolutionaries had failed: he had made Germany into a classless society. For 12 years inherited wealth and station had counted for nothing; what mattered was race, party membership, and military rank. After the destruction, and self-destruction, of his absolutist regime the West German Bonn Republic began from a base of social equality unprecedented in the nation’s history. But the foundation had been laid by Hitler’s ‘party of the workers’ and thanks to the relatively rapid withdrawal of the occupying powers in the West the Federal Republic had from an early stage to confront, from its own resources, the question posed by its continuity with the immediate German past. At fi rst the confrontation, in the public mind, took the form of a creative denial, the energetic construction of an alternative Germany, west-facing, republican, committed to free markets and European integration, and in economic terms highly successful. Culturally, however, the underlying continuity betrayed itself in a troubled relationship with the remoter past of the nation. The literary and philosophical achievements of the period around 1800 still enjoyed their Second Empire status of ‘classics’, but they were stylized and reinterpreted as an ‘other Germany’ of the mind from which, in some mysterious and fateful process, the Germany of 1871-1945

had become detached. To claim, however, that the Federal Republic had recovered that ‘other Germany’ - and the claim was implicit in the decision to call its cultural missions ‘Goethe Institutes’ - was to make the improbable claim that it somehow reincarnated the world of the late 18th-century principalities.

The local German dialectic between bourgeois and official which created the literary culture of that era was at an end.

The relentless advance of the global market had destroyed both parties: the European bourgeoisie was no more, swallowed up in the tide of proletarianization which has turned us all into consumer-producers for the mass market; officialdom had lost its privileged relationship to the national identity with the decline in signifi cance of the nation-state and of the local centre of political power. Both the re-canonization of the classics and the contestation of their authority by critics who felt themselves suffi ciently unimplicated in the German past to sit in judgement on it were failures to assess realistically the historical process in which the 18th-century literary revival, the rise and fall of German nationalism, and the emergence of the new republican Germany were all equally involved. The Russian zone of occupation, from 1949 the German Democratic Republic, was the site of unrealism’s last stand. Here, as elsewhere behind the Wall - surely the ultimate tariff barrier - officialdom for 40 years enjoyed an Indian summer, in seamless real continuity with the previous regime of malignant bureaucracy but in total mental and emotional denial of any resemblance to it. Eastern Germany, in physical possession of many of the cultural storehouses of Bismarck’s Prussia-centred Empire, claimed to be the only true inheritor of what the Second Empire had defi ned as ‘classical’ - though it implausibly represented the ‘other Germany’ as a great materialist tradition culminating in Marx, Engels, and the Socialist Unity Party. With some vacillations, which recall similar uncertainties in Hitler’s cultural policy, this party line was maintained in theatres, museums, and the educational system. With far greater rigour than in the West, therefore, any interrogation of the present which threatened to reveal its affi nities with the Germany of 1933-45

was suppressed, and the appalling crimes of that period were dismissed as somebody else’s affair.

So it was left at fi rst to relatively isolated writers and thinkers in the Federal Republic to begin defi ning an identity for the new Germany by remembering the nightmares from which it had awoken. Official memory, in what was left of the university system, struggled, on the whole unsuccessfully, to recover the literature of the previous two centuries as a living tradition. But poets and novelists and writers for radio, supported by a market eager for books, turned, with rather more effect, to the even more intractable task of relating private consciousness to the world-historical disasters that Germany had both infl icted and suffered, and gradually gained recognition outside Germany too.

As the emigrant generation of the 1930s reached maturity, and as universities on either side of the Atlantic came to exchange personnel more freely, it also came to be appreciated in the wider world that German philosophy and critical theory still provided essential instruments for understanding the revolutionary changes of the 20th century, especially if they were allowed to interact with ideas from the English-speaking cultures. After 1968

some of these international developments accelerated, partly as a result of intensive French engagement with German thinkers, but Germany itself found it more diffi cult to move forward, perhaps because the rewards of a generation’s reconstructive efforts were at last being enjoyed. The universities, transformed into institutions of mass education, fi nally lost their privileged position in the nation’s intellectual life except perhaps in the area in which they had begun, Protestant theology. An affl uent social security system took the sting of practical urgency out of domestic moral and political issues, whatever theoretical heat they generated.

Above all, the gravitational fi eld of the Democratic Republic pulled all left-wing thinking out of true, creating the illusion of a political alternative even when the regime was universally acknowledged to have lost all credit, spuriously reviving the attractions of ideas obsolete since 1918, such as authoritarian state socialism and German isolationism, and obscuring the signifi cance of the once more rising tide of globalization. It was to the global ‘culture industry’, to an American TV series of 1979, not to 30 years of work by her native intelligentsia, that Germany owed her public awakening to the hideous truth that only then became generally known by the name of the ‘Holocaust’. When the global market fi nally swept away the last vestige of old Germany in 1989-90, the redefi nition of the nation - again the fourth in a lifetime - continued to be hampered by a persisting nostalgia which was only superfi cially directed at the old East (Ostalgie). In reality, it was the last - let us hope, fading - trace of an animosity that runs through 250 years of German literary engagement with the concept of nationhood: the animosity between the official and the bourgeois, between the representatives of state power (which makes people virtuous) and the forces that make money (and so make people happy). In the ‘Weltmarkt’, the confl ict between the economic system and political power has certainly not gone away - if anything, it has intensifi ed - but it is more diffused, at once more intangibly collective and more internal to the individual. For nearly three centuries the German literary and philosophical tradition has been compelled by local circumstances to concentrate on the point where the opposing forces collide. But there has always also been a cosmopolitan, or internationalist, vein in German literature, and those who in recent generations have tapped into it - even perhaps at the cost of a life of wandering or exile - have been more able than strictly national writers to make Germany’s traumas into symbols of general signifi cance for other countries caught like their own between a national past and a global future.


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