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Language and Globalization: Alternative Models from a Cognitive Semantics Viewpoint

Language and Globalization: Alternative Models from a Cognitive Semantics Viewpoint

Author:
Publisher: www.pkrisc.cc.ukm.my
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Alhassanain (p) Network for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Language and Globalization: Alternative Models from a Cognitive Semantics Viewpoint

Imran Ho Abdullah

School of Language Studies & Linguistics

Faculty of Social Science and Humanities

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

imranho@pkrisc.cc.ukm.my

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

Abstract 3

1. Introduction 4

2. The construct 5

3. The expressions and their operational metaphors 7

3.1 The operational metaphors of globalization 8

GLOBALIZATION IS A TOOL 8

GLOBALIZATION IS A KEY 10

LINEAR ORDER SCHEMA 11

GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT 12

GLOBALIZATION IS HOMOGENEOUS 13

Conclusion 14

TOOL MODEL 15

LINEAR ORDER (NUMERICAL ORDERING) MODEL 16

GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT 17

GLOBALIZATION IS HOMOGENEOUS 18

References 19

English as the Global Language: 21

Good for Business, Bad for Literature 21

Notes for Editors: 24

Some Facts to Consider 25

Concordance 25

The expressions in the British documents include pertaining 28

Key collocates: 29

Abstract

This paper explores the interaction between language and the process of globalization. One of the major issues is the dominance of English as the de facto language of international communication [read: global communication]. Not surprisingly, various language communities have voiced their concern and distress over this linguisticshegemonization in the name of globalization. Questions remain whether there are new ways of framing the global language discourse by putting more emphasis on multi-linguality for global communication. Using a cognitive semantics approach, this paper provides several alternative models to the discourse on language andglobalisation .

1. Introduction

How we as Malaysians are made to view and understand the English languagevis -a-vis the phenomenaof globalization and thus define the role and importance of English in our nation will in many ways determine our language policies especially in relation to English in our curricula. This paper argues that, in many respects, our understanding of language in a globalized world is constructed by the language used in the discourse of language and globalization. Accordingly, new realities of language and globalization can be constructed via the use of new and relevant (perhaps also exciting conceptual metaphors) in the discourse of language and globalization.

Specifically, this paper will attempt to apply aLakoffian cognitive semantics framework to the analysis of “language and globalization” by examining the linguistic expressions used to articulate this concept.Lakoff and other metaphor analysts have argued how our understanding of events and concepts is shaped (consciously and/or unconsciously) by metaphorical thinking or conceptual metaphorical images. For instance, the Control is Up metaphor underlies expression such as ‘I am on top situation’, ‘I have control over him’; ‘He is under my spell; ‘I have it all under control’. (http://cogsci.berkeley.edu /metaphors/Control_Is_Up.html). Similarly the Anger is Heat and the Body is Container for Emotions metaphors can explain linguistic expressions such as: ‘You make my blood boil’; ‘He's just blowing off steam’; ‘He boiled over’. ‘He blew his top’. ‘I can't keep my anger bottled up anymore’. (http://cogsci.berkeley.edu /metaphors/Anger_Is_Heat.html)

The paper is structured as follows. First, I present a brief description of the cognitive semantics framework for linguistic description, paying particular attention to the construct of conceptual metaphors. This is followed by an analysis of how current discourse frames the discussion of language and globalization. The last section of the paper will provide a few suggestions as to how we might “reframe” the notions of ‘language andglobalisation ’ via the use of alternative conceptual metaphors in domestic discourseof language and globalization in Malaysia.

The aim of this paper is primarily to ask and examine what are the prevalent metaphors of language and globalization. The analysis attempts to reveal how a cognitive linguistics analysis of the expressions used in discussing language and globalization can reveal the multifaceted meaning conveyed by such expressions through different conceptual metaphors. A better understanding of English and globalization will do doubt be crucial as this issue has becomeso crucial as Malaysia seeks to maintain a competitive edge in the global economy. Hopefully the study here would serve to reveal what is sometimes concealed in our debate and discussion of language and globalization in Malaysia. However, the paper does not pretend to be exhaustive in its analysis and addresses only a few issues in the hope that the analysis will be useful towards the next frontiers of globalization in Malaysia.

2. The construct

Geeraerts perceives cognitive linguistics as “an approach to the analysis of natural language that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information”. As such, the analysis of the conceptual and experiential basis of linguistic categories is seen to be of primary importance.“The formal structures of language are studied not as if they were autonomous, but as a reflection of general conceptualorganisation ,categorisation principles, processing mechanisms, and experiential and environmental influences” (Geeraerts 1997:7).

Although the CL enterprise is not a monolith (Goldberg 1996:3), most if not all cognitive linguists share some foundational assumptions. Newman summarizes the theoretical assumptions of the cognitive linguistics enterprise as follows (Goldberg 1996:3-4;Geeraerts 1997:7, Heine 1997:3-7):

there are important links between linguistic structure and human cognition, making it imperative to acknowledge the role of human cognition and human experience in motivating and explicating linguistic structure;

a language community imposes its owncategorisations upon the entities which constitute reality and suchcategorisations may differ considerably from one language community to another;

most of the categories relevant to linguistics are viewed as having central and less central members rather than beingcriterially defined;

where the meaning of a form needs to be elaborated, then a larger context or ‘frame’ [domain] needs to be invoked in order to properly describe the meaning.

Newman (1996:ix )

A particular strong influence in the cognitive semantics paradigm has been the work ofLakoff . ForLakoff , our conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. Non-metaphorical thought is forLakoff only possible when we talk about purely physical reality. Being a linguist,Lakoff seeks to illustrate the above thesis by recourse to the everyday language we use to talk about various things.

The present paper shares the above assumptions and accepts the Cognitive Linguistics conception of semantic representation and their views on a system of conceptual metaphors in everyday language as essentially correct. Specifically, the semantic structure of an item or expression can be explicated in terms of conventionalized conceptual metaphors and the meaning of the expression can be defined with respect to some domain (Rudzka-Ostyn 1989:615). In cognitive linguistics, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain, e.g. one person's life experience versus another's. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experience (Lakoff 1987). The semantics of “language and globalization” to be drawn out in this study is dependent on the notion of conceptual metaphors and the identification of the source domains of such metaphors in the discussion of language and globalization. Fundamentally, the framework accepts the expression used in the discussion of language and globalization may utilize different conceptual metaphors with some conventional metaphors being the “default” or the “preferred” metaphor. To this extent, how someone understands language and globalization is dependent on the organizing metaphor or the “framing” of the discourse. Such “framing” can place a portion of coherent referent situation into the foreground of attention while placing the remainder of that situation into the background (Talmy 1994). In this regard, how we understand language and globalization might very well be dependent on that is what is fore grounded and what is back grounded.

3. The expressions and their operational metaphors

How do we talk about language and globalization and what are the typical expressions we hear and read about. In other words, how is the issue of language (especially English) framed in relation to globalization? Here is a sample of the expressions typical of such discussions:

the global dominance of the English language …

The situation of English is peculiar in that perhaps no other language has ever been so important on a global scale

It is becoming a global language unlike any other in history. English is an increasingly classless language

The rise of the English language to global proportions …

With interest in English around the world growing stronger, not weaker there are some linguists and others who say: Why fight it?

If you write for a global audience that includes people whose native language is not English …

In addition we believe that, in the context of increasingglobalisation , the value of English …

… English for these young people is a commodity,

They see possession of English as a key to opportunities to better their circumstances.

“…selling the English language as a commodity to a global market…

These expressions provide us with the means of understanding and explaining language and globalization. In some ways, the expressions are also reflective of the reality of the language issues in globalization in Malaysia (logical positivism) and in another, these expressions in turn shape how we understand language and globalization - a process of mental ‘construction’ (Ortony,1979). From a cognitive linguistics perspective these expressions are not only a source of literal descriptions of ‘reality’ but are significant metaphors by which we make sense of English in globalization in our concrete experience of the world. In the words ofLakoff and Johnson (1980:3) “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature”. Our understandings of these expressions are the outcome of a complex interaction between the information given, the context in which this takes place and the pre-existing knowledge of the interlocutors.

3.1 The operational metaphors of globalization

GLOBALIZATION IS A TOOL

The English as a tool metaphor provides the justification or rationale for the teaching and learning of English in Malaysia and I suspect also elsewhere where English is not a native language. Underlying this metaphor, the language “English” is understood through the metaphor of “a tool”. In the context of Malaysia, the tools allows us “to do business”, “to operate and compete in a global market”, to access the Internet and wealth of information there”, “to access knowledge particularly in the fields of science and technology”. “a tool for communication”. For the tool to be functional it must be “sharpened” and there are corresponding “components” to the tool, all of which must be functional in order for the tool to serve its purpose. Likewise, with tools which must be calibrated there is the notion of “standard” and “certification” with globalization.

Part of the conceptual network associated with the functions of a tool is used in the expressions to characterize the concept of “globalization”, if not “English” and in the process show how we understand, talk about, and the needs for globalization is structured by that association.

I must stress that I am not disputing the importance of this “rationale” for globalization. My point is that it is difficult for us to talk about the rationale for globalization other than in through the tool metaphor. [This in itself is proof of the power of metaphor in shaping and structuring how we think and act (cf. Harrison, Clarke and Reeve (1999)). Can we not substitute the metaphor of the system (or culture) for that of tool and would that change how we experience, talk and practice globalization in Malaysia? However, since this tool metaphor is so ingrained in Malaysia globalization, we should examine how it shape and structure our understanding of globalization and whether this metaphor in some ways skew and limit our vision of globalization.

The metaphor begs several questions. While Malaysian are quick to embrace (and master) tools and devices for communication such as the mobile phone with all its SMS, VMS technology we still have problem with English. English as a tool or device just isn’t the same as any other gadgets or tool. Otherwise, I am sure we would have “mastered” it by now and will be second nature to us, just us many of our youngsters are so comfortable with their mobile phone and proudly show them off. So the metaphor of English as a tool just is not working (or not convincing enough) for our students.

Secondly, if language is to be “a tool”, what is the role of globalization? Surely globalization itself isn’t the tool.globalization is to “build” this tool much in the fashion of the die-casting process. What about the raw ingredients or production material? Whatever, it is the process of building this tool begins at an early age for Malaysians and continues on for a good 11 years or so. At some stage the tools must surely have been built and globalization turns to training them how to use the tool effectively. Since the tool is multifunctional and have various components, each of these functions and components must be calibrated in order for the tools to be really effective.

However, unlike real tools, say a screwdriver or a drill which we can purchaseready made , English as a tool involves the building of this tool and the subsequent refining of skill needed to use and operate the tools.

Based on the elaborate description of the metaphor, one could reasonably ask whether current globalization syllabus and practice fit in with the metaphor. This is because some already have the tool while others are tool less. Even the tools they have are different. Some are using power drills while others still rely on the hand drill and others make do with a hammer and nail. In such an environment the tool metaphor for globalization really needs further examination.

GLOBALIZATION IS A KEY

A key can view as a specific kind of tools - one for opening door and gaining access. Expression such as “English is the key …” As an extension to the tool metaphor, the key metaphor also provides reasons as to why we need to learn English. Employment and business opportunities can “open up” to those with English. There is a down side to this metaphor. Part of the conceptual network associated with the functions of a “key” is that there is a lock that keeps the gates and doors closed to those without the key. Hence, the “key“ can also characterize the concept of “globalization” as gatekeepers. The notion of English as gatekeepers continues in globalization in the insistence of some university for their students to achieve a certain band in the Malaysian University English Test (MUET) before they can graduate from the program. Such policy and regulations are related to the metaphor of ENGLISH IS A KEY. A set back of course is that this metaphor can also create resentment and dissatisfaction as globalization and their proponents are seen as acting as gatekeepers. The recent proposal for a university BM entry exam also utilizes the key metaphor.

LINEAR ORDER SCHEMA

Another metaphor commonly associated with globalization in this part of the world is the notion of “second language”. A basic kinesthetic image schemas (Johnson 1987) central to human experience, namely the linear order schema is applied to our understanding of language or in this case globalization. One could legitimately ask “Second to what? Second in what sense?”. The use of the linear order schema, especially in relation to a linear numerical order in the case of globalization in Malaysia is perhaps to show the importance of the language. I propose that this order, namely the use of the word “second” is defeating in itself.

For many, English is not a second language – it is a foreign language. For others, it is a third or fourth. Yet for some Malaysians, English is their “first” and home language. Only for a small minority is English truly their second language in order of acquisition. Thus the linear order schema used does not really tie in with the reality on the ground. I propose we get rid of this notion of “English as a second language” or at least the use of this linear order schema. This is the strategy some use to neutralize (pacify) our insistence on English by adding it is vital to learn all languages including Arabic, French etc. English is basically a subject and recently has become the language of instruction for Science and Mathematics but this by no means entails that it is a second language. Hence, in some travelogue, it is stated that English is “widely spoken” rather than the use of the linear order schema.

GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT

In recent times, negativity permeates the media discourse on English and globalization. In particular expressions such as “decline of standard of English” “poor command of the language” “inability to communicate” are quite typical in the main stream newspaper. As a result the most persuasive image of learners we are presented with is that of decline and dilapidations. In other words, globalization in Malaysia has seen better days. Suchdiscourse on globalization are based on a conceptual metaphor which I shall call the GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT metaphor. While the laments are not without foundation but I think we have placed ourselves in a pit which makes it difficult for us to climb out of it. What is primarily wrong with this metaphor is the yardstick by which we measure the decline. Most of the people who laments the fall in standard uses the pre-80s yardstick to measure students and product of the English medium schools with those of the National medium products. Surely this is comparing apples with oranges. I suggest that the appropriate measure would be to measure the standard of English of the pre-80s Malay medium with those of the present day national medium schools. We might perhaps find that there are overall gains in terms of “standards of English”. For one thing, the teaching of English is muchmore broad based. While the defunct English medium schools were located primarily in the urban areas, current globalization has no such boundaries. Thus, we have to examine this metaphor in detail and come up with more appropriate and suitable metaphors. What we need to construct more forcefully is globalization as active regenerating, growing and positive. In this sense globalization is seen as reaching for the mass, something that is continuous (life-long), rewarding and natural.

GLOBALIZATION IS HOMOGENEOUS

One serious misconception, which all practitioners know and Curriculum Development Centre is very well awareof is the globalization as an homogeneous activity. We talk of “English” and “globalization” as being a singular concept. While there are different English papers in the form of the 1119 which is an elective and additional paper, English as a subject is undifferentiated i.e. homogeneous. In the Mathematics curriculum, at the secondary fourlevel we make a distinction between Modern Mathematics and Additional Mathematics. For Arabic, there is Advanced Arabic (Bahasa ArabTinggi ) and Arabic as two different subjects. Yet we have only one homogeneous English subject for all and sundry, when in fact there are some in the urban schools for whom a more advanced type of English might be in order and at the same time there are some in certain areas for whom English is truly alien. Why can’t we have two different papers much in the same mode as Mathematics and Arabic and students take the different papers according to their needs andproficiency. After all, English is not homogeneous and mostcurriculum (apart from the KBSR / KBSM) acknowledges this with graded level courses. This will make globalization not only more meaningful but also more fun.

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to explore themetaphors which frames our discussion of globalization in Malaysia. While the “descriptive adequacy and accuracy” of the metaphor are appropriate in some instances, in other instances they are self defeating and takes us down a very narrow road. As I have explored in this paper, in talking about globalization, the conceptual metaphors underlying the expressions we use affect and shapes how we view and comprehend globalization. In fact, some expressions have become commonplace in the discourse of globalization and are unconscious (used largely without being noticed). Some of the metaphors identified include

TOOL MODEL

Where English (the language) is a tool seen in the expression “to sharpen English language skills”; the role of globalization is the process that is suppose to make the tool an efficient one. The metaphor also providesthe many justification for globalization . A variation of this is the ENGLISH IS A KEY metaphor which sees English as opening up doors of opportunities and also as gate keepers.

LINEAR ORDER (NUMERICAL ORDERING) MODEL

This model provides legitimacy in some respect for globalization where the language has an order of priority (though the accuracy of this order is not clear). The model is self-defeating as the subject is relegated to second place. Constant reminder of being second cannot be good.

GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT

This metaphor permeates our discussion of globalization and has an element of nostalgia. While to some degree, our standard has declined but the yardstick of globalization should be redefined.

GLOBALIZATION IS HOMOGENEOUS

This is the sin of the Curriculum people who have not seen it fit to develop different levels of English (perhaps due to certain implementation constraints of classrooms and teachers) and different English papers in our school curriculum to better reflect globalization in Malaysia.

Through this metaphors, for instance the GLOBALIZATION IN MALAYSIA IS DEFICIENT metaphor, we havesome how accepted and tolerated the “sub-standardness ” of English among our students – sometimes even making excuses for them or placing blame elsewhere. I have argue that we should discard some of these expressions and consciously fashioned expressions utilizing different and unique conceptual metaphors to reframe the discourse of globalization, thus making globalization more effective and not alienating globalization. In order to do this, it is vital we first understand the current metaphors within the discourse of globalization and strive for new and appropriate conceptual metaphors to lead us into the new frontiers of globalization in Malaysia.

References

Bereiter , C. (2002). Education and mind in the knowledge age. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Engeström , Y. (1987).Learning by expanding. Helsinki:Orienta-Konsultit .

Hargreaves, D. H. (1999). The knowledge-creating school. British Journal of Educational Studies, 47, 122-144.

Paavola , S., &Hakkarainen , K. (2003). A Knowledge Creation Metaphor - an Emergent Epistemological Approach to Learning. The proceedings of the 6th International History, Philosophy & Science Teaching Conference, November 7 - 11, 2001, Denver, Colorado, USA.

Sfard , A. (1998).On two metaphors for learning and the dangers of choosing just one. Educational Researcher, 27, 4–13.

On the road again: the metaphor of the journey in understandings of learning.

Roger Harrison, Julia Clarke and Fiona Reeve, Faculty of Education and Language Studies, Open University

Lakoff , G. and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By.University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Lakoff , G. and Mark Turner. More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor University of Chicago Press, 1989.

Lakoff , G. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization#Characteristics

http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm

http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/index.htm

English as a Global Language

David Crystal

Cambridge University Press 1997

A book review by Danny Yee © 1997 http://dannyreviews.com/

Crystal begins English as a Global Language by asking what it means for a language to be global, and what the advantages and disadvantages of having a global language are. In three chapters he then traces the rise of English to that status. The first surveys the extent of its use around the world and briefly outlines the history of its spread. The second examines some nineteenth century ideas about the place of English in the world and the foundations for its success laid by the British Empire and the Industrial Revolution. The third describes the cultural legacy that underpins the present dominance of English — its use in diplomacy and international communications, in the media (Hollywood, popular music, books), in education, and on the Internet. The final chapter looks at the future of English as a global language, focusing on debates about its status within the United States and the possibility of its fragmentation into regional dialects (Crystal suggests these might end up coexisting with some form of "World Standard Spoken English").

With just 150 pages to cover such a broad topic, superficiality is hardly avoidable. (The maps could easily have been improved on, however: most are unexciting political maps with no information an ordinary atlas wouldn't have.) Those with a reasonable background in modern history and general politics will find nothing substantially new in English as a Global Language. Many of the details may be unfamiliar, however, and it is instructive to have them all pulled together. Crystal is, in any event, writing for the broadest possible popular audience — and he has succeeded in producing an accessible and enticing treatment of his subject.

13 August 1997

English as the Global Language:

Good for Business, Bad for Literature

English is well on its way to becoming the dominant global language. Is this a good thing? Yes, in fields such as science where a common language brings efficiency gains. But the global dominance of the English language is bad news for world literature, according to CEPR researcher JacquesMélitz (Centre deRecherche enEconomie et Statistique , Paris and CEPR). Why? Because if the English language dominates world publishing, very few translationsexcept those from English to other languages will be commercially viable. As a result, virtually only those writing in English will have a chance of reaching a world audience and achieving ‘classic status’. The outcome is clear,Mélitz argues: just as in the sciences, those who wish to reach a world audience will write in English. “World literature will be an English literature”,Mélitz warns, “and will be the poorer for it – as if all music were written only for the cello”. His work appears in "English-Language Dominance, Literature and Welfare," (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2055). By literature, he refers to imaginative works of an earlier vintage that are still read today, and therefore the accumulation of world literature refers to the tiny fraction of currently produced imaginative works which will eventually be regarded as ‘classics’. According toMélitz , the tendency of competitive forces in the global publishing market to privilege the translation of English fiction and poetry into other languages for reading or listening enjoyment may damage the production of world literature and in this respect make us all worse off.

Mélitz makes the following points:

• Language matters: In the case of literature, as opposed to other uses of language, language does not serve merely to communicate content (say, a story line) but is itself an essential source of enjoyment. Therefore, it is futile to argue that nothing would change if all potential contributors to literature wrote in the same language. “We might as well pretend that there would be no loss if all musical composers wrote for the cello” saidMélitz . Translations can only approximate the rhythms, sounds, images, allusions and evocations of the original, and in literature, those aspects are essential.

• Great authors write in only one language: Remarkably few people have ever made contributions to world literature in more than one language. Beckett and Nabokov may be the only two prominent examples. Conrad, who is sometimes mentioned in this connection, is a false illustration in a glaring regard: he never wrote in his native Polish. Quite conspicuously, expatriate authors generally continue to write in their native language even after living for decades away from home. This holds not only for poets, such as Mickiewicz and Milosz, which may not be surprising, but also for novelists. Mann went on composing in German during a long spell in the US. The list of authors who have inscribed their names in the history of literature in more than one language since the beginning of time is astonishingly short.

• English is much more likely to be translated: For straightforward economic reasons, only works that enjoy exceptionally large sales have any notable prospect of translation. Heavy sales in the original language represent an essential criterion of selection for translation, though not the only one. As a result, translations will be concentrated in original creations in the major languages. Since English is the predominant language in the publishing industry, authors writing in English have a much better chance of translation than those writing in other tongues.

• English dominance of translations has increased: The dominance of English in translations has actually gone up over the last 30 years, despite a general decline in the market share of English in the world publishing market. When English represented about a quarter of the world publishing market in the early 1960’s, the percentage of English in translations was already 40%. With the general advance of literacy and standards of living in the world, the share of English in world publishing fell to around 17% in the late 1980’s. Yet the language's share in translations rose to surpass 50% during this time.

• If you want to reach a world audience, write in English: In science, as in literature, a person writing in a minor language has a better chance of publication than one writing in a major tongue, but will necessarily have a much smaller chance of translation and international recognition. The result in science is clear. Those who strive to make a mark in their discipline try to publish in English. By and large, the ones who stick to their home language – English excepted, of course – have lower ambitions and do less significant work. The same pressure to publish in English exists for those engaged in imaginative writing who wish to attain a world audience.

• English dominance may cause the world pool of talent to dry up: However, the evidence shows that in the case of literary writing, the gifted – even the supremely gifted – in a language other than English generally cannot turn to English by mere dint of effort and will-power. Thus, the dominance of English may sap their incentive to invest in personal skills and to shoot for excellence. Working toward the same result are the relatively easier conditions of publication they face at home. If so, the dominance of English in translations may cause the world pool of talent to dry up.

• Literature may become just another field where the best work is in English: In other words, the dominance of English poses the danger that literary output will become just another field where the best work is done in English. In this case, the production of imaginative prose and poetry in other languages may be relegated to the same provincial status that such writing already has acquired in some other areas of intellectual activity. But whereas the resulting damage is contestable in fields where language serves essentially for communication, such as science in general, the identical prospect is alarming in the case of literature.

Along with the advances in telecommunications in the last thirty years, the dominance of English in auditory and audiovisual entertainment has become far greater than in books. Does the argument about translations in literature apply more generally and explain this wider ascension of English too? The answer is partly positive as regards television, but mostly negative in connection with the cinema. US television series indeed benefit from an unusually large home audience and only travel abroad when successful domestically. On the other hand, a film need not succeed in the home market before being made available to foreign-language cinema audiences. Hollywood achieved an important place in the cinema in the era of the silent film.

Notes for Editors:

CEPR is a network of over 450 Research Fellows based throughout Europe, who collaborate through the Centre in research and its dissemination. CEPR helps its Research Fellows to develop projects, obtain funding, administer them and disseminate their results. The Centre’s research ranges from open economy macroeconomics to trade policy, from the economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe to regionalism in the world economy. CEPR takes no institutional policy positions. CEPR is an ESRC Resource Centre. For further information about CEPR, please contact Rita Gilbert, External Relations Officer, Tel 44  7878 2917, Fax 44 20 7878 2999 or by email on rgilbert@cepr.org.

JacquesMélitz is a Professor of Economics at Centre deRecherche enEconomie et Statistique and a Research Fellow in CEPR’s International Macroeconomicsprogramme .

The tendency of a single world market to privilege the translation of English fiction and poetry into other languages for reading or listening enjoyment may damage the production of world literature and in this respect make us all worse off. In order to develop this thesis, the article begins with an economic model of the market for imaginative works in which translations are systematically concentrated on writings in the original language with the largest share in world sales. The model is then shown to agree with the facts. Next, it is argued that high concentration of translations on works coming from one particular language hurts the production of literature directly, because variety of languages of origin is enriching as such, and indirectly, because the concentration damages the incentives of those who do not write in the leading language to invest in their own talents. "Literature" in the paper refers to earlier production of imaginative works which represents capital or is still read.

Are we moving toward the use of a single language for global communication, or are there ways of managing language diversity at the international level?

Biography of the late Ayatullah Murtadha Mutahhari

Ayatullāh Murťadhā Muťahharī, one of the principle architects of the new Islāmic consciousness in Iran, was born on February 2nd, 1920, in Farīmān, then a village and now a township about sixty kilometres from Mashhad, the great centre of Shī`a pilgrimage and learning in Eastern Iran.1

His father was Muhammad Ĥusaīn Muťahharī, a renown scholar who studied in Najaf and spent several years in Egypt and the Hijāz before returning to Farīmān. The elder Muťahharī was of a different caste of mind then his son, who in any event came to outshine him.

The father was devoted to the works of the celebrated traditionalist, Mullāh Muhammad Bāqir Majlisī; whereas the son’s great hero among the Shī`a scholars of the past was the theosophist Mullā Sadrā.

Nonetheless, Āyatullāh Muťahharī always retained great respect and affection for his father, who was also his first teacher, and he dedicated to him one of his most popular books, Dastān-e-Rastān (“The Epic of the Righteous”), first published in 1960, and which was later chosen as book of the year by the Iranian National Commission for UNESCO in 1965.

At the exceptionally early age of twelve, Muťahharī began his formal religious studies at the teaching institution in Mashhad, which was then in a state of decline, partly because of internal reasons and partly because of the repressive measures directed by Ridhā Khān, the first Pahlavī autocrat, against all Islāmic institutions.

But in Mashhad, Muťahharī discovered his great love for philos­ophy, theology, and mysticism, a love that remained with him throughout his life and came to shape his entire outlook on religion:

“I can remember that when I began my studies in Mashhad and was still engaged in learning elementary Arabic, the philosophers, mys­tics, and theologians impressed me far more than other scholars and scientists, such as inventors and explorers. Naturally I was not yet acquainted with their ideas, but I regarded them as heroes on the stage of thought.”2

Accordingly, the figure in Mashhad who aroused the greatest devotion in Muťahharī was Mīrzā Mahdī Shahīdī Razavī, a teacher of philosophy.

But Razavī died in 1936, before Muťahharī was old enough to participate in his classes, and partly because of this reason he left Mashhad the following year to join the growing number of students congregating in the teaching institution in Qum.

Thanks to the skillful stewardship of Shaykh `Abdul Karīm Hā’irī, Qum was on its way to becoming the spiritual and intellectual capital of Islāmic Iran, and Muťahharī was able to benefit there from the instruction of a wide range of scholars.

He studied Fiqh and Uŝūl - the core subjects of the traditional curriculum - with Āyatul­lāh Ĥujjat Kuhkamarī, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muhammad Dāmād, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muhammad Ridhā Gulpāyagānī, and Ĥajj Sayyid Ŝadr al-Dīn as-Ŝadr. But more important than all these was Āyatullāh Burujerdī, the successor of Ĥā’irī as director of the teaching establishment in Qum. Muťahharī attended his lectures from his arrival in Qum in 1944 until his departure for Tehran in 1952, and he nourished a deep respect for him.

Fervent devotion and close affinity characterized Muťahharī’s relationship with his prime mentor in Qum, Āyatullāh Rūhullāh Khumaynī. When Muťahharī arrived in Qum, Āyatullāh Khumaynī was a young lecturer, but he was already marked out from his contem­poraries by the profoundness and comprehensiveness of his Islāmic vision and his ability to convey it to others.

These qualities were manifested in the celebrated lectures on ethics that he began giving in Qum in the early 1930s. The lectures attracted a wide audience from outside as well as inside the religious teaching institution and had a profound impact on all those who attended them. Muťahharī made his first acquaintance with Āyatullah Khumaynī at these lectures:

“When I migrated to Qum, I found the object of my desire in a personality who possessed all the attributes of Mīrzā Mahdī (Sha­hīdī Razavī) in addition to others that were peculiarly his own. I realized that the thirst of my spirit would be quenched at the pure spring of that personality. Although I had still not completed the preliminary stages of my studies and was not yet qualified to embark on the study of the rational sciences (ma`qulāt), the lectures on ethics given by that beloved personality every Thursday and Friday were not restricted to ethics in the dry, aca­demic sense but dealt with gnosis and spiritual wayfaring, ­and thus, they intoxicated me. I can say without exaggeration that those lectures aroused in me such ecstasy that their effect remained with me until the following Monday or Tuesday. An important part of my intel­lectual and spiritual personality took shape under the influence of those lectures and the other classes I took over a period of twelve years with that spiritual master (ustād-i ilahī) [meaning Āyatullāh Khumaynī].”3

In about 1946, Āyatullāh Khumaynī began lecturing to a small group of students that included both Muťahharī and his roommate at the Fayziya Madressah, Āyatullāh Muntazarī, on two key philosophical texts, the Asfar al-Arba`a of Mullā Ŝadra and the Sharh-e-Manzuma of Mullā Hādī Sabzwārī. Muťahharī’s participation in this group, which continued to meet until about 1951, enabled him to establish more intimate links with his teacher.

Also in 1946, at the urging of Muťahharī and Muntazarī, the Āyatullāh Khumaynī taught his first formal course on Fiqh and Uŝūl, taking the chapter on rational proofs from the second volume of Akhund Khurāsānī’s Kifāyatal Uŝūl as his teaching text. Muťahharī followed his course assiduously, while still pursuing his studies of Fiqh with Āyatullāh Burūjerdī.

In the first two post-war decades, Āyatullāh Khumaynī trained numer­ous students in Qum who became leaders of the Islāmic Revolution and the Islāmic Republic, such that through them (as well as directly), the imprint of his personality was visible on all the key developments of the past decade.

But none among his students bore to Āyatullāh Khumaynī the same relationship of affinity as Muťahharī, an affinity to which the Āyatullāh Khumaynī himself has borne witness to.

The pupil and master shared a profound attachment to all aspects of traditional scholarship, without in any way being its captive; a comprehensive vision of Islām as a total system of life and belief, with particular importance ascribed to its philosophical and mystical aspects.

An absolute loyalty to the reli­gious institution, tempered by an awareness of the necessity of reform; a desire for comprehensive social and political change, accompanied by a great sense of strategy and timing; and an ability to reach out beyond the circle of the traditionally religious, and gain the attention and loyalty of the secularly educated.

Among the other teachers whose influence Muťahharī was exposed in Qum, was the great exegete of the Qur’ān and philosopher, Āyatullāh Sayyid Muhammad Ĥusain Ťabā’ťabā’ī. Muťahharī participated in both Ťabāťabā’ī’s classes on the Shifā` of Abū `Alī Sīnā from 1950 to 1953, and the Thursday evening meetings that took place under his direction.

The subject of these meetings was materialist philosophy, a remarkable choice for a group of traditional scholars. Muťahharī himself had first conceived a critical interest in materialist philosophy, especially Marxism, soon after embarking on the formal study of the rational sciences.

Ac­cording to his own recollections, in about 1946 he began to study the Persian translations of Marxist literature published by the Tudeh party, the major Marxist organization in Iran and at that time an important force in the political scene.

In addition, he read the writings of Taqī Arānī, the main theoretician of the Tudeh party, as well as Marxist publications in `Arabic emanating from Egypt.

At first he had some difficulty understanding these texts because he was not acquainted with modern philosophical terminology, but with continued exertion (which included the drawing up of a synopsis of Georges Pulitzer’s Elementary Principles of Philosophy), he came to master the whole subject of materialist philosophy.

This mastery made him an important contributor to Ťabā’ťabāī’s circle and later, after his move to Tehran, an effective combatant in the ideological war against Marxism and Marxist-influenced interpretations of Islām.

Numerous refutations of Marxism have been essayed in the Islāmic world, both in Iran and elsewhere, but almost all of them fail to go beyond the obvious incompatibilities of Marxism with reli­gious belief and the political failures and inconsistencies of Marxist political parties.

Muťahharī, by contrast, went to the philosophical roots of the matter and demonstrated with rigorous logic the contra­dictory and arbitrarily hypothetic nature of key principles of Marx­ism. His polemical writings are characterized more by intellectual than rhetorical or emotional force.

However, for Muťahharī, philosophy was far more than a polemi­cal tool or intellectual discipline; it was a particular style of religios­ity, a way of understanding and formulating Islām. Muťahharī belongs, in fact, to the tradition of Shī`a philosophical concern that goes back at least as far as Nasīr ad-Dīn Ťuŝī, one of Muťahharī’s personal heroes.

To say that Muťahharī’s view of Islām was philo­sophical is not to imply that he lacked spirituality or was determined to subordinate revealed dogma to philosophical interpretation and to impose philosophical terminology on all domains of religious con­cern,

Rather it means that he viewed the attainment of knowledge and understanding as the prime goal and benefit of religion and for that reason assigned to philosophy a certain primacy among the disciplines cultivated in the religious institution.

In this he was at variance with those numerous scholars for whom Fiqh was the be-all and end-all of the curriculum, with modernists for whom philos­ophy represented a Hellenistic intrusion into the world of Islām, and with all those whom revolutionary ardour had made impatient with careful philosophical thought.4

The particular school of philosophy to which Muťahharī adhered was that of Mullā Ŝadra, the “sublime philosophy” (hikmat-i muta`āliya) that seeks to combine the methods of spiritual insight with those of philosophical deduction.

Muťahharī was a man of tranquil and serene disposition, both in his general comportment and in his writings. Even when engaged in polemics, he was invaria­bly courteous and usually refrained from emotive and ironical word­ing.

But such was his devotion to Mullā Ŝadrā that he would passionately defend him even against slight or incidental criticism, and he chose for his first grandchild - as well as for the publishing house in Qum that put out his books - the name Ŝadrā.

Insofar as Ŝadrā’s school of philosophy attempts to merge the methods of inward illumination and intellectual reflection, it is not surprising that it has been subject to varying interpretations on the part of those more inclined to one method than the other.

To judge from his writings, Muťahharī belonged to those for whom the intel­lectual dimension of Ŝadrā’s school was predominant; there is little of the mystical or markedly spiritual tone found in other exponents of Ŝadrā’s thought, perhaps because Muťahharī viewed his own inward experiences as irrelevant to the task of instruction in which he was engaged or even as an intimate secret he should conceal.

More likely, however, this predilection for the strictly philosophical dimension of the “sublime philosophy” was an expression of Muťahharī’s own temperament and genius. In this respect, he dif­fered profoundly from his great mentor, Āyatullāh Khumaynī, many of whose political pronouncements continue to be suffused with the language and concerns of mysticism and spirituality.

In 1952, Muťahharī left Qum for Tehran, where he married the daughter of Āyatullāh Rūhānī and began teaching philosophy at the Madressah Marwi, one of the principal institutions of religious learning in the capital.

This was not the beginning of his teaching career, for already in Qum he had begun to teach certain subjects - logic, philosophy, theology, and Fiqh - while still a student himself.

But Muťahharī seems to have become progressively impatient with the somewhat restricted atmosphere of Qum, with the factional­ism prevailing among some of the students and their teachers, and with their remoteness from the concerns of society. His own future prospects in Qum were also uncertain.

In Tehran, Muťahharī found a broader and more satisfying field of religious, educational, and ultimately political activity. In 1954, he was invited to teach philosophy at the Faculty of Theology and Islāmic Sciences of Tehran University, where he taught for twenty-­two years.

First the regularization of his appointment and then his promotion to professor was delayed by the jealousy of mediocre colleagues and by political considerations (for Muťahharī’s closeness to Āyatullāh Khumaynī was well known).

But the presence of a figure such as Muťahharī in the secular university was significant and effective. Many men of Madressah background had come to teach in the univer­sities, and they were often of great erudition.

However, almost without exception they had discarded an Islāmic worldview, together with their turbans and cloaks. Muťahharī, by contrast, came to the university as an articulate and convinced exponent of Islāmic science and wisdom, almost as an envoy of the religious institution to the secularly educated. Numerous people responded to him, as the peda­gogical powers he had first displayed in Qum now fully unfolded.

In addition to building his reputation as a popular and effective university lecturer, Muťahharī participated in the activities of the numerous professional Islāmic associations (anjumanhā) that had come into being under the supervision of Mahdī Bāzārgān and Āyatullāh Taleqānī, lecturing to their doctors, engi­neers, teachers and helping to coordinate their work. A number of Muťahharī’s books in fact consist of the revised transcripts of series of lectures delivered to the Islāmic associations.

Muťahharī’s wishes for a wider diffusion of religious knowledge in society and a more effective engagement of religious scholars in social affairs led him in 1960 to assume the leadership of a group of Tehran `Ulamā known as the Anjuman-e-Mahāna-yi Dīnī (“The Monthly Religious Society”).

The members of this group, which included the late Āyatullāh Beheshtī, a fellow-student of Muťahharī in Qum, organized monthly public lectures designed simultaneously to demonstrate the relevance of Islām to contempo­rary concerns, and to stimulate reformist thinking among the `Ulamā.

The lectures were printed under the title of Guftār-e-Māh (“Dis­course of the Month”) and proved very popular, but the government banned them in March 1963 when Āyatullāh Khumaynī began his public denunciation of the Pahlavī regime.

A far more important venture in 1965 of the same kind was the foundation of the Ĥusayniya-e-Irshād, an institution in north Tehran, designed to gain the allegiance of the secularly educated young to Islām. Muťahharī was among the members of the directing board; he also lectured at the Ĥusayniya-e-Irshād and edited and contrib­uted to several of its publications.

The institution was able to draw huge crowds to its functions, but this success - which without doubt exceeded the hopes of the founders, was overshadowed by a number of internal problems. One such problem was the political context of the institution’s activities, which gave rise to differing opinions on the opportuneness of going beyond reformist lecturing to political confrontation.

The spoken word plays in general a more effective and immediate role in promoting revolutionary change than the written word, and it would be possible to compose an anthology of key sermons, addresses, and lectures that have carried the Islāmic Revolution of Iran forward.

But the clarification of the ideological content of the revolution and its demarcation from opposing or competing schools of thought have necessarily depended on the written word, on the composition of works that expound Islāmic doctrine in systematic form, with particular attention to contemporary problems and con­cerns.

In this area, Muťahharī’s contribution was unique in its volume and scope. Muťahharī wrote assiduously and continuously, from his student days in Qum up to 1979 the year of his martyr­dom.

Much of his output was marked by the same philosophical tone and emphasis already noted, and he probably regarded as his most important work Uŝūl-e-Falsafa wa Ravish-e-Ri’ālism (“The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism”), the record of Ťabāťabāī’s discourses to the Thursday evening circle in Qum, supple­mented with Muťahharī’s comments.

But he did not choose the topics of his books in accordance with personal interest or predilection, but with his perception of need; wherever a book was lacking on some vital topic of contemporary Islāmic interest, Muťahharī sought to supply it.

Single handily, he set about constructing the main ele­ments of a contemporary Islāmic library. Books such as `Adl-e-Ilāhī (“Divine Justice”), Nizām-e-Ĥuquq-e-Zan dar Islām (“The System of Women’s Rights in Islām”), Mas’ala-yi Ĥijāb (“The Question of the Veil”), Ashnā’i ba `Ulūm-e-Islāmī (“An Introduction to the Islāmic Sciences”), and Muqaddima bar Jahānbīnī-yi Islāmi (“An Introduc­tion to the Worldview of Islām”) were all intended to fill a need, to contribute to an accurate and systematic understanding of Islām and the problems in the Islāmic society.

These books may well come to be regarded as Muťahharī’s most lasting and important contribution to the rebirth of Islāmic Iran, but his activity also had a political dimension that admittedly subordi­nate, should not be overlooked.

While a student and fledgling teacher in Qum, he had sought to instill political consciousness in his contemporaries and was particularly close to those among them who were members of the Fida’iyan-i Islām, the Militant Organization founded in 1945 by Nawwab Safawī.

The Qum headquarters of the Fida’iyan was the Madrasa-yi Fayziya, where Muťahharī himself resided, and he sought in vain to prevent them from being removed from the Madressah by Āyatullāh Burūjerdī, who was resolutely set against all political confrontation with the Shah’s regime.

During the struggle for the nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry, Muťahharī sympa­thized with the efforts of Āyatullāh Kāshānī and Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, although he criticized the latter for his adherence to secular nationalism. After his move to Tehran, Muťahharī collabo­rated with the Freedom Movement of Bāzārgān and Taleqānī, but never became one of the leading figures in the group.

His first serious confrontation with the Shah’s regime came dur­ing the uprising of Khurdad 15th, 1342/June 6th, 1963, when he showed himself to be politically, as well as intellectually, a follower of Āyatullāh Khumaynī by distributing his declarations and urging sup­port for him in the sermons he gave.5

He was accordingly arrested and held for forty-three days. After his release, he participated actively in the various organizations that came into being to maintain the momentum that had been created by the uprising, most impor­tantly the Association of Militant Religious Scholars (Jami`a yi Ruhāniyāt-e-Mubāriz).

In November 1964, Āyatullāh Khumaynī entered on his fourteen years of exile, spent first in Turkey and then in Najaf, and throughout this period Muťahharī remained in touch with Āyatullāh Khumaynī, both directly - by visits to Najaf - and indirectly.

When the Islāmic Revolution approached its triumphant climax in the winter of 1978 and Āyatullāh Khumaynī left Najaf for Paris, Muťahharī was among those who travelled to Paris to meet and consult with him. His closeness to Āyatullāh Khumaynī was confirmed by his appointment to the Council of the Islāmic Revolution, the existence of which Āyatullāh Khumaynī announced on January 12th, 1979.

Muťahharī’s services to the Islāmic Revolution were brutally curtailed by his assassination on May 1st, 1979. The murder was carried out by a group known as Furqān, which claimed to be the protagonists of a “progressive Islām,” one freed from the allegedly distorting influence of the religious scholars.

Although Muťahharī appears to have been chairman of the Council of the Islāmic Revolu­tion at the time of his assassination, it was as a thinker and a writer that he was martyred.

In 1972, Muťahharī published a book entitled `Illal-i Girayish ba Maddigarī (“Reasons for the Turn to Materialism”), an impor­tant work analyzing the historical background of materialism in Europe and Iran.

During the revolution, he wrote an introduction to the eighth edition of this book, attacking distortions of the thought of Ĥafiz and Hallaj that had become fashionable in some segments of Irānian society and refuting certain materialistic interpretations of the Qur’ān.

The source of the interpretations was the Furqān group, which sought to deny fundamental Qur’ānic concepts such as the divine transcendence and the reality of the hereafter.

As always in such cases, Muťahharī’s tone was persuasive and solicitous, not angry or condemnatory, and he even invited a response from Furqān and other interested parties to comment on what he had written. Their only response was the gun.

The threat to assassinate all who opposed them was already con­tained in the publications of Furqān, and after the publication of the new edition of `Illal-e-Girayish ba Maddigarī, Muťahharī apparently had some premonition of his martyrdom.

According to the testi­mony of his son, Mujtabā, a kind of detachment from worldly concerns became visible in him; he augmented his nightly prayers and readings of the Qur’ān, and he once dreamed that he was in the presence of the Prophet (S), together with Āyatullāh Khumaynī .

On Tuesday, May 1st, 1979 Muťahharī went to the house of Dr. Yadullāh Sahābī, in the company of other members of the Council of the Islāmic Revolution. At about 10:30 at night, he and another participant in the meeting, Engineer Katira`i, left Sahābī’s house.

Walking by himself to an adjacent alley where the car that was to take him home was parked, Muťahharī suddenly heard an unknown voice call out to him. He looked around to see where the voice was coming from, and as he did, a bullet struck him in the head, entering beneath the right earlobe and exiting above the left eyebrow.

He died almost instantly, and although he was rushed to a nearby hospi­tal, there was nothing that could be done but mourn for him. The body was left in the hospital the following day, and then on Thursday, amid wide­spread mourning, it was taken for funeral prayers first to Tehran University and then to Qum for burial, next to the grave of Shaykh `Abdul Karīm Hā’irī .

Āyatullāh Khumaynī wept openly when Muťahharī was buried in Qum, and he described him as his “dear son,” and as “the fruit of my life,” and as “a part of my flesh.” But in his eulogy Āyatullāh Khumaynī also pointed out that with the murder of Muťahharī neither his personality was diminished, nor was the course of the revolution interrupted:

“Let the evil-wishers know that with the departure of Muťahharī - his Islāmic personality, his philosophy and learning, have not left us. Assassinations cannot destroy the Islāmic personality of the great men of Islām…Islām grows through sacrifice and martyrdom of its cherished ones. From the time of its revelation up to the present time, Islām has always been accompanied by martyrdom and heroism.”6

The personage and legacy of Āyatullāh Muťahharī have certainly remained unforgotten in the Islāmic Republic, to such a degree that his posthumous presence has been almost as impressive as the attainments of his life. The anniversary of his martyrdom is regularly commemorated, and his portrait is ubiquitous throughout Iran.

Many of his unpublished writings are being printed for the first time, and the whole corpus of his work is now being distributed and studied on a massive scale. In the words of Āyatullāh Khamene’ī, President of the Republic, the works of Muťahharī have come to constitute “the intellectual infrastructure of the Islāmic Republic.”

Efforts are accordingly under way to promote a knowledge of Muťahharī’s writings outside the Persian-speaking world as well, and the Ministry of Islāmic Guidance has sponsored translations of his works into languages as diverse as Spanish and Malay.

In a sense, however, it will be the most fitting memorial to Muťahharī if revolutionary Iran proves able to construct a polity, society, economy and culture that are authentically and integrally Islāmic. For Muťahharī’s life was oriented to a goal that transcended individual motivation, and his martyrdom was the final expression of that effacement of self.

Notes

1. This sketch of the life and works of Āyatullāh Muťahharī is based chiefly on Muhammad Wa'izzāda Khurāsānī’s, “Sayrī dar Zindagi-yi `Ilmī wa Inqilābiīyi Ustad Shahīd Murtadhā Muťahharī,” in Yadnāma-yi Ustād Shahīd Murtadhā Muťahharī, ed. `Abdul Karīm Surūsh, Teh­ran, 1360 Sh./1981, pp. 319-380, an article rich in information on many aspects of the recent history of Islāmic Irān. Reference has also been made to Mujtabā Muťahhari, “Zindagi-yi Pidaram,” in Harakat (journal of the students at the Tehran Faculty of Theology), no. 1 (n.d.), pp. 5-16; M. Hoda, In Memory of Martyr Muťahharī, a pam­phlet published by the Ministry of Islāmic Guidance, Tehran, April, 1982; and Āyatullāh Muťahharī’s autobiographical introduction to the eighth edition of `Ilal-i Girayish ba Maddīgarī; Qum, 1357 Sh./1978, pp. 7ff.

2. `Ilal-e-Girayish ba Maddīgarī, Page 9.

3. `Ilal-i Girayish ba Maddigari, Page 9.

4. The authoritative statement of this view was made by Sayyid Qutb in his Khasā’is al-Tasawwur al-Islāmī wa Muqawwimatuhu, Cairo, numer­ous editions, which was translated into Persian and had some influence on views toward philosophy.

5. Muhahharī’s name comes ninth in a list of clerical detainees prepared by the military prosecutor’s office in June, 1963. See facsimile of the list in Dihnavi, Qiyam-e-Khunin-i 15 Khurdad 42 ba Rivāyat-e-Asnād, Tehran, 1360 Sh./1981, Page 77.

6. Text of Āyatullāh Khumaynī’s eulogy in Yādnama-yi Ustād-i Shahīd Murtadha Muhahharī, pp. 3-5.

Good Deeds of Non-Muslims

Outline of the Discussion

One of the issues which is discussed regarding “Divine justice” is the issue of the good deeds performed by non-Muslims.

Today, the issue of whether the good deeds of non-Muslims are accepted by God or not is under discussion amongst the different classes - whether learned or unlearned, literate or illiterate. If they are accepted, what difference does it make if a person is a Muslim or not; the important thing is to do good in this world.

If a person is not a Muslim and practices no religion, he or she has lost nothing. And if their actions are not acceptable and are altogether void with no reward or recompense from God, then how is that compatible with Divine justice?

This same question can be asked from a Shī`a perspective within the bounds of Islām: Are the actions of a non-Shī`a Muslim acceptable to God, or are they null and void? If they are acceptable, what difference does it make if a person is a Shī`a Muslim or a non-Shī`a Muslim?

What is important is to be Muslim; a person who is not a Shī`a and doesn’t believe in the wilāyah (Divinely-appointed guardianship) of the Ahlul Baīt (as) has not lost anything. And if the actions of such a person are not acceptable to God, then how is that compatible with Divine justice?

In the past, this issue was only discussed by philosophers and in the books of philosophy. However, today it has entered into the minds of all levels of society; few people can be found who have not at least broached the subject for themselves and in their own minds.

Divine philosophers would discuss the issue from the aspect that if all people who are outside the fold of religion are to face perdition and Divine punishment, it necessarily follows that in the universe, evil and compulsion are preponderant. However, the fact that felicity and good have primacy in the universe not evil and wretchedness is an accepted and definitive principle.

Humanity is the greatest of all of creation; everything else has been created for it (of course, with the correct conception of this idea that is understood by the wise, not the perception that the short-sighted people commonly possess).

If humanity itself is to be created for the Hell-fire – that is, if the final abode of the majority of humanity is to be Hell then one must grant that the anger of God supersedes His mercy.

This is because the majority of people are strangers to the true religion; and even those who are within the fold of the true religion are beset by deviation and digression when it comes to practicing.This was the background of the discussion amongst the philosophers.

It has been nearly half a century that, as a result of easier communication among Muslim and non-Muslim nations, an increase in the means of communication, and greater interaction amongst nations, the issue of whether being a Muslim and a believer as a necessary condition for the acceptability of good deeds is being discussed among all levels of society, especially the so-called intellectuals.

When these people study the lives of inventors and scientists of recent times who were not Muslim but who performed valuable services for humanity, they find such people worthy of reward.

On the other hand since they used to think that the actions of non-Muslims are altogether null and void, they fall into serious doubt and uncertainty. In this way, an issue which for years was the exclusive domain of the philosophers has entered the general conversations of people and has taken the form of an objection with regard to Divine justice.

Of course, this objection is not directly related to Divine justice; it is related to Islām’s viewpoint about human beings and their actions, and becomes related to Divine justice inasmuch as it appears that such a viewpoint regarding human beings, their actions, and God’s dealing with them is in opposition to the standards of Divine justice.

In the interactions that I have and have had with students and the youth, I have frequently been faced with this question. Sometimes they ask whether the great inventors and scientists, with all the worthy services which they have done for humanity, will go to Hell.

Will the likes of Pasteur and Edison go to Hell while indolent holy people who have spent their lives idly in a corner of the Masjid go to Heaven? Has God created Heaven solely for us Shī`as?

I remember that once an acquaintance from my city, who was a practicing Muslim, came to Tehran to visit me, and he raised this issue.

This man had visited a lepers’ hospital in Mashhad and had been stirred and deeply affected by the sight of the Christian nurses who were sincerely (at least in his view) looking after the patients with leprosy. At that time, this issue came up in his mind and he fell into doubt.

You are aware that looking after a patient of leprosy is a very difficult and unpleasant task and when this hospital was established in Mashhad, very few doctors were willing to serve there, and similarly, no one was willing to care for the patients.

Advertisements for the employment of nurses were taken out in the newspapers; in all of Iran, not a single person gave a positive answer to this invitation. A small group of so-called ascetic Christian women from France came and took charge of nursing the lepers.

This man, who had seen the humanitarianism and loving care of those nurses towards lepers, who had been abandoned by even their own parents, had been strongly affected by these nurses.

He related that the Christian nurses wore long, loose clothes, and apart from their face and hands, no part of their body was visible. Each of them had a long rosary which had perhaps a thousand beads and whenever they would find free time from work, they would busy themselves in their recitations on the rosary.

Then the man asked with a troubled mind and in a disturbed tone whether it was true that non-Muslims would not enter Heaven?

Of course, right now we are not concerned with the motives of those Christian ladies. Was it truly for God, in God’s way, and out of pure humanitarianism that they did what they did, or was another motive in play?

Certainly, we don’t want to be pessimistic, just as we are not overly optimistic; our point is that these incidents and events have introduced our people to a serious question.

Several years ago, I was invited to an association to give a speech. In that association, in accordance with their tradition, the participants were requested to write down any questions they had so that they could be answered at the appropriate time.

Those questions had been recorded in a notebook, and that notebook had been given to me so I could choose the topic of my speech from amongst those topics (noted in the book).

I noticed that the question that had been repeated more than any other was whether God will send all non-Muslims to Hell. Will Pasteur, Edison, and Kokh be amongst those who will be punished in the Hereafter?

It was from that time that I realized the importance of this issue inasmuch as it had attracted people’s thoughts.Now, in this part of the book, we will discuss this issue. But before we begin, we need to clarify two points in order for the topic at hand to become completely clear.

1. The General Aspect of the Discussion

The purpose of this discussion is not to clarify the status of individuals, for example to specify whether Pasteur will go to Heaven or Hell. What do we know about his true thoughts and beliefs? What were his true intentions? What were his personal and moral traits; and in fact what was the sum of all his actions? Our familiarity with him is limited to his intellectual services, and that is all.

This doesn’t apply only to Pasteur. As a matter of principle, the status of individuals is in the hands of God; no one has the right to express an opinion with certainty about whether someone will go to Heaven or Hell. If we were to be asked, “Is Shaykh Murtadhā al-Anŝārī , in view of his known asceticism, piety, faith, and deeds, definitely among the inhabitants of Heaven?”

Our answer would be, “From what we know of the man, in his intellectual and practical affairs we haven’t heard of anything bad. What we know of him is virtue and goodness. But as to say with absolute certainty whether he will go to Heaven or Hell, that isn’t our prerogative.

It is God who knows the intentions of all people, and He knows the secrets and hidden things of all souls; and the account of all people’s actions is also with Him. We can only speak with certainty about those whose final outcome has been made known by the religious authorities.”

Sometimes people discuss and debate amongst themselves about who was the most virtuous and excellent among the `Ulamā (scholars) in terms of nearness to God. For example, was it Sayyid Ibn Ťāwūs , or Sayyid Bahrul `Ulūm ? Or Shaykh al-Anŝārī ? Or sometimes they ask about the most eminent among the descendents of the A’immah.

For example, is Sayyid `Abdul `Adhīm al-Hasanīī (as) is superior in God’s view, or Sayyidah Fāťimah al-Ma`ŝūmah (as)?

Once, one of the Mujtahids was asked whether `Abbās Ibn `Alī (as) was superior or `Alī al-Akbar (as). In order to give the question the form of a practical issue so the Mujtahid would be compelled to answer it, they asked, “If someone vows to sacrifice a sheep for the most superior of the Imāms’ descendents, what is his duty? Is `Abbās Ibn `Alī superior, or `Alī al-Akbar?”

It is obvious that such discussions are improper, and answering such questions is neither the duty of a Faqīh (scholar of Islāmic law), nor of anyone else. Specifying the rank of God’s creation is not our responsibility. It should be left to God, and no one has any knowledge about the matter except through God himself.

In the early era of Islām, there were instances when people expressed such unjustified opinions, and the Prophet Muhammad (S) forbade them from doing so.

When `Uthmān Ibn Ma`zūn died, a woman of the Anŝār named Umme `Alī, who apparently was the wife of the man in whose house `Uthmān Ibn Ma`zūn was staying and whose guest he was, addressed his bier in the presence of the Prophet Muhammad (S) and said:

    هَنِيئاً لَكَ الْجَنَّةُ

“May Heaven be pleasant for you!”

Although `Uthmān Ibn Ma`zūn was an eminent man, and the Prophet Muhammad (S) cried heavily at his funeral and threw himself over the bier and kissed him, the inappropriate statement of that woman displeased him.

He turned to her and with an unhappy look said, “How did you know? Why did you make a statement out of ignorance? Have you received a revelation, or do you know the accounts of God’s creation?”

The woman replied, “O Messenger of God, he was your companion and a brave warrior!” The Noble Messenger (S) answered her with interesting words that are worthy of attention, he said:

    إِنِّي رَسُولُ اللٌّهِ وَمَا أَدْرِي مَا يُفْعَلُ بِــي

“I am the Messenger of God, yet I don’t know what will be done with me.”1

This sentence is the exact purport of a verse of the Qur’ān:

    قُلْ مٌـا كُنْتُ بِدْعاً مِّنَ الرُّسُلِ وَ مٌا أَدْرِي مٌا يُفْعَلُ بِي وَ لاٌ بِكُمْ

“Say, ‘I am not a novelty among the apostles, nor do I know what will be done with me, or with you.”2 3

A similar incident has also been related regarding the death of Sa`d Ibn Mu`ādh. In that instance, when the mother of Sa`d said a similar sentence over his coffin, the Messenger (S) said to her, “Be silent; don’t make a decision with certainty in God’s affairs.”4

2. No Religion Except Al-Islām is Accepted

The other point that must be made clear before beginning the discussion is that the topic of the non-Muslims’ good deeds can be discussed in two ways and in reality, is two discussions:

First, is any religion other than Islām acceptable to God, or is Islām the only acceptable religion? That is, is it necessary only for a person to have some religion or at most follow a religion associated with one of the Divine prophets, without it then making a difference which religion that is, for example, whether one be a Muslim, Christian, Jew, or even a Zoroastrian? Or is there only one true religion in each era?

After we have accepted that the true religion in each era is only one, the other discussion is whether a person who doesn’t follow the true religion but performs a good deed, one that is actually good and is also sanctioned by the true religion, is worthy of reward or not? In other words, is faith in the true religion a condition for one’s good deeds to merit reward?

What will be discussed here is the second issue

With respect to the first issue, we can say briefly that there is only one true religion in each era, and all are obligated to believe in it.

The idea that has recently become common among some so-called intellectuals to the effect that all Divine religions have equal validity in all eras is a fallacious one.

Of course, it is true that there is no disagreement or contradiction among the prophets of God. All of the prophets of God call towards a single goal and the same God. They have not come to create mutually contradicting groups and sects among humanity.

But this doesn’t mean that in every era there are several true religions, and thus people in each era can then choose whichever religion they want.

To the contrary, it means that a person must believe in all of the Prophets and affirm that each Prophet would give tidings of the Prophet to come, especially the final and greatest of them; and likewise, each Prophet would affirm the previous one.

Thus, the necessary consequence of believing in all of the Prophets is to submit in every era to the religion of the Prophet of the time. And of course, it is necessary that in the final era we act on the final commands that have been revealed by God to the final Prophet. And this is what necessarily follows from Islām, that is, submission to God and acceptance of the missions of His Messengers.

Many people in our day have subscribed to the view that it is sufficient for a person to worship God and be affiliated with and practice one of the Divine religions that was revealed by God; the form of the commandments is not that important.

`Isa (Jesus) (as) was a Prophet, Muhammad (S) was also a Prophet; if we follow the religion of `Isa (as) and go to church once a week, that is fine, and if we follow the religion of the final Messenger (S) and pray five times a day, that is also correct. These people say that what is important is for a person to believe in God and practice one of the Divine religions.

George Jordac, author of the book, Imām `Alī; Gibrān Khalīl Gibrān, the well-known Lebanese Christian author; and others like them have such a view.5 These two individuals speak of the Prophet Muhammad (S) and Amīrul Mo’minīn `Alī Ibn Abī Ťālib (as) and especially Amīrul Mo’minīn (as) – just as a Muslim would.

Some people ask how these people, in spite of their belief in Amīrul Mo’minīn `Alī Ibn Abī Ťalib (as) and the Prophet Muhammad (S), are still Christian.

If they were truthful, they would have become Muslims, and since they haven’t done so, it is clear there is something behind the curtain. They are being deceptive, and they aren’t sincere in their expression of love and belief in the Prophet Muhammad (S) and `Alī Ibn Abī Ťālib (as).

The answer is that they are not without sincerity in their expression of love and belief in the Prophet Muhammad (S) and Amīrul Mo’minīn `Alī Ibn Abī Ťalib (as). However, they have their own way of thinking regarding practicing a religion.

These individuals believe that human beings are not held to a particular religion; any religion is sufficient. Thus, at the same time that they are Christians, they consider themselves admirers and friends of `Alī Ibn Abī Ťalib (as), and they even believe that he himself held their view. George Jordac says, “`Alī Ibn Abī Ťalib declines to compel people to necessarily follow a particular religion.”

However, we consider this idea void. It is true that there is no compulsion in religion:

    لاٌ إِكْرٌاهَ فِي الدِّينِ

“There is no compulsion in religion.”6

But this doesn’t mean that there is more than one religion in every age that is acceptable to God, and we have the right to choose any one we please. This is not the case; in every age, there is one true religion and no more.

Whenever a Prophet was sent by God with a new religion, the people were obligated to avail themselves of his teachings and learn his laws and commandments, whether in acts of worship or otherwise, until the turn of the Seal of the Prophets came.

In this (current) age, if someone wishes to come near God, he or she must seek guidance from the precepts of the religion he brought.

The Noble Qur’ān says:

    وَ مَنْ يَبْتَغِ غَيْرَ الإِسْلاٌمَ دِيناً فَلَنْ يُقْبَلَ مِنْهُ وَ هُوَ فِي الأَخِرَةِ مِنَ الْخٌاسِرِينَ

“And whoever desires a religion other than Islām, it shall never be accepted from him, and in the hereafter he shall be among the losers.”7

If someone were to say that the meaning of “Islām” in this verse is not our religion in particular; rather, the intent is the literal meaning of the word, or submission to God, the answer would be that without doubt Islām means submission and the religion of Islām is the religion of submission, but the reality of submission has a particular form in each age.

And in this age, its form is the same cherished religion that was brought by the Seal of the Prophets. So it follows that the word Islām (submission) necessarily applies to it alone.

In other words, the necessary consequence of submission to God is to accept His commandments, and it is clear that one must always act on the final Divine commandments. And the final commandment of God is what His final messenger has brought.