Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter III: PSYCHOLOGY

GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL

“The human soul,” saysAlfarabi ,“is a unity in difference. This means that the soul is one, and that its unity is the basis for certain differences or powers. The powers of the soul are multiple but can be reduced to three kinds: vegetative, sensitive and intellective.” 89 Hence the following schema:

The Soul is: Vegetative, Sensitive, Intellective.

1. The Vegetative has three Powers: Nutritive, Augmentative, Generative.

2. The Sensitive has two Powers:

(a) Powers of Knowledge: External sensible (five external senses), Internal sensible (Imagination, Memory, Estimative power).

(b) Powers of Action: Sensitive (Concupiscible and Irascible), Locomotive.

3. The Intellective has two Powers:

(a) Powers of Knowledge: Perceptive (knowledge of the individual), Abstractive (knowledge of the universal) is obtained through the four Intellects: Passive Intellect, Active Intellect, Actual Intellect, Acquired Intellect.

(b) Power of Action: Intellective (the will)

1- THE POWERS OF KNOWLEDGE

SENSE-KNOWLEDGE

In the exposition of the theory of knowledge we shall compare the theory ofAlfarabi with that of St. Thomas for the purpose of helping the reader discover at a glance the similarity and the difference between them.

ALFARABI

Every idea comes from sense-experience according to the adage:“There is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses.” The mind is like a smooth tablet on which nothing is written. It is the senses that do all the writing on it. The senses are five: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Each of these has a proper sensible thing for its object. In every sensation the sense receives the form or species of sensible things without the matter, just as wax receives the form of a seal without any of the matter of it.90

ST. THOMAS

Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally changed by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such change is what is directly perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified. Now, change is of two kinds, one natural and the other spiritual. Natural change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual change takes place by the form of the changer being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing changed, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in sensible organ.91

IfAlfarabi had worked out more in detail the theory of sense-knowledge, he probably would have brought out not only the physical factor, but also the psychical. For, he seems to take for granted the following factors which bring about sensation proper. First, without the organs of the several senses, there can be no sensation. We cannot see without eyes, nor hear without ears. A sense organ is apotentia passiva , the actuation of which is due to a stimulus, and ultimately to an object. Second, when the object acts upon the sense-organ, it must produce therein a modification which is like to itself, and generally called sensible species. In receiving the sensible species, the sense passes frompotentia passiva to act. Hence, when sensible species are produced in a sentient organism, they must produce a corresponding reaction which we call sensation.

ALFARABI

The sensations we have once experienced are not utterly dead. They can reappear in the form of images. The power by which we revive a past sensible experience without the aid of any physical stimulus is called imagination (el-motakhayilah ).

The power by which we combine and divide images is called the cogitative (el-mofakarah ). If we were limited merely to the experience of our actual sensations, we would have only the present, and with it there would be no intellectual life at all. But fortunately we are endowed with the power of calling back a former experience, and this is called memory (el-hafizah - el-zakirah ).

ST. THOMAS

For the retention and preservation of these forms (sensible forms), thephantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, forphantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, thememorative power, which is a storehouse of such like intentions92

Finally, among the internal sensesAlfarabi mentions instinct or el-uahm (the estimative power of the Scholastics), by which animals seek what is useful to them and avoid what is harmful.“It is by this faculty,” he says,“that the sheep knows that the wolf is his enemy and that the little lambs need its care and attention.” 93

PERCEPTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTS CONTRASTED WITH CONCEPTS

If while hard at work writing, I smell something sweet but cannot tell where the sweet odor is coming from, I am said to have a sensation of smell. If I refer that“something sweet” to a rose on the table, then I have a percept of the smell of the rose. From this it follows that sensation is not knowledge (sentire est nondum scire ) .

Man's first knowledge, according toAlfarabi , is a percept. A percept is a knowledge of the individual, free from abstraction; it is individuality without universality. It comes after sensation, but prior to a concept (knowledge of the universal). Literally he says:“There is one part of the soul in which occurs the first knowledge, a knowledge free from abstraction, and which apprehends the principles of science immediately and without reflection.” 94

That a percept (knowledge of the individual) comes first, is proved by the fact that our mind must have the individual be-fore abstracting from it the universal. Hence, there is nothing in the intellect that has not been first in sense-perception.

But a percept is simply incomplete knowledge. To know the individual completely we must see it and understand it in relation to other individuals, which is like saying that we must conceive it and think of it.

ForAlfarabi , what is commonly called thought or concept seems to represent something like the concrete universal, something like the universal existing in the particular concrete thing. This is easily inferred from his definition of the universal as“Unum demultis et inmultis .” By the word“Unum” he means that the universality, that common something, is abstracted from the concrete thing (percept); and by the words“demultis et inmultis ” he means that the universality is to be applied to concrete cases and is contained within them.

ThatAlfarabi holds universality in concreteness as peculiar features of the concept is seen from the fact that he does not admit in its absolute sense the aphorism“singulare sentitur ,universale intelligitur .” He rather believes that, while by its matter the particular concrete thing is the object of sense-perception, yet by its form or essence, it is in the intellect, too. On the other hand, though the universal, as such, is in the intellect, yet it is also in sense-perception insofar as it isimmanent in the individual.95

ABSTRACTIVE KNOWLEDGE

All our intellectual powers are grouped under our common name“intellect,” by which we think, judge and reason.Alfarabi points out the various meanings of the term“intellect” as used in common speech and in philosophy proper. In everyday language“an intelligent man,” he says,“means a man of reliable judgment, who knows what he has to do as right and what he has to avoid as wrong, and thus is distinguished from a crafty man who employs his mind in devising evil expedients.” 96 He continues:

Theologians use the term“intellect” to denote the faculty which tests the validity of statements, either approving them as true or rejecting them as false. Hence, by“intellect” they mean the faculty which perceives the truths of common evidence.97

In Analytics Aristotle uses the term“intellect” to denote the faculty by which man attains to the certain knowledge of axioms and general abstract truths without the need of proof. This faculty is that part of the soul in which occurs the first knowledge (sense percept), and which is thereby able to lay hold of the premises of speculative science.98

In the book of Ethics Aristotle mentions an intellect of moral truths, and this is, forAlfarabi , that part of the soul in which moral experience, as we call it, takes place and by which we try to distinguish the acts to be done from those to be avoided.99

Finally comes the intellect spoken of in the Anima, and is the intellect proper. This is of two kinds: the speculative intellect is an apprehensive power relating to what is above itself, while the practical intellect is a motive power referring to what is below itself, namely, to the sensitive world that it must govern. The speculative intellect, as treated byAlfarabi , consists of four faculties or parts of the soul: the passive and active intellects, the acquired intellect and the actual intellect.

ALFARABI

The passive intellect oraql hayulani is in potentiality to things intelligible. It passes from potentiality to act when it separates mentally the essence from its individuating notes. This essence, abstracted from the individuals, becomes actually the intelligible form or species which is one and the same as the intellect in act.

When forms existing in matter outside the soul become actually intelligible, their existence as actually intelligible is not the same as forms existing in matter. For forms existing in matter (individualized concretely) are associated with the various categories of time and place, quantity and quality, but they are stripped of these individuating conditions the moment they become actually intelligible.101

The active intellect, oraql faal of which Aristotle speaks in the Anima III, is immaterial....it causes the passive intellect to pass from potentiality to act, and makes the intelligible in potentiality intelligible in act.

The active intellect is related to the passive as the sun is to the eye. The eye is in potentiality to see while it is dark, but it sees actually as soon as light shines. The same is to be said of both the passive and active intellect.

The active intellect shines a kind of light upon the passive, by which the passive becomes actual, (aql bilfil ) and the intelligible in potentiality becomes intelligible in act. Furthermore, the active intellect is a separate substance, which, by lighting up the phantasms, makes them to be actually intelligible.104

ST. THOMAS

The human intellect is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written. This is made clear from the fact that at first we are only in potentiality to understand and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be passive, and consequently the intellect is a passive power.100

Nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect, some power, to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.102

The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the active intellect; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the passive intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.103

ALFARABI

The acquired intellect oraql mustafad is simply the actual intellect developed under the inspiration of the active intellect.Albertus Magnus calls it“Intellectus adeptus ” 106

Alfarabi's theory may be summed up as follows: the intellect, in its primitive state, is a power of the soul. Since it has only a potential existence, he calls it“aql hayulani ” , the material intellect. For, like matter, it has the capacity for taking on a new form. In fact, the material or passive intellect passes from potentiality to actuality when it abstracts the essence from the individuals. But what is the force that causes the passive intellect to pass from potentiality to act? It is, according toAlfarabi , the active intellect, a separate 'substance emanating from God which is able to awaken the latent power in man and arouse it to activity.

ST. THOMAS

Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm; it does more. By its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstractiontherefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.105

St. Thomas' theory boils down to this: to abstract the essence and to perceive it are two acts specifically distinct; therefore they demand two distinct powers. Hence the soul requires one power which renders the essences of sensible things actually intelligible by stripping them of their material conditions in which they exist: which power is called the active intellect; and another power by which it comprehends the intelligible: this is called the passive intellect because of its being in potentiality to allintelligibles .

2- POWERS OF ACTION

SENSITIVE APPETITE

“By powers of action,” saysAlfarabi ,“are meant those powers which have action or movement for their object, and they are all grouped under the name of 'appetite.'“ A general law rules our appetitive powers: “Nilvolitum quin fuerit praecognitum .” Appetite follows knowledge. For, appetite can never operate unless something is known and presented to it. Appetite may be moved either by the sense or by the intellect. If the appetite is moved by the sense, it becomes sensitive appetite. This is simply a tendency to good perceived by the senses.

Now, the sensitive appetite is divided into two powers, theconcupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite.Concupiscible appetite (shahuaniat ) is a power by which the animal is led to seek what is useful to it, and to shun what is harmful. Irascible appetite (Gadibat ) is a power by which the animal is aroused to acquire a good that is difficult to attain, and to remove any evil that would prevent its attainment. By hisconcupiscible appetite a dog seeks proper food and avoids what is injurious; by his irascible appetite he is angered and attacks the animal that tries to deprive him of his food.

The manifestations of theconcupiscible appetite are calledconcupiscible passions, and those of the irascible appetite are called irascible passions.

Alfarabi characterizes the nature of the sensitive appetite by saying that It is accompanied by a physical, bodily change. Thus, for instance, when one is aroused by a great desire to see something, he looks up and stares at the thing. The looking up and the staring represent the bodily change.107

INTELLECTIVE APPETITE

If the appetite is moved by the intellect, it becomes intellective appetite, or will, and through it man attains his perfection and happiness. Of thisAlfarabi says:

The will is not to be confused with freedom (the power of choice). Freedom can choose only what is possible, while the will can choose also the impossible. The latter is well exemplified in a man who does not will to die. Therefore, the will is more general than freedom, and for this reason all freedom is will, but not all will is freedom.108

PART III: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER IV: ETHICS

ACTIONS--GOOD, BAD, INDIFFERENT

On the subject of human actionsAlfarabi says:

The end of human actions is happiness. Happiness is something all men desire. The voluntary actions by which man attains the end of his existence are called good, and from them proceed the habits of doing good, known as virtues; while the voluntary actions which prevent man from attaining his end are called evil, and from them flow the habits of doing evil, known as vices. Good actions deserve reward, whereas bad actions deserve punishment.109

And he continues:

In addition to good and bad actions there are actions that are indifferent. These possess a morality without significance to merit or demerit, and because of this they are called indifferent or amoral.110

Finally, man will attain full happiness only when he becomes free from the obstacles of the body.

Beyond these fundamental ideas we know very little ofAlfarabi's Ethics, simply because his commentary on theNicomachean Ethics, which represents his ethical thought, has been lost. However, these few ideas show perfectly well the general trend of his thought.

CHAPTER V: POLITICAL SOCIETY

Man needs the help of his fellowmen to attain the perfection proper to his nature. Unlike the brute, man is not equipped by nature with all that is necessary for the preservation and development of his being. It is only through society that he finds a complete satisfaction of his physical, intellectual and moral needs. Hence, it follows, that society is natural to man.

These areAlfarabi's words. And according to him society is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect society is of three kinds: the highest, the intermediate and the lowest. The highest is the whole inhabited earth coming under one political organization. The intermediate is a nation occupying a specific place of the inhabited earth. The lowest is a city which represents a fraction of the territory of a nation.

Imperfect society is of three kinds: the village, the suburb of a city and the home. These are merely steps leading to the organization of the state.111

DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL STATE

Alfarabi describes the organization of a model state in these words:

Just as the world is one harmonious whole ruled by the highest authority of God; just as the stars and the sub-lunar world are linked up and follow one another; just as the human soul is one in different powers; just as the human body is an organized whole moved by the heart; in like manner the state is to be regulated and patterned after these noble models.

In the model state there must be a hierarchy of rulers coming under the control of a supreme head or prince. This prince, head of the model state or of the whole earth, must possess certain traits: great intelligence, excellent memory, eloquence, firmness without weakness, firmness in the achievement of good, love for justice, love for study, love for truth, aversion to falsehood, temperance in food, drink and enjoyments, and contempt for wealth.

All these traits must be found in one man alone placed in charge of directing the complicated machinery of the state. In case all these traits cannot be found in one man alone, then inquiry should be made to determine whether there are two or more who possess the required traits jointly. If there are two, they should both rule the model state. If there are three, then these three should rule. If more are needed, more should rule.112

Thus the government by one man alone winds up in an aristocratic republic.

He continues:

Opposed to the model state are: the ignorant state, the perverted state and the mistaken state. The ignorant state is the state that has no knowledge of true happiness, and very often exchanges it for health, wealth and pleasure. Thus, it is the ignorant state which has for its end the acquisition of things, such as food, clothing and shelter; it is the ignorant state which has for its end the enjoyment of eating and drinking, sensual pleasures, amusements and games; it is the ignorant state which has for its end the seeking of praise and the making of a name; it is the ignorant state which believes in false liberty, by which everyone can do as he pleases; it is the ignorant state which pursues imperial-ism as a national policy, namely, the will of conquering people and nations by fire and sword.

The perverted state is the state that maintains a conduct similar to that of the ignorant state, even though it knows what is true happiness and perfection.

The mistaken state is the state that has wrong ideas about God and happiness.113

Alfarabi , in his conception of the state, shows amystico -philosophical belief in the absorption of the human spirit into the world spirit, and finally into God. In fact, he says:

The goal of the model state is not only to procure the material prosperity of its citizens, but also their future destiny. The souls of the citizens of the ignorant state are devoid of reason, and will return to the material elements as sensible forms in order to be united again to other beings, animals or plants.

In both the perverted and mistaken states, the ruler alone is to be held responsible, and he will be punished accordingly in the world hereafter; and the souls which have been led into error share the fate of the citizens of the ignorant state. On the other hand, the good souls will enter the world of pure spirits, and the higher their knowledge in this life, the higher their position after death.114

I cannot help quoting the following passage whereAlfarabi shows these good souls in possession of their supreme good:

When a great number of men have passed away, and their bodies are annihilated, and their souls made happy, other men will follow them. When these have also passed away and attained the happiness they longed for, each of them joins the one he is similar to in kind and degree. These souls join one another as an intelligible joins an intelligible. In proportion as the souls in-crease in number and are united to one another, in the same proportion their happiness increases, for, each one, thinking of his substance, thinks of a great many similar substances, and the object of such thinking goes on increasing indefinitely with the arrival of new souls.115

The political theory ofAlfarabi is a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian elements. The main Platonic element is to put all humanity in one universal state. For him, the state as it exists now, is not the model state. The model state, not yet realized, is organized humanity which is not circumscribed by national boundaries. It is likened to a family which has in heaven the same Creator and Father, and on earth the same forebears. In such a family there can be no wars, simply because the vision now of each and everyone is not a particular nation, but humanity; not a particular king, but God.

Such a political conception on the part ofAlfarabi might surprise the reader, for, we are wont to think that no one could ever dream of putting the whole world under one political organization, unless that came as a result of the progress of civilization. But it is not so. Just as the idea of political universality was contained in the imperialism of Alexander the Great, and later in the Roman imperialism, in like manner it was contained in the theocratic Moslem conception. And history bears this out.

Furthermore,Alfarabi tempers the ideal state of Plato with some Aristotelian elements, such as private property and the monarchic form of government. This, however, could be easily changed to an aristocratic republic if the required intellectual and moral traits of the chief executive cannot be found but in a few persons.

In one word, our philosopher envisaged the many nations of the world as welded together into one political organization under a wise ruler.

CONCLUSION

After studying the philosophy ofAlfarabi , one comes to three conclusions; first, thatAlfarabi brought about the first penetration of Arabism into Hellenism and of Hellenism into Arabism.

Second, thatAlfarabi exerted a great influence on medieval thinkers. This is made clear by the fact thatAlbertus Magnus quotesAlfarabi , and evidently he could not quote him unless he had known his writings. Hence, the knowledge of the works ofAlfarabi gaveAlbertus Magnus and his pupil, St. Thomas, an opportunity to do some sifting in the sense that they were enabled to throw out the theories that conflicted with Christian teaching and take in at the same time those that appeared to them as logically sound and reconcilable with Christianity.

Third, thatAlfarabi improved many Aristotelian theories, solved many problems till then unsolved, and enriched Scholasticism with new philosophical terms, such asquiddity , a necessary being, a contingent being, the speculative and practical intellects, etc.

We have considered the philosophy ofAlfarabi under a three-fold aspect: the philosophy of being (Metaphysics), the philosophy of thinking (Psychology), and the philosophy of acting (Ethics).

In the philosophy of being,Alfarabi taught that the most universal concept is being, which cannot be defined, nor re-solved into simpler concepts. Hence, the simplicity of being of the Latin Schoolmen.

The problem of universals which occupied the minds of medieval thinkers was solved byAlfarabi in the words:“Universale est unum demultis et inmultis .” Hence, the traditional definition of the universal,“Aptum praedicari de pluribus.”

He also believed that the nature of reality is being in becoming, that is, potentiality and actuality, substance and accident, essence and existence, matter and form, cause and effect. Is all reality that way? Certainly not. For, there is a reality which is beyond all change, and this is God. In comparing the Theodicy ofAlfarabi with that of St. Thomas, we found that the latter depends on the former for the first three arguments proving God's existence, and also for the way in which God's nature is known (Viaremotionis eteminentiae . )

Furthermore,Alfarabi , three hundred years before St. Thomas, taught in clear and distinct words, that the essence and existence in created things differ as different entities, while they are identical in God. This means that the Saint who came out with the same theory three hundred years later, must certainly have borrowed it fromAlfarabi .

In the philosophy of thinking, he describes the history of our speculative intellect. At first it is in potentiality to all things intelligible. It passes from potentiality to act through the action or illumination coming down from above, namely, the active intellect.

In the philosophy of acting, he shows how every human activity tends to happiness. Happiness is the cause that prompts man to live in society, thus creating the state. The model state is the universal state that puts the whole world under one political organization.

In conclusion, there is a unity of thought throughout the philosophy ofAlfarabi , who spared no efforts to make the various parts of his philosophical vision converge towards one living God, on Whom the one and the many, being and becoming, are essentially dependent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dr. T. J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, English translation by Edward Jones, London, 1903 (Luzac & Co.).

Dr. De Lacy O'Leary, Arabic Thought and its Place in History, London, 1922 (Trubner ).

Munk ,Melanges dePhilosophie Juive EtArabe , Paris, 1859 (A. Franck).

A.Schmoelders ,Documenta Philosophiae Arabum (Bonnae MDCCCXXXVI).